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CONVENTION

BETWEEN

GREAT BRITAIN, AUSTRIA, PRUSSIA, RUSSIA, AND TURKEY,

FOR THE

PACIFICATION OF THE LEVANT.

Signed at London, July 15, 1840.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty,
1841.

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CONVENTION

BETWEEN

GREAT BRITAIN, AUSTRIA, PRUSSIA, RUSSIA, AND TURKEY,

FOR THE

PACIFICATION OF THE LEVANT.

Signed at London, July 15, 1840.

Au Nom de Dieu Très Miséricordieux.

SA Hautesse le Sultan ayant eu recours à Leurs Majestés La Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, l'Empereur d'Autriche, Roi de Hongrie et de Bohème, le Roi de Prusse, et l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, pour réclamer leur appui et leur assistance au milieu des difficultés dans lesquelles il se trouve placé par suite de la conduite hostile de Méhémet Ali, Pacha d'Egypte,—difficultés qui menacent de porter atteinte à l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman et à l'indépendance du Trône du Sultan ;—Leurs dites Majestés, mûes par le sentiment d'amitié sincère qui subsiste entr'Elles et le Sultan ; animées du désir de veiller au maintien de l'intégrité et de l'indépendance de l'Empire Ottoman, dans l'intérêt de l'affermissement de la Paix de l'Europe; fidèles à l'engagement qu'Elles ont contracté par la Note Collective remise à la Porte par Leurs Représentans à Constantinople, le 27 Juillet, 1839 ; et désirant de plus prévenir l'effusion de sang qu'occasionnerait la continuation des hostilités qui ont récemment éclaté en Syrie entre les Autorités du Pacha d'Egypte et les sujets de Sa Hautesse ;

Leurs dites Majestés et Sa Hautesse le Sultan ont résolu, dans le but susdit, de conclure entr'Elles une Convention ; et ont nommé à cet effet pour Leurs Plénipotentiaires, savoir :

Sa Majesté la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, le Très Honorable Henri Jean, Vicomte Palmerston, Baron Temple, Pair d'Irlande, Conseiller de Sa Majesté Britannique en Son Conseil Privé, Chevalier Grand-Croix du Très Honorable Ordre du Bain, Membre du Parlement, et Son Principal Secrétaire d'Etat ayant le Département des Affaires Etrangères ;

Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche, Roi de Hongrie et de Bohème, le Sieur Philippe, Baron de Neumann, Commandeur de l'Ordre de Léopold d'Autriche, décoré de la Croix pour le Mérite Civil, Commandeur des Ordres de la Tour et de l'Epée du Portugal, de la Croix du Sud du Brésil, Chevalier Grand-Croix de l'Ordre de St. Stanislas de seconde classe de Russie, Son Conseiller Aulique, et Plénipotentiaire près Sa Majesté Britannique ;

Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse, le Sieur Henri Guillaume, Baron de Bülow, Chevalier de l'Ordre de l'Aigle Rouge de première classe de Prusse, Grand-Croix des Ordres de Léopold d'Autriche et des Guelphes de Hanovre, Chevalier Grand-Croix de l'Ordre de St. Stanislas de seconde classe, et de St. Wladimir de quatrième classe, de Russie, Commandeur de l'Ordre du Faucon de Saxe-Weimar, son Chambellan, Conseiller intime actuel, Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire près Sa Majesté Britannique;

Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, le Sieur Philippe, Baron de Brunnow, Chevalier de l'Ordre de Ste Anne de première classe, de St. Stanislas de première classe, de St. Wladimir de troisième, Commandeur de l'Ordre de St. Etienne de Hongrie, Chevalier de l'Ordre de l'Aigle Rouge, et de St. Jean de Jérusalem, son Conseiller Privé, Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire près Sa Majesté Britannique;

Et Sa Majesté le Très Majestueux, Très Puissant, et Très Magnifique Sultan, Abdul Medjid, Empereur des Ottomans, Chékib Effendi, décoré du Nichan Iftihar de première classe, Beylikdgi du Divan Impérial, Conseiller honoraire du Département des Affaires Etrangères, son Ambassadeur Extraordinaire près Sa Majesté Britannique:

Lesquels, s'étant réciproquement communiqué leurs pleins pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due forme, ont arrêté et signé les Articles suivans:—

ARTICLE I.

Sa Hautesse le Sultan s'étant entendu avec Leurs Majestés la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, l'Empereur d'Autriche, Roi de Hongrie et de Bohème, le Roi de Prusse, et l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, sur les conditions de l'arrangement qu'il est de l'intention de Sa Hautesse d'accorder à Méhémet Ali,—conditions lesquelles se trouvent spécifiées dans l'Acte Séparé ci-annexé,—Leurs Majestés s'engagent à agir dans un parfait accord, et d'unir leurs efforts pour déterminer Méhémet Ali à se conformer à cet arrangement; chacune des Hautes Parties Contractantes se réservant de co-opérer à ce but selon les moyens d'action dont chacune d'elles peut disposer.

ARTICLE II.

Si le Pacha d'Egypte refusait d'adhérer au susdit arrangement qui lui sera communiqué par le Sultan avec le concours de leurs dites Majestés, celles-ci s'engagent à prendre, à la réquisition du Sultan, des mesures concertées et arrêtées entr'Elles, afin de mettre cet arrangement à exécution. Dans l'intervalle, le Sultan ayant invité Ses Alliés à se joindre à lui pour l'aider à interrompre la communication par mer entre l'Egypte et la Syrie, et à empêcher l'expédition de troupes, chevaux, armes, munitions, et approvisionnemens de guerre de tout genre d'une de ces provinces à l'autre; Leurs Majestés la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, et l'Empereur d'Autriche, Roi de Hongrie et de Bohème, s'engagent à donner immédiatement à cet effet les ordres nécessaires aux Commandans de leurs forces navales dans la Méditerranée. Leurs dites Majestés promettent en outre, que les Commandans de leurs Escadres, selon les moyens dont ils disposent, donneront, au nom de l'Alliance, tout l'appui et toute l'assistance en leur pouvoir à ceux des sujets du Sultan qui manifesteront leur fidélité et obéissance à leur Souverain.

ARTICLE III.

Si Méhémet Ali, après s'être refusé de se soumettre aux conditions de l'arrangement mentionné ci-dessus, dirigeait ses forces de terre ou de mer vers Constantinople, les Hautes Parties Contractantes, sur la réquisition expresse qui en serait faite par le Sultan à Leurs Représentans à Constantinople, sont convenues, le cas échéant, de se rendre à l'invitation de ce Souverain, et de pourvoir à la défense de son trône, au moyen d'une co-opération concertée en commun, dans le but de mettre les deux détroits du Bosphore et des Dardanelles, ainsi que la Capitale de l'Empire Ottoman, à l'abri de toute agression.

Il est en outre convenu, que les forces qui, en vertu d'une pareille entente, recevront la destination indiquée ci-dessus, y resteront employées aussi longtems que leur présence sera requise par le Sultan; et lorsque Sa Hautesse jugera que leur présence aura cessé d'être nécessaire, les dites forces se retireront simultanément, et rentreront respectivement dans la Mer Noire et la Méditerranée.

ARTICLE IV.

Il est toutefois expressément entendu, que la co-opération mentionnée dans l'Article précédent, et destinée à placer temporairement les détroits des Dardanelles et du Bosphore, et la Capitale Ottomane, sous la sauvegarde des Hautes Parties Contractantes, contre toute agression de Méhémet Ali, ne sera considérée que comme une mesure exceptionnelle, adoptée à la demande expresse du Sultan, et uniquement pour sa défense dans le cas seul indiqué ci-dessus. Mais il est convenu que cette mesure ne dérogera en rien à l'ancienne règle de l'Empire Ottoman, en vertu de laquelle il a été de tout temps défendu aux bâtimens de guerre des Puissances Etrangères d'entrer dans les détroits des Dardanelles et du Bosphore. Et le Sultan, d'une part, déclare par le présent Acte, qu'à l'exception de l'éventualité ci-dessus mentionnée, il a la ferme résolution de maintenir à l'avenir ce principe invariablement établi comme ancienne règle de Son Empire, et tant que la Porte se trouve en paix, de n'admettre aucun bâtiment de guerre étranger dans les détroits du Bosphore et des Dardanelles; d'autre part, Leurs Majestés la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, l'Empereur d'Autriche, Roi de Hongrie et de Bohème, le Roi de Prusse, et l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, s'engagent à respecter cette détermination du Sultan, et à se conformer au principe ci-dessus énoncé.

ARTICLE V.

La présente Convention sera ratifiée, et les ratifications en seront échangées à Londres dans l'espace de deux mois, ou plutôt si faire se peut.

En foi de quoi, les Plénipotentiaires respectifs l'ont signée, et y ont apposé les sceaux de leurs armes.

Fait à Londres, le quinze Juillet, l'an de grace mil huit cent quarante.

(L.S.) PALMERSTON. (L.S.) CHEKIB.
(L.S.) NEUMANN.
(L.S.) BULOW.
(L.S.) BRUNNOW.

ACTE SEPARE annexé à la Convention conclue à Londres, le 15 *Juillet,* 1840, *entre les Cours de la Grande Bretagne, d'Autriche, de Prusse, et de Russie, d'une part, et la Sublime Porte Ottomane, de l'autre.*

SA Hautesse le Sultan a l'intention d'accorder et de faire notifier à Méhémet Ali les conditions de l'arrangement ci-dessous :

§ I.

Sa Hautesse promet d'accorder à Méhémet Ali, pour lui et pour ses descendans en ligne directe, l'administration du Pachalic de l'Egypte ; et Sa Hautesse promet en outre d'accorder à Méhémet Ali, sa vie durant, avec le titre de Pacha d'Acre, et avec le commandement de la Forteresse de St. Jean d'Acre, l'administration de la partie méridionale de la Syrie, dont les limites seront déterminées par la ligne de démarcation suivante :

Cette ligne, partant du Cap Ras-el-Nakhora sur les côtes de la Méditerranée, s'étendra de là directement jusqu'à l'embouchure de la rivière Seisaban, extrémité septentrionale du Lac Tibérias ; longera la côte occidentale du dit Lac ; suivra la rive droite du fleuve Jourdain, et la côte occidentale de la Mer Morte ; se prolongera de là en droiture jusqu'à la Mer Rouge, en aboutissant à la pointe septentrionale du Golfe d'Akaba ; et suivra de là la côte occidentale du Golfe d'Akaba, et la côte orientale du Golfe de Suez, jusqu'à Suez.

Toutefois, le Sultan, en fesant ces offres, y attache la condition, que Méhémet Ali les accepte dans l'espace de dix jours après que la communication lui en aura été faite à Alexandrie par un Agent de Sa Hautesse; et qu'en même temps Méhémet Ali dépose entre les mains de cet Agent les instructions nécessaires aux Commandans de ses forces de terre et de mer, de se retirer immédiatement de l'Arabie et de toutes les villes saintes qui s'y trouvent situées; de l'Ile de Candie; du district d'Adana; et de toutes les autres parties de l'Empire Ottoman qui ne sont pas comprises dans les limites de l'Egypte et dans celles du Pachalic d'Acre, tel qu'il a été désigné ci-dessus.

§ 2.

Si dans le délai de dix jours fixé ci-dessus, Méhémet Ali n'acceptait point le susdit arrangement, le Sultan retirera alors l'offre de l'administration viagère du Pachalic d'Acre; mais Sa Hautesse consentira encore à accorder à Méhémet Ali, pour lui et pour ses descendans en ligne directe, l'administration du Pachalic d'Egypte, pourvu que cette offre soit acceptée dans l'espace des dix jours suivans, c'est-à-dire, dans un délai de vingt jours, à compter du jour où la communication lui aura été faite, et pourvu qu'il dépose également entre les mains de l'Agent du Sultan les instructions nécessaires pour ses Commandans de terre et de mer de se retirer immédiatement en dedans des limites, et dans les ports, du Pachalic de l'Egypte.

§ 3.

Le tribut annuel à payer au Sultan par Méhémet Ali, sera proportionné au plus ou moins de territoire dont ce dernier obtiendra l'administration, selon qu'il accepte la première ou la seconde alternative.

§ 4.

Il est expressément entendu de plus, que dans la première comme dans la seconde alternative, Méhémet Ali (avant l'expiration du terme fixé de dix ou de vingt jours) sera tenu de remettre la flotte Turque, avec tous ses équipages et armemens, entre les mains du Préposé Turc qui sera chargé de la recevoir. Les Commandans des Escadres alliées assisteront à cette remise.

Il est entendu que dans aucun cas Méhémet Ali ne pourra porter en compte, ni déduire du tribut à payer au Sultan, les dépenses qu'il a faites pour l'entretien de la flotte Ottomane pendant tout le tems qu'elle sera restée dans les ports d'Egypte.

§ 5.

Tous les Traités, et toutes les lois de l'Empire Ottoman, s'appliqueront à l'Egypte et au Pachalic d'Acre, tel qu'il a été désigné ci-dessus, comme à toute autre partie de l'Empire Ottoman. Mais le Sultan consent, qu'à condition du payement régulier du tribut susmentionné, Méhémet Ali et ses descendans perçoivent, au nom du Sultan, et comme délégué de Sa Hautesse, dans les provinces dont l'administration leur sera confiée, les taxes et impôts légalement établis. Il est entendu en outre, que moyennant la perception des taxes et impôts susdits, Méhémet Ali et ses descendans pourvoiront à toutes les dépenses de l'administration civile et militaire des dites Provinces.

§ 6.

Les forces de terre et de mer que pourra entretenir le Pacha d'Egypte et d'Acre, fesant partie des forces de l'Empire Ottoman, seront toujours considérées comme entretenues pour le service de l'Etat.

§ 7.

Si à l'expiration du terme de vingt jours après la communication qui lui aura été faite, (ainsi qu'il a été dit plus haut, § 2,) Méhémet Ali n'adhère point à l'arrangement proposé, et n'accepte pas l'hérédité du Pachalic de l'Egypte, le Sultan se considérera comme libre de retirer cette offre, et de suivre, en conséquence, telle marche ultérieure que ses propres intérêts et les conseils de ses Alliés pourront lui suggérer.

§ 8.

Le présent Acte Séparé aura la même force et valeur que s'il était inséré, mot à mot, dans la Convention de ce jour. Il sera ratifié, et les ratifications en seront échangées à Londres en même temps que celles de la dite Convention.

En foi de quoi, les Plénipotentiaires respectifs l'ont signé, et y ont apposé les sceaux de leurs armes.

Fait à Londres, le quinze Juillet, l'an de grace mil huit cent quarante.

(L.S.) PALMERSTON. (L.S.) CHEKIB.
(L.S.) NEUMANN.
(L.S.) BULOW.
(L.S.) BRUNNOW.

PROTOCOLE signé à Londres, le 15 *Juillet*, 1840,

par les Plénipotentiaires
de la Grande Bretagne;
d'Autriche;
de Prusse;
de Russie; et
de la Porte Ottomane.

EN apposant sa signature à la Convention de ce jour, le Plénipotentiaire de la Sublime Porte Ottomane a déclaré:

Qu'en constatant, par l'Article IV. de la dite Convention, l'ancienne règle de l'Empire Ottoman, en vertu de laquelle il a été défendu de tout temps aux bâtimens de guerre étrangers d'entrer dans les détroits des Dardanelles et du Bosphore, la Sublime Porte se réserve, comme par le passé, de délivrer des Firmans de passage aux bâtimens légers sous pavillon de guerre, lesquels sont employés, selon l'usage, au service de la correspondance des Légations des Puissances amies.

Les Plénipotentiaires des Cours de la Grande Bretagne, d'Autriche, de Prusse, et de Russie, ont pris acte de la présente Déclaration, pour la porter à la connaissance de leurs Cours.

(Signé) PALMERSTON.
NEUMANN.
BULOW.
BRUNNOW.
CHEKIB.

PROTOCOLE réservé, signé à Londres le 15 *Juillet*, 1840,

par les Plénipotentiaires

de la Grande Bretagne ;
d'Autriche ;
de Prusse ;
de Russie ; et
de la Porte Ottomane.

LES Plénipotentiaires des Cours de la Grande Bretagne, d'Autriche, de Prusse, de Russie, et de la Sublime Porte Ottomane, ayant, en vertu de leurs pleins pouvoirs, conclu et signé en ce jour une Convention entre leurs Souverains respectifs, pour la pacification du Levant ;

Considérant que, vû la distance qui sépare les Capitales de leurs Cours respectives, un certain espace de temps devra s'écouler nécessairement avant que l'échange des Ratifications de la dite Convention puisse s'effectuer, et que les ordres fondés sur cet Acte puissent être mis à exécution ;

Et les dits Plénipotentiaires étant profondement pénétrés de la conviction, que vû l'état actuel des choses en Syrie, des intérêts d'humanité, aussi bien que les graves considérations de politique Européenne qui constituent l'objet de la sollicitude commune des Puissances signataires de la Convention de ce jour, réclament impérieusement d'éviter, autant que possible, tout retard dans l'accomplissement de la pacification que la dite transaction est destinée à atteindre ;

Les dits Plénipotentiaires, en vertu de leurs pleins pouvoirs, sont convenus entr'eux que les mesures préliminaires mentionnées à l'Article II. de la dite Convention, seront mises à exécution tout de suite, sans attendre l'échange des ratifications ; les Plénipotentiaires respectifs constatent formellement par le présent Acte l'assentiment de leurs Cours à l'exécution immédiate de ces mesures.

Il est convenu, en outre, entre les dits Plénipotentiaires, que Sa Hautesse le Sultan procèdera de suite à adresser à Méhémet Ali la communication et les offres spécifiées dans l'Acte Séparé, annexé à la Convention de ce jour.

Il est convenu de plus, que les Agens Consulaires de la Grande Bretagne, de l'Autriche, de Prusse, et de Russie, à Alexandrie, se mettront en rapport avec l'Agent que Sa Hautesse le Sultan y enverra, pour adresser à Méhémet Ali la communication et les offres susmentionnées ; que les dits Consuls prêteront à cet Agent toute l'assistance et tout l'appui en leur pouvoir ; et qu'ils employeront tous leurs moyens d'influence auprès de Méhémet Ali, à l'effet de le déterminer à accepter l'arrangement qui lui sera proposé d'ordre de Sa Hautesse le Sultan.

Les Amiraux des Escadres respectives dans la Méditerranée, recevront les instructions nécessaires pour se mettre en communication à ce sujet avec les dits Consuls.

(Signé) PALMERSTON.
NEUMANN.
BULOW.
BRUNNOW.
CHEKIB.

PROTOCOLE d'une Conférence tenue à Londres, le 17 *Septembre*, 1840.

Présens:

Les Plénipotentiaires
de la Grande Bretagne;
d'Autriche;
de Prusse;
de Russie; et
de la Turquie.

LES Plénipotentiaires des Cours de la Grande Bretagne, d'Autriche, de Prusse, et de Russie, après avoir échangé les ratifications de la Convention conclue le 15 Juillet dernier, ont résolu, dans le but de placer dans son vrai jour le désintéressement qui a guidé leurs Cours dans la conclusion de cet Acte, de déclarer formellement:

Que dans l'exécution des engagemens résultant de la susdite Convention pour les Puissances Contractantes, ces Puissances ne chercheront aucune augmentation de territoire, aucune influence exclusive, aucun avantage de commerce pour leurs sujets, que ceux de toute autre nation ne puissent également obtenir.

Les Plénipotentiaires des Cours susdites ont résolu de consigner cette déclaration dans le présent Protocole.

Le Plénipotentiaire de la Sublime Porte Ottomane, en rendant un uste hommage à la loyauté et au désintéressement de la politique des Cours Alliées, a pris acte de la déclaration contenue dans le présent Protocole, et s'est chargé de la transmettre à sa Cour.

(Signé) PALMERSTON.
NEUMANN.
SCHLEINITZ.
BRUNNOW.
CHEKIB.

(Translation.)

In the Name of the Most Merciful God.

HIS Highness the Sultan having addressed himself to their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of all the Russias, to ask their support and assistance in the difficulties in which he finds himself placed by reason of the hostile proceedings of Mehemet Ali, Pacha of Egypt,—difficulties which threaten with danger the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and the independence of the Sultan's throne,—Their said Majesties, moved by the sincere friendship which subsists between them and the Sultan; animated by the desire of maintaining the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire as a security for the peace of Europe; faithful to the engagement which they contracted by the Collective Note presented to the Porte by their Representatives at Constantinople, on the 27th of July, 1839; and desirous, moreover, to prevent the effusion of blood which would be occasioned by a continuance of the hostilities which have recently broken out in Syria between the authorities of the Pacha of Egypt and the subjects of the Sultan; Their said Majesties and His Highness the Sultan have resolved, for the aforesaid purposes, to conclude together a Convention, and they have therefore named as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Right Honourable Henry John Viscount Palmerston, Baron Temple, a Peer of Ireland, a Member of Her Britannick Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, a

Member of Parliament, and Her Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs;

His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, the Sieur Philip, Baron de Neumann, Commander of the Order of Leopold of Austria, decorated with the Cross for Civil Merit, Commander of the Orders of the Tower and Sword of Portugal, of the Southern Cross of Brazil, Knight Grand Cross of the Order of St. Stanislaus of the Second Class of Russia, His Aulick Councillor, and His Plenipotentiary to Her Britannick Majesty;

His Majesty the King of Prussia, the Sieur Henry William, Baron de Bülow, Knight of the Order of the Red Eagle of the First Class of Prussia, Grand Cross of the Orders of Leopold of Austria, and of the Guelphs of Hanover, Knight Grand Cross of the Orders of St. Stanislaus of the Second Class, and of St. Wladimir of the Fourth Class of Russia, Commander of the Order of the Falcon of Saxe-Weimar, His Chamberlain, actual Privy Councillor, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Her Britannick Majesty;

His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, the Sieur Philip, Baron de Brunnow, Knight of the Order of St. Anne of the First Class, of St. Stanislaus of the First Class, of St. Wladimir of the Third, Commander of the Order of St. Stephen of Hungary, Knight of the Order of the Red Eagle, and of St. John of Jerusalem, His Privy Councillor, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Her Britannick Majesty;

And His Majesty the Most Noble, Most Powerful, and Most Magnificent Sultan Abdul Medjid, Emperor of the Ottomans, Chekib Effendi, decorated with the Nichan Iftihar of the First Class, Beylikdgi of the Imperial Divan, Honorary Councillor of the Department for Foreign Affairs, His Ambassador Extraordinary to Her Britannick Majesty;

Who, having reciprocally communicated to each other their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon and signed the following Articles:—

ARTICLE I.

His Highness the Sultan having come to an agreement with their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of all the Russias, as to the conditions of the arrangement which it is the intention of His Highness to grant to Mehemet Ali, conditions which are specified in the Separate Act hereunto annexed; Their Majesties engage to act in perfect accord, and to unite their efforts in order to determine Mehemet Ali to conform to that arrangement; each of the High Contracting Parties reserving to itself to co-operate for that purpose, according to the means of action which each may have at its disposal.

ARTICLE II.

If the Pacha of Egypt should refuse to accept the above-mentioned arrangement, which will be communicated to him by the Sultan, with the concurrence of Their aforesaid Majesties; Their Majesties engage to take, at the request of the Sultan, measures concerted and settled between Them, in order to carry that arrangement into effect. In the meanwhile, the Sultan having requested his said Allies to unite with him in order to assist him to cut off the communication by sea between Egypt and Syria, and to prevent the transport of troops, horses, arms, and warlike stores of all kinds, from the one province to the other; Their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, engage to give immediately to that effect, the necessary orders to their naval Commanders in the Mediterranean. Their said Majesties further engage that the naval Commanders of their squadrons shall, according to the means at their command, afford, in the name of the Alliance, all the support and assistance in their power to those subjects of the Sultan who may manifest their fidelity and allegiance to their Sovereign.

ARTICLE III.

If Mehemet Ali, after having refused to submit to the conditions of the arrangement above-mentioned, should direct his land or sea forces against Constantinople, the High Contracting Parties, upon the express demand of the Sultan, addressed to their Representatives at Constantinople, agree, in such case, to comply with the request of that Sovereign, and to provide for the defence of his throne by means of a co-operation agreed upon by mutual consent, for the purpose of placing the two Straits of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, as well as the Capital of the Ottoman Empire, in security against all aggression.

It is further agreed, that the forces which, in virtue of such concert, may be sent as aforesaid, shall there remain so employed as long as their presence shall be required by the Sultan; and when His Highness shall deem their presence no longer necessary, the said forces shall simultaneously withdraw, and shall return to the Black Sea and to the Mediterranean, respectively.

ARTICLE IV.

It is, however, expressly understood, that the co-operation mentioned in the preceding Article, and destined to place the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus, and the Ottoman Capital, under the temporary safeguard of the High Contracting Parties against all aggression of Mehemet Ali, shall be considered only as a measure of exception adopted at the express demand of the Sultan, and solely for his defence in the single case above-mentioned; but it is agreed, that such measure shall not derogate in any degree from the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire, in virtue of which it has in all times been prohibited for ships of war of Foreign Powers to enter the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus. And the Sultan, on the one hand, hereby declares that, excepting the contingency above-mentioned, it is his firm resolution to maintain in future this principle invariably established as the ancient rule of his empire; and as long as the Porte is at peace, to admit no foreign ship of war into the Straits of the Bosphorus and of the Dardanelles; on the other hand, their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of all the Russias, engage to respect this determination of the Sultan, and to conform to the above-mentioned principle.

ARTICLE V.

The present Convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged at London at the expiration of two months, or sooner if possible.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the same, and have affixed thereto the seals of their arms.

Done at London, the fifteenth day of July, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and forty.

(L.S.) PALMERSTON.
(L.S.) NEUMANN.
(L.S.) BULOW.
(L.S.) BRUNNOW.

(L.S.) CHEKIB.

SEPARATE ACT annexed to the Convention concluded at London on the 15*th of July*, 1840, *between the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, on the one part, and the Sublime Ottoman Porte, on the other.*

HIS Highness the Sultan intends to grant, and to cause to be notified to Mehemet Ali, the conditions of the arrangement hereinafter detailed:—

§ 1.

His Highness promises to grant to Mehemet Ali, for himself and for his descendants in the direct line, the administration of the Pachalick of Egypt; and His Highness promises, moreover, to grant to Mehemet Ali, for his life, with the title of Pacha of Acre, and with the command of the Fortress of St. John of Acre, the administration of the southern part of Syria, the limits of which shall be determined by the following line of demarcation:—

This line, beginning at Cape Ras-el-Nakhora, on the coast of the Mediterranean, shall extend direct from thence as far as the mouth of the River Seizaban, at the northern extremity of the Lake of Tiberias; it shall pass along the western shore of that Lake; it shall follow the right bank of the River Jordan, and the western shore of the Dead Sea; from thence it shall extend straight to the Red Sea, which it shall strike at the northern point of the Gulf of Akaba; and from thence it shall follow the western shore of the Gulf of Akaba, and the eastern shore of the Gulf of Suez, as far as Suez.

The Sultan, however, in making these offers, attaches thereto the condition, that Mehemet Ali shall accept them within the space of ten days after communication thereof shall have been made to him at Alexandria, by an agent of His Highness; and that Mehemet Ali shall, at the same time, place in the hands of that agent the necessary instructions to the Commanders of his sea and land forces, to withdraw immediately from Arabia, and from all the Holy Cities which are therein situated; from the Island of Candia; from the district of Adana; and from all other parts of the Ottoman Empire which are not comprised within the limits of Egypt, and within those of the Pachalick of Acre, as above defined.

§ 2.

If within the space of ten days, fixed as above, Mehemet Ali should not accept the above-mentioned arrangement, the Sultan will then withdraw the offer of the life administration of the Pachalick of Acre; but His Highness will still consent to grant to Mehemet Ali, for himself and for his descendants in the direct line, the administration of the Pachalick of Egypt, provided such offer be accepted within the space of the ten days next following; that is to say, within a period of twenty days, to be reckoned from the day on which the communication shall have been made to him; and provided that in this case also, he places in the hands of the agent of the Sultan, the necessary instructions to his military and naval Commanders, to withdraw immediately within the limits, and into the ports of the Pachalick of Egypt.

§ 3.

The annual tribute to be paid to the Sultan by Mehemet Ali, shall be proportioned to the greater or less amount of territory of which the latter may obtain the administration, according as he accepts the first or the second alternative.

§ 4.

It is, moreover, expressly understood, that, in the first as in the second alternative, Mehemet Ali (before the expiration of the specified period of ten or of twenty days), shall be bound to deliver up the Turkish Fleet, with the whole of its crews and equipments, into the hands of the Turkish Agent who shall be charged to receive the same. The Commanders of the Allied Squadrons shall be present at such delivery.

It is understood, that in no case can Mehemet Ali carry to account, or deduct from the tribute to be paid to the Sultan, the expences which he has incurred in the maintenance of the Ottoman Fleet, during any part of the time it shall have remained in the ports of Egypt.

§ 5.

All the Treaties, and all the laws of the Ottoman Empire, shall be applicable to Egypt, and to the Pachalick of Acre, such as it has been above defined, in the same manner as to every other part of the Ottoman Empire. But the Sultan consents, that on condition of the regular payment of the tribute abovementioned, Mehemet Ali and his descendants shall collect, in the name of the Sultan, and as the delegate of His Highness, within the provinces, the administration of which shall be confided to them, the taxes and imposts legally established. It is moreover understood, that in consideration of the receipt of the aforesaid taxes and imposts, Mehemet Ali and his descendants shall defray all the expences of the civil and military administration of the said provinces.

§ 6.

The military and naval forces which may be maintained by the Pacha of Egypt and Acre, forming part of the forces of the Ottoman Empire, shall always be considered as maintained for the service of the State.

§ 7.

If, at the expiration of the period of twenty days after the communication shall have been made to him (according to the stipulation of § 2), Mehemet Ali shall not accede to the proposed arrangement, and shall not accept the hereditary Pachalick of Egypt, the Sultan will consider himself at liberty to withdraw that offer, and to follow, in consequence, such ulterior course as his own interests, and the counsels of his Allies may suggest to him.

§ 8.

The present Separate Act shall have the same force and validity, as if it were inserted, word for word, in the Convention of this date. It shall be ratified, and the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged at London at the same time as those of the said Convention.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the same, and have affixed thereto the seals of their arms.

Done at London, the fifteenth day of July, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and forty.

(L.S.) PALMERSTON.
(L.S.) NEUMANN.
(L.S.) BULOW.
(L.S.) BRUNNOW.

(L.S.) CHEKIB.

PROTOCOL signed at London, on the 15th of July, 1840, by the Plenipotentiaries of

Great Britain;
Austria;
Prussia;
Russia; and
Turkey.

IN affixing his signature to the Convention of this date, the Plenipotentiary of the Sublime Ottoman Porte declared:

That in recording by Article IV. of the said Convention the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire, by virtue of which, it has been at all times forbidden to Foreign Vessels of War to enter within the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus, the Sublime Porte reserves to itself, as heretofore, to deliver passes to light vessels under Flag of War, which may be employed according to custom, for the service of the correspondence of the Legations of Friendly Powers.

The Plenipotentiaries of the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, took note of the above Declaration, for the purpose of communicating it to their respective Courts.

(Signed) PALMERSTON.
NEUMANN.
BULOW.
BRUNNOW.
CHEKIB.

RESERVED PROTOCOL signed at London on the 15th of July, 1840, by the Plenipotentiaries of

Great Britain;
Austria;
Prussia;
Russia; and
Turkey.

THE Plenipotentiaries of the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Turkey, having, in virtue of their full powers, concluded and signed this day a Convention between their respective Sovereigns, for the pacification of the Levant;

Considering that, in consequence of the distances which separate the Capitals of their respective Courts, a certain space of time must necessarily elapse before the ratifications of the said Convention can be exchanged, and before orders founded thereupon can be carried into execution;

And the said Plenipotentiaries being deeply impressed with the conviction, that by reason of the present state of things in Syria, the interests of humanity, as well as the grave considerations of European policy which constitute the object of the common solicitude of the Contracting Parties to the Convention of this day, imperiously require that, as far as possible, all delay should be avoided in the accomplishment of the pacification which the said Convention is intended to effect;

The said Plenipotentiaries, in virtue of their full powers, have agreed, that the preliminary measures mentioned in Article II. of the said Convention, shall be carried into execution at once, without waiting for the exchange of the ratifications; the respective Plenipotentiaries recording formally, by the present Instrument, the consent of their Courts to the immediate execution of these measures.

It is moreover agreed between the said Plenipotentiaries, that His Highness the Sultan will proceed immediately to address to Mehemet Ali, the communication and offers specified in the Separate Act annexed to the Convention of this day.

It is further agreed, that the Consular Agents of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, at Alexandria, shall place themselves in communication with the Agent whom His Highness may send thither to communicate to Mehemet Ali the above-mentioned offers; that the said Consuls shall afford to that Agent all the assistance and support in their power; and shall use all their means of influence with Mehemet Ali, in order to persuade him to accept the arrangement which will be proposed to him by order of His Highness the Sultan.

The Admirals of the respective squadrons in the Mediterranean shall be instructed to place themselves in communication with the said Consuls on this subject.

(Signed) PALMERSTON.
NEUMANN.
BULOW.
BRUNNOW.
CHEKIB.

PROTOCOL of a Conference held at London the 17th of September, 1840.

Present:

The Plenipotentiaries of

Great Britain;
Austria;
Prussia;
Russia; and
Turkey.

THE Plenipotentiaries of the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, after having exchanged the Ratifications of the Convention concluded on the 15th of July last, have resolved, in order to place in its true light the disinterestedness which has guided their Courts in the conclusion of that Act, to declare formally:

That in the execution of the engagements resulting to the Contracting Powers from the above-mentioned Convention, those Powers will seek no augmentation of territory, no exclusive influence, no commercial advantage for their subjects, which those of every other nation may not equally obtain.

The Plenipotentiaries of the Courts above-mentioned have resolved to record this Declaration in the present Protocol.

The Plenipotentiary of the Ottoman Porte, in paying a just tribute to the good faith and disinterested policy of the Allied Courts, has taken cognizance of the Declaration contained in the present Protocol, and has undertaken to transmit it to his Court.

(Signed) PALMERSTON.
NEUMANN.
SCHLEINITZ.
BRUNNOW.
CHEKIB.

CORRESPONDENCE

RELATIVE TO THE

AFFAIRS OF THE LEVANT.

PART I.

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Presented to both Houses of Parliament by command of Her Majesty, 1841.

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CORRESPONDENCE

RELATIVE TO

THE AFFAIRS OF THE LEVANT.

PART I.

No. 1.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 18.)

My Lord, *Paris, February* 15, 1839.

COUNT MOLE, in the course of a conversation I had with him three days ago, on the affairs of the East of Europe, took occasion to remind me of the approach of the period of Mehemet Ali's return from his expedition to the mines of Sennaar, and to express his wish that by previous communication, the French and English Governments should be prepared to act in entire concert, when the Pasha again brought forward the question of his independence of the Porte, which he would not fail to do soon after his arrival at Alexandria. His Excellency observed, that although France and England both aimed at the preservation of peace between the Sultan and the Pasha, shades of difference existed in the interests of the two countries on the Oriental Question, which, should no previous concert be established, might tend to produce a want of unity in the language and proceedings of the two Governments, prejudicial to the object which both have in view. In speaking of the variation in the interests of the two countries, he alluded to Egypt affording a means of communication and of transit between Europe and the British Empire in India, which was an object of far greater importance to England than to France. I replied, that although the facility of communication with India, through Egypt, was a question in which England had greater interest than France, I did not see why that circumstance should tend to a divergence in the measures to be adopted for averting a collision between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, but that I had no doubt of my Government giving the most favourable attention to any proposal suggested by his Excellency, with the view of securing unity in the language and proceedings of the two Governments in this matter.

I observed, that they had both protested, as well as Austria and Russia, against the assertion by the Pasha, of his independence of the Porte; and that we had threatened to employ our naval force against him, if, in spite of their protests, he carried that intention into effect. Menaces had been successful, at least in suspending the announced declaration of independence.

Count Molé said he could not rely upon the effect of our menace, if no hope were held out to the Pasha of an arrangement being made with the Sultan, favourable to the future position of his descendants; our object ought to be, considering the great age of Mehemet Ali, to gain time, and to stave off the crisis in the affairs of the East; and nothing would tend more to the attainment of that object, than to indulge the Pasha in the expectation of the good offices of France and England being employed at Constantinople to secure to his son the succession to the Government of Egypt, on the same conditions on which it is now held by Mehemet Ali.

The above is the substance of Count Molé's conversation with me on this subject, and he requested me to report it to your Lordship.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 2.

Lord Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received March* 3.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, January* 27, 1839.

HAVE heard from good authority that advice has been given to the Sultan, to propose to the Great Powers the formation of a conference to decide the Oriental Question.

That the Great Council was held on the 22nd, to discuss the question of peace or war with the Egyptians; that the Sultan is as much as ever alive to that question.

That the Riala Bey has been sent to Alexandria in command of the steamer which took out the Sheik of the Mosque of Mecca, and has been ordered to obtain the best information of the state of the Army and Navy of Mehemet Ali.

On the 26th (yesterday), I heard from the same authority, that rumours continued to increase of war between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali; that there is much movement at the Seraskierate; that a levy of 80,000 men has been determined to be made throughout the empire, including the capital; and that great changes are about to be made amongst the high functionaries of the Porte, and several of them will be replaced by men particularly known by their hostility to the Pasha of Egypt.

Hafiz Pasha has lately shown a disposition to induce the Sultan to act offensively against Mehemet Ali. Your Lordship will observe, in the Persian correspondence sent home by this messenger, what is said respecting an understanding between the Shah of Persia and Mehemet Ali (a fact I long ago knew and stated).

I have endeavoured, as far as my means permitted me, to counteract what I knew (previous to the later information) had been doing with a view to induce the Sultan to deviate from his intention to wait for the results of Rechid Pasha's embassy to Her Majesty being fully known, before he should take any steps whatever of importance; and with this end in view, I sent M. Etienne Pisani to Riza Bey, to urge the necessity for acting with the greatest prudence and caution in the difficult and delicate situation of the Sultan's affairs, when a false step might have the most serious consequences.

No. 3.

Lord Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received March* 1.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, February* 6, 1839.

ON the 4th, there was a Grand Council of Ministers and Pashas, for the further discussion of the question of war or peace with Egypt.

The difficulty of obtaining from the Mussulman population men enough to complete the projected levies, was taken into consideration, and a plan for raising Rayah Regiments, to be commanded by Turkish officers.

I am ignorant of the decision of the Council; the report of it is gone to the Sultan. I may not be able to ascertain the result, but I believe, if war be determined on, Hosrew Pasha will be made Bash Vekil (Prime Minister), he being the most marked enemy of Mehemet Ali.

I have at the same time to report, that the Ottoman treasury is said to be empty; that the Minister of Finance states his inability to provide for the most urgent expences, and upon that poverty justifies the continuation of monopolies.

I have written despatches, which will go by the messenger, to acquaint your Lordship, that I had endeavoured to prevent the adoption of any warlike measures against Egypt; and it will there appear that I have been aware of the state of things and mindful of it.

No. 4.

Lord Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received March 3.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, February* 8, 1839.

WITH reference to my despatches of January 27 and February 6, I have to say, that I do not believe the Sultan will commence hostilities against Mehemet Ali at present. I have just had a communication with his Highness, and recommended most strongly his observance of the greatest prudence in his conduct; and said, that his Highness could not at this moment have sufficient grounds on which to form a sound judgment of his position.

The Sultan thanked me for my communication, and renewed the assurances he previously gave, that he would do nothing precipitately. It is certain that Hafiz Pasha has been advising war.

No. 5.

Lord Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received March 13.)

(Extract) *Therapia, February* 12, 1839.

I HOPE the Sultan will avoid committing himself in any way at present. I omit no opportunity that offers, or that I can create, for renewing to His Imperial Majesty the counsel not to put anything to risk.

No. 6.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received March 14.)

My Lord, *Paris, March* 11, 1839.

THE last despatches from Admiral Roussin, represent that the appearance of affairs at Constantinople is very warlike. The Ambassador states that the Grand Signor is intent upon attacking the Egyptians; and his counsellors, though differing in opinion from the Sultan, and apprehensive of the consequences of commencing hostilities, dare not risk incurring the displeasure of his Highness by giving him advice to remain at peace. On the other hand, Ibrahim Pasha, it is stated, says he will be cautious not to be an aggressor, but that if attacked by the Turkish Army, he has no doubt of entirely defeating it, and that he shall in that case march upon Constantinople immediately.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 7.

Viscount Palmerston to Lord Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, March* 15, 1839.

HER Majesty's Government entirely approve the language which, as reported in your despatch of the 12th ultimo, you have held with the view of inducing the Sultan to avoid committing himself in any way at present; and I have to instruct your Excellency to press strongly on the Sultan, that while, on the one hand, Great Britain would undoubtedly assist him to repel any attack on the part of Mehemet Ali; it would, on the other hand, be a different question if the war was begun by the Sultan.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 8.

Lord Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received March 24.)

My Lord, *Therapia, February* 26, 1839

THE Ottoman fleet has been brought out of port, and is getting ready to be employed, if wanted.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 9.

Lord Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 6.)

(Extract.) *Constantinople, March* 7, 1839.

IT is reported, that some time ago the Sultan sent a Hatti-Sherif to the Great Council to the following purport:—

"Hafiz Pasha informs me that my Army is able to defeat the Egyptian Army in Syria. The Capudan Pasha tells me that my Fleet is strong enough to defeat and destroy the Egyptian Fleet. It remains for you to be courageous, and to do your duty."

To this Hatti-Sherif the Great Council returned for answer, "that his Highness' Ministers would do everything in their power to act in conformity with the pleasure of their master."

I have taken every measure within my power to persuade the Sultan of the advantages to himself that must be derived from patient and prudent delay of all hostile movements on his part. I hope the Sultan is convinced of the truth of what I have said to him, and I expect that he will not act at present against the Pasha of Egypt.

No. 10.

Mr. Milbanke to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 6.)

(Extract.) *Vienna, March* 28, 1839.

HEARING of the arrival of the messenger Barnard, on his way to London, Prince Metternich sent for me to request that I would be the channel of communicating to your Lordship the substance of a report which he had just received from the Austrian Internuncio, relative to the threatening aspect which affairs had assumed on the Syrian and Turkish frontiers.

His principal object in sending for me, however, was to beg me to call the earnest attention of Her Majesty's Government to the necessity of at once putting a stop to these warlike ebullitions, by the united remonstrances of all the Great Powers; and he said that he was about to dispatch a messenger to Constantinople, with instructions to Baron Stürmer, to state to the Sultan and his Ministers, in the most positive terms, that Austria would not quietly allow events in the East to assume a character by which the peace of Europe itself might be compromised. That if the Pasha of Egypt was the aggressor, as the Turkish Ministers wished to make out, the Sultan might count upon the assistance of the other Powers in repelling any attack. But, that if the approach of the Turkish Army to the Syrian frontier led to a violation of the established *status quo*, the Turkish Government must not be surprised if those Powers withdrew their countenance from the Sultan, and abandoned the Empire to its fate.

Prince Metternich then added, that as he conceived this to be a case which admitted of no delay, he trusted that your Lordship would not lose a moment in instructing Lord Ponsonby to concert with his colleagues the means of warding off the mischiefs which the present conduct of the Sultan was calculated to produce.

No. 11.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received April* 11.)

My Lord,

Paris, April 8, 1839.

I HAVE received your Lordship's despatches to the 5th of April.

A letter having appeared in the "Journal des Débats" of yesterday, bearing the date of the 19th of March, from Constantinople, stating that the hopes which had been entertained of maintaining peace in the East had vanished, and that a war with the Egyptians was considered to be inevitable,—I, this day, enquired at the Foreign Office whether the last despatches from Admiral Roussin confirmed this intelligence?

I was informed that no despatches of a very recent date had been received by the French Government from Constantinople, but that Count St. Aulaire had written from Vienna, that the Russian Ambassador at that Court had communicated to Prince Metternich a despatch from M. de Bouténeff, in which it is stated, that although he, M. de Bouténeff, had declared that the assistance to the Turkish Government stipulated in the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, could not be claimed, if the Turks were the aggressors in a war against Mehemet Ali, the Sultan had not renounced his warlike intentions; and that it was most desirable that the Austrian Internuncio at Constantinople should be furnished with instructions to use the strongest language to deter the Sultan from carrying into execution those intentions.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 12.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

(Extract.)

Foreign Office, April 12, 1839.

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a despatch* from Her Majesty's Minister at Vienna, reporting the substance of a conversation with Prince Metternich, upon the disposition manifested by the Porte to commence hostilities with Mehemet Ali.

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* No. 10.

With reference to what is stated in this paper, I have to instruct your Excellency to continue to co-operate actively with your colleagues in endeavouring by all means in your power to prevail upon the Sultan to abstain from any hostile proceedings against Mehemet Ali.

I add a copy of a letter which I have addressed to M. Hummelauer.

Inclosure in No. 12.

Viscount Palmerston to M. de Hummelauer.

(Extract.) *Foreign Office, April* 10, 1839.

YOU may assure Prince Metternich, that instructions have already and frequently been given to Lord Ponsonby, to endeavour by all means to dissuade the Porte from commencing hostilities against Mehemet Ali; and that Lord Ponsonby has continued, whenever circumstances required it, and especially of late, to carry those instructions into execution. I shall not fail, however, to write again to his Lordship upon this important matter by the monthly messenger, who is about to set out; and Her Majesty's Government would fain hope that the united efforts of the Representatives of all the Great Powers will succeed in persuading the Sultan to remain quiet.

No. 13.

Lord Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 6.)

My Lord, *Therapia, March* 18, 1839.

I INCLOSE copy of a message I received this day from the Sublime Porte, and my reply to it.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 13.

Lord Ponsonby to M. E. Pisani.

Sir, *Therapia, March* 18, 1839.

I HAVE received your note containing the message from his Excellency Nouri Effendi, in the following words:

"D'après les dépêches reçues à la Porte, de la part de Hafiz Pacha, de Malatia, écrites il y a environ vingt jours, un corps très-considérable de troupes Egyptiennes, sous le commandement de Kourschid Pacha, est arrivé à Adana; tandis que le corps d'armée à Alep reçoit tous les jours des renforts. La distance d'Adana au camp de Hafiz Pacha, est d'environ soixante lieues. Cet état de choses donne beaucoup à penser à Hafiz Pacha, qui a été conseillé par les officiers Prussiens employés dans son armée, de lever le camp, et d'aller occuper certaines positions militaires situées entre l'emplacement du camp et Adana. Cette mesure est jugée nécessaire par les dits officiers. Les dépêches de Hafiz Pacha ont donné lieu à la tenure d'un Conseil. La Porte ne sait pas quelle réponse elle devrait faire à Hafiz Pacha, qui attend ses ordres. Elle se trouve dans le cas de prendre, en cette circonstance, l'avis de son Excellence Lord Ponsonby. Je le prie de me faire savoir quelle serait, dans sa manière de voir, la meilleure réponse à faire à Hafiz Pacha."

To the foregoing, I request you will reply, in my name, that I am very sensible of the honour done me by the Ottoman Government, in desiring my counsel, and that nothing would give me more satisfaction than to be able to prove my attachment to the interests of the Sublime Porte, by offering advice that might be of service, but that I value too much the interest of the Sublime Porte to venture to speak upon a military question, being myself ignorant of the art of war: and the question proposed to me is one that belongs exclusively to military men to determine. But I will, with the permission of his Excellency, take this occasion to renew what I have often and often said, with relation to the political part of the important matters of which this military question forms a portion, and again beg of the Sublime Porte to weigh most deliberately its decisions, and to make prudence and caution its guides. A false step might occasion irremediable mischief; and it seems to me, that the Sublime Porte can hardly be at this moment fully and completely acquainted with the precise situation of affairs in all those parts of the world where what is done, or doing, or to be done, must have a powerful action upon the welfare of the Sublime Porte.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

(Translation of part of the above Inclosure.)

"ACCORDING to the despatches received at the Porte, from Hafiz Pasha, of Malatia, written about twenty days since, a very considerable body of Egyptian troops, under the command of Kourschid Pasha, had arrived at Adana; whilst the *corps d'armée* at Aleppo receives reinforcements every day. The distance from Adana to the camp of Hafiz Pasha, is about sixty leagues. This state of things gives much anxiety to Hafiz Pasha, who has been advised by the Prussian officers employed in his army, to raise the camp, and to proceed to occupy certain military positions situated between the site of the camp and Adana. This step is considered necessary by those officers. The despatches of Hafiz Pasha have rendered it necessary that a Council should be held. The Porte does not know what answer it ought to return to Hafiz Pasha, who waits its orders. It finds itself under the necessity of asking, under these circumstances, the advice of his Excellency Lord Ponsonby. I request him to let me know what would, according to his view of the subject, be the best answer to return to Hafiz Pasha."

No. 14.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 13.)

(Extract.) *Cairo, March* 11, 1839.

THE Pasha may be expected here on or before the 17th instant, which is the 1st of the Turkish month of Moharem.

The Pasha's iron steamer left this for Essouan, five days ago, in order to convey him to Cairo.

Abbas Pasha, who is intrusted with the Government, during the absence of Mehemet Ali, has been alarmed by the reports which have been received from Constantinople, of the warlike preparations of the Sultan, which are said to be directed against Syria, and in consequence, wrote to press the return of the Viceroy to Cairo.

Orders have been given, and are in execution for getting the Pasha's fleet ready for sea. A considerable quantity of arms has been sent to Syria; and it is supposed that 4,000 troops, which have lately arrived at Alexandria from the interior, are for the same destination.

No. 15.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 13.)

(Extract.) *Cairo, March* 11, 1839.

THE Riala Bey, who arrived here on the 14th of February, left this on the 1st instant for Alexandria, which place he left on the 7th instant for Constantinople, on board of the Sultan's steamer.

I saw the Riala Bey different times during his stay in Cairo, and he expressed much desire to see Mehemet Ali, but feared that he should not be able to await his return to Cairo.

I have not been able to learn that the Riala Bey came here with any ostensible mission; and conclude, that the object of his coming to this country, was merely to observe and to report the result of his observations.

But although the different public establishments here were ordered to be open for his inspection, and the chiefs of them were directed to afford to him all facilities and information, he did not evince any desire [to visit] them.

The Riala Bey was attended by an officer of the Egyptian Navy, and lodged in the palace of Houssein Pasha in this city.

No. 16.

Lord Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 14.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, March* 19, 1839.

WHAT I am about to report may have connection with what I had the honour to communicate in my despatch of March 7, to your Lordship, and I entertain no doubt of its general truth.

"Hafiz Pasha and his officers are incessant in their demands and cries to the Porte to march against the Egyptians, alleging that there will never again be so favourable an opportunity for driving them out of Syria. The reports were received almost at the same hour with another report from Rechid Pasha, in which it is said that there is nothing to be expected from the Courts of London or Paris. The two reports have given force to the desire to attack Ibrahim, before his father can return from his journey; and it is almost certain that on the 17th instant, a resolution existed of following the advice of Hafiz Pasha."

Your Lordship will understand, that when I say, I believe in the general truth of what is stated, I do not mean to say that I believe the Ottoman Government will act in the way described, for on that point I give no opinion.

No. 17.

The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 15.)

(Extract.) *St. Petersburgh, April* 1, 1839.

WITH reference to the apparent probability that war may break out between Turkey and Egypt, and to the desire of the Sultan to reduce his refractory vassal to better subjection, I have to report to your Lordship that Count Nesselrode tells me he is confident the Sultan will maintain peace, and resign the hostile intentions he cherishes against Mehemet Ali, provided the Russian and British Ambassadors at Constantinople, hold to the Divan the same language on that subject.

I stated to his Excellency how assured I was that my Government would spare no effort to induce the Sultan to maintain peace.

My colleagues here are firmly convinced that it is the sincere and earnest desire of the Emperor that Turkey should remain in perfect tranquillity: and I see no reason to differ from them in that opinion.

No. 18.

Lord Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received April* 29.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, March* 23, 1839.

NOURI EFFENDI sent me a message on the 21st instant, indicating that my advice would be followed. I do not believe it had much weight, but I think there will be nothing done at present to disturb the peace.

No. 19.

Rechid Pasha to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received April* 26.)

Monsieur le Vicomte, 1, *Bryanston Square*, 26 *Avril*, 1839.

IL y a quelques jours j'ai eu l'honneur de demander à votre Excellence qu'elle voulût bien me communiquer le plus tôt possible, le projet de Traité contre les prétentions d'indépendance de Méhémet Ali.

Sachant bien que vous n'avez pas perdu de vue cette affaire, je ne vous la rappellerais pas aujourd'hui si je n'avais pas absolument besoin de m'absenter pendant quelques semaines; ce qui me serait facile après avoir envoyé ce projet à Constantinople.

Si vous pensiez, M. le Vicomte, que la confection de ce document dût entraîner quelque délai, je vous serais infiniment obligé de me le faire savoir, pour que, suivant votre réponse, je diffère ou avance le voyage dont je vous ai parlé.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, &c.,

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la Sublime Porte,
Ambassadeur Extraordinaire,

(Signé) RECHID.

(Translation.)

Rechid Pasha to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received April* 26.)

Monsieur le Vicomte, 1, *Bryanston Square, April* 26, 1839.

I HAD the honour, some days since, to request your Excellency to have the goodness to communicate to me, as soon as possible, the project of treaty against Mehemet Ali's pretensions to independence.

Knowing well that you have not lost sight of this matter, I should not recall it to your attention at present if I were not under the absolute necessity of absenting myself for some weeks, which I could easily do after having sent that project to Constantinople.

If you should think, M. le Vicomte, that the preparation of that document would occasion some delay, I should be greatly obliged by your informing me of it, as I shall defer or hasten the journey of which I have spoken, according to your answer.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

The Minister of the Sublime Porte for Foreign Affairs,
Ambassador Extraordinary,

(Signed) RECHID.

No. 20.

Viscount Palmerston to Rechid Pasha.

Sir, *Foreign Office, May* 6, 1839.

I HAVE had the honour to receive your Excellency's letter, of the 26th of April, requesting that I would communicate to you, as soon as possible, the draft of Treaty in opposition to the pretensions to independence advanced by Mehemet Ali; and I have to acquaint your Excellency that I propose to send it to you in the course of a few days.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 21.

Rechid Pasha to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 29.)

Monsieur le Vicomte, 1, *Bryanston Square, 27 Avril,* 1839.

M'ETANT toujours fait un devoir de tenir votre Excellence au courant de la tendance que les affaires prennent à Constantinople, j'ai aujourd'hui l'honneur de lui annoncer que les craintes que l'on avait sur le commencement des hostilités entre l'armée de Sa Hautesse et les troupes de Méhémet Ali, sont très-affaiblies par la teneur des dépêches que j'ai reçues aujourd'hui même; la paix semble désormais assurée pour cette année.

Je suis, &c.,
Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la Sublime Porte,
Ambassadeur Extraordinaire,
(Signé) RECHID.

(Translation.)

Rechid Pasha to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 29.)

Monsieur le Vicomte, 1, *Bryanston Square, April* 27, 1839.

HAVING always made it my duty to keep your Excellency acquainted with the turn which affairs take at Constantinople, I have to-day the honour to inform you that the fears entertained of the commencement of hostilities between the army of His Highness and the troops of Mehemet Ali are greatly diminished by the tenour of the despatches which I have received this day; peace appears to be henceforth secured for this year.

I am, &c.,
The Minister of the Sublime Porte for Foreign Affairs,
Ambassador Extraordinary,
(Signed) RECHID.

No. 22.

Viscount Palmerston to Rechid Pasha.

Sir, *Foreign Office, May* 6, 1839.

I HAVE had the honour to receive your Excellency's letter of the 27th of April, acquainting me that the tenour of the despatches which you had on that day received, led you to imagine that the apprehensions of hostilities between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali were much diminished, and that it was thought that peace would probably be maintained during the present year; and I hasten to express to your Excellency the sincere satisfaction which Her Majesty's Government have derived from this intelligence.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 23.

Lord Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 27.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, April* 6, 1839.

THE messenger who was the bearer of your Lordship's despatches to the 11th of March, arrived late on the 4th instant. That evening I sent for translation into the Turkish language, the substance of your Lordship's communication to me, " that you were agreed with Rechid Pasha on the principle of the proposed Treaty, and employed in preparing the details," and your other arguments. I added the best reasoning I could use, to induce the Porte to abandon warlike policy for the present. I pleaded for delay, knowing that I should do greater harm than good by calling for more.

The Mousteshar Nouri Effendi has replied to my communication, "that the Sublime Porte could not be satisfied with the Treaty, because it is not the Treaty that Rechid Pasha wished to make; that the Porte desired to destroy the *status quo*, and the Treaty proposed by Lord Palmerston not only leaves it in full force, but also binds the Porte not to take advantage in future of any favourable occasion that may offer; that Lord Palmerston's Treaty, with an extraordinary abruptness, stipulates, simply, that England shall unite with the Sublime Porte to act against Mehemet Ali, if he or his successor (of his family) shall declare his independence, or commit any aggression."

Nouri Effendi has promised to give a written answer to my communication, as soon as he has received the Sultan's commands. I will detain the messenger that it may be transmitted to your Lordship immediately.

Tahar Pasha (Chief of the Etat Major under the Seraskier) sailed yesterday in the steamer for Trebizond, from whence he goes to the headquarters of Hafiz Pasha. He was dispatched after the Treaty in question had been submitted in the first instance to the consideration of Nouri Effendi and the Capudan Pasha; and secondly, to the consideration of the Council. I have reason to fear the orders of Tahar Pasha are not of a nature to please your Lordship.

I believe that M. de Bouténeff has been seriously endeavouring to prevent war; the Internuncio has done the same, and the French Ambassador also; and I have continued unceasingly to recommend to the Sultan to delay at least, if not to abstain altogether from everything that may commit him in a perilous enterprize.

No. 24.

Mr. Consul Moore to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 29.)

My Lord, *Beyrout, March* 14, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship, that the forced conscription is again in operation in Syria.

The levy to be raised is given out as 9,000 men,—a number, small as it may appear, the country will have great difficulty in supplying, so great has been the preceding drain on the population.

Some modification, it is said, is to take place in respect to the manner of raising the conscripts, who are not to be seized as formerly. An eye-witness, however, informed me that he met recruits betwixt Aleppo and Damascus manacled.

By advices from Damascus to the 9th instant, Ibrahim Pasha left that place on the 5th, for the north of Syria, where his immediate presence is said to be required.

Rumour adds, that the insurgents of the ranges of the Taurus have been joined by the Sultan's troops on the Aleppo frontier.

At the Ledgea things remain in *statu quo*.

Up to this day, the authorities here remain without instructions relative to the Commercial Treaty, and the sale of the monopolies proceeds.

In this neighbourhood all is tranquil.

March 15.

We hear to-day that Ibrahim Pasha will remain for the present at Homs or Hamah. His Highness is making military preparations in consequence of advices received from the north. Solyman Pasha is about leaving Acre to join Ibrahim Pasha.

Affairs at the Ledgea are represented as in a very unsettled state, notwithstanding the conscription has been remitted, and a free promise of pardon given to everybody.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) N. MOORE.

March 16.

P.S.—Solyman Pasha is expected to pass near Beyrout this day, on his way to Aleppo, on urgent military affairs.

March 18.

Solyman Pasha arrived at Beyrout on Saturday evening, and left this morning for Homs and Hamah. His Excellency spoke publicly of the probability of an approaching conflict with the Sultan's forces in the north; and the troops are all ordered to be in a state of readiness.

N. M.

No. 25.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received May* 9.)

(Extract.) *Cairo, April* 1, 1839.

THE Pasha declares that he will not be the aggressor, but that if the Sultan does attack him, he will follow him up, and take entire possession of Orfa and Diarbekir, and which nothing will then oblige him to relinquish. He stated so this morning in my presence, in that of the Consuls-General of Russia and Tuscany, and of Boghos Bey.

The Pasha added, that he hoped the Sultan would not be so impolitic as to attack him. I am, however, of opinion that the Pasha was not sincere in his hope; and that he does desire a war with the Porte, provided the Sultan were the aggressor.

No. 26.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received May* 16.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, April* 22, 1839.

ON the 6th instant I reported that, in accordance with your Lordship's instructions, I urged with the Porte, as arguments against a breach between the Porte and the Pasha of Egypt, the facts that you had agreed with Rechid Pasha on the principle of a Treaty, and were occupied in preparing the details, &c., &c. I also reported Nouri Effendi's answer, and his promise to give me a further reply in writing, after he had received the commands of the Sultan, for which I would detain the messenger.

I endeavoured to gain from Nouri Effendi some knowledge of the Treaty to which your Lordship alluded, in order to be better enabled to execute my instructions; but Nouri Effendi's answers were unsatisfactory. On the 12th, he said, "The Treaty is rather mischievous than useful to the Porte. We must take time to consider it." He promised to inform me what was decided upon.

The 13th, I acquainted Nouri that a French merchant had talked of a Treaty of Alliance being in negotiation at London, between England and Turkey; Nouri said, he must have learnt it from the French embassy, as France was engaged in the affair.

On the 15th, Nouri promised to give me, confidentially, a copy of what the Porte had received from Rechid Pasha; and on the 18th he sent me a copy of the Treaty, which is inclosed.

Your Lordship had considered the Treaty a motive that should induce the Porte to abstain from hostilities: I thought it my duty to endeavour to counteract those who advised the Porte to reject it; and under this impression, I began, on the 18th, a discussion with Nouri, which I have continued up to the present time,—sending him reasonings, written in Turkish, to be submitted to the Sultan.

On the 21st, Nouri said he agreed with me in many points, and differed from me in others; but on the whole, he was convinced that no Treaty would be of any use to the interests of the Porte, which had not for its object the destruction of Mehemet Ali, and therefore the Porte ought not to make any Treaty.

I replied, that the British Government could not be expected to abandon in such a manner its known policy, and that it was vain to expect it. That Her Majesty's Government asked the Porte for nothing, but, on the contrary, gave the Porte by this Treaty a solid security against danger from any attacks made by the Pasha of Egypt. That the security thus afforded would enable the Sultan (were he disposed to avail himself of it) to diminish materially his expences.

Nouri said he valued my opinion very much; that he felt his responsibility and knew his duty; that he would make a report to be sent in to the Sultan, together with my observations.

Your Lordship will see that this affair is not yet decided; but it may be that the resolution is already taken to refuse the Treaty.

I have not received from the Porte the reply which was promised to my first communications on the subject of hostilities, and for which I detained the messenger; but I have learnt from other quarters enough to authorize me to believe that no hostile movement will be made at present by the Porte, and I therefore dispatch him with that statement; but your Lordship will observe that I do not speak positively, because a collision may at any time take place when hostile parties are in juxta position, as is at present the case.

The Sultan continues to repose confidence in Rechid Pasha. He has sent him orders to return here, and he will on his arrival resume the exercise of his functions as Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Inclosure in No. 26.

Traduction de la Minute d'un Traité à être conclu entre la Sublime Porte et le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique, contre les projets insénses d'indépendance du Pacha d'Egypte.

[N.B. *Cette traduction est faite sur une traduction Turque envoyée de Londres par Réchid Pacha.*]

ATTENDU la possibilité que le Pacha d'Egypte, qui se considère comme indépendant, manque à l'accomplissement de quelqu'un de ses devoirs auxquels il est obligé en sa qualité de sujet; attendu qu'il est

à présumer que par suite du décès du Pacha, ou de quelque autre événement, quelqu'un de ses fils, ou quelque membre de la famille du Pacha, ou quelqu'un autre, se rende coupable de désobéissance à la résolution et à la volonté de Sa Hautesse, il a été jugé à propos de convenir des Articles suivans:

ARTICLE I.

Le Sultan étant le souverain (Padishah) de l'Egypte, de la Syrie, et dépendances, Sa Hautesse permet à la flotte Anglaise d'arrêter les bâtimens de guerre et de commerce du Pacha; et comme il est probable que le Pacha se servira de bâtimens marchands des Puissances Amies qui resteront neutres, pour prendre et envoyer des munitions de guerre et de bouche, la flotte du Sultan visitera, d'après le droit clair et évident de Sa Hautesse, les bâtimens ci-dessus désignés, et, s'il le faut, elle en saisira les chargemens.

ARTICLE II.

Les Flottes Ottomane et Anglaise se réuniront, pour agir de concert, sur les côtes d'Egypte et de Syrie.

ARTICLE III.

Le présent Traité sera en vigueur l'espace de   années.

(Translation.)

Translation of the Minute of a Treaty to be concluded between the Sublime Porte and Her Britannic Majesty against the insane projects of independence entertained by the Pasha of Egypt.

[N.B. *This Translation is made from a Turkish Translation sent from London by Rechid Pasha.*]

SEEING that there is a possibility that the Pasha of Egypt, who considers himself independent, may fail to accomplish some of the duties which he owes in his quality of subject;—seeing that it may be presumed that, in consequence of the death of the Pasha, or of some other event, some one of his sons, or some member of the Pasha's family, or some other individual, may render himself guilty of disobedience to the resolution and to the will of His Highness, it has been judged proper to agree to the following Articles:—

ARTICLE I.

The Sultan being the Sovereign (Padishah) of Egypt, Syria, and their dependencies, His Highness permits the English fleet to detain the ships of war and merchant vessels of the Pasha; and as it is probable that the Pasha will make use of the merchant vessels of friendly Powers who will remain neutral, to take and send warlike stores and provisions, the fleet of the Sultan shall search, in conformity with the clear and evident right of His Highness, the vessels above described, and if need be, shall seize their cargoes.

ARTICLE II.

The Ottoman and English fleets shall unite to act in concert on the coasts of Egypt and Syria.

ARTICLE III.

The present Treaty shall be in force for the space of years.

No. 27.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 16.)

My Lord, *Vienna, May* 8, 1839.

PRINCE METTERNICH'S last advices from Constantinople assure him that the Sultan will not attack Mehemet Ali. His Highness has applied to Prince Metternich for advice in the very difficult situation in which he is placed; and the Prince is drawing up an answer, of which Prince Esterhazy will be the bearer to your Lordship.

The main idea in it seems to be, that the Sultan should run his life against Mehemet Ali's, denying at the same time the great difficulty of his situation, if he will but be content with it, and abandon the idea of improving it by the premature employment of force.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

No. 28.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 16.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, April* 23, 1839.

THE Internuncio called on me this day to inform me of the substance of a communication he had made, by order of his Government, to the Porte. The expressions used by the Internuncio were very friendly towards the Ottoman Government; and the Ministers in return used equally friendly language, whilst they stated the misery produced by the continuance of the *status quo*, which they said it was impossible to maintain without completing the ruin of this country. They said the Sultan had no desire for a triumph, because it must be bought by the blood of his people, but that things were hastening to ruin, &c., &c.

The impression of the Internuncio was, that the Porte would not at present begin hostilities, but that they might be caused by accidents; and he is of opinion that the state of affairs in this country cannot be preserved as it is. He talked of several things that had been suggested as possible for the remedy of the evils, but without arriving at any satisfactory conviction.

We both agreed, that to support Mehemet Ali against the Sultan would be a partition of the Ottoman Empire *de facto*.

The Internuncio spoke with entire frankness, of the community of the interests of England and Austria with respect to the preservation of Turkey.

The Internuncio told me, that the Ottoman Minister, in reply to a question, said, that there were still hopes of the success of Rechid Pasha in London. He did not ask me what the Treaty was, but talked of one being in contemplation between the Governments. I said, I thought it would be prudent to form some connection with Turkey.

No. 29.

The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 27.)

(Extract.) *St. Petersburgh, May* 14, 1839.

COUNT NESSELRODE expresses great confidence in the continuance of peace between the Sultan and the Pasha of Egypt.

His Excellency has shown me the instructions he has sent to Count Medem, the Russian Consul-General in Egypt, to persuade Mehemet Ali to withdraw his forces in Syria from their present advanced position; and the despatch directing Count Pozzo di Borgo to communicate those instructions to your Lordship.

No. 30.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 27.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, May* 4, 1839.

THE Pasha's steamer "Nile" arrived here on the 1st instant from Beyrout, and brought me a letter from Mr. Consul Moore, of which the following is an extract:—

"I hasten to acquaint you with the intelligence we have received here, confirmed by Mr. Werry this morning from Damascus,—his letter is to the 27th,—that the Sultan's forces have crossed the Euphrates at Bir. All the troops from every quarter are ordered to the north."

I much fear that this intelligence is true, and that the Sultan, in spite of the remonstrances of Lord Ponsonby, and of the other Ambassadors at Constantinople, has been persuaded by the presumptuous counsels of Hafiz Pasha, to take this rash step.

The Pasha's fleet is all ready for sea, and I deem it probable that he himself will very soon be here, if the reports from Syria prove to be correct.

The two sons of Ibrahim Pasha have returned from Syria in the "Nile" steamer.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

No. 31.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 27.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, May* 5, 1839.

WITH reference to my despatch of yesterday, I have now the honour to transmit to your Lordship the copy of a letter from Boghos Bey, together with that of its inclosure.

Your Lordship will see by this inclosure, that Ibrahim Pasha writes to the Viceroy, that the Sultan's forces had advanced beyond Bir, where they had erected some fortifications, and that Ibrahim Pasha was going to Aleppo, which is only about sixty miles from Bir; and that Mehemet Ali, evidently in order to prevent any possibility of his being considered the aggressor, had directed Ibrahim Pasha not to make any movements in advance.

I send copy of this despatch and of its inclosures to Lord Ponsonby, in the hope that it may possibly reach his Excellency before any collision may have taken place between the armies of the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, and that the Porte may be induced to listen to the counsels of his Lordship, and to retire its troops before any hostilities commence; but still I much fear that the prudent measures of Mehemet Ali may be construed by the Sultan's General into fear, and that he will advance, and force Ibrahim Pasha into active hostilities; and, indeed, it is difficult to conceive that the two armies can remain long so near to each other without coming into hostile collision.

It appears to me that the present movement of the Sultan's army must have been formed some time since, and the necessary preparations made, as by crossing the Euphrates at Bir, they avoid all the fortified defiles of the Taurus, and will completely come in the rear of them.

Should hostilities take place, I think it very probable that the army of Kourschid Pasha, which is now in Arabia, will either march on Bagdad, or come in the rear of the Sultan's army.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Inclosure 1 in No. 31.

Boghos Bey to Colonel Campbell.

Alexandrie, ce 4 *Mai,* 1839.

EN exécution de l'ordre supérieur, le Soussigné a l'honneur de transmettre par la présente, à M. le Colonel Campbell, Agent et Consul-Général de Sa Majesté Britannique en Egypte et dépendances, la traduction d'une lettre du 16 Sefer, 1255 (1er Mai), que M. Artin Bey, premier Secrétaire Interprète, lui a adressée de Chiban, dans la Basse Egypte, par commandement de Son Altesse le Vice-Roi, et relative à ce qui se passe en ce moment aux frontières nord de la Syrie.

Il saisit avec plaisir cette nouvelle occasion pour lui réitérer les assurances de sa très-haute considération.

(Signé) BOGHOS JOUSSOUFF BEY.

(Translation.)

Boghos Bey to Colonel Campbell.

Alexandria, May 4, 1839.

IN execution of superior orders, the Undersigned has the honour to transmit herewith to Colonel Campbell, Her Britannic Majesty's Agent and Consul-General in Egypt and its dependencies, the translation of a letter of the 16th Sefer, 1255 (1st of May) which M. Artin Bey, first Secretary Interpreter, has addressed to him from Chiban, in Lower Egypt, by command of His Highness the Viceroy, and which relates to what is passing at this moment on the northern frontiers of Syria.

He seizes with pleasure this fresh opportunity of renewing to him the assurances of his highest consideration.

(Signed) BOGHOS JOUSSOUFF BEY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 31.

Lettre de Monsieur Artin Bey, premier Secrétaire Interprète de Son Altesse le Vice-Roi, à son Excellence Boghos Bey, datée 16 *Sefer,* 1255 *(*1*er Mai), à Chiban, dans la Basse Egypte.*

(Traduction.)

SON ALTESSE le Généralissime vient de faire connaître par une lettre particulière, que les forces du Sultan ont dépassé Bilegik (appelé actuellement Bir), et y ont fait quelques fortifications; Son Altesse le Généralissime après avoir donné ordre à nos régimens cantonnés en Syrie, de marcher vers Alep, allait se rendre en personne dans cette ville.

Son Altesse le Vice-Roi ayant jugé que cette conduite de la Porte devait avoir pour but de faire tomber la faute sur nous, a écrit à Son Altesse le Généralissime de ne faire aucun mouvement avant que d'être sûr de l'avancement des troupes du Sultan, et de se confier en Dieu, et d'agir en conséquence, si l'avancement de ces forces se constatait d'une manière positive.

Son Altesse le Vice-Roi charge votre Excellence de communiquer de suite à Messieurs les Consuls-Généraux, ce que j'ai eu l'honneur de lui écrire ci-dessus.

(Translation.)

Letter from M. Artin Bey, first Secretary Interpreter of His Highness the Viceroy, to his Excellency Boghos Bey, dated 16*th Sefer,* 1255, (1*st May,*) *at Chiban, in Lower Egypt.*

HIS Highness the Generalissimo has just announced in a private letter, that the forces of the Sultan have passed Bilegik (now called Bir), and have constructed some fortifications there ; His Highness the Generalissimo, after having given orders to our regiments stationed in Syria, to march towards Aleppo, was about to repair in person to that city.

His Highness the Viceroy, having thought that this conduct on the part of the Porte must have had for its object to throw the blame upon us, has written to His Highness the Generalissimo to make no movement before he was sure of the advance of the troops of the Sultan, and to trust in God, and to act accordingly, if the advance of those forces was positively proved to have taken place.

His Highness the Viceroy instructs your Excellency to communicate forthwith to the Consuls-General, that which I have had the honour to write to you above.

No. 32.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received May* 27.)

(Extract.) *Alexandria, May* 7, 1839.

COUNT MEDEM read to me, yesterday, a despatch of 12th April, from Count Nesselrode.

Count Medem is directed to intimate to Mehemet Ali, to recall Ibrahim Pasha from Syria, and to retire the Egyptian troops towards Damascus, without delay. That as it is clear from the reports received by the Emperor from Constantinople, and from the Prussian officers in the service of the Sultan, that the offensive movements of the Egyptian Army have been the sole cause of the advance of the Sultan's forces, Mehemet Ali must be the first to retire his troops, and then the Emperor will prevail on the Sultan to cause his army to withdraw from the Syrian frontier.

Count Nesselrode adds, that a copy of the despatch will be sent to the different Courts of Europe; and he directs Count Medem to communicate it to his colleagues here.

Count Nesselrode appears to have grounded his despatch on very false data, in assuming that Mehemet Ali was the aggressor. So far from Mehemet Ali being the aggressor, it is a fact, that for some months past, the letters of Lord Ponsonby to me, and the despatches from Baron Stürmer and from Admiral Roussin to their Consuls-General here, mention the hostile preparations of the Sultan, and his intentions to attack Syria, and the efforts of the different Ambassadors to prevail on the Sultan not to take so rash a step; and, indeed, I am confident that the resolve of the Sultan to invade Syria was caused by his opinion, that upon the appearance of the Turkish Army, the whole of Syria would rise up in his favour.

As to Mehemet Ali, I can assert confidently, that it never was his intention to be the active aggressor, nor to pass the frontiers of Syria, nor to attack the Sultan's forces; and I am borne out in this view of the subject, not only by the positive declarations of Mehemet Ali, but also by the opinions of the Consuls-General of the Great Powers.

The Consul-General of Austria has received instructions from Vienna, similar to those received by Count Medem,

I do not believe that Mehemet Ali will accede to the intimation of Russia, either to recall Ibrahim Pasha, or to retire his troops, as in the latter case, he could not have any security, that after their withdrawal, the Sultan's army would not enter Syria, and perhaps destroy all the works erected by Ibrahim Pasha in the Taurus frontier; and if circumstances proved favourable, they might advance still further.

I trust to be enabled to communicate to your Lordship, officially, by Her Majesty's next steamer, the result of the communication of Count Medem and of M. de Laurin with the Pasha.

No. 33.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 27.)

My Lord, *Paris, May* 23, 1839.

THE Marshal Soult called upon me this day for the purpose of informing me that a telegraphic despatch had been received this morning from Marseilles, communicating the important intelligence that the army of the Sultan had made a movement in advance, and that hostilities had actually commenced between the Turkish and Egyptian forces.

This intelligence was brought by a steamer which left Malta on the 16th of this month, and it appears that it had reached that island from Syra as well as from Alexandria.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 34.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 27.)

My Lord, *Paris, May* 24, 1839.

I HAVE received your Lordship's despatches to the 21st of May.

I have not seen Marshal Soult since his communication to me yesterday, of the intelligence he had just received, by telegraph, of the commencement of hostilities between the Turkish and Egyptian troops.

When I called this morning at the Foreign Office, his Excellency was attending a Cabinet Council, which was deliberating upon the measures to be adopted by the French Government, in consequence of this intelligence.

I had, however, the opportunity of conversing last night with several members of the Cabinet, and amongst others, with M. Duchatel, the Minister of the Interior, and with General Schneider, the Minister of War; they both seemed strongly impressed with the seriousness of the danger to the peace of Europe, which may be apprehended from this invasion of Syria by the Turkish Army. They expressed an anxious desire that under these critical circumstances, the most cordial concert should exist between the French and British Governments; they had no doubt that the French Government would make great exertion to fit out a formidable fleet to be sent to the Levant, and hoped that it would co-operate with the naval force of Great Britain.

I may therefore, I think, give your Lordship reason to expect that whatever may be suggested by Her Majesty's Government as most expedient to be done in the present alarming state of affairs in the East, will be most favourably attended to by the French Government.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 35.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received May* 27.)

My Lord, *Paris, May* 25, 1839.

A DESPATCH was received yesterday by the French Government from Turin, stating that an Austrian steam-vessel had arrived at Trieste, which brought an account of hostilities having commenced between the Turkish and Egyptian Armies.

The intelligence previously received by way of Malta and Marseilles being thus confirmed, the French Ministry resolved to propose this day to the Chamber of Deputies, a vote of credit of ten millions of francs, to defray the expence of an augmentation of the French naval force in the Levant, rendered necessary by the rupture of the peace between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 36.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received May* 30.)

My Lord, *Paris, May* 27, 1839.

THE inclosed "Moniteur" contains the speech of the Minister of Marine, in the Chamber of Deputies, on Saturday last, when he presented the demand of a vote of credit to the amount of ten millions of francs, to defray the eventual expence of an augmentation of the naval forces of France in the Levant, which the imminent rupture of the peace between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, may render expedient.

The Chamber will, without doubt, acquiesce in this demand.

Marshal Soult told me this morning that his last despatches from Constantinople and from Alexandria, were both dated on the 7th of this month.

Admiral Roussin writes, that the Turkish Ministers still continue to give assurances that the Sultan will not attack the Egyptians; but the unwonted activity in the arsenals of Constantinople, and the extraordinary efforts made by the Turkish Government to send reinforcements to their Army on the borders of Syria, contradict these assurances.

To Marshal Soult, as well as to me, the Turkish Ambassador at Paris asserts positively that his latest advices from his Government are of a pacific tone; and he contends, that if hostilities have commenced, the Egyptians must have been the aggressors.

On the other hand, the despatches of the French Consul at Alexandria, state, that according to advices received by Mehemet Ali from Ibrahim Pasha, the Turkish Army had crossed the military line of demarcation between the Turkish and Egyptian Forces, and established fortifications at Bir, on the Euphrates; that he, Ibrahim Pasha, was in consequence concentrating his troops at Aleppo; but that Mehemet Ali, under the persuasion that it was the object of the Turkish Government to throw the responsibility of aggression on the Egyptians, had enjoined his son to make no movement, until the Turkish troops had advanced so far as to put that question out of doubt, and then to trust to God and his Prophet for the success of his arms.

Marshal Soult and his colleagues, with most of whom I have had the opportunity of conversing upon this subject, express the strongest desire that the British and French Governments may act entirely in concert.

The Marshal received this morning a despatch from M. de Bourqueney, reporting the substance of a conversation he had had with your Lordship, after the receipt of the last intelligence from the East, and was much pleased with this report; he understood from it, that the British Fleet in the Mediterranean, including the reinforcements which might be sent to it, would amount to ten sail of the line; and he told me that in a very short time, no less than eight or nine French sail of the line would be prepared for the Levant station.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 37.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 30.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, May* 1, 1839.

I INCLOSE for Her Majesty's Government, the answer His Majesty the Sultan has been pleased to make to my late communications respecting Mehemet Ali.

Inclosure in No. 37.

Réponse du Sultan aux communications qui lui ont été faites au sujet de Méhémet Ali; communiquée par son Excellence le Mousteshar Nouri Effendi, à son Excellence Lord Ponsonby, le 28 *Avril,* 1839.

(*Traduction faite sur la copie de la Réponse.*)

LES instructions qu'accompagnait un billet de la part de votre Excellence, ont été mises sous les yeux de Sa Hautesse, qui en a pris connaissance.

L'Internonce d'Autriche a communiqué à la Sublime Porte les réflexions que le Prince de Metternich vient de faire sur une mesure qu'il propose, savoir: d'abandonner les préparatifs de guerre dirigés contre l'individu qui se dit Pacha d'Egypte. Il est même venu, il y a peu de jours, au Mabein, pour faire soumettre à Sa Hautesse quelques considérations roulant sur la nécessité de prendre un terme moyen pour mettre fin à cette question embarrassante, sans recourir à la guerre. J'ai reçu alors de la propre bouche de Sa Hautesse l'ordre de dire à M. l'Internonce, ce qui suit: "Ce Méhémet Ali n'a cessé, depuis l'affaire de Conia, de se mettre sur un pied à tout entreprendre. Il ruine les pays qui ont passé sous son commandement, et il réduit les habitans à la misère; il lève des troupes, et fait construire des batteries et d'autres fortifications. Ma Sublime Porte n'avait songé, jusqu'à une époque récente, à élever nulle part des fortifications; et ce n'est que depuis l'année passée qu'elle a entrepris de faire fortifier quelques positions dans les environs de Conia. Et comme les procédés de Méhémet Ali, et ses folles prétentions, sont de nature à ne nous laisser l'ombre de sécurité, on a dû prendre les mesures de défense que les règles de la prudence suggéraient, en envoyant au vu et su de tout le monde, des troupes et le matériel de guerre nécessaire, vers Sivas et Conia. Si les Grandes Puissances ne disaient pas le mot contre les actes de rébellion de Méhémet Ali, et elles s'obstinaient, en même tems, à vouloir empêcher Ma Sublime Porte d'agir, voilà, certes, qui ne serait ni conforme aux égards que les Gouvernemens se doivent entr'eux, ni conséquent avec les sentimens de bienveillance que l'on professe; et il est clair et évident que si Méhémet Ali commet quelque acte d'agression, Ma Sublime Porte ne pourra plus rester dans l'inaction. Il

est également clair et évident, que comme l'on ne doit dans aucune circonstance vouloir l'effusion du sang, qui est une suite de la guerre, si Méhémet Ali reconnait et pratique les obligations que lui impose sa qualité de sujet, Ma Sublime Porte ne prendra point le parti de la guerre; d'autant plus que les pays soumis au Gouvernement de Méhémet Ali, faisant partie de mes états héréditaires, la perte d'hommes de part et d'autre, et les maux qui viendraient fondre sur les pays, et affliger les populations, et surtout les classes pauvres, ne me toucheraient que de trop près. Mais que faut-il faire, lorsqu'il ne reste plus aucune sécurité de la part d'un homme dévoré par l'ambition et l'avidité, qui a conçu des projets perfides? Tant que cet état de choses dure, la sûreté et la tranquillité mutuelles ne sauraient exister, et je suis dans le cas d'entretenir à grands frais, une armée et un camp Impérial. Si l'on considérait cette question, comme on devrait le faire, sous les rapports des convenances qui doivent s'observer entre Gouvernemens; si on l'examinait avec bienveillance et justice, n'est-ce pas que l'on trouverait que la raison est tout-à-fait de mon côté, et que Méhémet Ali est coupable? Quant au Prince Metternich, c'est un homme animé de sentimens bienveillans, un homme d'un excellent jugement; je dois donc soupçonner et croire que cette chaleur et cette vivacité qui caractérisent le langage qu'il tient aujourd'hui, ne sont que l'effet du ton sur lequel on lui a écrit, soit d'ici, soit d'autres endroits. M. l'Internonce a parlé à Nouri Effendi de terme moyen pour la solution de cette question, sans avoir recours aux armes; cela veut dire la rentrée de Méhémet Ali dans la position qui lui convient comme sujet; mais cette position ne peut se réaliser que par la restitution, par Méhémet Ali, d'Adana, de Damas, d'Alep, de Seyda, de Jérusalem, et de Naplouse, et par la réduction de ses forces actuelles à ce point qui seul serait compatible avec sa qualité de sujet. Si les Grandes Puissances veulent travailler à faire naître un pareil état de choses, alors il serait digne de moi d'y donner mon adhésion Impériale."

Telles sont les paroles que, d'ordre du Sultan, j'ai rapportées à M. l'Internonce. Son Excellence ayant prêté une oreille attentive à tout ce que je lui ai dit, elle m'a assuré, que conformément aux ordres qu'elle avait reçus de sa Cour, elle va faire savoir tout ce que je lui ai rapporté au Prince Metternich.

J'ai également reçu de Sa Hautesse l'ordre de dire, que si le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique veut faire un acte d'amitié et de bienveillance en adhérant à un Traité d'Alliance conçu dans le sens ci-dessus exprimé, Sa Hautesse l'acceptera avec plaisir; et M. l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre est prié de faire savoir à sa Cour cette réponse du Sultan.

(Translation.)

(*Translation made from the Copy of the Answer.*)

Reply of the Sultan to the Communications made to him on the subject of Mehemet Ali; communicated by his Excellency the Mousteshar Nouri Effendi to his Excellency Lord Ponsonby, April 28, 1839.

THE instructions which accompanied a note on the part of your Excellency, have been laid before His Highness, who has taken cognizance of them.

The Austrian Internuncio has communicated to the Sublime Porte the reflections which Prince Metternich has made upon a measure which he proposes; namely, to abandon the warlike preparations directed against the individual who calls himself Pasha of Egypt. He even came, a few days ago, to the Mabein, to cause some considerations to be submitted to His Highness, touching the necessity of taking a middle course for the purpose of putting an end to this embarrassing question, without having recourse to war. I then received from His Highness' own mouth the order to say to the Internuncio what follows: "This Mehemet Ali has not ceased, since the affair of Conia, from putting himself in a position to undertake anything. He ruins the countries which have passed under his rule, and he reduces the inha-

bitants to misery; he levies troops, and causes batteries and other fortifications to be erected. My Sublime Porte had not, until recently, contemplated the erection of fortifications anywhere; and it is only since last year that it undertook to cause some positions in the neighbourhood of Conia to be fortified. And since the proceedings and the foolish pretensions of Mehemet Ali are of a nature not to leave us a shadow of security, it has been necessary to take the measures of defence which prudence suggests, by sending openly and in the face of the whole world, the necessary troops and munitions of war towards Sivas and Conia. If the Great Powers were to say nothing against the rebellious acts of Mehemet Ali, and if they were to persist, at the same time, in wishing to prevent my Sublime Porte from acting, this, certainly, would not be in conformity with the deference which Governments owe to one another, nor in accordance with their professed sentiments of goodwill; and it is clear and evident that if Mehemet Ali commits any act of aggression, my Sublime Porte can no longer remain inactive. It is equally clear and evident, that since the effusion of blood, which is a consequence of war, is in no case to be desired, if Mehemet Ali acknowledges and performs the duties which are imposed on him by his quality of subject, my Sublime Porte will not have recourse to war; the more so, because, as the countries placed under the Government of Mehemet Ali constitute a part of my hereditary possessions, the loss of men on both sides, and the evils which would befall the country and afflict the population, and above all, the poorer classes, would touch me too nearly. But what is to be done, when there no longer remains any security with respect to a man devoured up by ambition and greediness, who has conceived perfidious plans? As long as this state of things lasts, mutual safety and tranquillity cannot exist, and I am obliged, at a great expence, to keep up an army and an Imperial camp. If this question were considered, as it ought to be considered, with reference to the relations which Governments should maintain with one another; if it were examined with goodwill and justice, would it not be found that reason is entirely on my side, and that Mehemet Ali is to blame? With regard to Prince Metternich, he is a man animated by kind feelings, a man of an excellent judgment. I am therefore led to suspect and to believe that the warmth and vivacity which characterise the language that he now holds, are the effect of the tone which has been used in writing to him, either from hence or from other places. The Internuncio has spoken to Nouri Effendi about a middle course for the solution of this question, without having recourse to arms; that means, Mehemet Ali's return to the position which becomes him as a subject; but this position cannot be realized, unless Mehemet Ali restores Adana, Damascus, Aleppo, Seyda, Jerusalem, and Naplous, and reduces his present forces to such amount as would alone be compatible with his condition as a subject. If the Great Powers are willing to labour to bring about such a state of things, then it would be worthy of me to give my Imperial assent."

Such are the words which, by the Sultan's orders, I reported to the Internuncio. His Excellency, having listened attentively to all that I said to him, assured me that, agreeably to the orders which he had received from his Court, he would report to Prince Metternich all that I had stated to him.

I likewise received directions from His Highness to say, that if the Government of Her Britannic Majesty is willing to do an act of friendship and goodwill by becoming a party to a Treaty of Alliance drawn up in the sense above expressed, His Highness will receive it with pleasure; and the British Ambassador is requested to make known to his Court this answer of the Sultan.

No. 38.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 2.)

(Extract.) *Paris, May* 31, 1839.

I CALLED upon Marshal Soult this morning, and I informed his Excellency that your Lordship had not, as yet, had an opportunity of bringing under the consideration of the Cabinet, the measures which it might be necessary to adopt in the event of a collision ensuing between the army of the Sultan and that of Mehemet Ali. That I had, therefore, no official instructions upon the subject, but that from a private communication which I had received from your Lordship, it appeared that you were of opinion that, in the first place, it was essential that complete unanimity should exist between the Governments of England and France, as to the course to be pursued; that a combined fleet should proceed to the coast of Syria, and that the orders given to the admirals should be identical; the object of such instructions being to arrest the progress of hostilities, if commenced, between the two parties.

The Marshal said he entirely concurred in this opinion; and I gathered from his conversation, that he would be ready to give instructions to the French Admiral, in conformity with those addressed to the British Admiral.

His Excellency informed me, that he had dispatched two officers, the one to proceed to Constantinople, the other to Alexandria, with directions, after having communicated with the French Ambassador and M. Cochelet, to repair to the head-quarters of the two armies, and to endeavour, by personal representations to the respective commanders, to prevent the breaking out of hostilities, and to report the exact state of affairs.

His Excellency added, that supposing the threatened collision should this time be averted, he considered it would be necessary that the Five Powers should concert together as to the means of definitively settling the future relations between the Sultan and the Viceroy.

No. 39.

The Duc de Dalmatie to Baron de Bourqueney; communicated by Baron de Bourqueney, June , 1839.

Monsieur, *Paris, le* 30 *Mai*, 1839.

J'AI reçu les dépêches que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire jusqu'au No. 43 inclusivement. Leur contenu étant de nature à me faire penser que vous aurez bientôt à me transmettre des informations plus précises sur les vues du Cabinet Britannique, par rapport à l'état actuel de l'Orient, je me réserve de discuter alors quelques unes des opinions que vous a exprimées à ce sujet Lord Palmerston. Je me bornerai pour le moment à remarquer, que ce Ministre me semble prendre un peu trop facilement son parti d'une seconde expédition Russe à Constantinople, moyennant des garanties peut-être illusoires; je crains aussi qu'il n'apprécie pas d'une manière suffisamment impartiale, la position respective de la Porte et de Méhémet Ali. A Vienne, on est à cet égard dans des dispositions très-équitables. Avant même de connaître les derniers événemens, M. de Metternich venait de se décider à une importante démarche. Frappé du danger dont les chances toujours imminentes d'une collision entre le Sultan et son puissant vassal, menaçaient depuis six ans la paix du monde, il allait, suivant ce que M. le Comte Appony m'a annoncé de sa part, charger l'Internonce d'appeler l'attention de la Porte sur la convenance d'un arrangement qui, en accordant au fils de Méhémet Ali l'hérédité du Gouvernement de l'Egypte, en rassurant par conséquent le Vice-Roi sur le sort de sa famille, calmerait en lui cette agitation inquiète tant redoutée, dit-on, à Constantinople.

Bien qu'avant d'avoir reçu des informations plus complètes, et de

nous être concertés avec nos Alliés, nous ne puissions évidemment penser à arrêter une détermination définitive sur la grave question qui vient de surgir, il est certaines mesures préliminaires tellement indiquées par la situation, que nous avons dû les prendre sur le champ. On sait déjà à Londres, que nous avons demandé aux Chambres de nous ouvrir un crédit destiné à couvrir les frais des armemens maritimes qui pourront devenir nécessaires. L'accueil fait à cette demande prouve qu'elle sera votée avec empressement. J'ai, de plus, envoyé à M. l'Amiral Roussin et à M. Cochelet, des instructions qui leur prescrivent d'insister pour que les hostilités cessent, si elles ont commencé, et pour qu'en tout cas les armées rentrent, de part et d'autre, dans les positions occupées par elles avant la marche des Turcs vers le point frontière des territoires respectifs. Ces instructions seront remises à leur destination par deux de mes officiers d'ordonnance, qui se rendront ensuite, l'un en Asie Mineure, l'autre en Syrie, à l'effet de constater l'état des choses, et, s'il y a lieu, de faire entendre avec énergie, aux deux parties, des paroles de prudence et de raison. Enfin, Monsieur, je viens d'écrire à M. de St. Aulaire, à M. Bresson, et à M. de Barante, pour les charger de s'entendre avec les Cabinets auprès desquels ils sont accrédités, sur la marche à suivre dans les conjonctures actuelles. J'ai particulièrement recommandé à M. de Barante de s'attacher à pénétrer si le Gouvernement Russe penserait à étendre la portée du Traité d'Unkiar Skélessi à un état de choses auquel il ne s'applique évidemment pas, puisque ses stipulations sont formellement conçues dans la prévision d'une attaque dirigée contre la Porte, et non d'une lutte dont la Porte prendrait elle-même l'initiative. Je n'ai pas besoin d'ajouter, que M. de Barante devra mesurer son langage de manière à éviter ce qui pourrait faire supposer que nous reconnaissons, même dans le sens le plus restreint, la validité d'un Traité contre lequel nous avons protesté en 1833; comme aussi ce qui donnerait à croire, qu'indépendamment de ce Traité, ou de tout autre engagement formel, nous fussions disposés à tolérer, soit le renversement du trône du Sultan, soit le démembrement de l'empire.

Veuillez, Monsieur, donner connaissance à Lord Palmerston, des informations contenues dans la présente dépêche.

Recevez, &c.,
(Signé) DUC DE DALMATIE.

(Translation.)

The Duc de Dalmatie to Baron de Bourqueney.

Sir, *Paris, May* 30, 1839.

I HAVE received the despatches which you have done me the honour to write to me up to No. 43 inclusive. Their contents being of a nature to make me suppose that you will soon have to transmit to me more precise information upon the views of the British Cabinet, with respect to the actual state of the East, I reserve till then the discussion of some of the opinions which Lord Palmerston has expressed to you upon this subject. I will confine myself for the moment to remarking that this Minister appears to me to make up his mind a little too readily to a second Russian expedition to Constantinople, upon the faith of guarantees, perhaps illusory. I fear, also, that he does not appreciate, in a manner sufficiently impartial, the respective positions of the Porte and Mehemet Ali. At Vienna they are very equitably disposed upon this subject. Even before being acquainted with the late events, M. de Metternich had decided upon an important step. Struck with the danger with which the peace of the world had, during six years, been threatened by the great probability of a collision between the Sultan and his powerful vassal, he was, according to what the Count Appony announced to me from him, about to instruct the Internuncio to call the attention of the Porte to the expediency of an arrangement, which, in granting to the son of Mehemet Ali the hereditary succession

to the Government of Egypt, and in thus satisfying the Viceroy as to the fate of his family, would calm in him that restless agitation said to be so much dreaded at Constantinople.

Although, until we have received more complete information, and have concerted with our Allies, we evidently cannot think of taking a definitive resolution upon the grave question which has arisen, there are certain preliminary measures so pointed out by circumstances, that we have been compelled to take them at once. It is already known at London that we have applied to the Chambers to open a credit for the purpose of covering the expences of the naval armaments which may become necessary. The reception given to this application proves that it will be readily voted. I have, moreover, sent to Admiral Roussin and to M. Cochelet instructions, directing them to insist upon the cessation of hostilities, if they have commenced, and that in any case, the Armies shall, on both sides, return to the positions occupied by them before the march of the Turks towards the frontier point of the respective territories. These instructions will be transmitted to their destination by two of my staff officers, who will afterwards go, the one into Asia Minor, the other into Syria, in order to ascertain the state of things; and if there be occasion, to employ with energy towards both parties the language of prudence and of reason. Lastly, Sir, I have written to M. de St. Aulaire, to M. Bresson, and to M. de Barante, to enjoin them to come to an understanding with the Cabinets to which they are accredited, upon the course to be followed in the present conjuncture. I have particularly recommended to M. de Barante to endeavour to ascertain if the Russian Government contemplates extending the operation of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi to a state of things to which it evidently does not apply, since its stipulations are formally conceived in the anticipation of an attack directed against the Porte, and not of a struggle in which the Porte should itself take the initiative. I need not add, that M. de Barante will guard his language in a manner to avoid giving rise to the supposition that we recognize, even in the most restricted sense, the validity of the Treaty against which we have protested in 1833; or to the belief that, independently of this Treaty, or of any other formal engagement, we would be disposed to tolerate, either the subversion of the throne of the Sultan, or the dismemberment of the Empire.

Be pleased, Sir, to make known to Lord Palmerston the information contained in the present despatch.

Receive, &c.,
(Signed) DUC DE DALMATIE.

No. 40.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received June* 6.)

My Lord, *Therapia, May* 11, 1839.

MEHEMET ALI remitted his last tribute to the Sublime Porte, through the Egyptian house, Anastasi. The chief conductor of that firm, by name Fuentes, has written to a person here, a letter by the last steamer, in which he says that the Pasha will not pay the tribute; that he declares the vast expences of his army and fleet absorb all his funds, and put the payment out of his power. I read this letter, and I have no reason to suppose the writer says anything but what he himself believes to be the truth, and it is probable he has means of knowing the fact.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 41.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 7.)

My Lord, *Paris, June* 5, 1839

THE inclosed paper contains the essential part of a long despatch from M. Cochelet, which was received yesterday by the French Government, and which Marshal Soult read to me this day. His Excellency also communicated to me a despatch from Admiral Roussin, in the postscript of which, dated the 17th ult. from Therapia, the Admiral states that though no account of hostilities having commenced in Syria had reached Constantinople, he considered them to be inevitable.

I have only time to add, before the departure of the post, that I was much gratified with the cordial confidence with which Marshal Soult communicated to me the whole of the despatches he received yesterday from Alexandria and Constantinople.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

Inclosure in No. 41.

Extract of despatch from M. Cochelet to Marshal Soult.

LE Vice-Roi a déclaré à M. Cochelet, Consul-Général de France, qu'il s'engage, dans le cas où les troupes du Sultan qui ont franchi l'Euphrate près de Bir, se retireraient de l'autre côté du fleuve, de faire un mouvement rétrograde à son armée, et de rappeler son fils Ibrahim Pacha à Damas; que dans le cas où cette démonstration pacifique serait, à son tour, suivie d'un mouvement rétrograde de l'armée de Hafiz Pacha au-delà de Malatia, Son Altesse rappellera le Généralissime en Egypte. De plus, Son Altesse le Vice-Roi a ajouté, de son propre mouvement, que si les Quatre Grandes Puissances consentaient à lui garantir la paix, et s'intéresseraient à lui obtenir la succession de sa famille, il retirerait une partie de ses troupes de la Syrie, et serait prêt à s'entendre sur un arrangement définitif propre à garantir la sécurité, et adapté aux besoins du pays.

(Translation.)

Extract of despatch from M. Cochelet to Marshal Soult.

THE Viceroy has declared to M. Cochelet, Consul-General of France, that he engages, in case the troops of the Sultan which have passed the Euphrates near Bir shall retire to the other side of the river, to make a retrograde movement of his army, and to recall his son Ibrahim Pasha to Damascus; that in case this pacific demonstration shall in its turn be followed by a retrograde movement of the army of Hafiz Pasha beyond Malatia, His Highness will recall the Generalissimo into Egypt. Moreover, His Highness the Viceroy has added of his own accord, that if the Four Great Powers should consent to guarantee peace, and to interest themselves to obtain for him the succession of his family, he would withdraw a part of his troops from Syria, and would be ready to come to a definitive arrangement proper to guarantee the security, and adapted to the wants, of the country.

No. 42.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received June* 9.)

(Extract.) *Paris, June* 7, 1839.

I HAD an interview this morning with Marshal Soult. His Excellency has received no despatches from the East of a later date than those which he communicated to me on Wednesday last, and of which I transmitted the substance to your Lordship by the post of that day.

The Marshal expressed his regret, that I had not as yet been able to make any official communication to him from your Lordship, in regard to the instructions to be given to the Admiral of the combined fleet on the Levant station. He said that the question of these instructions had been mooted in the Cabinet Council by Admiral Duperré, but that he, the Marshal, had desired to defer deliberating upon it, until they were in possession of the opinion of the British Government on that matter.

No. 43.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received June* 9.)

My Lord, *Therapia, May* 19, 1839.

I COMMUNICATED to Nouri Effendi the substance of your Lordhsip's instruction of March 15, which gave great dissatisfaction.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 44.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received June* 9.)

(Extract,) *Therapia, May* 20, 1839.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL CAMPBELL transmitted to your Lordship, copy of a letter, dated May 1st, written by Artin Bey, and communicated to the Consuls. A copy also reached the Sultan, who was so exasperated, that he gave orders that war should be declared against Mehemet Ali. Reflection, however, caused that order to be recalled, but orders were issued to hasten the equipment of the fleet, and to press the despatch of troops and military stores to the army: both orders are in execution.

The Sultan said he would rather die, than not endeavour to destroy his rebel subject. The language of those about the Sultan is: "We hope for success, because all the Syrians are enemies to the Pasha."

Nobody here doubts of war, and the general opinion is, that the Army of the Sultan will be defeated. My opinion is not worth anything, as I am not skilled in military matters.

If the Sultan should be victorious, there will be comparatively little difficulty, and it is enough at present to consider what may be the probable consequences of his defeat. The common opinion is, that the conqueror will march for the Capital, having declared himself independent. It appears to me more likely he will take the Pashalics of Bagdad, Orfa, Diarbekir, &c., &c.

The Great Powers have established, as the criterion of right or wrong, the abstinence from aggression, declaring the culpable to be the Sultan or the Pasha, as the one or the other might be the first to commence hostilities. Judgment has been given by Russia, who assumed to speak in the name of all, and the Pasha has been declared the aggressor. The charge of aggression made against him by Russia, is confined to late acts done by the Pasha; but from the beginning, during the whole period, as well as in this latter hour, the Pasha has always been the aggressor, and the Sultan has a right to claim from the Great Powers the maintenance of their own declarations. Passing over all the acts of the Pasha until the moment when the presumed (which your Lordship knows never existed) settlement of Koniah was made, the Sultan will be found from that hour in a state of quiescence, relying upon the intervention of the Great Powers for the settlement of differences as to territorial questions between himself and the Pasha, and for the payment of the miserable pittance of tribute due to him for the possession of kingdoms alienated from him. He made no preparations for war; committed no overt acts indicative of design to use force: he remained in a state actually inadequate to the defence of his remaining territories, until he was forced to have recourse to augmented armaments, by the menacing attitude of the Pasha, who had never ceased to assail the Sultan's power by intrigues, and had openly fortified all the avenues that lead through the Taurus into the provinces still under the Sultan's sceptre. The Pasha had never ceased to increase and perfect his army and his fleet, nor to push his conquests into new countries for the establishment of his power: and he made those conquests in his own name; he openly called on the Great Powers to sanction his assumption of independence of the Sultan. Could his intentions be doubted? The Sultan had the right of self-defence to justify his tardy exertions to guard against danger, and he had the further right, inherent in every man, be he sovereign or be he dependent, of placing himself in a position to repel insults.

No one of the Great Powers would have continued in a pacific attitude so long as the Sultan did, had any one of them been exposed to even a small part of the danger and the provocations he had to bear with.

Russia has declared a truth—a limited truth; the Great Powers cannot deny it; their repeated declarations engage them to oppose the aggressor.

No. 45.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received June* 9.)

(Extract.) *Vienna, June* 1, 1839.

PRINCE METTERNICH forwards to your Lordship the reports of the Internuncio, which agree with those of Lord Ponsonby as to the danger of war.

The Prince seeming to expect much from the arrival at Constantinople of his advice to the Porte, as to the course they ought to pursue, I observed to him, that the reply from thence might lead to the commencement of a negotiation, but it might also announce that of hostilities.

He admitted this, adding, that the only course to pursue was, for the Four Powers to agree among themselves what line to take.

If Her Majesty's Government should be disposed to enter into the Prince's views, as to the disposition to be made of Egypt, it will be necessary to decide whether the succession should be made personal to Ibrahim Pasha, or extended to his descendants, or to other descendants of Mehemet Ali. I would further remark, that such an arrangement, if it were practicable, would offer the best chance of preserving order in Egypt after Mehemet Ali's death, which will otherwise be exposed to many chances.

This first branch of the question being disposed of, I remarked to the Prince, that in all affairs there is a moment when reasonings cease, and action begins. He admitted the truth of this, and also, that in this instance the moment might possibly be arrived. That it was only then that the real affair commenced; and that it was probable that we might now be at the beginning of its end.

Is it not time then, I asked, to foresee, and if possible, to regulate its march? He said it was; and that as the first branch of the affair could only be conducted by the joint moral weight of the Four Powers, so must the second be (if it should present itself), by their combined material action; neither Russia, nor England, nor France, nor Austria, operating alone, but jointly, and in the name of the Alliance.

Being unacquainted with the views of Her Majesty's Government upon the subject, I did not think it advisable to press for anything more specific; but I should add, that the Prince said more than once that Austria would not decline her just share in the operation.

I have thought it my duty thus far to clear up the subject, and hope hereby to have furnished Her Majesty's Government with sufficient grounds upon which to determine their line of conduct; remarking only, that if war between the Sultan and the Pasha is to be averted, a firm and early demonstration on the part of the Four Powers, may, perhaps, be best calculated to produce that effect.

I would also observe, that nothing permanent would be gained, unless on both sides they are induced to disarm.

No. 46.

Lord William Russell to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received June* 10.)

(Extract.) *Berlin, June* 5, 1839.

BARON WERTHER said that the Prussian Minister at Constantinople as well as the military officers, had all co-operated to preserve peace and the *status quo*. One of them (Colonel Vincke) had drawn up a memorandum, in which he strategically proved to the Turks, that the commencement of hostilities must end by their defeat. This document, his Excellency said, had made more impression on the Turks, than all the remonstrances of the Foreign Ministers.

Baron Werther said, that no man had laboured more zealously and sincerely to preserve peace than Count Bouténeff, the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople; and he (the Baron) felt convinced that the Court of St. Petersburgh ardently desired the maintenance of peace in the East. I share this opinion with Baron Werther.

Baron Werther thinks that the Five Powers should call upon the Sultan and Mehemet Ali to retire and disarm their respective forces.

No. 47.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received June* 13.)

My Lord, *Therapia, May* 21, 1839.

TAHAR Pasha returned on the 19th, in the afternoon, from his inspection of the Ottoman Army under Hafiz Pasha. A Council was held to take his Report into consideration.

The best-informed persons concur in thinking war will take place.

The fleet is nearly quite ready: workmen have been employed night and day to fit it out; it may sail, if ordered to do so, in two or three days' time.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 48.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 16.)

(Extract.) *Paris, June* 14, 1839.

THE telegraph on Wednesday last announced the arrival at Marseilles, of a steam-packet from the Levant, bringing despatches which contradict the report of hostilities having commenced between the Turkish and Egyptian troops, though some scuffles had occurred between the soldiers of each army, which had been repressed by their respective officers. The date of these despatches is not stated in this telegraphic communication, and they had not reached the Foreign Office at the time I had an interview with Marshal Soult this morning.

I told the Marshal that though I had no official instruction upon the Turco-Egyptian Question, I had received private letters from your Lordship, which left no doubt in my mind, of the concurrence of Her Majesty's Government in the view taken by the Austrian and French Governments, as to the best and most practicable settlement of the question, namely: that Egypt should become hereditary in the family of Mehemet Ali under the sovereignty of the Sultan, and that the Egyptian troops should evacuate Syria.

Marshal Soult said, that in the despatches of Count St. Aulaire from Vienna, of the 18th and 22nd of last month, and of the 4th of this month, all reporting the conversations he had held with Prince Metternich on the affairs of Turkey, it did not appear that the Austrian Minister had suggested the evacuation of Syria by the Egyptians, as forming part of the proposed arrangement.

I replied that I was not apprised of the communications made by Prince Esterhazy on this matter, but that your Lordship was under the impression that this was the view both of the Austrian and French Governments; and indeed it seemed to me, if Syria were to be continued under the government of Mehemet Ali, no inducement could be found for the Sultan conceding to Mehemet Ali the hereditary government of Egypt. Ibrahim Pasha, on the real or pretended ground of the necessity of a force sufficient to repress insurrection, will continue to maintain a considerable army in that country, and the existence of such an army in the vicinity of Asia Minor would impose upon the Sultan the burden of keeping up a large military establishment in that province; and the preservation of peace, which was the object of all the European Powers, would be as uncertain as it ever had been, if the question of the occupation of Syria be only provisionally arranged at this period. Marshal Soult did not combat these opinions; but he remarked, that Syria was not the only Pashalic which was occupied by the Egyptians; that the Pashalic in which was situated the sacred city of Mecca, was held by Mehemet Ali, and might be a serious obstacle to our arriving at a satisfactory settlement; but on all these matters, his most anxious desire was, that our two Governments should come to a perfect understanding; and that if a conference of the Four Powers (or of the Five, including Prussia,) should take place on the affairs of the East, the instructions of the Representatives of France and England at such conference should be identical.

No. 49.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 17.)

My Lord, *Paris, June* 15, 1839.

I APPRISED your Lordship, in a private letter which I wrote hastily at the moment of the messenger's setting off for Calais, late last night, of the substance of the despatches from the East, which had just reached the hands of Marshal Soult.

I have been informed this morning at the Foreign Office, that two despatches were received from the French Consul at Alexandria: one dated on the 24th of May, and the other on the 27th. In the first, it is stated, that some Albanians belonging to the Turkish Army, had entered a village occupied by the Egyptians, and had been driven back by a detachment of cavalry, and that in the encounter only one Albanian and one Egyptian had been killed. In the second despatch, M. Cochelet writes, that Ibrahim Pasha represents the Turkish Army to be in a most deplorable state; that it suffers much from the want of provisions; that the troops were reduced to less than a demi ration of provisions, that one officer, and no less than 500 Turkish soldiers, had already deserted to the Egyptian camp, but that notwithstanding all the advantage which he could not fail to have in an engagement with the Sultan's Army, he should not fail to obey implicitly the orders of Mehemet not to be the aggressor.

Admiral Roussin writes from Constantinople, that although Nouri Effendi assures him, that no orders have been given to commence hostilities, little reliance can be placed on the continuance of peace; new subjects of complaint against Mehemet Ali have been brought forward. The Turkish Government assert, that both Orfa and Bassora have been occupied by Egyptian troops; but the grievance, which, above all others, has irritated the Sultan against his vassal, is the expulsion from Mecca, of two dignitaries appointed by His Highness, in his character of Head of the Mahometan Church, to reside in the sacred city.

It may be inferred from the despatches received from Alexandria, that there is not a shadow of foundation for the two first reports.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 50.

The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 17.)

(Extract.) *St. Petersburgh, June* 8, 1839.

I WAS informed on the 2nd instant, of a movement across the Euphrates, of the Turkish Army, by a letter from Mr. Yeames.

I met Count Nesselrode the following day; and as soon as I mentioned the subject, he said he believed that there was not a word of truth in the report: that his accounts from Constantinople were the most recent possible, and they led him entirely to disbelieve the intelligence which had been communicated to me, and which had appeared in the German papers.

I saw Count Nesselrode again, last evening, and although it is impossible any longer to doubt that the information which has been received from every quarter is well-founded, the Russian Ministers will not admit that it is accurately true; and they maintain the accounts to be exaggerated. Some assert, that the movement was merely one of reconnaissance, and a necessary precaution against a surprise, and that the Turkish Army speedily returned to its proper territory. Others affirm, that in some parts of the country near Bir, the Euphrates is not the boundary of Syria, and that the passage of the river does not necessarily constitute an invasion of the Pashalic of Mehemet Ali.

The Chancellerie of Count Nesselrode was in great activity on the 3rd and 4th instant, on the last of which days his Excellency waited upon the Emperor at Zarskoe-Celoe; and I believe, (but I do not know it,) that directions have been dispatched to Constantinople and Egypt, to spare no remonstrances or threats to prevent, if it may yet be possible, a conflict between the troops of the Sultan and the Pasha.

I am convinced that this event has caused surprise and great annoyance to the Imperial Government.

No. 51.

Mr. Acting-Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 17.)

My Lord, *Aleppo, May* 6, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, for your Lordship's information, copies of two despatches, dated the 30th March and 4th instant, which I have addressed to his Excellency Lord Ponsonby, G.C.B., Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

Since the latter despatch was closed, nothing further of any interest has transpired on this frontier, and meriting your Lordship's attention.

The last advices received from the frontier in the direction of Bir, is, that the Sultan's forces continue daily to cross the river, with ammunition, stores, &c. But we have no advice of the further advance of any of the Sultan's troops on any other point of his frontier.

His Excellency Ibrahim Pasha is still here, and the Egyptian forces are daily arriving, and concentrating here from different points.

It is now rumoured, that his Excellency will soon march forward with his forces towards Aintab and the river Sedjour, there to wait any attack which may be made against him by the Sultan's forces, for it is reported that his Excellency has positive orders not to pass his limits, or be the first aggressor.

But I am very much afraid, my Lord, that these movements will, if they are not intended immediately to take the offensive, eventually degenerate into hostilities.

I shall not fail to watch vigilantly, and forward immediate advice of all that transpires, to his Excellency the Ambassador at Constantinople, and to Colonel Campbell in Egypt.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) F. H. S. WERRY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 51.

Mr. Acting-Consul Werry to Viscount Ponsonby.

(Extract.) *Aleppo, March* 30, 1839.

I HAVE to acquaint your Lordship, that during this month the authorities here, and throughout this district, have been actively engaged in making extensive preparations with regard to the laying in of stores of all sorts. 4,000 okes of biscuit have been, and are still caused to be, daily made here, and in every town within this district, which are all being stored.

His Excellency the Seraskier has transmitted positive orders to this Government, to procure within five days' time, besides the usual allowance made by the "Shora," 100 cantars of soap, and the same quantity of oil, and also to purchase all the wheat and barley the Government can procure. His Excellency, further, demands of the Government here to procure as many horses and mules as possible, without considerations as to price; and directs that neither the animals they purchase, nor those of the artillery regiments in garrison here, are to be put out to grass until he arrives to give further orders on the subject.

I hear that of late there has been a considerable quantity of ammunition and military stores brought to this coast from Egypt, part of which have been landed, and are daily arriving here; the remainder, it is said, have gone round to Tarsous, and from thence have been conveyed to the defile of the Taurus and that district.

I am informed that this Government has issued orders to all the forces at the different points on this frontier, to hold themselves ready; but with the exception of a regiment lately landed at Suedia, from Egypt, which I hear is to proceed to Idlep, there is no further movement of any sort among any of the troops, who, I hear, all continue in their usual positions. His Excellency the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha left Damascus after the Ramazan, and arrived at Hamah on his way to this place, the 4th instant, where he has been ever since, occupied, it is said, in causing wheat and barley to be purchased, and all the horses and mules that can be procured. It is also positively stated, that his Excellency Solyman Pasha (the French Colonel Sèves) has arrived at Hamah, from Seyda, in order to have a conference with the Seraskier, for what object it is not yet known.

His Excellency the Seraskier is now daily looked for here, but it is uncertain whether he will be accompanied by Solyman Pasha.

I beg leave to acquaint your Lordship, with regard to the movements of the Sultan's forces, that I learn from persons that have lately arrived from Malatia, Diarbekir, and Mesopotamia, that very great and extensive military preparations are also being made by all the Sultan's authorities throughout the whole line of that country. I have not been able to elicit to what direction all these are to be directed. The persons from those parts say, that the most current report even with the troops is, that they are soon to march to Aleppo; others again say that they are to act in conjunction with Ali Pasha of Bagdad's forces, against Ismael Pasha (the Koord) of Amadieh.

Other reports coming from Malatia, state that there have been very extensive military preparations making, but that they had very much decreased, and that there was no particular movement of any sort, not even among any of the troops; and further assert, that the Seraskier Hafiz Ali Pasha had been called to Constantinople, and had been replaced by the late Seraskier Rechid Mahomed Pasha's son, who has taken command of the Sultan's forces in Mesopotamia and that neighbourhood; that Solyman Pasha of Marash had also received orders to proceed forthwith to Constantinople, with two other Pashas, the names of whom I have not been able to learn. It is stated, that at Marash there are hardly any troops at all; at Bir there are about 5,000, and at Orfa from 15,000 to 20,000 men; the forces at Malatia are stated to be about 25,000 to 30,000 men; for owing to the very severe weather in those parts, and the bad condition of the barracks, the bulk of the troops are now at Diarbekir.

From all accounts, the military preparations making by this Government and that of the Sultan in Mesopotamia, and along the whole line of the frontier, have on both sides been certainly very extensive of late; but for the present all their preparations appear defensive, and accompanied with nothing to denote any aggressive steps on either side. A few weeks longer will throw a little more light on this subject, and develop more clearly the reason for which they are pursuing these preparatory measures. I shall not fail immediately to inform your Lordship of whatever may further transpire.

Hassan Bey, Colonel of the 2d Regiment of Foot Guards quartered here, has been put under an arrest by his Excellency the Governor, until his Excellency the Seraskier's orders are known. There are several reports respecting his arrest: first, that he was in correspondence with the Sultan's authorities, and that the Government here had detected letters which he addressed to the Sultan's Seraskier, inviting him to invade Syria; the second report is that he was detected in a premeditated plan to fly with some of his troops over to the Sultan; but both of these want further confirmation.

I beg leave to mention to your Lordship a circumstance which has this moment been reported to me; that in two or three weeks a considerable force, composed of foot and horse, are to come to Aleppo; and the reason given for this is, that there is to be, under Solyman Pasha, a grand military review, in which the forces are to go through some military manœuvres and evolutions. I cannot vouch for the authenticity of this report, as I have not heard it from any other quarter. But under the present state of affairs, and the very extensive preparations making by this Government, in stores and provisions of all sorts, I consider it my duty to acquaint your Lordship of this circumstance, although it has not yet been confirmed.

Inclosure 2 in No. 51.

Mr. Acting-Consul Werry to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Aleppo, May* 4, 1839.

I HAD the honour of addressing your Excellency under the 30th of March; since then no Tatar has left this to enable me to communicate with your Lordship; and as the events that have passed on this frontier, within the last fortnight, are of great interest and importance, and such as I consider require that your Lordship should be made acquainted with them, without loss of time, I feel it my duty, although I reported the intelligence immediately to Mr. Consul Werry of Damascus, begging of him to forward advices of the same, *viâ* Egypt, to your Lordship, to dispatch the present by Hadji Omar, who was formerly in the service of the Euphrates Expedition, and who has promised me to deliver this, my packet, to your Lordship, within ten days' time from this.

I represented to your Lordship, in my last communication of the 30th March, that both this Government, and that of the Sultan, in the direction of Malatia, Orfa, and Diarbekir, were making very extensive preparations, in provisions, ammunition, and military stores of all sorts, but without any movement of troops up to that period.

I now beg leave to acquaint your Lordship, that under the 23rd ultimo, advices reached this Government by spies, that the Sultan's authorities had begun to cross troops at Bir, which were stated to consist of three regiments of Infantry.

The Musselim of this town immediately mounted his horse, and proceeded to Khan Touman, distant about five hours from hence, where his Excellency the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha was, looking after his agricultural interests in that neighbourhood, accompanied by Menekly Achmet Pasha, the Minister of War, who had reached this from Egypt, under the 16th ultimo, and is said to be the bearer of secret instructions to his Excellency the Seraskier, from His Highness Mehemet Ali.

The Musselim communicating the intelligence of which he was bearer, the Seraskier ordered his horse, and, previous to mounting, sent off a forced post, said to be for Egypt, and then left for this town, which he reached like wildfire. After holding a divan of his head officers, he dispatched that same night twelve forced posts, said to be to call his troops from their different stations, and sent an officer to bring immediately the animals of the Artillery Regiment stationed here, who had only fifteen days ago been sent to grass.

The subsequent advices which reached this Government the following day are, that 3,000 Irregulars had crossed the Euphrates under Koord Mahomed Pasha; and since then, up to this time, that a considerable force under a certain Ismael Pasha, is reported to have encamped at about three hours' distance from the banks of the river.

With regard to the number of troops that have crossed, there are several reports, but the most correct, from the latest intelligence received, coming from an authentic source, is, that there are no more than 15,000 men under Ismael Pasha, Koord Mahomed Pasha, and Inge Bairactar Mehemet Pasha, that have passed the river at Bir, with ammunition, stores, and some few artillery pieces. I am told that the Sultan's troops find great difficulty in crossing the Euphrates at this period, owing to the late heavy rains, which have caused it to swell greatly; so that the eleven boats they have there can only perform the service twice a-day,—once to bring troops across, and then the provisions, &c., required for them.

The troops that have crossed at Bir, compose part of one of the columns of the Turkish army, which is advancing on the frontier in that quarter, and which, it is said, will be joined by Ali Pasha of Bagdad, who, it is stated, has already arrived at Diarbekir with about 25,000 to 30,000 men. Another column, under the Seraskier Hafiz Ali Pasha, of, it is said, 60,000 strong, is advancing from Malatia, on Roum Kale; and the third column of 40,000 men, under Halil Pasha and Solyman Pasha, are advancing on the Marash line.

I am informed that a post reached this the day before yesterday from Aintab, bringing intelligence to his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha, that a force of about 15,000 to 20,000 men had all at once appeared at the further extremity of that plain; but from very strict inquiry that I have made, I cannot find that either that column, or the other two of the Sultan's forces, have as yet passed their limits; and I am positively assured that for the present, and up to the last advices received, they all continued within their jurisdiction.

It is reported here by some, that the brother of Hafiz Pasha is advancing with Suffook Bey of the Gerba Arabs, to act with all the Arabs on the Desert line. This is not confirmed in any way; from all inquiry I have made, there does not appear to be anything doing on that line from Dair to Hamah. I shall not fail to inform your Lordship, if I hear of any operations on that line.

By last advices from Damascus, I hear that the Haouran insurrection still continued, and had assumed a more determined character. This may arise not unlikely from some understanding which may exist between them and the Sultan's Seraskier, to act in unison with Hafiz Pasha's brother and Suffook Bey, in any operations which they may undertake to the South and on the Desert line, to cut off his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha and his forces to the South, from his operations on this northern frontier.

With regard to the movements on this side, I have to inform your Lordship, that this Government is actively occupied daily in laying in with all possible dispatch, provisions, ammunition, and stores of all sorts; besides those obtained here, there are daily arrivals from Latakia, landed there from Egypt.

It appears that his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha intends to make Aleppo his head-quarters, at least for the present. Since the advices reached this, that some of the Sultan's forces had crossed the Euphrates, his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha's forces are daily arriving here, and are being lodged in mosques, khans, and every place the Government can procure. I inclose, for your Lordship's information, copy of a note of the forces that have arrived here, and those that are expected.

His Excellency Ibrahim Pasha intends, after the arrival of all the forces, to have a general review of the whole, and then purposes to march his forces at about ten or twelve hours' distance, and form his camp in the plain between this place and Aintab, and near the river Sedjour, and there wait any attack which may be made against him by the Sultan's forces; for I am positively assured, that his Excellency has received through Achmet Menekly Pasha, the Minister of War, positive orders from his father Mehemet Ali, not to move out of his limits upon any consideration, or to be the first aggressor. Some say that his instructions are to act on the defensive, and on his own territory to resist two attacks of the Sultan's forces; but on the third he gives him permission to advance. How far this may be true remains to be seen; as yet, he has no regular troops nearer the frontier than this. The Annadis, or Bedouin Cavalry, are the only troops on the frontiers; they are stationed at the Sedjour, watching the movements on the other side.

I have to inform your Lordship, that by Mr. Vice-Consul Hays's last letter, everything was quiet in his district, and among the late malcontents of the mountains in that neighbourhood. But from some conversation that I had yesterday with several persons who are well acquainted, and come into continual contact with the inhabitants of the whole range of those mountains extending from Beylan to Byass, and along that continuity to those of the Taurus, I learn that in the event of any hostilities taking place between the Sultan's forces and the Egyptians, in which the latter met with any repulse, the whole of that immense range of mountains would in all probability take up arms against his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha; and this is the opinion of many persons; but only in the event of Ibrahim Pasha's forces meeting with a defeat.

I am informed by persons that have just come from the Adana district, that his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha has a force of Irregular Cavalry (Bashi Bozuks) and Annadis, say 4,000 to 5,000 men, on the Byass mountains, and some along the continuity of that range to the base of the Taurus.

Mr. Vice-Consul Hays informs me, that the mountains in his district are, for the present, quiet, but there is no doubt that if hostilities commence, the Sultan's Pashas will try to excite all the malcontents on that line to revolt, and take up arms against the Egyptians; I have begged of Mr. Vice-Consul Hays to be very vigilant on all that is doing in that quarter, which I will not fail to transmit to your Lordship.

I am further informed that his Excellency the Pasha has directed that the force at Adana is not to move, but to be ready to act in the event of any attack being directed by the Sultan on the defile line. I inclose for your Lordship's information, a note of the forces at Adana and the defile of the Taurus.

I have made strict inquiry, but I do not find that for the present there are any of the Sultan's forces marching on that line.

I am very sorry to be obliged to acquaint your Lordship, that from inquiry I have made from our merchants, the present critical state of affairs in this country is causing most ruinous consequences to our trade; for since the intelligence received of the Sultan's forces having crossed the Euphrates, and that the army is advancing on the frontier at different points, with an apparent hostile intention,—and subsequently the steps taken by this Government in the concentration of all the Egyptian forces in this neighbourhood,—the commerce of this place has been completely paralyzed, and commercial transactions of all sorts have entirely ceased; thereby causing great detriment to our British merchants, who can neither effect sales of the large stocks they have on hand, nor recover, at this present moment that payments are suspended under the plea of the unsettled state of affairs, any of their outstanding debts, of which they have on the place to such large amounts; moreover, this suspension of trade is not only ruinous to our merchants established here, but it also causes considerable detriment and loss to our general commercial interests.

Mr. Vice-Consul Hays informs me, that under the 30th ultimo, the Austrian frigate "Medea," arrived there in eighteen days from Smyrna, bearing the flag of Commodore Bandiera. I believe her visit at Alexandretta is only the yearly one, to obtain all the news from this part of Syria, for which purpose he sent up a messenger to the Austrian Consul-General here.

It is, I believe, the Commodore's intention from Scanderoon to go southwards.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) F. H. S. WERRY.

Inclosure 3 in No. 51.

Note of the Egyptian Forces that are at Aleppo.

INFANTRY.	CAVALRY.
2nd of the Guards.	
3rd ditto	1st Lancers of the Guard.
2nd of the Line.	1st Cuirassiers.
4th ditto	1st Lancers.
9th ditto	2nd do.
10th ditto	
11th ditto	
17th ditto	
34th ditto	
9 Regiments.	4 Regiments.

ARTILLERY.

1st of the Guard.
2nd of Foot.

2 Regiments.

Note of Egyptian Forces expected to arrive.

INFANTRY.	CAVALRY.
1st of the Guard.	
6th of the Line.	6th.
35th ditto	11th.
3 Regiments.	2 Regiments.

And 6 Regiments of the Line are expected from Egypt.

Inclosure 4 in No. 51.

Note of the Forces at Adana and the Defile of the Taurus.

At Adana.

INFANTRY.	CAVALRY.
29th of the Line.	5th.
30th ditto.	7th.
2 Regiments.	2 Regiments.

At the Defile of the Taurus.

5th of Infantry of the Line.
2 Battalions of Sappers.
2 Battalions of Artillerymen.
And 2 Forts and 8 Batteries, mounting in all 150 Cannons.

No. 52.

Mr. Consul Moore to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 17.)

My Lord, *Beyrout, May* 9, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship, that accounts have been received at this place, of the passage of the Euphrates by the Sultan's troops, at Bir, and that forces under Hafiz Pasha are also advancing on the northern frontier.

On the other hand, the Egyptian troops have been summoned to Aleppo by Ibrahim Pasha, from all parts of Syria, and he has encamped his forces in the immediate neighbourhood of that city. His Highness is strongly fortifying and entrenching his position,—apparently with the intention to wait an attack, which is universally believed to be imminent.

The conflict, however, should it take place, will probably be deferred till after the Turkish moon Saffar, ending the 12th instant,—a season considered inauspicious by the Moslems for commencing military operations.

The maximum of Ibrahim Pasha's force in Syria is estimated at 60,000 regular troops. Report makes that of the Sultan at least double the amount, including irregulars; but it is not possible, at this distance, to number the latter army with any degree of accuracy. And indeed all that transpires just now, relative to pending events, coming chiefly through the organs or partizans of the respective parties, must be received with much caution.

The most active preparations are making by this Government to maintain a prompt communication with Egypt. Couriers from Aleppo are to reach Cairo the sixth day.

The Emir Bechir has received orders to send a force to Damascus and Tripoli; and about 1,000 Christian troops will march to each of the above places, under the command of the son and grandson of the Emir. This is a measure of precaution, as at neither of the above cities is the Mahomedan population believed to be well affected to the existing Government. Indeed any success on the part of the Sultan's troops, it is believed, would be the signal for revolt not only at those places, but throughout Syria.

An exception to this feeling I am of opinion may be looked for amongst the Christian troops of Lebanon, who certainly entertain fears that should the Sultan repossess himself of Syria, the Mahomedans would regain the ascendancy, and once more exhibit their naturally intolerant and fanatical character towards other sects.

In this immediate neighbourhood all is for the present tranquil, but much anxiety exists amongst all classes, but especially in the Christian population, as to the issue of pending events.

An individual whose life is of immense importance to the Egyptian cause at the present juncture, is Solyman Pasha, perhaps the only person in Ibrahim Pasha's army possessing the requisite talents for extensive and combined military operations.

No reliance can be placed on the accounts received respecting the insurrection in the Ledgea. I have observed that as the monthly period of the communication with Europe approaches, the authorities represent them as terminated, and that subsequent information belies those accounts.

A distinguished traveller who has just returned to this place from a tour along the banks of the Jordan, assures me, that he found the Arab tribes there all opposed to Ibrahim Pasha, and ardently desirous of an opportunity of acting hostilely against him. They had, of late, begun to show themselves in large masses, armed, on this side Jordan, and to enter the villages, which a little time ago they did not venture to do. The news of the Sultan's troops having crossed the Euphrates, had not reached the Jordan, when the traveller alluded to left its banks about eight days ago; but he does not doubt the news will afford the liveliest pleasure to the Arab tribes there, and lead to an open demonstration of their feelings should a collision between the armies take place.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) N. MOORE.

P.S.—13th May, up to this day, nothing new relative to the movement of the armies.

N. M.

No. 53.

Mr. Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 17.)

My Lord, *Damascus, May* 10, 1839.

ON the 27th ultimo, I received intelligence from Mr. Pro-Consul F. H. S. Werry at Aleppo, under date of the 23rd, of the advance of the Sultan's troops, crossing the Euphrates at Bir, and the measures taking by His Highness Ibrahim Pasha. This information I transmitted the same day to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, *viâ* Beyrout, and to Her Majesty's Resident in Egypt, by the Government post.

On the 30th, I received further intelligence from Mr. Pro-Consul Werry at Aleppo, under date of the 25th and 27th, of the further movements of the Sultan's Army and His Highness Ibrahim Pasha's measures, which I transmitted the same day to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, *viâ* Beyrout, and to Her Majesty's Resident in Egypt, by the Government post. And on the 29th, I transmitted *viâ* Beyrout, to Her Majesty's Resident at Cairo, the information I was in possession of on the foregoing subjects.

I now have the honour to inclose copies of all the intelligence I received from Mr. Pro-Consul Werry, at Aleppo, to those dates, for your Lordship's information, as the Pro-Consul at Aleppo may be prevented transmitting the same to your Lordship.

I make no doubt your Lordship is fully informed of the cause for which the Sultan's Army is advancing, whether for a demonstration for a political object, either to cover Bagdad, or for any other political motive connected with the Sultan's Asiatic provinces and Persia, or for that of invading Syria. I, consequently, abstain from intruding and fatiguing your Lordship with speculative opinions thereon.

The Sultan's forces are stated to be 80,000 men and 170 guns; but whether that number includes all arms and the Irregulars, is not ascertained. Lieutenant Lynch, at Bagdad, states the Seraskier's Army to be 35,000 Regulars.

By the latest advices, it would appear that the Sultan's Army would have its head-quarters, and form the pivot of its operations at Roum Kale, its left extending on the high road from Bir to Aleppo, with its extreme left to be supported by the Arab tribes under Suffook Bey, operating by crossing the Euphrates between Bir, and below Dair. Its extreme right resting on Marash, to co-operate with the malcontents of the ranges of the Taurus:

By way of Roum Kale and Bir, against the centre and main body of the Egyptian Army, the columns of the former turning the Egyptian positions at Aintab: by way of Marash, to co-operate with the malcontents of the ranges of the Taurus, extending to Byass, Beylan, and Alexandretta, and threatening the left wing and rear of the Egyptian Army: the Arabs under Suffook Bey acting on the right of the Egyptian Army, and attacking the flank of Syria, uniting with the insurgents of the Haouran, and intercepting the desert line from south to north, cutting off the operations of Ibrahim Pasha therewith, and attacking him in the rear at Aleppo.

Besides crossing the Euphrates unopposed, and advancing into the Egyptian territories, and attacking Ibrahim Pasha's Army, the Sultan's Seraskier has also the advantage of having the population in his favour; but as he will be removed from his depôts of provisions, or have difficulty to bring them up in his rear, that latter advantage is counter-balanced, unless the population, which is not generally armed, rises against the Egyptians; such advantage will increase, should the first attack prove favourable to the Sultan's arms; but should a general action take place, and the contrary fate is experienced, the Sultan's Army will have great difficulty to retreat across the Euphrates; still the passage is susceptible of being defended against the Egyptians; this operation both ways will be difficult of execution, as neither are provided with pontoon equipages, and the boats available on the river at different points, for common purposes, are inadequate. Thus, in a military point of view, it may be said, that should the Sultan's Army be overthrown in a general battle on this side of the Euphrates, it may be looked upon as lost.

I am without any information of what is going on in the Adana district, and whether the Sultan's forces are advancing either along the coast of Caramania, or by the defile of the Taurus.

His Highness Ibrahim Pasha's forces will be twenty-two regiments of Infantry, twelve regiments of Cavalry, and six of Artillery, Regulars, say 55,000 bayonets, 10,000 sabres, including the Cavalry artillerymen, and 196 guns; besides 6,000 Irregular Annadi Cavalry, the body of Albanians said to be expected from Candia, and such other irregular mountain foot as he can collect from the neighbourhood of the Taurus. There will also be about 2,500 to 3,000 Hauharrah Irregular Cavalry to protect the desert line.

It appears, from the measures taking by Ibrahim Pasha, that he is concentrating his troops in the first instance, to cover Aleppo, and that if he waits to be attacked by the main body of the Sultan's Army from Roum Kale and Bir, he is placed in an unfavourable and false position, and is exposing his position and both wings of his army, to the imminent risk of being out-flanked, turned, and taken in the rear; and the principal attack of the Sultan's Seraskier, if made at all, will not probably be made until that takes place. What measures Ibrahim Pasha will take to counteract any operations which the Sultan's Seraskier may undertake by Marash, and the malcontents of the ranges of the Taurus, whether by Byass, to intercept Ibrahim's communications with Alexandretta, or in the plains of Aleppo, I am uninformed. The troops in position at Killis, though not sufficiently to the left, and for the present of inadequate force, and seemingly to support the position at Aintab, will require to be supported by a large body of irregulars, foot, and cavalry, should that position be intended to prevent the irruption of the Sultan's forces into the plain, with the object to menace the left wing of Ibrahim Pasha's Army before, or in advance of, Aleppo. Probably the Albanians said to be expected from Candia under Mustafa Pasha, are intended to act on that line; and as the country from Marash, Byass, and Beylan, and to the plains of Aleppo, is chiefly mountainous, they may act with advantage.

To protect the desert line, and defend the right wing against the attacks of the Arabs, whether directed from the Sultan's jurisdiction, those of the Syrian desert and the malcontents of Haouran, and any which may be excited to join the Sultan's auxiliaries on that line, it would appear Ibrahim Pasha can only act by the Annadi Cavalry and other irregular Cavalry; and it remains to be seen if he has sufficient force of this kind to direct on these points, to embrace all these objects effectually. But unless Suffook Bey penetrates to the Syrian frontier, and takes a decisive part in the attacks on that line, of which there may exist some doubt, as the Arab tribes in common are too intelligent and cunning to compromise themselves until they are certain that a general battle has given a decided superiority to either the Sultan's or the Egyptian Army, nothing is likely to materially defeat the Egyptian operations on the desert line, though the marauding Arab tribes will take advantage of every opportunity to pillage and plunder, which may be partially restrained by detachments of Annadi Cavalry. Late advices from Bagdad mention, that Suffook Bey had been in that vicinity, and had made peace with the Shamma Arabs, and had returned to the north through the Jesirah, leaving Sengar on the right, to act with the Sultan's Seraskier, Hafiz Pasha, in his operations on the Syrian desert line. This cannot be commenced without being on good terms with the Shamma Arabs, who are on the east side of the Euphrates; but as the latter are always at war with the great tribes of the Annarees, who hold the desert between the Euphrates and the Syrian line, it will be an operation of considerable difficulty for Suffook Bey to act successfully and combine the whole against the Egyptian forces or jurisdiction on the flank of Syria.

It does not appear by the progress made by the Egyptian Government in forming depôts of provisions, which generally are at a considerable distance in the rear of Aleppo, and on the desert line, and by the tardy operation executing by Ibrahim Pasha, of concentrating the army on the Aleppo frontier, that his Highness had previously planned to throw his operations across the Euphrates, and make Mesopotamia the theatre of his campaign, whether to prosecute the same towards Bagdad, or to the north. In fact, they would appear to have been planned for defence rather than for aggression. It may also be remarked, that if the Egyptian Army is defeated, it has no reserves or force in its rear, or any means it can rely on, to recruit or recover itself, to hold possession of Syria.

The Haouran insurrection has not subsided; the insurgents have manifested a determined hostile spirit to the Government. Part remain in the Ledgea, and most of them commit ravages on the adjacent villages and passengers of all descriptions. They pillaged the messengers bringing the intelligence of the approach of the caravan from Mecca, and have had an encounter with the cavalry force under Shebli Harrian, in which they were the chief sufferers. They still, however, temporize and negotiate with the Government here for pardon, but always retain their hostile attitude. The Government, with a view to conciliate them in the present political state of affairs in the north, and spare from devastation the abundant crops in the Haouran district, from which Damascus obtains its chief supplies, listens to their propositions, and in most instances appears to consent to their demands. But I have learnt from a good source, that the chiefs of these insurgents have received intimation that they may expect aid from —— to maintain them in hostility against the Egyptian Government; and that they have sent to say, they await it and will join him. Thus, I don't see any immediate prospect of this insurrection being extinguished, and it appears chiefly dependent on the military operations on the Aleppo frontiers. Though Government to-day gives out, that affairs have been arranged with them, and the Irregular Cavalry of Shebli Harrian has been withdrawn from acting against them.

500 or 600 Mutuali horsemen, who fled from the district of the Emir Bechir, between Balbec and the Cedars, infested the road on the line of Hamah; orders were sent to act against them with the Christians of Gebel Akar, and it is said the Mutualis have, for the present, returned to obedience.

The preparations making for the depôts of provisions for the army in the North, have continued with unabated activity here, at Homs and Hamah. A large quantity of ammunition has been received from Acre, and sent to Aleppo.

The Treasury here has been drained of funds sent to Aleppo, for the payment of the troops and the military demands. The Ferdeh tax, which should not be issued for four months hence, is being actively collected. The farmers of the Customs' duty, and duty on wine and spirits, have been imprisoned and menaced with the bastinado, to oblige them to pay up arrears of the revenue: they consequently made terms with the Government; but fresh demands made on them for funds, have caused them to disappear.

The 2nd Regiment of Guards, and the 14th of the line Infantry, and the Horse Artillery here, have marched to Aleppo. Two regiments of Cavalry from Gazza, and 1,000 Annadi Cavalry also left for the same destination. All the Artillery at Homs, the 1st Regiment of Guards and one regiment of the line Infantry at Hamah, marched for Aleppo.

The Government here continues to press the departure of all the Annadi Cavalry as it arrives from Egypt, for the north. 260 camels have been purchased and sent to the army, to complete the original number ordered by Ibrahim Pasha.

The Government here has sent to Acre about 5,000 stand of arms, which had been taken from the population and placed in the castle; this measure is taken to place them in safety, in the event of a change of circumstances, either from the population, or the enemy.

Ibrahim Pasha's Tatar Agha arrived here, to place additional relays on the road between Aleppo, Damascus, and Cairo, by which the service may henceforward be performed in six days, between his Highness' head-quarters and Cairo.

Damascus and its immediate vicinity continues in a tranquil state, though the military movements in the north occupy exclusively the public mind, and create considerable uneasiness. Commerce at Aleppo and here, may be said to be entirely suspended, and indeed, not only the British and European interests, but those generally of the population, are in a precarious and suffering state.

Damascus will be guarded by a battalion of the 25th Regiment, 1,000 Infantry from Jerusalem, about 500 or 600 Invalids, 3,000 Christian Irregular Foot troops from the Emir Bechir's territories, under his son Emir Halil, and a body of Irregular Cavalry; and though the Mussulman population is disaffected, I do not think they dare rise so long as this force remains here.

The Emir Bechir has also sent troops, under different Emirs, to guard Tripoli, Beyrout, and the towns on the coast.

I hear that the Chiefs of the Haouran insurgents have arrived here, and had an interview with his Excellency Sheriff Pasha; and that pardon has been granted to and accepted by them; and that the affair is, at least for the present, pacified.

I have also just received further advices from Mr. Pro-Consul Werry at Aleppo, and in order that your Lordship may not experience inconvenience from want of such information reaching you, I have the honour to inclose copies of the same.

I learn from Mr. Vice-Consul Hays, that latterly, 10,000 troops have arrived at Tarsous and Adana; and that forty guns had arrived there from Egypt.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) N. W. WERRY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 53.

Substance of a private letter received April 27, per weekly post, from Mr. Pro-Consul F. H. S. Werry, dated Aleppo, April 23, 1839.

AT about an hour before noon on the 23rd, a Government spy reached Aleppo from Bir, with the intelligence that three Regiments of the Sultan's Infantry had crossed the Euphrates at Bir, but had not then advanced, and were still on the Sultan's territory. His Highness Ibrahim Pasha and Menekly Achmet Pasha were absent at Khan Touman, occupied with his Highness' agricultural interests there; and his Excellency the Governor Ismael Bey was absent at his villages, engaged in the same pursuits. The spy communicated the intelligence to the Musselim of Aleppo, who having consulted with the chief officers there, it was considered necessary that he should proceed post to his Highness Ibrahim Pasha to give him the intelligence. His Highness on receiving it, immediately mounted his horse and came in full speed to Aleppo, and held a Divan of all the Colonels and Solyman Pasha; and in the course of an hour, eight express posts were sent off, it is supposed to call his troops from different points and stations. His Highness then ordered that the provisions he had previously commanded should be completed by the following day at noon, under pain of death to whoever did not comply. It is stated, that the intelligence his Highness received of the advancing of the Sultan's troops had very much discomposed him, as it came upon him unawares, and he did not the least expect it.

There was no Tatar or any other conveyance leaving Aleppo for Constantinople, by which Mr. Pro-Consul F. H. S. Werry could transmit the intelligence to Her Majesty's Ambassador.

The preparations continued at Aleppo as before advised, and the agent at Latakia informed the Pro-Consul that there were daily arrivals there of stores and ammunition; 1,000 cases of gunpowder had arrived at Aleppo a day or two back from Latakia.

The Pro-Consul was without information if the Sultan's troops were advancing by way of Marash.

The Government at Aleppo was making great exertion to collect the revenue. A supply had been prepared to pay the troops at Aintab, which on the present emergency had been applied for the acquisition of stores.

It is stated that private advices mentioned the arrival of six regiments of the Sultan's troops at Orfa from Malatia, and it is conjectured the force that crossed at Bir formed a part of it.

Inclosure 2 in No. 53.

Substance of a Private Letter, received the 30th April, per an express foot messenger, from Mr. Pro-Consul F. H. S. Werry, dated Aleppo, April 25, 1839.

CONFIRMING the intelligence given under the 23rd, of a body of the Sultan's troops having crossed the Euphrates at Bir.

He states there was no Tatar to be obtained, or any other conveyance offering to transmit the intelligence to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, on which he expresses much regret and anxiety.

He states by the latest advices, the Sultan's troops were still in his territories.

He states that he omitted under the 23rd, to inform me that, in consequence of the late reports that his Highness Ibrahim Pasha has posted a force at the village of Nezib in the Sultan's jurisdiction, Mr. Pro-Consul Werry had sent his Cawass on horseback the 23rd, to Bir. The Cawass had been instructed in passing Nezib to make inquiry what force was or had been there, and what was doing in the direction of Bir.

Inclosure 3 in No. 53.

Substance of a Private Letter received the 30th April, by the Government Post, from Mr. Pro-Consul Werry, dated Aleppo, April 27, 1839.

HE states, that the Sultan's Officer, Ismael Pasha, crossed the Euphrates at Bir, having, it is said, the command of 10,000 Cavalry, 3,000 of which had crossed; and that troops, cannon, ammunition, and military stores, were daily crossing.

That the Musselim of Aintab arrived at Aleppo the night before, bringing a letter which had been addressed him by Ismael Pasha, and which the Musselim delivered to his Highness Ibrahim Pasha for his information. This letter states, that in a few days Ismael Pasha hoped to arrive at Aintab, and that the Musselim was to have everything in readiness for him, as he made no doubt of his fidelity to the Sultan, although he was in Ibrahim Pasha's service. His Highness, on reading this letter, desired the Musselim to return to his post, and let them write what they liked, he was his Musselim, and had nothing to fear.

That on the 26th, two Persian messengers had arrived at Aleppo, bearers of letters to the pilgrims at Damascus.

They state, that on their arrival at Malatia, they requested from the Sultan's Seraskier, Hafiz Pasha, tezkerehs; that the Seraskier replied, "Wait here six days, until I go in the direction of Roum Kale."

The Sultan's Army advanced, and the messengers followed; on arriving at Besne, finding that the Army advanced slowly, they fled during the night. The Seraskier continuing his march for Roum Kale. They state that the Seraskier's forces are 80,000 men and 170 guns.

Nothing positive was known at Aleppo under the 27th, except that the Sultan's forces were marching on the frontiers.

His Highness Ibrahim Pasha had not reinforced his positions on the frontiers; he appeared to be collecting his troops at Aleppo. It is stated, that two regiments of Infantry and one of Cavalry had arrived, and four other regiments were to arrive the following day. His Highness Ibrahim Pasha had caused all the mosques to be taken note of, except the two large ones, and has taken many houses and khans to place troops in. This is supposed to denote that his Highness intends to make Aleppo his head-quarters. The requisitions of provisions for the Army was so great, that even bread could not be obtained in the bazaar.

2,000 Annadis, Irregular Cavalry, were the only troops that have been sent in advance by his Highness Ibrahim Pasha, and they are at the Sedjour River.

The Cawass of the Consulate sent to Bir, returned on the 27th at daylight, without having been able to proceed to his destination. He met with opposition, and narrowly escaped with his life. A report the Cawass was making is promised to be sent.

Up to the latest advices, the Sultan's troops had not entered the Egyptian territories.

Inclosure 4 in No. 53.

Extracts from Copy of Aleppo Journal, brought down from the 18*th of April to the* 25*th idem.*

April 18.

HIS Highness the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha left this at noon for some of his villages in the neighbourhood of Khan Touman, in order, it is said, to look into his agricultural interests there. His Excellency Achmet Menekly Pasha accompanied his Highness in this excursion.

This Government continues to make very extensive preparations in ammunition, military stores, and provisions of all sorts.

April 19.

The late extensive preparations that have been making by this Government continue to be pursued with great activity. As yet, no movement of any of the troops has taken place indicating hostile measures.

April 20.

His Excellency Kourschid Pasha left this for Adana, to take the command of his post as Governor of that district. From a Christian merchant just arrived from Orfa, I learn that a few days previous to his departure, six regiments of Infantry had reached that place from Malatia, part of which were daily expected to start for Birejick. This Orfaleen further adds, that the Sultan's Authorities at that place, and throughout the whole line of country, are making very extensive military preparations, which are being pursued with great activity, and that the daily arrivals of ammunition and warlike stores from the north, are very great and incredible, all of which were reported as being intended against Syria. The preparations on this side, by all the Egyptian Authorities, continue with the same activity and unabated perseverance.

Part of a large quantity of biscuit, ammunition, and other military stores, that have been landed at Latakia from Egypt, have reached this place. There is a report in town, that the mission of his Excellency Achmet Menekly Pasha, is to instruct Ibrahim Pasha from his Highness Mehemet Ali, that, according to the understanding with the European Powers, the Egyptian forces are not to pass their limits the first, or be the first aggressors; and that, therefore, Ibrahim Pasha is to collect his forces in this district, and await the Sultan's forces, but on no account to march forward, or in any way attack the Sultan, unless he is the first aggressor.

April 21.

His Excellency the Governor Ismael Bey left this for his villages, to look into his agricultural interests there. The late preparations that have been making by this Government in biscuit, soap, oil, ammunition, and other military stores, continue to be pursued with great activity.

Received a letter from Mr. Vice-Consul Elias, of Latakia, under date 16th instant, inclosing copy of his journal, mentioning the late extensive arrivals at that port, of ammunition and stores, and those reported that are to follow.

April 24.

I am this morning informed, from the same authentic source that I obtained yesterday's intelligence, that another Government spy reached this place during the night, who left after yesterday's one, and who reports, that besides the three regiments of Infantry on this side of the Euphrates, there are 3,000 Bashi Bozuks, or Irregular Cavalry, that have crossed the river, under Koord Mahomed Pasha.

It is further reported, that this Koord Mahomed Pasha has the command of 10,000 of these troops, 3,000 of whom have only crossed, but that more are to follow.

This morning, the Annadi troops have all been ordered to mount and proceed to Beglie, a village on the road from hence to Bir, with orders to reconnoitre and see what is going on, but not to cross in any way the limits.

This forenoon, his Highness the Seraskier dispatched twelve officers, all of whom have separate missions; said to be, to bring immediately troops from different stations. An officer also started to bring in the Artillery horses that are at grass; and I am positively informed that the Artillery is all out and ready, only waiting for the animals.

The Dragoman Lewis Hakim tells me, that this day at noon, he was at the Seraglio, and heard the Musselim give the following orders to the butchers and bakers: that by command of his Highness the Seraskier, beginning from the day after to-morrow, 7,500 okes of fresh meat are to be daily supplied for the troops, and 20,000 okes of flour daily, for the same purpose. It is also rumoured to-day, that Government are to pay the troops, officers, and employés, nine months' pay.

The Government Authorities are with great activity and exertion pursuing the preparations; there is already great scarcity of wood, charcoal, and grain of all sorts.

Everything continues quiet in the town. His Excellency Solyman Pasha, who has been, ever since his arrival here, staying at the garden of his Excellency Ismael Bey, has now transported his things into town, and has taken up his abode with his Highness the Seraskier in his palace.

April 25.

I am informed, that during the past night, part of the Artillery horses reached this, from grass.

It is rumoured that the four regiments at present in garrison here, are to leave this and encamp between Aleppo and Aintab, and that other three regiments will replace them here.

It is said, that the Pasha has ordered the members of the Board of Health to go round the town and visit some of the mosques, to find one suitable as an hospital.

The public report during this day is, that the Sultan's forces are marching on three columns from Marash, Bir, and the Desert. (This is not authentic.)

At mid-day, the remainder of the Artillery horses reached this.

This Government is actively pursuing the late preparations, and causing everything to be got ready.

It is reported that late last night, a forced post in forty-one hours reached this from Beyrout, to the following purpose:

"Jeri verso il tarde una posta da Berutti per 41 ore, giunse qui con dei dispacj a Sua Altesse Ibrahim Pasha, proveniente d'Alessandria, in data 5 Sefer, per informarlo degli avisi, che egli avevano da Costantinapoli, d'aver ordinato il Gran Signor che le sue forze si avicinassero sulle frontiere della Soria, dietro tali avisi, il Vice-Re d'Egitto prese diverse misure per rinforzare la sua Armata che si trova in queste parti, con delle istruzioni pero a Sua Altesse Ibrahim Pasha, di non prendere sopra di lui il principio della guerra, ma solamente di difendersi in caso che fosse attacato, per la 1°. et 2°. volta, ed il 3°. attacato che dalle forze del Gran Signor sara fatto agli Egyziani, Sua Altessa Ibrahim Pasha a l'ordine di fare il suo possibile per battere le Truppe del Gran Signor intornandosi a quel territorio: le forze che il Vice-Re d'Egitto decidasse giungere quella della Soria, sono davergia fatto marciare 4 regimenti d'infanteria regolati, partite dall' Egitto, dal 8 ai 20 Moharem, accompagnati anche da diversi Annadi, diedi pure l'ordine a Sua Altessa Mustapha Pasha di Candia, di solecitare la sua partenza per la costa della Soria, accompagnato da 16 mille di suoi Arnaouti.

In Alessandria si presero le necessarie misure per fare partire giornalmente, delle munizioni di guerra, provisioni da bocca e dei fondi (dei quali si conosce gia diversi arrivi alla scala di Lattachia) sufficienti ai bisogni delle forze Egyziani che si formerano in queste parti."

The above is publicly reported.

I hear this evening that his Highness the Seraskier has received advice that several of his regiments have already reached this neighbourhood from the south, and that he has ordered them to march forward on the frontiers and await his orders. It is stated that the army that his Highness is forming to oppose any attack the Sultan may make, will be composed of 20,000 Irregular Troops, twenty regiments of Regular Troops, and 16,000 Arnaouts that he is expecting from Candia; this force is to be under the command of his Highness the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha, his Excellency Solyman Pasha, and his Excellency Achmet Menekly Pasha.

No further advices have been received here respecting the movements of the forces (Sultan's) already crossed.

(Translation of part of the above Inclosure.)

LATE yesterday a post from Beyrout arrived here in forty-one hours with despatches to His Highness Ibrahim Pasha coming from Alexandria, dated 5th Sefer, to inform him of advices from Constantinople, that the Grand Signor had ordered that his forces should approach the frontiers of Syria, upon which intelligence the Viceroy of Egypt took various measures to reinforce his army in those parts; and with instructions also to His Highness Ibrahim Pasha not to take upon himself the initiative of hostilities, but only to defend himself in case he should be attacked, the first and second time; and on the third attack which may be made on the Egyptians by the force of the Grand Signor, His Highness Ibrahim Pasha has orders to do all in his power to beat the troops of the Grand Signor approaching that territory. Of the forces which the Viceroy of Egypt had decided should join those in Syria, four regiments of Regular Infantry had marched, having set out from Egypt from the 8th to the 20th Moharem, accompanied by several Annadi, orders being given to His Highness Mustapha Pasha of Candia to hasten his departure for the coast of Syria with 16,000 of his Arnaouts.

The necessary measures were taken at Alexandria for the daily despatch of warlike stores, provisions, and money (of which various arrivals are known to have taken place at the port of Latakia,) sufficient for the wants of the Egyptian forces which shall assemble in those quarters.

Inclosure 5 in No. 53.

Copy of Aleppo Journal brought down from the 28th April to the 1st of May, 1839.

April 28.

THE Government is actively providing provisions, &c., which, with those arriving from the coast, are being put into store.

I am told that there are daily arrivals here from the coast, of ammunition.

All the bakers and ovens have been seized to work for the Government, so that not a loaf of bread is to be found in the bazaars.

The French Consul, Mr. Guys, visited his Highness the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha to-day. I am told that the conversation which took place between them, was on the late movement made by the Sultan's forces in the direction of Bir, part of which column had crossed the river Euphrates, and which his Highness Ibrahim Pasha said, he considered as indicating an intention to attack him, and which obliged his Highness to take immediate steps to collect his forces, in order to be ready to meet any attack which might be made against him; to which, I am told the French Consul replied to his Highness as follows: "I am of opinion that there will be no war between you and the Sultan, for the European Powers are determined to maintain the peace between you;" to which his Highness replied again, "All that is very good, but can I have anything stronger, and indicating that the Sultan has the intention to attack me, when he has crossed some of his troops at Bir; and that there is another column advancing at Roum Kale, under Hafiz Pasha, for the same purpose?"

There are daily arrivals here of regiments, who are all quartered in the town.

April 29.

This Government continues its active preparations, both in the laying in of stores and military ammunition of all sorts; as also, of daily arrivals of troops, which are all lodged in mosques, coffee-houses, &c., prepared for their reception.

It is rumoured to-day, that a colonel and several subaltern officers, with 200 men, had deserted from the Sultan's side, and had arrived at Adana. This requires further confirmation.

It is positively reported to-day, that the son of the late Rechid Mehemet Pasha, in the direction of Merdin and Moussul, is marching with a force of 40,000 strong, to join Suffook Bey, Chief of the Gerba Arabs, who is with a considerable force of Arabs; both of whom are to advance along the desert, in order to act with the Haouran Arabs to the South.

Received this afternoon a letter from his Excellency Solyman Pasha, who states, that owing to the different caravans and communications between the Sultan's territory and this place, having been lately stopped by that Government, and not allowed to come to Syria, this Government had in consequence come to the same determination, of not allowing any intercourse to take place between this country and the Sultan's territory, so long as the Sultan's Government impeded the intercourse on their side, which his Excellency begged might be communicated to the British merchants for their information.

Circulated this afternoon, the foregoing communication from his Excellency Solyman Pasha to the British merchants of this place.

April 30.

Part of the Horse Artillery from Hamah, fifty-four pieces, reached this at noon.

It is reported to-day, that Inge Bairactar Mehemet Pasha has also crossed the river with a force, and that Ali Pasha of Bagdad had arrived at Diarbekir, with a force intended to act against Syria.

I hear from M. Geoffroy, the French Cancellier, that his Excellency Solyman Pasha had said, that by the last advices they had up to Sunday night, only eight battalions of the Sultan's forces had crossed the river Euphrates at Bir, with six pieces of Artillery; and further added, that it is with great difficulty the troops cross, owing to the river being very high, and only having seven boats, which can only take in and land a battalion a-day.

His Highness the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha's troops are daily arriving in this town from all quarters.

The desertion of a colonel with 200 men, from the Sultan's territory, is not yet verified.

May 1.

I am informed that Germanoss Bachri, with Shukri Teggar, went to-day to the Syrian Patriarchs, upon which the head Christian merchants were sent for; on their arrival, the purport of the meeting was, that Germanoss Bachri communicated to them, that his Highness the Seraskier demanded of them a loan of a sum of money, which the treasury is to pay in the course of a week; and that if it could not be obtained by that means, his Highness would be compelled to levy the Ferdeh tax, which he is very unwilling to do, as under the present miserable state of the poorer classes, it would cause great suffering.

I am informed that a meeting of the principal Turk merchants was held at his Excellency the Governor's for the same purpose, but I have not been able to learn yet what amount is required of them.

M. Geoffroy, the French Cancellier, tells me that Mr. French Consul Guys received to-day a letter, *viâ* Beyrout and Alexandria, from his Excellency the French Ambassador at Constantinople, under date 26th March, which states, "You will hear in your neighbourhood on the Sultan's territory, of a considerable movement of troops, provisions, ammunition, and stores, having taken place, but you have nothing to fear, for there will ultimately be no war between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali."

It is to-day reported, that his Highness Ibrahim Pasha called Abdullah Babinsi, the Musselim, and required of him a guarantee for the security and tranquillity of the town of Aleppo, during his absence. The Musselim replied, "If your Highness will leave me 4,000 to 5,000 troops, I remain responsible that during the time you are in the camp, everything remains in the greatest quietness here."

The result of this discourse is not known positively; some say that his Highness refused to leave him more than 2,000 troops, in consequence of which the Musselim refused taking any responsibility: others again say, that his Highness promised the Musselim the number he required.

The public report among the Christians of the town is, that the population is very disaffected against them; and that in the event of Ibrahim Pasha meeting with a repulse, a rise would ensue here and throughout the towns of Syria.

By the last advices from Mr. Vice-Consul Hays and Jones, everything appeared quiet in their respective districts. The former writes that there is still, however, a little discontent among the inhabitants of Giaour-dagh mountains.

(Signed) F. H. S. WERRY.

Inclosure 6 in No. 53.

Solyman Pasha to Mr. Consul Werry.

Monsieur, *Alep, le* 16 *Sefer,* 1255.

DEPUIS quelque tems les caravanes n'arrivent plus de la Turquie, et le commerce de ces côtés-là se trouve entièrement suspendu: nous avons dû prendre patience pour ne pas aggraver encore les préjudices que souffre le commerce; mais depuis qu'une tête de colonne de l'Armée Turque a passé l'Euphrate, il parait qu'on a redoublé encore de sévérité, puisque rien n'arrive plus, ni marchandises, ni caravanes; vû les circonstances présentes, et malgré tout le déplaisir que j'éprouve à vous communiquer une pareille mesure, qui peut faire tort aux intérêts commerciaux en général, j'ai l'honneur de vous prévenir qu'il est défendu à toute espèce de caravane, de se diriger vers les frontières. Pendant quatre jours, à compter de la date de ma lettre, les caravanes et marchandises quelconques seront arrêtées et renvoyées au point du départ; mais après cette époque fixée, elles seront confisquées. Aussitôt que du côté de l'Armée Turque on rétablira la libre circulation, les ordres seront donnés pour qu'elle soit immédiatement rétablie ici. Il a été donné connaissance de cet arrêté aux Rayas et aux habitans; et j'ai l'honneur de vous prévenir de cette mesure, pour que vos commerçans et nationaux ne soient pas dans le cas d'éprouver des pertes par ignorance ou malentendu.

Je regrette qu'une pareille détermination, prise du côté de l'armée Turque, sans qu'il nous en ait été donné aucune communication, nous force à user de représailles, même dans le cas très-possible d'un commencement d'hostilités, ce que Dieu veuille éloigner pour la prospérité

du pays; la guerre me parait assez désastreuse par elle-même, pour ne pas y joindre encore sans motif des mesures désolantes pour le commerce et les populations en général.

Agréez, Monsieur le Consul, &c.,

Le Major-Général des Armées Egyptiennes,
Chargé des Affaires Européennes,
(Signé) LE GENERAL SULEIMAN.

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(Translation.)

Solyman Pasha to Mr. Consul Werry.

Sir, *Aleppo*, 16*th Sefer*, 1255.

FOR some time past caravans have ceased to arrive from Turkey, and the trade with those parts is entirely suspended; we have been obliged to bear this with patience, in order not to add to the evils under which trade suffers; but since one division of the Turkish Army has passed the Euphrates, stricter measures appear to have been adopted, and now neither merchandize nor caravans come to us. Under these circumstances, and notwithstanding that I grieve to communicate to you measures which may hurt commercial interests in general, I have the honour to acquaint you, that caravans, of every sort, are forbidden to approach the frontier. For the space of four days, reckoning from the date of my letter, caravans and merchandize of all sorts will be stopped and sent back to the place from which they came, but after that fixed period they will be confiscated. So soon as free transit shall be allowed by the Turkish Army, orders will be issued to reallow it here. The Rayas and other inhabitants have been informed of this decree; and I have now the honour of making you acquainted with this measure, in order that your merchants and countrymen may not be subjected to losses from ignorance or misunderstanding.

I regret that such a proceeding on the part of the Turkish Army, without any previous communication with us, forces us to adopt reciprocal measures, even at a time when hostilities may very possibly commence, though I pray to God that such a result may, for the good of this country, be distant: war seems to me disastrous enough in itself, without adding to it unnecessarily measures which must be injurious to commerce and to the people in general.

Receive, Sir, &c.,

The Major-General of the Egyptian Armies,
Charged with the European Affairs,
(Signed) GENERAL SULEIMAN.

Inclosure 7 in No. 53.

Rapport de Hadji Hidou, Cavass envoyé à Biredjic, le 23 *Avril*, 1839, *pour examiner l'état du local des Anglais de l'Expédition de l'Euphrate, par suite des grandes pluies que nous avons eues cette année.*

LE susdit Hadji Hidou partit d'Alep le mardi matin (23 Avril, 1839), pour se rendre à Biredjic; a passé le premier jour, divers villages dont il ignore les noms, et à l'Asir il s'arrêta pour prendre un peu de repos à un village nommé Elkout Serougi, et de là il fut coucher au village dit Elkhatterin, où il arriva à l'Eiche. Le lendemain il continua sa route, en passant les villages nommés Tchobanbek, Tchamourlou, Maghara, Eche, et plusieurs autres dont il ignore les noms, et il arriva vers le midi à la rivière appelée Sagiour, qu'il traversa avec peine; et en continuant sa route, il a vu plusieurs tentes de Bédouins, et ensuite des villages dont il ignore les noms, à l'exception d'un seul nommé Emeltel. A l'Asir il entra à Nézib, où il ne vit point de troupe, à l'exception d'une cinquantaine d'hommes qu'il supposa être la garnison de ce village; il fut à un autre dont le nom lui a échappé de la mémoire, et comme il était nuit, il fut déscendre dans la maison du cheik nommé Ali Agha, pour y passer la nuit; ce cheik ne se trouvait pas à la maison, mais ses gens donnèrent asile à Hadji Hidou, qui, étant fatigué, s'est couché, mais sans pouvoir bien dormir; vers le minuit, à peu près, il entendit arriver le cheik, qui, en entrant, s'est informé du dit Hidou, qu'il voyait dormir là, et il a dit: "Eh bien, il lui arrivera ce qui est arrivé à un homme qui, venant des pays d'Ibrahim Pacha, a été arrêté comme espion, et le Pacha lui fit trancher la tête." A ces mots, Hadji Hidou se leva, et s'est assis sur son lit en s'informant de l'événement précité; alors le cheik commença à questionner Hadji Hidou sur le motif de son voyage, et s'il était muni d'un teskéré de route. Celui-ci lui exposait le but de son voyage, qui était d'examiner si les magazins et autres appartenant aux Anglais avaient souffert à la suite des grandes pluies qu'il a fait cette année, et qu'il venait de la part du Consul Anglais d'Alep, dont il était le cavass (en lui montrant son bâton d'argent), et il lui dit qu'il avait une lettre pour le Musselim de Biredjic, en outre de son teskéré de route; à tout cela, le cheik lui répondit, que dans ce moment personne ne connait plus Musselim ni rien, il suffisait d'être traduit par-devant le Pacha pour avoir la tête tranchée, et qu'il avait l'air d'un espion et non pas de cavass d'un consul; et que comment il n'avait choisi de venir visiter les domaines des Anglais, que lorsque les troupes Turques avaient passé l'Euphrate? que, par conséquent, il voulait lui conseiller de retourner d'où il était venu, mais que craignant d'être compromis, il devait le garder comme prisonnier; et il ordonna de suite d'apporter une chaîne, qu'on lui mit aux pieds, en le faisant dépouiller de tout ce qu'il avait de mieux sur lui. Sur ces entrefaites, un Arabe qui était dans la maison, et dont l'origine est des environs d'Alep, à ce qu'il disait, prit la défense de Hadji Hidou, en faisant au cheik des représentations; et sur ce, le cheik fit rendre à Hidou ses effets, et lui dit de retourner de suite en arrière; c'est alors que Hadji Hidou s'est aperçu qu'il n'avait plus de papiers dans sa poche, c'est-à-dire, ni le teskéré ni la lettre pour le Musselim; il sentit alors la conséquence fâcheuse qui pouvait lui arriver s'il était traduit devant quelque autorité sans avoir aucun papier, et il eut peur, désirant de se débarrasser un moment plus tôt de la main de ces gens là pour retourner; alors le cheik, après lui avoir fait lever la chaîne des pieds, lui dit de partir, mais qu'il devait lui laisser son bâton d'argent; sur ce, l'Arabe qui était toujours là de la compagnie, observa au cheik, que cela n'était pas à faire, que par la suite il pourrait lui arriver quelques désagrémens; alors le cheik prit de Hadji Hidou toute la monnaie qu'il avait, consistant en 3 taleris, 2 mamdouckis, et quelques petites pièces d'environ 5 à 6 piastres; de plus, il lui prit encore la baguette des pistolets, un paire de souliers, et un vase pour l'eau en cuir, appelé en Arabe matara, et il le laissa partir. Deux heures après que Hadji Hidou était en route pour retourner à Alep, étant nuit et pleuvant fortement, il vit sur la route trois cavaliers, qu'à peine il distinguait, à cause de l'obscurité; il menaça ces cavaliers de leur tirer dessus, s'ils s'approchaient, ces cavaliers s'écartèrent alors pour le laisser passer; mais après avoir fait quelques pas, le dit Hidou, de crainte que ces cavaliers ne le poursuivissent, il traversa les campagnes en quittant la route, et ayant trouvé une espèce de gouffre, il s'y mit dedans avec son cheval, en attendant le jour; et aussitôt que le jour parut, il continua son chemin sans rencontrer plus aucune difficulté, et il arriva ici à Alep, le vendredi matin (26 du présent mois d'Avril).

N.B.—Le dit Hadji Hidou ajoute, qu'en retournant il n'a vu dans aucun endroit des troupes Egyptiennes; il a entendu dire seulement qu'un avis a été donné par le Musselim d'Alep, que de la Cavalerie des Bédouins dits Hannadi devait se rendre sur la rivière de Sagiour pour inspecter ce qui se passe.

(Translation.)

Report of Hadji Hidou, the Guard sent to Biredjic, on the 23rd *of April,* 1839, *in consequence of the great rains which we have had this year, to examine into the state of the locality occupied by the Englishmen connected with the Euphrates Expedition.*

THE said Hadji Hidou left Aleppo on Tuesday morning, (23rd April, 1839,) on his way to Biredjic; the first day he passed several villages, of which the names are unknown to him, and at the time of "El Asser" (two hours and a half before sunset) he stopped to take a little rest at a village called Elkout Serougi, and thence he went to pass the night at a village named Elkhatterin, where he arrived at "El Eiche" (about nightfall). The next day he continued his journey, passing through the villages called Tchobanbek, Tchamourlou, Maghara, Eche, and several others of which he does not know the names; and towards noon he reached the river called the Sedjour, which he crossed with difficulty; and in continuing his journey he saw many Bedouin tents, and afterwards some villages, the names of which, with the exception of one called Emeltel, are unknown to him. At "El Asser" he entered Nezib, where he saw no troops, excepting about fifty men, whom he took to be the garrison of that village; thence he went to another village, the name of which he has forgotten, and it being night he alighted at the house of the Sheik called Ali Agha, intending to pass the night there. The Sheik was not at home, but his servants admitted Hadji Hidou, who, being fatigued, laid himself down to rest, but was not able to sleep much; towards midnight he heard the Sheik arrive, and inquire who the person was whom he saw lying there; the Sheik then said, "Well, he will share the same fate as the man from Ibrahim Pasha's territories, who was arrested as a spy and beheaded by the Pasha." At these words Hadji Hidou raised himself up, and sat on his bed while he made inquiries respecting the occurrence above referred to. The Sheik then began to question Hadji Hidou, as to the object of his journey, and whether he was provided with a teskereh (passport). Hadji Hidou explained the object of his journey, which was, to examine whether the magazines, &c., belonging to the English had suffered in consequence of the heavy rains which had fallen this year; and he said that he came by order of the English Consul at Aleppo, whose guard he was, showing, at the same time, his silver stick, and that, in addition to his teskereh, he had a letter for the Musselim of Birejic. In answer to all this, the Sheik said, that at present no one recognized Musselims or anything else; that it was quite sufficient to be brought before the Pasha, to make sure that one's head would be cut off; and that he looked like a spy, and not like a consular guard; and that why had he not chosen to come and inspect the English property, until the period when the Turkish troops crossed the Euphrates? that, consequently, he would have advised him to return whence he came, but that, fearing to compromise himself, he must detain him as a prisoner; and he then ordered a chain to be attached to his feet, and desired that he should be dispossessed of all that he had most valuable about him. Upon these proceedings, an Arab who was in the house, and who stated that he came originally from Aleppo, took up the defence of Hadji Hidou, by making a representation to the Sheik. Upon this, the Sheik directed the effects of Hidou to be restored to him, and ordered him to return back at once. At that moment Hadji Hidou perceived that he no longer had his papers in his pocket; that is to say, neither the teskereh nor the letter to the Musselim. He at once felt the danger in which he would probably be placed, were he to be brought before any person in authority without having any papers; and he was alarmed, as he desired to free himself without a moment's loss of time, from the hands of these people, in order to set out on his return. Then the Sheik, after having caused the chain to be removed from his feet, desired him to depart, but told him that he must leave his silver stick. Upon this, the Arab, who was still present, observed to the Sheik, that this should not be done, as it might very probably inconvenience him much. The Sheik then took from Hadji Hidou all the money he possessed, amounting to 3 taleris, 2 mamdouckis, and some small coin in value from 5 to 6 piastres. He further took from him the ramrods of his pistols, a pair of slippers, an a leather water bottle, called by the Arabs matara, and then allowed him to go. Two hours after Hadji Hidou was on his journey back to Aleppo, it being night and raining heavily, he saw three horsemen on the road, whom he could scarcely distinguish on account of the darkness. He threatened to shoot at these horsemen if they approached him; upon which they got out of his way in order to let him pass; but after having gone on some paces, the said Hidou, being afraid lest these horsemen should pursue him, cut across the country, quitting the regular road, and having discovered a sort of hollow, he placed himself there with his horse to wait daylight. At daybreak he continued his journey, without meeting any more difficulties, and arrived here at Aleppo, on Friday morning, (26th of the present month of April.)

N.B.—The said Hadji Hidou adds, that in returning he did not see Egyptian troops in any place; he only heard that information had been given by the Musselim of Aleppo, that the cavalry of the Bedouins was to proceed to the river Sedjour to see what is going on.

No. 54.

Extract of a despatch from the Consul-General of France in Egypt.—(Communicated by Baron de Bourqueney.)

Alexandrie, le 15 *Mai,* 1839.

C'EST dans ces circonstances que M. de Médem est venu communiquer à Méhémet Ali la dépêche du Comte du Nesselrode qui le chargeait d'obtenir un mouvement rétrograde de l'armée Egyptienne, et que M. de Laurin, qui avait aussi reçu une lettre de M. de Stürmer conçue dans le même but, est venu, ainsi qu'on le lui recommandait, appuyer seulement par son influence morale, la demande du Consul-Général de Russie.

Méhémet Ali a montré en répondant, une grande prudence et beaucoup de modération. Il a dit que tout ce qui s'était passé en Turquie, depuis son départ pour le Soudan, témoignait suffisamment des intentions hostiles du Sultan à son égard; qu'il n'avait rien fait, cependant, pour s'attirer son animadversion, et qu'il désirait sincèrement que la paix ne fût pas troublée. Il a ajouté, que si les Turcs repassaient l'Euphrate, il ferait rétrograder ses troupes jusqu'à Alep; que s'ils allaient reprendre leurs positions à Malatia, il enjoindrait à Ibrahim Pacha de se retirer à Damas; et qu'enfin si Hafiz Pacha se retirait avec son armée au-delà de Malatia, il rappellerait Ibrahim Pacha en Egypte.

Méhémet Ali a parlé ensuite de la nécessité d'en finir avec sa position. Il parait avoir renoncé à son idée d'indépendance, et ne désire rien de plus que l'hérédité pour ses enfans, du pouvoir qui lui est confié.

Du 16 *Mai.*

P.S.—Je viens de recevoir la note ci-jointe, qui a été communiquée par Artin Bey, aux Consuls-Généraux des Grandes Puissances, et qui confirme le contenu de ma dépêche. Le Vice-Roi a déclaré à M. Cochelet, Consul-Général de France en Egypte, &c., qu'il s'engage, dans le cas où les troupes du Sultan qui ont franchi l'Euphrate près de Bir, se retireraient de l'autre côté du fleuve, à faire faire un mouvement rétrograde à son armée, et à rappeler son fils Ibrahim Pacha à Damas; que dans le cas où cette démonstration pacifique serait à son tour suivie d'un mouvement rétrograde de l'armée de Hafiz Pacha au-delà de Malatia, son Altesse rappellera le Généralissime en Egypte. De plus, son Altesse le Vice-Roi a ajouté, de son propre mouvement, que si les Quatre Grandes Puissances consentaient à lui garantir la paix, et s'intéressaient à lui obtenir la succession de sa famille, il retirerait une partie de ses troupes de la Syrie, et serait prêt à s'entendre sur un arrangement définitif propre à garantir la sécurité, et adapté aux besoins du pays.

(Translation.)

Extract of a Despatch from the Consul-General of France in Egypt.—(Communicated by Baron de Bourqueney.)

Alexandria, May 15, 1839.

IT is under these circumstances that M. de Medem communicated to Mehemet Ali the despatch of Count Nesselrode, which directs him to obtain a retrograde movement of the Egyptian Army, and that M. de Laurin, who also had received a letter from M. de Stürmer directed to the same object, supported, solely by his moral influence, as had been recommended to him, the demand of the Consul-General of Russia.

Mehemet Ali, in replying, showed great prudence and much moderation. He said, that all that had passed in Turkey since his departure for Soudan, sufficiently testified the hostile intentions of the Sultan with respect to him; that he had done nothing, however, to draw down upon him the Sultan's animadversion; and that he sincerely desired that peace might not be disturbed. He added, that if the Turks repassed the Euphrates, he would withdraw his troops as far as Aleppo; that if they took up their positions again at Malatia, he would enjoin Ibrahim Pasha to withdraw to Damascus; and that, lastly, if Hafiz Pasha should withdraw with his army beyond Malatia, he would recall Ibrahim Pasha into Egypt.

Mehemet Ali afterwards spoke of the necessity of putting an end to his present position. He appeared to have renounced his idea of independence, and to desire nothing more than hereditary succession for his children, with the power which is confided to him.

May 16.

P.S.—I have just received the annexed Note which has been communicated by Artin Bey to the Consuls-General of the Great Powers, and which confirms the contents of my despatch. The Viceroy has declared to M. Cochelet, Consul-General of France in Egypt, &c., that he engages, in case the troops of the Sultan, which have passed the Euphrates near Bir, retire to the other side of the river, to cause his army to make a retrograde movement, and to recall his son Ibrahim Pasha to Damascus; that in case this pacific demonstration shall in its turn be followed by a retrograde movement of the army of Hafiz Pasha beyond Malatia, His Highness will recall the Generalissimo into Egypt. Moreover His Highness the Viceroy has added, of his own accord, that if the Four Great Powers consent to guarantee peace, and to interest themselves to obtain for him the succession of his family, he would withdraw a part of his troops from Syria, and would be ready to come to an understanding as to a definitive arrangement calculated to guarantee the security, and adapted to the wants of the country.

No. 55.

Baron Roussin to the Duc de Dalmatie.—(Communicated by Baron de Bourqueney.)

(Extrait.) *Thérapia, le* 16 *Mai,* 1839

J'AI immédiatement adressé l'instruction ci-jointe à M. Lapierre, mais il était trop tard pour qu'il pût voir le Ministre le même jour; son rapport ne m'est parvenu que ce matin, et le voici:

" D'après vos ordres, je suis allé chez Nouri Effendi. Je lui ai lu votre instruction, ainsi que la copie de la communication de Boghos Bey aux Consuls-Généraux, et après avoir entendu ces pièces, il m'a répondu:

"'Dites à M. l'Ambassadeur, qui je lui confirme officiellement que la Porte n'a aucune nouvelle de cela; que d'après celles que nous venons de recevoir hier par un Tatar d'Hafiz Pacha, l'armée Turque était encore loin des confins; la Porte n'a donné aucun ordre d'attaquer, mais si les troupes de Méhémet Ali attaquent, celles du Sultan se défendront, et feront ce qu'elles pourront.

"'Ceci est encore une ruse de Méhémet Ali. Ce nom de Bir n'est pas connu dans le voisinage de l'armée d'Hafiz Pacha; c'est Biledjick qui est dans l'eyalet d'Orfa, lequel appartient au Grand Seigneur;' et le Ministre a fait apporter une liste des villes et villages de chaque Gouvernement d'Asie, et m'a fait remarquer, en effet, que Biledjick est peu éloigné d'Orfa; 'le Gouvernement d'Orfa,' répéta-t-il, 'appartient à Hafiz Pacha; il est donc hors de doute qu'il peut y avoir placé ses troupes sans rompre la paix. Je vous prie de dire à M. l'Ambassadeur, qu'il doit connaître assez la mauvaise foi de Méhémet Ali, pour ne pas douter qu'il n'en donne ici une nouvelle preuve.'

" Il m'a demandé à faire faire la traduction de mon instruction par le Drogman de la Porte, et à prendre copie de la seconde pièce, et j'y ai consenti. Il m'a assuré de nouveau officiellement, que la Porte n'a donné aucun ordre qui puisse commencer la guerre de la part de l'armée Ottomane, et répété que cette armée n'a pas dépassé la frontière."

Ce rapport ne répondant pas positivement aux deux questions posées dans mon instruction, j'ai renvoyé M. Lapierre pour demander une réponse plus catégorique.

Cependant, on ne peut pas nier que l'observation de Nouri Effendi ne soit plausible. c'est-à-dire, que le lieu indiqué dans le bulletin Egyptien est plutôt Biledjick du Gouvernement d'Orfa, que Bir, que je crois beaucoup plus éloigné vers les sources de l'Euphrate (ce que, d'ailleurs, nos mauvaises cartes de la Syrie ne me permettent pas de vérifier). La réponse du Ministre est l'affirmation qu'il a toujours donnée à toutes les Légations, que "l'armée Turque n'a point attaqué, et qu'elle n'attaquera pas, si elle ne l'est elle-même."

Il m'est impossible, Monsieur le Duc, de savoir et de vous écrire autre chose; si le second rapport du Drogman m'arrive avant le départ du paquebot (demain), et s'il ajoute au premier, je le joindrai à la dépêche.

(Signé) BARON ROUSSIN.

P. S.—17, une heure avant le départ du paquebot.—Je reçois un second rapport du premier Drogman. Il confirme le premier dans son point essentiel. La guerre ne parait pas commencée, mais elle parait inévitable; la Porte ne l'a pas décidée dans un conseil, comme on l'avait dit; elle a, au contraire, conclu à l'éviter et à résister à l'entraînement du Sultan; mais cette résistance manque d'ensemble et d'énergie, parcequ'elle pourrait être dangereuse. La Porte est divisée; contre la guerre on compte Réouf, Khosreff, Nazif Pacha, Nouri Effendi, Sarim Bey, et trois conseillers; pour la guerre, Saïd Pacha, Séraskier, gendre du Sultan, qui soutient que l'armée Ottomane est bien supérieure à celle de Méhémet, quoiqu'il n'ait vu ni l'une ni l'autre; Achmet, Capitan Pacha, qui assure que si on le laisse sortir des Dardanelles avant l'Escadre

Turque, celle de Méhémet Ali viendra aussitôt se rallier à lui; enfin Hafiz Pacha, généralissime, qui n'a jamais fait la guerre comme officier général. Ce parti se fortifie des familiers du Mabeim et d'un grand nombre de Ridsals, tant ceux qui aspirent à sa faveur, que ceux qui redoutent les dangers d'une opposition trop marquée, et ceux encore plus nombreux qui, ennemis de l'ordre de choses actuelles, voudraient le renverser à tout prix, fut-ce à celui d'une catastrophe. Tous les ulémas sont de ce parti; la perte totale de leur influence qu'ils espèrent recouvrer, en est le motif.

Toutes les troupes de Roumélie et de l'Asie Mineure sont dirigées et en marche pour rejoindre le camp de Hafiz Pacha, et ceux de Kutahia. Il reste à peine 8,000 de garnison à Constantinople, où l'opinion publique est hostile aux réformes.

Des émissaires arrivent chaque jour d'Egypte et de Syrie, envoyés secrètement par le Sultan; ils lui rapportent que toutes les populations sont prêtes à s'insurger contre Méhémet Ali, au premier signal. Tahar Pacha, parti il y a deux mois pour le camp de Hafiz Pacha, avait réellement mission ostensible d'ordonner de rester en-deçà de la frontière; mais il a reçu des instructions secrètes du Sultan; on les ignore, mais on les dévine. Le Sultan veut détruire son vassal ou succomber; il le dit tout haut. Tel est le résumé des derniers rapports. En résumé, Monsieur le Duc, on ne sait pas et l'on ne croit pas que l'armée ait franchi la frontière, mais on espère qu'elle en est assez près pour rendre l'attaque des Egyptiens inévitable, et le Sultan le désire ardemment.

(Signed) BARON ROUSSIN.

(Translation.)

Baron Roussin to the Duc de Dalmatie.—(Communicated by Baron de Bourqueney.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, May* 16, 1839.

I IMMEDIATELY addressed the annexed instruction to M. Lapierre, but it was too late for him to see the Minister the same day; his report has only reached me this morning, and it is as follows:

"According to your orders, I called upon Nouri Effendi. I read to him your instruction as well as the copy of the communication from Boghos Bey to the Consuls-General, and after having heard these communications, he replied:—

"'Tell the Ambassador that I confirm officially that the Porte has no intelligence to that effect; that according to the intelligence which we yesterday received by a Tatar of Hafiz Pasha, the Turkish Army was still far from the confines: the Porte has given no order to attack; but if the troops of Mehemet Ali attack, those of the Sultan will defend themselves, and will do what they can.

"'This is another device of Mehemet Ali. The name of Bir is not known in the neighbourhood of the army of Hafiz Pasha; it is Biledjick, which is in the Pashalic of Orfa, which belongs to the Grand Signor;'—and the Minister ordered a list to be brought of all the towns and villages of each Government of Asia, and pointed out to me that Biledjick is, in fact, little distant from Orfa. 'The Government of Orfa,' he repeated, 'belongs to Hafiz Pasha; without doubt, therefore, he may have placed his troops there without breaking the peace. I request you to tell the Ambassador that he must be sufficiently aware of the bad faith of Mehemet Ali to have no doubt of his giving a fresh proof of it on the present occasion.'

"He asked my permission to cause the translation of my instruction to be made by the Dragoman of the Porte, and to take a copy of the second document; to which I consented. He repeated officially his assurance that the Porte has not given any order which can cause the commencement of war on the part of the Ottoman Army, and he repeated, that this army has not passed the frontier."

This report not giving any positive answer to the two questions

proposed in my instruction, I sent back M. Lapierre to demand a more categorical answer.

Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the observation of Nouri Effendi is plausible; that is to say, that the spot indicated in the Egyptian Bulletin, is rather Biledjick of the Government of Orfa, than Bir, which I take to be much further off in the direction of the source of the Euphrates, (which however the badness of our maps of Syria does not permit me to verify.) The answer of the Minister is the assertion which he has always given to all the Legations, viz., that "the Turkish Army has not attacked, and that it will not attack, unless it be itself attacked."

It is impossible for me, M. le Duc, to ascertain and to communicate to you anything else. If the second report of the Dragoman reaches me before the departure of the packet, (to-morrow,) and if it contains any addition to the first, I will annex it to the despatch.

P.S.—17, one hour before the departure of the packet. I have received a second report from the first Dragoman. It confirms the first in its essential point. War does not appear to have commenced, but it appears to be inevitable; the Porte has not decided on it in Council, as was reported; the Porte has, on the contrary, come to the conclusion to avoid it, and to resist being drawn into it by the Sultan; but this resistance is deficient in unanimity and in energy, because it might be dangerous. The Porte is divided: against the war are reckoned Réouf, Khosreff, Nazif Pasha, Nouri Effendi, Sarim Bey, and three Councillors; in favour of war, Said Pasha, Seraskier, son-in-law of the Sultan, who maintains that the Ottoman Army is very superior to that of Mehemet Ali, though he has seen neither the one nor the other. Achmet, Capudan Pasha, who asserts that if he be allowed to issue from the Dardanelles before the Turkish squadron, that of Mehemet Ali will immediately rally round him; and finally, Hafiz Pasha, Generalissimo, who has never conducted a war as General Officer. This party is strengthened by the partizans of the Mabeim, and by a great number of Ridsals, as well those who aspire to his favour, as those who dread the dangers of too marked an opposition; and also by those still more numerous, who, enemies of the present order of things, would overturn it at any risk, even at that of a revolution. All the Ulemas are of this party; the total loss of their influence, which they hope to recover, is their motive.

All the troops of Roumelia and of Asia Minor are under orders, and on the march to join the camp of Hafiz Pasha, and those of Kutahia. There remain barely 8,000 to garrison Constantinople, where public opinion is hostile to reform.

Emissaries are arriving every day from Egypt and from Syria, sent secretly by the Sultan. They bring him word that the whole population are ready to rise against Mehemet Ali, at the first signal. Tahar Pasha, who set off two months ago for the camp of Hafiz Pasha, had really the ostensible mission of ordering the army to remain on this side of the frontier; but he received secret instructions from the Sultan; they are not known, but they are guessed. The Sultan wishes to destroy his vassal, or to fall; he avows it openly. Such is the substance of the last reports. To sum up, M. le Duc, it is not known, and it is not believed, that the army has crossed the frontier; but it is hoped that it is sufficiently near to render the attack of the Egyptians inevitable, and the Sultan ardently desires it.

No. 56.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 17.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, May* 19, 1839.

I HAD the honour to report to your Lordship, in a private letter of 7th May, *viâ* Marseilles, the arrival of despatches for Count Medem and M. de Laurin, and I have now to correct two errors in my letter, which are however of little import; one in the date of the letter of Count Nesselrode, which is the 29th of March and not the 12th of April,—and the other relative to the despatch to M. de Laurin, which was not from Vienna, but from the Internuncio at Constantinople.

Those despatches came in charge of a Russian messenger by an Austrian steamer.

On the 7th of May, Count Medem sent to Boghos Bey a copy of the despatch from Count Nesselrode, but Count Medem told me that it was not an exact transcript from the despatch, as he had deemed it necessary, from the change of circumstances since that despatch was written, to curtail and modify (*élaguer*) some parts; and Count Medem read to me part of a despatch to his Court, in which he states his reasons for so doing.

Count Medem also sent to Boghos Bey the original despatch of M. de Bouténeff; and as Boghos Bey gave those two documents into my hands, I am enabled to send copies of them to your Lordship.

As Count Nesselrode states that he has sent a copy of his despatch to the principal Courts, your Lordship will see the changes made in the copy sent by Count Medem to Boghos Bey.

In consequence of a letter from Boghos Bey, the Pasha arrived here on the morning of the 12th instant, and Count Medem and M. de Laurin had some interviews with him on the 12th, 13th, and 14th instant, at the last of which he agreed to a declaration in the terms agreed on, and which the Pasha said he would send to the Consuls-General of the Four Great Powers, to be by them communicated to their Governments; and on the morning of the 15th, Count Medem and M. de Laurin went together to the Pasha, when the declaration was agreed to; and on the same evening a copy was sent, by order of the Pasha, to myself, and to the Consuls-General of Austria, France, and Russia.

I have now the honour to transmit to your Lordship a copy of that declaration; and I sent to Viscount Ponsonby, by the French steamer which left this on the morning of the 17th instant, copies of the despatches of Count Nesselrode and M. de Bouténeff, and of the declaration of the Pasha.

M. de Laurin has been so kind as to send me the copy of his despatch on this occasion to the Internuncio, and I have the honour to inclose a copy of it, by which your Lordship will see the details of the interviews of M. de Laurin and of Count Medem with the Pasha.

My latest accounts from Aleppo are of the 6th of May, at which date Ibrahim Pasha was at Aleppo with the main body of his army; and Aleppo, Killis, and Hamah, had been reinforced by troops from the south, but only after the arrival of the army of the Sultan at Bir; after which, also, the greater part of the horses of the Cavalry and Artillery had been brought in from grass.

It cannot, therefore, be said that Ibrahim Pasha was the first to commence operations indicative of hostilities, as even now he has not reinforced Aintab, which is the nearest of his posts to the Turkish frontier, from which it is distant about seven hours.

Part of the army of Hafiz Pasha, (it is said about 10,000 men,) with some artillery, has crossed the Euphrates at Bir, but has not come on this side of the Sedjour, which is there the boundary of the territory under Mehemet Ali; but there is a report, not official, that part of the Sultan's troops have entered Syria, near Aintab.

Mr. Pro-Consul Werry of Aleppo, writes to me on the 6th of May, that

Ibrahim Pasha intends, after the arrival of all his forces, to have a general review, and then proposes to march his force ten hours' distance from his camp, in the plain between Aleppo and Aintab, and there await any attack which may be made against him by the Sultan's forces; as he has received positive orders from Mehemet Ali, not to move out of his limits upon any consideration, or to be the first aggressor.

Ibrahim Pasha has some Bedouin Cavalry near the Sedjour, to observe the movements of the Sultan's army; but I am persuaded (and his orders from his father are peremptory to that effect) that he will not move forward to attack Hafiz Pasha's advance, which he might easily destroy, nor commit any act which can be called aggressive; and I trust that the remonstrances of Lord Ponsonby and of the other Ambassadors, will yet prevail on the Porte to retire the Turkish Army before any action takes place. It does not, however, appear to me that in the ineffective state of a Turkish commissariat, any Turkish Army can long have means of subsistence; and it must, therefore, either retire or advance, and in this last case an engagement will be inevitable.

Mr. Consul Moore writes, that the native Christians in Syria dread success on the part of the Sultan; and this shows that the Christians are favourable to Mehemet Ali. But it is far different with the Mussulman population in Syria, whose affections have been quite alienated by their sufferings from conscriptions.

Mr. Consul Werry, of Damascus, has stated to your Lordship in his despatch of May 10, the bad prospects of commerce from the present state of affairs in Syria, and from Hafiz Pasha having stopped all the caravans; which caused a counter order by Solyman Pasha, copy of which was transmitted to your Lordship by Mr. Werry.

Mr. Pro-Consul Werry writes to me on this subject, as follows:—

"I am very sorry to be obliged to acquaint you, that from what I hear from our merchants, the present critical state of affairs in this country is causing most ruinous consequences to our trade; for since the intelligence received of the Sultan's forces having crossed the Euphrates, and that the army is advancing on the frontier at different points, with an apparent hostile intention, and subsequently, the steps taken by this Government, in the concentration of all the Egyptian forces in this town and neighbourhood, the commerce of this place has been completely paralyzed, and commercial transactions of all sorts have entirely ceased, thereby causing great detriment to our British merchants, who can neither effect sales of the large stocks they have on hand, nor can they recover, at this present moment that payments are suspended under the plea of the unsettled state of affairs, any of their outstanding debts, of which they have on the place to such large amounts.

"Moreover, this suspension of trade is not only ruinous to our merchants established here, but it also causes considerable detriment and loss to our general commercial interests."

I may remark, that the British merchants in Aleppo suffer more particularly, as much trade was carried on by them to Asia Minor and Mesopotamia.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Inclosure 1 in No. 56.

Count Nesselrode to Count Medem.

Pétersbourg, le 29 *Mars,* 1839.

LES dernières nouvelles que nous avons reçues de Constantinople, nous annoncent qu'un changement notable venait de se faire remarquer dans l'attitude de l'armée Egyptienne en Syrie.

De nouvelles troupes et des dépôts du matériel de guerre ont été portés en avant jusqu'à Alep. De plus, une grande quantité de muni-

tions a été expédiée successivement pour Antab, endroit qui ne se trouve qu'à une distance de 6 à 8 heures de Marache, de Biledjik, et de Roumkala, qui forment les positions les plus avancées que l'armée Turque est dans la nécessité de couvrir, pour se mettre à l'abri d'une attaque imprévue. Enfin, sur l'extrémité même de la frontière qui sépare les deux armées, les Egyptiens ont établi des batteries à Tesbichlir-kouyou; de sorte qu'au premier mouvement qu'ils feraient, ils seraient les maîtres de poser le pied sur le territoire Turc, d'envahir Bichisti, et d'occuper jusqu'à Biledjik et Ourfa, sans que l'armée Ottomane, qui se trouvait à une distance de 60 heures en arrière de ces positions avancées, aurait été en mesure d'opposer le moindre obstacle à une pareille agression.

Cette considération n'a point permis à Hafiz Pacha, Commandant-en-Chef de l'Armée Turque, de rester dans l'inaction, tandis que l'Armée Egyptienne venait de prendre une attitude menaçante et rapprochée des frontières.

En présence de ce mouvement de l'Armée Egyptienne, Hafiz Pacha s'est trouvé dans l'obligation de prendre, à son tour, des mesures de précaution et de défense. De son côté, il a fait avancer des troupes vers Ourfa, Diarbékir, et Siverek, pour mettre à couvert les positions que les Egyptiens menaçaient.

Ainsi les deux armées se trouvent aujourd'hui en présence. Les troupes de Méhémet Ali ont été les premières à se rapprocher de la frontière. Celles du Sultan n'ont fait que suivre ce mouvement, pour ne point être pris au dépourvu, et pour pouvoir repousser la force par la force, dans le cas ou l'Armée Egyptienne se livrerait à des actes d'hostilité.

Tels sont les faits qui résultent des rapports circonstanciés que l'Empereur vient de recevoir de son Ministre à Constantinople, et qui se trouvent fondés de la manière la plus positive sur le témoignage des officiers Prussiens attachés à l'état-major de l'Armée du Taurus.

En portant un regard attentif sur la position respective des deux armées, notre Auguste Maître a acquis la certitude que c'est celle de Méhémet Ali qui a été la première à faire un mouvement qui, sans être agressif, porte néanmoins le caractère d'une démonstration menaçante que rien ne saurait justifier.

Or, une semblable démonstration se trouve ouvertement en contradiction avec les assurances pacifiques que vous avez souvent recueillies de la bouche de Méhémet Ali; elle est en opposition directe à l'intention formellement arrêtée de toutes les Puissances de l'Europe, qui ont unanimement résolu de maintenir la paix de l'Orient, et de ne point permettre qu'elle soit violée impunément.

Vous connaissez, Monsieur le Comte, les déterminations que l'Empereur a arrêtées à cet égard; elles sont irrévocables. Tous les Cabinets de l'Europe les partagent, car ils ont tous également à cœur de préserver l'Empire Ottoman du danger d'une nouvelle complication.

Le Pacha d'Egypte, s'il veut examiner mûrement ses propres intérêts, verra que personne ne devrait éviter, plus que lui, de donner le signal d'une pareille complication. En effet, troubler l'état de paix dont il jouit, c'est ébranler son propre pouvoir; c'est remettre en question tous les avantages qui lui sont assurés par ses arrangemens antérieurs avec la Porte; c'est échanger le danger d'une lutte hasardeuse contre le bienfait d'une possession paisible; enfin c'est se mettre en opposition avec l'Europe entière; car tous les Cabinets ont hautement frappé de réprobation tout acte d'hostilité que le Pacha d'Egypte commettrait au mépris des assurances pacifiques qu'il a si souvent répétées de la manière la plus solennelle.

Ces vérités sont trop frappantes, Monsieur le Comte, pour qu'elles ne soient pas appréciées par Méhémet Ali, avec la supériorité de jugement qui le distingue. Aussi ne doutons-nous pas un seul instant des explications satisfaisantes qu'il s'empressera de vous offrir. Mais les circonstances du moment sont trop graves pour que ces explications seules puissent nous suffire.

Lorsque les armées se trouvent en présence, les paroles les plus pacifiques ne servent pas à éloigner le danger d'un conflit, que le moindre incident peut provoquer d'un instant à l'autre.

Pour prévenir ce danger, il n'y a qu'un seul moyen: c'est de rétablir de nouveau la distance qui jusqu'ici séparait les deux armées.

Or, comme c'est celle du Pacha d'Egypte qui est la plus rappochée des frontières, c'est elle aussi qui devra être la première à se replier. En conséquence, les nouvelles troupes et les dépôts du matériel de guerre qui ont été portés à Antab et Alep, devront rétrograder de rechef vers Damas, pour replacer les choses dans l'état où elles ont été anciennement.

Alors, lorsque celle-ci aura repris ses anciennes positions, les Cabinets amis de la Porte, pourront en appeler, à leur tour, aux sentimens pacifiques du Sultan, pour inviter ce Souverain à donner à Hafiz Pacha l'ordre de rentrer dans les cantonnemens qu'il vient de quitter, et de faire cesser les mesures de défense que l'attitude menaçante de l'Armée Egyptienne avait rendues nécessaires.

L'Empereur vous charge, Monsieur le Comte, de vous acquitter immédiatement auprès du Pacha d'Egypte, de la communication contenue dans la présente dépêche.

Le Feldjäger qui en est porteur, attendra la réponse que vous donnera Méhémet Ali.

Dans l'intervalle, notre Auguste Maître m'a chargé de porter la présente dépêche à la connaissance de tous les Cabinets de l'Europe. De même qu'ils ont concouru unanimement aux démarches que vous avez reçu ordre de faire en exécution des déclarations que l'Empereur a fait émaner à Töplitz, de même aussi les grands Cabinets, unis avec nous d'intentions et de principes, sauront veiller au maintien du repos du Levant, en réclamant, comme nous venons de la faire, la cessation des démonstrations récentes auxquelles l'Armée Egyptienne s'est portée.

Persuadés de l'intime accord qui existe à cet égard entre toutes les Puissances, nous vous invitons, Monsieur le Comte, à communiquer la présente dépêche à vos collègues, qui ne tarderont pas, j'en suis sûr, de recevoir des instructions analogues de leurs Cours.

(Translation.)

Count Nesselrode to Count Medem.

Petersburgh, March 29, 1839.

THE latest accounts which we have received from Constantinople inform us that a notable change is observable in the attitude of the Egyptian Army in Syria.

Fresh troops and depôts of warlike stores have been pushed forward as far as Aleppo. Besides, a great quantity of stores has been at different times despatched to Aintab, a place at a distance of not more than six or eight hours from Marash, from Biledjik, and from Roumkala, which form the most advanced positions which the Turkish Army is under the necessity of covering to protect itself from a sudden attack. In short, the Egyptians have established batteries at Tesbichlir-kouyou, on the very extremity of the frontier which separates the two Armies; so that on the very first movement which they might make, they would be enabled to enter the Turkish territory, to invest Bichisti, and to occupy even Biledjik and Orfa, without the Ottoman Army, which would be at a distance of sixty hours behind these advanced positions, having the means of opposing the least obstacle to such an aggression.

This consideration has prevented Hafiz Pasha, Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish Army, from remaining inactive, while the Egyptian Army was taking up a threatening attitude near the frontiers.

In consequence of this movement of the Egyptian Army, Hafiz Pasha found himself under the necessity of taking, on his side, precautionary and defensive measures. On his side, he advanced troops towards Orfa, Diarbekir, and Sivereck, in order to cover the positions which were threatened by the Egyptians.

Thus the two Armies are at this moment in presence of each other. The troops of Mehemet Ali were the first to approach the frontier. Those

of the Sultan only followed that movement, in order not to be taken by surprise, and to be able to repel force by force, in case the Egyptian Army should commit any acts of hostility.

Such are the facts which result from the circumstantial reports which the Emperor has lately received from his Minister at Constantinople, and which are founded upon the most positive testimony of the Prussian officers attached to the Staff of the Army of the Taurus.

In attentively considering the respective position of the two Armies, our august Master has satisfied himself that it is the Army of Mehemet Ali which first made a movement, which, without being one of aggression, yet bears the character of a threatening demonstration, which nothing can justify.

But, such a demonstration is openly in contradiction to the pacific assurances which you have often received from the mouth of Mehemet Ali; it is in direct opposition to the formally recorded intention of all the Powers of Europe, which have unanimously resolved to maintain the peace of the East, and not to permit that it shall be broken with impunity.

You know, Monsieur le Comte, the determination which the Emperor has adopted in that respect; it is irrevocable. It is shared by all the Cabinets of Europe, for they all have equally at heart the preservation of the Ottoman Empire from the danger of a new complication.

The Pasha of Egypt, if he will attentively consider his own interests, will see that no one should avoid, more than himself, giving the signal of such a complication. In fact, to disturb the state of peace which he enjoys, is to jeopardize his own power; it is to bring again into question all the advantages which are secured to him by the previous arrangements of the Porte; it is to exchange for the danger of a hazardous struggle, the advantage of a peaceable possession; in fact, it is to put himself in opposition to the whole of Europe; for all the Cabinets have highly disapproved of any act of hostility which the Pasha of Egypt should commit in defiance of the pacific assurances which he has so often repeated in the most solemn manner.

These truths are too striking, Monsieur le Comte, not to be appreciated by Mehemet Ali with the superior understanding which distinguishes him. We have therefore no doubt that he will hasten to afford to you the most satisfactory explanations. But the circumstances of the moment are too serious for explanations alone to be sufficient for us.

When armies are in presence of each other, the most pacific language does not remove the danger of a conflict which the smallest incident may provoke at any moment.

To remove this danger there is but one way; it is to re-establish afresh the distance which hitherto separated the two Armies.

Thus, as the Army of the Pasha of Egypt is the nearest to the frontier, it is that Army which should be the first to retreat. Therefore the fresh troops and the depôts of warlike stores which have been brought to Aintab and Aleppo, must forthwith return towards Damascus, to replace matters in the state in which they formerly were.

Then, when that Army shall have resumed its former positions, the Cabinets, friends of the Porte, will be able, on their side, to appeal to the pacific inclinations of the Sultan, to engage that Sovereign to give to Hafiz Pasha the order to return into the contonments which he has lately left, and to put a stop to the defensive measures which the menacing attitude of the Egyptian Army had rendered necessary.

The Emperor directs you, Monsieur le Comte, to communicate immediately to the Pasha of Egypt the contents of this despatch.

The courier who is the bearer of it will wait for the answer which Mehemet Ali will give you.

Meantime, our august Master has ordered me to bring this despatch to the knowledge of all the Cabinets of Europe. Just as they unanimously agreed to the measures which you received orders to adopt in execution of the declarations of the Emperor at Töplitz, in the same manner the Great Cabinets, united to us in intentions and principle, will watch over the maintenance of peace in the Levant, by demanding, as

we now do, the cessation of the recent demonstrations which the Egyptian Army has made.

With the conviction of the perfect agreement which exists between all the Powers, we direct you, Monsieur le Comte, to communicate this despatch to your Colleagues, who will shortly, I am convinced, receve similar instructions from their Courts.

Inclosure 2 in No. 56.

M. de Bouténeff to Count Medem.

Monsieur le Comte, *Péra, le* $\frac{12}{24}$ *Avril,* 1839.

VOTRE dernier rapport sous cachet volant, à l'adresse de Son Excellence M. le Vice-Chancelier, en date du $\frac{2}{14}$ courant, No. 6, m'est exactement parvenu par la voie du pyroscaphe Français, et je profite du retour de ce même bâtiment pour vous en accuser la réception, et pour vous remercier de la communication des intéressantes informations que vous transmettez au Ministère Impérial, et que je ne manquerai pas à acheminer sans délai vers leur destination.

Sans pouvoir vous donner aujourd'hui des instructions spéciales sur la ligne de conduite que vous avez à tenir au milieu des circonstances du moment, je ne saurais, Monsieur le Comte, ne pas applaudir à la sage réserve que vous mettez dans vos explications avec Méhémet Ali, ainsi qu'au zèle avec lequel vous plaidez auprès de lui, la cause de la justice et du bon droit.

Les assurances du Pacha d'Egypte sont tellement positives, elles vous ont été réitérées si souvent, qu'il n'est pas permis d'élever des doutes sur leur sincérité sans suspecter la bonne foi de Méhémet Ali. Ces dispositions pacifiques sont d'ailleurs dans son propre intérêt, car le Pacha a trop de perspicacité pour ne pas comprendre, que toutes les conséquences d'une agression contre son Souverain légitime, retomberaient infailliblement sur leur auteur et consommeraient sa ruine.

D'un autre côté, la volonté bien arrêtée de toutes les Grandes Puissances est pour le maintien de la paix,—but constant de leurs efforts et principal objet de leur généreuse sollicitude. Elles ne souffriraient pas que le Pacha d'Egypte veuille la troubler impunément, au préjudice du Sultan et au détriment du repos général.

D'ailleurs le rôle de Méhémet Ali, qui doit son élévation à un concours de circonstances favorables, autant qu'à son mérite personnel, est assez beau, pour qu'il puisse s'en contenter, sans s'abandonner à des rêves, dont la réalisation entraînerait un bouleversement total de tout l'édifice de la politique Orientale.

Pour ce qui est enfin du Sultan, Monsieur le Comte, le Pacha n'aura rien à redouter, nous en avons la conviction, aussi longtems que de son côté il respectera les droits imprescriptibles de son Souverain, et tant qu'il remplira fidèlement les engagemens qu'il a contractés envers lui. Tout récemment encore. Sa Hautesse a protesté, à deux reprises différentes, de son désir sincère d'éviter toute collision. Si le Sultan a réuni des forces considérables dans le Diarbékir, ce sont les armemens de Méhémet Ali qui l'y ont contraint, bien à regret, car l'entretien d'une armée dans ces contrées lointaines et peu fertiles, sont un pesant fardeau pour ces provinces, comme pour le trésor déjà si obéré de Sa Hautesse. Loin de vouloir et de provoquer la guerre, le Sultan est au contraire très-disposé à livrer à un entier oubli ses anciens griefs, et rendre sa faveur à Méhémet Ali pour peu que ce dernier ne lui fournisse plus de nouveaux sujets de mécontentement.

Ce serait donc, ce me semble, un moment propice pour Méhémet Ali de fournir à son Souverain la preuve irrécusable de la sincérité de ses intentions pacifiques, dont vous avez recueilli la promesse éventuelle de la propre bouche du Pacha, et qui consisterait à rappeler auprès de lui son fils Ibrahim Pacha, et de retirer une partie de son armée de Syrie, ce qui,

dans le présent état des finances Egyptiennes, serait un allègement réel dans les dépenses du Pacha.

Je réserve à votre habileté, Monsieur le Comte, de vous ménager une occasion favorable de revenir sur une sage détermination, dont le Pacha vous a lui-même suggéré l'idée dans ses entretiens avec vous et Messieurs vos collègues.

Recevez, &c.,
(Signé) A. BOUTENEFF.

(Translation.)

M. de Bouténeff to Count Medem.

Sir, *Pera, April* $\frac{12}{24}$, 1839.

YOUR last report of the $\frac{2}{14}$ instant, addressed under flying seal to His Excellency the Vice-Chancellor, reached me safely by the French steamer, and I avail myself of her return to acknowledge its receipt, and to thank you for communicating to me the interesting information which you transmit to the Imperial Government, and which I will not fail to forward without delay to its destination.

Although I am not able now to give you any special instructions upon the line of conduct which you have to observe under present circumstances, I cannot but express my approval of the discreet manner in which you have conducted your discussions with Mehemet Ali, and of the zeal with which you have advocated before him the cause of justice and right.

The assurances of the Pasha of Egypt are so positive, and they have been repeated to you so often, that it is impossible to doubt their sincerity without suspecting Mehemet Ali's good faith. These pacific intentions are besides calculated to further his own interest, for the Pasha has too much discernment not to see that all the consequences of an attack upon his legitimate Sovereign, would inevitably fall upon its author, and would complete his ruin.

On the other hand, all the Great Powers are firmly resolved to maintain peace, which is the constant and principal object of their efforts and of their generous solicitude. They could not suffer the Pasha of Egypt with impunity, to interrupt peace to the prejudice of the Sultan, and to the detriment of general tranquillity.

Moreover, Mehemet Ali, who owes his elevation as much to a concurrence of favourable circumstances, as to his personal merits, has a part to play sufficiently important to satisfy him, without giving himself up to the pursuit of schemes which, if carried into effect, might bring on the total destruction of the political edifice of the East.

And with regard to the Sultan, we are sure, M. le Comte, that the Pasha will have nothing to fear, so long as he shall on his part respect the inalienable rights of his Sovereign, and so long as he shall faithfully fulfil the engagements which he has contracted towards him. His Highness has quite recently on two different occasions formally avowed his sincere desire to avoid any collision. If the Sultan has assembled a considerable force in Diarbekir, it is because the armaments of Mehemet Ali have obliged him to do so, much to his regret, because the maintenance of an Army in those remote and barren regions, presses heavily upon those provinces as well as upon the Sultan's Treasury, which is already overburthened. The Sultan, far from wishing for, or provoking war, is, on the contrary, well disposed to consign to complete oblivion his ancient grounds of complaint, and to restore Mehemet Ali to favour, provided the latter gives him no new grounds of displeasure.

It seems to me, therefore, that the present is a favourable moment for Mehemet Ali to prove to his Sovereign, in a manner which cannot be mistaken, the sincerity of his pacific intentions, the assurance of which you received from the Pasha's own lips, by recalling his son Ibrahim Pasha, and by withdrawing a part of his Army from Syria, which measure would, in the present state of the finances of Egypt, materially lighten the Pasha's expences.

I leave it to your judgment, M. le Comte, to find a favourable opportunity to recur to the wise determination, the notion of which the Pasha himself suggested to you in his conversations with you and your colleagues.

Receive, &c.,
(Signed) A. BOUTENEFF.

Inclosure 3 in No. 56.

Declaration made by Mehemet Ali to Colonel Campbell.

LE Vice-Roi a déclaré à M. le Colonel Campbell, Agent et Consul-Général de Sa Majesté Britannique, qu'il s'engage dans le cas où les troupes du Sultan qui ont franchi l'Euphrate près de Bir, se retireraient de l'autre côté du fleuve, de faire faire un mouvement rétrograde à son armée, et de rappeler son fils Ibrahim Pacha à Damas; que dans le cas où cette démonstration pacifique serait à son tour suivie d'un mouvement rétrograde de l'armée de Hafiz Pacha au-delà de Malatia, Son Altesse rappellera le Généralissime en Egypte. De plus, Son Altesse le Vice-Roi a ajouté de son propre mouvement, que si les Quatre Grandes Puissances consentaient à lui garantir la paix, et s'intéressaient à lui obtenir la succession de sa famille, il retirerait une partie de ses troupes de la Syrie, et serait prêt à s'entendre sur un arrangement définitif propre à garantir la sécurité, et adapté aux besoins du pays.

(Translation.)

Declaration made by Mehemet Ali to Colonel Campbell.

THE Viceroy has declared to Colonel Campbell, Her Britannic Majesty's Agent and Consul-General, that he engages, in case the troops of the Sultan which have passed the Euphrates near Bir, should retire to the other side of the river, to cause his army to make a retrograde movement, and to call back his son Ibrahim Pasha to Damascus; that in case this pacific demonstration should in its turn be followed by a retrograde movement of the army of Hafiz Pasha beyond Malatia, His Highness will call back the Generalissimo to Egypt. Moreover, His Highness the Viceroy added, of his own accord, that if the Four Great Powers consented to guarantee to him peace, and interested themselves in obtaining for him the hereditary succession for his family, he would withdraw a part of his troops from Syria, and would be ready to come to an understanding as to a definitive arrangement calculated to guarantee the safety, and adapted to the wants of the country.

Inclosure 4 in No. 56.

M. de Laurin to the Baron de Stürmer.

M. le Baron, *Alexandrie, ce* 16 *Mai,* 1839.

AINSI que j'ai eu l'honneur de l'annoncer à votre Excellence par mon Rapport du 10 du courant, Méhémet Ali est arrivé ici Dimanche matin, 12 du courant.

Je suis allé le complimenter deux heures après son arrivée, au Palais de Rass-el-Tyn, sans l'intention de l'entretenir de la sommation que la Cour Impériale de Russie lui adressait, et à laquelle a trait la dépêche de votre Excellence du 29 Avril dernier. Cependant, après avoir congédié un nombre de visites, il aborda franchement la question, en me disant, "qu'il avait été indignement calomnié (faisant allusion à la Note de M. le Comte de Nesselrode, dont Boghos Bey lui avait fait part le soir du 7 du courant, où il en avait pris connaissance lui-même); que la supposition d'avoir fait prendre à ses troupes une attitude autre que purement défensive est tout-à-fait fausse; que les troupes du Grand Seigneur, sous le prétexte de combattre les Kourdes, se sont établis dans le Diarbékir et dans l'Asie Mineure, bien avant que les Egyptiennes se fussent portées en avant; que c'est de ces camps des Osmanlis que sortaient continuellement les provocations et cris de guerre qui ont été cause du soulèvement du Haouran; qu'il est vrai que les incursions des Turcomans dans les Provinces d'Adana et de Tarsus l'ont obligé d'y envoyer des troupes pour les contenir; mais que l'expédition faite, elles ont été constamment renvoyées dans leurs cantonnemens; que même les faibles garnisons de Gulek et des Beilans n'avaient d'autre but que celui de prêter main forte aux colonnes mobiles employées à la poursuite des nomades mentionnés; que ce n'est qu'au commencement du mois de Zilkadé de l'année 1254 (vers la fin de Janvier), que quelques renforts, consistant en recrues Egyptiennes, ont été envoyés en Syrie; et qu'alors l'Armée de Hafiz Pacha avait déjà reçu une organization. La Porte avait eu des nouvelles sinistres sur mon sort, disait-il, et croyant pouvoir entrer en campagne avant mon retour, elle se flattait d'un succès complet; mais voyant que ce projet est confondu par ma présence, elle pousse des cris de guerre contre l'Egypte, signe évident de faiblesse, et qui me fait croire, qu'au lieu d'attaquer, on se bornera à crier, et à chercher du secours à l'étranger. Les nouvelles de Constantinople sont contradictoires; celles de la Syrie sont à la guerre; j'attendrai dans l'attitude actuelle l'issue de cette complication, et je n'attaquerai dans aucun cas, mais si l'on m'attaque, je me jetterai sur Ourfa et Diarbékir, et ne les rendrai qu'à condition qu'on m'accorde l'hérédité."

Je laissai parler le Pacha jusqu'à ce qu'il me sembla fatigué; et ne voulant pas entrer en matière, je lui dis que s'il est accusé à tort il lui sera bien facile de se justifier, mais que ses troupes, quoique éloignées de la frontière, peuvent être considérées dangereuses, ayant égard aux prétentions à l'indépendance dont il n'avait fait aucun secret; que du reste n'ayant pas l'intention d'attaquer, lui, et la Porte ne pouvant pas le faire, il serait bon, tant pour lui que pour le Grand Seigneur, de renvoyer les troupes dans l'intérieur et les employer à des travaux publics.

"Je ne demande pas mieux," disait-il, "mais comment me fier à mes voisins? ils parlent de la paix en passant l'Euphrate; je dois bien me défendre. La sommation de Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Russies, de faire rentrer les troupes dans les cantonnemens de paix, est venue bien mal-à-propos. Je ne saurais m'y soumettre sans ruiner mes affaires en Syrie. Si les démonstrations que l'Armée du Grand Seigneur vient de faire à Bir ne sont pas aussi dangereuses qu'on le dit, et si ses troupes repassent l'Euphrate, le camp d'Alep sera levé, et les troupes rentreront dans leurs anciens cantonnemens; à cette condition, je suis prêt à entrer en explication avec M. de Medem et avec vous, qui êtes chargé de l'appuyer."

Je lui dis que nous en parlerions le lendemain matin, et pris congé de lui vers 11 heures.

J'ai fidèlement rapporté cet entretien à mon collègue de Russie, qui se proposa d'aller voir le Pacha le soir même.

Votre Excellence apprendra du Rapport que M. le Comte de Medem adresse à sa Cour, les particularités des deux audiences qu'il a eues avec Méhémet Ali, Dimanche soir et Lundi matin. Ils se sont quittés parfaitement satisfaits l'un de l'autre, de sorte que me présentant moi au Pacha, Lundi le soir, il me reçut avec beaucoup d'empressement, et me raconta qu'il avait déclaré à mon collègue de vouloir se soumettre au désir de Sa Majesté Russe tant que le permettront les circonstances actuelles, essentiellement changées depuis le mois de Mars dernier,—époque où l'on peut avoir provoqué la sommation dont il est question; et qu'il déclarera solennellement et par écrit, aux Consuls-Généraux des Quatre Grandes Puissances, qu'il n'avait jamais eu l'intention de troubler la paix, mais que connaissant les intentions d'une fraction du Divan de Constantinople, il a voulu être prêt à repousser l'agression; que même il fera rentrer une partie de son armée de Syrie en Egypte, et en rappellera son fils et sa famille, dès que les Puissances Européennes s'engageront à lui garantir la paix. De plus, il proposera d'entrer en négociation sous la médiation de quelque Puissance amie de la Porte, sur un arrangement définitif, basé sur l'équité, si la Porte consentait à lui accorder l'hérédité. Je ne pus m'empêcher de lui faire des complimens sur la bonne grâce dont il a répondu à la demande de la Russie, et d'exprimer mes regrets que les circonstances aient en attendant tellement changées que sa concession ne pouvait être que conditionnelle; mais qu'ayant pris la résolution de maintenir une attitude purement défensive, sa conduite sera probablement jugée correcte; que par cette déclaration, on est autorisé à croire que si la Porte cesse de le menacer, il donnera le premier l'exemple de la soumission, et que les troupes établies à Antab et à Killis, retourneron à Antioche et à Balbec.

Il me dit que tout cela sera arrangé à l'amiable, pourvu que la Porte le met dans le cas de commencer ce mouvement rétrograde; que quant aux régimens de Killis et d'Antab, ils n'y sont restés que peu de jours après les manœuvres d'automne dernier, et cela parce qu'Ibrahim Pacha avait hésité à choisir un endroit convenable pour les placer; que maintenant il n'y a dans ces deux villes que de très-faibles garnisons qui, peut-être à l'heure qu'il est, se sont déjà repliées sur Alep.

Nous avons parlé sur l'hérédité comme d'une chose tout-à-fait étrangère à la sommation Russe, qui, pour prix de sa soumission, ne lui offrait que ses bons offices auprès du Sultan pour l'induire à ordonner à son armée aussi un mouvement rétrograde. Il convint de cela, mais il croit qu'ayant offert une concession au-delà de la demande, et qui, en tranchant toutes les questions qui subsistent entre lui et la Sublime Porte, pourrait mettre un terme à l'incertitude actuelle et le rapprocher du Grand Seigneur, on ne saurait pas le blâmer s'il fait allusion à un moyen d'arrangement que Sa Hautesse a concédé à d'autres.

J'ai rendu compte à M. le Comte Medem de cet entretien; et voulant profiter des bonnes dispositions du Pacha, avant que quelques nouvelles de Syrie, ou quelque autre circonstance, pût troubler son humeur, nous sommes tombés d'accord de nous rendre chez lui ensemble le lendemain matin, et fixer ce qui avait été préparé dans les quatre audiences particulières.

D'après cela, nous sommes allés voir le Pacha hier matin, et après avoir fait quelque observation sur l'addition spontanée qui a trait à l'hérédité, nous nous sommes contentés de la Déclaration dont copie ci-jointe.

J'ai énoncé à M. le Comte de Medem l'opinion d'accepter cette Déclaration quoique conditionnelle;

1°. Parce que j'ai considéré que la dépêche de la Cour de St. Pétersbourg est basée sur un état de choses bien différent de celui dans lequel Méhémet Ali se trouve actuellement, vis-à-vis de la Sublime Porte; que d'agresseur qu'il y est supposé, il est maintenant de fait lui-même menacé par les troupes du Grand Seigneur;

2°. Parce qu'il est raisonnable de supposer, que la dite Cour Impériale, si elle eut connu la complication actuelle, aurait cru ne devoir pas obliger Méhémet Ali à rappeler ses troupes, pour ne pas le priver de moyens de défense, et pour ne pas encourager les Osmanlis à pénétrer dans la Syrie, et en troubler la paix ; et finalement,

3°. Parce que la condition que Méhémet Ali a stipulée, de commencer par faire d'abord repasser les troupes du Grand Seigneur l'Euphrate, est de peu de conséquence à l'égard du Grand Seigneur, qui, peut-être, n'avait pas même ordonné le passage de ce fleuve, tandis qu'elle est du plus haut intérêt pour la tranquillité et le repos de la Syrie, surtout après une excitation si forte et si dangereuse que celle qui y a été produite par l'apparition des dites troupes en-deçà de l'Euphrate.

Agréez, M. le Baron, &c.,
(Signé) **A. DE LAURIN.**

(Translation.)

M. de Laurin to Baron de Stürmer.

M. le Baron, *Alexandria, May* 16, 1839.

AS I had the honour to inform your Excellency in my report of the 10th instant, Mehemet Ali arrived here on Sunday morning the 12th.

Two hours after his arrival I went to compliment him at the palace of Rass-el-Tyn, without any intention of speaking to him on the subject of the summons addressed to him by the Court of Russia, to which your Excellency's despatch of the 29th of April refers. Having dismissed a number of visitors, he nevertheless entered freely into the question, saying, "that he had been shamefully calumniated (alluding to the note of Count Nesselrode, which Boghos Bey had communicated to him on the evening of the 7th, on which day he himself had become acquainted with it); that the statement that he had caused his troops to assume any other attitude than one purely defensive, was entirely false; that the troops of the Grand Signor had established themselves in Diarbekir and in Asia Minor, under pretence of combating the Koords, long before the Egyptians had advanced; that the provocations and the cries of war which had caused the revolt of the Haouran, had uniformly had their origin in the Osmanli camps; that it was true that the incursions of the Turcomans into the provinces of Adana and Tarsus, had obliged him to send troops thither in order to control them, but that they had always been sent back to their cantonments as soon as that object had been accomplished; that even the weak garrisons of Gulek and of the Beilans had no other object than that of affording support to the moveable columns employed in the pursuit of the above-named wandering tribes; that it was only at the commencement of the month of Zilkade, of the year 1254, (about the end of January,) that some reinforcements, consisting of Egyptian recruits, had been sent to Syria; and that at that period the army of Hafiz Pasha was already organized. The Porte, he said, had received unfavourable accounts of my fate, and thinking that it should be able to open the campaign before my return, flattered itself with the hope of complete success; but seeing the plan defeated by my presence, the Porte now cries for war against Egypt; an evident sign of weakness, which induces me to think, that instead of attacking, they will confine themselves to making a noise, and to seeking assistance from the foreigners. The news from Constantinople is contradictory; that from Syria is warlike. I shall await in my present position the end of these complications, and I shall in no case be the attacking party; but if I am attacked, I shall throw myself on Orfa and Diarbekir, and shall not give them up again except on the condition that hereditary tenure be granted to me."

I allowed the Pasha to talk till he appeared to me to be tired, and not wishing to discuss the subject with him, I told him, that if he had

been wrongfully accused, it would be an easy matter for him to justify himself, but that his troops, although removed from the frontiers, might be considered dangerous when his pretensions to independence, of which he made no secret, came to be considered; that moreover, as he had no intention of attacking, and as the Porte had not the power of doing so, it would appear to be desirable as well for himself as for the Grand Signor, to send the troops back to the interior, and to employ them in public works.

"I do not wish anything more," said he, "but how am I to trust my neighbours? They speak of peace while passing the Euphrates; I must defend myself. The summons of the Emperor of Russia to cause the troops to return to their peace cantonments is very untimely; I should not be able to comply with it without ruining my cause in Syria. If the demonstrations recently made by the Army of the Grand Signor at Bir, are not of so dangerous a nature as is supposed, and if his troops repass the Euphrates, the camp of Aleppo shall be raised, and the troops shall return to their ancient cantonments; on this condition I am ready to enter into explanations with M. de Medem, and with you, who are instructed to support him."

I said that we would speak about it next morning, and took my leave of him about 11 o'clock.

I repeated this conversation exactly to my Russian Colleague, who had the intention of going that same evening to see the Pasha.

Your Excellency will learn from the report which the Count de Medem addresses to his Court, the details of the two audiences which he had of Mehemet Ali on Sunday evening and on Monday morning. They separated perfectly satisfied with one another, so much so, that on my presenting myself to the Pasha on Monday evening, he received me with great attention, and told me that he had declared to my Colleague, that he would submit to the wishes of His Russian Majesty, as far as the circumstances of the moment would allow—circumstances which had considerably changed since the month of March, at which period it was to be supposed that the steps to call forth the summons had been taken; and that he would solemnly, and in writing, declare to the Consuls-General of the four Great Powers, that he never had entertained the intention of disturbing the peace; but that, being acquainted with the views of a portion of the Divan at Constantinople, he had wished to be prepared to repel aggression; and that he would even cause part of his Army to return from Syria to Egypt, and would recall from thence his son and his family, so soon as the European Powers would pledge themselves to guarantee to him peace. He moreover would propose to enter into negotiations under the mediation of some Power friendly to the Porte, with respect to a definitive arrangement founded on equity, if the Porte would agree to grant to him the inheritance. I could not resist complimenting him upon the good grace with which he had replied to the demands of Russia, and to express my regret that circumstances had in the mean time changed to such a degree, as to render his concession only conditional; that as he had resolved to maintain a purely defensive position, his conduct would probably be judged correct; that in accordance with his declaration, there was ground for believing that if the Porte were to cease menacing him, he first would give the example of submission, and that the troops which had been posted at Aintab and Killis, would return to Antioch and Balbec.

He told me all this would be amicably arranged, provided the Porte should place him in a position to commence this retrograde movement; that with respect to the regiments at Killis and Aintab, those regiments had only remained there a few days after the manœuvres of last Autumn, because Ibrahim Pasha had been in doubt as to the place where they ought to be stationed; and that at the present moment those towns were occupied only by very feeble garrisons, which in all probability, at the present moment, have already retired on Aleppo.

We spoke on the subject of the inheritance as of a matter entirely foreign to the Russian summons, which, as the price of his submission, only offered him the good offices of Russia with the Sultan, for the purpose of inducing him likewise to order his Army to make a retrograde movement. He agreed in this, but he expresses a belief, that having offered a concession going beyond that which had been asked of him, and which, by resolving all the questions at issue between him and the Sublime Porte, would put an end to all existing uncertainties, and would bring him nearer to the Sultan, he could not be blamed if he were to make mention of a means of arrangement which His Highness had already conceded to others.

I reported this conversation to Count Medem, and wishing to avail myself of the good disposition of the Pasha, before any new accounts from Syria or any other circumstance could spoil his humour, we agreed to go together to him on the following morning, and to record what had been already prepared in the four separate audiences.

We accordingly went to the Pasha yesterday morning, and after having made some observations on the spontaneous addition which has reference to the inheritance, we remained satisfied with the Declaration of which a copy is hereunto annexed.

I gave my opinion to Count Medem, that he should accept this Declaration, although only a conditional one;

1st. Because I thought the despatch from the Court of St. Petersburgh to be founded on a very different state of things from that in which Mehemet Ali was actually placed with respect to the Porte; that instead of being, as is therein supposed, the aggressor, he is himself, in fact, menaced by the troops of the Grand Signor;

2ndly. Because it is reasonable to suppose that the Imperial Court, if it had been aware of the existing complication, would not have thought it its duty to oblige Mehemet Ali to recall his troops, in order not to deprive him of the means of defence, and not to encourage the Osmanlis to advance into Syria and to disturb its repose; and finally,

3rdly. Because the condition stipulated by Mehemet Ali, of commencing by obliging the troops of the Grand Signor to repass the Euphrates, is of little moment to the Grand Signor, who perhaps had not even ordered the passage of that river; while it is of the highest importance for the tranquillity and the repose of Syria, particularly after so strong and dangerous an excitement as that which had been produced by the appearance of the said troops on this side the Euphrates.

Accept, M. le Baron, &c.,

(Signed) A. DE LAURIN.

No. 57.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 17.)

My Lord, *Therapia, May* 22, 1839.

BY order of the Sultan, his Excellency Nouri Effendi invited me to meet him this day at the Kiosk of Calendar. I there found the Capudan Pasha, Nouri Effendi, the Chief Clerk of the Foreign Department, and the Chief Dragoman of the Porte. I was accompanied by the Chief Dragoman, M. Frederic Pisani.

Nouri Effendi, speaking in the name of the Porte, said that Mehemet Ali had committed acts that furnished indisputable proofs of aggression, viz :—

1st. He had sent a corps of troops to menace Bassora and Bagdad, and the Porte feared the former place might have already fallen into the hands of the Egyptians.

2ndly, He had ordered the arrest of seventeen of the chief individuals of Medina, and their transportation to Egypt, where they were thrown into prison; and also the expulsion from Medina of the authorities established there by the Sultan for the administration of *vacoufs* (that is, the lands belonging to the Mosques), accompanied by a notification to them, that they had nothing more to do with those affairs; and Nouri said, this is an act not to be endured by the Sultan, who is bound by so many ties to the Holy City.

3rdly. His son had ordered the irruption of Arabs in the Pasha's pay, and forming the advance guard of the Egyptian army, into the villages of the district of Biredjik, which they plundered; acts (Nouri said) that established the aggression of Mehemet Ali, without the addition of many others, even stronger.

His Excellency then said, "We wish to know what is the opinion of the Government of England upon these matters?" I replied, that the Government of Her Majesty was ignorant of them, and ignorant that war was imminent at the time when your Lordship last instructed me, and therefore I could not reply to his Excellency's question, nor say whether the war would be considered just or not by my Government; that Her Majesty's Government had always counselled the Porte against war, and that wise advice had been solely founded upon the conviction that war was likely to have the worst results for the Sultan; that as to the aggression of Mehemet Ali, I thought his Excellency should collect every proof he could obtain to establish the fact.

Both Nouri Effendi and the Capudan Pasha spoke a long time, to show that it is impossible the Sublime Porte could any longer suffer the *status quo;* and then asked if the British Government might not be disposed to aid the Sultan to escape from a state of things that ruined him?

I replied, that it was not consistent with the policy of my Government to deviate in such a way from solemn declarations and successive acts, and that my Government would not act except in concert with the other Great Powers.

Nouri Effendi then said, there are some Legations that give the most pressing counsels to the Sublime Porte not to undertake war: it will be my business to reply to them; but should they pass from words to threats, will your Government interpose to make them silent?

I asked his Excellency in what way could he suppose it to be in the power of the English Government to prevent other Governments holding what language might be by them considered proper? He said, "I will then ask if England will permit those Governments to attack us by force?" To this I said the British Government have always declared and felt the strongest desire to support the independence of the Ottoman Government; and I cannot suppose the British Government will ever concur with, or sanction, any attempt to deprive the Sublime Porte of the exercise of any of the rights of Sovereignty, as long as the British Government continues to be at peace with and the ally of the Sultan. Nouri then asked if the British fleet would attempt, by force, to interrupt the Ottoman fleet in its route towards Syria and Egypt? I replied, that I had no knowledge of any order having been given by Her Majesty's Government to that effect, and that I had no reason whatever to believe it had been given.

I knew that war had been determined upon by the Porte; but I thought it advisable to ascertain the fact, and I said, that judging from what their Excellencies had said to me, it appeared that the Sublime Porte had resolved upon war. Nouri admitted it to be so, and launched out into an enumeration of the causes that forced upon the Sultan the adoption of that resolution.

After again expressing the disapprobation I knew Her Majesty's Government would feel, I said that it only remained for me to hope the Sublime Porte had taken the best measures to secure success. The Capudan Pasha shortly afterwards brought a map from another room, and pointed out Jaffa as the place to which the Ottoman fleet would go; and, in reply to my question, said part of his fleet would sail on Friday, the 24th of May, for the Dardanelles, where some stores are to be taken in, and that he would follow immediately. I understand he is only waiting till the great four-decker is ready, and that it will be so in a very few days.

I ought, perhaps, to have mentioned before, that in replying to Nouri Effendi's demand whether or not Her Majesty's Government would assist the Sultan to get rid of the Pasha, I took occasion to animadvert upon the ill-policy of the Porte in having declined the Treaty lately proposed by your Lordship to Rechid Pasha, which, if accepted by the Porte, might perhaps have made such a change in the state of affairs as would have induced the Porte to avoid war. The point was discussed for some time; and Nouri Effendi ended by saying, that if the Porte could succeed in freeing itself from the dangers and difficulties created by Mehemet Ali, the Porte would make any Treaty with Her Majesty's Government they might desire to have. I place no reliance upon such declarations, but I think it my duty to report what was said, as it may deserve attention.

This long despatch is but a brief abstract of what was said at the Conference that lasted several hours, but it states the main points; and I have only to add, that the impression made upon my mind, by the tone and manner of the Ottoman Ministers, is that the Sultan looks to Her Majesty's Government with infinitely more confidence than to any other quarter. I think he would be much guided by advice from thence, were he freed from the irritation he has felt against all who have forced him to submit to the *status quo*.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 58.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received June* 17.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, May* 26, 1839.

COUNT MEDEM has written to Monsieur de Bouténeff, that he is satisfied with the explanations given by Mehemet Ali, that the Egyptians are not the aggressors, as has been supposed by Count Nesselrode.

Monsieur de Bouténeff is to have, on the 28th or 29th, an interview with the Ottoman Ministers, to communicate, with the utmost formality possible, the reply made by Mehemet Ali to Count Nesselrode's note, delivered by Count Medem to the Pasha. Your Lordship has received from Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell copy of the above-mentioned declaration.

I have found the greatest frankness in Baron Stürmer upon the affairs of this country, which he has studiously made the subject of repeated conversations with me. He appears to entertain nearly the same opinions I entertain, and to have acted much as I have acted. We have both exerted our best means to persuade the Sublime Porte not to risk a war, and we both expect nearly the same results from the measure, which we equally consider to be actually resolved, and certain to be carried into full execution, unless some sudden change be effected in the feelings of the Sultan.

Your Lordship will see some confirmation of part of what I have now said, in the extract of a despatch from M. de Stürmer to Prince Metternich, which I communicate to your Lordship.

Inclosure in No. 58.

Baron Stürmer to Prince Metternich.

(Extrait.) *Constantinople, ce* 22 *Mai,* 1839.

L'EVENEMENT le plus saillant de la dernière huitaine, est le retour de Tahar Pacha de l'Armée. Cet officier-général, parti d'ici pour Malatia, le 5 Avril dernier, est arrivé dans cette capitale le 19 de ce mois. Je n'ai pu savoir encore d'une manière certaine, quel rapport il a fait au Sultan, ni quelles seront les conséquences de sa mission. Je pense d'ailleurs que la Porte voudra se donner encore quelques jours pour mûrir les communications qu'elle aura à faire aux Légations Etrangères.

A en croire les avis officiels qui me sont parvenus à cet égard, Tahar Pacha aurait représenté l'armée comme étant dans la position la plus avantageuse pour commencer les hostilités et pour frapper un grand coup. D'après ces mêmes avis, la résolution de faire la guerre aurait été prise dans un Conseil qui a été convoqué à la Porte, par ordre du Sultan, le 20 de ce mois. Ce qui me fait craindre que c'est effectivement là le parti auquel on s'est arrêté, c'est que Hosreff Pacha, qui s'est toujours montré opposé à la guerre, n'a pas assisté, à ce que l'on m'assure, n'a pas même été appelé à ce Conseil.

Ainsi que je l'ai pressenti, et que j'ai eu l'honneur de le mander à Votre Altesse dès le départ de Tahar Pacha, sa mission n'a évidemment eu lieu que dans le but de gagner du tems, et de tenir la Porte quitte pendant six semaines des interpellations des Missions Etrangères, auxquelles elle disait ne pouvoir s'expliquer sur ses projets, avant que ce Général n'eût examiné, de ses propres yeux, la situation des affaires, et n'en eût rendu de vive voix un compte exact et détaillé. Maintenant on se prépare, dit-on, à nous adresser collectivement une communication où les déterminations de Sa Hautesse seront clairement exposées.

Le public, qui jusqu'ici se flattait que les efforts des Puissances Etrangères en faveur du maintien de la paix ne resteraient pas sans succès, est en émoi depuis le retour de Tahar Pacha; et le bruit d'une guerre imminente, peut-être même déjà commencée, est généralement accrédité. La question n'est plus maintenant que de savoir de quel côté vient l'agression? Cette question est difficile à résoudre. Certes ce n'est pas toujours celui qui tire le premier coup de canon qui doit avec justice être considéré comme l'agresseur, et dans ce cas la Porte, en supposant que l'attaque vienne de la part de ses troupes, pourrait bien ne pas l'être. Tout le monde connait les actes provocateurs de Méhémet Ali, et les velléités d'indépendance et de guerre qu'il a manifestées l'année dernière encore. La Porte aurait donc eu raison de se mettre en défense et de travailler dès-lors à s'assurer les moyens de lui opposer au besoin une rigoureuse résistance? Une pareille conduite n'eut été que sage et conforme à sa dignité autant qu'à ses vrais intérêts.

Les partisans de Méhémet Ali voudraient rejeter la faute de l'agression sur la Porte; ils disent que l'on s'est trompé en Europe, lorsqu'on a accusé le Pacha d'Egypte d'avoir poussé ses troupes jusqu'à l'extrême frontière de la Syrie, tandis qu'elles en ont toujours été éloignées à une distance de 9 à 15 lieues. Ils disent, en outre, que bien qu'il ait parlé de guerre et d'indépendance l'année dernière, il a depuis remis son épée dans le fourreau, payé le tribut qu'il devait, et s'est mis en règle envers la Porte, qui paraissait satisfaite de cette apparente soumission. Les armemens faits depuis par cette dernière, et poussés avec tant de vigueur, ainsi que la marche des troupes Ottomanes jusqu'à la frontière même de la Syrie, ne peuvent donc être imputés à Méhémet Ali, et doivent être considérés comme l'unique cause de la lutte qui se prépare. Ces

raisons ont quelque chose de spécieux et ne sauraient être rejetées sans examen.

Quoiqu'il en soit, au point où en sont venues les choses, il faut espérer que toutes les Puissances prendront le parti de la Porte et mettront ce qu'il peut y avoir d'obscur dans son langage, sur le compte de ses embarras.

Si j'ai cru devoir toucher ici la question de l'agression, c'est que de sa solution dépendra la conduite de la Russie, si la Porte se voit obligée de lui demander du secours; car d'après les déclarations qui lui ont été faites dans le tems par M. de Ruckman, et dernièrement encore par M. de Bouténeff, ce n'est qu'au cas où elle serait attaquée, que le Traité d'Emirghien* lui donnerait le droit de réclamer son assistance.

(Translation.)

Baron Stürmer to Prince Metternich.

(Extract.) *Constantinople, May* 22, 1839.

THE most marked event of the last week is the return of Tahar Pasha from the army. That General-officer, who left this for Malatia on the 5th of April last, arrived in this capital on the 19th of the present month. I have not as yet been able to ascertain what report he has made to the Sultan, nor what will be the results of his mission; I, however, believe that the Porte wishes to afford to itself a delay of some days more, in order to mature the communications which it may wish to make to the foreign Legations.

If I am to believe the official reports which have reached me in this respect, Tahar Pasha must have represented the army as being in the most advantageous position for the commencement of hostilities and for a great blow. According to the same accounts the determination to make war was taken at a Council convoked at the Porte, by order of the Sultan, on the 20th of this month. That which causes me to fear that this is really the course adopted is, that Hosrew Pasha, who has always been opposed to the war, was not at the Council, and was not, as I have been assured, even summoned.

As I foresaw, and as I had the honour of reporting to your Highness at the time of the departure of Tahar Pasha, that officer's mission was evidently only undertaken with a view to gain time, and to free the Porte during six weeks from the demands for explanation of the foreign Missions, to which it stated, that it was unable to give explanations as to its intentions, before that General should have examined with his own eyes the state of affairs, and should have given with his own mouth an exact and detailed account of the same. At present, a communication to be addressed to us collectively, in which the determinations of His Highness are clearly explained, is, it is said, in course of preparation.

The public, which had flattered itself that the efforts of the foreign Powers in favour of the maintenance of peace would not remain without success, is greatly excited since the return of Tahar Pasha; and the report of an impending, perhaps of an already commenced, war is generally believed. The only question remaining is to know from what quarter the aggression will proceed. It is difficult to resolve this question. It is undoubtedly not always he who fires the first shot who ought in justice to be considered as the aggressor; and in such case, the Porte, supposing that the attack were to proceed from its troops, might very well not be so considered. All the world knows the acts of provocation on the part of Mehemet Ali, and the inklings after independence and war which even last year he manifested. The Porte would consequently have been justified in placing itself on its defence, and in exerting itself to provide the means of opposing vigorous resistance to such attack. Such conduct would have only been prudent and conformable, as well to its dignity, as to its true interests.

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* Autrement dit de Unkiar Skélessi.

The partizans of Mehemet Ali are anxious to throw the blame of aggression on the Porte; they say, that a mistake has been committed in Europe, in accusing the Pasha of Egypt of having advanced his troops to the extreme frontier of Syria, those troops having always been from nine to fifteen leagues removed from that frontier. They moreover say, that although last year he spoke of war and independence, he has since sheathed his sword, paid the tribute which he owed, and has put himself in the right with respect to the Porte, which appeared satisfied with this apparent submission. The armaments which have since been made by the latter, and which have been carried on with so much energy, together with the march of the Ottoman troops to the very frontiers of Syria, can therefore not be imputed to Mehemet Ali, and must be considered as the sole cause of the approaching struggle. These reasons are specious to a certain degree, and cannot be thrown aside without examination.

However this may be, it is to be hoped that, at the point at which matters have now arrived, all the Powers will take the part of the Porte, and will attribute to its embarrassments what may be obscure in the language it holds.

If I have thought it right to advert here to the question of the aggression, it is because the conduct of Russia, in case the Porte should see itself compelled to demand the assistance of that Power, will depend on its solution; for according to the declarations which were made at the time by M. de Ruckman, and latterly again by M. de Bouténeff, it is only in case the Porte should be attacked, that the Treaty of Emirghien* would give to it the right of applying for such assistance.

No. 59.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 17.)

My Lord, *Therapia, May* 26, 1839.

LATE this evening I received a letter from the Chief Dragoman, who had been sent for in the earlier part of the day to the Sultan's Palace, of which I inclose copy.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 59.

M. Frederic Pisani to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Péra, ce* 26 *Mai,* 1839.

SAID BEY m'a fait chercher aujourd'hui. Il m'a parlé de l'Affaire Egyptienne. La substance de ce qu'il m'a dit est absolument la même que celle de ce que Nouri Effendi nous a dit dans la dernière conférence; et par conséquent, je me suis tenu dans mes réponses à la lettre de ce que nous avons dit. Saïd Bey a exprimé le désir de Sa Hautesse, que l'Angleterre lui donne des secours pour battre Méhémet Ali. Je lui ai donné bien à entendre que votre Excellence sait que l'Angleterre ne veut pas aider la Porte à détruire le *status quo* à présent, mais que si l'agression vient de la part de Méhémet Ali, l'Angleterre aidera le Sultan à repousser l'attaque. Saïd Bey a tâché de prouver l'existence de l'agression de la part de Méhémet Ali, par les mêmes faits cités par Nouri Effendi et le Capitan Pacha. Saïd Bey s'est beaucoup étendu sur la nécessité de détruire le *status quo.* Il a fini par me charger de prier votre Excellence, de la part du Sultan, d'employer tout votre zèle pour les intérêts de Sa Hautesse dans les circonstances présentes, et d'écrire à votre Gouvernement en faveur de sa cause, et cela de manière à l'engager à rendre à la Porte les services que Sa Hautesse réclame de l'amitié du Gouvernement Britannique.

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* Otherwise of Unkiar Skelessi.

Saïd Bey m'a paru extrêmement pénétré de la gravité des circonstances; le Sultan ne s'en fait pas illusion non plus.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.,
(Signé) FREDERIC PISANI.

(Translation.)

M. Frederic Pisani to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Pera, May* 26, 1839.

SAID BEY sent for me to day. He spoke to me about the Egyptian affair. The substance of what he said to me is entirely the same as that which Nouri Effendi said to us at the last conference; and consequently I adhered in my answers to the letter of what we said. Saïd Bey expressed His Highness's desire that England should give him assistance to overcome Mehemet Ali. I gave him clearly to understand that your Excellency knows that England will not aid the Porte to destroy the *status quo* at present, but that if the aggression comes from the side of Mehemet Ali, England will assist the Sultan in repelling the attack. Saïd Bey tried to prove the existence of aggression on the part of Mehemet Ali, by the same circumstances as those quoted by Nouri Effendi and the Capudan Pasha. Saïd Bey dwelt much upon the necessity of destroying the *status quo.* He finished by instructing me to request your Excellency, on the part of the Sultan, to use all your zeal for His Highness's interests under existing circumstances, and to write to your Government in favour of his cause, in such a manner as to persuade it to render to the Porte the services which His Highness claims from the friendship of the British Government.

Saïd Bey appeared to me to be very much impressed with the importance of the matter; neither does the Sultan deceive himself upon the subject.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) FREDERIC PISANI.

No. 60.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 19.)

My Lord, *Paris, June* 17, 1839.

I HAVE received your Lordship's despatches to the 14th of June.

Marshal Soult again expressed to me his disappointment that I had no official communication to make to him relative to the instructions to be given to the British and French Admirals in the Levant; and he requested me earnestly to press upon the attention of Her Majesty's

Government, the necessity of immediately concerting them. His Excellency informed me, that already seven sail of French ships of the line had arrived off Smyrna, that one was to sail yesterday from Toulon for the same destination, that two others will speedily follow, and that thus the French fleet on the Levant station will consist of ten sail of the line, besides frigates and sloops of war. He concluded, that the British fleet in the Levant (though it appeared that some ships of Admiral Stopford's squadron were still cruizing off the coast of Sicily) would not be inferior in force to that of France; and he looked forward with great confidence to the moral effect of the union of the two fleets, amounting altogether to twenty sail, on the conduct of the Sultan and of Mehemet Ali, as well as to the power they will have of preventing a collision between the Turkish and Egyptian squadron, and of suspending the military operations of the two armies, by cutting off their supplies by sea.

In regard to a permanent settlement of the differences between the Sultan and the Pasha of Egypt, the Marshal was of opinion that it could only be effected by the concurrence of all the Great Powers of Europe, and that a conference of their Representatives could alone afford any hope of their agreeing upon the terms of the arrangement; and that Vienna appeared to be the most central and convenient place for its assembling.

Count Medem, the first Secretary of the Russian Embassy at Paris, informs me, that he has received letters from his brother, the Russian Consul at Alexandria, which state, that if hostilities should commence, it will be the fault of the Sultan, for that nothing can be more satisfactory than the assurances given him by Mehemet Ali, of his determination to avoid, if possible, a collision between the Turkish and Egyptian army, and of his readiness to order the retreat of the Egyptian army, and the recall of Ibrahim Pasha from Syria, if the Turkish army shall retire from the Syrian frontier.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 61.

The Duc de Dalmatie to the Baron de Bourqueney.—(Communicated by Baron de Bourqueney.)

Monsieur, *Paris, le* 17 *Juin*, 1839.

JE réponds à la lettre que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire le 14 de ce mois, sous le No. 52.

Ma précédente expédition vous a fait connaître la réponse du Cabinet de Vienne à nos premières communications sur les affaires d'Orient. Vous trouverez dans les extraits ci-joints de deux dépêches de MM. de Barante et Bresson, les seules données que nous ayons encore sur les dispositions de la Prusse et de la Russie. A Berlin, je vous l'ai déjà dit, on est tout disposé à s'unir, pour maintenir la paix, aux démarches des autres Puissances. A St.-Pétersbourg, où nos communications n'étaient pas encore parvenues, M. de Barante supposait, d'après des indices dont la force ne me parait pas décisive, le Cabinet Russe enclin à saisir tout prétexte honorable de ne pas se jeter dans les embarras qu'entraînerait l'application du Traité d'Unkiar Skélessi.

Les dépêches arrivées, il y a trois jours, par le paquebot de l'Orient, ne nous ont apporté aucune nouvelle tant soit peu importante. Les armées étaient toujours en présence sur le bord de l'Euphrate; il y avait même eu entre quelques soldats une légère escarmouche; mais rien n'annonçait, de la part des chefs, la volonté d'en venir aux mains. S'il faut en croire, d'ailleurs, les rapports envoyés par Ibrahim Pacha à son père, les Turcs seraient peu en mesure de commencer les hostilités. Leur armée ne s'élèverait pas au-dessus de 36,000 hommes affaiblis même par le défaut

d'approvisionnemens suffisans, et par la désertion. Aussi, commençait-on à croire à Alexandrie, qu'il n'y aurait pas de guerre ; c'était même l'opinion du Vice-Roi. A Constantinople, on était moins rassuré, parce qu'à travers les protestations pacifiques de la Porte, ses intentions hostiles éclataient dans l'empressement qu'elle mettait à chercher jusque dans les moindres circonstances et dans les bruits les plus invraisemblables, des griefs contre Méhémet Ali.

Je viens de résumer en peu de mots, l'état des choses tel qu'il se présente en ce moment, c'est-à-dire, propre à justifier encore de très-sérieuses inquiétudes. Vous en jugerez plus complètement, d'ailleurs, par les extraits ci-joints de la correspondance d'Egypte et de Constantinople.

Je vais maintenant vous mettre en mesure de répondre aux questions que vous a adressées Lord Palmerston, sur l'opinion que s'est formée le Gouvernement du Roi des dispositions à prendre dans le but de pourvoir aux nécessités du moment.

Le Gouvernement du Roi reconnait l'utilité et la convenance d'un concert entre les Grandes Puissances pour aviser aux moyens d'assurer, par une attitude et un langage communs, le maintien de l'Empire Ottoman; il pense que c'est à Vienne que pourrait être établi, de la manière la plus avantageuse, le siège des délibérations qui s'ouvriront à cet effet.

Il croit que pour empêcher les hostilités, si elles n'ont pas encore éclaté, ou pour y mettre fin, si malheureusement elles avaient déjà commencé, les escadres Anglaise et Française doivent, en s'arrogeant une sorte de médiation armée, se constituer maîtresses de la mer ; imposer aux forces maritimes de l'Egypte et de la Porte une entière inaction; et les déterminer même à rentrer dans leurs ports, si elles en sont sorties.

L'escadre Anglaise parait devoir être forte de dix vaisseaux de ligne, sans compter les autres bâtimens. La nôtre sera portée aussi à dix vaisseaux, et comptera, de plus, quatre ou cinq frégates, avec quatre bateaux à vapeur au moins, et d'autres bâtimens plus légers. Déjà, sept vaisseaux sont réunis à Smyrne, ou en route pour s'y rendre. Les trois autres partiront très-prochainement. Il importe que des instructions, non pas communes, mais inspirées par une pensée identique, et que les deux Cours se communiqueraient au préalable, soient envoyées, sans retard, aux commandans des deux escadres pour diriger leurs opérations. Lorsqu'on saura, dans l'Orient, que de telles forces agissent dans un même esprit, et tendent vers le même but, il n'est pas possible de supposer que soit la flotte du Sultan, soit celle du Pacha, veuille s'exposer à lutter contre elles. Je dis plus : leur développement, en rendant la guerre presque impossible, ôtera à la Russie tout prétexte de mettre en mouvement sa flotte de Sébastopol, ou même son armée de terre.

Pour mieux atteindre le résultat que nous avons en vue, peut-être serait-il à propos que le pavillon Autrichien se montrât au milieu de l'escadre combinée Française et Anglaise: une ou deux frégates, avec quelques bâtimens légers, seraient suffisantes pour cela. Il est à remarquer, au surplus, que M. de Metternich en a déjà exprimé la pensée.

Telles sont, Monsieur, les mesures qui me paraissent devoir être adoptées sans retard, si l'on ne veut pas se laisser surprendre par les événemens. J'arrive à celles qui, lorsque des délibérations formelles seraient ouvertes entre les Cabinets, pourraient être prises pour terminer la crise actuelle, et en prévenir à jamais le renouvellement.

Dans le cas où nos déclarations et l'attitude de nos escadres n'auraient pu empêcher les deux parties de prendre les armes, ou ne les leur auraient pas fait déposer immédiatement, la nécessité d'une action commune des Grandes Puissances deviendrait évidente ; et il n'y a pas lieu d'espérer qu'on pût alors décider la Russie à ne pas intervenir matériellement dans une question où ses intérêts seraient si directement engagés. Ce qu'il faudrait obtenir, c'est que son action fût déterminée et limitée de concert avec les autres Cours ; c'est qu'elle se liât à celle que la France et l'Angleterre auraient, de leur côté, à exercer ; c'est qu'enfin, par le fait, une Convention Européenne remplaçât les stipulations d'Unkiar Skélessi. Je n'ignore pas tout ce qu'un pareil projet rencontrerait d'obstacles de la part du Cabinet de St.-Pétersbourg, dont la politique a été constamment de tenir, autant que possible, ses relations avec la Turquie, en dehors du droit Européen. C'est pour le même motif qu'on est fondé à craindre qu'il ne veuille pas se prêter à des négociations suivies par voie de conférences permanentes. Cependant, il aurait peu d'argumens tant soit peu spécieux à faire valoir pour repousser des combinaisons évidemment suggérées par le désir de la paix, et appuyées par tous ses alliés.

Il me reste à parler du but final de ces négociations, de l'arrangement par lequel il serait possible de placer le Sultan et son puissant vassal dans une situation plus satisfaisante pour l'un et pour l'autre, plus rassurante pour la tranquillité de l'Orient que celle où ils se trouvent depuis six années.

La nécessité de concéder à Méhémet Ali l'investiture héréditaire d'une partie au moins de ses possessions actuelles, parait maintenant admise d'une manière à peu près générale. On a compris qu'au point de grandeur où il est parvenu, le besoin d'assurer l'avenir de sa famille, et de la mettre, après sa mort, à l'abri des vengeances de la Porte, se fait sentir trop impérieusement à son esprit, pour qu'il puisse se livrer à des pensées vraiment pacifiques, tant qu'il n'aura pas obtenu quelque satisfaction à cet égard.

D'un autre côté, on ne peut pas se flatter de l'espoir que la Porte consente à lui accorder ce surcroit de force morale, si, par compensation, on ne lui donne pas à elle-même quelque avantage qui lui fournisse une garantie matérielle contre les entreprises éventuelles d'un ennemi dont elle aurait ainsi accru la puissance. La nature et l'étendue de cet avantage ne sont certes pas faciles à déterminer. Lord Palmerston pense qu'il ne faudrait pas moins que la rétrocession de la Syrie toute entière. A Berlin, on semble admettre que le Sultan pourrait se contenter d'une partie seulement de cette province. Quant à nous, Monsieur, nous reconnaissons que la Porte aurait droit à une compensation réelle, mais nous croyons que le moment d'en fixer la nature et la proportion n'est pas arrivé; qu'une question pareille ne peut être résolue que d'après des données diverses et compliquées dont l'appréciation ne peut être l'œuvre d'un moment; et que ce point doit être renvoyé au concert qui, si nos vues viennent à prévaloir, s'établira entre les Puissances.

Veuillez, Monsieur, donner lecture à Lord Palmerston de la présente dépêche. En exposant ainsi au Cabinet de Londres, l'ensemble de notre manière de voir sur les graves circonstances du moment, nous lui donnons un gage non équivoque de la confiance qu'il nous inspire, et du désir que nous avons de marcher avec lui dans le plus parfait accord. Lord Palmerston comprendra de lui-même qu'au nombre des idées que vous êtes chargé de lui faire connaître, il en est d'hypothétiques, et que les événemens ou même de plus mûres réflexions peuvent beaucoup modifier.

Recevez, &c.,

(Signé) MARECHAL DUC DE DALMATIE.

P.S.—Nous attendons impatiemment votre réponse et la communication que Lord Palmerston s'empressera sans doute de vous faire, de la décision du Cabinet de Londres, au sujet des délibérations communes dont nous proposons d'établir le siège à Vienne, aussi bien que des instructions destinées à l'Amiral Stopford.

(Translation.)

The Duc de Dalmatie to the Baron de Bourqueney.—(Communicated by the Baron de Bourqueney.)

Sir, *Paris, June* 17, 1839.

I PROCEED to answer the letter which you did me the honour to address to me on the 14th of this month, marked No. 52.

My preceding despatch will have made you acquainted with the answer of the cabinet of Vienna to our first communications upon the affairs of the East. You will find in the annexed extracts of two despatches from M.M. de Barante and Bresson, the only data which we have as yet with respect to the views of Prussia and Russia. At Berlin, as I have already informed you, they are quite disposed to join for the maintenance of peace in the measures of the other Powers. At St. Petersburgh, where our communications had not yet arrived, M. de Barante supposed, from indications which I do not consider decisive, that the Russian Government was inclined to seize every honourable pretext to avoid involving itself in the embarrassments which the execution of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi would entail.

The despatches arrived three days since by the packet boat from the Levant, have not brought us news of any importance. The armies were still in presence on the banks of the Euphrates; there had even been a slight skirmish between some soldiers, but nothing indicated a wish on the part of the leaders to come to an engagement. If, moreover, the reports sent by Ibrahim Pasha to his father, are to be believed, the Turks were far from being in a state to commence hostilities. Their army did not amount to more than 36,000 men, and these weakened by the want of sufficient supplies and by desertion. A belief, also, began to be entertained at Alexandria, that there would not be a war: it was even the opinion of the Viceroy. At Constantinople less security was felt, because, through the veil of pacific protestations, the Porte manifested its hostile intentions in the eagerness with which it sought grievances against Mehemet Ali, even in the most trivial circumstances and in the most improbable reports.

I have now sketched the state of things such as it exists at the present moment, that is to say, calculated still to justify very serious anxiety. You will, however, form a more complete judgment upon the matter from the annexed extracts of the correspondence from Egypt and Constantinople.

I will now enable you to answer the enquiries which Lord Palmerston has addressed to you as to the opinion which the Government of the King has formed with respect to the measures to be taken with a view to provide for the exigencies of the moment.

The Government of the King acknowledges the utility and the propriety of a concert between the Great Powers to provide the means of securing, by a common attitude and language, the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire; it thinks that the seat of the deliberations to be commenced for this purpose can be the most advantageously established at Vienna.

It is of opinion that, in order to prevent hostilities, if they should not yet have broken out, or to put a stop to them if they should have unfortunately commenced, the English and French squadrons, assuming a sort of armed mediation, should constitute themselves mistresses of the sea; should impose complete inaction upon the naval forces of Egypt and of the Porte, and should induce them to re-enter their harbours in the event of their having left them.

The English squadron appears to amount to ten ships of the line without counting other vessels. Our own will be composed also of ten sail of the line, and will reckon in addition four or five frigates, with at least four steam-vessels, and other lighter vessels. Seven ships of the line are already assembled at Smyrna, or on their way thither. The three others will very soon take their departure. It is important that instructions, not common, but dictated in the same spirit, and which instructions the two Courts would previously communicate to one another, should be transmitted without delay to the commanders of the two squadrons for the guidance of their operations. When it is known in the East that such forces are acting in the same spirit, and tending to the same end, it is not possible to suppose that either the fleet of the Sultan, or that of the Pasha, will venture to contend against them. I say more: the employment of such forces, by rendering war almost impossible, will deprive Russia of every pretext for putting in movement her Sevastopol fleet or her land army.

In order the better to obtain the result which we have in view, it may perhaps be expedient that the Austrian flag should appear among the combined French and English squadron: one or two frigates with some light vessels will be sufficient for the purpose. It is to be observed, moreover, that Prince Metternich has already expressed this opinion.

Such, Sir, are the measures which, it appears to me, are required to be adopted without delay, if we do not wish to be surprized by events. I now come to the measures which, when the formal deliberations shall be opened between the Cabinets, may be taken in order to put an end to the existing crisis, and to prevent at any time its return.

If our declarations and the attitude of our squadrons should fail in preventing the two parties from coming to hostilities, or in compelling them immediately to cease therefrom, the necessity for a common action by the Great Powers would become evident; and there is no ground for expecting that Russia would, in that case, be induced to refrain from a physical intervention in a question in which her interests would be so directly affected. What should be obtained is, that her course of action be fixed and limited in concert with the other Courts; that she should bind herself to that which France and England would on their part have to exert; in short, it is, in fact, that a European Convention should take the place of the stipulations of Unkiar Skelessi. I am not ignorant of all the obstacles which would be raised to such a plan by the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, whose policy has always been to keep its relations with Turkey beyond the pale of European law. It is for the same reason that there are grounds for fearing that that Cabinet will not lend itself to negotiations carried on by means of permanent conferences. It will, however, have few arguments of any force to oppose to combinations evidently suggested by the desire for peace, and supported by all its Allies.

It now remains for me to speak of the final object of these negotiations, of the arrangement by which it might be possible to place the Sultan and his powerful vassal in a situation more satisfactory to both, and more promising for the tranquillity of the East than that in which they have been placed for the last six years.

The necessity of conceding to Mehemet Ali the hereditary investiture of a part at least of his actual possessions, appears to be almost generally admitted. It has been considered that Mehemet Ali, at the degree of eminence which he has reached, would be too strongly impressed with the urgency of providing for the future interests of his family, and of placing them in security from the vengeance of the Porte after his death, to permit himself to entertain really pacific views, until he shall have obtained some satisfaction on this head.

On the other hand, it is not to be hoped that the Porte will consent to grant him this augmentation of moral force, unless some advantage by way of compensation be given to it, which may afford a positive guarantee against the subsequent enterprises of an enemy, whose power it will thus have increased. The nature and the extent of this advantage are not indeed easy to be determined. Lord Palmerston thinks that nothing less than the restitution of the whole of Syria would suffice. At Berlin, it appears to be admitted, that the Sultan might content himself with a part only of this province. With regard to us, Sir, we acknowledge that the Porte would be entitled to a real compensation; but we think that the moment for fixing its nature and its extent has not yet arrived; that such a question can only be solved, according to various and complicated data, the estimation of which cannot be the work of a moment; and that this point should be referred to the Conference which, if our views prevail, will be established between the Powers.

Be so good, Sir, as to read this despatch to Lord Palmerston. In thus communicating to the Cabinet of London, the whole of our views upon the important circumstances of the moment, we give it an unequivocal pledge of the confidence with which it inspires us, and of the desire which we feel to act with it, in the most perfect accordance. Lord Palmerston will readily understand, that some of the ideas which you are directed to communicate to him are hypothetical, and that events or even more mature reflections may greatly modify them.

Receive, &c.,
(Signed) MARECHAL DUC DE DALMATIE.

P.S.—We anxiously await your answer, and the communication which Lord Palmerston will no doubt hasten to make to you of the decision of the Cabinet of London, upon the subject of the common deliberations, of which we propose to establish the seat at Vienna, as well as of the instructions destined for Admiral Stopford.

No. 62.

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, June* 19, 1839.

THE inclosed paper contains the substance of the instructions which Her Majesty's Government propose to give to Sir Robert Stopford, the Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's Naval Forces in the Mediterranean, and upon which they request the previous opinion of the French Government.

The part of these instructions which relates to the possibility of the English and French squadrons going up to Constantinople in the event of a Russian force entering the Turkish territory, may require some consideration. It seems clear that such a measure would, in such case, be highly desirable, and that it would be the best, if not the only way, of effectually counteracting the bad consequences which might result from the entrance of the Russians into Turkey; but if that movement were to be effected against a vigorous resistance on the part of the Turkish forts in the Dardanelles, it would be difficult to accomplish it, unless the fleet were accompanied by some force which could be landed to carry the forts by taking them in the rear. This operation would not be difficult, and would not require any large amount of force; for though the batteries are formidable against ships, on account of the narrowness of the channel, the strength of the current, which sets downwards towards the Mediterranean, and because at this time of year the wind sets chiefly the same way as the current, yet those forts are weak on the land side, and might be taken one after the other, by any moderate force which attacked them in the rear.

It is probable, however, that if the Turkish troops were defeated, and if the Russians had entered Turkey, the Sultan would cheerfully permit, if he did not actually invite, the British and French squadrons to go up to Constantinople; and as those squadrons would come as friends to protect the Sultan, and not as enemies to attack him, it would be difficult for the Russians to suggest to him a plausible reason for refusing to receive such protection.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

Inclosure in No. 62.

Substance of proposed Instructions to Sir Robert Stopford.

THE Admiral to proceed with the ships under his command to the Bay of Scanderoon, or to any other neighbouring part of the coast of Syria which may be near to the places where the armies of the Sultan and of Mehemet Ali may happen to be.

If on his arrival off the coast he should find hostilities have not commenced, and that, on the contrary, the two armies have made retrograde movements, and that there is no likelihood of collision, he will then proceed in the execution of such other orders as he may have received from the Admiralty.

If he should find that, although hostilities had not actually commenced, the two armies, nevertheless, were near to each other, and continued to occupy positions likely to lead to collision, the Admiral should immediately open a communication with the Commander of each army, in doing which he will be assisted by the British Consuls on the coast; and the best step to take for this purpose would probably be, to send to the General of each army an officer, accompanied by a competent interpreter.

The Admiral should earnestly request each General to withdraw his troops some days' march from their actual position, in order to widen the distance between the two armies, and thus to give a security that no collision should take place to interfere with the efforts of the Allied Powers to effect by negotiation, a permanent settlement between the Sultan and his vassal. If the Generals should either or both of them refuse to comply with this request, the Admiral should dispatch a ship of war to Constantinople or Alexandria, or to both, as the case might be, to urge the superior Authorities to send the necessary orders; and he should express to the Generals the confident and well-founded expectation of the British Government, that they should suspend all forward movements till they should hear from their respective Governments; and he should impress upon them the deep responsibility which they would incur by any hasty and inconsiderate step.

If on his arrival off the coast he should find that hostilities had already commenced, he should, as in the former supposed case, immediately open a communication with the Generals commanding the contending armies, and state to them that he has been specially sent by the British Government to propose and strongly to press upon them a suspension of arms. That the British Government, in concert and in co-operation with Her Majesty's Allies, is going to endeavour to bring about, by negotiation, an amicable and a mutually satisfactory arrangement between the Sultan and the Pasha of Egypt; and that it is of great importance, for the success of such negotiation, that the hostilities between the two armies should be suspended while that negotiation is going on; that the views of the Powers with respect to these arrangements must be founded upon an enlarged consideration of the great interests of Europe; and that, consequently, those views could not be altered by any events which a continuance of hostilities might produce; and that such a continuance of hostilities, therefore, would only cause a useless effusion of blood, without being attended with any permanent advantage to either party; because the final settlement will depend, not upon the chances of the campaign in Syria, but upon the negotiations between the Great Powers and the Contending Parties.

If the two Generals should accede to the proposed suspension of arms, the Admiral will immediately send off a report thereof to Constantinople and Alexandria, and also, by the shortest way, to England; and he will, at the same time, urgently request the two Generals to withdraw their armies to a certain distance from each other, so as to leave a sufficient space between their respective troops.

It will also be desirable that the armistice should be confirmed by a formal Military Convention, and that its duration should be without any definite limit of time, and that a month's notice should be required before it could be put an end to by either party.

If either or both of the Generals should refuse to accede to this armistice, the Admiral should, as in the former supposed case, send off to Constantinople, or to Alexandria, or to both, to urge through the Ambassador at Constantinople, and through the Consul-General at Alexandria, that the requisite orders might be sent to the Generals in Syria, to agree to the suspension of arms.

If the refusal shall come from the Turkish General, it will, for many reasons, political and physical, be difficult for the Admiral to employ any other means than those of persuasion, to procure the consent of the Sultan; for to say nothing of the position in which Her Majesty stands towards the Sultan, who is Her Majesty's Ally, and who is also the acknowledged and undoubtedly the rightful Sovereign of the territory which is the cause of dispute, it is to be borne in mind that the operations of the Sultan's Army do not depend upon any communication by sea between Constantinople and the scene of operations, and that it would not be easy for the squadron to force its way up to Constantinople for the purpose of supporting by its presence, the representations of Her Majesty's Ambassador.

But in such case, the Admiral would strongly point out to the Turkish Commander how uncertain are the chances of war, and how great and fearful his responsibility would be, if, after he had refused an honourable armistice, when proposed to him by an ally of his master, for the express purpose of negotiation, any unforeseen disaster should befall his army; and if, instead of finding himself under the security of an armistice at the head of a strong and unbroken force, he were to be compelled to retreat with a defeated army, and be pursued by a victorious enemy; and if he should thus bring upon his country the most serious calamities through hostilities, the continuance of which he had himself insisted upon.

If, on the contrary, the refusal should proceed from the General commanding the troops of Mehemet Ali, geographical circumstances would enable the Admiral to employ more effectual means to accomplish his purpose; because the Egyptian Army could not well carry on its military operations in Syria without a free communication by sea with Egypt; and because the squadron, by going to Alexandria, could exert a powerful influence in support of the representations which the Consul-General might make to the Pasha of Egypt.

In such case, therefore, the Admiral would employ towards the General commanding the troops of Mehemet Ali in Syria, all the arguments which have been pointed out as applicable to the General of the Sultan; but the Admiral would further proceed to employ all the means at his command to produce compliance with his request.

For this purpose, he would, in the first place, prevent all further communication by Egyptian vessels, whether of commerce or of war, between Syria and Egypt; he would turn away all Egyptian ships of war, and would send all Egyptian transports and merchantmen to Malta, or to any other place, where they might be held for a time in safe custody. He would then leave on the coast of Syria such ships of war as he might think necessary for this purpose, and would proceed with the rest of his force to Alexandria, and would lose no time in earnestly pressing Mehemet Ali to send to Syria, in a British ship of war, positive orders for an immediate suspension of hostilities. If Mehemet Ali should comply with this request, all vessels which might have been detained should immediately be released; but the Admiral should remain off Alexandria with his squadron, till he had learnt that the order had actually been obeyed, and he might then return to the coast of Syria, to watch events, or might remain off Alexandria, according to his discretion under the then existing circumstances.

If the Pasha should refuse to give the order, the Admiral should then employ such means of pressure, gradually increasing in their stringency, as he may find necessary, or may think best calculated to accomplish the desired result.

Among the measures to which he might resort, would be a refusal to permit the Egyptian fleet either to come out, if in port, or to go in, if out of port; and he might detain all Egyptian merchantmen, and, according to his discretion, any Egyptian ships of war.

But it might happen that the army of the Sultan might have suffered a great defeat, and that measures of extreme vigour might become necessary to stay the advance of the Egyptians, and to save the Turkish Empire. In this case, the Admiral would be authorized to have recourse to any measures of compulsion which he might think to be within his means, and which he might consider likely to induce the Pasha to give the necessary orders for stopping the advance of his army, and for bringing it back within the limits of Syria.

In such an event, it is also possible that a Russian force, either naval or military, might enter the ports and territory of Turkey with the professed object of protecting the Sultan, and of repelling the Egyptian invaders.

In such a case, and after the Admiral had obtained from the Pasha the order for the retreat of his troops, and after he had received certain information that such order had been obeyed, it would be extremely desirable that the British squadron should proceed to Constantinople, and should remain there, or in the Black Sea, until the Russian forces had evacuated the Turkish territory.

There would be time for the Admiral to communicate on this matter with Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, for the purpose of ascertaining in what manner this measure could best be executed; and having stated to the Admiral their opinion on this point, Her Majesty's Government must leave it to his discretion, to determine whether, in the event of permission to pass not being granted, the force under his command would be strong enough to force the passage without sustaining such an amount of loss in men, and of damage to the ships, as would cripple the squadron and unfit it for any useful operation after the passage had been effected.

If the Turkish and Egyptian squadrons should be at sea, the Admiral should endeavour, as far as he could, consistently with the execution of the foregoing instructions, to prevent a collision between them, by interposing his squadron in a friendly manner between the other two fleets, and by urging the respective Admirals to retire to their own ports. But the first and most important object is to prevent or to put an end to hostilities by land, because it is the contest by land, much more than a conflict between the squadrons by sea, that might lead to consequences disastrous to the Turkish Empire and fatal to the peace of Europe.

These instructions have been prepared with the view of providing for all the cases which can at present be foreseen; but unexpected circumstances may arise, and different measures may be required; the Admiral, therefore, should use his discretion in departing, if he should think fit, from the letter of these instructions, provided he adheres to their spirit.

Orders of a nature similar to these, have been given to the French squadron in the Mediterranean; and that squadron will be instructed to join and co-operate with Sir Robert Stopford's. The most perfect understanding has been established between the British and French Governments upon the great and important matters to which these instructions relate. The interests of the two countries on these affairs are the same, their views and objects are identical, and their measures will be uniform.

The Admiral will, therefore, communicate, concert, and co-operate with the French Admiral, with the utmost confidence and frankness, upon all matters connected with the execution of these instructions, which he will show *in extenso* to the French Admiral; and Her Majesty's Government cannot doubt that the same harmony which exists between the two Governments, will prevail between their Admirals and squadrons.

No. 63.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 20.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, May* 27, 1839.

REPORTS from Syria have been made to your Lordship, of the hostile feeling of the Mahomedan population towards the Egyptian Government; similar reports abound here, and they are, I believe, true: it is thought that these widely extended feelings will ultimately give success to the Sultan, provided his army shall be prudently directed.

The declaration made by Mehemet Ali, and forwarded by Count Medem, is public, and, as I hear, is universally considered to amount to a demand for the partition of the Ottoman Empire. I presume the Sultan cannot comply with it without ensuring the loss of his spiritual supremacy—the Khalifat.

The defeat of the Sultan's army by that of the Pasha of Egypt, would be a less calamity to our interests than the partition of the empire as alluded to above, if it were to be established with our concurrence.

We might easily prevent the destruction of the empire by such a defeat, and, I believe, repair the mischiefs it would occasion; but the slow, silent, and perpetual action of universal disorder inherent in the partition of the empire, would defy our wisdom and baffle our power to resist and remedy.

I inclose extracts from Mr. Vice-Consul Hays' letter to me, dated May 7, lest your Lordship should not have received the statements it contains.

Inclosure in No. 63.

Mr. Vice-Consul Hays to Viscount Ponsonby.

(Extract.) *Alexandretta, May* 7, 1839.

THE last advices here from Bir are, that the Sultan's forces had crossed the Euphrates, and from all appearances, with an hostile intention. His Highness the Pasha here, with Solyman Pasha, and Achmet Menekly Pasha, Minister of War, are making active preparations to stand any attack that may be made against them, for I do not think the Egyptians will strike the first blow. There are about ten regiments already arrived here, and twenty more are expected, to form the force which is to be opposed against the Sultan, should he attack.

The information I have been able to obtain is, that the advanced guard only of the Turkish army, consisting of from 2,000 to 3,000 men, had, up to the 4th instant, crossed the Euphrates; they had encamped at a village about two miles to the eastward of Bir. The strength of the Turkish army was not at all known, but reinforcements were daily arriving with great quantities of stores and provisions.

The Egyptian forces were at that time estimated at about 60,000 men, but I have not been able to ascertain the proportions of Infantry and Cavalry. These forces were stationed between Aleppo and Aintab; and 20,000 more men were expected, which it was supposed would constitute the whole available force of the country.

On the 1st instant, his Highness Ibrahim Pasha made a demand for a loan of 1,200 purses from the native merchants of Aleppo, which, however, was not granted, on the plea of incapacity, and I understand was not attempted to be forced.

On the 4th instant, about twenty of the Annisee Arabs and as many Turkish prisoners, were brought into Aleppo by Mahomed Bey, who was sent with a party of Irregular Cavalry against the former to prevent their junction with the Sultan's forces. The former prisoners were detained, but the latter were sent back by order of his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha.

The Commodore Bandiera received a despatch on the 5th instant from his Highness Ibrahim Pasha, stating his intention of acting solely on the defensive, and explaining the necessity he had been under of interdicting all commercial communication with the Turkish dominions, in consequence of an edict to that effect, in the name of the Sultan, regarding the Egyptian territories.

A proclamation to the above effect has been issued, I understand, at Aleppo.

I am informed the Albanians from Candia are not to be sent for.

On the 1st or 2nd instant, an order was issued at Aleppo for all European instructors to hold themselves ready for service at a minute's warning, who replied they were ready to do so, only on condition their arrears were all paid up, which are from ten to sixteen months; and up to the 4th not any measures had been taken. The general arrears of the army are, I believe, from twelve to eighteen months; the feeling at Aleppo appears opposed to this Government, and this has been increased by the mosques having been appropriated as temporary barracks.

The Egyptian forces stationed at Adana, Tarsus, and on the frontier of Kulek Boghas, amount to about 15,000 men, a great part of whom are invalids; and the Sultan's army on the opposite frontier, I am told, amounts to about 40,000 men.

All is at present quiet in this district, but the general feeling, particularly in the mountains, appears to be opposed to this Government.

No. 64.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 24.)

(Extract.) *Paris, June* 21, 1839.

I RECEIVED yesterday, by the ordinary Calais messenger, your Lordship's despatches of the 18th of this month, and I this morning received by a special messenger your despatch of the day before yesterday, inclosing a copy of the instructions Her Majesty's Government propose to give to the Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's Naval Forces in the Mediterranean, and upon which they request to have the opinion of the French Government. A Cabinet Council met at an early hour this morning; and I have not had the opportunity of communicating with Marshal Soult, relative to the proposed instructions to the Admiral.

I hope to have a conference with his Excellency on this subject to-morrow, and will re-dispatch the special messenger in the evening, with the result.

No. 65.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 24.)

(Extract.) *Vienna, June* 14, 1839.

THE last despatch I have seen from the Internuncio, is of the 30th ultimo. Prince Metternich will send all his despatches to Prince Esterhazy, for communication to your Lordship; but as this may reach your Lordship first, I have to acquaint you that the Prince's recommendations seem to have made little effect upon the Porte, and that the tone of the Turkish Ministers was decidedly warlike. The only overture to which they seem to have listened, was one for obtaining the immediate restitution of Syria to the Sultan, by means of the intervention of the Four Powers. This overture was made by Baron Stürmer in his own name, not in that of his Government, and was to be taken into consideration by the Turkish Ministers, and to form the subject of a conference.

Since I saw him, I have learnt that France has already pronounced herself upon some of the leading points of the affair. King Louis Philippe thinks a conference indispensable, and that the place at which to assemble it is Vienna. He is willing to concur in securing the succession in Egypt to the family of Mehemet Ali, and the reversion of Syria to the Sultan, after the Pasha's death. It will, however, require all the weight of the Four Powers to induce the Two Parties to agree to this—the Sultan demanding the immediate restitution of Syria, and the Pasha its permanent annexation to Egypt. It is further to be foreseen that the project, if agreed to, will probably only produce a prolongation of the same armed truce, which has existed since the peace of Kutaya; and that the ultimate restitution of Syria will depend upon the circumstances of the moment, and probably not be effected without the employment of force. Only one other plan presents itself to my mind, and this is, the immediate wresting of Syria from the Pasha, and its restitution to the Porte. It is doubtful how far the Powers could be induced to concur in this plan, but if it could be carried into effect, it would put an end to the provisional state which at present exists, and give a better chance of peace to both the Sultan and the Pasha.

No. 66.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received June* 24.)

(Extract.) *Vienna, June* 14, 1839.

I HAVE just seen the French Ambassador, of whose confidence and disposition to co-operate with us, I cannot speak in terms too strong. I learn from him, that Prince Metternich still deprecates the employment of the word "conference," representing strongly the inconvenience attached to it. His wish is, that each Cabinet should send its opinion to its Representative here, leaving a certain latitude for discussion, and that from a comparison of the five opinions should be sought one in which all might coincide, which, when found, should form the basis of communications to the Sultan and the Pasha.

The points upon which the opinions of the Cabinets are wanted, are:

1st. The securing Egypt to the family of Mehemet Ali, and whether this should be done by successive investitures, or by the establishment of hereditary right, reserving always to the Porte its feudal superiority.

2dly. Whether the restitution of Syria should be contingent on the death of Mehemet Ali, or immediate; and upon this point, although Prince Metternich argues the expediency in the interest of the Pasha himself of making the restitution immediate, he yet allows that there would be no chance of obtaining his assent to it.

If the plan of restoring Syria to the Porte after Mehemet Ali's death should ultimately be the one resolved upon, we must expect that the Porte will demand the guarantee of the Five Powers for its being carried into effect, and must be prepared what answer to give.

Prince Metternich further stated that he had taken the Emperor's commands for preparing the Austrian vessels which might take part in the expedition, and that the son of the Archduke Charles would probably embark in one of them.

Prince Metternich informs me that although he sends the Internuncio's despatches for communication to your Lordship, he writes nothing concerning them, as he is expecting your answer to the communications which have been already made.

No. 67.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 25.)

(Extract.) *Paris, June* 22, 1839.

MARSHAL SOULT paid me a visit late in the evening of yesterday, and I delivered to him a copy of the instructions which Her Majesty's Government propose to give to the Commander-in-Chief of the British Naval Forces in the Mediterranean; but as the translation which he had directed to be made of these instructions had not been finished at the time I had an interview with him this morning, his Excellency was not prepared to enter into any discussion respecting them; he was, however, satisfied from the general statement I made of their purport, that the instructions issued by the French Government to their Admiral, would be in accordance with them.

Marshal Soult read to me a despatch which he had just received from M. de Bourqueney, reporting the conversation he had with your Lordship, on his communicating to you a despatch of Marshal Soult's, developing at some length the opinions of the French Government upon the Oriental Question. He rejoiced, he said, to find how entirely the views of the two Governments corresponded, not only regarding the measures to be taken for preventing or suspending hostilities between the Turks and Egyptians, but also respecting the arrangements to be subsequently made for placing upon a permanent basis, the relations between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali; and he was glad to find, that after balancing the advantages and disadvantages of Vienna being selected as the place of Conference between the Great Powers, upon the affairs of the East, you were inclined to accede to the proposal of the Conference being held in that city.

Prince Metternich, he said, was not without apprehension of the startling effect in some quarters, of the word Conference on Eastern Affairs, but was, notwithstanding, most desirous that an identity of purpose and of language to be held to the Porte and to Mehemet Ali, should be concerted by the Representatives of the Five Great Powers at Vienna; and he, the Marshal (provided he had the substance), was quite willing that the name of Conference should not be pronounced.

Count Appony communicated to the Marshal this day, a despatch from Prince Metternich, inclosing Reports from the Internuncio at Constantinople; the communication is probably the same as that which Lord Beauvale apprizes your Lordship you will receive from Prince Esterhazy.

No. 68.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 25.)

My Lord, *Paris, June* 23, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship, a copy of a telegraphic despatch from Marseilles, which has been communicated to me this morning by Marshal Soult.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

Inclosure in No. 68.

Dépêche Télégraphique de Marseille, du 22 Juin, 1839, à 11 heures.

LE "Minos" est parti hier au soir pour Malte. Le "Mentor" est arrivé en même tems. Ce dernier a rencontré le 17, entre Maritimo et la Sicile, l'Escadre de l'Amiral Stopford paraissant se diriger sur Malte.

Les Capitaines du "Scamandre" et du "Dante," dont le "Mentor" m'apporte les rapports, annoncent le commencement des hostilités en Syrie; au départ du "Dante" d'Alexandrie, le 7 Juin apportait la nouvelle de l'invasion du territoire Egyptien par les Turcs qui s'étaient emparés de quinze villages dont les habitans avaient été armés. A cette nouvelle, Ibrahim Pacha avait fait marcher un corps de 25,000 hommes contre eux; des transports étaient partis d'Alexandrie avec des troupes à bord.

L'Escadre Turque était dans le Bosphore au départ du "Scamandre" de Constantinople, le 7 courant, avec 7,000 hommes, qu'on disait devoir opérer un débarquement en Egypte. Le bruit courait à Constantinople qu'une affaire sérieuse, dans laquelle les Turcs avaient été battus, avait eu lieu en Syrie.

Le Grand Seigneur était malade.

(Translation.)

Telegraphic Despatch from Marseilles of the 22nd *of June,* 1839, 11 *o'clock.*

THE "Minos" started last night for Malta. The "Mentor" arrived at the same time. This last met on the 17th, between Maritimo and Sicily, with the squadron of Admiral Stopford apparently directing its course towards Malta.

The Captains of the "Scamandre" and of the "Dante," whose reports were brought to me by the "Mentor," announce the commencement of hostilities in Syria. At the departure of the "Dante" from Alexandria, news had arrived, on the 7th of June, of the invasion of the Egyptian territory by the Turks, who had possessed themselves of fifteen villages, the inhabitants of which had been armed. On this intelligence Ibrahim Pasha had marched a division of 25,000 men against them; transports had left Alexandria with troops on board. At the departure of the "Scamandre" from Constantinople on the 7th instant, the Turkish squadron was in the Bosphorus with 7,000 men, who, it was reported, were intended to effect a landing in Egypt. A report was current in Constantinople that a serious affair, in which the Turks had been beaten, had taken place in Syria.

The Grand Signor was ill.

No. 69.

Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

My Lords, *Foreign Office, June* 25, 1839.

I HAVE received the Queen's commands to signify to your Lordships Her Majesty's pleasure, that instructions to the following effect may be forthwith addressed to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's Naval Forces in the Mediterranean.

Sir Robert Stopford will proceed with the ships under his command to the Bay of Scanderoon, or to any other part of the coast of Syria which may be near to the places where the armies of the Sultan and of Mehemet Ali may happen to be.

If, on arriving off the coast, the Admiral should find that hostilities have not commenced, and that, on the contrary, the two armies have made retrograde movements, and that there is no likelihood of collision, he will then proceed in the execution of such other orders as he may have received from your Lordships.

If he should find that, although hostilities had not actually commenced, the two armies, nevertheless, were near to each other, and continued to occupy positions likely to occasion collision, the Admiral should immediately open a communication with the commander of each army, in doing which he will be assisted by the British Consuls on the coast; and the best step to take for this purpose would probably be, to send to the general of each army an officer, accompanied by a competent interpreter.

The Admiral should earnestly request each general to withdraw his troops some days' march from their actual position, in order to widen the distance between the two armies; and thus to give a security that no hostile collision should interfere with the efforts of the Allied Powers to effect, by negotiation, a permanent settlement between the Sultan and his vassal. If one or both of the generals should refuse to comply with this request, the Admiral should dispatch a ship of war to Constantinople, or to Alexandria, or to both those places, as the case might be, in order to request the British Ambassador and Consul-General to urge the superior authorities to send the necessary orders; and he should express to the generals the confident and well-founded expectation of the British Government that all operations or forward movements should be suspended till the further orders of their respective Governments should have been received; and he should impress upon the generals the deep responsibility which they would incur by any hasty and inconsiderate step.

If, on his arrival off the coast, he should find that hostilities had already commenced, he should, as in the former supposed case, immediately open a communication with the generals commanding the contending armies, and should state to them that he has been specially sent by the British Government to propose, and strongly to press upon them, a suspension of arms; that the British Government, in concert and co-operation with Her Majesty's Allies, is going to endeavour to bring about, by negotiation, an amicable and a mutually satisfactory arrangement between the Sultan and the Pasha of Egypt; and that it is of great importance for the success of such negotiation, that the hostilities between the two armies should be suspended while that negotiation is going on; that the views of the Powers with respect to these final arrangements, must be founded upon an enlarged consideration of the great interests of Europe, and that those views could not be altered by any events which a continuance of hostilities might produce; and that such a continuance of hostilities, therefore, would only cause a useless effusion of blood without being attended with any permanent advantage to either of the Contending Parties. Because the final settlement will depend, not upon the chances of the campaign in Syria, but upon the negotiations between the Great Powers and the two parties.

If the two Generals should accede to the proposed suspension of arms, the Admiral will immediately send a report thereof to Constantinople and to Alexandria, and also, by the shortest way, to England; and he will, at the same time, urgently request the two Generals to withdraw their armies to a certain distance from each other, so as to leave an ample interval of space between their respective troops.

It will also be desirable that the armistice should be confirmed by a formal military convention, and that its duration should be without any definite limit of time; and two months' notice, at the least, should be required, before it could be put an end to by either party.

If either or both of the Generals should refuse to accede to this armistice, the Admiral should, as in the former supposed case, send off to Constantinople, or to Alexandria, or to both, to urge through the Ambassador at Constantinople, and through the Consul-General at Alexandria, that the requisite orders might be sent to the Generals in Syria to agree to the suspension of arms.

If the refusal shall come from the Turkish General, it will, for many reasons, political and physical, be difficult for the Admiral to employ any other means than those of persuasion, to procure the consent of the Sultan. For to say nothing of the position in which Her Majesty stands towards the Sultan, who is Her Majesty's Ally, and who is also the acknowledged and rightful Sovereign of the territory which is the cause of dispute, it is to be borne in mind that the operations of the Sultan's Army do not depend upon any communication by sea between Constantinople and the scene of operations, so that the squadron could not check those operations; and that it would not be easy for the squadron to force its way up to Constantinople for the purpose of supporting by its presence, the representations of Her Majesty's Ambassador.

But in such case the Admiral would strongly point out to the Turkish Commander, how uncertain are the chances of war, and how great and fearful his responsibility would be, if, after he had refused an honourable armistice, when proposed to him by an Ally of his master, for the express purpose of negotiation, any unforeseen disaster should befall his army; and if, instead of finding himself under the security of an armistice at the head of a strong and unbroken force, he were to be compelled to retreat with a defeated army, and to be pursued by a victorious enemy; and if he should thus bring upon his country the most serious calamities in consequence of hostilities, the continuance of which he had himself insisted upon.

If, on the contrary, the refusal should proceed from the General commanding the troops of Mehemet Ali, geographical circumstances would enable the Admiral to employ more effectual means to accomplish his purpose; because the Egyptian Army could not well carry on its military operations in Syria without a free communication by sea with Egypt, which communication the squadron could cut off; and because the squadron, by going to Alexandria, could exert a powerful influence in support of the representations which the Consul-General might make to the Pasha of Egypt.

In such case, therefore, the Admiral would employ towards the General commanding the troops of Mehemet Ali in Syria, all the arguments which have been pointed out as applicable to the General of the Sultan; but the Admiral would, in addition, proceed to employ all the means at his command to produce compliance with his request.

For this purpose, he would, in the first place, prevent all further communication by Egyptian vessels, whether of commerce or of war, between Syria and Egypt; he would turn away all Egyptian ships of war; and would send all Egyptian transports and merchantmen to Malta, or to any other place, where they might be held for a time in safe custody. He would then leave on the coast of Syria such ships of war as he might think necessary for this purpose; and would proceed with the rest of his force to Alexandria, and would lose no time in earnestly pressing Mehemet Ali to send to Syria, by a British ship of war, positive orders for an immediate suspension of hostilities.

If Mehemet Ali should comply with this request, all vessels which might have been detained should be released; but the Admiral should remain off Alexandria with his squadron, till he had learnt that the order had actually been obeyed; and he might then return to the coast of Syria to watch events, or he might remain off Alexandria, according to his discretion under the then existing state of circumstances.

If the Pasha should refuse to give the order, the Admiral should then employ such means of pressure, gradually increasing in their stringency, as he might find necessary, or might think best calculated to accomplish the desired result.

Among the measures to which he might resort would be, a refusal to permit the Egyptian fleet either to come out, if in port, or to go in, if out of port; and he might detain all Egyptian merchantmen, and, according to his discretion, any Egyptian ships of war.

But it might happen, that the army of the Sultan might have suffered a great defeat, and that measures of extreme vigour might become necessary to stop the advance of the Egyptians, and to save the Turkish Empire. In this case, the Admiral would be authorized to have recourse to any measures of compulsion which he might think to be within his means, and which he might consider likely to induce the Pasha to give the necessary orders for stopping the advance of his army, and for bringing that army back within the limits of Syria.

If the Turkish and Egyptian squadrons should be at sea, the Admiral should endeavour, as far as he could consistently with the execution of the foregoing instructions, to prevent a collision between them, by interposing his squadron in a friendly manner between the Turkish and Egyptian fleets, and by urging the respective Admirals to retire to their own ports. But the first and most important object is, to prevent or to put an end to hostilities by land, because it is the contest by land, much more than a conflict between the squadrons by sea, that might lead to consequences disastrous to the Turkish Empire, and fatal to the peace of Europe.

These instructions have been prepared with the view of providing for all the cases which can at present be foreseen. But unexpected circumstances may arise, and different measures may be required. The Admiral, therefore, should use his discretion in departing, if he should think fit, from the letter of these instructions, provided he adheres to their spirit.

Orders of a nature similar to these, will probably have been given to the French squadron in the Mediterranean; and that squadron will be instructed to join and co-operate with the squadron of Sir Robert Stopford. The most perfect understanding has been established between the British and French Governments upon the great and important matters to which these instructions relate. The interests of the two countries in these affairs are the same, their views and objects are identical, and their measures will be uniform. The Admiral will therefore communicate, concert, and co-operate with the French Admiral, with the utmost confidence and frankness, upon all matters connected with the execution of these instructions, which he will show *in extenso* to the French Admiral; and Her Majesty's Government cannot doubt, that the same harmony which exists between the two Governments will prevail between their Admirals and squadrons.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 70.

Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

My Lords, *Foreign Office, June* 25, 1839.

I HAVE stated in my other letter of this day's date, that among the contingencies which might arise out of the existing state of affairs in the Levant, and with which Admiral Sir Robert Stopford might have to deal, "it might happen that the army of the Sultan might have suffered a great defeat, and that measures of extreme vigour might become necessary to stop the advance of the Egyptians, and to save the Turkish Empire. In this case, the Admiral would be authorized to have recourse to any measures of compulsion which he might think to be within his means, and which he might consider likely to induce the Pasha to give the necessary orders for stopping the advance of his army, and for bringing it back within the limits of Syria."

I am to signify to your Lordships Her Majesty's pleasure, that a further instruction be addressed to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford with reference to the above-mentioned contingency, and to the following effect:

Sir Robert Stopford should be informed that, in such an event, it is possible that a Russian force, either naval or military, might enter the ports and territory of Turkey, with the professed object of protecting the Sultan, and of repelling the Egyptian invaders.

In such a case, and after the Admiral had obtained from the Pasha the order for the retreat of his troops, and after he had received certain information that such order had been obeyed, it would be extremely desirable that the British squadron should proceed to Constantinople, and should remain either there, or in the Black Sea, until the Russian forces should have evacuated the Turkish territory.

There would be time for the Admiral to communicate on this matter with Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, for the purpose of ascertaining in what manner this measure could best be executed; and Her Majesty's Government having stated to the Admiral their opinion on this point, must leave it to his discretion to determine whether, in the event of permission to pass not being granted, the force under his command would be strong enough to force the passage, without sustaining such an amount of loss in men, and of damage to the ships, as would cripple the squadron, and unfit it for any useful operation after the passage had been effected.

It is however unlikely that in the case supposed, the Turkish Government should seriously object to receive at Constantinople a fleet belonging to a friendly Power, and coming for a friendly object. The Turkish Government itself could have no motive for refusing to the British squadron permission to pass the Dardanelles, and if such permission were to be refused out of delicacy towards Russia, it is most likely that the refusal would be nominal, and that no real resistance would be opposed to the passage. But upon this point Sir Robert Stopford would receive more definite information from Lord Ponsonby.

The Admiral will show this instruction, as he will the other of this day, *in extenso*, to the French Admiral; and a copy of it will also be sent to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 71.

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, June* 25, 1839.

I HAVE to request that your Excellency will state to the French Government, that the accounts received to-day from Marseilles, of the commencement of hostilities, have led Her Majesty's Government to send off the instructions to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, without further delay, in order that the messenger may not be too late for the Marseilles steamer, and because your Excellency has stated that the French Government concurs in the general tenor of those instructions.

If further communication between the two Governments should lead to any modifications of those instructions, those modifications could easily be sent out afterwards.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 72.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 27.)

My Lord, *Paris, June* 24, 1839.

I HAVE received your Lordship's despatches to the 21st of June.

The Marshal Soult is much satisfied with the general tenor of the instructions which Her Majesty's Government propose to give to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford; but he was not prepared when I saw him this morning, to communicate to me officially the opinion of the French Government upon them. His Excellency told me that he was this day to confer respecting them with the Minister of Marine, that to-morrow they would be submitted to the Cabinet Council, and that he would then communicate to me a Memorandum containing such observations as may have occurred to the French Government upon the consideration of them, and suggesting such changes as might appear advisable.

There are two points in the instructions on which I collected from the conversation of Marshal Soult, that it is probable some change will be suggested. The first relates to the conduct to be observed towards the Turkish fleet. The Marshal seemed to think that, though the operations of the Sultan's Army do not depend upon communication by sea between Constantinople and the scene of operations, it would be nevertheless expedient, in the case of the refusal to agree to a suspension of arms coming from the Turkish General, to compel the Sultan's fleet to return to the Dardanelles, not so much for the purpose of preventing supplies reaching the Turkish Army from the coast, as to give to our proceedings the character of an impartial mediation;—the other point refers to our fleets not permitting the Egyptian squadron to go into Alexandria, if it should be out of port.

I expect also that in the Memorandum some observations will be made upon that part of the instructions which relates to the combined squadron proceeding to Constantinople or into the Black Sea. Marshal Soult talked to me this morning of the danger of cruizing in a sea where we had no friendly port of refuge. I will not, however, attempt to anticipate the contents of the Memorandum, which I shall probably have to transmit by the next messenger.

I believe I have before mentioned that the Marshal was much pleased at learning that the Austrian Government were preparing some vessels of war to act in conjunction with the French and English fleets. This union of the three flags will, he thinks, have a great moral effect; if some Russian ships of war were also to be added to the combined fleet, such an indication of concert among the Great European Powers could not fail to have an irresistible influence on the Contending Parties, and ensure the preservation of peace.

Count St. Aulaire writes from Vienna, that Lord Beauvale has been endeavouring to persuade Prince Metternich to assemble a military force of 10,000 men at Trieste, ready to be embarked with a view to operations in the East; and that though the Austrian Minister had declined to accede to this proposition, Lord Beauvale did not despair of his being induced to adopt it. Marshal Soult asked me, if I had heard of this communication between Her Majesty's Ambassador and Prince Metternich. He appeared to take great interest in the success of this proposition. I answered that, in the last despatch from Lord Beauvale, which had passed through my hands under flying seal, no reference was made to this subject.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 73.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 27.)

My Lord, *Paris, June* 24, 1839.

SINCE I wrote to your Lordship this morning, the French Government has received the despatches from Alexandria and from Constantinople, both dated the 7th, which were announced on Saturday by the Marseilles telegraph.

Marshal Soult, who dined here, communicated to me the substance of their contents.

M. Cochelet writes, that according to the official report of Ibrahim Pasha, the Turkish troops had advanced beyond the line of the frontier, and that with a superior force of Cavalry, they had driven out of a village an Egyptian detachment of Cavalry which had been stationed in it, and which had retired upon Aintab, where some redoubts had been raised by Ibrahim for the defence of that position. That arms had been distributed in various villages to the inhabitants, who had been excited to revolt against the dominion of the Pasha.

Mehemet Ali, on the receipt of this intelligence, had invited the Consuls of the Five European Powers to attend him, and had laid before them the despatches of Ibrahim Pasha, and asked their advice as to the conduct he should pursue. They advised him to act entirely on the defensive; and upon their remonstrating against the intention he had avowed of sending his fleet to sea, he gave up that intention.

The despatches from Constantinople state that the Turkish Government still gives assurances that orders have been issued to the Com-

mander of the Turkish Army, not to commence hostilities, but that no credit is given to these assurances.

The Sultan Mahmoud had been ill for four days, but had recovered from his illness.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 74.

Count Nesselrode to Count Pozzo di Borgo.—(Communicated by M. de Kisseleff, June 27, 1839.)

Monsieur le Comte, *St.-Pétersbourg, le* $\frac{3}{15}$ *Juin,* 1839.

LES dernières dépêches de Constantinople, du $\frac{17}{29}$ Mai, et d'Alexandrie, du $\frac{3}{15}$ Mai, nous annoncent que les troupes Ottomanes et Egyptiennes se trouvaient tellement rapprochées les unes des autres, qu'un conflit entre elles semblait devenir imminent. Cette supposition acquiert d'autant plus de probabilité à nos yeux, que le mouvement de Hafiz Pacha sur Bir, situé à l'extrémité des frontières de la Syrie, semble nous indiquer, qu'il entrait réellement dans les vues du Sultan, tout en protestant de ses intentions pacifiques, de faire avancer l'armée du Taurus au point de rendre un conflit inévitable, en l'attribuant à quelque circonstance fortuite, sans que la Porte ait eu l'air de l'avoir provoqué.

M. de Bouténeff, à la date de ses derniers rapports, continuait encore à employer tous ses efforts pour détourner le Sultan de l'idée de se précipiter dans une lutte, dont les conséquences pourraient devenir si graves pour le repos de l'Empire Ottoman. Il se peut que les remontrances de notre Ministre, jointes à celles de ses collègues, aient réussi à prévenir une complication qui semblait prochaine. En ce cas, le danger dont le repos de l'Orient paraissait menacé, aurait été détourné encore une fois; de même qu'il l'a été il y a juste un an, grâces à l'unanimité qui a présidé alors aux déterminations des Grandes Puissances de l'Europe.

Mais il se peut aussi que les événemens aient marché aujourd'hui avec trop de rapidité pour que les efforts des Représentans Alliés soient parvenus à arrêter l'exécution d'un plan d'agression, que la Porte semble avoir médité depuis longtems, et qu'elle a su couvrir du plus profond mystère.

A la distance où nous sommes du théâtre des événemens, les remontrances que nous adresserions aujourd'hui à la Porte seraient certainement tardives. Nous ne saurions empêcher une lutte qui déjà peut s'être engagée à l'heure qu'il est. Il ne nous reste qu'une seule tâche à remplir, c'est de circonscrire cette lutte dans les bornes les plus étroites possible, afin qu'elle ne puisse pas devenir compromettante pour le maintien du repos général de l'Europe.

Je vais, M. l'Ambassadeur, développer clairement cette pensée, et résumer en peu de mots, les conséquences pratiques qui s'y rattachent.

Pour l'Europe en général le danger réel n'est pas dans un combat qui se livre en Syrie entre les troupes du Sultan et celles du Pacha d'Egypte.

Il n'y aurait pas de danger non plus pour l'Europe, si le Sultan, ainsi qu'il le désire et l'espère, parvenait à reconquérir la Syrie. Le danger ne commencerait à devenir grave que si le sort des armes venant à se déclarer contre le Sultan, le Pacha d'Egypte profitait de cet avantage pour mettre en péril la sûreté de Constantinople et l'existence de l'Empire Ottoman.

C'est là que se trouve le véritable et unique danger pour le maintien de la paix générale, car dès que Constantinople serait menacée, la question cesserait d'être agitée simplement entre la Porte et l'Egypte. Il ne s'agirait plus d'une lutte engagée entre deux forces Musulmanes; il s'agirait d'une complication Européenne qui dès-lors nous semblerait imminente.

Pour empêcher que les choses n'en viennent là, il importe de prendre à tems des mesures pour circonscrire la lutte entre le Sultan et Méhémet Ali, dans de certaines bornes, afin que cette lutte ne puisse, dans aucun cas, s'étendre au point de devenir compromettante pour la sécurité de la capitale de l'Empire Ottoman.

Dans cette vue, il nous a semblé urgent de nous entendre franchement avec les Grandes Puissances de l'Europe qui ont également à cœur, comme nous, de mettre obstacle au danger que nous venons de signaler. Parmi ces Puissances, la Grande Bretagne est incontestablement celle qui peut exercer le plus d'influence sur le sort de cette question, et concourir de la manière la plus décisive, à réaliser les intentions pacifiques de notre Auguste Maître.

Dans cette conviction, Sa Majesté vous charge, M. l'Ambassadeur, de vous expliquer à ce sujet avec le Cabinet Britannique sans la moindre réserve. Veuillez lui exposer, qu'il est de son intérêt comme du nôtre, de faire en sorte que la lutte entre la Porte et l'Egypte n'acquierre pas un tel caractère de gravité qu'elle puisse jamais mettre en péril la sûreté de la capitale de l'Empire Ottoman;

Que pour éviter une pareille catastrophe, il faudrait être en mesure, 1°. d'empêcher que la flotte du Pacha d'Egypte ne puisse sortir des ports; 2°. de ne pas tolérer que l'armée Egyptienne, si elle avait des succès décisifs comme en 1833, s'avançât comme alors au centre de l'Asie Mineure jusqu'aux portes de Constantinople;

Qu'en conséquence, pour mettre d'avance de justes limites à l'action du Pacha d'Egypte, limites clairement définies, qu'il ne lui soit pas permis de franchir impunément, il faudrait lui déclarer de la manière la plus formelle, "que tant qu'il se bornerait à la défense des territoires qui lui ont été assignés par l'arrangement de Kutahia; tant qu'il n'étendrait pas ses opérations militaires au-delà des districts de Diarbékir et d'Ourfa, ainsi qu'il en a donné aux Consuls Alliés la promesse formelle, la Grande Bretagne, d'accord avec les autres Puissances de l'Europe, resterait témoin impassible de la lutte qui s'est engagée en Syrie; mais que dès qu'il prendrait l'offensive, dès qu'il étendrait le théâtre de la guerre au-delà des défilés du Taurus, pour la porter au centre de l'Asie Mineure, l'Angleterre considérerait un pareil acte d'hostilité comme s'il était dirigé contre elle-même, et agirait dès-lors comme si elle était en guerre ouverte avec le Pacha d'Egypte;

"Qu'elle se regarderait de même comme en état de guerre avec lui, s'il essayait de faire sortir sa flotte pour engager avec le Sultan une lutte sur mer; l'intention formelle de l'Angleterre étant de renfermer le combat dans les bornes de la Syrie, et de ne pas permettre, sous aucun prétexte, qu'il puisse dépasser ces bornes, irrévocablement fixées par l'intérêt général de l'Europe, qui veut que la paix de l'Orient soit promptement rétablie, et que la lutte actuelle, quelles que soient les chances de la guerre, ne puisse d'aucune manière mettre en péril la tranquillité de l'Empire Ottoman."

Si l'Angleterre s'accordait avec nous pour émettre une déclaration conçue dans ces termes, l'Empereur autoriserait son Représentant à Alexandrie à se prononcer exactement dans le même sens.

Les autres Cours Alliées s'empresseraient sans doute de joindre leurs efforts à ceux de la Russie et de l'Angleterre.

L'accord qui présiderait ainsi aux déterminations des Cinq Puissances pourrait préserver encore une fois l'Europe du malheur d'une conflagration générale dans le Levant, en renfermant, pour ainsi dire, les deux adversaires en champ clos, les obligeant à vider leur querelle en Syrie, sans leur permettre d'engager le combat sur un terrain plus vaste, dont l'intérêt général de l'Europe doit les tenir éloignés malgré eux.

Si nous parvenons à obtenir le résultat que je viens d'indiquer; si le Gouvernement Anglais accueille les idées que votre Excellence est chargée de lui communiquer; si nous empêchons ainsi la flotte de Méhémet Ali de sortir de ses ports; et si nous défendons à son armée de franchir le Taurus, sous peine de se trouver en guerre avec l'Europe entière, nous aurons obtenu tout ce qui est nécessaire pour prévenir une complication sérieuse dans le Levant.

Avant tout, il nous faut maîtriser les faits, c'est-à-dire, empêcher que la lutte ne devienne menaçante pour le repos de l'Europe entière.

Lorsque nous aurons une fois atteint ce but, les circonstances se simplifieront d'elles-mêmes; alors on jugera avec plus de maturité quelle sera l'issue du combat et quels devront être les arrangemens ultérieurs qui pourront intervenir entre les deux parties, afin de rétablir les relations pacifiques de la Porte avec le Pacha d'Egypte sur une base solide et durable.

Pour le moment, notre prévoyance doit se borner à aller au plus pressé, c'est-à-dire à empêcher que la politique mal dirigée du Sultan ne puisse nous entraîner dans une complication qui soit de nature à amener la chance d'un conflit Européen.

C'est ce danger que nous sommes intéressés à éloigner de tous nos efforts; et c'est dans cette vue qu'il nous a semblé indispensable de nous expliquer franchement avec l'Angleterre, en faisant à Londres la démarche dont je viens, d'ordre de l'Empereur, de vous indiquer le but et le plan. Elle prouvera au Ministère Britannique, que loin de vouloir provoquer une complication dans le Levant, nous employons tous nos soins à la prévenir; et qu'au lieu de nous prévaloir avec empressement des stipulations de notre Traité d'Alliance avec la Porte, nous sommes les premiers à désirer nous-mêmes d'éloigner le renouvellement d'une crise qui nous forcerait, malgré nous, à reprendre une attitude militaire sur les rives du Bosphore.

La certitude que l'Angleterre acquerra par là de nos intentions vraiment conservatrices, ne saurait manquer d'exercer une influence utile sur les dispositions du Cabinet de Londres. Il appréciera, je l'espère, la loyauté des sentimens qui a dicté la démarche dont vous allez vous acquitter. Veuillez ne pas tarder un seul instant, M. le Comte, à nous informer de l'accueil qu'elle aura obtenu de la part de Lord Palmerston. L'Empereur se plait à croire que cet accueil répondra pleinement à nos vœux, et que l'entente qui s'établira entre le Cabinet Anglais et le nôtre, pour le maintien de la paix du Levant, servira à la faire rétablir promptement, lors-même que la politique imprévoyante du Divan aurait tenté de la troubler momentanément.

Agréez, &c.,
(Signé) NESSELRODE.

(Translation.)

Count Nesselrode to Count Pozzo di Borgo.—(Communicated by M. de Kisseleff, June 27, 1839.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, June* $\frac{3}{15}$, 1839.

THE last despatches from Constantinople of the $\frac{17}{29}$ May, and from Alexandria of the $\frac{3}{15}$ May, apprise us that the Ottoman and Egyptian troops had approached so near to each other that a conflict between them appeared imminent. This supposition seems to us the more probable, because the movement of Hafiz Pasha upon Bir, situated at the extremity of the frontiers of Syria, appears to indicate that it entered really into the views of the Sultan, all the while declaring his pacific intentions, to cause the Army of the Taurus to advance to such a point as to render a conflict inevitable, by attributing it to some chance circumstance, without the Porte appearing to have given any provocation for it.

M. de Bouténeff, at the date of his last reports, was continuing to employ all his efforts to dissuade the Sultan from the notion of precipitating himself into a struggle, the consequences of which might become so serious to the repose of the Ottoman Empire. It may be that the remonstrances of our Minister, joined to those of his Colleagues, have succeeded in preventing a complication which seemed at hand. In this case, the danger which appeared to threaten the repose of the East will have once again been averted; in the same manner as it was just a year ago, thanks to the unanimity which then presided at the determinations of the Great Powers of Europe.

But it is also possible that events may have now proceeded with too great

rapidity for the efforts of the Allied Representatives to have succeeded in arresting the execution of a plan of aggression, which the Porte appears to have meditated for a long time, and which it has contrived to veil in the most profound mystery.

At the distance at which we are from the scene of events, the remonstrances which we might now address to the Porte would certainly be somewhat late; we should be unable to prevent a struggle, which is perhaps at the present moment already begun. There remains but one task for us to fulfil, that is, to confine this struggle within the narrowest possible bounds, so that it may not compromise the maintenance of the general repose of Europe.

I will explain this idea clearly, and recapitulate in a few words the practical consequences which attach to it.

The real danger for Europe at large is not in a combat carried on in Syria between the troops of the Sultan and those of the Pasha of Egypt.

Neither would there be danger to Europe if the Sultan succeeded in reconquering Syria, as he wishes and hopes to do. The danger would not begin to become serious until, in the event of the fate of arms declaring against the Sultan, the Pasha of Egypt should profit by this advantage to place the safety of Constantinople and the existence of the Ottoman Empire in peril.

That would be the true and only danger for the continuance of general peace, for from the moment that Constantinople should be threatened, the question would cease to be considered simply as one between the Porte and Egypt. There would no longer be question of a struggle between two Mussulman forces,—there would be question of a European complication, which from that moment would appear to us to be imminent.

To prevent things reaching such a point, it is of consequence to take measures in time for confining the struggle between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali within certain limits, in order that this struggle may in no case extend itself so as to compromise the safety of the capital of the Ottoman Empire.

With this view, it has appeared to us essential to come to an understanding, frankly, with the Great Powers of Europe, who, equally with us, have at heart to prevent the danger which we have just pointed out. Among those Powers Great Britain is incontestably the one that can exercise the greatest influence over the fate of this question, and can co-operate in the most decisive manner in realising the pacific intentions of our august Master.

With this conviction His Majesty desires you, Sir, to come to an explanation with the British Cabinet on this subject, without the least reserve. Have the goodness to submit to that Cabinet, that it is as much for its interest as for ours, to take care that the struggle between the Porte and Egypt shall not assume so serious a character as may ever place the safety of the capital of the Ottoman Empire in danger;

That in order to avoid such a catastrophe, we should be prepared, 1st. To prevent the fleet of the Pasha of Egypt from coming out of port; 2dly. Not to allow the Egyptian Army, if it met with decided successes as was the case in 1833, to advance, as at that period, to the centre of Asia Minor, even to the gates of Constantinople;

That consequently, in order, beforehand, to set due bounds to the action of the Pasha of Egypt,—bounds clearly defined which he is not to be permitted to transgress with impunity,—it would be necessary to declare to him in the most formal manner, "That as long as he shall confine himself to the defence of the territories which have been assigned to him by the arrangement of Kutaya; as long as he shall not extend his military operations beyond the district of Diarbekir and Orfa, as he has formally promised to the Allied Consuls, so long will Great Britain, in conjunction with the other Powers of Europe, remain a passive spectator of the struggle which is going on in Syria; but that from the instant he shall act on the offensive, from the moment that he shall extend the theatre of the war beyond the defiles of the Taurus in order to carry it into the centre of Asia Minor, from that moment England would consider such act of hostility as if it were directed against herself, and would thenceforward act as if she were at open war with the Pasha of Egypt;

"That in the same manner she would consider herself in a state of war with him, if he attempted to send out his fleet to enter upon a naval contest with the Sultan; the formal intention of England being to confine the contest within the limits of Syria, and not to permit it, under any pretence, to pass those limits, fixed irrevocably by the general interest of Europe, which desires that the peace of the East may be promptly re-established, and that the present struggle, whatever may be the chances of the war, shall in no manner place the tranquillity of the Ottoman Empire in jeopardy."

If England came to an agreement with us to issue a declaration couched in these terms, the Emperor would authorize his Representative at Alexandria to hold precisely the same language.

The other Allied Courts would doubtless hasten to unite their efforts to those of Russia and of England.

The harmony which would thus preside over the determinations of the Five Powers, might once again preserve Europe from the misfortune of a general conflagration in the Levant, by confining, as it may be said, the two adversaries in closed lists, compelling them to settle their quarrel in Syria, without permitting them to engage on a wider field, from which it is the general interest of Europe to keep them off in spite of themselves.

If we succeed in obtaining the result which I have described; if the English Government accepts the ideas which your Excellency is directed to communicate to it; if we thus prevent the fleet of Mehemet Ali from coming out of his ports; and if we forbid his army from crossing the Taurus, under penalty of finding himself at war with the whole of Europe, we shall have obtained all that is necessary to prevent a serious complication in the Levant.

Above all things, we must be able to bring the matter within our control, that is to say, prevent the struggle from becoming threatening to the repose of all Europe.

When once we shall have attained this end, circumstances will simplify themselves of their own accord; a more mature judgment can then be formed as to the issue of the combat, and as to what the ulterior arrangements which may be made between the two parties ought to be, in order to re-establish the pacific relations of the Porte with the Pasha of Egypt upon a solid and durable basis.

For the moment, we must confine ourselves to what is most pressing, that is to say, to guard against the ill-advised policy of the Sultan dragging us into a complication of a nature to bring on a chance of a European conflict.

It is this danger which we are interested in removing with all our endeavours; and it is with this view that we have thought it indispensable to come to a frank explanation with England, by taking in London the step of which, by the Emperor's orders, I have pointed out to you the plan and the object. It will prove to the British Ministry that, far from wishing to bring about a complication in the Levant, we are using all our care to prevent one; and that, instead of greedily availing ourselves of the stipulations of our Treaty of Alliance with the Porte, we are ourselves the first to desire to prevent the recurrence of a crisis which would compel us, in spite of ourselves, again to take up a military attitude on the shores of the Bosphorus.

The certainty which England will thereby acquire of our truly conservative intentions, cannot fail to exercise a salutary influence over the disposition of the Cabinet of London. It will, I hope, appreciate the sincerity of the sentiments which has dictated the step which you are about to take. Have the goodness, Sir, not to delay a moment in informing us of the reception it meets with from Lord Palmerston. The Emperor flatters himself, that this reception will fully answer our wishes, and that the understanding which will be established between the

English Cabinet and our own for the preservation of the peace of the Levant, will serve speedily to re-establish it, even if the short-sighted policy of the Divan should have attempted momentarily to disturb it.

Accept, &c.,
(Signed) NESSELRODE.

No. 75.

Instructions to the French Admiral in the Levant.—(Communicated by M. de Bourqueney, June 29.)

M. le Contre-Amiral, *Paris, le* 26 *Juin*, 1839.

DEJA quelques actes d'hostilité paraissent avoir eu lieu en Syrie, entre les troupes du Sultan et celles du Vice-Roi d'Egypte. Un puissant intérêt Européen existe à prévenir ou arrêter les effets d'une collision, et c'est là le but que se propose la France, aidée de ses Alliées; c'est celui que vous devez chercher à atteindre avec l'escadre sous votre commandement, soit isolément, soit par votre co-opération avec l'escadre de Sa Majesté Britannique et avec la station navale d'Autriche dans le Levant, si, comme il y a tout lieu de le croire, cette station a l'ordre de se joindre aux forces navales Françaises et Anglaises. Vous aurez donc à vous concerter avec leurs commandans, sur les moyens de rendre la co-opération efficace. De son côté, sans doute, Sir Robert Stopford aura reçu des instructions conformes à l'intérêt puissant qu'ont les deux pays dans la conduite d'une affaire dans laquelle leurs vues et leur but sont identiques, et leurs mesures doivent être semblables.

Il doit donc y avoir entre les deux amiraux communication réciproque de leurs instructions, et il doit s'établir entre eux toute la confiance et toute la franchise propres à amener dans leurs opérations le même accord qui existe entre les deux Gouvernemens. Lorsque le cas exigera concert et co-opération, la direction supérieure appartiendra à l'officier le plus élevé ou le plus ancien en grade.

A la réception des présentes instructions, l'escadre sous vos ordres devra se diriger vers les côtes de Syrie.

Dans le cas de la rencontre des escadres Turque et Egyptienne, vous vous attacherez à rendre impossible une collision, en vous interposant entre elles, et en pressant les amiraux de rentrer dans leurs ports respectifs; et vous empêcherez tout arrivage de troupes et de munitions de guerre, par mer, sur le théâtre de la guerre.

Vous devrez chercher à vous mettre immédiatement en communication avec les deux généraux-en-chef, soit dans la baie d'Alexandrette, soit sur tout autre point le plus rapproché des lieux occupés par les deux armées.

Vous ferez tous vos efforts pour leur faire proposer et accepter une suspension d'armes, pendant laquelle les Puissances entreront en négociation pour amener un arrangement mutuellement satisfaisant pour la Porte et pour le Pacha d'Egypte. Il convient de faire remarquer, que cet arrangement devant être fondé sur une large appréciation des grands intérêts de l'Europe, et non pas sur les éventualités de la guerre, aucune des deux parties n'a intérêt à continuer les hostilités qui, quelle qu'en fût l'issue, ne pourraient, en définitive, améliorer sa situation; il sera également important d'insister pour que les deux armées se retirent à une certaine distance l'une de l'autre.

L'armistice sera constaté par une Convention militaire portant que la reprise des hostilités, si elle avait lieu, devrait être dénoncée au moins un mois à l'avance.

Ces démarches, ces dispositions, soit qu'elles proviennent d'un des deux commandans des escadres agissant isolément, soit, en cas de réunion des deux escadres, qu'elles aient lieu de concert et avec la participation de l'un et de l'autre, ces dispositions, dis-je, devront être portées immédiatement à la connaissance de notre Ambassadeur à Constantinople, et du Consul-Général à Alexandrie, et l'avis en sera transmis en France par la voie la plus prompte.

Si les deux généraux, ou l'un d'eux, se refusaient à accéder à cet armistice, l'Ambassadeur à Constantinople et le Consul-Général à Alexandrie en seraient immédiatement informés, comme dans le cas précédent, afin qu'ils eussent à réclamer l'envoi aux généraux en Syrie, des ordres nécessaires pour les faire consentir à la suspension d'armes.

Si le refus venait du général Turc, on appellerait son attention sur la grave responsabilité qu'il assumerait en cas de revers. Il lui serait signifié que dès ce moment, la voie de mer serait fermée à tout secours destiné à l'Armée Ottomane, tandisque notre Ambassadeur, informé du refus, agirait auprès du Sultan pour vaincre cette résistance.

Si le refus, au contraire, provenait du général Egyptien, des représentations analogues lui seraient faites, et toute communication maritime entre la Syrie et l'Egypte serait immédiatement fermée.

Dans l'un ou l'autre cas, les deux amiraux se concerteraient sur la répartition des forces qu'il serait nécessaire de placer soit à l'entrée du détroit, soit devant Alexandrette, soit enfin sur tel point du territoire de l'Asie Mineure qui serait jugé convenable pour y établir un blocus étroitement serré, et ne permettre la sortie d'aucun bâtiment de guerre ou autre.

Outre le concert établi entre les commandans des escadres Française et Anglaise, et même le commandant de la station Autrichienne, il serait possible qu'une escadre Russe offrit son concours; il doit être bien entendu qu'il serait admis dans un but pacifique et conforme aux présentes instructions.

Ces instructions ont pour but, de pourvoir aux éventualités qui ont pu être actuellement prévues. Il en est d'autres qui, par leur nature et leur gravité, exigeront des instructions ultérieures: elles vous seront adressées. Le Roi s'en rapporte, pour tout le reste, au zèle et à l'habileté du Commandant de son escadre, aidé de ses connaissances locales, et de la vieille expérience de l'illustre amiral avec lequel il va se trouver en rapports de service.

(Translation.)

Instructions to the French Admiral in the Levant.—(Communicated by M. de Bourqueney, June 29.)

M. le Contre-Amiral, *Paris, June* 26, 1839.

ALREADY some acts of hostility appear to have taken place in Syria between the troops of the Sultan and those of the Viceroy of Egypt. An important European interest is at stake to prevent or arrest the effects of a collision, and this is the object which France proposes to effect with the assistance of her Allies; it is this which you are to endeavour to attain with the squadron under your command, either separately or by your co-operation with the squadron of Her Britannic Majesty, and with the naval division of Austria in the Levant, if, as there is every reason to believe, this division has received orders to join the French and English naval forces. You will, therefore, have to concert with their commanders upon the means of rendering the co-operation efficacious. Sir Robert Stopford on his side will, no doubt, have received instructions in conformity with the important interest which the two countries have in the management of an affair in which their views and their object are identical, and in which their measures should be similar.

The two Admirals should, therefore, reciprocally communicate to each other their instructions, and should act towards each other with all the confidence and frankness requisite to introduce into their operations the same unanimity which subsists between the two Governments. Whenever circumstances may require concert and co-operation, the chief direction will belong to the officer of the highest rank or of the longest standing.

Upon the receipt of these instructions, the squadron under your orders should proceed towards the coast of Syria.

In the event of a meeting between the Turkish and Egyptian squadrons, you will endeavour to render a collision impossible, by interposing yourself between them, and by urging the Admirals to re-enter their respective ports; and you will prevent any arrival by sea, at the theatre of war, of troops and warlike stores.

You will seek to place yourself immediately in communication with the two Generals-in-Chief, either in the Bay of Scanderoon, or at any other point the nearest to the places occupied by the two armies.

You will exert every effort to induce them to propose and agree to a suspension of arms, during which the Powers will enter into negotiation in order to bring about an arrangement mutually satisfactory for the Porte and for the Pasha of Egypt. It is proper to remark that, as this arrangement must be founded upon an enlarged consideration of the great interests of Europe, and not upon the chances of the war, neither of the two parties has any interest in continuing hostilities which, whatever may be their issue, cannot ultimately improve their situation. It is equally important to require that the two armies should retire to a certain distance from each other.

The armistice shall be confirmed by a military Convention, stipulating that the renewal of hostilities, if it takes place, should be notified at least one month beforehand.

These measures and these arrangements, whether proceeding from one of the two Commanders of the squadrons acting individually, or resulting, in case of a junction of the two squadrons, from the concert and participation of both Commanders, should be immediately communicated to our Ambassador at Constantinople and Consul-General at Alexandria, and information thereof should be forwarded to France by the most expeditious channel.

If the two Generals, or either of them, should refuse to agree to this armistice, the Ambassador at Constantinople and the Consul-General at Alexandria should be immediately informed thereof, as in the preceding case, in order that they may urge the transmission of the necessary orders to the Generals in Syria to consent to a suspension of arms.

If the refusal should come from the Turkish General, his attention should be directed to the serious responsibility which he would incur in case of a reverse. It should be pointed out to him that from that moment communication by sea would be closed to all succours destined for the Ottoman Army; whilst our Ambassador, informed of his refusal, would exert himself with the Sultan to overcome this resistance.

If the refusal, on the contrary, should come from the Egyptian General, similar representations should be made to him, and all communication by sea between Egypt and Syria should be immediately cut off.

In either case, the two Admirals should concert as to the distribution the forces which it may be necessary to place either at the entrance of the Straits, or off Scanderoon, or in short, at any point of the territory of Asia Minor which may be considered expedient for the maintenance of a strict blockade, and for preventing the departure of any vessel, either of war or of any other description.

Besides the concert established between the Commanders of the French and English squadrons, and also between them and the Commander of the Austrian naval division, it is possible that a Russian squadron may tender its co-operation; it must be well understood that its co-operation should be admitted for a pacific object and in conformity with the present instructions.

These instructions are intended to provide for contingencies which it has been possible to foresee. There are other contingencies which from their nature and their importance require ulterior instructions: those instructions will be addressed to you. The King relies in every other respect upon the zeal and ability of the Commander of his squadron, aided by his local knowledge, and upon the practised experience of the illustrious Admiral with whom he is about to act.

No. 76.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 30.)

My Lord, *Paris, June* 28, 1839.

I MENTIONED in the postscript of a private letter to your Lordship, written on Monday night, that late on that evening, Marshal Soult had communicated to me, that the French Government, in consequence of the intelligence received from Alexandria of the commencement of hostilities in Syria, had determined to send off without further delay, instructions to Admiral Lalande, commanding the French Naval Force in the Levant. These instructions, he said, would contain nothing which was not in accordance with the instructions which Her Majesty's Government proposed giving to Sir Robert Stopford, omitting that part on which the French Government were inclined to propose to Her Majesty's Government some change or modification.

The Marshal called upon me this morning, and put into my hands a copy of the instructions sent to the French Admiral, which I do not inclose in this despatch, having been informed by his Excellency, that a copy of them was last night forwarded to M. de Bourqueney, to be communicated to your Lordship.

On reading over these instructions, I observe two points of difference between them and the instructions transmitted to Sir Robert Stopford. The one relates to the orders given to the French Admiral to intercept all transport of troops or ammunition by sea to the theatre of war; whereas, those addressed to the British Admiral (on the ground chiefly of the operations of the Sultan's Army not depending upon any communication by sea between Constantinople and the scene of military operations), direct him only to prevent all communication by Egyptian vessels, whether of commerce or of war, between Syria and Egypt. The other point relates to the contingency of a Russian squadron offering to co-operate with the French and English combined fleet. The French Admiral is instructed to admit of this co-operation, provided it be offered with a pacific object, and in a spirit conformable to the Admiral's instructions.

I learnt from Marshal Soult, that he had directed M. de Bourqueney to propose to your Lordship, that the British and French Ambassadors at Constantinople should be instructed to bring under the consideration of the Divan, the entrance of the combined French and English fleet into the Sea of Marmora, in case a Russian naval and military force shall have entered the Bosphorus. The Marshal said, he fully concurred in your Lordship's view of its being desirable that the British and French flags should appear before Constantinople at the same time with that of Russia; but he had doubts as to allowing so important a question as that of declaring war against Turkey and Russia, to which the forcing of the passage of the Dardanelles was tantamount, to be left to the discretion of the Admirals. That question had better, he thought, be reserved for the consideration of the two Governments. The passage of the fleet up to Constantinople, he observed, would be a dangerous and difficult operation, if really resisted by the Turks, unless a military force were attached to it to take possession of the forts by land, and no military force adequate to such an undertaking had been embarked on board either fleet. The fire of the forts was not the only danger to which, he said, the fleet would be exposed; it might have to encounter in a damaged and crippled state the hostility of the Russian fleet, combined with that of Turkey, prepared in the Bosphorus for combat, and aided by the Russian Army.

I observed, that all these considerations would certainly be well weighed by the Ambassadors and the Admirals who, upon the spot, could best judge of the practicability and safety of the operation; but I thought the danger of it would be enhanced, if, by communications with the Divan, we indicated our intention, and allowed a length of time to elapse before we attempted the execution of it.

The Marshal has not received from St. Petersburgh any official reply to the instructions he gave to M. de Barante relative to the affairs of the East; but he showed me the postscript of a private letter from the French Ambassador, stating that the disposition of the Russian Cabinet was very pacific and conciliatory.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 77.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 27.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, May* 28, 1839.

A COURIER of this Government, which arrived here yesterday, brought to me letters from Aleppo, of the 15th instant, and from Damascus, of the 20th instant.

Mr. Consul Werry of Damascus, writes to me, that the Haouran insurrection is entirely pacified, and that everything is perfectly quiet in Damascus and its neighbourhood.

Mr. Pro-Consul Werry of Aleppo, writes to me, that he had an interview, on the 8th instant, with Ibrahim Pasha, and the following is the extract of Mr. Werry's letter: "I have just returned from seeing Ibrahim and Solyman Pashas, with both of whom I had a long conversation. The former says to me, 'We have at present twenty-three deserters from the other side, among whom is a Yuzbachi, and a Chawish of Hafiz Pasha, who states to me, that Hafiz Pasha had crossed with three regiments; but who gives a very poor account of the troops under him.' His Highness then said, 'Our forces are superior in every way; and I hear from the Chawish, that there are only 45,000 to 50,000 men intended to act against us. The Sultan has fifteen regiments of Infantry. We have eighteen regiments. He has six regiments of Cavalry; ours are eight regiments. His Artillery is of 100 pieces; ours are double that; so that, if they attack us, they will fare but badly.' He then turned round to five Colonels sitting in the room, saying, 'I tell you all, and the English Consul present, that when the match is placed to the first cannon, from that time, in half an hour, I am on the other side, and in pursuit of that Khanzir, (meaning, I suppose, Hafiz Pasha,) and who will see what Ibrahim Pasha is.' He then turned to me and said, 'I know Hafiz Pasha; he was at the Morea; he is nothing: his predecessor, Rechid Mehemet Pasha, was much superior, quite another man;' I then told his Highness, that the European Powers would not allow any fighting, and that all would be arranged between them without gunpowder. He answered, 'We shall see; but if he did not intend to attack me, why is he crossing with these forces? And, moreover, I will tell you, that I have heard positively, that as the forces find difficulty in crossing at Bir, the Seraskier had changed his march, and is bringing them on Roum Kale and on [illegible], which will oblige him, with his forces, to pass a part of my frontier and limits: why should he do that? If you will not believe me, and you have courage, mount a horse and go to Aintab, from where you will see, with your own eyes, if they put their feet within my territory or not. I shall protest,' his Highness said laughing, 'against the Ambassadors at Constantinople, for allowing the Sultan's troops to enter my territory;' and added, laughing, 'You say that there is no war, how can it be credited? You Franks are the cause that the Sultan's forces now are crossing my territory, by—your 'continuing to remain quiet;' 'you must not act;' 'they will not attack you,' and so forth. But what can be done now; there is no remedy. Had you left us without tying us down, the Sultan's troops would never have dared to cross and enter in any way our territory.'

"I then brought the conversation round to the mountaineers of Pyass, and along the continuity of that range to the Taurus extending to Marash. His Highness replied, 'All is quiet in that part. But I will tell you one thing, that the Sultan and we must come to blows, for I must have Marash. I require it for the keeping of these mountaineers in order; as it was evident; the other day they committed all sorts of depredations in Giaour Dagh, and that range: I went against them; what followed? They merely went on the other side of the mountain, saying, We are in the Sultan's territory. And, moreover, I will tell you another thing, Marash I must have, as also along the line to Orfa; and then all will be quiet and right in Syria. I shall not then require such a large force, to keep all these mountains, &c., in order; and I shall be able to give my attention to the interests of the country, and to further the commercial interests of all, and particularly of the English. And all will go on quietly, and without requiring troops continually, which I well know, without your telling me, is very detrimental. But so long as our boundary line is where it is, I must keep a large force to check both the movements of the Sultan's forces, as also those of the people of the mountains.'

"His Excellency Solyman Pasha, spoke in pretty nearly the same substance, adding, that he had heard that the Sultan's troops had only very small rations of bread and provisions supplied to them. His Excellency was also of opinion, that war would not take place."

All the reports from the Vice-Consuls of Tripoli, Latakia, Suedia, and Alexandretta, to their Consuls-General here, mention the arrival of large quantities of biscuit, wheat, barley, rice, &c., and ammunition, from Egypt, and from other parts, all of which is immediately forwarded to Aleppo, at which place also the different troops which were on the coast and in the south of Syria have arrived.

These troops are abundantly supplied with provisions from the stores, and thus the peasantry and inhabitants do not suffer. And Mr. Pro-Consul Werry writes to me, that such is the good conduct of these troops, that no complaints have to be made against them, and that it could not be supposed that there were 50,000 soldiers in Aleppo and its neighbourhood.

Upon the 10th instant, there was a grand review of Ibrahim Pasha's Army at Gibreen, an hour and half distance from Aleppo. The troops consisted of thirteen regiments of Infantry, four regiments of Cavalry, and three of Artillery; in all more than 42,000 men. Ibrahim Pasha slept the previous night at the village of Gibreen, in order to see each regiment as it came on the ground.

The manœuvres are said to have been conducted with good order and discipline, after which the troops returned to their respective quarters.

The Colonel of the 17th Regiment of the Line having not known the ground which he was to take up on the day of the review, was condemned by Ibrahim Pasha to give a dinner for sixty persons, which he did on the 12th May, and the table was laid out in the European manner.

The army of Hafiz Pasha suffers much from desertion, and is said to be in a very disorganized state; and the position of this army seems to offer only a choice of difficulties, as if the army advances to attack Ibrahim Pasha, it will most probably be signally defeated, and if it retires, the soldiers of Hafiz Pasha will probably all disperse; and it does not seem possible that Hafiz Pasha can have supplies to remain in his present position.

The rash conduct of the Sultan in acting contrary to the advice given to him by the Ambassadors at Constantinople, will not only have drained his resources, but will very much have enfeebled his moral influence in all Turkey; and, on the contrary, the prudent and moderate conduct of Ibrahim Pasha, acting under his father's orders, and his refraining from any hostile act, or from destroying the army of Hafiz Pasha, will proportionally raise Mehemet Ali, and give him an increased influence in the opinion of the Turkish Empire.

Syria is now perfectly quiet, and the inaction of Hafiz Pasha has cooled the part of the Turkish population in Syria which was indisposed to the Egyptian Government, at the same time that it has fixed the wavering on the side of Mehemet Ali, and has in every way strengthened the party of the Viceroy.

The Christians in Syria are all in his favour, and they dread any success of the Sultan: the more as the Turkish population in Syria has for some time back been threatening the Christians, to whom they have said that their reign was nearly over.

Mehemet Ali had intended a few days ago to send out his fleet to cruise off Alexandria, and the order had already been given by him to that effect, but the Consuls-General of Austria, France, and Russia, as well as myself, having separately mentioned to him our opinions, that it would be better and perhaps conducive to the maintenance of peace, that his fleet should remain in harbour, he immediately acceded to our desires, and the fleet now remains here; and it is but justice to Mehemet Ali to say that he appears to have listened with good grace to the pacific counsels given to him by us, and upon those points there has been perfect accord and frankness between my colleagues and myself.

The Pasha has sent two of his steamers to Alexandretta, in order to keep up a constant communication with Ibrahim Pasha; and he has assured my colleagues and myself that Ibrahim Pasha will not commit any act of hostility, nor advance with his army, unless he should be attacked by that of the Sultan; and as Hafiz Pasha does not seem in a state to attack, it is still to be hoped that hostilities may be avoided, and that the Ambassadors at Constantinople may be able to persuade the Sultan to recall his army from the Syrian frontier.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

No. 78.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received June* 27.)

My Lord, *Therapia, June* 5, 1839.

IT appears that the Ottoman Army under Hafiz Pasha, is entrenched to the west-north-west of the point where it crossed the Euphrates near Bir. It is within the territory to which Mehemet Ali Pasha does not lay claim, and there has not been any act of hostility committed by it that I have heard of.

The Ottoman Fleet, it is said, will sail on the 8th.

The messenger will afford me the means of forwarding intelligence to your Lordship about that time.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 79.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received June* 27.)

My Lord, *Therapia, June* 5, 1839.

THE Austrian Internuncio had, yesterday, an interview with the Ottoman Ministers, and I learn that all his efforts to prevent war were fruitless. I believe the actual commencement of hostilities will depend upon the time when all things are ready here, and that there will be then issued by the Porte a declaration addressed to the Sultan's Allies, setting forth the grounds upon which the Sublime Porte acts, &c., &c. That may take place the 8th instant.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 80.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 27.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, June* 6, 1839.

AS in conformity with my instructions I send a special messenger to Malta, by the French steamer, with the despatches from India, I avail myself of the same messenger to transmit to your Lordship copies of my despatches, with their inclosures, to Viscount Ponsonby.

The duplicates of all those I shall have the honour to transmit by Her Majesty's steamer on its return from Beyrout, to which place it proceeds to-day.

I have been so much occupied for the last two days, in consequence of the departure of Her Majesty's steamer for Beyrout, of the French steamer for Constantinople, and of the letters to overtake our steamer at Suez, all of which happened at the same time, that my constant avocations have not permitted me to see the Pasha this day, nor to enter so fully as I should have wished, in my despatches to Lord Ponsonby, into the important nature of their contents at this critical moment; but I believe that I have not omitted anything of moment.

There are two steamers of the Pasha at Alexandretta; and the one which returned from thence on the 4th instant, is ready to start at a moment's notice.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Inclosure 1 in No. 80.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Alexandria, June* 5, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that yesterday forenoon, myself and colleagues of Austria, France, and Russia, waited on Mehemet Ali by his desire.

The Inclosure No. 1, which was drawn out in common by myself and colleagues, is the detail of our interview with the Pasha; and before our departure we all most strongly urged him to be very particular in his instructions to Ibrahim Pasha, which we all requested should be in the most moderate terms, and in which he should be ordered not to commit any sort of aggression.

Inclosure No. 2 is the translation of the letters from Ibrahim Pasha to Mehemet Ali, and which are referred to in the procès-verbal of our conference with the Pasha; and your Excellency will perceive by it, how much we have to fear that hostilities will take place.

Soon after we took leave of the Pasha, he sent off a steamer to Syria, with the letter of instructions for Ibrahim Pasha; and it was only this morning that my colleagues or myself had a copy of it, and which I now transmit in Inclosure No. 3.

Your Excellency will perceive that the Pasha writes to his son that we told him to "repousser la force par la force;" but, as is seen by the procès-verbal, we said so, in the event only that the army of Ibrahim Pasha should be attacked in its positions in his territory.

I fear that there is on both sides a strong desire for war; and, in this case, hostilities cannot long be delayed.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Sub-Inclosure 1 in Inclosure 1 in No. 80.

Procès-Verbal of the interview of the Four Consuls-General with Mehemet Ali.

DANS la matinée du 4 Juin, le Vice-Roi fit inviter par son second interprète, Hosreff Effendi, les quatre Consuls-Généraux d'Autriche, d'Angleterre, de France, et de Russie, à se rendre chez lui vers les 10 heures, en conférence. Nous fumes tous exacts au rendez-vous. Aux complimens d'usage, qui consistent à demander des nouvelles de la santé de Son Altesse, elle nous répondit, qu'elle se trouvait bien de corps, mais fort mal d'esprit par suite des nouvelles alarmantes qui venaient de lui parvenir de son fils Ibrahim Pacha. Méhémet Ali nous fit alors part des trois lettres ci-jointes en copie reçues simultanément la veille d'Alep. Après lecture faite de ces pièces, qui annonçaient que les troupes de Sa Hautesse avaient définitivement franchi le territoire de Syrie, et avaient occupé le village d'Ouront, il nous déclara que l'objet de notre réunion était de nous consulter sur les mesures qu'il se proposait de prendre dans les circonstances du moment, et sur les instructions qu'il allait adresser dans le courant de la journée au Généralissime.

"Je suis d'avis," nous a-t-il dit en substance, "de faire évacuer plusieurs villages de la province d'Antab, à l'effet d'empêcher une collision, et de laisser une distance convenable entre mes troupes et celles du Sultan; mais j'autoriserai mon fils, dans le cas où les villages que j'aurai fait abandonner par mes soldats, seraient occupés par ceux du Grand Seigneur, à les en déloger et à commencer les hostilités. Je ferai de plus avancer le gros de l'armée vers la frontière, pour éviter que l'apparition des troupes Turques sur mon territoire ne donne l'alarme à la population, et ne l'encourage, soit à une révolte, soit à des désordres quelconques."

Nous fumes tous d'accord à représenter au Pacha que l'apparition d'une partie de la Cavalerie Turque sur la frontière de Syrie, ne saurait nullement être envisagée par lui comme une hostilité; que l'occupation d'un village, et de plusieurs même, s'ils étaient abandonnés par les troupes Egyptiennes, pouvait fort bien être considérée comme un acte de pillage commis par les avant-postes, mais à l'insçu d'Hafiz Pacha; que le meilleur moyen d'éviter de pareilles irrégularités serait de renouveler l'autorisation déjà précédemment donnée à son fils, de se mettre en rapport avec le Séraskier Ottoman, et de demander à ce dernier des explications au sujet de l'apparition de ses troupes dans les limites de la Syrie; enfin, qu'il ne lui restait qu'à prendre une bonne position défensive dans telle ville de la Syrie qu'il jugerait la plus convenable à la sûreté du pays, et attendre d'abord une attaque en règle de la part des troupes de Sa Hautesse pour la repousser ensuite par la force.

Après d'assez longs pourparlers, dans lesquels le désir de Méhémet Ali d'en venir aux mains avec les forces Turques se trahissait visiblement, il déclara qu'il écrirait à son fils:

1°. De se mettre sans retard en rapport avec Hafiz Pacha, à l'effet de le prévenir de ce qui venait d'avoir lieu au village d'Ouront, et de l'engager de ne point donner lieu à un conflit, en permettant à ses troupes de pénétrer sur son territoire et d'occuper des villages Syriens;

2°. Que le Généralissime avait à diriger une partie de ses forces vers Antab, afin de mettre cette ville dans un état de défense convenable, et que ce n'est que lorsque les redoutes qui se trouvent à quelque distance de cette place, seraient attaquées par les troupes du Sultan, qu'il eût à envisager les hostilités comme commencées;

3°. Que dans ce cas seulement, Ibrahim Pacha était autorisé à avancer en personne avec toutes ses forces, et à combattre l'armée du Grand Seigneur. Le Pacha nous promit de faire remettre à chacun de nous quatre, une copie de l'ordre qu'il adressait à son fils.

Avant de quitter le Vice-Roi, il nous fit part encore du contenu de plusieurs lettres qu'il venait de recevoir de ses affidés de Constantinople; elles étaient toutes à la guerre. L'un d'eux lui annonçait la sortie de la Flotte Turque comme imminente; un autre l'engageait à profiter des circonstances favorables qui se présentaient, pour frapper un coup décisif;

un troisième enfin, lui annonçait qu'une conférence extraordinaire venait d'avoir lieu entre les Ministres et les Pachas de la Porte, dans laquelle Tahar Pacha, récemment revenu du quartier-général, avait rendu compte de l'état de l'armée Turque, qu'il représentait comme fort peu satisfaisant; qu'un des membres de cette assemblée avait été d'avis que la Question Egyptienne devait être réglée par le Sultan seul; qu'elle ne regardait que lui, et qu'il ne devait admettre aucune ingérence quelconque des Puissances Européennes dans cette question; cet avis, ajoute-t-il, avait été goûté par les grands dignitaires de Sa Hautesse.

Méhémet Ali ne manqua pas de manifester à cette occasion quelques velléités de faire sortir immédiatement sa flotte, mais il y renonça aussitôt, sur les observations qui lui furent adressées sur l'inopportunité d'une pareille mesure, et promit de retenir son escadre dans le port jusqu'à la réception de nouvelles plus positives sur la sortie de la Flotte Ottomane des Dardanelles.

(Translation.)

Minute of the interview of the Four Consuls-General with Mehemet Ali.

ON the morning of the 4th of June, the Viceroy, by his second interpreter, Hosrew Effendi, invited the four Consuls-General of Austria, England, France, and Russia, to a conference with him about ten o'clock. We were all punctually at the place appointed. To the usual compliments, which consist in asking after His Highness's health, he replied, that he was well in body, but very ill in mind in consequence of the alarming intelligence which had just reached him from his son Ibrahim Pasha. Mehemet Ali thereupon communicated to us the three letters of which copies are annexed, which had been received together the evening before from Aleppo. When these documents, which announced that the troops of His Highness (the Sultan) had actually passed over into the territory of Syria, and had occupied the village of Ouront, had been read, he declared to us that the object of assembling us was to consult us on the measures which he proposed to adopt under existing circumstances, and on the instructions which he was about to address in the course of the day to the General Commanding in Chief.

"I am inclined," said he to us in substance, "to cause several villages in the province of Aintab to be evacuated, in order to prevent a collision, and to leave a suitable distance between my troops and those of the Sultan; but I shall authorize my son, in the event of the villages which I shall have caused to be abandoned by my soldiers, being occupied by those of the Grand Signor, to dislodge them, and to commence hostilities. I will, moreover, cause the main body of my army to advance towards the frontier, to prevent the appearance of the Turkish troops on my territory from occasioning alarm to the people, and from encouraging them either to revolt, or to commit some disorders."

We all concurred in representing to the Pasha that the appearance of a portion of Turkish Cavalry on the frontier of Syria, could in no wise be looked upon by him as an act of hostility; that the occupation of one village, and even of several, if they were abandoned by the Egyptian troops, might very well be looked upon as an act of pillage committed by the outposts, but without the knowledge of Hafiz Pasha; that the best method of avoiding such irregularities would be to renew the authority already previously given to his son, to place himself in communication with the Ottoman Commander, and to require from the latter an explanation with respect to the appearance of his troops within the limits of Syria; finally, that it only remained for him to take up a good defensive position in such town of Syria as he should consider most suitable for the security of the country, and to await in the first instance a regular attack on the part of the troops of His Highness, in order thereupon to repel it by force.

After a pretty long discussion, in the course of which the desire of

Mehemet Ali to come to an engagement with the Turkish forces, clearly showed itself, he declared that he would write to his son:—

1st. To place himself without delay in communication with Hafiz Pasha, in order to apprize him of what had taken place at the village of Ouront, and to urge him not to give occasion for an action, by allowing his troops to penetrate into his territory, and to occupy the Syrian villages.

2ndly. That the General Commanding in Chief should move a portion of his forces towards Aintab, in order to place that town in a suitable state of defence; and that he should look upon hostilities as being commenced, only in the event of the works, situated at some distance from that place, being attacked by the troops of the Sultan.

3rdly. That in that case alone, Ibrahim Pasha was authorized to advance in person with all his forces, and to engage the Army of the Grand Signor. The Pasha promised that he would cause to be delivered to each of us four a copy of the order which he addressed to his son.

Previously to our leaving the Viceroy, he further communicated to us the contents of several letters which he had just received from his confidential Agents at Constantinople: they were all warlike. One of them announced to him that the departure of the Turkish fleet was close at hand; another exhorted him to take advantage of the favourable circumstances which presented themselves, to strike a decisive blow; lastly, a third stated to him that an extraordinary conference had taken place between the Ministers and the Pashas of the Porte, in which Tahar Pasha, recently returned from head-quarters, had given an account of the state of the Turkish Army, which he represented as very little satisfactory; that one of the members of this assembly had expressed an opinion that the Egyptian Question should be settled by the Sultan alone; that it concerned no one but him, and that he ought not to allow any intervention on the part of the European Powers in that Question; this opinion, it was added, had been agreeable to the great dignitaries of the Sultan.

Mehemet Ali did not fail to exhibit on this occasion some inclination to send his fleet immediately to sea; but he immediately gave up the idea in consequence of the remarks which were made to him on the unseasonableness of such a measure, and promised to keep the squadron in port until the receipt of more positive intelligence of the departure of the Ottoman fleet from the Dardanelles.

Sub-Inclosure 2 in Inclosure 1 in No. 80.

Lettre d'Ibrahim Pacha, à la date du 14 *Rebi-el-evel.—Alep.*

(Traduction.)

JE vous envoie ci-joint tous les rapports que j'ai reçus concernant l'armée Turque. Parmi eux il y a une lettre du Kaftana Bey, datée du 13 Rebi-el-evel, dans laquelle il m'annonce que la Cavalerie Turque vient de prendre possession sur nos territoires. Ouront est un village de la province d'Antab, où se trouve maintenant la Cavalerie Turque. Le Boï Bey, le chef de ce village, a été maltraité par eux. Notre Cavalerie s'est retiré vers Antab d'après leurs instructions. Il est évident que demain ils s'avanceront davantage; ils maltraiteront les Boïs Bey des autres villages, et nous serons obligés de reculer. Ce système peut occasionner une grande révolution dans les provinces qui sont sous notre autorité. J'ai pensé d'envoyer un officier à Hafiz Pacha pour lui demander quelques explications là-dessus. Mais pour cela je n'étais pas autorisé. Ils ne sont éloignés d'Antab que cinq heures de distance; cet état de choses ne pourrait pas continuer ainsi. Je présume qu'avant que cette lettre vous soit parvenue, le feu de la guerre sera peut-être allumé. Pour éviter tous les soupçons, et qu'on ne dise pas c'est vous ou c'est moi qui ait commencé les hostilités, j'attends la réponse à cette lettre. Pour accélérer la poste, vous pouvez l'expédier par un bateau à

vapeur à Alexandrette ou à Latakié, d'où elle me parviendra en peu de tems.

P. S.—Je vous expédie aussi toutes les lettres que je viens de recevoir d'Adana. Leur lecture vous fera connaître que les intrigues des Turcs y entrent aussi pour quelque chose. Je peux contrebalancer leur menée comme je l'ai fait à Antab, à Kourd Dak, en y envoyant des troupes. Mais comment empêcher leur avancement? J'ai écrit à Kaftana Bey de se porter en avant avec 800 Cavaliers, pour protéger les villages d'Antab, et si les Turcs font encore un mouvement en avant, ils vont se trouver près d'Antab à la distance de trois heures; il ne nous reste lors que deux moyens, ou se reculer ou bien commencer l'hostilité.

Extrait de la lettre de Son Altesse Ibrahim Pacha, à la date du 15 *Rebi-el-evel,* 1255.—*Alep.*

JE vous ai fait expédier hier par la poste expresse, tous les rapports que j'ai reçus par différens points. Aujourd'hui encore j'ai reçu quatre lettres de Ferhad Bey, ainsi qu'une lettre de Magioun Bey, que vous verrez que l'armée Turque a fait avancer des détachmens de cavalerie vers les villages qui sont sur le territoire d'Antab. J'ai fait acheminer sur le champ Kaftana Bey avec sa cavalerie pour Antab. Notre cavalerie se trouve donc au village qui se nomme Tel-Béchir; la Cavalerie Turque est à Ouront.

Les villages qui se trouvent entre ces deux points ne seront nécessairement pas exempts de leurs attaques; j'ai déjà écrit à Kaftana Bey, ainsi qu'à Magioun Bey, de faire évacuer ces villages, et faire reculer leurs habitans en-deçà de ce district.

Lettre du Kaftana Bey à Son Altesse Ibrahim Pacha, à la date du 13 *Rebi-el-evel.*

LA Cavalerie Turque qui se trouvait à Mézar, a fait un mouvement en avant; s'est emparée hier soir d'Ouront, d'où, selon vos ordres, nos soldats ont été retirés; les Turcs ont pris et ont maltraité le Boï Bey qui est à Ouront.

(Translation.)

Letter of Ibrahim Pasha, dated 14*th Rebi-el-evel.—Aleppo.*

I SEND you herewith all the reports I have received concerning the Turkish Army. Among them there is a letter from the Kaftana Bey, dated the 13th Rebi-el-evel, in which he informs me that the Turkish Cavalry has taken up a position in our territory. Ouront, where the Turkish Cavalry now is, is a village of the Province of Aintab. The Boi Bey, the Chief of that village, has been maltreated by them. Our Cavalry according to their instructions have fallen back on Aintab. It is evident that the Turks will advance further to-morrow; they will maltreat the Boi Beys of other villages, and we shall be obliged to retire. This system may occasion a great revolution in the Provinces under our authority. I had thought of sending an officer to Hafiz Pasha to ask some explanation from him on this matter. But I had no authority to do so. They are not more than five hours distant from Aintab: this state of things cannot continue. I presume that before this letter shall have reached you, the flames of war will perhaps be lighted up. To obviate all suspicions, and that it may not be said that you or I were the party to commence hostilities, I wait for an answer to this letter. To hasten the post, you can send it by a steam vessel to Alexandretta or Latakia, whence it will reach me in a short time.

P.S.—I also send you all the letters which I have just received from Adana. The perusal of them will apprize you that the intrigues of the Turks are active in that quarter also. I can counteract their proceedings as I have done at Aintab and Kourd Dak, by sending troops there. But how prevent their advance? I have written to Kaftana Bey to advance with 800 horse, to protect the villages of Aintab; and if the Turks still make a forward movement, they will find themselves within three hours' distance of Aintab; two alternatives will then only remain for us, either to retreat or to commence hostilities.

Extract of a Letter from His Highness Ibrahim Pasha, dated 15*th Rebi-el-evel,* 1255.—*Aleppo.*

I SENT you yesterday by express all the reports which I have received from different points. To-day I have further received four letters from Ferhad Bey, and also a letter from Maggiun Bey, by which you will see that the Turkish Army has moved on detachments of Cavalry in the direction of the villages in the territory of Aintab. I immediately despatched Kaftana Bey with his Cavalry to Aintab. Our Cavalry is therefore at a village called Tel-Bechir: the Turkish Cavalry is at Ouront.

The villages between these two points will not necessarily be free from their attacks; I have already written to Kaftana Bey, as well as to Maggiun Bey, to evacuate these villages, and to cause the inhabitants of them to retire within this district.

Letter from the Kaftana Bey to His Highness Ibrahim Pasha, dated 13*th Rebi-el-evel.*

THE Turkish Cavalry which was at Mezar, has made a movement in advance; and yesterday evening occupied Ouront, from whence, according to your orders, our soldiers retired; the Turks captured and maltreated the Boi Bey of Ouront.

Sub-Inclosure 3 in Inclosure 1 in No. 80.

Traduction de la Lettre de Son Altesse le Vice-Roi à Son Altesse le Généralissime Ibrahim Pacha, à la date du 22 *Rebi-el-evel,* 1255.

J'AI sous les yeux vos lettres en date du 14 et du 15 du présent mois, ainsi que celle du Kaftana Bey, qui vous a été adressée, par lesquelles j'ai eu connaissance que quelques détachmens de la Cavalerie Turque ont saccagé les villages du district d'Antab, et qu'ils ont pris possession d'Ouront. En conséquence, vous me demandez la ligne de conduite à tenir dans cette circonstance. J'ai sur le champ fait traduire ces trois pièces, et je les ai communiquées aux Consuls-Généraux des Quatre Grandes Puissances résidans à Alexandrie. Après avoir longuement discuté leur contenu, ils m'ont dit:—"L'intérêt de Votre Altesse est toujours de se tenir sur le pied de la défensive, mais avec cela Votre Altesse repoussera la force par tous les moyens qui sont en votre pouvoir; il est donc essentiel que Son Altesse Ibrahim Pacha envoie un officier à Hafiz Pacha, pour lui demander des explications de sa conduite; et dans cet intervalle, pour protéger la province et la garnison d'Antab contre un coup de main, fortifiez-la en envoyant le nombre suffisant de troupes; et si, malgré tout cela, les Turcs persistent dans leurs menées et marchent vers Antab, la garnison se repliera vers le corps d'armée qui s'avancera en même tems, et marcheront à la rencontre de l'Armée Turque. Par cette mesure, la bataille n'aura lieu que sur le territoire Egyptien; par là vous prouverez facilement, que la première agression a eu lieu de leur part." Cette explication me parut d'autant plus convenable qu'elle s'accorde tout-à-fait avec la conduite modérée que j'ai tenue jusqu'à présent à leur égard; en conséquence, je vous invite, mon fils, de vous régler exactement au contenu de la présente lettre.

(Translation.)

Translation of the letter from His Highness the Viceroy to His Highness the Generalissimo Ibrahim Pasha, dated the 22nd Rebi-el-evel, 1255.

I HAVE before me your letters of the 14th and 15th of this month, as well as that of the Kaftana Bey addressed to you, by which I have learnt that some detachments of Turkish Cavalry have pillaged the villages of the district of Aintab, and have taken possession of Ouront. You ask me, in consequence, what line of conduct you should pursue under these circumstances. I caused these three documents to be immediately translated, and I communicated them to the Consuls-General of the Four Great Powers residing at Alexandria. After having discussed their contents for a long while, they stated to me:—"The interest of Your Highness is to continue to maintain a defensive attitude; but therewithal Your Highness will repel force by force with all the means at your disposal; it is therefore essential that His Highness Ibrahim Pasha should send an officer to Hafiz Pasha, to ask an explanation of his conduct; and in the meanwhile, in order to protect the province and garrison of Aintab against a sudden attack, strengthen it by sending thither a sufficient number of troops; and if, notwithstanding, the Turks persist in their machinations and march on Aintab, the garrison will fall back on the corps which will at the same time be advancing, and they will march to meet the Turkish Army. By these means, the battle will only take place on the Egyptian territory; whereby you will easily prove that the first aggression was on their side." This exposition appeared to me the more suitable from being in perfect accordance with the moderate conduct which I have hitherto observed with regard to them; I therefore beg you, my son, to regulate your conduct exactly by the contents of this letter.

Inclosure 2 in No. 80.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Alexandria, June* 5, 1839.

IN reference to my preceding despatch, I have the honour to inform your Excellency, that a steamer of the Pasha arrived late yesterday evening from Alexandretta, with letters from Ibrahim Pasha to his father.

Those letters, dated the 30th May, from his head-quarters, state that some Turkish Cavalry of Hafiz Pasha had attacked the Egyptian Cavalry encamped in front of Aintab, and have excited the villages in the Aintab district to revolt; that eleven villages having received arms and ammunition from Hafiz Pasha, are now in revolt.

On receipt of those news, Ibrahim Pasha had left Aleppo on the 29th May, and gone to a small village between Aleppo and Aintab, where he awaits the arrival of Solyman Pasha with a brigade and with some Artillery, most probably to drive back the advance which had attacked his Cavalry.

I shall endeavour to procure a copy of the letter of Ibrahim Pasha, in order to transmit it to your Excellency with this despatch.

Thus it may be said, that hostilities have in some measure begun, and the only hope which now remains is, that the officer to be sent by

Ibrahim to Hafiz Pasha, (vide Procès-Verbal in my late despatch,) may induce the latter Pasha to retire beyond the Syrian frontier.

Admiral Roussin has written to M. Cochelet, to inform him that the Porte has complained loudly to him that Mehemet Ali had committed the first aggressions; 1st. In having sent 150 soldiers to Orfa, who had plundered that town; and 2ndly. That Kourschid Pasha had entered Bassora with the Egyptian Army; and Admiral Roussin requests M. Cochelet to give to him explicit explanations as to those reports.

The Porte appears to mistify Admiral Roussin in many cases, and it is only to that Ambassador that those complaints have been made. They are wholly false. And how could Admiral Roussin suppose that 150 troops were to cross the Euphrates, and plunder a town with a large garrison at some distance beyond Bir, where there was also a garrison? It is equally untrue that any part of Kourschid Pasha's troops have entered Bassora; but those allegations of the Porte evidently show its desire for war, and its natural wish to throw the blame of the aggression on Mehemet Ali.

That the Porte has many causes of complaint against Mehemet Ali is an undoubted fact, but he is quite free from the complaints urged by Baron Roussin.

In fact, the great causes of complaint on the part of the Porte, date from the peace of Kutaya, and from mutual irritation on the part of the Porte at the triumph of Mehemet Ali, as also from the semi-independent and anomalous position of that Pasha.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Inclosure 3 in No. 80.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Alexandria, June* 6, 1839.

WITH reference to my despatch of yesterday's date, to your Excellency, I have now the honour to transmit the report from Ibrahim Pasha, which was brought by the steamer from Alexandretta.

Hostilities have now unfortunately taken place, and it is probable that, before this, a battle of a more serious nature will have been fought between the armies of the two Seraskiers, headed by themselves in person.

If the inclosed report be true, it is most clearly evident that the Porte has been the aggressor in the commencement of active hostilities; as not only has Hafiz Pasha incited the population of Syria to revolt, and supplied them with arms, ammunition, and money, but he has also attacked a corps of the Cavalry of Ibrahim Pasha, at a point incontestably within the Syrian territory.

What the measures of Mehemet Ali may be in the event of an action, and of the defeat of the Sultan's army, which will be the probable result of it, time alone can show, but he will certainly not abate in his demands in regard to his independence.

Any measures now to be taken by the Great Powers must, in order to be successful, be conducted in a complete spirit of unity and accord; and it should be borne in mind that it is a certain fact that Mehemet Ali has a powerful party amongst the great dignitaries of the Porte, and even in the Divan itself; and I am almost certain that he could at any moment raise up the Turkish provinces in Europe (certainly Albania) in rebellion against the Sultan.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Sub-Inclosure in Inclosure 3 in No. 80.

Extrait des Rapports qui sont parvenus de Syrie à la date du 15, *du* 16, *et du* 17, *Rebi-el-evel,* 1255.

LES quatorze villages du district d'Ouront dans la Province d'Antab, ont été occupés par des troupes de Hafiz Pacha. Il a distribué aux habitans de ces villages des armes et des munitions de guerre. Il s'est fait présenter les vieillards de ces mêmes villages; il leur a donné des habits d'honneur. Trois cavaliers Arabes, Hanadis, ont été pris par les habitans de ces villages, qui se sont empressés de les conduire près de Hafiz Pacha, pour en recevoir le backchiche (pour-boire) promis en outre. Hafiz Pacha a donné l'ordre à ses troupes, que s'ils rencontrent des soldats Egyptiens, de les arrêter ou bien de faire feu sur eux. On a fait tirer à Nézib des coups de canon pour annoncer l'arrivée de Hafiz Pacha dans la dite ville. On a fait courir des bruits qu'Ibrahim Pacha ne peut plus avancer; qu'il sera obligé de se reculer devant les troupes Turques jusqu'au Caire; et que le Pacha qui se trouve à Mouche, va déserter et venir près de Hafiz Pacha avec la moitié des soldats qui sont sous son commandement; qu'un Pacha avec onze régimens vient du côté de Malatia, et qu'aussitôt ces régimens arrivés, Hafiz Pacha marchera vers Antab, dans l'armée duquel se trouvent déjà 140 pièces d'artillerie. En outre, on a intimidé les habitans des villes et des villages, en répandant des bruits que le village qui ne se soumettra pas à tems à l'autorité de Hafiz Pacha, hommes, femmes et enfans, tous seront passés au fil de l'épée; le village de Ouront est occupé par une partie de leur cavalerie; le Chef de ce même village a été appelé par Hafiz Pacha; il lui a fait cadeau d'une montre en or. Lorsque ce chef d'Ouront était de retour à son village, il a fait venir tous les vieillards des villages du district, et leur a enjoint de repousser les soldats Egyptiens. Il a fait réunir les habitans de quatre ou cinq villages dans un seul; il leur a distribué des fusils et de la poudre que Hafiz Pacha lui avait envoyés.

Son Altesse Ibrahim Pacha, par sa lettre du 17 Rebi-el-evel, mande en outre, que le Pacha qui se trouve à Marache, excite aussi la population de Kourd Dak; qu'on a remarqué un des chefs des troupes de ce même Pacha parmi la tribu Kourde qui avait saccagé Boulanick; qu'on répand le bruit qu'on a à Koniah 16,000 hommes; à Gifté-kan autant sous le commandement de Ali Pacha de Koniah; qu'on va recruter 8,000 hommes encore dans ces contrées; qu'on a 20,000 hommes à Caramanie; et qu'on dit que toutes ces troupes sont destinées pour le Kuluk-Bogaz. Un autre corps d'armée marchera vers la Syrie par le district de Nijdé. Le corps d'armée fort de onze régimens, marchera pour Kaisserie; le Pacha de Marache avec autant de Kourdes et des canons, &c., &c.

En répandant tous ces bruits, on espère pouvoir exciter la population, comme on l'a déjà fait dans la Province d'Antab.

J'apprends à l'instant par deux exprès de Magioun Bey, que cinq escadrons de la Cavalerie Turque ont attaqué le corps de Cavalerie Arabe sous le commandement du dit Bey, à Tel-Béchir. Notre cavalerie n'a pu résister à leur choc, attendu qu'elle était inférieure en nombre, et que la Cavalerie Turque était suivie de près par des régimens d'Infanterie. Pour empêcher que leurs intrigues et leurs menées ne soient pas communiquées aux environs d'Alep, je me suis décidé à aller à leur rencontre, et je suis arrivé à Tel-Chaïr avec sept régimens de Cavalerie, et douze batteries d'Artillerie à cheval, en laissant l'ordre au Général Solyman Pacha de me suivre avec le corps d'armée.

(Translation.)

Extract of Reports from Syria, dated the 15*th*, 16*th, and* 17*th of Rebi-el-evel,* 1255.

THE fourteen villages of the district of Ouront in the province of Aintab have been occupied by the troops of Hafiz Pasha. He has distri-

buted arms and ammunition to the inhabitants of these villages. He has caused the elders of these same villages to be presented to him; he has given them dresses of honour. Three Arab Horsemen, Hanadis, have been captured by the inhabitants of these villages, who hastened to carry them before Hafiz Pasha, in order to receive from him the promised reward. Hafiz Pasha has ordered his troops, if they fall in with Egyptian soldiers, to capture them, or to fire upon them. Cannon were fired at Nezib to announce the arrival of Hafiz Pasha in that town. Reports have been spread, that Ibrahim Pasha can no longer advance; that he will be obliged to retreat before the Turkish troops as far as Cairo; and that the Pasha who is at Moosh is about to desert, and join Hafiz Pasha with half the soldiers under his orders; that a Pasha with eleven regiments is coming from the direction of Malatia; and that as soon as these regiments arrive, Hafiz Pasha, with whose army there are already 140 guns, will march towards Aintab. Moreover, the inhabitants of the towns and villages have been intimidated by reports that the men, women, and children of any village which shall not submit in good time to the authority of Hafiz Pasha, shall be all put to the sword; the village of Ouront is occupied by a part of their Cavalry; the Chief of that same village was summoned by Hafiz Pasha, who gave him a gold watch. When this Chief of Ouront returned to his village, he convened all the elders of the villages of the district, and enjoined them to drive back the Egyptian soldiers. He collected into one village the inhabitants of four or five villages, and distributed to them some muskets and powder which Hafiz Pasha had sent to him.

His Highness Ibrahim Pasha, in his letter of the 17th of Rebi-el-evel, further reports, that the Pasha of Marash also is stirring up the population of Kourd Dak; that one of the superior officers of that Pasha's troops has been noticed among the tribe of Koords who plundered Boulanick; that it is reported that there 16,000 men at Koniah; as many at Gifté-kan under the orders of Ali Pasha of Koniah; that 8,000 more men are about to be raised in those countries; that there are 20,000 men in Caramania; and that all these troops are reported to be destined for the Kuluk-Bogaz. Another corps will march towards Syria by the district of Nijdé. The corps, consisting of eleven regiments, will march for Kaisserieh; the Pasha of Marash with as many Koords, and the guns, &c., &c.

It is hoped that, by spreading these reports, the people may be stirred up, as has already been done in the province of Aintab.

I learn this moment by two expresses from Maggiun Bey, that five squadrons of Turkish Cavalry have attacked the corps of Arab Cavalry under the orders of that Bey at Tel-Bechir. Our Cavalry could not withstand the shock, being inferior in number, and the Turkish Cavalry being closely followed by some regiments of Infantry. In order to prevent their intrigues and machinations from being extended to the neighbourhood of Aleppo, I decided upon advancing to meet them, and I arrived at Tel-Chaïr with seven regiments of Cavalry, and twelve batteries of Horse Artillery, leaving orders for Solyman Pasha to follow me with the main body.

No. 81.

Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale.

(Extract.) *Foreign Office, June* 28, 1839.

I HAVE to inform your Excellency, that Her Majesty's Government have received from Prince Esterhazy, from M. Kisseleff, and from the French Government, important, and generally speaking, satisfactory, communications upon the subject of the present state of affairs between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali; and the result of these communications leads Her Majesty's Government to conclude, that the views taken of these matters by the Austrian, French, and Russian Governments, may be stated shortly to be nearly as follows:—

All three of those Governments appear to be strongly impressed with the necessity of preventing, if possible, the outbreak of hostilities between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, or of putting a speedy end to those hostilities, if they should unfortunately have already broken out; and in that opinion Her Majesty's Government entirely concur. The Russian Government, however, in a despatch of which M. Kisseleff gave me yesterday a copy, states, that the Powers of Europe might be contented to remain passive spectators of the continuance of those hostilities, so long as the Contending Parties should carry on their conflict within the limits of Syria. But in this view, Her Majesty's Government cannot agree; because it is not so much the scene of action, as the possible result of the conflict, which may exercise a decisive influence on the great interests of Europe, and a signal defeat and dispersion of the army of the Sultan, would be scarcely less disastrous on one side of the Taurus, or of the Euphrates, than upon the other.

Your Excellency will see, by the instructions given to Sir Robert Stopford, and which you are authorized to read to Prince Metternich, that Her Majesty's Government consider, that if hostilities shall have begun, and if the Egyptian Troops shall have advanced into Asia Minor, the first object to be aimed at, will be, to procure a suspension of arms, and to cause the Egyptian Troops to return within the limits of Syria; and, therefore, it is unnecessary to state that Her Majesty's Government are not willing to consent that Mehemet Ali should continue to occupy the districts of Diarbekir and Orfa;—districts beyond the Province of Syria, of considerable importance in a military and political point of view, and which it has long been the desire of Mehemet Ali to acquire.

Upon the first point, then, connected with these affairs, there appears to be a general concurrence of opinion, that hostilities between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali ought to be prevented or stopped. Austria, France, and England, seem also to feel that the present relative position of the Sultan and the Pasha is incompatible with the safety of the Turkish Empire, and with the peace of Europe; and that some different arrangement must be arrived at, in order to avoid serious and extensive dangers.

Some parts of Count Nesselrode's despatch, might, perhaps, be construed to imply that Russia is not of this opinion, and is satisfied with the present state of things; but there are other passages which appear to indicate that Russia is not disinclined to take into consideration the possibility of making some more permanent settlement. France, Austria, and Great Britain, have expressed a decided opinion that some such settlement is absolutely required for the safety of Europe, and that the Great Powers ought, without loss of time, to enter into communication with each other for that purpose. Prussia would of course concur in such a proceeding; and, although Russia has hitherto endeavoured to retain within her own discretion, everything belonging to her relations with Turkey, yet the Cabinet of Petersburgh must clearly see that the general interests of all the Powers of Europe are so directly concerned in the fate of the Turkish Empire, that no one Power can separate herself from the rest in her dealings with respect to Turkey; but that Turkish affairs must henceforward be considered to be as much an European question, as any other affairs with which the Cabinets of Europe have been occupied.

The French Government proposed that these matters should be discussed in a Conference of the Five Powers, to be held at Vienna. Prince Metternich has stated reasons why, in his opinion, these matters cannot properly be submitted to a formal conference, but he has proposed that Vienna should be the seat of negotiation on these affairs. Her Majesty's Government saw many strong reasons in favour of the French proposal, and some of much weight against it; the proposal of Prince Metternich is open to fewer objections, and holds out less advantages.

The informal negotiation proposed by Austria would certainly not fetter the action of Great Britain as much as a formal conference would do.

Her Majesty's Government, however, are willing to agree to the proposition of Prince Metternich, provided it shall be acceded to by Russia and Prussia, as well as by Great Britain and France; and I have great satisfaction in stating to your Excellency, that one strong motive which leads Her Majesty's Government to acquiesce in this arrangement is, the entire confidence which they place in your ability, discretion, and firmness.

The general view which Her Majesty's Government, as at present informed, entertain of the affair in question, may be stated as follows:

The Great Powers are justified in interfering in these matters, which are, in fact, a contest between a sovereign and his subject, because this contest threatens to produce great and imminent danger to the deepest interests of other Powers, and to the general peace of Europe. Those interests and that peace require the maintenance of the Turkish Empire; and the maintenance of the Turkish Empire is, therefore, the primary object to be aimed at. This object cannot be secured without putting an end to future chances of collision between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali. But as long as Mehemet Ali continues to occupy Syria, there will be danger of such collision. Mehemet Ali cannot hold Syria without a large military force constantly stationed there. As long as there is an Egyptian force in Syria, there must necessarily be a Turkish army in that part of Asia Minor which borders on Syria. Each party might agree at present to reduce those forces to a given amount, but neither could be sure that the other was not, after a time, secretly increasing his amount of force; and each party would, beyond a doubt, gradually augment his own force; and thus, at no distant period, the same state of things which has existed of late, would again recur: for the motives and passions which have led to it would still be in action. Mehemet Ali, or Ibrahim, would still desire to add more territory to their Pashalics; the Sultan would still burn to drive them back into Egypt.

It appears then to Her Majesty's Government, that there can be no end to the danger with which these affairs menace the peace of Europe, until Mehemet Ali shall have restored Syria to the direct authority of the Sultan; shall have retired into Egypt; and shall have interposed the Desert between his troops and authorities and the troops and authorities of the Sultan. But Mehemet Ali could not be expected to consent to this, unless some equivalent advantage were granted to him; and this equivalent advantage might be hereditary succession in his family to the Pashalic of Egypt: Mehemet Ali and his descendants being secured in the Government of that Province in the same way that a former Pasha of Scutari and his family were so secured; the Pasha continuing to be the vassal of the Porte, paying a reasonable tribute, furnishing a contingent of men, and being bound like any other Pasha by the treaties which his sovereign might make. Such an arrangement would appear to be equitable between the parties, because, on the one hand, it would secure the Sultan against the many dangers and inconveniences which arise from the present occupation of Syria by the Pasha; while, on the other hand, it would afford to the Pasha that security as to the future fate of his family, his anxiety about which, he has often declared to be the main cause of his desire to obtain some final and permanent arrangement.

It appears to Her Majesty's Government that if the Five Powers were to agree upon such a plan, and were to propose it to the two parties, with all the authority which belongs to the Great Powers of Europe, such an arrangement would be carried into effect, and through its means, Europe would be delivered from a great and imminent danger.

No. 82.

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.

(Extract.) *Foreign Office, June* 29, 1839.

I HEREWITH transmit to your Excellency, a copy of a despatch which I have addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna* acquainting His Excellency with the substance of the communications which I have received from the Austrian Ambassador, and from the French and Russian Chargés d'Affaires, upon the present state of affairs in the Levant, and also communicating to him a copy of a despatch from Count Nesselrode to Count Pozzo di Borgo upon the same subject, which was communicated to me by the Russian Chargé d'Affaires on the 27th of this month*.

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* See No. 81.

It seems to Her Majesty's Government, that the great interests of the Powers, as regards the affairs of Turkey, can never be considered as secure, until Mehemet Ali shall have evacuated Syria, and shall have withdrawn his forces into Egypt.

No. 83.

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, June* 29, 1839.

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, an extract of a despatch from Prince Metternich to Count Appony, which has been communicated to me by Prince Esterhazy, stating reasons why, in the opinion of the Austrian Cabinet, the resolution of the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, as to the principles which ought to regulate the establishment of Conferences of the Great Powers, would prevent the establishment of a formal Conference upon the present state of affairs in the Levant.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

Inclosure in No. 83.

Prince Metternich to Count Appony.

(Extrait.) *Vienne, le* 14 *Juin,* 1839.

UN Protocole signé en 1818 entre les Cinq Grandes Cours à Aix-la-Chapelle, a établi, pour les réunions de Cabinets, un règlement sage, fondé sur le respect qu'il est juste de porter à l'indépendance des Etats. Les Cinq Cours ont arrêté entre elles (et elles ont fait part de leur ferme détermination à cet égard à toutes les autres Cours), que jamais des questions touchant aux droits et à l'intérêt d'un Etat tiers, ne seraient abordées par elles en Conférence sans que le Gouvernement intéressé n'eût été invité à prendre part à la réunion. En appliquant cette utile règle au cas échéant, il faudrait faire intervenir un Plénipotentiaire Ottoman dans tel lieu que choisiraient les Puissances pour y établir une Conférence; et dans ce fait seul se trouverait un obstacle insurmontable pour la réussite de l'entreprise. Jamais la Porte ne munirait son Envoyé de facultés suffisamment étendues pour que l'affaire pût marcher.

Mais il existe d'autres considérations encore qui seraient défavorables à la réunion d'une Conférence pour traiter de l'affaire du jour. Nous pouvons admettre que plus d'une Puissance ne serait que faiblement disposée au choix de cette forme, et le Public Européen y chercherait ce qui ne doit pas s'y trouver, et ce qui d'après les sentimens indubitables des Cinq Cours, ne s'y trouve point en effet. De quoi s'agit-il réellement? Il s'agit d'empêcher que la guerre n'éclate entre la Porte et l'Egypte, ou de mettre le terme le plus prompt à celle qui, contrairement aux vœux déjà hautement et uniformément prononcés de ces mêmes Cours, aurait déjà commencé, ou qu'on ne serait plus à tems d'empêcher.

Ce n'est point par le moyen d'une Conférence placée à distance qu'il serait possible d'atteindre l'un et l'autre de ces buts. C'est à Constantinople et à Alexandrie que la pensée déjà connue des Cinq Cours devra être soutenue, sans perte de tems et avec vigueur. A cet effet, il n'est besoin que d'instructions fondées sur le principe pacifique, qu'on adresserait aux Représentans de ces mêmes Puissances, et qui leur donneraient la latitude suffisante pour pouvoir régler leur conduite d'après les circonstances et les événemens. Tout ce qui ne s'écartera pas de ce point de vue fondamental des Puissances, tel que nous le saisissons, sera bien, et devra produire un effet salutaire, si toutefois leurs Représentans s'imposent le devoir de tenir, dans leurs explications, un langage uniforme. Ce n'est cependant également point dans la forme d'une Conférence que devraient s'établir entre eux des relations tant à Constantinople qu'à Alexandrie; c'est, au contraire, dans celle d'une libre entente. Toute Conférence qui ne se trouvera point placée sous la direction immédiate d'un Cabinet, assumera constamment un caractère d'indépendance des commettans, qui, loin d'être favorable à l'affaire dont elle aura à s'occuper, y fera naître des embarras, et l'exposera même au danger de la faire dévier (et ne fût-ce même que dans des questions de détails) de l'objet qui aura motivé la réunion.

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* See No. 74.

(Translation.)

Prince Metternich to Count Appony.

(Extract.) *Vienna, June* 14, 1839.

A PROTOCOL signed in 1818, between the Five Great Courts at Aix-la-Chapelle, has laid down for meetings of Cabinets, a judicious rule founded on the respect which it is proper to entertain for the independence of States. The Five Courts agreed among each other, (and they communicated their firm resolve in this respect to all other Courts,) that no questions having reference to the rights or interest of a third State should be treated by them in Conference, without inviting the Government interested to take part in the meeting. Applying this useful regulation to the actual case, it would be necessary to call upon an Ottoman Plenipotentiary to repair to such place as shall be chosen by the Powers for the establishment of a Conference; and in this one circumstance alone, an insurmountable obstacle to the success of the attempt is to be found. The Porte will never furnish its Envoy with powers sufficiently extended to allow the affair to advance.

There are, however, other considerations which would be unfavourable to the meeting of a Conference for the purpose of discussing the affair of the day. We may admit that more than one Power would be but slightly favourable to the selection of such a course, and the European public would look to it for things which ought not to be there sought, and which, according to the undoubted sentiments of the Five Courts, are in fact not there to be found. What is, in fact, the object in view? It is to prevent war breaking out between the Porte and Egypt, or to put as speedy an end as possible to any war which, contrary to the wishes already loudly and uniformly proclaimed by those same Courts, may have already broken out, and which it would be too late to prevent.

It is not by means of a Conference placed at a distance, that it will be possible to attain either of the above objects. It is at Constantinople and at Alexandria, that the already known opinion of the Five Courts should be supported, without loss of time and with energy. To accomplish this, nothing is requisite but to address to the Representatives of those same Powers instructions founded on the pacific principle, and which shall afford them sufficient latitude to regulate their conduct according to circumstances and events. Every thing which shall not be alien to this fundamental point of view of the Powers, such as we understand it, will be well, and will produce salutary effect, provided always that their Representatives make it their duty in their explanations to use an uniform language. Neither should relations between those Powers, either at Constantinople or at Alexandria, assume the form of a Conference, but, on the contrary, should be merely an unfettered understanding. Every Conference not placed under the immediate direction of a Cabinet, would constantly assume a character of independence for its members, which, far from being favourable to the business which would occupy its attention, would only give rise to embarrassments, and would even expose it to the danger of causing it to deviate (were it even only in questions of detail) from the object with which the meeting was convoked.

No. 84.

Lord William Russell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 1.)

My Lord, *Berlin, June* 26, 1839.

COUNT BRESSON showed me a despatch that Marshal Soult had addressed to M. de Bourqueney, in which he expresses the wish that the French fleet should co-operate with the English fleet in the Mediterranean, in order to prevent a collision between the Turkish and Egyptian squadrons; and that subsequently, measures should be taken in concert with Austria, to bring the Eastern Affairs to a final settlement. M. de Bourqueney was instructed to communicate the same despatch to your Lordship.

Count Bresson told me that he had made known to Baron Werther the views of Marshal Soult, and that his Excellency approved of them. I afterwards saw Baron Werther, and spoke to him on the subject. He said that Prussia had so little influence in the East, that she could in no way contribute to the maintenance of peace, beyond expressing a wish that peace should be maintained; but he thought the Four Powers most interested ought to prevent war, by imposing their authority on the hostile armies; and that afterwards, by the mediation of the same Powers, an arrangement should be brought about which would prevent a renewal of the present evil. His Excellency thought that Syria should be ceded to the Porte, and that Mehemet Ali should be allowed to transmit his Egyptian possessions to his posterity.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) WILLIAM RUSSELL.

No. 85.

Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

My Lords, *Foreign Office, July* 2, 1839.

WITH reference to my letter of the 25th ultimo, conveying to your Lordships the Queen's commands as to the instructions to be addressed to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, I have the honour to inclose, for your Lordships' information, a copy* of the instructions which the French Government have issued to the Commander-in-Chief of the French naval forces in the Mediterranean, and which have been communicated to me by the French Chargé d'Affaires. I am at the same time to signify to your Lordships Her Majesty's pleasure that a copy of the inclosed instructions be sent to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford for his information; and further, with reference to the contingency contemplated in the latter part of the French instructions, that a Russian squadron may join the British and French squadrons, Sir Robert Stopford should be instructed that although Her Majesty's Government conceive that such a contingency is not likely to happen, as the Russian squadron in the Black Sea cannot well come out through the straits, and it is not likely that Russian ships of war should be sent round about from the Baltic into the

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* See No. 75.

Mediterranean, yet if a Russian naval force should offer to co-operate with Her Majesty's ships, Sir Robert Stopford should accept the offer, for the attainment of the objects specified in his general instructions.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 86.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received July* 4.)

My Lord, *Paris, July* 1, 1839, 11 P.M.

MARSHAL SOULT has this moment communicated to me a telegraphic despatch from Marseilles, by which it appears that the officers whom the Marshal had dispatched to Constantinople and Alexandria, had arrived at those places on the 14th of last month.

Accounts had been received at Constantinople, of a slight engagement in which the Turks had the advantage, and had taken several villages. This success had given the ascendancy to the war party in the Divan; and on the 9th, an order had been sent to Hafiz Pasha to move forwards (*d'aller en avant*).

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 87.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received July* 4.)

My Lord, *Paris, July* 2, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship, the copy of a despatch from the Consul-General of France at Alexandria, which has been communicated to the French Government this morning by the Marseilles telegraph.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

Inclosure in No. 87.

Telegraphic Despatch from Marseilles.

Le Consul de France à Alexandrie à M. le Président du Conseil des Ministres.

Alexandrie, le 18 *Juin.*

MÉHÉMET ALI a donné des ordres à Ibrahim Pacha pour s'arrêter partout où il serait, à l'arrivée de M. le Capitaine Caillier, et d'attendre l'issue des arrangemens que prendront les Grandes Puissances.

L'Escadre Egyptienne est sortie, mais sans but hostile. Elle ira croiser sur les côtes de la Syrie.

(Translation.)

The Consul of France at Alexandria to the President of the Council of Ministers.

Alexandria, June 18.

MEHEMET ALI has given orders to Ibrahim Pasha to halt wherever he may be on the arrival of Captain Caillier, and to abide the issue of the arrangements which the Great Powers shall adopt.

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The Egyptian squadron is gone out, but without any hostile object. It will go and cruize on the coasts of Syria.

No. 88.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 4.)

My Lord, *Therapia, June* 12, 1839.

A STEAMER, hired by the Porte, is about to carry Mahomed Ali Bey, one of the Sultan's secretaries, to Samsoun, from whence he is to proceed direct to the head-quarters of Hafiz Pasha, to deliver to him the Nishan, that is, the mark of his dignity as Generalissimo, to which he has been lately raised.

Mahomed Ali Bey also carries instructions to Hafiz Pasha, the main point of which is, that he should not risk any battle in the plain, but should keep his army in the strong country, and in positions where it cannot be attacked but at a disadvantage to the enemy.

The accounts from Syria seem to concur in representing the population of that country to be very ill-disposed towards the Egyptian Government; and a Prussian traveller just arrived from thence, has described to a friend of mine, the Egyptian army as containing a vast proportion of boys, and as being inferior in that respect to the Ottoman army under Hafiz Pasha, though it may be better drilled. He estimates Ibrahim's army at 60,000 men, and, as I learn, does not appear to think it on the whole much, if at all, superior to the Ottoman army. The greatest exertions are making to reinforce the Sultan's army, and to supply it with everything. It is my belief that Hafiz Pasha will continue to avoid hostilities till after the appearance of the Ottoman fleet off the coast of Syria shall have given courage to the partizans of the Porte to show themselves; and it may also be intended to wait the results of the probable collision of the Ottoman and Egyptian fleets.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 89.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 4.)

My Lord, *Therapia, June* 12, 1839.

THE Ottoman fleet sailed on the 9th instant, under the command of the Capudan Pasha, for the Dardanelles, where it will remain during six or eight days, and thence proceed to the coast of Syria, as I am informed.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 90.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, July* 5, 1839.

I HAVE to instruct your Excellency to state to the Porte, that if the course of events should lead the Porte to ask or to accept military or naval aid from any European Power, in the contest with Mehemet Ali, Her Majesty's Government trust that the Porte will at the same time address itself to Great Britain to the same effect; and your Excellency will say, that Admiral Sir Robert Stopford has orders to repair with his squadron to Constantinople, for the purpose of affording to the Sultan physical and moral support, the moment Sir Robert Stopford shall receive from the Porte, through your Excellency, an invitation to that effect.

Similar instructions will be given by the French Government to Admiral Roussin; and your Excellency will concert with Admiral Roussin, and you will make your communication on this matter to the Porte simultaneously with that of the French Ambassador.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 91.

Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 5.)

My Lord, *Aleppo, June* 4, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith, for your Lordship's information, copy of my despatch of this day's date to his Excellency Lord Ponsonby, G.C.B., Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, together with copy of a translation in French, of an Arabic report made to me upon the state of the Sultan's Seraskier Hafiz Pasha's forces on this side of the river Euphrates, and extract of Vice-Consul Hays' journal, the whole of which, I hope, will meet with your Lordship's approval.

I have no further advices to lay before your Lordship, beyond what are contained in the inclosed despatch, which is the latest intelligence I have up to this moment, respecting the movements of both the Sultan's and Egyptian forces on the frontier; but should anything further transpire, I shall not fail to forward the same to your Lordship with all possible dispatch.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) F. H. S. WERRY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 91.

Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Ponsonby.

(Extract.) *Aleppo, June* 4, 1839.

I HAD the honour of stating to your Lordship, in my despatch under date 4th and 6th ultimo, that a part of the Sultan's troops had crossed the river at Bir, and the following advices stated that they continued daily to cross.

I beg now to inform your Lordship, that the subsequent advices which reached this from thence, brought the intelligence that almost all the Sultan's troops, together with the Seraskier Hafiz Pasha, had crossed the river, and that the column that had marched from Malatia to Roum Kale by way of Bisnê, had also joined the main body of the army that had crossed at Bir.

It is stated that the total amount of the Sultan's forces under Hafiz Pasha form a body of 80,000 men; 56,000 of which are Regulars, and 25,000 Irregular Cavalry. The former consists of Spahis, Militia, and Regular Infantry and Cavalry, with about 180 pieces of artillery; the latter, of Bachi Bozuks and Arabs. This, I understand, is the total amount of the Sultan's Seraskier Hafiz Pasha's forces; the advanced guard, which is composed of 6,000 strong, Regular and Irregular Cavalry, are at Nezib, a village distant four hours from the river. Hafiz Pasha, with the rest of the forces, has, it is said, formed his camp, which extends from the banks of the river, occupying a distance of one hour inland.

During the concentration of the Egyptian Army here, I continually visited his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha and Solyman Pasha; both of whom always assured me, that they had no intention of moving, or of commencing hostilities, so long as the Sultan's forces did not invade Syria; and the Seraskier, on the 27th ultimo, added, that in accordance to his instructions, he would not make any hostile movement further forward, or advance his troops on the frontier, or in any way be the aggressor, but in the event of the Sultan's forces advancing and considerably surpassing his limits.

I beg further to inform your Lordship, that on the 28th ultimo I obtained intelligence that some of the Sultan's troops had advanced, and had passed their limits; in consequence of which I immediately called on his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha, who informed me that it was the case; and that he had received a letter from Aintab, and from the Colonel of the Irregular Cavalry stationed on the frontier, along the river Sedjour, both of which state, that a part of the Sultan's advanced guard had taken possession of a village named Orul, distant four hours and a half from Aintab, and were obliging the inhabitants to supply them with provisions; and also attempting to make the inhabitants rise and take up arms against the Egyptian Government. His Excellency added, "This is not all; they found three of my Annadi troops near the village, whom they had seized, and conveyed to the Seraskier Hafiz Pasha's camp." While I was with his Excellency, an officer came in, to give an account of a mission which he had been sent on by his Excellency. The Seraskier accosted him with, "Well, what have you done?" and then turned to me, saying, "Listen to what that gentleman is going to say; and then you will see if I can act with more prudence, and in accordance to my instructions."

"I have sent off the officer your Excellency desired, with the letter your Excellency gave me for the Colonel of the Annadis, telling him, his Excellency the Seraskier's orders are, that you will ride with all possible dispatch to the river Sedjour, and find Maggiun Bey wherever he may be; and after delivering to him this letter from his Excellency the Seraskier, you will repeat to him verbally, that his Excellency's positive orders are, that he will not allow a single shot to be fired by any of his troops; and that if he sees the Sultan's troops advance and take possession of any other villages, he is to fall back, and evacuate that country, taking no notice of the advance; and to continue to do so, falling back until he has arrived at least two hours in the Egyptian territory; and if he should then find that the Sultan's troops continue to advance, he will then stand; and if fired upon, return it, and send immediate advice to his Excellency; but repeat to him, that this is only in the event of the Sultan's troops following him up two hours in our territory."

After which his Excellency observed to me as follows:—"This is the third attempt of the Seraskier Hafiz Pasha, since he has been on this side of the Euphrates, to cause my people to rise against me. He first attempted to make the malcontents of Giaour Dagh rise, in which he failed, by my sending a force of Irregular Cavalry in those parts, threatening them. He then next tried to persuade the Koord Mountain, near Killis, to revolt, by sending the son of Hadji Omar, formerly one of its chiefs, amongst them; but in this he was also foiled, by the inhabitants replying, that they would have nothing to do with the matter, either one way or the other. And now it appears he is attempting the same thing in the direction of Aintab: we shall see how far this will succeed." His Excellency then called on Achmet Menekly Pasha, sitting in the room, to bear witness to what he had been saying, and which that Pasha did by confirming all his Excellency had stated.

On the 29th ultimo, at about noon, I obtained intelligence that the Sultan's Seraskier's advanced guard, which had occupied the village of Orul, had also taken possession of several other villages in that district; and in the afternoon, I learnt that his Excellency the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha, in company with Achmet Menekly Pasha, had just left very suddenly for Tellisheir, distant about twelve hours from hence, in the plain towards the river Sedjour, taking with him seven regiments of Cavalry and one of Artillery (light) of twelve batteries, seventy-two pieces.

The following morning, I called on his Excellency Solyman Pasha, to inquire respecting the cause of this sudden movement of the Seraskier's, after he had told me, but two days ago, that he did not intend to quit Aleppo but in the event of the Sultan's troops positively entering his territory. His Excellency Solyman Pasha replied, that the cause of the Seraskier's sudden departure from Aleppo, arose from his having received advice, that the Sultan's Seraskier, with the main body of his army, which had been till now encamped near the banks of the Euphrates, had moved, and had apparently advanced to Nezib; and the advanced guard which was at Nezib, had come further forward near the frontier. Besides that, his Excellency had received intelligence that part of this advanced guard which had occupied Orul, had also taken possession of several other villages, some of which, it is stated, belong to the Aintab district, among whom it had distributed 200 muskets and swords, persuading them to take up arms against the Egyptian Government; and that in consequence of this step, the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha thought that his presence might prevent any further rise among the villages; and had, therefore, taken the Cavalry and a regiment of Artillery, and had gone to Tellisheir, where it was always his Excellency's intention of forming his camp, in case of necessity; but that he, Solyman Pasha, did not intend to quit Aleppo, with the Infantry and rest of the Artillery, until he received orders to that effect from the Seraskier, which would only be in the event of the Sultan's troops continuing to advance, but which he did not think would be the case.

On the following morning, at about 6 A.M., it was reported to me, that the Infantry had all been ordered to get ready to march. As this was in contradiction to what his Excellency Solyman Pasha stated to me the day before, I immediately called on him: and upon my entrance, his Excellency said, "I told you yesterday that I did not intend to move, but affairs have changed since then; for one of his Excellency the Seraskier's Aides-de-camp reached this an hour ago, bringing me orders from the Seraskier to join them immediately with all the troops, in consequence of his having obtained advice that the Sultan's troops continued advancing, and had crossed the river Sedjour; and had come as far as Telbashir, two hours on this side of the river, and five hours to Tellisheir, where his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha's camp is; so that I shall leave this in the course of two hours with all the Infantry and Artillery, to proceed to Tellisheir, where his Excellency the Seraskier is."

I learn from the Government here, that the Sultan's troops that have occupied Telbashir, are principally all Koord Irregular Cavalry. The following is the report made to me with regard to the assault which took place; in which it appears that the Koords employed a *ruse*, or stratagem, and took the Annadi troops by surprise.

The day before the affray took place, the Koord Irregular Cavalry during the night crossed the river to the right and left of the Annadi camp, which was at Telbashir; and at the dawn of day, some sixty or seventy Spahis, (Yeomanry Cavalry,) on the opposite side of the river, came galloping up; upon which the Annadis seeing this, mounted their horses, with a view of galloping forward also, to check this apparent hostile demonstration of the Spahis. But great, I am told, was the surprise of the Annadis, on turning round, to find themselves encircled by these Koords, which movement being so unexpected and sudden, caused great confusion among the Bedouin Cavalry, who, after a slight skirmish, and seeing that some thirty of their men were killed, and a great many wounded, escaped in the greatest confusion, galloping towards Tellisheir, which place Ibrahim Pasha had just reached, leaving behind them a great many of their tents, among which were those of the chief, containing valuable horses, &c. Yesterday a post arrived from the camp, by which I am told his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha writes, that he would proceed to Kaisserie Salieh, distant two hours from Telbashir. His Excellency was to take with him all the Regular Cavalry, a regiment of Artillery, and some of the Irregular Cavalry, and there remain to watch the further movements of the Turkish Irregular Cavalry. It is stated by some to-day, that on his Excellency's arrival at the above-named place, the Koords recrossed the river and left Telbashir; others again assert that his Excellency had sent Maggiun Bey and Caftan Bey, of the Bedouin Cavalry, to Telbashir, to inquire of the

Sultan's Irregular Cavalry why they had entered his territory; and that it was on seeing them approach that the Koords immediately left Telbashir.

I have to inform your Lordship, that to-day I obtained the following intelligence from the Governor; that his Excellency the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha, having been informed that some of the Sultan's troops were approaching Aintab, sent and ordered the two regiments of the line that were quartered there, with all the Government officers and employés, to leave the place, and come to the camp, which they have reached; thus it appears that Aintab has been abandoned by Ibrahim Pasha, with the exception of a few men who are in charge of the fort. It is supposed that this is a *ruse* of his Excellency. There are a great many reports in town respecting Aintab, and that it has been taken by the Sultan's authorities; but up to this moment, no authentic advices state that.

It is said by many, that Solyman Pasha of Marash, with 10,000 regulars, accompanied by the son of Hadji Omar, one of the late Koord Chiefs, with as many irregulars, is coming on that line on Aintab; but this requires confirmation.

I have not been able to elicit anything further respecting Suffook Bey with the Gerba Arab Tribe, who, it was said, intended to act on the Desert line. I beg to inclose for your Excellency's information, a translation in French, of an Arabic Report made to me, on the state of the Sultan's Army under Hafiz Pasha.

By the latest advices we have from the camp under the Sultan's Seraskier, Hafiz Pasha, he, with all his regular troops, continued to be at Nezib, and had not made any further movement either way.

It is also positively asserted, that up to this, none of the Sultan's regular troops have on any point entered the Egyptian jurisdiction, or infringed on their territory.

I beg to represent to your Lordship, that since the concentration of the Sultan's Army on this side of the Euphrates, there has been great desertion among the troops. It is said, that up to this period, no less than 1,500 men have come over to this side, who were received by his Excellency Ibrahim, and after questioning them, his Excellency gave them the choice of either remaining with him, or returning again to the other side; I am informed that they preferred the former, and many have entered in the Irregular Cavalry, Bachi Bozuks. Desertion has also taken place among the Egyptian troops, but not to so great an extent as from the other side.

It is generally supposed that there will be no war between the two parties. The French and Austrian Consuls here are firmly of that opinion, and it is to be hoped that this will be confirmed, as both countries are suffering greatly in consequence of the concentration of so large a force on one point. The present state of affairs causes great detriment to our British residents, as also to our general commercial interests.

I received advices from Mr. Vice-Consul Hays, under the 24th ult., that some little disturbance has taken place among the mountaineers of his district; the subsequent advices from Mr. Vice-Consul Hays, say nothing more respecting it, so that things appear quieter.

I beg to inclose, for your Lordship's information, extract from Mr. Vice-Consul Hays' Journal under the 24th ult. I beg to inform your Lordship that I have a Tatar here, whom I will dispatch to you immediately anything further transpires meriting your attention.

P.S.—After closing my despatch to your Lordship, I obtained the following intelligence, coming from Nasri Tegger, his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha's private secretary, and M. Molinari, the Sardinian Pro-Consul, who both assert that they have read the letter which contained the same, and which I hasten to transmit to your Lordship.

"Last night a horseman arrived to the Musselim of this town, Abdullah Babinsi, from the Boi Bey of Barrak, on the other side of the river Sedjour, who is father-in-law to the former, and although under the Sultan's jurisdiction, communicated to his son-in-law, that the Sultan's Seraskier Hafiz Pasha's powder magazine, consisting of about 10,000

cases of gunpowder, had blown up, and that it had destroyed 380 persons and 400 horses; and that the maimed and wounded were innumerable."

I am also informed, that by a post which has just arrived from the camp, there is a letter from his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha, who writes, that he had arrived near Telbashir a quarter of an hour, but that he could not see anything of the Sultan's Koord Irregulars, neither there nor anywhere else on the other side of the river. That 200 horsemen had deserted from the Sultan's Army and had come to him; but his Excellency does not say whether regulars or irregulars. And further, that his Excellency has given orders to the two regiments of Aintab, who had arrived at the camp, to return again to their posts.

His Excellency Solyman Pasha, with the Infantry, is still at Tellisheir.

Inclosure 2 in No. 91.

Traduction d'un Rapport fait en Arabe au Pro-Chancelier du Consulat Britannique à Alep, par un homme envoyé aux environs de Biredjik, pour prendre toutes les informations possibles à l'égard de l'armée Ottomane.

Voici son propre Récit:

EN partant d'Alep je me suis rendu d'abord aux environs de la rivière dite Saggiour, où se trouve le petit camp des troupes d'Ibrahim Pacha, postées là pour surveiller les mouvemens de l'armée du Grand Seigneur.

Ces troupes consistent en cavalerie irrégulière dite Hanadi et Bachi Bouzuk. Les Hanadis, au nombre d'environ 1,500, sont commandés par leur colonel nommé Magioun Bey, et les Bachi Bouzuk sont commandés, 500 par Zeir Aga, et 400 par Kara Beirakdar, ce qui forme en tout environ 2,400 hommes sans aucune artillerie; ce camp est dressé sur les bords du Saggiour, à seize heures d'Alep, à un endroit qui porte le nom de Loulie et Elkoubal, et il s'étend jusqu'à un lieu dit Tel-Béchir, distance de quatre heures toujours en-deçà du Saggiour. Ces troupes reçoivent leurs vivres du Miri, par les villages voisins appelés El Baglie; de là je me suis porté, avec ma marchandise, à un village nommé Barak, qui est en-delà de la dite rivière du Saggiour, à une petite distance; là connaissant particulièrement le Mussellim, j'ai obtenu de lui un teskéré pour me rendre à Nézib, village à quinze heures du Saggiour. Arrivé à ce village, j'y ai trouvé le frère du Mussellim de Barak, qui était à faire ramasser des grains pour l'armée du Grand Seigneur, dont le camp commence à peu de distance de ce village, et s'étend jusqu'à l'Euphrate; à ce village j'ai fait la connaissance du Nezoul Amini (Fournisseur), nommé Méhémed Effendi, qui m'a dit que l'armée campée là, avait besoin chaque jour de 28,000 okes de pain, qui étaient distribuées aux soldats à raison d'une demi oke pour chacun, et ce, en outre du pain fin que les Pachas et les officiers consument.

En parcourant le camp, j'ai appris que le nombre des troupes dites Spahis qui étaient là, s'élevait à environ 4,000 cavaliers, et les Bachi Bouzuk étaient au nombre de 2,090 cavaliers, dont 1,200 commandés par Aghogia Dahli Moustapha Aga; 800 par Ali Aga de Malatia; et 90 cavaliers seulement, sous les ordres de Karagiali Darouieh Aga; et l'on recrutait à grand force pour grossir ce corps, parceque, à ce que l'on dit, le Séraskier Hafiz Ali Pacha, ayant appris qu'Ibrahim Pacha avait réuni beaucoup de troupes à Alep, et jugeant que son armée n'était par assez forte pour tenir tête à l'Armée Egyptienne, il s'était décidé d'augmenter le nombre de ces troupes dites Bachi Bouzuk, et à cet effet, il avait envoyé des recruteurs dans différens pays, avec des sommes d'argent pour l'enrôlement.

Le susdit Séraskier a fait venir auprès de lui le chef de la tribu Arabe appelée Maoûalis, qui habite au-delà de l'Euphrate, à environ seize heures du camp, et il l'a fait vêtir d'une uniforme de Nizam, et l'a chargé de réunir sous ses ordres 1,000 cavaliers de sa tribu, mais il n'avait encore avec lui que 200 hommes.

Le même Séraskier a demandé aussi de la tribu des Kourdes appelée Bérasie, qui est à environ dix heures au-delà de l'Euphrate, encore 1,000 cavaliers, mais ceux-ci ont refusé de fournir ces hommes, et ils ont pris la fuite en abandonnant leurs terres; alors le Séraskier a envoyé des gens auprès des chefs de cette tribu, pour leur demander s'ils entendaient se déclarer rébelles contre la Porte Ottomane; mais ces chefs ont répondu qu'ils n'entendaient nullement être rébelles, ni qu'ils préféraient le Gouvernement Egyptien, mais que pour fournir des hommes pour la guerre, ils ne le pouvaient pas, mais que si on leur demandait tout autre chose, ils étaient prêts à sacrifier toutes leurs fortunes pour le service du Grand Seigneur; d'après cette réponse, le Séraskier s'est contenté de leur demander pour le moment 1,000 chameaux, à quoi ils ont consenti; et le Séraskier dépêcha un moubacher (intendant) pour faire ramasser ces chameaux; et ces Kourdes sont rentrés maintenant dans leurs foyers.

Mercredi passé (22 du courant), une bande de vingt hommes, des Bédouins dits Mouali, s'est portée sur le village de Tédef-el-bab qui est à la distance de neuf heures d'Alep (du territoire du Gouvernement Egyptien), et ont volé dix-huit bêtes de somme qu'ils conduisirent à Barak, où le Mussellim fit saisir ces animaux, et en donna avis au Séraskier de l'Armée Ottomane, lequel a ordonné de faire de suite retourner ces animaux au village d'où ils ont été enlevés.

Au camp de l'Armée Ottomane se trouvent onze Pachas; les noms que j'ai pu connaître, sont, Kourd Méhémed, Pacha d'Ourfa; Chérif Pacha, ci-devant Pacha d'Ourfa; Mirza Pacha, Commandant de Cavalerie; Ismaël Pacha, Commandant les Spahis; Assad Pacha, Commandant de Nizam (troupe régulière), et plus, un nommé Osman Pacha et un autre Chérif Pacha.

Le nombre des troupes régulières est d'environ 56,000 hommes, y compris cependant les Spahis et les canonniers; et entre les Bachi Bouzuk et les Bédouins il y aurait une vingtaine de mille; à ces derniers on ne fournit pas les vivres, ils se nourrissent à leurs frais, et chaque soldat a la paye de soixante piastres par mois; par ce motif, il règne une grande disette dans les villages voisins, où une dragme de pain coûte 2 paras; le fromage, 9 paras le rotle; le lait, 3 paras; et le reste en proportion; la viande cependant ne coûte que 2 paras l'oke, et le beurre 6 paras.

Aussi à cause de la sâleté qui règne dans le camp et les environs, il existe beaucoup de maladies parmi la troupe: on voit les soldats en général maigres et pâles.

Il m'a été dit, que Amin Pacha, fils de Réchid Méhémed Pacha, ex-Séraskier, vient du côté de Sivas joindre l'armée avec 10,000 Arnaoutes (Albanais).

Le Séraskier a ordonné de faire évaluer les champs ensemencés voisins du camp, pour en payer le montant aux propriétaires, aux prix suivans, savoir: le froment, à 150 paras le kel (mesure de 2 chumbols d'Alep); et l'orge à 75 paras la dite mesure.

Il a ordonné aussi d'estimer les terres ensemencées où les chevaux de l'armée sont en pâturage, pour en payer également la valeur aux propriétaires: il y a plus de 10,000 bêtes de somme qui se trouvent dans les champs à pâturer.

Le Séraskier a fait déjà prendre de Barak, 2,000 kels de blé; 1,500 kels d'orge; et 700 kels de bourghol (blé comassé); qui ont été payés, savoir: le blé et le bourghol à 50 paras le kel, et l'orge à 20 paras; et il en demande maintenant autres mille kels de blé, mais les habitans du dit village ont répondu qu'il ne leur en restait pas de quoi vivre eux-mêmes, et sur cela, le Séraskier a envoyé faire une perquisition dans le village. On a pris aussi des habitans de Bérasie, 6,000 kels de blé, 4,000 kels d'orge, et 2,500 kels de bourghol, aux prix susmentionnés. Maintenant les dits habitans cherchent une poignée de farine sans la trouver, et se trouvent réduits presque à la famine; et de la crainte qu'ils ont que la cavalerie ne dévaste entièrement toutes leurs terres, ils sont à moissonner leurs récoltes sans attendre la maturité des grains.

Il existe au camp environ soixante canons, et il y a deux gros canons placés devant la tente du Séraskier.

J'ai appris aussi que la bande de la tribut des Bédouins dits Anazis qui est sous le commandement du chef nommé Souffouk Bey, vient contre Ibrahim Pacha au nombre de 20,000; ils sont arrivés à Zaara (nom d'une colline), à soixante heures d'Alep sur l'Euphrate, et ils voulaient passer le fleuve à cet endroit où les eaux sont basses, mais ayant trouvé de la résistance de la part d'un corps de 8,000 Bédouins de Horan, appelés Fedaan, que Ibrahim Pacha a placés à ce passage depuis peu de tems en leur fournissant sept pièces de canons, et 200 canonniers, ils se sont retirés en donnant avis au Séraskier de l'Armée Ottomane, à qui ils ont demandé la permission de venir à Biredjik, pour passer le fleuve à cet endroit; mais le Séraskier leur a répondu d'attendre un peu, parce qu'à présent on était occupé à faire passer les munitions et les attirails de l'armée.

Les 8,000 Bédouins placés par Ibrahim Pacha sur les rives de l'Euphrate, dont il est parlé ci-dessus, étaient jadis ennemis des Egyptiens, et avaient été battus par Ibrahim Pacha, mais après, ils se sont soumis en prêtant serment de fidélité à Son Altesse, et celui-ci leur accorda la paix.

J'ai appris aussi que le fils de Hadji Omar Bey, de la montagne des Kourdes, qui n'est pas éloignée d'Alep, a promis au Séraskier qu'il fera soulever les habitans de la dite montagne ainsi que ceux de la montagne voisine dite Giaour-dagh, et l'aidera par-là à attaquer Alep; le Séraskier l'a fait accompagner par le frère de son trésorier pour cette entreprise. Ce fils de Hadji Omar, Bey des Kourdes, avait été battu dans un tems par Ibrahim Pacha, et poursuivi vivement; il ne dut son salut qu'à la fuite, en se retirant vers les Osmanlis.

On m'a assuré, qu'en outre de l'armée dont je parle, il en existait une autre de 60,000 hommes, qui est aux environs de Nijdé et Elbour, à dix-huit heures de Kuluk Boghaz; et l'on dit que ces deux armées avec les Bédouins alliés formeront une armée d'environ 200,000 hommes; de même l'on dit qu'avec les canons que l'on attend, il y aurait en tout environ 300 canons. (N.B.—Le récit de ce paragraphe mérite confirmation.)

Jusqu'au jour de mon départ du camp, aucune escarmouche n'avait eu lieu entre les troupes du Grand Seigneur et celles d'Ibrahim Pacha; seulement la veille de mon départ du camp, un cheval de la cavalerie des Spahis, s'étant échappé et ayant couru vers le Saggiour, quelques Spahis ont couru après lui pour l'attraper, et comme ils s'étaient bien approché de la rivière, quelques Hanadis (cavalerie d'Ibrahim Pacha) coururent sur les Spahis, qui, voyant cela, rebroussèrent chemin; mais un d'eux étant tombé de son cheval, les Hanadis s'avancèrent sur lui et lui coupèrent la gorge à demi; les Spahis s'étant aperçu de cela, retournèrent sur les Hanadis, mais ceux-ci prirent quelques vêtemens de l'assassiné et son cheval, et regagnèrent leur camp; alors les Spahis enlevèrent le mourant et le portèrent à Nézib, où il expira en arrivant.

Le Séraskier a publié partout, que celui qui saisirait et reconduirait à son camp un déserteur de son armée, aurait une gratification de mille piastres; et il a fixé les peines suivantes contre les déserteurs, savoir: que si le déserteur était un Spahi, il sera noyé dans l'Euphrate, et si c'est un Saouaris, il recevra mille coups de verge; et si c'est un des Nizam (troupes régulières), il sera envoyé à Kara Nazam.

Pendant mon séjour au camp, j'ai assisté aux exercices des troupes, mais j'ai trouvé qu'ils étaient loin d'égaler l'instruction des troupes Egyptiennes: ceux-ci sont infiniment mieux instruits et disciplinés.

Lorsque j'ai quitté le camp pour retourner à Alep, j'ai appris à Nézib, que trois Tatares étaient arrivés au camp, et que le Séraskier avait tenu une assemblée de tous les Pachas; Mirza Pacha, commandant la cavalerie dite Saouari, avait alors fait mettre tous les chevaux de son corps en pâturage près de Barak; les habitans de ce village lui ayant représenté que d'après les ordres du Séraskier, leurs terres qui étaient ensemencées et qui servaient de pâturage aux chevaux, devaient être estimées pour en recevoir le dédommagement, ce Pacha leur répondit que si dans deux à trois jours il ne quittait leurs terres, il les ferait évaluer; d'après cette réponse, et l'arrivée des trois Tatares, le bruit de paix se répandit, et j'ai cru à propos alors de retarder mon départ de quelques jours pour en voir la suite; mais après trois jours, ne voyant aucun mouvement ni changement dans l'armée, je suis parti pour venir vous faire mon rapport.

Il se trouve au camp, environ un millier d'Alepins, qui s'étaient émigrés à différentes époques, et parmi lesquels il se trouve des Aïans (gens de distinction) dont j'ai connu les noms suivans, savoir: Achmed Aga, fils de Hatab, chef des ouvriers en galons; Chérif Aga, fils de Louessan, Ex-Metesseb d'Alep (Commissaire de Police); et Méhémed Aga, fils de Khalas, et le fils de Hachem Aga, tous deux ci-devant Yuzbachi dans le Régiment de la Garde: tous ces Alepins sont nourris par les Osmanlis, mais aucun d'eux n'est employé.

Avant de retourner à Alep, j'ai voulu aller à Tédef pour voir ce qui se passait de ce côté-là, et j'ai poussé même ma course jusqu'à Bachikoï, village à deux heures de là de Tédef; ayant rencontré là trois chameliers des Bédouins, appelés Sessars, qui venaient du camp, ils m'ont dit que toute l'armée était toujours dans sa position, à l'exception d'environ 6,000 cavaliers Spahis et Saouaris, qui, avec les Pachas nommés Mahomed Pacha, Assad Pacha, et Mirza Pacha, se sont portés aux environs des villages dits Ghermouch et Chetlik, à trois heures de distance du camp, pour faire pâturer leurs chevaux, l'herbe ayant manqué à l'endroit où ils étaient; ils n'avaient point avec eux de l'artillerie.

En retournant, j'ai rencontré non loin d'Alep, de la Cavalerie d'Ibrahim Pacha (Hanadis et autres) qui vont à Tel-il-Chaïr, à douze heures d'ici, pour surveiller ce qui passe.

(Translation.)

Translation of a Report made in Arabic to the Pro-Chancellor of the British Consulate at Aleppo, by a person sent to the neighbourhood of Biredjik, to gather every possible information respecting the Ottoman Army.

The following is his Report:

ON leaving Aleppo I proceeded first to the neighbourhood of the river called Sedjour, where the small camp of Ibrahim Pasha's troops is placed, for the purpose of watching the movements of the Grand Signor's Army.

Those troops consist of Irregular Cavalry, called Hanadi and Bachi Bouzuk. The Hanadis, amounting to about 1500, are commanded by their Colonel, Maggiun Bey; and of the Bachi Bouzuk, 500 are commanded by Zeir Aga, and 400 by Kara Beirakdar, forming altogether about 2,400 men, without any Artillery. This camp is posted on the borders of the Sedjour, sixteen hours' distance from Aleppo, at a spot which goes by the name of Loulie and Elkoubal; and it extends to a place called Tel-Bechir, distant about four hours; all on this side of the Sedjour. These troops get their provisions from the Miri, by way of the adjoining villages, called El Baglie; from thence I went, with my merchandise, to a village called Barak, which is on the other side of the said river Sedjour, and at a little distance from it: being well acquainted with the Musselim there, I obtained from him a teskereh to enable me to go to Nezib, a village fifteen hours from the Sedjour. On arriving at this village, I there found the brother of the Musselim of Barak, who was procuring corn for the Grand Signor's Army, whose camp begins close by this village, and extends to the Euphrates. At this village I became acquainted with the Nezoul Amini (Commissary), named Mehemed Effendi, who told me that the Army which was there encamped, required every day 28,000 okes of bread, of which half an oke was given to each soldier, and this in addition to the better kind of bread eaten by the Pashas and Officers.

In going through the camp, I learnt that the number of troops called Spahis who were there, amounted to about 4,000 horsemen; and the Bachi Bouzuks to 2,090 men, of whom 1,200 were commanded by Aghogia Dahli Moustapha Aga; 800 by Ali Aga of Malatia; and 90 horsemen only under the orders of Karagliari Darouieh Aga. Great efforts were being

made by recruiting to increase this corps; for it was said that the Seraskier Hafiz Ali Pasha having heard that Ibrahim Pasha had collected a large force at Aleppo, and being of opinion that his Army was not sufficiently strong to make head against the Egyptian Army, he had determined to increase the number of troops called Bachi Bouzuk, and with this view had sent recruiting parties into the different districts, with large sums of money towards the enrolment of them.

The above-mentioned Seraskier sent for the Chief of the Arab tribe, called Maoûalis, who live on the other side of the Euphrates, at about sixteen hours' distance from the camp, and dressed him up in the uniform of the Nizam, and ordered him to assemble under his orders 1,000 horsemen of his tribe, but he had not with him at the time more than 200 men.

This same Seraskier also required the Kourd Tribe called Berasié, dwelling about ten hours on the other side of the Euphrates, to furnish a thousand horsemen; they refused however, and abandoning their lands, took to flight. Upon this the Seraskier sent to the chiefs of this tribe to enquire, whether they wished to be considered as rebels to the Ottoman Porte. But they replied, that they were not rebels, and that they did not prefer the Egyptian Rule; but that they were unable to furnish warriors, though in regard to any thing else, they were ready to sacrifice their whole fortunes in the service of the Grand Signor. Upon this answer being given, the Seraskier was satisfied with requiring at the moment 1,000 camels, which they agreed to give; and the Seraskier despatched a moubacher (commissary) to collect these camels; and after this the Kourds returned to their homes.

Last Wednesday (22d instant,) a body of twenty men, called Moûali Bedouins, rushed upon the village of Tédef-el-bab, distant about nine hours from Aleppo, (in the Egyptian territory,) and stole from thence eighteen beasts of burthen, which they took to Barak, where the Musselim caused the animals to be seized, and reported the matter to the Seraskier of the Ottoman Army, who ordered the beasts to be returned immediately to the village from whence they had been taken.

There are eleven Pashas in the camp of the Ottoman Army; the names which I heard were, Kourd Mehemed, Pasha of Orfa; Sherif Pasha, formerly Pasha of Orfa; Mirza Pasha, commanding the Cavalry; Ismael Pasha, commanding the Spahis; Assad Pasha, commanding the Nizams (regular troops); moreover, one named Osman Pasha, and another Sherif Pasha.

The number of regular troops is about 56,000 men, including, however, the Spahis and Artillerymen; and of the Bachi Bouzuks and Bedouins there might be about 20,000: to these latter no provisions are given; they live at their own expense, and each soldier receives the pay of 60 piastres per month; owing to this there is a great scarcity of provisions in the neighbouring villages, where a *dragme* of bread costs 2 paras; cheese, 9 paras the rotle; milk, 3 paras, and so on in proportion; meat, however, only costs 2 paras the oke, and butter 6 paras.

Moreover, the filth which exists both within and without the camp, has engendered much sickness among the troops: the soldiers appear to be generally thin and pale.

I have been told that Amin Pasha, son of Rechid Mehemet Pasha, ex-Seraskier, is coming by the way of Sivas, to join the army, with 10,000 Arnaouts (Albanians).

The Seraskier has ordered the fields bordering on the camp, which were sown, to be valued, in order to pay an equivalent to the proprietors, at the following prices: viz., for wheat 150 paras the kel (a measure of 2 chumbols of Aleppo); and 75 paras for the same measure of barley.

He has also ordered the cultivated lands where the horses of the army are feeding, to be valued, and to pay in like manner the amount to the proprietors: there are more than 10,000 beasts pastured in these same grounds.

The Seraskier has already had from Barak 2,000 kels of wheat; 1,500 kels of barley; and 700 kels of bourghol (*blé comassé*); for which the following sums have been paid: for wheat and bourghol 50 paras the kel, and 20 paras for barley. He now requires a further thousand kels of wheat; but the inhabitants of the said village say that they would not have enough left to live upon themselves, and upon this the Seraskier has sent to search the village. Also, 6,000 kels of wheat, 4,000 kels of barley, and 2,500 kels of bourghol, have been taken from the inhabitants of Berasie, at the above-mentioned prices. At this moment, these said inhabitants seek in vain for a handful of flour, being almost reduced to a state of famine; and fearing, as they do, lest the cavalry should completely lay waste their crops, they are already gathering in their harvest, without waiting till the corn becomes ripe.

There are about sixty guns in the camp, and two large cannons before the tent of the Seraskier.

I have also heard that a force of the tribe of Bedouins called Anazis, to the number of 20,000, commanded by a chief called Souffouk Bey, is marching against Ibrahim Pasha: they arrived at Zaara (the name of a hill), at sixty hours from Aleppo on the Euphrates, and tried to ford the river at a place where the waters are shallow; having, however, met with resistance from a corps of 8,000 Bedouins of Horan, called Fedaan, which Ibrahim Pasha had placed at this point a short time before, having given them 7 field pieces, and 200 artillerymen, they retired, giving notice of their retreat to the Seraskier of the Ottoman army, from whom they requested permission to come to Biredjik, in order to pass the river at that place; but the Seraskier told them, in reply, to wait a little, because he was then occupied in transporting warlike stores.

The 8,000 Bedouins stationed by Ibrahim Pasha on the banks of the Euphrates, as mentioned above, were formerly hostile to the Egyptians, and had been beaten by Ibrahim Pasha, but afterwards, having taken an oath of fidelity to His Highness, peace was granted to them.

I have also heard that the son of Hadji Omar Bey, of the mountain of the Kourds, which is not far from Aleppo, has promised the Seraskier to raise the inhabitants of that mountain, as well as those of the neighbouring mountain, called Giaour-dagh, and will thus assist him in attacking Aleppo; the Seraskier has sent the brother of his treasurer to accompany him in this enterprise. This son of Hadji Omar Bey, of the Kourds, was formerly beaten by Ibrahim Pasha, and closely pursued; he retired towards the Osmanlis, and owed his safety to flight.

I have been assured that, in addition to the army of which I have been speaking, there is yet a force of 60,000 men in the neighbourhood of Nijde and Elbour, at eighteen hours' distance from Kuluk Boghaz; and report says that these two armies, together with the Allied Bedouins, will form an army of about 200,000 men; it is also said, that with the cannons which are expected, there would be altogether 300 cannons. (N.B. What is stated in this paragraph requires confirmation.)

Up to the day of my departure from the camp, no skirmishing had taken place between the troops of the Grand Signor and those of Ibrahim Pasha; but the day before my departure, a horse belonging to the Spahis having got loose and run towards the Sedjour, a few Spahis ran after the horse to try and catch him; and having thus got close to the river, some Hanadis (of Ibrahim Pasha's Cavalry) rode at the Spahis; who seeing this, turned quickly back; but one of them having fallen from his horse, the Hanadis caught him and cut his throat. The Spahis perceiving this, turned back upon the Hanadis; but these, having taken the garments and horse of the murdered man, regained their camp: then the Spahis took up the dying man and carried him to Nezib, where he expired.

The Seraskier has given out everywhere, that any person who shall seize and bring back to the camp a deserter from the army shall receive a reward of 1,000 piastres; the punishment of the deserters to be as follows: If the deserter be a Spahi, he shall be drowned in the Euphrates; if a Saouaris, he is to receive 1,000 blows; if one of the Nizam (regular troops), he is to be sent to Kara Nazam.

While I remained in the camp, I was present at the exercise of the troops, but I found them far from equal to the Egyptian troops, who are infinitely better taught and disciplined.

After I had quitted the camp to return to Aleppo, I heard at Nezib, that three Tatars had arrived at the camp, and that the Seraskier had assembled together all the Pashas; Mirza Pasha, commanding the Cavalry called Saouari, had sent all the horses of his corps to pasture near Barak: the inhabitants of this village having represented to him that, according to the orders of the Seraskier, their lands which had been sown, and were used as pasture for the horses, should be valued, in order that an equivalent should be given them; the Pasha answered them, that if he did not quit their lands in two or three days, they should be valued. After this answer and the arrival of the three Tatars, a report of peace became current, and I thereupon thought it better to delay my departure some days to see what the result would be; but after three days having seen no movement nor change in the army, I came away for the purpose of making you my report.

There are in the camp about a thousand persons from Aleppo, who emigrated from thence at different periods, and among whom there are some Aians (people of rank); the names which I heard are as follows:—Achmed Aga, son of Hatab, Chief of the Embroiderers; Sherif Aga, son of Louessan, Ex-Metesseb of Aleppo (Commissary of Police); and Mehemed Aga, son of Khalas, and the son of Hachem Aga, both of whom were formerly Yuzbachi in the Regiment of Guards: all these persons from Aleppo are supported by the Turks, but they are not employed.

Before returning to Aleppo, I wished to go to Tedef, to see what was going on there, and I went even as far as Bachikoi, a village two hours beyond Tedef; having there met three Bedouin camel drivers, called Sessars, who had come from the camp, they told me that the whole army was still in the same position, with the exception of about 6,000 Spahis and Saouaris horse, who had gone with the Pashas, named Mahomed Pasha, Assad Pasha, and Mirza Pasha, to the neighbourhood of the villages called Ghermouch and Chetlik, distant three hours from the camp, for the purpose of pasturing their horses, because there was no grass in the place where they were stationed. They had no artillery with them.

As I returned I met, not far from Aleppo, some cavalry of Ibrahim Pasha (Hanadis and others), who are going to Tel-il-Chair, at about twelve hours from hence, to see what is going on.

Inclosure 3 in No. 91.

Extract of Mr. Vice-Consul Hays's Journal, dated Alexandretta, May 24, 1839.

RECEIVED information of the descent of about 300 men from the Giaour Dagh mountains, on the town of Masis, which they robbed, and carried off the cattle.

Received information of the descent of about twenty men on, and the robbery of the village of Archi, one hour and a half from Alexandretta.

Was informed by Rushwan Effendi, who returned this morning from Byass, that the reported attack upon Masis was without foundation, but that an attack had been made at Borgas, three hours beyond Byass, on a party of fifty police, during the night, by the mountaineers, in which two of the police were killed and some horses taken, the robbers getting off; their force was supposed to be about 100 men; and that in consequence of that, and the attack upon Archi, the cutting and transporting of timber was to be discontinued beyond the immediate vicinity of Alexandretta, on the Byass side, and the men and animals employed in it to be sent to the mountains, on the other side of the Beylan and Arzous range.

He also said, that by the orders of his Highness Ibrahim Pasha, a body of 700 Irregular Cavalry, as mounted police, were placed under the orders of Rustan Effendi, Governor of Byass, to patrol from Koorkgolok to Alexandretta, for the protection of the roads and the country, with orders to put to death on the spot, any robber they may apprehend; an equal number of others were also daily expected to join them, so as to form a police force of 1400 or 1500 men.

No. 92.

Mr. Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received July* 5.)

(Extract.) *Damascus, June* 7, 1839.

THE last despatch I had the honour of addressing your Lordship by the Beyrout steamer, was under the 10th ultimo.

The road between Aleppo and Beyrout continuing uninterrupted and free, Mr. Pro-Consul F. H. S. Werry will put your Lordship in possession amply of all the information relating to the Sultan's Army, and proceedings on that frontier, as well as what is taking place by his Highness Ibrahim Pasha, and the forces under his command, on both of which subjects I instructed the Pro-Consul to be full, precise and correct, in the reports he transmits to your Lordship; therefore little remains for me to offer to your Lordship's notice on this very important subject, further than to be permitted by your Lordship, to make a few cursory observations thereon, inasmuch as it appears to me it is connected with the general relations of this country.

From the information transmitted me by the Aleppo Pro-Consul, which I have duly forwarded to Colonel Campbell, it appears the military measures pursued by the Sultan's Seraskier, are in accordance with those I anticipated in my last despatch to your Lordship, which are in substance, that while the main body of his army, encamped on this side of the Euphrates between Roum Kale and Bir, makes advances towards and on the Egyptian territory, this movement is gradual, and in proportion to those operated by his irregulars and the malcontents on both wings of the Egyptian Army, and his Highness Ibrahim Pasha's position at Aleppo. It will be seen by the reports, that with many influential persons belonging formerly to Aleppo and other parts of Syria, there are also numerous Syrian partizans assembled at the Sultan's Seraskier's head-quarters: this denotes the object of his advance to Aleppo, and corroborates the insurrectionary measures above cited, and attempting to be extended in the rear and to all parts of Syria. Those measures are calculated not only to facilitate the success of an attack of the Sultan's Seraskier on his Highness Ibrahim Pasha's Army, but to induce a belief generally to the world, that he is invited by the Syrian population. Your Lordship will observe the immense advantage derivable by the Sultan's Seraskier, compared with the advantage which would have accrued to his Highness Ibrahim Pasha, had he at once taken the offensive or had he thrown his operations on the eastern side of the Euphrates, in which countries, the same elements would have favoured his operations to a far greater extent than those of the Sultan's Seraskier in Syria, taking into account also that the Egyptian Army is in every respect superior to the Sultan's. Under such a view of the question, should these premises be correct, it does not appear to me in truth and justice, that it can be established in the present attitude of the rival armies, that the *status quo* of the Treaty of Kutaya is observed by the Sultan's Seraskier on the northern frontiers of Syria.

It cannot be doubted, that these movements will produce the most destructive and disastrous effects to the interests of this country generally, and particularly to the British; and unless prompt and final measures are adopted to settle the pending question between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, this country will eventually become a scene of disorder, instead of a field for commercial enterprize and of prosperity.

I have adverted, my Lord, to the position and proceedings of the Ottoman Armies and the state of this country, as in point with our immediate interests in it, without connecting it with the policy pursued by your Lordship, in promoting the general pacific relations of the East, from which it would appear inseparable, but which the assembling of the Ottoman forces on the Northern Syrian frontier do not for the present, if they are maintained much longer in their present attitude, authorize the hope that hostilities between the rival armies can be averted.

I had thus far prepared this despatch to your Lordship, when I received advices from the Aleppo Pro-Consul, that his Highness Ibrahim Pasha has quitted Aleppo with all his forces, between the 29th and 31st ultimo, and fixed his head-quarters, and concentrated his army at Tellisheir, ten hours in advance of Aleppo, in consequence of an advanced guard of Irregular Cavalry from Hafiz Pasha's Army having occupied some villages, distributed arms and ammunition to the villagers within the Egyptian limits, and having crossed the river Sedjour, three hours on its western side, to Telbashir. The main body of the Sultan's Army was at Nezib with the Seraskier's head-quarters. These movements almost preclude the hope of hostilities being averted, unless very prompt measures are taken to preserve peace.

Damascus is in a tranquil state. I hear that the line of country between this place and Balbec, from thence to Tripoli, and that country to Hamah, is infested with the marauding Mutualis, at the head of whom an Emir of the Harfoush family, deposed from the Mussellimlic of Balbec, and replaced by a Cousin Emir, is at present at war. The Government does not appear to take any active part in this feud, and appears to employ conciliatory measures to appease the parties, and induce both to re-establish order in the country, through the intervention of the Emir Bechir, who is contiguous to them.

I hear that the Arabs from the Desert make continual irruptions into the Haouran district and the surrounding country; but the Druse and Fellah population of that district and the country are quiet for the present.

The plague has spread from the south to the Naplous Mountains, and to the villages to the south of Damascus, a few hours distant. Here some cases have occurred, and two or three are daily announced. Precautions are taking to prevent its propagation. It is not likely to do much mischief. Its character is reported mild and languid. The season is also well advanced, and it is therefore hoped not to be of long duration.

No. 93.

Mr. Consul Moore to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 5.)

My Lord, *Beyrout, June* 8, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship with the latest information which has reached this place from Aleppo, under date of the 1st instant.

Hafiz Pasha had established his head-quarters at Isil; and the Sultan's troops had occupied a village five hours distant from Aintab, after expelling therefrom a party of Bedouins in the Egyptian service.

Both Ibrahim Pasha and Solyman Pasha had quitted Aleppo with troops, the former for Tellisheir.

Much anxiety is felt here as to the result of the advance of the Ottoman forces; and a battle, it is apprehended, may be the consequence.

In this immediate neighbourhood, tranquillity is maintained; but we daily hear of robberies taking place in almost every direction.

The Aleppo post, now due, is not yet arrived.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) N. MOORE.

No. 94.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 5.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, June* 14, 1839.

IN continuation of my despatch of the 6th of June, I have now the honour to inform your Lordship, that Mehemet Ali received, on the evening of the 9th instant, an overland courier from Syria, with reports from Ibrahim Pasha.

Early on the morning of the 10th instant, a steamer of the Pasha arrived from Suedia, to the south of Alexandretta; and as I was anxious for intelligence, M. de Laurin, the Consul-General of Austria, and myself, went to call on Mehemet Ali.

The Pasha told us, that he had received some details of the attack by the Turkish Cavalry on his Bedouin Arab Cavalry, within the limits of his own territory; and also, that emissaries of Hafiz Pasha were raising up the people of the villages against him, and distributing arms, ammunition, and money to them. And he then detailed to us the substance of the inclosed reports (Nos. 1 and 2.), of which copies were sent to myself, and the Consuls-General of the other Great Powers.

The Pasha then told us, that he would immediately send orders to Ibrahim Pasha, to drive the Turks out of Syria, and to follow them, and act according to circumstances, and that he would occupy Orfa and Diarbekir.

M. de Laurin and myself urged him, by every possible argument and entreaty, not to go beyond his own frontier; but the Pasha said the danger was too imminent, and the aggression of the Porte too marked and too manifest, to permit any further moderation on his part; that he had done everything to avoid a war, but that now he must give discretionary powers to his son, as he was too far distant to refer to him on every circumstance and event, and great evils and danger might accrue from his so doing. And he added, that if his neighbour set his (the Pasha's) house on fire, he had the right to take measures to punish him for it, and to prevent his so doing again.

On the evening of the 10th, Messrs. Laurin and Cochelet, and Count Medem, called on me. The two latter had been to wait on the Pasha, and had also, in vain, endeavoured to dissuade him from giving permission to Ibrahim Pasha to pass his frontier; and the steamer was sent off that evening to Ibrahim Pasha.

I can assure your Lordship, that everything has been done by myself and colleagues to dissuade Mehemet Ali from allowing Ibrahim to pass his frontier; and the most complete accord and harmony has existed amongst us all on this point. But our arguments were very much weakened by the positive aggressions of Hafiz Pasha, and by the moderation and deference to our advice shown by Mehemet Ali up to the present moment.

There is also little doubt, that Hafiz Pasha waits only his reinforcements, and the march of his different corps, in order to attack Ibrahim Pasha in front, whilst his other corps act on different points of Syria; and the fact, that Hafiz Pasha is accompanied by all the Turks who have emigrated from Syria, particularly from Aleppo, clearly convinces Mehemet Ali, that the Sultan intends to strike a decisive blow against him.

I think it probable, that a battle will soon take place between Hafiz Pasha and Ibrahim Pasha; and I feel convinced, that as the Sultan has set the example of causing revolt in Syria, Mehemet Ali will follow it in Albania, and Roumelia, and Bosnia; and I firmly believe, that he may cause a conflagration in those places.

I think it also probable, that Kourschid Pasha, from the Nejid, may turn his views against Bassora, and the more so, as he has an Agent at Kaouat or Gran, where he has large houses for granaries. He has, also, another Agent at Muhumrah, who is employed in purchasing provisions which are forwarded to the former post.

The preceding intelligence is given to me, under date of 4th May, by Captain Hennell, from Karrak.

As to what Mehemet Ali may do in regard to Bagdad, I am quite ignorant; but the Resident there writes, that the late inundations have destroyed one-third of the houses of that city, and that the whole of that Pashalic is in great disorder.

Since writing thus far, I have received a translation of the order sent by Mehemet Ali to Ibrahim Pasha, on 10th June; and I have now the honour to transmit copy of it.

This order has solely been caused by the outrages and the aggressions of the troops of Hafiz Pasha, as the previous order to Ibrahim Pasha merely directed him to drive the Turks out of Syria, but not to pass the frontier.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Inclosure 1 in No. 94.

Extraits des Rapports adressés au Général-en-Chef de l'Armée Egyptienne, à la date du 18 *Rebi-el-evel*, 1255.

LES hostilités que les Turcs ont commises contre la Province d'Antab vous ont été connues par les derniers rapports du 17 courant. Depuis, on lit dans le rapport du Kaftana Bey, du Magioun Bey, et du Mussellim, datés du 17 courant, de Biouk-Kessil-Hissar, ce qui suit: Un Cavalier Hanadi (Arabe) arrive ventre à terre et nous dit (pour acheter du pain et d'autres provisions de bouche): " Nous étions une vingtaine de cavaliers à Tel-il-Béchir, tout-à-coup nous aperçûmes de loin un corps de cavalerie, à peu près 1,500 hommes, qui venait sur nous à la distance d'une mille; ces cavaliers ont commencé à faire feu. Nous avons fait un mouvement en arrière sans résister; nous avons eu trois hommes blessés. Aussitôt après ce récit (Kaftana Bey et autres continuent) nous sommes partis pour aller à la rencontre de la Cavalerie Turque. Chemin faisant, nous avons rencontré un cavalier Sari (Arabe) qui était blessé; nous a constaté la véracité du fait; un instant après, un homme de Mussellim Bey nous est venu assurer que les Turcs sont encore à Tel-Béchir, et qu'on envoie à Mezar, qui n'est éloigné d'Antab qu'à peu près de cinq heures, des troupes et des canons, et qu'ils sont entrés à Kessil-Hissar, grand village appartenant à la Province d'Antab; là on a trouvé un homme de Mussellim Bey; on l'a fait prisonnier, et on a forcé le Boï Bey de ce village à se porter vers Antab, pour exciter la population. Le Boï Bey aussi est venu jusqu'auprès d'Antab, d'où il a fait avertir le Président du Conseil d'Antab, des intentions hostiles des Turcs contre cette ville; et lorsque ce même Boï Bey retourna à Kessil-Hissar, il fut enlevé par 40 ou 50 cavaliers Turcs et conduit à l'Armée Ottomane. Les Arabes qui se trouvaient entre Antab et l'armée Turque, se sont retirés vers Killis; de manière qu'ils ont laissé le champ libre aux Turcs, qui se sont emparés des villages jusqu'auprès d'Antab; par conséquent, la population d'Antab est dans une grande anxiété.

Extrait de la Lettre de S. A. Ibrahim Pacha, en date du 19 *Rebi-el-evel*, 1255.

JE vous ai déjà annoncé par ma lettre précédente, que j'ai laissé l'ordre à Solyman Pacha pour me suivre à Tel-il-Chaïr. J'ai fait revenir à moi les régimens qui se trouvaient à Antab et à Killis; je laisse Solyman Pacha avec le corps d'armée à Tel-il-Chaïr, et je me porte en avant à la rencontre de la Cavalerie Turque, avec sept régimens de la Cavalerie et six batteries d'artillerie à cheval. Si l'Infanterie Turque ne se porte pas en avant pour secourir leur Cavalerie, le corps de Solyman Pacha gardera sa position jusqu'à nouvel ordre, et je renverrai les régimens que j'ai retirés d'Antab. Si au contraire la grande armée Turque fait un mouvement en avant, Solyman Pacha viendra me trouver avec le corps d'Infanterie. C'est donc l'armée Turque qui a passé le premier les limites ; elle a fait dévaster nos villages par sa Cavalerie régulière et irrégulière ; c'est elle encore qui a fait le feu le premier ; dans l'affaire que la Cavalerie Turque a eu avec les Hanadis (Arabes), ils ont perdu 60 à 70 hommes ; notre perte est de 20 à 30 hommes. Il n'y a plus de doute maintenant que l'opinion contre la guerre est entièrement échouée. Puisque c'est l'armée Turque qui a la première commis des hostilités contre nos villages, il est juste que j'use de représailles, en faisant faire dévaster par nos Hanadis les villages de Barash.

(*Note du Traducteur.*)

Son Altesse le Généralissime dans cette lettre mentionne, sans aucun détail, il est vrai, la perte qu'on a eu dans cette affaire entre les Hanadis et Turcs ; mais nous savons déjà par sa lettre du 17 courant, que cinq escadrons Turcs ont attaqué une partie du corps de Cavalerie Arabe sous les ordres de Magioun Bey, à Tel-Béchir. On peut conclure par là que nos Hanadis se sont retirés en combattant, et que la Cavalerie Turque s'est avancée jusqu'à Kessil-Hissar.

(Translation.)

Extracts of the Reports addressed to the General-in-Chief of the Egyptian Army to the date of the 18*th Rebi-el-evel*, 1255.

THE hostilities which the Turks have committed against the province of Aintab have been made known to you by the last reports of the 17th instant. Since then, the reports of the Kaftana Bey, the Maggiun Bey, and of the Mussellim, dated the 17th instant from Biouk-Kessil-Hissar, contain the following : a Hanadi horseman (an Arab) arrived post haste, (to buy bread and other provisions) and said to us : we were about twenty horsemen at Tel-il-Bechir ; suddenly we saw at a distance a body of cavalry, nearly 1,500 men, who came upon us from the distance of a mile ; these horsemen began firing ; we retreated without resisting ; we had three men wounded. Immediately after this account (Kaftana Bey and the others continue) we set off to meet the Turkish cavalry. On our way we met a Sari horseman (an Arab) who was wounded, and proved to us the truth of the circumstance ; an instant afterwards a man from Mussellim Bey came to tell us that the Turks are still at Tel-Bechir, and that they are sending troops and cannon to Mezar, which is only about five hours distant from Aintab, and that they had entered Kessil-Hissar, a large village belonging to the province of Aintab ; there they found a man belonging to Mussellim Bey ; they made him prisoner, and forced the Boi Bey of that village to go towards Aintab to excite the population. The Boi Bey also arrived close to Aintab, from whence he sent information to the President of the Council of Aintab, of the hostile intentions of the Turks against that town ; and when this same Boi Bey returned to Kessil-Hissar, he was carried off by forty or fifty Turkish horsemen and taken to the Ottoman army. The Arabs who were between Aintab and the Turkish army have retired towards Killis, so as to leave the field open to the Turks, who have taken possession of the villages close to Aintab ; consequently the population of Aintab is in great anxiety.

Extract of the letter from His Highness Ibrahim Pasha, dated the 19*th Rebi-el-evel*, 1255.

I HAVE already informed you in my former letter that I have left orders for Solyman Pasha to follow me to Tel-il-Chair. I have caused the regiments which were at Aintab and at Killis to return to me ; I leave Solyman Pasha with the *corps d'armée* at Tel-il-Chair, and advance myself, with seven regiments of cavalry and six batteries of horse artillery, to meet the Turkish cavalry. If the Turkish infantry does not advance to cover their cavalry, Solyman Pasha's corps will keep its position until fresh orders, and I shall send back the regiments which I have withdrawn from Aintab. If, on the contrary, the main body of the Turkish army makes a movement in advance, Solyman Pasha will join me with the body of infantry. It is then the Turkish army which has first passed the boundary; they have sacked our villages with their regular and irregular cavalry; they were also the first to open fire; in the affair which the Turkish cavalry had with the Hanadis (Arabs), they lost from sixty to seventy men; our loss is from twenty to thirty men. There is now no longer doubt that the opinion against the war is completely at an end. Since it was the Turkish army which was the first to commit hostilities against our villages, it is right that I should resort to reprisals by making our Hanadis sack the villages of Barash.

(Note by the Translator.)

His Highness the Generalissimo in this letter mentions, it is true without any details, the loss sustained in this affair between the Hanadis and Turks; but we know already by his letter of the 17th instant, that five Turkish squadrons had attacked a part of a corps of Arab cavalry under the orders of Maggiun Bey at Tel-Bechir. We may conclude from this that our Hanadis had retired fighting, and that the Turkish cavalry had advanced as far as Kessil-Hissar.

Inclosure 2 in No. 94.

Extrait des Rapports parvenus au Généralissime, sous la date du 21 Rebi-el-evel, et dont il rend compte au Vice-Roi, par sa lettre du 23 du même mois.

LE nommé Kutchuk Ali Oglou, qui avait passé du côté des Turcs, il y a déjà quelque tems, a été envoyé au village d'Erzin pour faire soulever les montagnards du Giaour Daghi. Le déserteur Khadje Omar Oglou aussi a été expédié à Tchertchil dans le même but. Mistick Bey est arrivé à Boulanik, et a cherché à soulever les villages dans le district de Pyass. Les Akkars, qui appartiennent au Sandjack de Tripoli, instigués par Mistick Bey, ont tué leur Mussellim, saccagé sa maison, et pillé la caisse publique; de manière que si l'on n'arrête pas cet état de choses, la révolte se propagera de plus en plus.

Le 13 *Juin*, 1839.

(Translation.)

Extract of Reports received by the Generalissimo, dated the 21*st Rebi-el-evel, and reported by him to the Viceroy, in his letter of the* 23*rd of the same month.*

THE person named Kutchuk Ali Oglou, who some time ago came over from the Turks, has been sent to the village of Erzin to raise the mountaineers of the Giaour Daghi. The deserter, Khadje Omar Oglou, also has been sent to Tchertchil with the same view. Mistick Bey has arrived at Boulanik, and has endeavoured to raise the villages in the district of Pyass. The Akkars, who belong to the Sandjack of Tripoli, at the instigation of Mistick Bey, have slain their Mussellim, sacked his house, and pillaged the public chest; so that, if this state of things is not put an end to, the revolt will increase more and more.

June 13, 1839.

Inclosure 3 in No. 94.

Dépêche de Son Altesse le Vice-Roi à Son Altesse Ibrahim Pacha, en date du 28 Rebi-el-evel, 1255.—(10 *Juin,* 1839.)

(Traduction.)

J'AI reçu votre dépêche du 23 du courant, par laquelle vous m'annoncez que nos adversaires étendent de plus en plus leur agression et leur invasion; qu'ils ont armé les habitans de tous les villages situés au-delà d'Antab, et ceux de Kessil-Hissar, en-deçà des villages d'Antab; qu'ils ont emmené de leur côté les notables d'Antab; qu'outre qu'ils ont précédemment et dernièrement séduit le territoire de Pyass, la montagne Kourd-Daghi, et celle de Giaour-Daghi, ils ont excité les insurgés à attaquer Akkar, dépendance de Tripoli, et à assassiner et piller le Gouverneur de l'endroit.

L'agression de nos adversaires a dépassé les bornes; avec plus de patience nous ne pourrons plus les arrêter, car peu-à-peu ils sémeront partout le désordre. Autant avons-nous été patiens et circonspects, pour ne pas agir contre le gré des Grandes Puissances, autant nos adversaires se sont avancés et ont porté les choses au point où elles en sont; de manière qu'il n'y a plus de remède. En différant davantage, nous perdrons du tems, ce qui ne convient pas à notre position. Donc, nous n'avons d'autre ressource que celle de marcher sur eux et de les attaquer. Comme l'agression vient de leur part, l'état évident des choses démontre qu'après tout les Grandes Puissances nous excuseront et nous donneront raison. En conclusion, à l'arrivée de la présente dépêche, vous attaquerez les troupes de vos adversaires qui sont entrées sur notre territoire, et après les en avoir chassées, vous marcherez sur leur Grande Armée à laquelle vous livrerez bataille. Si par l'aide de Dieu, la fortune se déclare pour nous, sans dépasser le défilé de Goulek-Boghas, vous marcherez droit vers Malatia, Kharpaut, Ourfa, et Diarbékir.

(Translation.)

Despatch from His Highness the Viceroy to His Highness Ibrahim Pasha, dated the 28th Rebi-el-evel, 1255.—(10*th June,* 1839.)

I HAVE received your despatch of the 23rd instant, in which you inform me that our adversaries carry their aggression and invasion further and further; that they have armed the inhabitants of all the villages situated beyond Aintab, and those of Kessil Hissar on this side of the villages of Aintab; that they have gained to their side the chief men of Aintab; that besides having, from first to last, corrupted the territory of Pyass, the mountain Kourd Daghi and that of Giaour Daghi, they have incited the insurgents to attack Akhar, a dependency of Tripoli, and to assassinate and plunder the Governor of the place.

The aggression of our adversaries has passed bounds; if we have patience any longer, we shall be unable to stop them, for by degrees they will scatter disorder everywhere. The more patient and circumspect we have been in order not to act contrary to the wish of the Great Powers, the more have our adversaries advanced, and have pushed matters to the point where they now are; so that there is no longer any remedy. By delaying further, we shall lose time, which would be inconvenient in our position. We have then no other resource than to march against them and attack them. As the aggression comes from their side, the evident state of affairs shows that, after all, the Great Powers will excuse us and do us justice. In conclusion, on the arrival of this despatch, you will attack the troops of your adversaries who have entered our territory, and after having driven them out, you will march on the main body of their army,

and will engage them. If, by the aid of God, fortune declares in our favour, without passing the defile of Goulek-Boghas, you will march straight upon Malatia, Kharpoot, Orfa, and Diarbekir.

No. 95.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 5.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, June* 16, 1839.

THE Pasha's steamer, the "Nile," arrived here on the morning of the 14th instant, with letters from Ibrahim Pasha, dated Touzel, the 8th of June.

I was with the Pasha when the letters arrived, and he immediately caused them to be read aloud by one of his secretaries, in the presence of several persons, and of M. de Laurin, who arrived soon after the letters.

I have the honour to inclose a copy of the report of Ibrahim Pasha, by which your Lordship will perceive that one of the Pashas of the Sultan, Solyman Pasha of Marash, has entered into, and taken possession of, Aintab, the chief town of a district in Syria, and that Hafiz Pasha himself was with that corps. No doubt can therefore remain in regard to the aggression of Hafiz Pasha on Syria: and up to the last news from Syria, not a single soldier of Ibrahim Pasha's army had entered the territory of the Sultan, or committed any aggression.

I have also the honour to transmit the translation of a letter from Ibrahim Pasha to Hafiz Pasha, and which was sent to the latter by a Colonel of Artillery. Your Lordship will see that Ibrahim Pasha states all his causes of complaint against Hafiz Pasha, and accuses Hafiz Pasha himself of having approached his camp with a corps of Regular Cavalry. And the whole letter is couched in terms of great moderation, and, in one part, of deference to the wishes of the Great Powers; and the moderation of Mehemet Ali has been clearly shown in the orders he gave to Ibrahim Pasha to remain at Aleppo as long as possible, even at the risk of seeing the insurrection caused by Hafiz Pasha, spread in Syria, and giving time to the Turks to concentrate their forces and receive all their reinforcements. The reply of Hafiz Pasha was not yet known.

The fleet of Mehemet Ali is leaving this for the coast of Syria. On my speaking to the Pasha on the subject, and telling him that I thought it a bad and useless measure, he replied, that he had not any intention of meeting the Sultan's squadron, but as the coast of Syria was now almost entirely without troops, and as the Sultan's emissaries were using all their means to cause a revolt against him in every part of Syria, it becam necessary to send the fleet to the sea-ports to protect the people and the foreign commercial interests in those towns.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Inclosure 1 in No. 95.

Extrait de la lettre de Son Altesse Ibrahim Pacha, en date du 27 *Rebi-el-evel,* 1225, *de Touzel.*—(8 *Juin,* 1839.)

LES régimens qui se trouvent à Antab ont été retirés par moi, et j'ai laissé seulement dans la forteresse de la dite ville un bataillon d'Infanterie. Solyman Pacha de Marache est entré à Antab. Pour m'assurer de ce fait, j'ai expédié Magioun Bey vers la dite ville avec 600 cavaliers Arabes (appelés Hanadis). Le dit Solyman Pacha avec un égal nombre de cavaliers Turcs irréguliers, sortit de la ville, et un engagement a eu lieu entre ces deux corps. Solyman Pacha s'est retiré dans la ville avec une perte de 40 à 50 hommes, et nos Arabes ont amenés 15 à 20 chevaux avec eux, de manière que Solyman Pacha se trouve encore à Antab. Le lendemain de cette affaire, nos Arabes Hanadis ont aperçu non loin d'ici un corps de

cavaliers réguliers de l'Armée Turque qui a commencé à tirer du canon sur eux. Aussitôt j'ai pris la cavalerie et quatre batteries d'artillerie à cheval et j'ai marché vers l'ennemi. A peine m'ont-ils vu de loin, que les uns se sont sauvés au trot et d'autres au galop. Je me suis assuré par des déserteurs, et des hommes blessés qui ont été pris par nos Hanadis, que Hafiz Pacha se trouvait avec eux. J'ai pris des mesures pour expulser Solyman Pacha d'Antab, et attaquer la cavalerie susdite d'Hafiz Pacha.

(Translation.)

Extract of the Letter of His Highness Ibrahim Pasha, dated 27th Rebi-el-evel, 1225, de Touzel.—(June 8, 1839.)

THE regiments which were at Aintab have been withdrawn by me, and I have left only one battalion of Infantry in the fortress of that town. Solyman Pasha of Marash has entered Aintab. To assure myself of this fact, I despatched Maggiun Bey in the direction of that town with 600 Arab horsemen (called Hanadis). The said Solyman Pasha, with an equal number of Turkish Irregular Cavalry, came out of the town, and an engagement took place between the two corps. Solyman Pasha retreated into the town with a loss of from forty to fifty men, and our Arabs brought from fifteen to twenty horse with them; so that Solyman Pasha is still at Aintab. The day after this affair, our Arab Hanadis perceived, not far from hence, a corps of Regular Cavalry of the Turkish Army, which began to cannonade them. I immediately took the Cavalry and four batteries of Horse Artillery, and I marched upon the enemy. They had hardly seen me from a distance, before they made their escape, some at a trot, and others at a gallop. I ascertained from some deserters, and from some wounded men who were taken by our Hanadis, that Hafiz Pasha was with them. I have taken measures for driving Solyman Pasha out of Aintab, and for attacking the above-mentioned Cavalry of Hafiz Pasha.

Inclosure 2 in No. 95.

Lettre de Son Altesse Ibrahim Pacha à Son Excellence Hafiz Pacha, en date du 27 *Rebi-el-evel.*—(8 *Juin*, 1839.)

D'APRES les dépêches adressées de la part des Grandes Puissances à leurs Consuls-Généraux résidans à Alexandrie, je suis persuadé qu'elles n'approuvent pas la guerre, et que Sa Hautesse, notre magnanime Maître, est du même sentiment. Malgré cela,—1°. Solyman Pacha de Marache a envoyé un corps de cavalerie, et il a attaqué la nôtre qui se trouvait à Boulanik. 2°. Vous avez envoyé un corps de Kourde Mistic Bey à Payass, dans le but de soulever la population. 3°. Hadji Omar Oglou a été envoyé à Kourd-Dagh dans le même but. 4°. Vous avez attaqué sur notre territoire, avec la cavalerie régulière et irrégulière, nos Hanadis. 5°. Vous avez distribué des armes aux habitans des villages de la province d'Antab, et Solyman Pacha est entré dans cette ville et il s'y trouve encore. Hier aussi Votre Excellence avec un corps de cavalerie régulière a fait une excursion jusqu'à l'approche de notre camp, et elle a fait jouer son artillerie contre notre avant-garde Hanadi. Jusqu'à présent, j'ai souffert tout cela sans aucun mouvement hostile de ma part, persuadé comme je le suis, que les hostilités sont contraires à la volonté sublime de notre Auguste Maître, comme aux principes et aux intentions des Grandes Puissances Européennes. Si Votre Excellence attribue mon inaction à la crainte, elle se trompe; mon inaction n'est autre chose que le désir de me conformer à la volonté de Sa Hautesse notre Auguste Maître. Au contraire, si Votre Excellence a l'ordre de commencer la guerre, pourquoi ces intrigues, pourquoi ces menées? Venez, mais venez ouvertement sur le champ de bataille. Votre Excellence n'aura probablement pas oublié qu'elle a à faire à des hommes sans peur; par conséquence ces intrigues ne

seront pas souffertes longtems. Enfin, je prends la liberté de vous écrire, et de vous envoyer le Colonel d'Artillerie Mahomed Bey, pour avoir une réponse franche de Votre Excellence.

(Translation.)

Letter from His Highness Ibrahim Pasha to his Excellency Hafiz Pasha, dated 27th Rebi-el-evel.—(June 8, 1839.)

ACCORDING to the despatches addressed by the Great Powers to their Consuls-General at Alexandria, I am persuaded that they do not approve of the war, and that His Highness, our magnanimous Master, is of the same opinion. Nevertheless,—1°. Solyman Pasha of Marash has sent a body of Cavalry, and he has attacked our Cavalry which was at Boulanik. 2°. You have sent a corps of Kourd Mistic Bey to Payass, with the view of raising the population. 3°. Hadji Omar Oglou has been sent to Kourd-Dagh with the same object. 4°. You have attacked our Hanadis in our territory, with Regular and Irregular Cavalry. 5°. You have distributed arms amongst the inhabitants of the villages of the Province of Aintab, and Solyman Pasha entered that town, and is still there. Yesterday also your Excellency, with a corps of Regular Cavalry, made an incursion near to our camp, and discharged your artillery upon our advanced guard of Hanadis. Hitherto I have suffered all this without any hostile movement on my part, persuaded, as I am, that hostilities are contrary to the sublime will of our august Master, as well as to the principles and intentions of the Great European Powers. If your Excellency attributes my inaction to fear, you deceive yourself; my inaction is only owing to my desire to comply with the wish of His Highness our august Master. On the contrary, if your Excellency has orders to begin the war, wherefore these intrigues, wherefore these plots? Come, but come openly to the field of battle. Your Excellency has probably not forgotten that you have to do with men without fear; consequently, these intrigues will not be long endured. Finally, I take the liberty of writing to you, and of sending to you the Colonel of Artillery, Mahomed Bey, in order to obtain a candid answer from your Excellency.

No. 96.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 5.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, June* 16, 1839.

THE French packet-steamer arrived here late in the evening of the 13th instant with Captain Caillier, an aide-de-camp of Marshal Soult.

Captain Caillier was the bearer of despatches, dated the 28th of May, from the Marshal to M. Cochelet, directing him to call on Mehemet Ali to cease all hostilities in the event of their having taken place, and to retire his army into Syria, if they had passed beyond the limits of that province.

The Marshal says in his despatch, that the Five Great Powers have resolved to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, they demand that measures from the Pasha are necessary to Europe, "comme une nécessité Européenne," which it will be more to his advantage to conform to than to oppose, "qu'il vaut mieux respecter que braver;" that Mehemet Ali having in these late affairs given proofs of good faith, "loyauté," and having kept his word, he had acquired fresh titles to the good-will of the European Powers, and so much the more, as the Porte, on its part, had evidently been the aggressor; that France consults at this moment with England and with the Allies, on the means of employing the united squadrons of England and France, whose Admirals will, without delay, receive instructions and powerful reinforcements; and that measures are taking to settle the Question of the East on a solid and equitable basis.

Monsieur Cochelet having explained this to Mehemet Ali, the Pasha, on the 15th instant, agreed to give a formal letter to Captain Caillier, to be delivered by him to his son Ibrahim Pasha, in which he directs him not to pursue the Turks beyond his frontier, in case the Turks should not already have repassed it, and to halt wherever Captain Caillier may find him, in case the Egyptian army should already have entered the Sultan's territory and occupied any part of it.

M. Cochelet had engaged myself and his other Colleagues to support the demand of his Government with Mehemet Ali, and we all did so.

As I had not then a full knowledge of the contents of M. Cochelet's despatch, I limited myself, (and my other Colleagues did the same,) to state to the Pasha, the same as I have ever done, that he should not pass the frontiers of Syria, as that would be an offensive and not a defensive operation, and would be injurious to his interests. But the Pasha did not seem disposed to accede to this, until after Ibrahim Pasha should first have defeated the Turks, and that he might remain in the country which he would occupy after a victory.

But M. Cochelet having accepted what Mehemet Ali offered, Captain Caillier will leave this with the first steamer to be sent by the Pasha to Alexandretta or Suedia, from whence he will proceed to the head-quarters of Ibrahim Pasha.

I believe that if M. Cochelet would have held out a little longer, our united remonstrances might possibly have prevailed on the Pasha to accede to the full extent of his desire, to retire the Egyptian troops, in the event that they were now in the Sultan's territory; but M. Cochelet was, I believe, so glad that he had prevailed so far on the Pasha without the aid of his Colleagues, that he hastened to accept the Pasha's offer, in order that he might be able to say that France had done everything, and that her voice was all-powerful.

I hope to be in time to transmit a translation of the letter to Ibrahim Pasha, of which Captain Caillier is to be the bearer, but which has not yet been sent to M. Cochelet.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

June 17.

P.S.—I have just received the document above alluded to, and of which I now transmit a copy.

Inclosure in No. 96.

Lettre de Son Altesse le Vice-Roi à Son Altesse Ibrahim Pacha, en date du 5 *Rebi-el-akhir,* 1255.—(16 *Juin,* 1839.)

(Après les titres.)

LE porteur de cette lettre est M. Caillier, Aide-de-camp de Son Excellence le Maréchal Soult, Président du Conseil, et Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de France. Arrivé ici avant-hier, il m'a informé qu'il est chargé de vous voir, tandis qu'un autre Aide-de-camp comme lui, va à Constantinople, pour se rendre de là auprès de Hafiz Pacha. Je vous l'envoie donc par un bateau à vapeur et accompagné de mon second interprète, Husroff Effendi. Cet officier annonce que sa mission, ainsi que celle de l'Aide-de-camp qui se rend auprès de Hafiz Pacha, a pour objet d'empêcher la guerre qui parait imminente; et il ajoute, que les Grandes Puissances arrangeront cette affaire.

En conséquence, si jusqu'à l'arrivée de M. Caillier vous n'avez pas encore fait sortir de la frontière les troupes Turques entrées dans nos limites, cet officier vous fera rester où vous êtes, et après avoir été auprès de Hafiz Pacha, vu l'Aide-de-camp expédié vers lui, et reconnu ce qu'il aura fait, il reviendra vous en rendre compte. Si à son retour il vous dit que l'Armée Ottomane s'est arrêtée où elle est, et que les troupes Turques entrées dans nos limites vont être retirées, vous ne ferez de votre côté aucun mouvement et vous vous arrêterez où vous êtes. Mais si après le retour de M. Caillier avec cette assurance, Hafiz Pacha ne s'arrête pas, s'il continue les mêmes mouvemens qu'auparavant, et ne fait pas sortir ses troupes de notre frontière, vous marcherez contre lui et le combattrez. Dans le cas enfin où à l'arrivée de cet officier, vous auriez déjà chassé les troupes Turques entrées dans nos limites, et où vous auriez marché en avant, vous devrez encore vous arrêter là où vous serez, et attendre que l'arrangement que prendront les Grandes Puissances, soit connu et vous ait été notifié par moi.

Je vous annonce aussi que pour faire cesser l'inquiétude que causera l'avis de la sortie de la flotte de Constantinople, je vais envoyer ma flotte sur les côtes de la Syrie; à cet effet, une portion est sortie aujourd'hui et le reste sortira demain.

(Translation.)

Letter from His Highness the Viceroy to His Highness Ibrahim Pasha, dated 5th Rebi-el-akhir, 1255.—(16*th June*, 1839.)

(After Titles.)

THE bearer of this letter is M. Caillier, Aide-de-camp of His Excellency Marshal Soult, President of the Council, and Minister for Foreign Affairs of France. Having arrived here the day before yesterday, he informed me that he is instructed to see you, whilst another Aide-de-camp like himself, goes to Constantinople, to proceed from thence to Hafiz Pasha. I therefore send him to you in a steam boat, accompanied by my second interpreter, Husroff Effendi. This officer declares that his mission, as well as that of the Aide-de-camp who proceeds to Hafiz Pasha, has for its object to prevent the war which appears imminent, and he adds, that the Great Powers will arrange this affair.

Consequently, if before the arrival of M. Caillier, you have not yet driven across the frontier the Turkish troops which had entered within our bounds, that officer will cause you to remain where you are, and after having been to Hafiz Pasha, seen the Aide-de-camp despatched to him, and ascertained what he has done, he will return to make his report to you thereupon. If, on his return, he tells you that the Ottoman Army remains stationary, and that the Turkish troops which had entered within our limits are about to be withdrawn, you will not make any movement on your own part, and you will remain where you are. But if after the return of M. Caillier with this assurance, Hafiz Pasha does not remain stationary, if he continues the same movements as formerly, and does not withdraw his troops from our frontier, you will march against him and engage him. Finally, in case you should, on the arrival of that officer, have already driven away the Turkish troops which had entered within our bounds, and if you should have advanced, you must still remain where you may then be, and wait until the arrangement which the Great Powers may make, shall be known and shall have been notified to you by me.

I also announce to you, that in order to put an end to the uneasiness which will be caused by the intelligence of the departure of the fleet from Constantinople, I am going to send my fleet to the Coast of Syria; for this purpose, a portion of it is gone to-day, and the remainder will go to-morrow.

No. 97.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 5.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, June* 18, 1839.

THE Government post from Damascus has this moment brought to me a letter, dated 10th of June, from Mr. Consul Werry of Damascus.

Mr. Consul Werry has inclosed to me copy of a letter of 5th of June, from Solyman Pasha to Mr. Pro-Consul Werry, and of which I have the honour to transmit a copy.

Your Lordship will perceive by this letter, that the Sultan's van-guard has retired upon the main body, and thus evacuated the territory of Mehemet Ali, and I sincerely trust that a general action may yet be avoided. The Sultan's officers, however, continue their intrigues and efforts to stir up rebellion in Syria, and more particularly towards Beylan and Pyass, as your Lordship will perceive by the report of Mr. Vice-Consul Hays, of which I have the honour to transmit copy, and which shows the efforts of Hafiz Pasha to cause revolt in the lower ranges of the Taurus extending to Beylan and Pyass. And his plan, therefore, seems to be to avoid a battle, and to cause revolt, and to move on in the rear of that movement.

By intelligence from Lieutenant Lynch of the steamer in the river Tigris, I learn that Ali Pasha of Bagdad was detained at Moussoul by the spirit of insurrection which had been manifested by the inhabitants of that place.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Inclosure 1 in No. 97.

Solyman Pasha to Mr. Pro-Consul Werry.

Du Camp de Bahwarta,
Monsieur le Consul, 24 *Rebi-evel*, 1255.

JE remplis avec plaisir la promesse que je vous fis à mon départ d'Alep, de vous donner quelques nouvelles sur ce qui se passe de ce côté-ci. A mon arrivée à Bahwarta, près de Tel-il-Chair avec l'infanterie de l'armée, j'ai trouvé Son Altesse le Général-en-Chef qui y était campé avec la cavalerie. Le lendemain avant le jour, Son Altesse partit avec ce dernier corps pour Tel-Béchir, afin de décider l'avant-garde Turque qui devait se trouver là, à un mouvement significatif; ce but a été atteint, en ce que cette troupe, sans attendre nos régimens, s'est repliée sur le gros de l'armée et ainsi évacué entièrement notre territoire. Son Altesse est à Touzel.

Mais en renonçant, du moins selon les apparences, à nous faire la guerre à force ouverte, les Turcs n'ont pas renoncé à leur système d'hostilité sourde et constante: vous avez su précédemment leurs menées sur l'esprit des populations du côté d'Antab.

Maintenant c'est dans le Beylan qu'ils cherchent à nous susciter des troubles: ils viennent d'envoyer à Payass un certain Mistick Bey, ancien Mousselim de cette ville, pour essayer de soulever les peuples; mais un régiment d'infanterie, un de cavalerie, et une batterie de canons se rendent à Payass; et leur présence suffira pour étouffer promptement toutes les guerres de soulèvement qu'aurait pu répandre cet émissaire.

Hier, 26 cavaliers Turcs déserteurs sont arrivés ici; 30 autres sont dirigés sur Adana par Antab.

Agréez, &c.,
(Signé) LE GENERAL SOLYMAN.

(Translation.)

Solyman Pasha to Mr. Pro-Consul Werry.

Sir, *Camp of Bahwarta, Rebi-el-evel* 24, 125

I FULFIL with pleasure the promise I made to you on my departure from Aleppo, to give you some news of what is passing in this quarter. On my arrival at Bahwarta, near Tel-il-Chair, with the infantry of the army, I found His Highness the General-in-Chief, who was encamped there with his cavalry. On the morrow before day His Highness set out with this last corps for Tel-Bechir, in order to cause the Turkish advanced guard who might be there, to make some positive movement; that object was accomplished, by that force, without waiting for our regiments, falling back upon the main body of the army and thus entirely evacuating our territory. His Highness is at Touzel.

But in declining, at least as far as appearances went, to make war upon us openly, the Turks have not given up their system of covert and constant hostility: you have known previously of their machinations on the minds of the people in the direction of Aintab.

At present it is in the Beylan that they are seeking to raise up troubles to us: they have just sent to Pyass a certain Mistick Bey, formerly Mussellim of that town, in order to attempt to raise the people; but a regiment of infantry, one of cavalry, and a battery of guns is going to Pyass; and their presence will suffice promptly to suppress all the insurrections which that Emissary may have occasioned.

Yesterday twenty-six Turkish horsemen deserters arrived here; thirty others have gone to Adana by Aintab.

Receive, &c.,
(Signed) GENERAL SOLYMAN.

Inclosure 2 in No. 97.

Mr. Vice-Consul Hays to Mr. Pro-Consul Werry.

(Extract.) *Alexandretta, June* 4, 1839.

I TAKE advantage of this conveyance, to inform you that an attack is apprehended on this side, and of the measures that have been taken in consequence.

Yesterday it was reported, that Mistik Bey had reached a place, called Boulauk, fifteen hours from Pyass, with a force, stated variously at from 1,000 to 6,000 men, with the intention of making a descent on Pyass. This morning I heard he had advanced to Arsine, three hours from Pyass, to the Governor of whom he had sent notice of his approach with his forces, in the name of the Sultan, and not as robbers.

In consequence of these reports, I went to ascertain the facts from Rushman Effendi, who informed me, that Mistik Bey had reached Arsine with the intention of advancing to Pyass, and that the force he had with him amounted to about 6,000 mountaineers. That the excuse of advancing in the name of the Sultan was a mere pretence; the people he had with him were the mountaineers of Giaour Dagh. The precautions taken are to reland 400 of the troops embarked yesterday for Alexandria, 200 of which are going to Pyass by the "Crocodile" steamer, and 200 remain here; and to send 200 Irregular Cavalry, arrived yesterday from Beylan, to a village called Archi, one hour and a half from Alexandretta, towards Pyass; and also to retain the remainder of the troops on board the vessels, amounting to 1,300 men, till orders are received from Ibrahim Pasha, for which purpose this post is sent. They are on board the two corvettes that have been some time here, and were to have sailed to-day.

No. 98.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received July* 5.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, June* 19, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship, that "El Generoso," steamer of the Pasha, arrived yesterday from Alexandretta, with letters dated, Touzel, 10th June, from Ibrahim Pasha to Mehemet Ali.

Ibrahim Pasha was with his army at Touzel, which is not far from Aintab, and Hafiz Pasha was at about three hours' distance at Nezib, near the banks of the Sedjour river, but in the territory of the Sultan; and Solyman Pasha of Marash was still in Aintab with troops of the Sultan.

The steamer of the Pasha, which left this on the 10th instant with the order of Mehemet Ali to drive the Turks out of Syria, and to advance on Hafiz Pasha, had arrived at Alexandretta at the departure of "El Generoso," but Ibrahim Pasha had not then received the letter of Mehemet Ali; and although no action had taken place between the armies, I much fear that it would not be delayed long after Mehemet Ali's order of 10th June should reach Ibrahim Pasha.

I have the honour to transmit the reply of Hafiz Pasha to the letter sent to him by Ibrahim Pasha, and which is the inclosure in my despatch of 16th June.

Your Lordship will perceive, that Hafiz Pasha writes in a very vague manner to Ibrahim Pasha, but does not make any reference to his reason for stirring up revolt in the villages in Syria, or for taking possession of Aintab; nor does he say that it is his intention to retire his army.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

P.S.—Captain Caillier, the Aide-de-camp of Marshal Soult, will leave this in the Pasha's steamer to-morrow morning for Alexandretta, from whence he will proceed to the head-quarters of Ibrahim Pasha.

Inclosure in No. 98.

Lettre d'Hafiz Pacha à Son Excellence Ibrahim Pacha, sous la date du 28 *Rebi-el-evel,* 1255.—(9 *Juin,* 1839.)

(Après les titres.)

J'AI reçu le trésor de la lettre que Votre Excellence avait chargé le Colonel d'Artillerie Mahomed Hazik Bey de m'apporter, et j'en ai compris le précieux contenu. Dans cette lettre, en témoignant une grande soumission à notre bienfaiteur, au bienfaiteur du monde, notre tout-puissant et très-honoré Seigneur et Maître, et en exprimant le désir d'appeler sur elle le bon vouloir de Sa Hautesse, Votre Excellence est bien aise aussi de connaître mon opinion.

Que le Dieu bon daigne conserver le corps de notre Auguste Seigneur aussi longtems que le monde durera, et qu'il fasse que son ombre s'étende sur tous les serviteurs et protège ceux qui lui sont dévoués.

Il est hors de doute que la soumission ne consiste pas seulement dans les paroles, mais qu'elle doit se manifester par des services effectifs.

Lorsque l'armée Sultanienne est venue à Bir et qu'elle a planté en cet endroit ses tentes victorieuses, Magioun Akasi, Commandant de la Cavalerie Arabe (Hanadi), s'est avancé jusqu'à demi lieue de Bir, dan l'intention de faire des reconnaissances, et probablement aussi de saccager les villages. En effet, à leur retour, ces cavaliers ont ravagé les villages de la Province d'Ourfa, et emmené tous les bestiaux; deux jours auparavant

ces mêmes Hanadis ont volé et maltraité un meunier: ces deux faits doivent être à votre connaissance. De notre côté, forcés par la nécessité, et dans l'intention de protéger les pauvres, nous avons fait marcher un corps de Spahis comme avant-garde. Quelques-uns de ces Spahis ayant perdu leurs chevaux, et s'étant avancés à leur recherche jusqu'au lieu qui sépare Antab de Bir, où se trouvaient 300 Hanadis, une trentaine de ces derniers se sont séparés de leur corps, ont couru sur ces quelques Spahis, en ont désarmé un, l'ont mis à mort, et non contens de cela, ils lui ont ensuite tranché la tête. Ce fait, qui est à votre connaissance, ne s'accordant pas avec les principes de soumission que vous professez envers notre Maître, nous avons été contraints d'user des représailles. Quoiqu'il en soit, si, conformément à la loi pure, Votre Excellence fait accorder les faits avec les prétentions, elle sera un objet d'envie pour tous ses confrères, sous l'ombre tout-puissante de notre haut Seigneur. C'est comme un avertissement de bienveillance que j'ai pris la liberté d'écrire cette lettre amicale, et je vous l'adresse par le Colonel Hazik Bey qui retourne auprès de Votre Excellence, accompagné par Achmet Bey, un des Colonels de l'armée victorieuse. Lorsque, par la grâce de Dieu, elle vous sera heureusement parvenue, l'exécution de son contenu dépendra de la haute opinion de Votre Excellence.

(Translation.)

Letter from Hafiz Pasha to his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha, dated 28*th Rebi-el-evel*, 1255.—(9*th June*, 1839.)

(After titles.)

I HAVE received the esteemed letter which your Excellency desired the Colonel of Artillery, Mahomed Hazik Bey, to bring to me, and I have understood its precious contents. In this letter your Excellency, showing great submission to our benefactor, and to the benefactor of the world, our all-powerful and much-honoured Lord and Master, and invoking the goodwill of His Highness, is so good as to ask my opinion.

May the good God deign to preserve the body of our august Lord as long as the world shall last, and may he cause his shadow to extend over all his servants, and to protect those who are devoted to him.

It is beyond doubt that submission does not consist merely in words, but that it also must show itself in effective services.

When the Army of the Sultan came to Bir, and pitched in that place its victorious tents, Maggiun Akasi, Commander of the Arab (Hanadi) Cavalry, advanced to within half a league of Bir, intending to make a reconnaissance, and probably also to pillage the villages. In fact, on their return those horsemen ravaged the villages of the Province of Orfa, and carried away all the cattle. Two days previously, these same Hanadis robbed and maltreated a miller: these two facts ought to be known to you. We on our side, forced by necessity, and intending to protect these poor people, sent a body of Spahis forward as an advanced guard. Some of these Spahis, having lost their horses, and having proceeded to look for them as far as the place which separates Aintab from Bir, where there were 300 Hanadis, thirty of these Hanadis separated from their regiment, charged these Spahis, disarmed one, put him to death, and not content with that, afterwards cut off his head. This fact, which is known to you, not being in accordance with the principles of submission which you profess towards our Master, we have been obliged to resort to reprisals. Be this as it may, if, in conformity with the pure law, your Excellency causes your acts to be in accordance with your professions, you will be an object of envy to all your Colleagues, under the all-powerful shadow of our high Lord. It is by way of an intimation of goodwill that I have taken the liberty of writing this friendly letter. I send it to you by Colonel Hazik Bey, who is returning to your Excellency, accompanied by Achmet Bey, one of the Colonels of the victorious Army. When by the grace of God it shall reach you safely, the fulfilment of its contents will depend upon the high opinion of your Excellency.

No. 99.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 7.)

My Lord, *Therapia, June* 16, 1839.

ON the 14th, late, I received the inclosed note from his Excellency the French Ambassador, and I immediately waited upon him. He read to me part of a despatch from Marshal Soult, which he had just received. It contained instructions to apply in the strongest manner to the Sublime Porte to prevent hostilities, if they had not already commenced, and to put an instant end to them if they had; and it directed his Excellency to communicate with me, and said that the British Government entirely concurred with the French in everything relating to affairs in this country; and it appeared that the French Government had not had communication with the British Government since the arrival in Paris of the intelligence that gave rise to this instruction from the Marshal to the Ambassador.

His Excellency asked me what I would do. I replied, that having no instructions, I could not take any steps, under circumstances that were new, and might occasion new views to be taken by my Government. His Excellency agreed that I was not authorized to act, but said that he must immediately apply to the Porte as he had been instructed to do.

His Excellency did send a message, which I understand was to the effect that the Sublime Porte must, without delay, recall the army of Hafiz Pasha from the position it occupies, and order it to recross the Euphrates, and that otherwise the Porte will be considered to be the aggressor.

I am informed that the Ottoman Ministers are excessively angry.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 99.

Baron Roussin to Viscount Ponsonby.

Ce 14 *Juin,* 1839.

LE BARON ROUSSIN a l'honneur de transmettre les lettres ci-jointes à son honorable Collègue, et de lui demander un moment d'audience; il a reçu un officier, aide-de-camp de M. le Maréchal Soult, porteur de dépêches de la plus haute importance pour les deux Cabinets amis, et il désire vivement les communiquer à son honorable Collègue, qu'il prie d'agréer ses affectueux complimens.

(Translation.)

Baron Roussin to Viscount Ponsonby.

June 14, 1839.

BARON ROUSSIN has the honour to forward to his honourable Colleague the accompanying letters, and to ask a moment's interview with him; he has received an officer, Aide-de-camp of Marshal Soult, who is the bearer of despatches of the highest importance for the two friendly Cabinets, and he anxiously desires to communicate them to his honourable Colleague, whom he requests to accept his most affectionate compliments.

No. 100.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 7.)

My Lord, *Therapia, June* 16, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a letter from me to the Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's Naval Forces in the Mediterranean, dated May 22.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 100.

Viscount Ponsonby to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford.

Sir, *Therapia, May* 22, 1839.

I HAVE satisfied my own mind that the Sublime Porte has finally determined upon war against the Pasha of Egypt. It does not appear that hostilities have decidedly commenced as yet.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 101.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 4.)

(Extract.) *Paris, July* 2, 1839.

I THIS morning communicated to Marshal Soult, Count Nesselrode's despatch to Count Pozzo di Borgo, upon the present state of affairs in the Levant, of which a copy was given to your Lordship by the Chargé d'Affaires in London. His Excellency expressed his entire concurrence in your opinion, in regard to the impolicy of continuing the present relative position of the Sultan and of Mehemet Ali, and the necessity of settling on a permanent footing their relations to each other; but he was not prepared to assent to your Lordship's proposition that no settlement would be satisfactory which did not restore the whole of Syria to the direct authority of the Sultan. He said, that the Court of Berlin had suggested the plan of the Pashalics of Tripoli and of Aleppo being given up by Ibrahim Pasha, leaving to him the possession of the Pashalic of Acre and of Damascus; that he was not aware of the views of the Court of Vienna in regard to this matter, and that the French Government had not yet formed any opinion upon it. Marshal Soult, however, gave me to understand, that his hesitation to accede to your Lordship's proposal, arose from his doubt of the possibility of obtaining Mehemet Ali's acquiescence in it, rather than from any objection to the arrangement itself.

No. 102.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 8.)

My Lord, *Paris, July* 5, 1839.

I HAVE received your Lordship's despatches to the 2nd of July.

The debate in the Chamber of Deputies, on the vote of credit demanded by the Government for the augmentation of the French Naval Force in the Levant, excited a much greater degree of interest than is usually felt in that assembly upon foreign affairs, and was remarkable for the ability with which the question was discussed. Not a dissentient voice was heard against the proposition of the Government, and a willingness was even manifested to increase the amount of the vote, if a larger sum were required, to enable the French Government to assume an imposing attitude in the affairs of the East. Many distinguished speakers, of different political parties, concurred in the policy of maintaining the independence and integrity of the Turkish Empire; of rescuing the Sultan from the protection of Russia; and of resisting, with determination, the pretension of Russia to the exclusive right of stationing her fleets in the Bosphorus.

The debate lasted three days, and terminated with a vote of 287 to 26 in favour of the proposition of the Government.

The vote will much strengthen the hands of the French Government; and the ground on which it was supported by most of the speakers, cannot fail to show, that France is not less determined than England to resist the principle of the Unkiar Skelessi Treaty.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 103.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 8.)

My Lord, *Paris, July* 5, 1839.

ON calling this day at the Foreign Office, Marshal Soult informed me that the despatches from Alexandria and Constantinople, of which notice was given three days ago by the Marseilles telegraph, had been received this morning. His Excellency read to me several from M. Cochelet, and from Admiral Roussin.

M. Cochelet writes, that intelligence having reached Alexandria, of the entrance of a detachment of Turkish troops into Aintab, and of sixty villages having been excited to insurrection by Hafiz Pasha, the united endeavours of all the Consuls of the Great Powers had failed to induce the Viceroy to suspend the transmission of orders to Ibrahim Pasha to attack the Turkish army. That Captain Caillier (the officer who had been directed by Marshal Soult to proceed to Alexandria, and from thence to the head-quarters of the Egyptian Army in Syria), had, however, arrived on the 13th, immediately after the departure of the steam-vessel which conveyed the order to Ibrahim Pasha; that he was admitted without delay to an audience of the Viceroy; and that having explained to his Highness the object of his mission, he had succeeded in obtaining an order, of which he, Captain Caillier, was to be himself the bearer (and a copy of which M. Cochelet incloses in his despatch) to Ibrahim Pasha, to halt the march of the Egyptian Army wherever it might be, on the arrival of Captain Caillier at his head-quarters.

M. Cochelet mentions that the Egyptian Fleet had left the port of Alexandria, but that Mehemet Ali had declared it was sent upon a cruise for the purpose of exercising the crews, as was usual at this season of the year, and not with any hostile intention.

Admiral Roussin's despatches confirm the accounts previously received, of the resolution of the Sultan to go to war with the Pasha of Egypt, and of the efforts to reinforce the army of Hafiz Pasha. On the sailing of the Turkish Fleet to the Dardanelles, the French Ambassador complained to Nouri Effendi of the secrecy which had been observed towards him in respect to the movements of the fleet, and inquired what was its destination. To this inquiry, Nouri Effendi distinctly replied that the fleet would proceed with the troops which were embarked on board of it to the coasts of Syria. The number of troops embarked is supposed to be between 8,000 and 10,000 men.

Admiral Duperré expressed two days ago to me his opinion, that the Egyptian Fleet would have the advantage over that of the Sultan, if an engagement took place; and the more decidedly so if the latter were encumbered by having troops on board.

Marshal Soult told me that several of the despatches he had received were in cypher, and had not as yet been decyphered. If, he said, they contained anything of importance, he would in the evening apprize me of their contents.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 104.

Lord William Russell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 8.)

My Lord, *Berlin, July 3*, 1839.

M. DE RIBEAUPIERRE (who has taken leave of the King of Prussia, and leaves Berlin to-day) read me a despatch addressed by Count Nesselrode to the Russian Ambassador in London, which his Excellency is instructed to communicate to your Lordship. This despatch suggests for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government, a plan for putting an end to hostilities between the Porte and the Pasha of Egypt, and for regulating the affairs of the Contending Parties. M. de Ribeaupierre told me, that the King of Prussia had spoken to him three times during his visit at Potsdam, on the subject of this despatch, expressing the pleasure he received from the moderate and politic views of Russia, and his hope that they would be acceptable to the British Cabinet. Baron Werther has since expressed to me his satisfaction at the language held by Russia; concluding by saying, that the question was placed by all parties in the hands of Her Majesty's Government.

Prussia will take no part beyond that of counselling the maintenance of peace.

Count Bresson showed me some despatches of Count St. Aulaire's, relating his conversation with Prince Metternich on this subject, when his Highness had suggested the expediency (in case the Sultan's army should be defeated) of allowing the Russian Army to occupy Constantinople, whilst the English, French, and Austrian fleets sailed up the Dardanelles.

I observe in the despatches your Lordship was good enough to communicate to me, that the writers all consider aggression as the pivot upon which the policy of the Four Powers is to turn. This induces me to call to your Lordship's recollection, the definition of aggression given by Frederick the Great, previous to commencing the seven years' war. His Majesty said it was not the Power which struck the first blow that was guilty of aggression, but the Power which by its armaments forced another Power to strike a blow in its own defence. The acceptation of this definition would make Mehemet Ali the aggressor.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) WILLIAM RUSSELL.

No. 105.

Viscount Palmerston to Lord William Russell.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, July* 9, 1839.

YOUR Lordship states in your despatch of July 3, that M. de Ribeaupierre had read to you a despatch from his Court on the present state of affairs in the Levant, and that Baron Werther had expressed to you his satisfaction at the language of Russia on that subject.

The despatch to which your Lordship alludes, is, I conclude, that of the $\frac{3}{15}$th of June, of which I transmitted to you a copy on the 2nd of this month. The general tone and spirit of that despatch was satisfactory to Her Majesty's Government, and the more especially so, as it was a spontaneous offer on the part of Russia, to enter into concert with the other Powers of Europe upon the subject of Turkish Affairs; and Her Majesty's Government have no doubt that the result of the communications which are about to take place on these matters between the Five Powers, will be an unanimous adoption of a common course of policy.

But there were some parts of the particular plan recommended by Count Nesselrode, to which Her Majesty's Government could not agree.

In the first place, the Russian Government seemed to think, that provided the hostilities between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali should be confined to Syria, the Powers of Europe might, without any danger to their general and common interests, remain passive spectators of the contest; and might leave the two parties, like gladiators in an arena, to exhaust themselves, and cripple each other as much as they might choose. But Her Majesty's Government would regard such a conflict, even if waged in Syria, with much uneasiness; because it would probably end in greatly weakening the power of the Sultan, and in rendering him less able to maintain hereafter his political independence and the integrity of his empire.

Again, the Russian Government proposes, in the event of any marked success on the part of Mehemet Ali, to leave the Egyptians in possession of Orfa and Diarbekir; but Diarbekir is the central key of Asia Minor; and whoever is strongly in military possession of that post, will have the command of the whole country. A Turkish Army at Diarbekir, is equally well placed to defend the approach to Constantinople against an enemy advancing across the Taurus from Aleppo; to repel any invasion by way of Kars and Erzeroum; or to protect Bagdad from attack by a force descending the Euphrates from the frontiers of Syria. As long as the Sultan's Army is in strength at Diarbekir, the Egyptian Army will be kept in check. But if that post were taken from the Turks and given to the Egyptians, the latter would have all those means for attack which the former now have for defence. Bagdad would immediately fall; for, in fact, all communication between it and Constantinople would be cut off; and if ever the time should come, when Russia and Mehemet Ali should determine to co-operate together against the Sultan, a Russian force from Gumri, united with the troops of Mehemet Ali at Diarbekir, would sweep through the whole extent of Asia Minor.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 106.

Viscount Palmerston to the Marquess of Clanricarde.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, July* 9, 1839.

I TRANSMITTED to your Excellency, on the 29th ultimo, a copy of a despatch from Count Nesselrode to Count Pozzo di Borgo, dated the $\frac{3}{15}$th of June, containing a statement of the opinion of the Russian Government on the present state of affairs in the Levant, which was communicated to me by M. Kisseleff, on the 27th of June.

I have to instruct your Excellency, to thank the Russian Government for this communication. Her Majesty's Government fully appreciate the confidence thus evinced in the British Government by the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, and are rejoiced to find, that the general tenour of the views which have been taken of the matters in question by the two Cabinets, should be so much the same. Each Government has manifested an earnest desire, that hostilities between the Sultan and the Pasha should be prevented, or should be speedily suspended, if begun; and both Governments seem impressed with a conviction, that some final and permanent arrangements should be come to, which, by preventing, for the future, a recurrence of a crisis like the present, may secure the peace of Europe from the dangers which might arise from hostilities in the Levant. It is to be hoped, therefore, that Russia and Great Britain, in concert with the other Great Powers, may be able to agree upon a common course of policy, which may be calculated to accomplish purposes so essential for the general interests of Europe. The British Government has authorized and instructed Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna, to communicate with his colleagues, and with the Austrian Government, on these matters, with a view to establish a common understanding about them.

Her Majesty's Government has already taken, in concert with that of France, the first step which is adverted to in the despatch of Count Nesselrode; and instructions have been given to Sir Robert Stopford, to endeavour, in conjunction with the French Admiral, to bring about a suspension of arms, and to induce Mehemet Ali to withdraw his troops within the limits of Syria, if the course of events should have led those troops beyond the confines of that province. When an armistice shall have been agreed to by both parties, the Five Powers will be able with better effect to endeavour to negotiate a final arrangement between the Contending Parties; and the views and opinions at present entertained upon that matter by Her Majesty's Government may be stated as follows.

It seems to the British Government, that there can be no security for permanent peace between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, as long as they have both of them an army in Syria; for neither of them can look upon their present state of occupation as permanently satisfactory. Mehemet Ali has too much, not to wish for more; and the Sultan has lost too much, to be able to sit down contented with his loss. Each party, therefore, must consider his present position in Syria, as a starting point for an attempt to accomplish the object of his desire; the one for further encroachment on the Turkish provinces; the other for the reconquest of Syria. The two parties might, indeed, be invited to reduce their respective forces to a peace establishment; but no confidence could be placed in such an arrangement, even if for the moment agreed to. Mehemet Ali could not maintain his authority in Syria without a considerable force; and the Sultan would necessarily be obliged to have an equal force at Diarbekir and its neighbourhood. Each party would suspect the other of secretly augmenting his force; and probably their mutual suspicions would be equally well-founded. In a short time the two armies would again be in presence of each other; and the work of pacification would have to be done over again.

The only arrangement, therefore, which could appear to Her Majesty's Government to be calculated to secure peace for the future, would be the evacuation of Syria by Mehemet Ali, and the withdrawal of his authorities, civil and military, into Egypt. By such means, the Desert would be interposed between the two parties; and the chances of conflict between them would be almost entirely prevented. But Mehemet Ali would justly require some counterbalancing advantage, in return for such a concession on his part; and Her Majesty's Government conceive, that this might be given him, by making the Pashalic of Egypt hereditary in his family.

Mehemet Ali has always stated, that the chief considerations which render him discontented with his present situation, are, first, a feeling of regret that the public works which he has accomplished in Egypt should, after his death, be let fall to decay, by being entrusted to the care of an ordinary Pasha; secondly, an anxiety for the fate of his family, which might, after his death, be exposed to poverty and exile.

Now both of these circumstances would be provided for, by such an arrangement as that above-mentioned. While, on the other hand, the just rights of the Sultan might be secured by stipulations, that Mehemet Ali and his descendants should pay tribute to the Sultan; should furnish the Sultan with a contingent in time of war; and should, like the Governors of any other provinces of the Turkish Empire, be bound by all the treaties and laws which the Sultan, as Sovereign, might make.

If the Russian Government should concur in this general view, and should instruct its Ambassador at Vienna accordingly, there can be no doubt, that such an expression of opinion on the part of Russia, would carry with it all the weight which naturally belongs to the sentiments of Russia upon such a matter: and if the Five Powers should by mutual interchange of opinions arrive at a common conclusion, it is reasonable to suppose, that the opinions of the Five, announced to the two parties by the Representatives of the Five Powers at Constantinople and Alexandria, would prevail over any reluctance which might at first be felt on either side; and that such an arrangement would be carried into effect, as would be in the highest degree conducive to the maintenance of the peace of Europe.

Your Excellency will communicate this despatch to Count Nesselrode, and give him a copy of it.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 107.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 11.)

(Extract.) *Vienna, June* 30, 1839.

ON the 24th instant, the French Ambassador received from his Government, and communicated to Prince Metternich and myself, the plan of Her Majesty's Government for operations in the Levant, as laid down by your Lordship in your conversation with M. de Bourqueney.

I need hardly say that it met with the approbation of Prince Metternich in all its parts, being, in fact, the same which he had transmitted to London and Paris. He doubts, however, the possibility of executing that part of it which prescribes the interruption of hostilities if they should have already begun.

His Highness yesterday received a despatch from Petersburgh, inclosing copy of one which has been addressed to Count Pozzo di Borgo, for communication to your Lordship.

Prince Metternich had confidently predicted that Russia would take the same view of the question with himself; and these despatches, written previous to the receipt of any thing from the Prince, fully confirm his prediction.

It is impossible to refuse the evidence they afford, that Russia at this moment is frankly pursuing the same conduct as ourselves with regard to the Turkish Empire. In one case, the Prince thinks the Russian plan more practicable than that of England and France. It is that of hostilities having actually commenced, in which event Russia proposes to confine them within a prescribed limit,—Syria, and the districts of Orfa and Diarbekir,—not to attempt their total interruption;—an attempt which the Prince thinks might succeed, though with difficulty, if Mehemet Ali were gaining the advantage, and which in that case, it would therefore be desirable to make; but which must fail if the Sultan's army were in the course of success, aided, as it would be, by insurrections in the country.

These, however, he considers as minor points; and the Five Powers having now pronounced themselves upon the principles by which they are directed, he regards them as united, and the danger to Europe, which is well defined in the Russian despatch, as averted.

One contingency only, the Prince remarked upon, as having been overlooked at St. Petersburgh, and to that he had, in the mean time, called the attention of the Russian Cabinet: it is that of all our precautions failing to preserve Constantinople from the danger of attack; in which case, the Prince, adopting our view of the subject, has proposed, that the French and English armaments should unite with that of Russia for its defence, Austria joining her flag to the powerful squadrons of her Allies.

He now intends further to propose to Russia, to invite their co-operation in such a case.

No. 108.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received July* 11.)

My Lord, *Vienna, June* 30, 1839.

ON the night of the 28th, Prince Metternich received an estafette in nine days from Constantinople, confirming the unfavourable account I gave your Lordship some time back of the Sultan's health. For the last three months, the Sultan has seen none of the regular physicians, either Turkish or Christian, who have been in the habit of attending him. During that time he has confided himself medically to the care of a Jewess, an old Armenian woman, and two Turkish apothecary's boys.

On returning from a fête at the Valley of the Sweet Waters, he appears to have become worse, and sent for the Austrian physician who was sent from hence last year at his special request to attend him. This gentleman found him in a high state of fever, and a consultation was held the next day with three other physicians, at which a full investigation of the state of his Highness's health took place. The result is, that he was ascertained to have his liver very seriously affected, and tubercles on the lungs accompanied by high fever. The first efforts of medicine will be directed to subdue the fever, which, (if they fail,) will destroy life very soon. If the fever is subdued, the other diseases will remain to be combated. In this most unfortunate complication, Prince Metternich has acted with the promptitude and energy which he has shown from the commencement of these affairs. He has this day despatched a courier to Petersburgh, establishing the attitude of Austria in the event of the Sultan's death. The present courier will carry a similar communication to London and to Paris; and he has no doubt but what Russia will unite herself to his views. I need hardly say, that he counts equally upon the concert of England and France. These views will best be developed by himself; but the principle upon which they are founded is, that of the support of the Allies to the heir of the Ottoman throne, securing to him his succession in its full integrity, the Four Powers binding themselves by reciprocal declarations, to abstain from the smallest acquisition at the expence of the Turkish Empire.

If your Lordship will look back to the long period of time, beginning before the signature of the Treaty of Vienna, during which Prince Metternich has steadily and undeviatingly, through all circumstances, kept in view the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire as almost the first interest of Austria, and combine this with the efforts he is now making for its support, I think you will be disposed to admit that those efforts have never at any time been limited, except by considerations of practicability and prudence; and his views being now absolutely and entirely identical with those of the British Cabinet, I have no doubt but what the full confidence which has been established between the two Governments upon this head, may be continued, with the greatest advantage to the common object the have in view.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

No. 109.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received July* 11.)

(Extract.) *Vienna, July* 1, 1839.

PRINCE METTERNICH having delayed his courier for a day, I am enabled to apprize your Lordship that he attaches the greatest value to an invitation from the Two Powers to the Emperor of Russia to join his squadron to theirs in the Mediterranean. His reasons are founded on the great principle which guides him in this affair,—that of its being the joint concern of all Europe. Out of this he sees no safety, and every thing which tends to consecrate it, and extend its application, is of value in his eyes.

No. 110.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 11.)

My Lord, *Vienna, July* 1, 1839.

THE Austrian squadron in the Levant will be reinforced, and will place itself under the orders of Admiral Stopford.

The Arch-Duke will join the squadron.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

No. 111.

Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale.

(Extract.) *Foreign Office, July* 13, 1839.

YOUR Excellency's despatches to the 1st of July, have been received and laid before the Queen.

With reference to those of June 30 and July 1, I have to state, that it is undoubtedly true, as observed by Prince Metternich, that the measures proposed to be taken by the British and French squadrons, with a view to put an end to hostilities in Syria, would probably not be as successful if the fate of arms had declared in favour of the Sultan, as they would be if the first encounters between the armies had been favourable to the Pasha. But this arises from the nature of things, and from the difference which exists between the position of the Powers of Europe with respect to the Sultan, and their position with respect to the Pasha. But it must also be remembered, that the motive of the interference of the Powers of Europe to bring about a cessation of hostilities, and the object which they propose to attain by that interference, can only be the fear of the danger to which those hostilities would expose the peace of Europe, and an anxiety to avert that danger; but it is evident that this danger would arise from the success of the Pasha, and not from the success of the Sultan.

Her Majesty's Government, however, cannot but entertain a sanguine hope that the interference of the two squadrons, backed as they will be by the exertions of all the Missions at Constantinople, and of all the Consuls at Alexandria, will succeed in accomplishing the desired object.

Your Excellency, in your despatch of July 1, announces, that an Austrian squadron, with an Archduke on board, will be ordered to join the British squadron, and to place itself under the command of Sir Robert Stopford. Your Excellency will express to Prince Metternich, the extreme gratification which the British Government have experienced, in learning this intention on the part of the Government of Austria. The Queen is deeply sensible of the high compliment which is thus paid to Her Majesty by the Emperor of Austria; and Her Majesty's Government feel the full value of this measure as a public manifestation to all the world, of the close alliance between Great Britain and Austria, and of the intimate union which exists between them upon the great and important matters to which this measure relates.

Your Excellency further suggests, that England and France should invite Russia to send her Black Sea squadron into the Mediterranean, to co-operate with the combined British, French, and Austrian fleet; and you certainly urge many very strong reasons in support of that proposition.

But all things considered, Her Majesty's Government are inclined to doubt the expediency of such a measure at present.

In the first place, the object now to be accomplished in the Mediterranean, is the suspension of hostilities; for this, the combined fleet would be sufficient, and the support which the Russian Agents at Constantinople and Alexandria will, of course, give to such an endeavour, will afford to our efforts the assistance to be derived from the weight of her open and avowed concurrence.

If, indeed, the Five Powers should determine to press upon the Porte and upon Mehemet Ali, the arrangement by which Mehemet Ali would have to evacuate Syria, and if the Pasha should demur to accede to that arrangement, there might then be an obvious advantage in proving to the Pasha, by the co-operation of the Russian flag with that of Austria, France, and England, that the Great Powers are unanimous in their decision. But the negotiations at Vienna have not yet arrived at such maturity as to admit of such a communication being made to the two parties.

It appears to Her Majesty's Government, that there is a marked distinction between the co-operation of the four flags in the Sea of Marmora, or in the Bosphorus, for the defence of Constantinople, and the junction of those flags in the Mediterranean.

I have adverted to these points, in order that your Excellency may know the views of Her Majesty's Government respecting them. But the alarming state of the Sultan's health, as described in your Lordship's despatch of June 30, creates new dangers, more serious than those with which the Five Powers have hitherto been occupied. This new cause of peril requires new and additional measures.

The accounts received by Her Majesty's Government within the last few days, by various channels, from Vienna and Constantinople, render it highly probable that the Sultan may already have sunk under his complicated disorders. What effect his death might produce, Her Majesty's Government have not the means to foresee; but it seems probable it would, in the first instance at least, cause a suspension of hostilities in Syria, as both armies would naturally wait to see what might happen at Constantinople, and what might be the policy of the new sovereign.

In this state of things, nothing can be wiser, or more urgently required, than the measure proposed by Prince Metternich, namely, that the Five Powers should each make a solemn declaration of their determination to maintain the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire under the present dynasty; and, as a necessary consequence of such a determination, that none of them will seek to profit by the present state of things, for the purpose of gaining any acquisition of territory, or any exclusive influence.

Your Excellency is instructed to state to Prince Metternich, that you are fully authorized at once to make such a declaration on the part of Great Britain; and if it should be thought expedient to give to such declaration a more formal shape, your Excellency is authorized to sign on behalf of Great Britain, any instrument by which it may be proposed to record it.

No. 112.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received July* 11.)

My Lord, *Paris, July* 8, 1839.

MARSHAL SOULT has read to me the Note which he proposes should be addressed by the French Ambassador to the Sublime Porte, requesting that a French fleet may pass the Dardanelles, in case an Egyptian Army should approach Constantinople, and foreign succour be required for the defence of the capital. A copy of this Note, the Marshal told me, was sent the night before last to M. de Bourqueney, for the purpose of its being communicated to your Lordship; and his Excellency expressed his hopes that Her Majesty's Government would instruct Lord Ponsonby to address to the Turkish Government a similar Note, for the admission of the British fleet within the Dardanelles, to be presented at the same time with that of the French Ambassador.

The Marshal said that Count St. Aulaire's last despatches from Vienna were satisfactory.

Prince Metternich was eager for the junction of the Austrian ships of war with those of England and of France; and he had reason to think, from the tenour of Count Fiquelmont's reports from St. Petersburgh, that the Russian Government would acquiesce in the proposal of the combined fleet being stationed in the Sea of Marmora for the protection of Constantinople.

The last accounts received at Vienna from Constantinople, state that the Sultan is very ill; and that the German physician who attends him is of opinion, that though he may live till the autumn, he, in all probability, will die before the expiration of the month.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 113.

Lord William Russell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 12.)

My Lord, *Berlin, July* 6, 1839.

A FRENCH courier arrived here this morning from St. Petersburgh. M. de Barante states in his letters, that the proposition made by Prince Metternich to concert measures at Vienna for the pacification of the East, has been favourably received by the Emperor of Russia; and M. de Barante thinks the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh well and sincerely disposed to act in union with the other Powers of Europe.

Baron Werther thinks that your Lordship has judged right in preferring simple negotiation to a formal conference. His Excellency has given the necessary instructions to the Prussian Minister at Vienna; and he feels convinced that the most perfect harmony will exist between the Five Powers on this important question.

The latest accounts received here from Constantinople, state that the Sultan's health is rapidly declining.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) WILLIAM RUSSELL.

No. 114.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 13.)

My Lord, *Therapia, June* 24, 1839.

I KEPT the messenger, that I might have means of informing your Lordship of matters of moment, and have now to acquaint you that the Sultan's fever continues, and that it is the opinion of his physicians, that if it is not removed, he will not live fifteen days. The physicians think the fever will not be removed. The Sultan, it is said, cannot at any rate live more than two or three months.

The public is now aware of the alarming nature of the Sultan's illness, but the Ottoman Ministers have not mentioned it to my Colleagues or to me; they have, however, begun to consider what shall be done, and are discussing whether it be best to establish a Council of Regency or a Council of Government.

The Ministers have, I hear, written to Rechid Pasha to abandon every affair in England, and return full speed to Constantinople.

The Ottoman Fleet is to sail from the Dardanelles for Rhodes, on Monday the 24th instant. On the 21st (Friday last), the French Ambassador had an interview with Nouri Effendi, to receive a verbal reply from the Porte to his Excellency's Note, demanding the recall of the troops from the Aleppo side of the Euphrates. The Porte would not give a written reply. The verbal one was, "That the Ministers had not communicated to the Sultan the demands made by the French Ambassador."

I had a letter from Sir Robert Stopford, which I inclose. I have heard of the arrival of Sir Thomas Fellowes in the "Vanguard," at Besica Bay.

I think it probable the corps of Ulemas will take a part. It has great material strength as well as moral influence. The Chiefs are, perhaps, the best-informed men in the country, and they may be aware of the weakness of it, and the necessity for acting with the greatest prudence. I have taken the only measures in my power to make some of the influential members reflect upon their real situation, but my means are extremely limited. I have stated the ruin that might follow any reaction attended with violence, and that at the present moment the existence of the Turks, as a governing nation, depended upon Foreign Powers.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 114.

Admiral Sir Robert Stopford to Viscount Ponsonby.

"*Princess Charlotte,*"
Palermo Bay, June 7, 1839

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's letters of the 22nd and 27th May, the former acquainting me that your Excellency had satisfied your mind, that the Sublime Porte has finally determined upon war against the Pasha of Egypt; the latter transmitting the copy of a letter from Mr. Vice-Consul Hays at Alexandretta, dated 7th May, describing the unprotected state of that port, and the danger to which British property is liable, in consequence of the disturbed state of that part of the country.

I have the honour to acquaint your Excellency that, although I have not received any orders from Government to guide my proceedings with respect to the two belligerent Powers of Turkey and Egypt, I shall immediately send the "Vanguard" to the Levant, to be followed by a sloop of war, for the purpose of observing the proceedings of the two fleets, giving orders to Captain Sir Thomas Fellowes to observe the strictest neutrality towards Turks and Egyptians, and to avoid all communication with either.

I have also the honour to acquaint your Lordship, that I have ordered the "Dido" to proceed to Alexandretta, to protect British property said to be endangered at that place.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) ROBERT STOPFORD,
Admiral.

No. 115.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 13.)

Therapia, June 24, 1839.

My Lord,

I HAD sent M. Etienne Pisani to the Capudan Pasha upon business, which will be elsewhere reported to your Lordship. I received from that gentleman a letter, which I inclose, as it contains important matter relating to the Capudan Pasha's orders and intentions, should the French fleet attempt to bar his passage. I have to report that the moment I received the letter, I wrote to M. Pisani, and directed him to accompany the Pasha as far as Rhodes; and to use his utmost endeavours to prevent a collision between the Pasha and the French, by engaging the Pasha to be calm, and to wait for the actual exertion of force by the French, before he attempted to defend himself by arms, and to answer civilly, and state to the French the purport of his orders from his Sovereign, and that he must obey them; and that, doing this, he should continue his route without resenting anything that might be said. It will, I think, be fortunate, if my directions reach M. Pisani in time, because I believe there is nobody with the Capudan Pasha able to interpret well, and prevent misconceptions of what may be said; and I also have much confidence in the prudence of M. Pisani, and in his influence over the Capudan Pasha.

I made no reply to what the Capudan Pasha said; but your Lordship will recollect, that in answer to a question from him and the other Ministers with whom I had an interview, I said that I had no knowledge of any intention entertained by Her Majesty's Government to oppose the Sultan by force; and that I did not think Her Majesty's Government would ever resort to such a measure.

The report here is, that the French fleet will oppose by force the progress of the Ottoman fleet. I disbelieve the report, because the French Ambassador told me when I last saw him, that it was not in the contemplation of his Government to use force.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 115.

M. Etienne Pisani to Viscount Ponsonby.

(Extrait.) *Dardanelles, le* 20 *Juin,* 1839.

J'AI l'honneur d'informer votre Excellence, que je suis arrivé ici hier matin et que je me suis rendu en droiture à bord du "Mahmoudié." Le Pacha pense parfaitement comme votre Excellence, au sujet de la quarantaine. Il regrette infiniment qu'il ne m'a pas envoyé à Constantinople sur un de ses bateaux; et il m'a promis que tant qu'il serait aux Dardanelles, si je me trouvais dans le cas d'aller à Constantinople, qu'il me priait de disposer d'un de ses bateaux à vapeur.

Hier, après avoir fait ma visite au Pacha, le Capitaine Walker, Mr. Lander, et moi, nous nous sommes embarqués sur le petit bateau à vapeur Turc que le Pacha a eu la bonté de mettre à notre disposition, et nous sommes allés à bord du "Vanguard," qui se trouve mouillé à Bésik Baie. Nous sommes restés à bord jusqu'à 5 heures, après quoi nous sommes retournés aux Dardanelles.

Le Capitan Pacha se propose de faire voile avec toute la Flotte, samedi, pour Rhodes. Mais je doute fort qu'il puisse partir avant mardi ou mercredi, car son bâtiment ne pourra guère être prêt avant lundi soir ou mardi matin. Le Pacha trouve que les Français n'ont aucun droit de l'empêcher de suivre les ordres de son Souverain. Et il dit qu'il a des ordres positifs de venir en contact avec la Flotte Egyptienne; qu'il espère, que cette année-ci les Anglais demeureront neutres, et qu'ils ne s'opposeront pas aux vœux du Sultan; que si les Français étaient seuls dans leur démarche actuelle, que cela ne l'empêchera pas de suivre ses plans; mais que si les Anglais étaient entendus avec les Français, qu'en ce cas il se verrait forcé, bien malgré lui, de se soumettre à leur volonté.

Discours faisant, le Pacha m'a proposé de l'accompagner jusqu'à Rhodes, et dès qu'il y serait, il me promettait de me renvoyer sur son bateau à vapeur. J'ai répondu à son Excellence, que j'étais réellement fâché de ne pas pouvoir complaire à ses désirs, vu que je dépendais exclusivement de votre Excellence, et que je ne pouvais pas prendre sur moi de m'absenter sans avoir au préalable demandé la permission et les ordres de mon Chef.

(Translation.)

M. Etienne Pisani to Viscount Ponsonby.

(Extract.) *Dardanelles, June* 20, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that I arrived here yesterday morning, and that I straightway went on board the "Mahmoudié." The Pasha is entirely of your Excellency's opinion on the subject of the quarantine. He regrets extremely that he had not sent me to Constantinople on board of one of his vessels; and he has promised me, that so long as he should be at the Dardanelles, if I should have occasion to go to Constantinople, he would request me to make use of one of his steam-vessels.

Yesterday, after having paid my visit to the Pasha, Captain Walker, Mr. Lander, and myself embarked on board a little Turkish steam-vessel, which the Pasha had the goodness to place at our disposal, and we went on board the "Vanguard," which was anchored in Besika Bay. We remained on board until five o'clock; after which we returned to the Dardanelles.

The Capudan Pasha intends to sail on Saturday with all his fleet for Rhodes; but I much doubt whether he can depart before Tuesday or Wednesday, as his vessel can scarcely be ready before Monday evening or Tuesday morning. The Pasha considers that the French have no right to hinder him from following the orders of his Sovereign: and he says that he has positive orders to engage the Egyptian fleet; that he hopes that this year the English will remain neuter, and that they will not oppose themselves to the wishes of the Sultan; that if the French were alone in their present proceedings, that would not prevent him from following his own plans; but if the English should be agreed with the French, in that case he should feel himself constrained, much against his inclination, to submit to their will.

In the course of conversation, the Pasha proposed to me to accompany him as far as Rhodes; and when he should be there, he promised to send me back in his steam-vessel. I replied to his Excellency, that I was really sorry to be unable to comply with his wishes, seeing that I depended exclusively upon your Excellency, and that I could not take upon myself to absent myself without having first asked the permission and the orders of my Chief.

No. 116.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 13.)

My Lord, *Therapia, June* 24, 1839.

ON the 23rd, the Ottoman Fleet was still at the Dardanelles. I inclose Consul Lander's despatch.

There are two French ships off the Troad, and two ships and a corvette at Vourla. The Prince de Joinville is on board. The "Vanguard" is at Besica Bay. The English Squadron was expected at Malta, from Palermo, on the 18th instant.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 116.

Mr. Consul Lander to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Dardanelles, June 23, 1839.*

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship, that the whole of the Ottoman Squadron are still at anchor between Nagara and these castles; and I am informed that it is the intention of his Highness the Capudan Pasha not to leave these Straits before Friday next, the 28th instant. In the meanwhile, most of the large ships are daily exercising their guns, and firing at marks, under the direction of Captain Walker.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) C. A. LANDER.

No. 117.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, July 13, 1839.*

WITH reference to my despatch of July 5, instructing your Excellency to express to the Porte the wish of Her Majesty's Government, that in the case therein specified, the Porte should apply to Great Britain for naval or military aid, I have to state to your Excellency, that if the Sultan should die, and if in consequence of his death, the presence of the British Squadron at Constantinople should appear useful, your Excellency is instructed to offer the assistance of the Squadron to the Turkish Government, in concert with the French Ambassador, who will have instructions to make a similar offer of the assistance of the French Fleet.

Your Excellency will perceive by Earl Granville's despatch of July 8, that the French Government have sent to Admiral Roussin the draft of a Note to be presented to the Porte, with reference to the application to be made for the admission of the French Squadron; but Her Majesty's Government leave it to your Excellency to word, according to your discretion, the Note which you will present on that subject, simultaneously with the Note of the French Ambassador.

I have, at the same time, to acquaint your Excellency, that the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty will instruct Admiral Sir Robert Stopford to go up to Constantinople, if invited to do so by the Turkish Government; and will apprize that officer, that the object of his going up to Constantinople, either in the case of the request being made by the Sultan, or by the Turkish Government in the case of the Sultan's death, should be to afford protection and support to the Sultan's authority, chiefly by the moral effect of the presence of the fleet; but further, if actually necessary, by such measures as unexpected circumstances may require, and as may be judged suitable by the joint and concurrent opinions of the Admirals and Ambassadors.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 118.

Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

My Lords, *Foreign Office, July 13, 1839.*

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordships, that Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople has been instructed to state to the Porte, that if the course of events should lead the Porte to ask or to accept military or naval aid from any European Power, in the contest with Mehemet Ali, Her Majesty's Government trust that the Porte will, at the same time, address itself to Great Britain to the same effect; and that the British Admiral in the Mediterranean has orders to repair to Constantinople with his squadron, for the purpose of affording to the Sultan physical and moral support, the moment he shall receive from the Porte, through Her Majesty's Ambassador, an invitation to do so.

Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople has been further instructed, that if the Sultan should die, and if, in consequence of his death, the presence of the British Squadron at Constantinople should appear to be useful, his Excellency is to offer the assistance of that squadron to the Turkish Government, in concert with the French Ambassador, who will have instructions to make a similar offer of the assistance of the French Fleet in the contingencies above specified.

I am commanded by the Queen to signify to your Lordships Her Majesty's pleasure, that Admiral Sir Robert Stopford be instructed, under the circumstances which I have now stated, to go up to Constantinople with his squadron, if invited by the Turkish Government to do so: and the Admiral should be apprized that the object of his going up to Constantinople, in the case of the request being made either by the Sultan, or by the Turkish Government, in the case of the Sultan's death, should be to afford protection and support to the Sultan's authority, chiefly by the moral effect of the presence of the fleet; but further, if actually necessary, by such measures as unexpected circumstances may require, and as may be judged suitable by the joint and concurrent opinions of the Admirals and Ambassadors.

The Queen's messenger, who will be dispatched from this office on Monday the 15th instant, can convey to Malta your Lordships' instruction to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 119.

Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

My Lords, *Foreign Office, July* 18, 1839.

WITH reference to my letter of the 13th instant, I have to request your Lordships to acquaint Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, that a further instruction will be sent to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, stating, that if the Russian Fleet should, for any reason whatever, enter the Bosphorus, his Excellency will apply for permission for the British Fleet to do the same; and I am to signify to your Lordships the Queen's commands, that Sir Robert Stopford be instructed to act upon any invitation which, in consequence of the foregoing instruction, may be addressed to him by the Porte through Her Majesty's Ambassador.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 120.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, July* 18, 1839.

WITH reference to my despatches of July 5 and 13, instructing your Excellency, under the contingencies therein specified, to offer to the Turkish Government to bring up to Constantinople the British Squadron, I have now to state to your Excellency, that if the Russian Fleet should, for any reason whatever, enter the Bosphorus, you will apply for permission for the British Fleet to do the same.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 121.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 15.)

My Lord, *Paris, July* 12, 1839.

I HAD an interview this morning with Marshal Soult; he told me that your Lordship had approved of the note which he proposed should be presented by Admiral Roussin to the Turkish Government, relative to the admission of the French fleet within the Dardanelles; and he expressed much satisfaction with M. de Bourqueney's reports of his late communications with you on the affairs of the East.

I said that M. de Bourqueney had, without doubt, mentioned in his reports, that he had seen some of Lord Ponsonby's recent despatches, which proved that his Lordship had, in conformity to his instructions, tried to dissuade the Porte from going to war with Mehemet Ali; and that your Lordship had sent instructions to Her Majesty's Ambassador to co-operate with Admiral Roussin, and would again write to him to the same effect; but I would not conceal from him that you had, in a private letter to me, intimated that the tone of the communications of the French Government with that of Turkey was rather too rough and harsh, and that it would be better, for the furtherance of the objects common to both Governments, if the language used to the Porte were more conciliatory. The Marshal answered that M. de Bourqueney had apprized him of the apprehension felt by your Lordship, that the use of strong language might excite irritation in the mind of the Sultan, and that he had in consequence written to Admiral Roussin to consult with Lord Ponsonby before he presented his Note to the Reis Effendi; and if his Lordship thought that there were expressions in the preamble which it might be expedient to soften down, to acquiesce in any change in the wording of it, which might be suggested by Her Majesty's Ambassador.

Marshal Soult informed me that he received yesterday despatches from Vienna, reporting that Prince Metternich, considering that the life of Mahmoud could not be much longer prolonged, was very anxious that the Great Powers of Europe should lose no time in coming to an understanding to recognise, immediately upon the Sultan's death, his son, as successor to the Sovereignty of the whole of the Turkish Empire. The Marshal Soult expressed his entire concurrence in the opinion of the Austrian Minister. And though the son of the Sultan is scarcely seventeen years old, he had no apprehension, under the circumstance of all the Great European Powers at once acknowledging him, of any serious danger arising from the change of reign.

M. de Barante's despatches from St. Petersburgh give a favourable report of the disposition of the Russian Cabinet. Count Nesselrode is much satisfied with the endeavours of the British and French Governments to prevent, or, if begun, to suspend, hostilities between the Turks and Egyptians; and expressed a wish that the differences between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali may be settled by a concert between all the European Powers.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 122.

The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received July* 15.)

(Extract.) *St. Petersburgh, July* 8, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatches to the 25th of June.

They have not conveyed to me any instructions with reference to the late movement of the Turkish Army, or information of the course which Her Majesty's Government may adopt, in consequence of the state of affairs in Syria. I have had two or three conversations with Count Nesselrode upon the subject, and his Excellency asked my opinion upon his despatch to Count Pozzo di Borgo, which embodies a proposition for giving a limit to the probable success of Mehemet Ali's warfare, and upon the suggestion which, I am told, has been made by Prince Metternich to Her Majesty's Government, and to the Cabinet of Paris, for settling the differences between the Pasha of Egypt and the Porte, by restoring Syria to the Sultan, and granting the inheritance of the Pashalic of Egypt to the family of Mehemet Ali.

I replied to Count Nesselrode, that I had received no instructions upon the subject, but that I thought my Government would receive his communication with satisfaction, insomuch as it indicated a desire to restore peace, and to check the warfare in Syria. But that the proposition in my opinion was defective, as it referred to only one possible result of the hostilities that had been commenced, and did not settle the whole question, even if that result should happen.

Count Nesselrode said he had provided for one only issue of the war in Syria, because he believed that that one was certain to occur.

With respect to the Austrian proposition, I said I thought it likely to meet a favourable consideration from Her Majesty's Government. Count Nesselrode offered no objection to it, but rather insinuated a doubt that it would be acceptable to the Contending Parties, particularly to the Porte.

Upon every occasion, Count Nesselrode has expressed to me the desire of the Russian Government to obviate the possibility of a *casus fœderis* arising under the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. His Excellency has held the same language to all my colleagues; and I believe this desire to be sincerely and anxiously entertained.

I have every reason to believe that the Sultan deceived M. de Bouténeff, and that his commencement of hostilities was as disagreeable to, as it was unexpected by, His Imperial Majesty.

Upon every account, I am confident the Russian Government are desirous of avoiding the possibility of a war in Europe; and Count Nesselrode thinks there is no probability of such a calamity, unless the successes of Mehemet Ali should bring him under the walls of Constantinople, or menace the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire.

No. 123.

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, July* 16, 1839.

I HEREWITH transmit to your Excellency a copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, inclosing a copy of a letter from M. Etienne Pisani, relative to the Capudan Pasha's orders and intentions, should the French fleet attempt to bar his passage.*

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* See Inclosure in No. 115.

Your Excellency will communicate the substance of this despatch to the French Government.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 124.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 17.)

My Lord, *Paris, July* 15, 1839.

I HAVE received your Lordship's despatches to the 12th of July.

The inclosed copies of telegraphic despatches which were received here on Saturday by the French Government, were sent to me on Saturday evening by Marshal Soult.

The more detailed reports from Admiral Roussin and from the French Consul at Alexandria, had not reached Paris at the time I saw Marshal Soult this day, but are expected to arrive to-night or to-morrow morning.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 124.

Telegraphic Despatch from Marseilles.

Le Consul de France à M. le Président du Conseil.

Alexandrie, le 26 *Juin.*

UN courrier arrivé aujourd'hui du quartier-général d'Ibrahim, annonce à Méhémet Ali que l'attaque contre l'Armée Turque devait avoir lieu le 21 Juin.

(Translation.)

The Consul of France to the President of the Council.

Alexandria, June 26.

A COURIER arrived to-day from the head-quarters of Ibrahim, reports to Mehemet Ali that the attack on the Turkish army was to take place on the 21st of June.

Inclosure 2 in No. 124.

Telegraphic Despatch of 13*th July*, 3 A.M.

ON mande de Constantinople, que le Sultan est gravement malade; qu'il ne s'occupe plus des affaires; et que les médecins avaient déclaré que son existence ne pourrait pas se prolonger plus de trois mois.

Le 26 Juin, on parlait à Alexandrie d'une bataille qui aurait eu lieu le 21, entre les Egyptiens et les Turcs, mais on n'avait pas de détails, et l'on attendait avec impatience le paquebot de Beyrout.

La flotte Turque qui devait sortir le 24, était encore, le 28, dans le détroit des Dardanelles; on attribuait ce tems d'arrêt à la maladie du Sultan.

L'Amiral Lalande avait envoyé le "Trident," "l'Hercule," et le "Jupiter," à Ourlac, et se trouvait avec "l'Jéna" seulement à Ténédos.

L'Escadre Anglaise, composée de sept vaisseaux, deux frégates, une corvette, deux bricks, et un bateau à vapeur, a quitté Malte le 2 Juillet, se dirigeant sur l'Egypte et la Syrie.

(Translation.)

Telegraphic Despatch of 13*th July,* 3 A.M

IT is reported from Constantinople that the Sultan is seriously ill; that he no longer busies himself about affairs; and that the physicians had declared that his existence cannot be prolonged beyond three months.

The 26th of June, there was a rumour at Alexandria of a battle having taken place on the 21st between the Egyptians and the Turks, but the details had not been received, and the packet from Beyrout was looked for with impatience.

The Turkish fleet, which was to go out on the 24th, was still, on the 28th, within the straits of the Dardanelles; this detention was attributed to the illness of the Sultan.

Admiral Lalande had sent the "Trident," the "Hercules," and the "Jupiter," to Vourla, and was alone with the "Jena" at Tenedos.

The English squadron, composed of seven sail of the line, two frigates, one corvette, two brigs, and one steam-vessel, left Malta on the 2nd of July, proceeding towards Egypt and Syria.

No. 125.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received July* 17.)

(Extract.) *Paris, July* 15, 1839.

MARSHAL SOULT, this morning, informed me that he has written a despatch to M. de Bourqueney, to be communicated to your Lordship, in which he has authorized the French Chargé d'Affaires to declare the readiness of the French Government to become a party to a general guarantee of the integrity of the Turkish Empire by the Five Great European Powers. His Excellency indeed dwelt at some length upon the advantages of such a self-denying engagement.

The Marshal then spoke to me of a conversation you had had with M. de Bourqueney, and said to me that he agreed with your Lordship, that if any Russian ships should propose to join the combined fleets of England, of France, and of Austria, upon the Syrian coast, their being permitted to pass through the Dardanelles for that purpose should be considered as a *cas exceptionnel*;—a case in which the deviation from the established principle of shutting the straits, would be counterbalanced by the advantage of manifesting that all the Great Powers acted in concert.

With reference to the Sultan's death, and the possible disturbance of the public tranquillity, the Marshal was of opinion that the Ambassadors, in case they apprehended danger to the lives and properties of their countrymen, might call upon the Admirals to station one or two frigates near Constantinople for their protection, and which might be used as a place of refuge even for the young Sultan, if any apprehension should be felt for the security of his person, from the disturbed state of the capital.

No. 126.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received July* 17.)

My Lord, *Paris, July* 15, 1839, 10 P.M.

I INCLOSE the copy of a telegraphic despatch which I have just received from Marshal Soult, announcing the death of the Sultan Mahmoud.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

Inclosure in No. 126.

Dépêche Télégraphique de Strasbourg, le 15 *Juillet, à* 6 *h. du soir.*

Le Préfet du Bas Rhin à M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.

LE Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à Bade vient de donner avis à M. de Bacourt, que le 10, on a reçu à Vienne la nouvelle que le Sultan Mahmoud est mort le 30 . . . .

(Interrompue par la nuit.)

(Translation.)

Telegraphic Despatch from Strasburgh, July 15, 6 P.M.

The Prefect of the Lower Rhine to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

THE Minister of Foreign Affairs at Baden has just acquainted M. de Bacourt, that on the 10th news was received at Vienna that Sultan Mahmoud died on the 30th . . . .

(Interrupted by night.)

No. 127.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 18.)

My Lord, *Paris, July* 16, 1839.

I TRANSMIT to your Lordship the continuation of the telegraphic despatch from Strasburgh, of which I forwarded to you the beginning by the messenger who left Paris last night.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

Inclosure in No. 127.

Fin de la Dépêche Télégraphique de Strasbourg, du 15 *Juillet, à* 6 *h. du soir.*

. . . . . que le Sultan Mahmoud est mort le 30 Juin. Son fils aîné, déclaré majeur par le Divan, a été proclamé Empereur. Le 28, l'ordre avait été envoyé à Hafiz Pacha de suspendre les hostilités.

(Translation.)

End of the Telegraphic Despatch from Strasburgh, of July 15, 6 P.M.

. . . . . that Sultan Mahmoud died on the 30th of June. His eldest son, declared of age by the Divan, was proclaimed Emperor. On the 28th orders had been sent to Hafiz Pasha to suspend hostilities.

No 128.

Baron de Bourqueney to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received July* 21.)

My Lord, *Londres, le* 19 *Juillet*, 1839.

JE m'acquitte des ordres de mon Gouvernement, en transmettant sans retard à votre Excellence, copie de la dépêche que je viens de recevoir de M. le Maréchal Duc de Dalmatie, sous la date du 17 Juillet.

Le Gouvernement du Roi, my Lord, sait d'avance qu'il trouvera dans le Cabinet de Sa Majesté Britannique, des principes et des sentimens conformes à ceux qui dirigent et qui continueront invariablement à diriger sa politique dans les affaires d'Orient; mais il attache un véritable prix à recevoir un nouveau témoignage de cette heureuse conformité.

Je prie votre Excellence de vouloir bien m'accuser réception de cette lettre, et je saisis cette occasion, &c.

(Signé) BOURQUENEY.

(Translation.)

Baron Bourqueney to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received July* 21.)

My Lord, *London, July* 19, 1839.

I EXECUTE the orders of my Government by transmitting to your Excellency without delay, a copy of the despatch which I have just received from the Marshal Duke of Dalmatia, dated the 17th of July.

His Majesty's Government, my Lord, knows beforehand, that it will find in the Cabinet of Her Britannic Majesty, principles and sentiments in conformity with those which direct, and which will continue invariably to direct, its policy in the affairs of the East; but it attaches a real value to receiving a fresh pledge of this happy conformity.

I request your Excellency to have the goodness to acknowledge the receipt of this letter, and I take this opportunity, &c.

(Signed) BOURQUENEY.

Inclosure in No. 128.

The Duc de Dalmatie to the Baron de Bourqueney.

Monsieur le Baron, *Paris, le* 17 *Juillet*, 1839.

DANS la crise si grave où la mort du Sultan Mahmoud, survenant au milieu des événemens qui ont marqué les derniers mois de son règne, vient de jeter l'Empire Ottoman, l'union des Grandes Puissances de l'Europe pouvait seule offrir une garantie suffisante pour rassurer les amis de la paix. Les communications échangées depuis quelques semaines, ont heureusement prouvé que cette union est aussi complète qu'il était possible de le désirer. Tous les Cabinets veulent l'intégrité et l'indépendance de la Monarchie Ottomane sous la Dynastie actuellement régnante; tous sont disposés à faire usage de leurs moyens d'action et d'influence pour assurer le maintien de cet élément essentiel de l'équilibre politique; et ils n'hésiteraient pas à se déclarer contre une combinaison quelconque qui y porterait atteinte. Un pareil accord de sentimens et de résolutions devant suffire, lorsque personne ne pourra plus en douter, non seulement pour prévenir toute tentative contraire à ce grand intérêt, mais même pour dissiper des inquiétudes dont la seule existence constitue un danger véritable par suite de l'agitation qu'elles jettent dans les esprits, le Gouvernement du Roi croit que les Cabinets feraient quelque chose d'important pour l'affermissement de la paix, en constatant dans des documens écrits qu'ils se communiqueraient réciproquement, et qui nécessairement ne tarderaient pas à avoir une publicité plus ou moins complète, l'exposé des intentions que

je viens de rappeler. En ce qui nous concerne, Monsieur le Baron, je déclare formellement que ce sont, que ce seront invariablement, les nôtres, et je vous autorise à laisser à Lord Palmerston une copie de la présente dépêche après lui en avoir donné lecture. Je ne doute pas que le Gouvernement Britannique, dans la réponse qu'il croira sans doute devoir faire à la lettre par laquelle vous lui transmettrez cette dépêche, n'adhère de son côté de la manière la plus formelle à cette profession de foi, si parfaitement conforme à l'expression souvent reproduite de sa politique. Si, comme j'ai lieu de l'espérer, les Cabinets de Vienne, de Pétersbourg, et de Berlin, répondent de même aux communications semblables que je vais leur faire parvenir, le but que se propose le Gouvernement du Roi se trouvera atteint.

Recevez, &c.,
(Signé) MARECHAL DUC DE DALMATIE.

(Translation.)

The Duke of Dalmatia to the Baron de Bourqueney.

Monsieur le Baron, *Paris, July* 17, 1839.

IN the very serious crisis into which the death of Sultan Mahmoud, occurring in the midst of the events which have characterized the last months of his reign, has thrown the Ottoman Empire, the union of the Great Powers of Europe could alone offer a guarantee sufficient to reassure the friends of peace. The communications which, during a few weeks, have been interchanged, have happily proved that this union is as complete as it is possible to desire it. All the Cabinets wish for the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Monarchy under the Dynasty now reigning; all are disposed to employ their means of action and of influence to ensure the maintenance of this essential element of the political equilibrium; and they would not hesitate to declare themselves against any combination whatever, which might impair it. As such an agreement of sentiments and determinations must be sufficient, when there can be no longer any doubt of it, not only to prevent any attempt being made at variance with this great interest, but even to dispel the uneasiness of which the mere existence produces a real danger, by reason of the disquiet which it occasions in the public mind, His Majesty's Government considers that the Cabinets would effect some thing important towards the settlement of peace, by recording in written documents to be reciprocally communicated to each other, and which necessarily would not be long before they acquired a publicity more or less complete, the declaration of the intentions which I have just mentioned. So far as we are concerned, Monsieur le Baron, I formally declare that such are, and such will invariably be, our intentions, and I authorize you to leave with Lord Palmerston a copy of this despatch after having read it to him. I entertain no doubt that the British Government, in the answer which it will assuredly think it fitting to return to the letter, by which you will transmit to it this despatch, will on its part adhere in the most formal manner to this profession of faith, which is in such perfect conformity with its often repeated enunciation of its policy. If, as I have reason to hope, the Cabinets of Vienna, Petersburgh, and Berlin, reply in the same manner to the communications of a like nature which I am about to forward to them, the object which His Majesty's Government proposes to itself, will be accomplished.

Receive, &c.,
(Signed) MARECHAL DUC DE DALMATIE.

No. 129.

Viscount Palmerston to the Baron de Bourqueney.

Monsieur le Baron, *Foreign Office, July* 22, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 19th instant, inclosing, by order of your Government, a copy of a despatch dated the 17th instant, which you have received from the Duc de Dalmatie, relative to the present posture of affairs in Turkey.

I have to express to you, in reply, the great satisfaction with which Her Majesty's Government have received this communication; and I lose no time in authorizing you to assure your Government, that the British Cabinet, like that of France, desires to uphold the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire under its existing Dynasty; and is ready to use its influence and its means of action, for the purpose of maintaining this essential element of the balance of power in Europe; and that Her Majesty's Government, like that of France, would not hesitate to declare itself openly against any combination which might be conceived in a spirit of hostility to the principles above-mentioned.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 130.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 22.)

(Extract.) *Paris, July* 19, 1839.

ALTHOUGH your despatch of the 16th does not instruct me to communicate to the French Government the despatch inclosed in it, addressed by your Lordship to Lord Beauvale, on the 13th instant, I have not, I trust, acted indiscreetly, in having this morning put Marshal Soult in possession of its contents. It appeared to me desirable, that his Excellency should perfectly understand the circumstances under which you thought that the co-operation of Russian ships of war, with the combined Fleet of England, of France, and of Austria, in the Levant, might be expedient.

The Marshal expressed his entire concurrence in your view of this question; and he adverted to the expression of *cas exceptionnel* which he had used, when speaking to me of the advantage of manifesting at this moment the unanimity of the Great Powers of Europe upon the affairs of Turkey and Egypt, by the junction of a Russian squadron with the combined English, French, and Austrian Fleet, as showing that he was adverse to the opening of the Straits of Constantinople generally for the passage of ships of war.

Marshal Soult read to me a despatch from Count St. Aulaire, with a letter inclosed in it from Admiral Roussin to his colleague at Vienna. Count St. Aulaire writes, that the Court of St. Petersburgh adopts unhesitatingly the propositions upon the Turkish Question, which the Austrian Ambassador had been instructed by Prince Metternich to submit to the consideration of the Russian Government. And Admiral Roussin states, not only that the order had been sent to Hafiz Pasha to suspend military operations in Syria, but that the Capudan Pasha commanding the Turkish Fleet had been ordered not to quit the Dardanelles.

Under these circumstances, Marshal Soult thought that the prospect of settling satisfactorily the Oriental Question was much improved.

No. 131.

Lord William Russell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 22.)

My Lord, *Berlin, July* 15, 1839.

I COMMUNICATED your Lordship's observations on Count Nesselrode's despatch to Baron Werther. He approves of the view your Lordship has taken of the Eastern Question; and thinks you will find the Russian Cabinet disposed to agree with the other Powers.

Kiamil Pasha, the Ottoman Minister at this Court, is of opinion, that a mere settlement of a frontier between Turkey and Egypt can only be a provisional arrangement. He wishes the British Cabinet to establish a basis for his country, on which they can construct their regeneration; if this is not done, he fears that the internal weakness of the Empire will soon cause it to fall.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) WILLIAM RUSSELL.

No. 132.

The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 23.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, July* 15, 1839.

WITH reference to the subject of your Lordship's despatch to Lord Beauvale, of the 28th of June, and of Count Nesselrode's despatch to Count Pozzo di Borgo, of the $\frac{3}{15}$ of June, I beg leave to state, that the impression made upon my mind by Count Nesselrode, in the conversations which I have had the honour to hold with his Excellency upon the hostilities that have occurred in Syria, and upon his despatch to the Russian Ambassador in London, was, that he did not intend by the proposition communicated in that despatch, that the intervention of England, and other European Powers, should be wholly limited to confining the warfare to the Syrian territory; but that, as the success of the arms of Mehemet Ali appeared imminent, and as that success, if it carried him beyond the Taurus, would menace the safety of the Turkish capital, and thereby occasion a complication of the difficulties of the Turco-Egyptian Question, and a great chance of war in Europe, that contingency should be instantly guarded against; but without prejudice to ulterior steps, or to such a settlement of the disputes between the Sultan and the Pasha of Egypt, and of their respective claims, as the Great Powers might afterwards determine upon. In answer to a remark I made thereupon on one occasion, Count Nesselrode said, "We shall have time to consider of that afterwards, but what we must do at once, is to prevent Mehemet Ali from complicating the question, and perhaps causing a general war by his successes." Your Lordship will observe also, that Count Nesselrode in his despatch to Count Pozzo di Borgo, says, "Avant tout, il faut maîtriser les faits, c'est-à-dire, empêcher que la lutte devienne menaçante pour le repos de l'Europe entière." And I believe that by the words "avant tout," Count Nesselrode meant to imply, that subsequent arrangements should be entered into, after the precautions he deemed necessary against the danger near at hand, had been adopted.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) CLANRICARDE.

No. 133.

The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 23.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, July* 15, 1839.

SINCE writing my preceding despatch I have seen Count Nesselrode. Our conversation has confirmed me in the impression I entertained of the nature and limited extent of the proposition which he made to Her Majesty's Government through the Russian Ambassador in London.

Count Nesselrode tells me that he has received very satisfactory intelligence from Constantinople; the Commander of the Turkish fleet, and Hafiz Pasha, having been directed, since the death of the late Sultan, to avoid a conflict with the Egyptian forces, and the latter having been ordered to retire from the Syrian territories. His Excellency said, that he had for some time considered it impossible, that a definitive arrangement of the matters in dispute between the Porte and the Pasha of Egypt, could be much longer delayed, and that such an arrangement had now become necessary. His Excellency proceeded to say, "Austria proposes, that for the hereditary tenure of the Pashalic of Egypt assured to his family, Mehemet Ali should relinquish Syria at his death. We do not object to that arrangement. Your Government say, that Syria should be immediately restored to the Sultan. We also think that better. But have you any reason to suppose that Mehemet Ali will accede to such a proposal?"

I have, &c.,
(Signed) CLANRICARDE.

No. 134.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 23.)

My Lord, *Vienna, July* 10, 1839.

PRINCE METTERNICH has received intelligence of the arrival of his despatches of 14th of June at St. Petersburgh.

Count Nesselrode had informed Count Fiquelmont that he should reply to them in a day or two, but that in the meantime he was directed to acquaint him, that they had been laid *in extenso* before the Emperor, who had approved of them in all their parts. When Count Nesselrode's despatch arrives, I shall write more fully to your Lordship. In the meantime, I would only remark, that there appears to be a certainty of Russia uniting her counsels and her action to those of the other Powers.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

No. 135.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 23.)

(Extract.) *Vienna, July* 10, 1839.

PRINCE METTERNICH has had the goodness to communicate to me the Internuncio's despatches. It appears from them, that immediately upon the Sultan's death, his eldest son was proclaimed.

Orders were subsequently sent to Hafiz Pasha to suspend operations. This point then is gained, but the difficulty in inducing Mehemet Ali to relinquish Syria will remain entire.

Prince Metternich further informs me that, by way of doing a popular act upon the accession of the Sultan, the quarantines were all thrown open, which was received with general acclamation.

No. 136.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 23.)

(Extract.) *Vienna, July* 10, 1839.

I COMMUNICATED to Prince Metternich your Lordship's letter to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, of the 25th of June.

Before reading it, he remarked to me that the Note delivered by Admiral Roussin at Constantinople, and the instruction to Admiral Lalande, were both founded upon the false principle of an equality of right between the Sultan and the Pasha,—a principle which Austria could not adopt, and the falseness of which he had pointed out to M. de St. Aulaire.

After reading your Lordship's letter, Prince Metternich expressed his satisfaction with it in all its parts, and his sense of its completeness as an instruction. He has since dwelt much to me upon his astonishment that the French Government, with such an instruction before them, should have given one varying from it in essential points, incorrect in principle, and comparatively vague in its provisions.

I did not omit to point out to Prince Metternich the advantage of your Lordship's instruction over the Russian proposition, for confining hostilities within a certain district in case of their having commenced, in which, when he saw the application of the principle as laid down in your Lordship's letter, he fully concurred.

No. 137.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 23.)

(Extract.) *Vienna, July* 11, 1839.

IT appears certain that the Sultan died on the morning of the 29th, and that his death was kept secret for six-and-thirty hours, at the end of which period the only notification of it was the proclamation of his successor.

The orders to the Commanders, by sea and land, to suspend operations, were sent on the 28th or 29th. Admiral Roussin was ignorant, till some time afterwards, of this step having been taken, and he had received a refusal to his demand to be allowed to send an officer to the army of Hafiz Pasha. This refusal was founded upon various pretexts, and accompanied by a request to be furnished with the grounds of accommodation which he was authorized to propose between the Sultan and the Pasha. He was told that his first Note had not been laid before the Sultan, it being impossible to propose to his Highness to revert to the *statu quo;* but that if he would present a conciliatory reply, conveying a reasonable plan of arrangement, the clemency of the Sultan might probably be extended towards his vassal.

The leading Turkish Ministers have stated to Baron Stürmer, that if anything could have deterred them from ordering operations to be suspended, it would have been Admiral Roussin's tone in demanding it.

They further requested the Baron to apply to Prince Metternich for his advice how to act; and Hosrew Pasha stated, that if Mehemet Ali would restore Syria and Candia to the Porte, and would reduce his forces, the right of hereditary succession in Egypt might be secured to his family.

The documents, of which I have here given a summary, will be communicated to your Lordship, and to the French Government.

Prince Metternich's answer to Constantinople will approve of the suspension of hostilities; will recommend the Porte to keep its army and fleet entire, withdrawing them out of the reach of daily collisions; and will recommend them to await in total stillness the overtures of the

European Powers. To Mehemet Ali, the Prince will give the same advice, under pain of destruction, if he neglects it.

As to the plan of pacification, Prince Metternich fully adopts your Lordship's ideas; but the Porte having itself designated the terms upon which it is willing to confer Egypt upon the family of Mehemet Ali, he considers these, consisting of the restitution of Syria and Candia, and the disarming, as a *sine quâ non;* whereas the restitution of the eastern coast of the Red Sea, and the terms upon which Egypt is to be held as a fief, are open to negotiation.

His plan for the conduct of this negotiation is the following. It must begin at Constantinople, and will be complete when the Porte shall have agreed with the Five Powers upon the terms to be granted to the Pasha: this agreement to be consigned to official notes. When this is done, the Five Powers will notify to the Pasha the terms, and call upon him to accept them, supporting their intimation by such pressure, in case of refusal, as may be sufficient to determine his assent. This assent being obtained, the arrangement to be placed under the guarantee of the Five Powers. The outline of the terms is already sketched, and may be considered as adopted by England, Austria, Prussia, and Russia. France remains; and Prince Metternich requests the British Government to persuade France.

As to the eastern coast of the Red Sea, the amount of tribute, the obligation of treaties, present and future, entered into by the Porte, upon the Pasha, and the extent of reduction of force to be required of him; these, although of minor importance, are yet points which will offer many difficulties, and which must be regulated with the Porte, before an ultimatum can be presented to the Pasha. The only difficulty of treating them will be with France, and it will be for your Lordship to determine whether to treat them at Paris or here. I shall request Prince Metternich, in case your Lordship decides upon the former place, to direct Count Appony to give all the assistance in his power.

In the question of disarming, it is probable that the Porte will insist, as it is entitled to do, upon a diminution of Mehemet Ali's fleet, and this diminution is precisely what will be most unpleasant to France, who has always looked upon the naval power of Egypt as a reinforcement to her own, and thereby a counterpoise to our maritime superiority in the Mediterranean. If, therefore, this branch of the question is to be treated here, it will be necessary that I should be furnished with instructions as to the amount of reduction to be insisted upon, and the mode, specifying whether any part of the fleet is to be given up to the Sultan.

When this is settled, it will be necessary to establish the relations between the negotiation at Vienna and the Ambassadors at Constantinople.

It is clear that Vienna in its relations with that place is nearly a month a-head of London and Petersburgh. It will therefore be for your Lordship to provide, that when the proposition to be presented to the Porte has been assented to by the Five Powers, it shall receive the support of Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople. The application of the Porte to Prince Metternich for advice, and the proximity of this Capital, throw this branch of the negotiation very much into his hands; nor, considering the identity of his objects with our own, can it be better placed. The amount of this exclusive direction will be augmented or diminished in proportion to the number of references which shall be necessary to London and Paris.

When we come to treat with Egypt, the Maritime Powers must take the lead; and the first question will arise upon the mode of summoning the Pasha to accept the ultimatum of the Porte.

The modes are three,—by the Consuls, by the Admirals, or by a Commissioner to be sent on board the fleet. If the latter be preferred, how is the Commissioner to be chosen, and from whence is he to be sent? In either of the three alternatives, it will be necessary that the Admirals should be instructed how to act in case of Mehemet Ali's refusal to accept the Sultan's offer.

Prince Metternich believes that the moral weight of the Five Powers acting in concert will determine the submission of the Pasha, but if it should not, I cannot but doubt the efficacy of a blockade to induce him to evacuate Syria. That country is reported to be provided with warlike stores for more than one campaign, nor would it be difficult to organize a transport by camels across the Desert. The Pasha's fleet would be laid up in port, and his commerce would pass under neutral flags. In such a case, the Russian proposition to consider ourselves in a state of war might be found the only one efficacious.

If any part of this second branch of the negotiation is to be treated from hence, (and I do not see, after an agreement has been come to at Constantinople, what can be gained by references to Paris and London,) it will be requisite that the Admirals should be furnished with instructions, and the negotiation here with directions for its guidance.

I have comprised in this despatch the result of many conversations with Prince Metternich, with the view of assisting the deliberations of Her Majesty's Government.

P. S.—I see I have omitted a consideration of much importance; it is, that whenever a common proposition shall have been agreed upon by the Five Powers, all separate communications either from the Ambassadors or from the Courts should cease.

If Mehemet Ali were to remark a difference of meaning, or even of tone, between any one of these and the collective language of the Alliance, the chance of his submission would be much diminished.

No. 138.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 23.)

My Lord, *Vienna, July* 11, 1839.

PRINCE METTERNICH has received answers from St. Petersburgh, to his despatches of 14th June. They were copying for transmission to London and Paris, so that I did not see them; but the Prince assures me that they bespeak an identity of views with Austria. The despatches to which they reply, did no more than convey Prince Metternich's first communications to Constantinople. Prince Jablonowski, who left this on the 21st, bearing a private letter from Prince Metternich, recommending the establishment of a central point of negotiation, had but just reached Petersburgh before their departure; a further courier, therefore, must be expected with the official answer to this proposition; but Russia already adopts the principle, that everything is to be done in common.

Upon all the details Prince Metternich agrees to your Lordship's ideas without reserve, and is sure of their adoption by Russia: so that, according to him, England, Austria, and Russia, are placed exactly upon the same line, and there only remains to induce France to relinquish her deviations from it.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

No. 139.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 23.)

(Extract.) *Vienna, July* 11, 1839.

I THIS day applied to Prince Metternich upon the subject of the Austrian squadron. He told me it would consist of nine sail; that the Archduke had been ordered to hold himself in readiness to embark; but that its sailing would be delayed until an answer should be received from Paris to an application calling upon the French Government to conform its instruction to its Admiral to that which had been given by England;

the principle of parity between the Sultan and the Pasha being one which Austria could not admit, any more than she could its application to the equal treatment of their vessels. Till this was done, Prince Metternich said the Austrian squadron could not join the combined fleet, as it would not know with whom to act.

No. 140.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received July* 23.)

(Extract.) *Vienna, July* 12, 1839.

PRINCE METTERNICH has just communicated to me the whole of his despatches to Paris with their inclosures. They will be laid before your Lordship. His despatch upon the incorrectness of principle in the instructions to Admiral Lalande, is a masterpiece of argument. It treats the difference between the French and English Instructions as merely apparent, assuming and proving that the real thought of the French Cabinet cannot be other than that of England and Austria.

The despatch of Count Fiquelmont is conclusive upon this point, the Emperor regarding Mehemet Ali only as a rebellious subject.

No. 141.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received July* 23.)

My Lord, *Vienna, July* 14, 1839.

THE departure of Prince Metternich's courier was suspended, by the arrival of an estafette from Constantinople. I inclose Lord Ponsonby's despatches received by this occasion; those of the Internuncio will be communicated by Prince Esterhazy. There are two differences between them. The first is, that Baron Stürmer mentions it to be intended by the Porte to apprize Mehemet Ali that the Sultan may be induced to appoint one of his sons to the Pashalic of one of the Provinces he (Mehemet Ali) at present holds, which is virtually a relinquishment of Syria to Ibrahim Pasha. The other, that the Internuncio notifies the consent of the Representatives of the Five Powers having been given to support the propositions of the Porte, while Lord Ponsonby only speaks of their having agreed to notify the facts to the Consuls. There is a further difference between this overture made by Nouri Effendi, and the one he made to the Internuncio; in that, the evacuation of the Holy Cities was omitted, as in this, is the disarming.

Prince Metternich intends making no change in the attitude Austria has taken; on the contrary, the squadron will receive immediate orders to join the combined one of England and France, in the Levant. He holds that no difference of sentiment has taken place in the Turkish Councils; that the tranquillity now sought to be re-established would not last; and that the European Powers having been brought forwards, must carry through the task they have undertaken.

The reasoning upon which this opinion is founded will be laid before your Lordship, and appears to me to be founded in truth.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

No. 142.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 24.)

My Lord, *Therapia, July* 1, 1839.

THE death of His Majesty the Sultan was not expected to take place so soon, for there had been alleviations of the malady, though not such as to give well-grounded hopes of his recovery. The event obliges the Internuncio to dispatch an estafette without delay, and I have no time to write as I wish to do upon so serious a subject as the state of this country; but I did write some time ago to Lord Beauvale, and I have now written a hasty letter to him, in which I have summarily given such opinions as I should lay before Her Majesty's Government in an official form if I had time; and perhaps Lord Beauvale will have the goodness to communicate them to your Lordship, if he thinks they ought to be submitted.

I regret that it is not competent to me to suggest any measures to the Admiral commanding Her Majesty's squadron, for I am of opinion that the presence of the squadron at the Dardanelles would be useful, and perhaps necessary to prevent the occurrence of things that may be disadvantageous to Her Majesty's interests in this country.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 143.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 24.)

My Lord, *Therapia, July* 2, 1839.

I RECEIVED, this evening, from his Excellency Nouri Effendi, a note, of which I inclose copy. The meeting probably will not be over in time to allow me afterwards to write by post, and therefore I will report now what I have good reason to believe is the substance of the business intended to be brought forward by the Ottoman Ministers,—namely, a communication of a resolution taken by the Sublime Porte, to propose to Mehemet Ali to make the Government of Egypt hereditary in his family on the terms of vassalage and tribute, provided he consents to restore Syria, and Candia, and Mecca, and Medina, to the Sultan.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 143.

Nouri Effendi to Viscount Ponsonby.

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur, *Constantinople, le* 20 *Rebi-el-akhir,* 1255.

CHARGE d'ordre Souverain de faire à votre Excellence une communication importante, je m'empresse de la prévenir du désir que j'ai d'avoir l'honneur de m'entretenir avec elle, et de la prier par conséquent de vouloir bien se rendre à ma maison de campagne à Emirghienoghlou, demain à 5 heures à la Turque.

Agréez, &c.,
(Signé) NOURI.

(Translation.)

Nouri Effendi to Viscount Ponsonby.

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur, *Constantinople, 20th Rebi-el-akhir*, 1255.

CHARGED, by order of my Sovereign, to make to your Excellency an important communication, I hasten to acquaint you of my desire to have the honour of conversing with you, and consequently to request that you will have the goodness to come to my country-house at Emirghien-oghlou, to-morrow at 5 o'clock, Turkish time.

Receive, &c.,
(Signed) NOURI.

No. 144.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 24.)

My Lord, *Therapia, July* 3, 1839.

IN pursuance of the desire of the Sublime Porte, the Ministers of the Five Great Powers assembled this day at the House of the Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs. Nouri Effendi was the only Ottoman Minister present. He stated, that the Sultan had commanded him to assure the Ministers, in his Highness' name, of his esteem and friendship for the Sovereigns they represented, and his warm desire to cultivate by every means the good understanding that existed between their Governments and the Ottoman Porte. This was handsomely expressed according to Turkish forms.

His Excellency proceeded to say, he was commanded to make known to the Ministers of his Allies and friends, that the Sultan, being animated by the wish to put an end to the calamities which pressed heavily upon his people, in consequence of the conduct of the Pasha of Egypt, and the anger he had excited in the bosom of the late Sultan Mahmoud, had determined to send one of the eminent men of his Court to offer the Egyptian Pasha pardon for the past, and assurance of favour for the future (of which the Sultan sent a decoration as the mark and evidence), and to promise that his Highness would confer upon the Pasha and his family the hereditary government of Egypt to be held by the Pasha and his descendants as vassals, on the condition that Syria, &c. should be immediately restored to the Sultan.

Nouri Effendi asked for the opinion of the Ministers, who replied that they would rejoice in the restoration of peace, and were warmly desirous of the prosperity of his Highness; that, being uninstructed by their Governments, they could not give any opinion as to the terms which the Sublime Porte was about to propose to the Pasha, but they would not fail to report to their Governments the communication they had received.

Questions were asked to ascertain precisely the nature of the proposal intended to be made to the Pasha, and it was distinctly understood, that the Sultan would grant to Mehemet Ali the hereditary government of Egypt, within the boundaries that were formerly the limits of that country; that is, as I understand it, the limits that used to circumscribe the country as a Pashalic.

It was asked if it was intended to leave Mehemet Ali in possession of Syria, or of Mecca, or Medina, or St. John d'Acre, and the reply was in the negative. The Ministers thought it right to confine themselves to inquiries directed solely to the perfect elucidation of what was stated to them, and not to enter at all into discussion of the merits of the proposition.

Nouri Effendi desired the Ministers to write to the Consuls of their respective Governments; and the Ministers agreed to notify the facts and what had taken place to the Consuls.

I will forward by the French steamer, copy of my letter to Colonel Campbell.

There were questions asked as to the state of the armies in Syria, and Nouri Effendi said that orders had been sent, which would be received by Hafiz Pasha in about ten days, peremptorily commanding him not to engage in any act of hostility; and he added, that Mahomed Ali Bey had already carried orders to that officer to avoid attacking the Egyptian Army, and said the Porte had no intelligence of any fighting having taken place of greater magnitude than skirmishes between detached bodies of Irregulars, and so forth.

The Sultan's measure has the advantage of showing his disposition to live on friendly terms with the Pasha: he offers pardon and oblivion as to the past, and favour as to the future. He shows that the Pasha has not to fear from him the effects of personal hate, as he had from the deceased Mahmoud; and takes from the Pasha the excuse that fear afforded him for his armaments. He throws the defence upon the Pasha of continued rebellion, and of the disturbance of the peace of the world, which will be the consequence of his pursuit of projects of aggrandizement and ambition.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 145.

Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, July* 23, 1839.

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a draft of Note which Baron Roussin has been instructed to present to the Turkish Government, requesting that if the naval or military forces of other Powers are invited to Constantinople, the French Squadron may be permitted to pass the Dardanelles.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 146.

Draft of Note to be presented to the Porte by Admiral Roussin.—(Communicated by Baron de Bourqueney, July 18.)

Juillet, 1839.

LE Soussigné, Ambassadeur de France, a reçu l'ordre de faire la communication suivante à Son Excellence M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la Sublime Porte.

Les graves événemens qui viennent d'éclater en Syrie, imposent à la politique des Cours Européennes l'obligation de prévoir jusqu'aux chances les plus invraisemblables de la crise qu'ils ont fait naître.

Il est sans doute bien peu probable qu'on voie renaître aujourd'hui les dangers qui en 1833 menaçaient la capitale même de l'Empire Ottoman, et forçaient la Porte à accepter un appui étranger. Sans parler des autres circonstances qui, depuis lors, se sont tant modifiées, il y a tout lieu d'espérer que les efforts des Grandes Puissances Européennes pour arrêter les hostilités à peine commencées, préviendront des extrémités semblables.

Encore une fois, pourtant, il faut tout prévoir, et l'histoire présente trop d'exemples d'accidens inattendus qui ont trompé les calculs des Gouvernemens les plus forts et les plus habiles, pour que la Sublime Porte puisse considérer comme une injure, l'hypothèse d'un désastre qui l'obligerait de nouveau à réclamer, pour sa défense, l'appui de ses Alliés.

Le jour où l'existence du trône du Sultan serait réellement compromise, elle les trouverait tous disposés à lui accorder leur concours pour prévenir une catastrophe qui, en ébranlant l'équilibre politique, mettrait en péril

la paix du monde, dont le maintien les intéresse tous au même degré. A Pétersbourg, à Vienne, à Berlin, à Londres, à Paris, il n'y a qu'un sentiment à cet égard.

Dans un tel état de choses, la Sublime Porte comprendrait sans doute que le moyen le plus assuré de concilier avec la nécessité fâcheuse où elle se trouverait réduite, le soin de sa dignité et même de sa sûreté, ce serait de demander, non pas à une Puissance en particulier, mais à l'Europe entière, l'appui qui lui serait devenu indispensable. Un grand Empire ne déchoit pas, en effet, en se plaçant sous la protection des grands intérêts Européens. Il trouve dans la diversité même de ces intérêts, lorsqu'ils se réunissent pour venir à son aide, la garantie certaine que cette protection ne pourra pas se transformer en une suprématie dangereuse pour son indépendance.

Le systême de conduite que cette considération puissante indique à la Sublime Porte est d'ailleurs le seul qui s'accorde avec les convenances et les justes susceptibilités de la politique des Grandes Cours, dont il lui importe certainement de tenir compte.

Le Gouvernement du Roi a donc la conviction qu'il va au-devant des intentions de la Sublime Porte en demandant que, dans le cas où les forces de terre ou de mer d'une ou de plusieurs des Cours Alliées seraient appelées à Constantinople, les ordres fussent donnés pour ouvrir immédiatement le passage des Dardanelles à une escadre Française qui viendrait, de son côté, protéger le trône du Sultan contre les périls dont l'imminence aurait déterminé une telle mesure.

Le Soussigné prie Son Excellence M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de lui faire parvenir le plus promptement possible, la réponse de la Sublime Porte à cette communication, pour qu'il puisse, ainsi qu'il en a l'ordre, l'envoyer sur le champ à Paris.

(Signé) BARON ROUSSIN.

(Translation.)

Draft of Note to be presented to the Porte by Admiral Roussin.

July, 1839.

THE Undersigned, Ambassador of France, has received orders to make the following communication to his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Sublime Porte.

The serious events which have just occurred in Syria, render it obligatory upon the policy of the Courts of Europe to anticipate even the most improbable chances of the crisis which those events have produced.

It is indeed very little likely, that a recurrence should be witnessed at the present time of those perils, which, in 1833, menaced even the capital of the Ottoman Empire, and forced the Porte to accept foreign support. Without mentioning the other circumstances which since that time have been so much modified, there is every reason to hope, that the efforts of the Great European Powers to put a stop to hostilities which have scarcely commenced, will prevent the like extremities.

Once again, however, it is necessary to anticipate everything, and history offers too many instances of unlooked-for accidents which have deceived the calculations of the strongest and most skilful Governments, for the Sublime Porte to regard as an insult the supposition of a disaster which might compel it again to solicit for its defence the support of its Allies.

The day that the existence of the Sultan's throne should really be compromised, the Porte would find them all inclined to afford it their co-operation to prevent a catastrophe which, by shaking the political balance, would endanger the peace of the world, in the maintenance of which they are all interested to the same degree. At Petersburgh, at Vienna, at Berlin, at London, and at Paris, there is but one opinion in this respect.

In such a state of things, the Sublime Porte would doubtless understand that the surest method of reconciling a regard for its dignity, and even for its security, with the grievous necessity to which it would find

itself reduced, would be, to request, not from one Power in particular, but from the whole of Europe, the support which would be indispensable for it. A great Empire, in fact, is not degraded by placing itself under the protection of the great European interests. It finds even in the diversity of those interests, when they unite in coming to its succour, the sure guarantee that this protection cannot be transformed into a supremacy dangerous to its independence.

The system of conduct which this weighty consideration indicates to the Sublime Porte is, moreover, the only one which is consistent with the duties and the just susceptibilities of the policy of the Great Courts, which it is certainly important for the Porte to pay attention to.

His Majesty's Government therefore is persuaded, that it meets the intentions of the Sublime Porte by requesting that, in the event of the land or sea forces of one or more of the Allied Courts being invited to Constantinople, orders may be given immediately to open the passage of the Dardanelles to a French squadron, which, on its part, would arrive for the protection of the throne of the Sultan against the perils, the imminence of which would have led to such a measure being determined upon.

The Undersigned requests his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs to forward to him as quickly as possible the answer of the Sublime Porte to this communication, in order that he may immediately send it, as he is instructed to do, to Paris.

(Signed) BARON ROUSSIN.

No. 147.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 25.)

My Lord,

Paris, July 22, 1839.

THE inclosed telegraphic despatches, one from the French Ambassador at Constantinople, and the other from the French Consul-General at Alexandria, were sent to me this day by Marshal Soult. The intelligence they contain, though coming from opposite quarters, is in substance the same; and no doubt, therefore, can be entertained of the complete rout of the Turkish army under Hafiz Pasha.

I was not at home this morning when Count Appony called upon me, but I have just been told by Marshal Soult, that the Austrian Ambassador has received despatches from Prince Metternich, containing accounts from Constantinople of the 3rd, stating that an entire change in the politics of the Divan had taken place.

The Internuncio writes, that Nouri Effendi had communicated to him, and also to the other Ambassadors of the Great European Powers, that the Sultan had determined to accord to Mehemet Ali the hereditary right to the government of Egypt; and that he proposed sending an Envoy of rank and consideration to Alexandria, charged to communicate to the Pasha this determination, and to deliver to him the decoration of the highest order in the Turkish Empire, with magnificent presents. The Marshal Soult was inclined to think that the news of the battle of the 24th of June, though not divulged, must have reached Constantinople on the 3rd, and that the intelligence of this disaster caused the sudden veering in the politics of the Turkish Government; but in Admiral Roussin's despatch of the 8th, from Therapia, it is stated, that the Porte had only just received the news of the battle. It is not improbable that the partizans of Mehemet Ali at Constantinople, relieved from the terror inspired by the Sultan Mahmoud, may have gained an ascendancy in the councils of the new sovereign. It seems, however, that Prince Metternich had instructed the Internuncio to dissuade, if possible, the Sultan from thus prostrating himself before Mehemet Ali, and to engage him to rely upon the European Powers for protection.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 147.

Telegraphic Despatch from Marseilles, of the 22nd July, at 5 A. M.

Le Consul-Général à M. le Président du Conseil des Ministres.

Alexandrie, le 6.

L'ARMEE Egyptienne sous les ordres d'Ibrahim Pacha ayant attaqué l'armée Turque commandée par le Séraskier Hafiz Pacha, à Nézib, au-delà d'Alep, celle-ci a abandonné le champ de bataille après un combat de deux heures. Tout le matériel, en fusils, canons, et munitions, est tombé au pouvoir des Egyptiens. Ibrahim a écrit cette nouvelle le 25 Juin, sous la tente du Général-en-Chef Turc. Il était de retour à Antab le 28, mais avait donné ordre à trois régimens d'infanterie et trois régimens de cavalerie de se porter en avant sur Ourfa et Diarbékir.

(Translation.)

Telegraphic Despatch from Marseilles of the 22nd July, at 5 A.M.

The Consul-General to the President of the Council of Ministers.

Alexandria, the 6th.

THE Egyptian Army under the orders of Ibrahim Pasha, having attacked the Turkish Army commanded by the Seraskier Hafiz Pasha, at Nezib, beyond Aleppo, the latter abandoned the field of battle after an action of two hours. All the *matériel*, in guns, cannon, and ammunition, has fallen into the power of the Egyptians. Ibrahim wrote this intelligence the 25th of June, from the tent of the Turkish General-in-Chief. He had returned to Aintab on the 28th, but had ordered three regiments of Infantry and three regiments of Cavalry, to advance upon Orfa and Diarbekir.

Inclosure 2 in No. 147.

Telegraphic Despatch from Marseilles of the 22nd July, at 3 P.M.

Thérapia, le 8.

LA Porte vient de recevoir la nouvelle qu'une bataille a été livrée dans le voisinage d'Alep, le 24 Juin, et que l'Armée Turque a été détruite. Les débris ont repassé la frontière, et on ne dit pas que l'Armée Egyptienne les ait poursuivis.

(Translation.)

Telegraphic Despatch from Marseilles of the 22nd July, at 3 P.M.

Therapia, the 8th.

THE Porte has just received the intelligence that a battle has been fought in the neighbourhood of Aleppo, on the 24th of June, and that the Turkish Army has been destroyed. The remains have repassed the frontier, and it is not said that the Egyptian Army has pursued them.

No. 148.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received July* 26.)

My Lord, *Therapia, July* 8, 1839.

I INCLOSE copy of a letter to me from his Excellency the French Ambassador, stating that Ahmed Pasha had sent his second in command, Osman Bey, to Admiral Lalande, &c. &c. &c.

I had a long conversation with his Excellency, and he read me parts of Admiral Lalande's despatch. Ahmed Pasha accused Hosrew and Halil Pasha of having murdered Sultan Mahmoud, and of the intention to give up this country to the Russians. He said he had written on the 2d July to Hafiz Pasha, to call upon him to march with his army to depose the present Minister by force. That he (Ahmed) would ask Mehemet Ali for his support in the undertaking, and announced his intention to take the Ottoman fleet to Candia. Admiral Lalande said, that Candia belongs to Mehemet Ali, and it would be to deliver up the Ottoman fleet to him; and the Pasha subsequently said he would go to Rhodes.

The French Ambassador communicated what he had heard to the Grand Vizier, accompanied with assurances of the friendship of the French Government, &c. I wrote to the Grand Vizier, and said that Her Majesty's Government would act as a faithful Ally.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

P.S.—I inclose copies of my letters to Admiral Stopford, and to Colonel Campbell.

P.

Inclosure 1 in No. 148.

Baron Roussin to Viscount Ponsonby.

Thérapia, le 7 *Juillet*, 1839.

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur et cher Collègue,

UN événement grave vient d'arriver; j'apprends directement et avec certitude que le Capitan Pacha est en insurrection avec sa flotte, contre le Gouvernement de Sa Hautesse, et est parti pour Rhodes, prétendant que ce Gouvernement est vendu à la Russie; il dit avoir envoyé un Tatare à Hafiz Pacha pour l'engager à marcher avec son armée sur Constantinople pour y changer le Gouvernement. Ce Tatare serait parti le 2.

La tentative du Capitan Pacha est folle s'il se borne à rester à Rhodes avec sa flotte, puisqu'il n'a aucun moyen d'y subsister longtems; mais il peut se livrer à Méhémet Ali, à qui, dit-il, il a proposé la paix. Si l'avis qu'il a donné à Hafiz Pacha détermine ce Général-en-Chef à s'insurger aussi contre le Sultan, ces deux chefs des forces de terre et de mer peuvent renverser le Gouvernement de Sa Hautesse et organiser la guerre civile.

Il me semble que la conduite de nos Gouvernemens ne peut pas être douteuse dans cette circonstance: ils sont alliés du Sultan Abdoul Medjid, et leurs vœux seront pour lui; je viens pour le compte du mien d'en donner l'assurance au Gouvernement de Sa Hautesse. Comme je ne fais pas un seul doute sur la parfaite intelligence qui existe entre les nôtres, je vous offre, Monsieur l'Ambassadeur et cher Collègue, de m'unir à vous pour nous concerter sur toutes les mesures que nous pouvons avoir à prendre, et sur les conseils à donner au Gouvernement de Sa Hautesse dans cette circonstance.

Agréez, &c.,
(Signé) BARON ROUSSIN.

(Translation.)

Baron Roussin to Viscount Ponsonby.

Therapia, July 7, 1839.

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur and dear Colleague,

AN important event has just happened; I learn directly and for certain, that the Capudan Pasha is in insurrection with his fleet against the Government of His Highness, and has set out for Rhodes, pretending that this Government is sold to Russia; he says that he has sent a Tatar to Hafiz Pasha to persuade him to march on Constantinople with his Army, to change the Government there. That Tatar would have set out the 2nd.

The attempt of the Capudan Pasha is foolish if he only remains at Rhodes with his fleet, since he has not any means of subsisting there for a length of time; but he may deliver himself up to Mehemet Ali, to whom, he says, he has proposed peace. If the advice which he has given to Hafiz Pasha determines that General-in-Chief to rebel also against the Sultan, these two Chiefs of the land and sea forces may overthrow the Government of His Highness and organize a civil war.

It appears to me that there can be no doubt as to the conduct of our Governments in this matter; they are the Allies of the Sultan Abdul Medjid, and their wishes will be in his favour: I have given this assurance to the Government of His Highness on the part of my own. As I have not the least doubt of the perfect understanding which exists between ours, I propose, Monsieur l'Ambassadeur and dear Colleague, to join with you in order that we may concert together respecting all the measures which we may have to adopt, and with reference to the advice to be given to the Government of His Highness in this matter.

Accept, &c.,
(Signed) BARON ROUSSIN.

Inclosure 2 in No. 148.

Viscount Ponsonby to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford.

Sir, *Therapia, July* 7, 1839.

I INCLOSE for your information, copy of a letter to me from the French Ambassador; and I have to add, that his Excellency has assured the Sublime Porte that it will find in the Government of His Majesty the King of the French, support, &c.

I have assured the Porte, that Her Majesty's Government will perform all that is incumbent upon a faithful Ally.

I have to add, that intelligence has this day been received of the total defeat of Hafiz Pasha by the Egyptian troops on the 24th June. It is said that Hafiz Pasha acted in direct opposition to the counsel given him by the Prussian officers with his army.

These events place us in a most critical situation. I presume to think that Her Majesty's squadron ought not to be at any distance from the centre of affairs.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 3 in No. 148.

Viscount Ponsonby to Colonel Campbell.

Sir, *Therapia, July* 7, 1839.

I INCLOSE copy of a letter which will inform you of what has taken place. The statement comes from Admiral Lalande, who was visited by the second in command of the Ottoman Fleet, Osman Bey, bearer of a message from Ahmed Pasha.

It seems Ahmed asserts, that the Sultan was murdered by Hosrew Pasha, now Grand Vizier, and Halil Pasha; that those persons intend to give up this country to Russia; that it is necessary to oblige the Sultan to appoint another Ministry.

The, Capudan Pasha proposed to go to Candia: but as Admiral Lalande pointed out to the messenger, Osman Bey, that Candia belonged to Mehemet Ali, and that to carry the Ottoman Fleet there, would be to deliver it up to that Pasha, Osman seemed struck with the remark, and said the Capudan Pasha would go to Rhodes.

Admiral Lalande said he had no orders to interfere by force with the movements of the Ottoman Fleet. He has ordered a French brig of war to observe the motions of that fleet.

The French Ambassador communicated the facts to the Sublime Porte, and has assured the Sultan of the devotion of the French Government to the cause of the Sultan, &c. He has advised the Porte to send couriers in all haste to Hafiz Pasha; and I believe he has advised that orders should be given for the recall of the army back to this neighbourhood. I shall give advice, that the army be left where it is, because that part of the Empire ought not to be exposed to become the prey of Mehemet Ali.

The Ambassador has desired the French Consul-General to place before Mehemet Ali the expediency of his remaining quiet, and to show him that all the Great Powers must interfere in this crisis, and that his part is to be acquiescent.

I have to beg of you to say, that the Pasha will do well to reflect upon the inadequacy of his own means to resist the force of the united Sovereigns, and that his wisdom will direct him to avoid the consequences that may attend imprudence.

I have assured the Porte of the firm support of the British Government.

I have only the shortest time for writing, therefore I confine myself to the principal facts. It is not easy to believe Ahmed Pasha has taken this step (unless he be mad) without having some support somewhere; but as yet there are no signs here of any disposition to make a disturbance. I think the end may be, that Ahmed Pasha will offer the Fleet to Mehemet Ali. It is to be seen whether or not he will be able to give it to him.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 149.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 26.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, July* 8, 1839.

COUNT KŒNIGSMARCK yesterday received intelligence of the total defeat of the Ottoman Army by Ibrahim Pasha, on the 24th of June. The Count informed M. de Bouténeff of the fact, who told it to me a few minutes afterwards.

Count Königsmarck's information came from the Baron de Vincke, who had received the news from one of the Prussian officers attached to the army of Hafiz; and, as I understand, that Pasha had reached Marash in his flight.

Count Königsmarck said, that Hafiz Pasha had acted in direct opposition to the counsel given him by the Prussian officers; that he said it was a disgrace to fight behind ditches and walls; and that he abandoned his position.

The opinion of the Prussian officers is stated to have been, that Ibrahim Pasha would have been reduced to great straits had Hafiz Pasha acted with any sort of skill, and had avoided the most capital faults. Sultan Mahmoud had given Hafiz strict orders not to risk a battle in the plain, but to defend his positions. I did all in my power to cause Hafiz to be subjected to the advice of a skilful man, and to bind him down by orders, so as to deprive him of the power of producing ruin by his rashness.

It is said, Ibrahim Pasha desires to push on for Constantinople, but that Mehemet Ali purposes to take possession of Diarbekir, and the Pashalic of Bagdad, &c. If the advance upon Constantinople be made, Russia will be bound by the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi to aid the Sultan. If the supposed policy of Mehemet Ali be followed, I think Russia will not move.

Before these late events, and after the death of Mahmoud, I told the Grand Vizier that I thought it very possible the Ottoman Army would be defeated; and I advised him in that case to avoid, with pertinacity, making any concessions to Mehemet Ali, of territory, &c., before the advice of the Great Powers should be given. He assured me, that he would not make any concessions before being informed of the opinion of the Great Powers. It is not impossible that Hosrew knew, when he answered me, that Hafiz had been defeated; but I do not state this as a ground upon which to form an opinion of what his conduct will be.

No. 150.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received July* 26.)

(Extract.) *Vienna, July* 17, 1839.

I THIS day received the inclosed despatches from Lord Ponsonby by an Austrian estafette. It appears to me so desirable that Prince Metternich's communications should accompany them to England, that I shall delay a day in forwarding them, to give time for this to be done.

Your Lordship will perceive that the first news of the battle which reached the Corps Diplomatique at Constantinople, was through Count Königsmarck, who received it on the 7th of July, thirteen days after the action had been fought. It is not to be believed that the Turkish Government had not learnt it sooner; and Prince Metternich is in possession of reports which prove to his satisfaction, that the defeat was known before the overture to Mehemet, and that it decided that measure. The hasty manner in which it was carried into effect, and the strange confused letter of the Grand Vizier to the Pasha, indicate the state of feeling under which it was written.

It is called a battle, but in fact there was none, the whole Turkish army having run away as soon as the cannonade grew hot.

Prince Metternich's instructions to the Internuncio will be communicated to your Lordship; but it is not easy to give directions for events which so far outstrip all previsions. With regard to the position of the Powers, it does not appear to me to be much changed by what has happened. By the inclosed précis of a report from the Austrian Consul at Alexandria, your Lordship will see that the attack was made by Ibrahim upon the receipt of Mehemet Ali's order to that effect. Captain Caillier, who bore the counter order, will have reached the camp within forty-eight hours after the defeat of the Turkish army, so that we may hope that Ibrahim will have halted upon the Euphrates. There seems to be far from a certainty of the fleet having gone over to Mehemet Ali; in which case it is possible that the ultimate loss may only be that of the Turkish army, which is to be considered as totally disbanded. This state of things, with the assistance of the Five Powers, might not be irreparable.

Inclosure in No. 150.

Extract from Colonel Laurin's Report to the Internuncio.

Alexandria, June 26.

IBRAHIM received the order to attack on the 15th, and a Tatar sent off on the 19th, by Ibrahim Pasha to Mehemet Ali, has just brought word that the army would be ready to attack on the 21st, and that this would positively take place on that day.

No. 151.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 26.)

(Extract.) *Vienna, July* 19, 1839.

IT was impossible not to feel that a new state of things has arisen since your instructions of 28th June were given. The death of the Sultan Mahmoud, the accession of a successor, the destruction of the army, the defection of the fleet, and the rivalry of the leading persons of the empire, have totally changed the state of things, and may be felt by Her Majesty's Government to require an alteration in their determinations. Under this impression, I thought it would be useful to transmit to your Lordship the views of the Austrian Government upon the altered posture of affairs; and being prevented by indisposition from calling on Prince Metternich on the evening of the 17th, I addressed a letter to him. The next day passed without my being able to obtain an answer; and as I am still unable to go to the Prince, Baron Neümann has this instant come to me, from whom I learn, that he purposes sending a courier in a few days to London, by whom he will enter into a full consideration of the actual posture of affairs.

I would remark to your Lordship, that it appears highly probable that the Porte and the Pasha will come to an agreement. The overture, of which Akiff Effendi is the bearer, having been sent with the knowledge of the defeat of the Turkish Army, it is to be supposed that he is authorized to submit to the Pasha's conditions; and Mehemet Ali will prefer closing at once with the Sultan in a moment of defeat, rather than await the interposition of the Five Powers.

No. 152.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 26.)

My Lord, *Vienna, July* 19, 1839.

PRINCE METTERNICH has just sent to me, by Baron Neümann, Prince Esterhazy's report of an interview with your Lordship, in which you communicate to him your instructions to me of the 28th June, and your views upon the subject of the negotiation at Vienna.

The Prince is highly pleased with Prince Esterhazy's account of his conversation with your Lordship, and fully satisfied with your views upon the negotiation. The only thing he begs to suggest in addition, is the necessity of orders to the Ambassadors at Constantinople, and the Consuls at Alexandria, to abide by what they may receive from hence on the part of the Five Powers, and not to act independently of it.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

No. 153.

Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, July* 26, 1839.

YOUR Lordship's despatches to the 14th of July, by the Austrian courier, did not reach me till a late hour on the night of the 23rd instant, and after the messenger Kaye had been sent off to Vienna from this office.

I have to inform your Excellency, that the contents of your despatches have afforded the greatest pleasure to Her Majesty's Government.

Those despatches prove that there exists perfect identity between the views of Austria and those of England, upon the Turco-Egyptian Affair; and that full reliance may be placed upon the complete co-operation of Russia with the other Powers in effecting a permanent and satisfactory settlement of those important matters.

I have to instruct you to express to Prince Metternich the extreme gratification which is felt by Her Majesty's Government at this state of things, and to assure his Highness, that Her Majesty's Government fully appreciates the enlarged and statesmanlike views which he has been the first to sketch out upon these matters, and does ample justice to the ability of the combined arrangements by which he proposes to work those views out.

The Austrian Government shall have the zealous and cordial co-operation of that of Great Britain for the accomplishment of the great purpose which is aimed at; and Her Majesty's Government is perfectly convinced that France will be found to be as zealous and as sincere as Great Britain, in labouring to accomplish an object of such vital importance for the peace of Europe.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 154.

Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, July* 26, 1839.

I HAVE to state to your Excellency, that Her Majesty's Government fully concur with the Austrian Cabinet in thinking, that the death of the late Sultan ought to make no difference in the course which the Five Powers were prepared to pursue for the purpose of effecting a final settlement between the Sultan and the Pasha of Egypt; and Her Majesty's Government, from its knowledge of the sentiments and views of the Cabinet of Vienna, is also convinced that Austria will agree with England in opinion, that the objects aimed at by the Five Powers ought not in any degree to be affected by the defeat which the Turkish Army sustained at Nezib on the 24th of June.

The result of the battle of the 24th cannot entitle Mehemet Ali to any greater favour from the Five Powers, but rather the contrary; because the battle was fought in defiance of the remonstrances and warnings of the Five Powers, his army being the assailant, and the field of action having been beyond the frontier of Syria.

But neither can the results of that battle diminish the force of those political considerations which have led the Powers to think that the evacuation of Syria by Mehemet Ali is essential for the maintenance of the Turkish Empire, and consequently for the preservation of the peace of Europe: on the contrary, the results of that battle must tend to give additional force to those considerations, and to demonstrate the urgent necessity of not delaying to carry into execution so indispensable an arrangement. For the results of that battle, by weakening, for a time at least, the military means of defence possessed by the Sultan, renders it still more incumbent on the Five Powers to interpose, in order not only to rescue the Sultan from present danger, but to protect him from a recurrence of similar danger in future.

Nor, on the other hand, can that battle increase in any sensible degree the difficulties which the Five Powers may have to overcome in the practical execution of the proposed arrangement; for, on the contrary, in whatever degree the effectiveness of the Egyptian forces in Syria may have been diminished by the casualties and by the expenditure of stores, consequent upon the action and upon the operations connected with it, in the same proportion must the Pasha of Egypt become more sensible how much his military position in Syria might be affected, if the communication between Egypt and Syria by sea were to be cut off by the squadrons of the Allied Powers.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 155.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 27.)

My Lord, *Paris, July* 25, 1839.

I HAVE only time before the departure of the post, shortly to state the substance (which was this day communicated to me by Marshal Soult) of the despatches which were received late last night from Admiral Roussin, from M. Cochelet, and from Admiral Lalande, commanding the French squadron in the Levant. The despatches, at the time of my interview with the Marshal, were in the hands of the King at St. Cloud.

The most important part of their contents, namely, the total rout of the Turkish Army in Syria, was made known to the French Government by the Marseilles telegraph on Monday last, and communicated, I am told, to your Lordship on the following day by M. de Bourqueney. Next in importance to this intelligence is the news of the Turkish fleet having sailed from the Dardanelles in disobedience of the orders issued by the Turkish Government. It appears from Admiral Lalande's report, that the Capudan Pasha sent Osman Bey on board the French Admiral's vessel, to inform him that, in consequence of the ascendancy of Russian interest in Constantinople, he would not risk, by returning to the Sea of Marmora, placing the Ottoman fleet at the disposal of the Russians, and that he was proceeding with it to the Island of Candia. Admiral Lalande strongly remonstrated against this intention, observing, in the first place, that he was acting upon erroneous information; and secondly, that, under any circumstances, he had better go to the Isle of Rhodes than to Candia, which was in possession of the Egyptians, and which, in fact, would be the surrender of the Turkish fleet to Mehemet Ali. The Capudan Pasha apparently yielded to this advice. Admiral Roussin writes, that apprehensions are felt of insurrectional movements in Thessaly, as well as in Albania.

Mehemet Ali, according to M. Cochelet's reports, is in a state of great exultation at the success of Ibrahim Pasha, and talks of the necessity of the Sultan yielding to him the hereditary right, not only to the Government of Egypt, but also to that of all the Pashalics of Arabia, and the whole of Syria; and treats contemptuously all idea of a Russian army being able to thwart his views. Ibrahim Pasha had written to request that vessels should be sent for the transport to Egypt of 6,000 soldiers of the Turkish Army who had enlisted in the service of the Pasha, and for the conveyance to Alexandria, of the trophies of his victory.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 156.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received July* 29.)

My Lord, *Paris, July* 26, 1839.

I INCLOSE copies of the two telegraphic despatches from Marseilles which were communicated to me this morning by Marshal Soult. The first containing intelligence of the Capudan Pasha having proposed to Mehemet Ali to place under his protection the Turkish fleet which he commanded; and the second, stating that Akiff Effendi had arrived on the 10th at Alexandria, sent by the Sultan to announce to Mehemet Ali the death of his father Mahmoud; to confer upon him, with hereditary right, the government of Egypt and of Syria; to propose to him his being nominated Generalissimo and Supporter of the Turkish Empire; and to invite him to Constantinople to preside over the reorganization of the Administration.

I had not the opportunity of seeing Marshal Soult till nearly 6 o'clock this evening. He was at St. Cloud with the King in the early part of the day, and was obliged afterwards to attend a debate in the Chamber of Peers. In the short interview I had with his Excellency, he read to me several despatches of Admiral Roussin and of M. Cochelet; but as he informed me that copies of these papers will be sent this evening to M. de Bourqueney, to be communicated to your Lordship, it is unnecessary for me, during the short time I have left for writing before the departure of the messenger, to attempt giving a statement of their contents.

Your Lordship will learn from M. de Bourqueney also, that the French Government is of opinion, that neither the disastrous overthrow of the Turkish Army, nor the traitorous conduct of the Capudan Pasha, nor the prostrate attitude of the Divan, should affect the course which the Great Powers of Europe intended to pursue. That any arrangements made between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali at a moment when the advisers of the former were either paralyzed with fear, or treacherously seeking to promote their own interests by the sacrifice of the rights of their Sovereign, should be regarded as null; and that a declaration to that effect should be made to Mehemet Ali. The Marshal said he should write to the French Ambassador at Vienna this evening, to apprize Prince Metternich of this opinion of the French Government, and to urge its adoption by the Austrian Government.

I did not hesitate to express my belief, that Her Majesty's Government would entirely coincide in the view he took of this question, and would be prepared to join with the other Powers of Europe in resisting the pretensions of Mehemet Ali to the hereditary government of Syria, and all the Arabian Pashalics, besides that of Egypt, which he seemed determined to assert.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 156.

Telegraphic Despatch from Marseilles.

L'Agent des Affaires Etrangères à M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.

Marseille, 25 *Juillet,* 3 *h. du soir.*

LE 10, arrivée à Alexandrie de Akiff Effendi, envoyé par le jeune Sultan pour annoncer à Méhémet Ali la mort de son père; le confirmer dans le gouvernement de l'Egypte et de la Syrie, avec l'hérédité dans sa famille; et lui proposer l'oubli du passé, en le nommant Généralissime et soutien de l'Empire Turc; et en l'invitant à se rendre à Constantinople pour présider à la réorganisation de l'administration.

L'escadre Anglaise croise dans les parages de Chypre, et communique avec Alexandrie.

La "Gazette d'Agra" du 9 Mai, annonce que Runjeet Singh était dans un état désespéré.

Ces nouvelles ont été apportées à Malte par le paquebot Anglais "l'Acheron," parti d'Alexandrie le 14, et M. Fabreguette a profité du bateau à vapeur Anglais le "Blazer," qui arrive à l'instant, pour me les transmettre avec une dépêche pour vous, que je vous enverrai par le courrier de demain matin.

(Translation.)

Telegraphic Despatch from Marseilles.

The Agent of Foreign Affairs to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Marseilles, July 25, 3 P.M.

AKIFF EFFENDI arrived at Alexandria on the 10th, sent by the young Sultan to announce to Mehemet Ali the death of his father, to confirm him in the Government of Egypt and of Syria, with hereditary succession in his family; and to propose to him to forget the past, nominating him Generalissimo and support of the Turkish Empire, and inviting him to proceed to Constantinople to preside over the reorganization of the administration.

The English squadron is cruizing off Cyprus, and communicates with Alexandria.

The "Gazette d'Agra" of the 9th of May, announces that Runjeet Sing was in a hopeless state.

These news have been brought to Malta by the English Packet, "the Acheron," which left Alexandria the 14th, and M. Fabreguette has taken advantage of the English steam-boat the "Blazer", just arrived, to transmit them to me, with a despatch for you, which I will send you by the Courier of to morrow morning.

Inclosure 2 in No. 156.

Telegraphic Despatch from Marseilles.

L'Agent des Affaires Etrangères à M. le Président du Conseil.

Marseille, 25 *Juillet,* 3 *h. du soir.*

LE 8, on connaissait à Alexandrie la mort du Sultan. Le 9, arrivée à Alexandrie d'une Corvette Turque ayant à bord Negib Bey, Kiaja du Capitan Pacha, chargé d'annoncer au Vice-Roi la présence du Capitan Pacha à Stankio, se dirigeant sur Rhodes, et de lui proposer de placer la flotte Turque sous sa protection, pour la garantir contre les troubles à craindre par suite de la mort du Sultan. On ignore la réponse de

Méhémet Ali, qui a expédié le bateau à vapeur la "Mer Noire" au Capitan Pacha.

Le 10, arrivée à Alexandrie d'Akiff Effendi, envoyé par le jeune Sultan pour annoncer à Méhémet Ali la mort de son père.

(Translation.)

Telegraphic Despatch from Marseilles.

The Agent of Foreign Affairs to the President of the Council.

Marseilles, July 25, 3 P.M.

THE death of the Sultan was known at Alexandria on the 8th. On the 9th a Turkish Corvette arrived at Alexandria, having on board Negib Bey, Kiaja of the Capudan Pasha, having orders to inform the Viceroy, that the Capudan Pasha was at Stankio, on his way to Rhodes, and to propose to him to place the Turkish Fleet under his protection, to secure it against the troubles which it is feared may follow the death of the Sultan. The reply of Mehemet Ali, who has sent the steam-boat, the "Mer Noire," to the Capudan Pasha, is not known.

On the 10th, Akiff Effendi arrived at Alexandria, sent by the young Sultan to announce to Mehemet Ali the death of his father.

No. 157.

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.

(Extract.) *Foreign Office, July* 30, 1839.

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch of the 26th instant, reporting your conversation with Marshal Soult, as to the course which should be followed by the Five Powers in the present state of the affairs of the Levant.

Your Excellency will express to Marshal Soult, the great satisfaction with which Her Majesty's Government have learnt, that the sentiments of the Government of France upon these important matters coincide so exactly and entirely with their own; and your Excellency will assure Marshal Soult, that Her Majesty's Government fully agree with him in thinking, that neither the overthrow of the Turkish Army, nor the treachery of the Capudan Pasha, nor the timidity or submission of the Divan, ought to alter, in any degree, the course which the Five Powers had previously intended to pursue; and that any arrangements which may have been made between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, at a moment when the advisers of the Sultan were struck down with fear, or influenced by treacherous motives, ought to be regarded as null; and that a declaration to this effect should be made to Mehemet Ali. Her Majesty's Government will immediately instruct Lord Beauvale to make to the Austrian Government a communication upon this subject, similar to that which the French Government has instructed M. de St. Aulaire to make.

Her Majesty's Government sincerely rejoice at the complete identity of opinion on these most important matters between France and England; and they consider this identity as being the more valuable, because it has arisen spontaneously, each Government having been led to the same conclusion by its own view of the great European interests which are involved in these questions.

There can be no doubt, that this perfect union of England and France will confirm Austria in the course which she was herself one of the first to chalk out. With Austria, Prussia will go; and it is impossible that Russia can be unwilling to concur in the same course.

No. 158.

The Duc de Dalmatie to the Baron de Bourqueney.—(Communicated by the Baron de Bourqueney, July 29.)

(Extrait.) *Paris, le* 26 *Juillet*, 1839.

J'AI reçu les dépêches que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire jusqu'au No. 68 inclusivement. La réponse faite par Lord Palmerston à la déclaration dont je vous avais chargé de lui remettre copie, est de tous points satisfaisante. Les importantes nouvelles arrivées depuis quelques jours de l'Orient, ont donné à l'état des choses un aspect tout nouveau. Quelque inquiétude qu'on pût concevoir à l'avance sur la gravité des périls auxquels la politique adoptée en dernier lieu par le Sultan Mahmoud exposait l'Empire Ottoman, l'évènement a dépassé toutes les conjectures. La mort du Sultan, la défaite complète de l'Armée Turque en Syrie, la défection de la flotte, ont mis cet Empire dans une telle situation, que désormais la protection de l'Europe et la prudence de Méhémet Ali sont les seules garanties qui restent au trône du jeune Abdoul Medjid.

Les extraits ci-joints de ma correspondance de Constantinople et d'Alexandrie vous feront connaître les circonstances de ces grands évènemens. Vous y verrez aussi que la Porte, peu de jours après la mort de Mahmoud, lorsqu'elle ignorait encore la défection de la flotte, mais lorsque sans doute elle était déjà informée de la défaite d'Hafiz Pacha, a annoncé officiellement aux Représentans des Grandes Puissances, l'intention de se réconcilier avec le Vice-Roi, et de lui faire des concessions à cet effet. Vous y verrez également que Méhémet, exalté par le sentiment de la supériorité que lui donnaient les circonstances nouvellement survenues, se montrait disposé à de grandes exigences.

La rapidité avec laquelle marchent les évènemens peut sans doute faire craindre que la crise ne se dénoue d'un moment à l'autre par quelque arrangement dans lequel les Puissances Européennes n'auront pas le tems d'intervenir, et où, par conséquent, les intérêts essentiels de la politique générale ne seront pas pris en considération suffisante. Ce danger est une conséquence inévitable de la distance où nous sommes de Constantinople et d'Alexandrie; il n'y a pas moyen d'y rémédier d'une manière absolue. Je pense néanmoins qu'il convient de persister dans la marche suivie jusqu'à présent, et qui consiste en substance, à subordonner à un concert aussi intime et aussi soutenu que possible entre les Cabinets, l'action que chacun d'eux est en mesure d'exercer dans la Question d'Orient. Pour l'Angleterre comme pour la France, pour l'Autriche aussi, bien qu'elle ne le proclame pas aussi ouvertement, le principal, le véritable objet de ce concert, c'est de contenir la Russie, et de l'habituer à traiter en commun les Affaires Orientales. C'est assez dire que dans les conjonctures actuelles, il y a lieu plus que jamais de travailler à la resserrer.

Cela posé, je crois que les Puissances, tout en donnant une pleine approbation aux sentimens concilians manifestés par la Porte, doivent l'engager à ne rien précipiter, et à ne traiter avec le Vice-Roi que moyennant l'intermédiaire et le concours de ses alliés, dont la co-opération serait sans doute le meilleur moyen de lui ménager des conditions moins désavantageuses et mieux garanties.

Je crois qu'à Alexandrie, ces mêmes Puissances doivent tenir au Vice-Roi un langage propre à lui faire sentir que, quels que soient les avantages qu'il vient d'obtenir, il risquerait de les compromettre en voulant les pousser trop loin, et que s'il prétendait, dans quelque forme ou sous quelque prétexte que ce fût, arracher au Sultan des conditions incompatibles avec sa dignité et la sûreté de son trône, l'Europe entière interviendrait pour s'y opposer. Pour qu'un tel langage ait l'efficacité désirable, il faut que les Consuls soient mis en mesure de le tenir simultanément et en termes qui prouvent leur parfait accord. Il faut aussi que la fermeté, j'ai presque dit la sévérité, des conseils qu'il exprimera, soit tempérée par un ton de modération et de bienveillance qui, tout en avertissant la prudence

de Méhémet Ali, ne blesse pas trop fortement son orgueil et son ambition. Il y aurait certainement de l'affectation à paraitre croire qu'après les succès que vient de lui procurer la folle conduite de la Porte, il n'a rien à attendre de plus que ce qu'il était en droit de demander auparavant. Ce serait méconnaître l'empire des faits, les nécessités de la situation. Si le Vice-Roi acquérait la conviction qu'il ne doit rien espérer de l'équité des Puissances, il se révolterait contre leurs représentations impérieuses, et son irritation pourrait amener d'un moment à l'autre, des conséquences, dont la seule possibilité est de nature à effrayer tout esprit prévoyant.

Voilà, Monsieur, les premières impressions que le Gouvernement du Roi a reçues des dernières nouvelles de l'Orient. Veuillez en faire part à Lord Palmerston, et lui demander si elles sont conformes à la manière de voir du Cabinet Britannique. Je vous ferai bientôt connaître avec plus de détail des idées que je n'ai encore eu que le tems d'ébaucher.

(Translation.)

The Duke of Dalmatia to the Baron de Bourqueney.—(Communicated by the Baron de Bourqueney, July 29.)

(Extract.) *Paris, July* 26, 1839.

I HAVE received the despatches which you have done me the honour to address to me, to No. 68, inclusive. The reply made by Lord Palmerston to the declaration which I directed you to give him a copy of, is satisfactory on all points. The important intelligence received within the last few days from the East has given quite a new aspect to the state of things. Whatever uneasiness may have been felt beforehand as to the greatness of the dangers to which the policy recently adopted by Sultan Mahmoud exposed the Ottoman Empire, the event has surpassed all conjecture. The death of the Sultan, the complete defeat of the Turkish army in Syria, the defection of the fleet, have placed that Empire in such a situation, that henceforth the protection of Europe and the prudence of Mehemet Ali are the only guarantees which remain to the throne of the young Abdul Medjid.

The annexed extracts from my correspondence with Constantinople and Alexandria will make you acquainted with the details of these great events. You will also see therein that the Porte, a few days after the death of Mahmoud, when it was still ignorant of the defection of the fleet, but when it was doubtless already informed of the defeat of Hafiz Pasha, officially announced to the Representatives of the Great Powers its intention to effect a reconciliation with the Viceroy, and to make concessions to him for this object. You will also perceive, that Mehemet, elevated by the feeling of superiority which these late events gave him, seemed inclined to exact a great deal.

The rapid course of events doubtless gives reason to fear, that the crisis may be got over at any moment by some arrangement in which the European Powers may not have time to interpose, and in which, consequently, the essential interests of general policy may not be taken into sufficient consideration. This danger is the inevitable consequence of our distance from Constantinople and Alexandria. There is no absolute remedy for this. I think nevertheless that it is expedient to persevere in the course hitherto followed, and which consists, in substance, in making the action which each Cabinet is in a state to exercise in the Eastern Question, subordinate to the closest and most continued concert of all of them. The principal, the true object of this concert, for England as well as for France, as also for Austria, although she does not so openly proclaim it, is to keep Russia within bounds, and to accustom her to treat in common on the affairs of the East. It is enough to say, that, at the present conjuncture there is more reason than ever to strive to restrain her.

That being the case, I think that the Powers, at the same time that they express entire approbation of the conciliatory disposition manifested by the Porte, should urge it not to precipitate matters, and only to treat with the Viceroy through the medium and with the concurrence of its Allies, whose co-operation would doubtless afford the best means of procuring for it terms less disadvantageous and better guaranteed.

I think that at Alexandria these same Powers should hold to the Viceroy a language calculated to make him feel that, whatever advantages he may now have obtained, he would run the risk of compromising them by wishing to push them too far, and that if he attempted, under whatever form or pretence it might be, to extort from the Sultan terms incompatible with his dignity and with the security of his throne, the whole of Europe would interfere to oppose it. In order that such language may have the required efficacy, the Consuls ought to be enabled to use it simultaneously and in such terms as would prove their perfect union. The firmness, I had almost said the severity, of the counsels which this language should express, should be modified by a tone of moderation and goodwill, which, at the same time that it gives a warning to the prudence of Mehemet Ali, should not wound his pride and ambition too deeply. There would certainly be an affectation in appearing to think that, after the successes which he has gained through the foolish conduct of the Porte, he is to expect nothing more than what he was previously entitled to ask. This would be to misapprehend the power of circumstances, the necessity of the situation. If the Viceroy were to acquire the conviction that he had nothing to hope from the justice of the Powers, he would revolt against their imperious representations; and his irritation might at any moment bring about consequences, the very possibility of which is calculated to alarm any person of foresight.

Such, Sir, are the first impressions which the late intelligence from the East has produced upon the King's Government. Have the goodness to communicate them to Lord Palmerston, and to ask him whether they are in conformity with the views of the British Cabinet. I will shortly make you acquainted in greater detail with the ideas which I have only had time as yet to sketch out.

No. 159.

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, July* 30, 1839.

I HEREWITH transmit to your Excellency, a copy of a despatch from Marshal Soult to M. de Bourqueney, dated the 26th instant, which was communicated to me last night by M. de Bourqueney.

Your Excellency will see that there is a material difference between the contents of that despatch and the language held to your Excellency by Marshal Soult, as reported in your despatch of July 26; because while Marshal Soult, in that conversation, declared his opinion, that recent events in the Levant ought to make no change in the measures of the Allies; that a declaration to this effect ought to be made to Mehemet Ali; and that the Marshal would send, on the evening of the 26th, instructions couched in this spirit to M. de St. Aulaire, to recommend this view of things to Prince Metternich; the despatch to M. de Bourqueney, on the contrary, expresses an opinion that recent events ought to make a change in the course to be pursued by the Five Powers; and that Mehemet Ali is entitled, in consequence of his successes, to terms more favourable than would have been offered to him before.

Her Majesty's Government conceiving that the despatch was written before the conversation took place, and that the conversation being the latest in point of time, is to be considered as being the expression of the final determination of the French Government, I have replied to the conversation, and not to the despatch; but I think it necessary to state to your Excellency, that Her Majesty's Government, concurring as they do completely and entirely in the opinions expressed by Marshal Soult in his conversation with your Excellency, do not agree with the opinions, implied, it is true, rather than distinctly expressed, in the despatch.

Mehemet Ali cannot have acquired any fresh claim upon the favour of the Five Powers by the results of a battle fought by his generals in open defiance of the repeated remonstrances and positive declarations of those Powers. The importance which the Five Powers attach to the maintenance of the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire cannot in the slightest degree be affected by the late events; while, on the other hand, those events demonstrate still more strongly, how indispensably and urgently necessary it is, that the Five Powers should interpose, in order to maintain the Turkish Empire against the dangers with which it is threatened; and, lastly, whatever increase of force the victory of Nezib and the defection of the Turkish fleet may have given to Mehemet Ali in a contest to be waged by him single-handed against the Sultan, those events give him no additional means of resisting the will of the Five Great Powers.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 160.

The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 30.)

(Extract.) *St. Petersburgh, July* 18, 1839.

I WAITED upon Count Nesselrode this morning, to communicate to him your Lordship's despatch of July 9, and I had a long conversation upon the subject of it, with his Excellency.

When I had read it, Count Nesselrode said, "That which Lord Palmerston desires is already done," that is, "I have directed our Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna to state to the Austrian Government, that we prefer the suggestion of your Government to that which emanated from Prince Metternich; and that the Emperor will support that proposition, which is most beneficial to the Porte."

His Excellency repeated to me more than once, that the Russian Government were ready to accede to any proposal that was favourable to the Sultan; and that he intended to despatch a courier to London by the same boat which will convey this despatch, with a communication to that effect.

But he did not disguise from me, that he had great doubts that we could prevail upon Mehemet Ali to resign Syria immediately; and he asked me, whether France would press, or even propose to the Pasha, to make such a sacrifice. I replied, that I knew no reason to doubt that France would join the other Powers in any plan that promised to ensure peace, whatever her opinions upon the precise details of the settlement might be; and that that Power had shown the greatest desire to act sincerely, and entirely in concert with Great Britain upon this question.

Count Nesselrode expressed the satisfaction which the Imperial Cabinet felt, that their opinion, and that of Her Majesty's Government, as to what was fitting to be done in the emergency that had arisen, had been identical. "You," said his Excellency, "commenced the intervention which we desired, before our recommendation could reach your Government."

No. 161.

Sir George Hamilton to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 30.)

My Lord, *Berlin, July* 24, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch of the 16th instant, inclosing copies of a despatch which your Lordship addressed to Lord Clanricarde, on the 9th of July, and one addressed to Lord Beauvale, on the 13th of July, on the affairs of Turkey and Egypt.

I read to Baron Werther, the first of the above-mentioned despatches; and his Excellency was so much gratified at your Lordship's view of the state of affairs in the East, and concurred so entirely in your opinion as to the attitude that should be assumed by Great Britain and Russia in the present state of things, that he begged of me to leave the copy of the despatch with him, in order that he might communicate the contents of it to the King of Prussia at Töplitz. Baron Werther assured me, that the King would derive much satisfaction from a knowledge of your Lordship's language to Russia on the occasion; and although he had been prevented from taking His Majesty's pleasure on Eastern Affairs before he left Berlin, yet he felt confident that he might enable me to assure Her Majesty's Government, that Prussia would entirely agree in the line of conduct which your Lordship proposed to adopt, in conjunction with the views of the Austrian Cabinet.

I likewise read to Baron Werther, some extracts of your Lordship's despatch of July 13, addressed to Lord Beauvale, in reply to the observations and suggestions of Prince Metternich on the same subject. The remark that I have made on Baron Werther's opinion of your Lordship's despatch to Lord Clanricarde, will equally apply to your observations to Lord Beauvale.

As your Lordship states, that it did not appear advisable to Her Majesty's Government, to adopt the suggestion of Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna, and of Prince Metternich, that Russia should be invited to send her Black Sea squadron into the Mediterranean, to co-operate with the combined British, French and Austrian fleets, I abstained from touching upon this point with Baron Werther. But his Excellency seemed highly to approve of Prince Metternich's proposal, that in the event of the Sultan's death, the Five Powers should each make a declaration of their determination to maintain the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire, and that none of them will seek to profit by the present state of things, for the purpose of gaining any acquisition of territory.

I had written thus far when Baron Werther sent to beg that I would call upon him, when his Excellency informed me that he had sent off a messenger to the King, at Töplitz, who is bearer of your Lordship's views with respect to the affairs of the East, as contained in your despatches to Lords Clanricarde and Beauvale. He then informed me that he had received an estafette from Constantinople, and read to me a despatch addressed to the King by Count Königsmarck, dated the 12th instant, conveying the alarming intelligence of the total dispersion of the Ottoman Army under Hafiz Pasha by Ibrahim Pasha, on the 24th ultimo, and of the revolt of the Capudan Pasha with the whole of the Turkish Fleet, who had sailed from the Dardanelles on the 5th instant, and had spoken with the French Admiral off Tenedos, on the 8th; and had informed him that the Sultan had been poisoned by the Russians through the agency of Hosrew Pasha, who had been sold to Russia; that Abdul Medjid had been imprisoned; and that he was about to join the fleet of Mehemet Ali, in order that they might concert measures together, for the protection of the Ottoman Empire.

Your Lordship will probably have received this intelligence through earlier sources than the present, but I may as well add, that Count Königsmarck informed the King, that the Turkish Army did not withstand the

Egyptian attack above half an hour; that the very first discharge of cannon spread dismay through the Ottoman ranks, and that the whole army took to flight; not above a thousand men perished in the combat itself, but two-thirds of the army were lost or destroyed in the retreat, or rather flight which ensued.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GEORGE B. HAMILTON.

No. 162.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received July* 27.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, July* 6, 1839.

ON the 1st instant I received by Government post, a letter from Mr. Pro-Consul Werry, of Aleppo, dated 22d June, in which he informed me, "That on Thursday, the 20th June, at noon, Ibrahim Pasha, with all his army, moved forward from Telbashir, and crossing the Sedjour, marched to the village called Mazzar, on approaching which he observed a body of the Sultan's Army (cavalry) said to be commanded by four viziers, two of which are Koord Mahomed Pasha, of Orfa, and Mirza Pasha. Ibrahim Pasha ordered forward the Artillery, and approached; and at about 5 P.M. opened a fire on the Sultan's camp, which was not, however, of long duration, for the Sultan's Cavalry gave way, and fled in the direction of Nezib, where the main army was, leaving behind them all their tents and provisions, besides the military case containing about 50,000 piastres.

"His Highness the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha then halted his troops to repose; and after a short time moved forward again in the direction of Nezib; and yesterday morning, *chemin faisant,* he met another body of the Sultan's Cavalry and Artillery. His Highness ordered forward his Artillery and Cavalry, and opened a fire on them. The engagement lasted for almost four hours, and the Sultan's troops gave way, and retreated to Nezib, leaving behind them fourteen pieces of artillery, ten light and four large pieces. His Highness Ibrahim Pasha then told his troops to repose, and ordered two regiments of Cavalry, and one of light Artillery, with his Annadis (a Bedouin tribe), to be ready, as he intended to advance on Hafiz Pasha himself, ordering at the same time the rest of his army to follow him."

Mr. Pro-Consul Werry adds, that his informant, who was present at those two affairs, told him, that the Infantry of Ibrahim Pasha did not fire a single shot, and that a general action might be hourly expected, as the army of Ibrahim Pasha was not more than two hours' march from Nezib, where the army of Hafiz Pasha was with that Vizier.

On the evening of the 3rd instant, at the time when I was with the Pasha, a courier came with a letter from Ibrahim Pasha, dated from Nezib, the 25th June. The Consuls-General of Austria and Russia were also present; and the Pasha read to us the letter, which only contained a few lines, from the tent of Hafiz Pasha, to say that he had on that day attacked the Turkish Army, which had been completely defeated, with the loss of all its artillery, tents, and matériel; and that he should send the details as soon as he could collect them from the generals in command of divisions.

On the morning of yesterday, M. de Laurin received a letter from the Austrian Consul-General at Aleppo, dated 26th June, and of which I have the honour to transmit copy and translation, and by which your Lordship will perceive that many Turkish prisoners of rank have been made, and also several English amateurs.

I have not the least apprehension for the safety of those gentlemen, as I am confident that Ibrahim Pasha will not detain them a moment, and that he will treat them with every regard, and give to them every facility to go wherever they may desire.

The Pasha's steamer has not yet arrived with the details of the action;

but it is probable that some of the Turkish prisoners of rank may be sent here by the steamer, and which will have delayed the departure of it.

It is probable that Captain Caillier will have reached the camp of Ibrahim Pasha on the 27th ultimo; and that, in conformity with the order of which he was the bearer from Mehemet Ali, Ibrahim Pasha will not make any movement in advance after the arrival of Captain Caillier; but I learn from my colleagues here, that they have been informed by their respective Ambassadors, that the Sultan refused to allow the officer sent by Marshal Soult to Constantinople, to proceed with any mission to Hafiz Pasha to suspend his operations; and this is the more to be lamented, as that officer might possibly have reached in time to prevent the late battle.

As far as regards the issue, no other result was to be anticipated by any military man who had seen the Egyptian and Turkish Armies, and compared their discipline; and I had on different occasions the honour to report to your Lordship, and to Her Majesty's Representative at Constantinople, the opinions to that effect of Marshal Marmont, and of British and Foreign officers of rank who had seen the two armies; and I took the liberty to give my own military opinions as to the efficient state of the army of Ibrahim Pasha; and I never for a moment had a doubt of the result of a general battle.

As to the hopes generally entertained at Constantinople, of a rising of the Syrian population on the appearance of the Turkish Army, I was never very sanguine on that point; and as I had had the experience of personal observation in that country, I was not inclined to place faith against my own conviction, in the reports of Syrian discontent made by British and other agents in that country; and it has now been proved that the efforts of all the emissaries of the Sultan in Syria, have caused only very partial and trifling movements, and that only in as far as regards the Mussulmans; for I can safely say that in respect to every sort of Christians, and to the Jews, they dread a return to the old direct rule of the Sultan.

The Pasha's fleet is still cruizing in sight of this port; and salutes from the forts and from the fleet have been fired to celebrate the late victory.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Inclosure in No. 162.

The Austrian Consul-General at Aleppo to M. de Laurin.

Illmo. Signore, *Aleppo*, 26 *Giugno*, 1839, *sera.*

L'ARMATA di Hafiz Pascià non esiste più. Jeri dopo una cannonata di trè ore ha gettato essa le armi, e abbandonato le artiglierie e munizioni, fuggendo de tutte le parti. Nessuno potrebbe raggiungere l'Eufrate, se Ibrahim Pascià volesse seriamente impedirlo. La città di Aleppo dirigge a Ibrahim Pascià delle preghiere accioché faccia in modo che la soldatesca disarmata sia obbligata a ripassare l'Eufrate, onde non disturbare la sicurezza di cui godiamo.

La popolazione di questa città si rende in massa sulla strada di Messir, per scontrare diversi illustri prigionieri che si attendono. Sul campo furono raccolti diversi dilettanti Inglesi, che la curiosità aveva spinto in quella parte. Si dicono molto sorpresi di questo poco felice risultato.

Il Gran Signore dovrà probabilmente far de'nuovi sagrifizi per aquietare il suo potente vassallo.

Le poche truppe rimaste qui si sono istradate verso il campo, che è quello precisamente che jeri mattina occupava Hafiz Pascià con i suoi.

Domani ò dopo domani, l'avanguardia Egizia, comandata da Osman Pascià, tenterà di passare l'Eufrate. Tutto indica essere questa l'intenzione del Seraschiere Egizio.

(Translation.)

The Austrian Consul-General at Aleppo to M. de Laurin.

Sir, *Aleppo, June* 26, 1839, *Evening.*

THE Army of Hafiz Pasha has ceased to exist. Yesterday, after a cannonade of three hours, the Turks threw down their arms and abandoned their artillery and ammunition, flying in every direction. Not one of them could have reached the Euphrates had Ibrahim Pasha wished seriously to prevent it. The city of Aleppo has petitioned Ibrahim Pasha to make arrangements for obliging the disarmed soldiery (of Hafiz Pasha) to recross the Euphrates, in order not to disturb the security we enjoy here.

The population of this town is proceeding *en masse* on the road to Messir, for the purpose of meeting several prisoners of rank who are expected to arrive. On the field of battle were taken several English amateurs, who had been brought thither by curiosity, and who have expressed their great astonishment at the luckless result of the campaign.

The Sultan will probably have to make fresh sacrifices, in order to appease his powerful vassal.

The few troops left here have set out in the direction of the camp, which is precisely on the same ground occupied yesterday morning by Hafiz Pasha and his army.

To-morrow or next day the Egyptian advanced guard, commanded by Osman Pasha, will commence passing the Euphrates. Everything indicates that such is the intention of the Egyptian Seraskier.

No. 163.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 27.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, July* 6, 1839.

THE Pasha's iron steamer arrived here early this morning, and the "Boulac," steamer of the Pasha, came in soon after; both in three days from Alexandretta.

Ibrahim Pasha had not yet had time to send his detailed report of the late battle, and we are therefore ignorant of the loss on either side, or of number, or rank, of prisoners.

The Pasha read aloud the letters which he had received this morning, and the substance is as follows:—

Ibrahim Pasha writes on the 28th of June from Aintab; and it may, therefore, be presumed that Solyman Pasha of Marash had evacuated that city.

Three regiments of Infantry and three of Cavalry had been sent by Ibrahim Pasha to take possession of Orfa and Diarbekir, and he was going to send on troops to Malatia.

Hosrew Effendi, who accompanied Captain Caillier, the Aide-de-camp of Marshal Soult, to Syria, writes from Alexandretta, on the 23rd of June, that they were to leave on the next day for the head-quarters of Ibrahim Pasha, which they expected to reach in six or seven days; but it is evident that the troops of Ibrahim Pasha will have occupied Orfa and Diarbekir, and perhaps even Malatia, before Captain Caillier can have communicated the order of Mehemet Ali for them to halt.

Ibrahim Pasha demands transports to be sent over to Alexandretta to convey to Alexandria, 4,000 soldiers of the army of Hafiz Pasha, and who have enlisted in the Egyptian Army.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

No. 164.

Viscount Palmerston to the Marquess of Clanricarde.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, July* 30, 1839.

SINCE I wrote to your Excellency on the 23rd of this month, Her Majesty's Government have received intelligence of the defeat of the Sultan's Army at Nezib on the 24th of June, and of the supposed defection of the Capudan Pasha from the authority of the reigning Sultan; but those events, however unfortunate they have been, do not appear to Her Majesty's Government to afford to the Five Powers any reason for altering in any degree the course which they had previously intended to pursue; and those events cannot, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, oppose any insurmountable difficulties to prevent the Five Powers from carrying into effect those arrangements which they may finally agree upon. The union of the Five must necessarily carry with it a moral force which will overcome any obstacles they may meet with.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 165.

Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 31, 1839.)

My Lord, *Aleppo, July* 1, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith, for your Lordship's information, copies of two despatches I addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, under the 26th and 29th ultimo, accompanied with copy of a translation of an Arabic report made to me by a person who was in the Egyptian camp, present when the engagement took place on the 24th ultimo between the two armies; as also copy of a letter I addressed to Captain Davis, of Her Majesty's ship "Dido," under the 26th ultimo.

I hope the above, and the steps I have pursued throughout, will meet with your Lordship's entire approval.

Since closing the above copies of despatches to his Excellency the Ambassador, nothing of any interest has transpired worthy of your Lordship's notice.

This morning a post reached this, bringing the intelligence, that his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha had reached Aintab with all the forces, from whence it is said his Excellency has started for Marash.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) F. H. S. WERRY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 165.

Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Aleppo, June* 26, 1839.

MR. VICE-CONSUL HAYS having informed me under date 22nd instant, which reached me on the 24th, of the arrival at that port of Her Majesty's ship "Dido," Captain Davis, in pursuance to instructions from Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's Naval Forces in the Mediterranean; and further, that Captain Davis was anxious to receive every, and the latest, information respecting the movements of the two armies; I have this day addressed him, transmitting to him the events that have transpired.

I do not know whether Captain Davis will leave Alexandretta on receipt of my letter; but as I am anxious to communicate to your Lordship a moment sooner the events that have transpired, I risk these few lines to do myself the honour to inclose herewith for your Lordship's information, copy of my letter to Captain Davis, begging Mr. Vice-Consul Hays in the event of Her Majesty's ship "Dido" not leaving, to forward this to your Lordship per Austrian steamer, expected on the 2nd July, by which opportunity I shall do myself the honour of again addressing your Lordship, with any further information I may have elicited.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) F. H. S. WERRY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 165.

Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Captain Davis.

Sir, *Aleppo, June* 26, 1839.

I RECEIVED on the 24th instant, late at night, from C. W. Hays, Esquire, British Vice-Consul at Alexandretta, the intelligence of the arrival at the port under the 21st instant, of Her Majesty's ship "Dido," under your command, in pursuance to instructions from Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's Naval Forces in the Mediterranean.

As Mr. Vice-Consul Hays informs me, that you are desirous of receiving every, and the latest, advice on the movements of the Egyptian and Turkish Armies, I do myself the honour of transmitting herewith, for your information, the latest I have thereon.

I beg leave to inform you, that after the occupation of Aintab by Solyman Pasha of Marash, with the Sultan's troops, advice reached this on the 22nd instant, that the Egyptian forces under his Excellency the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha, had advanced on the 20th instant from their encampment at Tel-Bashir, two hours on this side of the river Sedjour, and had marched on the village called Mazar, occupied by a body of the Sultan's advance guard, composed of regular Cavalry; on approaching it, a slight engagement took place between them and the Turkish troops, in which the latter gave way, and were shortly after obliged to fly to a village named Nezib, distant three hours from thence, where the main body of the Sultan's Army was concentrated under the Seraskier Hafiz Ali Pasha, leaving behind them all their tents, provisions, flags, and some 50,000 piastres.

On the 21st instant, the Egyptian troops advancing from thence in the direction of Nezib, met another small body of the Sultan's advanced guard, which, after a slight skirmish, was also put to the rout, and obliged to join the main army. Since then, no official advices of any sort reached this from the Egyptian camp, respecting any further movement; the person, however, employed in the transport of provisions from hence to the camp, reported that the Egyptian troops had advanced, and had completely encircled the Turkish Army at Nezib, cutting off their communication with Biregik.

This morning, the 26th instant, his Excellency Ismael Bey, Governor of this town, received a post from his Excellency the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha, informing him that on Monday, the 24th instant, at 5 A. M., the Egyptian forces advanced on Nezib, where the Osmanli Army was concentrated, and after an engagement of two hours between them, in which the Artillery and Cavalry on both sides alone acted, the Infantry not firing a single shot, the Sultan's Army was put completely to the rout, and obliged to disunite, leaving behind in the Egyptian hands the camp composed of all the provisions, ammunition, baggage, and 120 artillery pieces. I inclose for your information, copy of the Governor's official note to me on the subject, with its translation in French.

The deserters from the Sultan's Army are hourly reaching this, in scores, and taking service under the Egyptian Government, as Bashi Bozuks, Irregular Cavalry; they state, that 25,000 of them were taken prisoners, not including many that deserted to this side at the first onset.

They further state, that the Seraskier Hafiz Pasha seeing his army routed, fled with some of them in the direction of Roum Kale; but that the remainder, and greater part of the Turkish Army, were taken prisoners besides; many of whom threw themselves on the mercy of Ibrahim Pasha, who, it is said, pardoned them, and sent them forward here. That Mirza Pasha, General of the Regular Cavalry, and Assad Pasha, General of the Spahis, with many other officers, such as Colonels, &c., fell in the engagement; these latter, it is reported, were killed by the Sultan's troops themselves, who bore a great enmity to their officers, and when the order was given to advance, turned and killed their officers, so as to enable them easier to fly and surrender to the enemy.

I am also told by some of these deserters, that among those who fell was a certain Morbak Bey, Prussian officer in the Sultan's service, and attached to Hafiz Pasha's staff in the quality of instructor, against whom, it is said, the troops bore great enmity, and who was almost the first person destroyed by them, while he was encouraging them on.

It is impossible, for the present, to obtain correct and full details on these events, until the arrival here of some European employé who witnessed the movements that took place.

This success of the Egyptian arms over the Osmanli forces is being celebrated here, by the citadel two ordnance pieces firing three times a day a salute of twenty-one guns. The town and bazaars are illuminated, and are to remain so during the whole night.

As regards the state of the Alexandretta district, and of the movements of the mountaineers in that neighbourhood, I make no doubt you will receive from Mr. Vice-Consul Hays much fresher information than any I am enabled to communicate to you from hence.

Indeed, the whole of this district has of late been in a very unsettled state; but I think the events that have taken place on the frontiers between the two armies, will remove the fears that have been of late entertained; and I hope shortly, that this district will again resume its usual tranquillity.

It was reported about a week ago, that in the direction of Hamah and Homs, some appearance of plague had manifested itself; but from strict inquiry I have made, I do not hear it confirmed.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) F. H. S. WERRY.

Inclosure 3 in No. 165.

Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Aleppo, June* 29, 1839.

I HAD the honour to address your Lordship, under the 26th instant, inclosing copy of a letter which I addressed under that day's date, to Captain Davis, of Her Majesty's ship "Dido," who had reached Alexandretta on the 22nd instant, in pursuance to instructions from Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, informing him of the engagement which took place at Nezib, on the 24th instant, between the Turkish and Egyptian forces, in which the former were completely put to the rout. I now avail of the Austrian packet "Seri Pervas," expected at Alexandretta on the 2nd July, to do myself the honour of laying before your Lordship what has further transpired since that date.

I have to inform your Lordship, that the subsequent advices which reached this from his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha, stated that the Egyptian forces were encamped at Nezib, and had taken possession of all that was in the Turkish camp, of which there was a great abundance of everything, and consequently desiring the Government here to send forward no further provisions from hence.

His Excellency the Seraskier does not mention anything at all respecting his movements; but from the persons, attachés of the Government, arriving from the camp, I learn that his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha had sent a Mussellim to Orfa, and another to Biregick; and further, that Maggiun Bey, Colonel of the Annadis, with his troops, Bedouin Cavalry, had crossed the Euphrates, accompanied with two regiments of Regulars, for the above-mentioned places; and that his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha, accompanied with all the army, intended starting about the 27th instant from Nezib for the direction of Marash, where it is said the Sultan's Seraskier Hafiz Pasha, with several other viziers, officers, and about 40,000 men, the remainder of his army, with some Artillery, had taken refuge.

It is also to-day asserted, that Solyman Pasha of Marash, who was occupying Aintab with about 12,000 men, on hearing of the defeat and overthrow of the Ottoman army at Nezib, retreated immediately to Marash.

It is supposed by some, that this movement of Solyman Pasha's from Aintab to Marash, and the retreat of the Seraskier Hafiz Pasha there, is done with a view of collecting the remainder of the Turkish forces they have left, and endeavour to make a stand, to oppose, if possible, the further advance of the Egyptian forces on that line, which is not at all improbable.

It is almost incredible, my Lord, how such a large army as that under the Seraskier Hafiz Pasha, composed of fine strong young men, judging from the deserters and prisoners arrived here, of which there are 3,000, who have almost all voluntarily enlisted for the Irregular Cavalry (Bashi Bozuks), should have met in not more than two hours' time with such a complete defeat.

The details relating to the engagement on the 24th instant are numerous, and all vary a little. I have compared them all, and I find the most correct one is that made to me by a person who was an eye-witness of the whole affair, having been constantly in the Egyptian camp from the time it started from Telbashir up to the moment, and after the collision took place between the two armies.

I beg leave to inclose, for your Lordship's information, copy of a translation I have made of these details, as narrated to me by the party, which will, I hope, meet your Lordship's approval.

I beg leave further to inform you, that on the 27th instant, in the evening, M. Caillier, one of Marshal Soult's Aides-de-camp, reached this, coming from Alexandria in six days. The French Consul here, M. Guys, tells me that he has a letter by him from M. Cochelet, the French Consul-General in Egypt, dated the 19th of June, which states that M. Caillier, bearer of his letter, had reached Alexandria direct from Paris on a mission to his Highness the Viceroy of Egypt, the purport of which is, that he is not to commence hostilities against the Sultan's troops, and if he has done so, to cease immediately. Consequently, he leaves this for Aleppo, accompanied by his Highness's second interpreter, and bearer of a letter from his Highness the Viceroy to his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha, instructing him that wherever the letter reaches his Excellency's hands, at that place he is to immediately cease any hostilities his Excellency may have undertaken against the Sultan's forces under the Seraskier Hafiz Pasha.

M. Caillier, on reaching this, was, I am told, thunderstruck on hearing of the sad event that had taken place on the 24th instant between the two armies; nevertheless, he left this yesterday afternoon, accompanied by his Highness Mehemet Ali's interpreter, repairing with all speed in quest of his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha, who, from all accounts, I dare say he will find between Aintab and Marash.

I have this afternoon seen at the French Consul's here, a M. Petit, Frenchman, instructor in the Sultan's service, who was at Hafiz Pasha's camp during the engagement, and was taken prisoner by the Egyptians, from whose camp he reached this this morning The account he gives of the engagement agrees in part with what I have herein transmitted to your Lordship, with the exception as to the amount of troops composing the Sultan's Seraskier's camp, which he states not to have amounted to more than 40,000 men of all arms; and that Izet Pasha, who was expected with a force of 25,000, had not yet reached the camp when the engagement took place; and that there were no more than 140 pieces of artillery, which were all left on the field.

He further states, that Hafiz Pasha left the camp retreating towards Marash, full one hour and a half previous to the defeat and overthrow of his troops, taking with him all the cavalry he had—say 5,000 men, and the military cash chest.

M. Petit also informs me, that a few days previous to the engagement, a Mr. Ainsworth and a Mr. Russell (the former was, if I mistake not, attached to the late Euphrates Expedition), reached the camp coming from the interior of Asia Minor, where they had been travelling for the Geographical Society, and making a chart of the same. These two gentlemen, he says, he saw very early the day the engagement took place, but that he afterwards lost sight of them, and has not since seen or heard anything of them, except while he was in the Egyptian camp, some papers were brought to Solyman Pasha, which M. Petit tells me he recognized as the papers and notes belonging to these gentlemen, and mentioned the same to his Excellency Solyman Pasha, to whom I shall immediately write, to obtain the same, and to beg he will cause every search and inquiry to be made, to obtain tidings of Mr. Ainsworth and Mr. Russell. M. Petit adds, that they may have followed Hafiz Pasha with the baggage, &c., to Marash: if so, they are safe, but if not, I am very much afraid these two talented and good men have fallen a sacrifice in the collision between the two armies. I shall also dispatch a messenger immediately to Marash, to see if I can obtain any intelligence respecting them from that quarter.

By the last advices from Alexandretta, I find that Mustook Bey had again attempted another descent near Byass, but I hope and trust that tranquillity will now very soon be re-established in that district.

The town of Aleppo is, I am happy to say, very quiet, although the Mussulman population of the Emirs have evinced, ever since this affair has begun, great enmity to all the Christians; and if Ibrahim Pasha had met with a reverse, I am afraid the rise here would have been a very serious one

I have, &c.,
(Signed) F. H. S. WERRY.

Inclosure 4 in No. 165.

Translation of an Arabic report given by a person who was on the spot at the time the Engagement took place on the 24th June, between the Turkish and Egyptian Forces.

ON the 18th instant I left Aleppo for Solyman Pasha's camp, which was stationed at the villages Dabek and Duebek, nine hours distant from Aleppo.

On arriving, I found it had left, and was informed that it was marching to Touzel, six hours further, to join Ibrahim Pasha's detachment. I followed, and when I reached, we were approaching the river Sedjour. I observed that this is not the road to Touzel; and, in asking where we were going, was replied, that a post had arrived from Ibrahim Pasha, informing Solyman Pasha that he had left that place, and desired to meet him on the cross of that river, where he would wait for him, to join the two detachments in one.

They met, and crossed the river at a place called Mehadit-el-Tuab; after which a villager came, and informed Ibrahim Pasha, that there was a detachment of 2,000 cavalry of the Sultan's army encamped at an hour's distance, commanded by Koord Mahomed Pasha, who, on hearing of the arrival on the Sedjour of Ibrahim Pasha, marched back to the village, Mazar to join another detachment of 4,000 men encamped there, commanded by the Pasha of Moush.

Ibrahim Pasha hearing this, pushed on with his army, encamped at the spot which Koord Mahomed Pasha had quitted, and ordered that ammunition should be distributed to his army.

On the 20th instant we advanced towards Mazar, while Ibrahim Pasha preceded the army with his Annadis, and with them alone gave the attack. This lasted about forty minutes; after which the enemy fled, leaving behind 400 tents and eight pieces of artillery, with ammunition and provisions of all kinds, of which Ibrahim Pasha took possession, and pillaged the village. Two of the Annadis were killed, and twenty wounded, while twenty horses were maimed on Ibrahim Pasha's side.

The fugitives were pursued until they reached the remaining part of the Sultan's army, which was at Nezib, commanded by Hafiz Ali Pasha. Ibrahim Pasha perceiving that he was not attacked, retreated his army back to Mazar.

During three days, for about two hours every day, Ibrahim Pasha advanced his Annadis, to irritate a general attack, but was repelled only by the Irregulars on the Sultan's side.

The two armies, at each of these skirmishes, had reciprocally from twenty to thirty men wounded.

Solyman Pasha having examined the field, perceived that the Egyptian Army was not in a favourable situation,and advised Ibrahim Pasha to bring it up to the east of the Sultan's, which was towards Biregik, which he observed would impede the enemy's intercourse with Biregik, where they had left a portion of their ammunition.

On the 22d we marched there, and reached the bridge called Ghergin, which is between two hills, at four hours to the north-east of Mazar. The pass being very narrow, it was only on the next day, Sunday the 23rd, that all the army had crossed. It appears that if the Sultan's troops had placed only 2 cannons and 1,000 men here, Ibrahim Pasha could not have passed.

The whole of the Sunday was spent on the other side of this bridge, where biscuits and ammunition were given to the army to last three days; and each soldier was ordered to prepare for action, which Ibrahim Pasha announced to them would be on the following day, Monday the 24th.

At midnight we were surprised by an attack from the enemy, which dispersed our camp, while Ibrahim Pasha repelled them with two battalions of Artillery. After an hour, the Sultan's troops retreated, leaving on the field five cannons, which they took back before daybreak, Ibrahim Pasha not being aware of it.

Before sunrise, we marched an hour and a half to meet the enemy, leaving half an hour's space between us. After each regiment was placed to prepare for battle, Ibrahim Pasha again sent forward his Annadis, which again were only repelled by the Bachi Bozuks (irregulars). The two armies remained looking on the scene without either of them attacking with their regulars, for a space of time. Ibrahim Pasha advanced twice, each time approaching nearer to the enemy, without the Sultan's troops firing a gun, and it was only on a third approach that the Sultan's cannons fired, when he ordered up his Artillery against them, and put his Infantry and Cavalry in the rear; the Egyptians twice retreated, when Ibrahim Pasha drew his sword, and cut down twenty-seven of them with his own hand. At this moment half of the 3rd Regiment of the Guards, which is composed principally of Syrians, ran over to the enemy, where they were well received. Ibrahim Pasha then galloped along the lines, ordering a general attack. This being executed, the enemy appeared intimidated; and after an hour's fire from the first clash, retreated at full speed, blowing up the powder magazines. There was now a general fire given by the Egyptians, with an advanced march, pushing the Sultan's troops before them until they reached the spoil of their enemy's camp and the intrenchments, where we found about 100 cannons which they had left, 4,000 tents, and an immense quantity of butter, rice, honey, flour, and provisions of all kinds, while cartridges, muskets, &c., were to be seen on the ground like pebbles.

When the Regiment of the Guards which ran over to the enemy saw this general retreat, it began to fire on the fugitives.

On arriving, I asked one of the surrendered cannoniers whether this is all the cannon they had. He answered in the negative; adding, that Hafiz Ali Pasha, their General-in-Chief, had taken with him in his retreat

200 pieces, loading the military cash chest and his tent upon mules; but it is not ascertained whether the cannons were not left in their flight on the road, for the direction he took is mountainous.

I tried as much as possible to know the exact quantity of killed and wounded of each army, and found that on the Sultan's side there were 4,000 killed and 1,000 wounded, while of Ibrahim's troops 1,000 were killed and 2,000 wounded.

That night they remained on the field; and it was only on the next day that Ibrahim Pasha ordered each regiment to seek their companions, bury those they would find dead, and bring into the camp the wounded, before attending on those of the Sultan's troops.

After this, Ibrahim Pasha marched towards Biregik with three regiments of Infantry and two of Cavalry. I followed him.

On his arrival on the Euphrates, opposite Biregik, he sent for camels to load the ammunition and provisions he found there, and ordered Maggiun Bey to cross with his Annadis over to Biregik, at which time I left, and returned to the camp.

I was given to believe that the prisoners taken were from 12,000 to 15,000 men, besides those who fled towards Aleppo, which, I heard, amounted to 4,000 or 5,000.

This is what I have heard and seen.

No. 166.

Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 31.)

My Lord, *Aleppo, July* 1, 1839.

SINCE closing my despatch of this day's date to your Lordship, I have again seen M. Petit, Frenchman in the Sultan's service, who was at Hafiz Pasha's camp during the engagement on the 24th ultimo, and taken prisoner by the Egyptians, from whose camp he reached this.

I beg to inclose herewith, for your Lordship's information, copy of the narration made to me by M. Petit, of the details of the engagement which took place between the Turkish and Egyptian forces, which details I have every reason to believe and hope are correct.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) F. H. S. WERRY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 166.

Relation sur la Bataille de Nézib, par M. Petit, Instructeur à l'Etat-Major de Hafiz Ali Pacha.

LE camp Ottoman était placé au sud de Nézib, sur trois lignes, les deux premières d'Infanterie et la troisième de Cavalerie; l'Artillerie se composait de 140 bouches à feu; les troupes étaient de 37,000 hommes, dont 23,000 d'Infanterie, sous les commandemens des Pachas de divisions, Sadula Laider et Kourd Mahomed Pacha, 5,000 hommes de Cavalerie étaient commandés par Chérif Pacha, 3,000 d'Artillerie par Békir Pacha, et environ 4,800 Bachi Bozuks (irréguliers), étaient commandés par Solyman Pacha.

L'armée d'Ibrahim Pacha, composée de 43,000 hommes, était campée sur le prolongement de la gauche de l'armée Turque, à 6,000 mètres de distance; le terrain qui couvrait la gauche de camp Ottoman était très-accidenté, ce qui rendait la bataille dans cette direction extrêmement désavantageux pour l'Armée Egyptienne.

Hafiz Pacha étant informé que plusieurs régimens composés de Syriens avaient l'intention de passer dans ses rangs, fit canonner le 23 Juin, à 11 heures du soir, le camp Egyptien, pour y mettre le désordre et faciliter la désertion des dits corps; à cet effet, quatre batteries d'obusiers

du calibre de 24, se portèrent dans le silence de la nuit à 1,000 mètres du camp Egyptien, et lancèrent 260 obus; ces projectiles jettèrent le trouble et la confusion dans le camp d'Ibrahim; les points de direction du tir qui avait été relevé à 5 heures du soir par les officiers Européens de l'Etat-Major de Hafiz Pacha, étaient les tentes d'Ibrahim et Solyman Pacha, lesquelles étaient faciles à distinguer puisque la troupe Egyptienne n'avait point de tentes. Ces deux Pachas se hâtèrent de monter à cheval pour empêcher la confusion qui était devenue très-grande.

Plusieurs centaines de Syriens désertèrent dans le camp Ottoman, et plusieurs pelotons étaient en marche dans la même intention; mais l'activité que Solyman Pacha déploya aux avant-postes, empêcha qu'un plus grand nombre de fugitifs ne sortissent du camp.

Ibrahim Pacha sentit la nécessité d'en finir par une grande bataille; en conséquence, l'Armée Egyptienne prit les armes à l'aube du jour, et une division en bon ordre sur six colonnes se dirigea sur les derrières du camp Ottoman. La 1re colonne était composée de 60 bouches à feu, marchant par sections; la 2de, d'Infanterie, (colonne de direction,) composée de 12 bataillons, marchait par divisions à distance entière; les 3me and 4me colonnes, d'Infanterie, chaque colonne de 12 bataillons, marchaient à colonnes doubles serrées en masse, à distance entière de déploiement; les 5me and 6me colonnes, composées de 9 régimens de Cavalerie, marchaient en colonnes par escadrons à demi distance.

Solyman Pacha avait intercalé entre les distances de l'Infanterie en tête et en queue, 8 bataillons à colonnes doubles serrées en masse, pour soutenir les attaques que les Ottomans auraient pû exécuter sur la tête ou sur la queue des colonnes; il avait également placé en tête 2 batteries de 12 obusiers du calibre de 36, qui tiraient avec beaucoup de précision.

L'intention de Solyman Pacha fut dévinée par un officier d'ordonnance de Hafiz Pacha; ce premier avait l'intention de former une ligne oblique sur l'extrême gauche des lignes Ottomanes; ces lignes avaient fait un changement de direction à gauche face en arrière sous un angle d'environ soixante degrés; mais les têtes de colonnes d'Ibrahim Pacha n'ayant pû se prolonger à la hauteur du village de Nézib, en ayant été empêchées par le feu bien nourri de l'Artillerie Turque, alors Solyman Pacha donna l'ordre à toutes les troupes de se former face à gauche en bataille, et le général Egyptien manœuvra sous le feu d'une terrible artillerie Turque (chose remarquable) avec autant d'ordre que sur un terrain d'exercice.

Dans ce moment un feu très-vif de 304 bouches à feu s'engagea à 1,200 mètres; ce combat d'artillerie dura 1 heure $\frac{3}{4}$; l'Artillerie Egyptienne qui tirait très-promptement, ayant épuisé ses caissons et coffres de munitions, fut contrainte de ralentir son feu, en attendant que des munitions de la réserve arrivassent; ce moment devint critique pour l'armée Egyptienne; seize bataillons de la droite des 1re and 2de lignes avaient déjà pris la fuite dans ce grand désordre; c'est alors qu'un Européen, officier d'ordonnance de Hafiz Pacha, conseilla à ce dernier de marcher à la bayonnette sur les Egyptiens; pendant ce moment d'hésitation du dit Hafiz Pacha, Solyman Pacha, aidé de ses aides-de-camp, le sabre à la main, contraignit les fuyards à rentrer en ligne sous le feu meurtrier de l'Artillerie Turque.

Les cartouches à canons d'Ibrahim Pacha étant arrivées, un feu bien nourri à mitraille s'engagea de nouveau à 600 mètres.

C'est dans ce moment que les Bachi Bozuks de Hafiz Pacha prirent la fuite dans le plus grand désordre: Hafiz Pacha et ses officiers d'ordonnance sabrèrent les fuyards pour les faire rentrer; mais cette énergie du Général-en-chef devint inutile; et les troupes Turques, qui se trouvaient sous un feu terrible de mitraille, commencèrent à lâcher pied.

Le désordre grandissait toujours davantage, malgré l'activité et la bravoure de Hafiz Pacha et le dévouement de ses officiers Européens à son service; une grande partie d'Infanterie qui pendant l'action avait montré assez de sang-froid et de courage, quitta le champ de bataille, en abandonnant un grand nombre de fusils. La Cavalerie Turque qui n'avait pas donné, par la mauvaise direction de son Général-en-chef, fut entraînée par la fuite des Bachi Bozuks et de l'Infanterie; cependant elle seule exécuta sa retraite avec ordre, et le Séraskier Hafiz Pacha se retira sur Marache avec le reste de son armée.

L'Armée Turque laissa sur le champ de bataille plus de 100 pièces de canons, ses bagages de campement, et ses munitions; le trésor, s'élevant à 45,000 bourses (5 millions et ½ de francs), fut cependant sauvé.

Sur les cinq officiers Européens qui étaient au service de Hafiz Pacha, M. Petit fut fait prisonnier sous une charge de Cavalerie, dans le tems qu'il remettait en ligne plusieurs batteries qui étaient en retraite, voulant éviter qu'elles fussent prises par l'ennemi.

On a de fortes raisons de croire que le Baron de Molke, officer distingué de l'Etat-Major, a été tué.

Les Ottomans ont eu 4,000 hommes hors de combat, entre tués et blessés; dans l'Armée d'Ibrahim Pacha, 3,200 hommes également hors de combat, mais les blessés sont presque tous mortellement.

Il faut rendre justice à l'Infanterie Turque, qui montra beaucoup de courage et de résistance, mais qui malheureusement ne fut pas secondée.

La bataille fut très-sanglante, puisque l'Armée Ottomane perdit le huitième de son effectif.

La perte de la bataille est attribuée aux causes suivantes:

A ce que les officiers Européens ne furent pas écoutés dans les conseils qu'ils donnèrent; 1°. Que les troupes Ottomanes ne devaient pas quitter un mamelon qui se trouvait à 800 mètres en avant du centre de leur front; 2°. Qu'elles devaient exécuter la charge à la bayonnette lorsque l'Armée Egyptienne avait ralenti son feu et avait quatre régimens en déroute.

A ce que la Cavalerie ne prit pas part au combat; elle aurait pû en se déployant en échelon par régiment, la gauche en tête, former en ordre concave sur les têtes de colonnes d'Ibrahim Pacha, et produire une grande action de force, puisque les trois armes auraient agi de concert sur le point qui était le chef de la bataille.

(Translation.)

Account of the Battle of Nezib, by M. Petit, Instructor to the Staff of Hafiz Ali Pasha.

THE Ottoman camp was situated to the south of Nezib, upon three lines, the two first of Infantry and the third of Cavalry; the Artillery consisted of 140 pieces; the troops amounted to 37,000 men, of whom 23,000 were Infantry, under the command of the Pashas of division, Sadula Laider and Kourd Mahomed Pasha, 5,000 Cavalry were commanded by Chérif Pasha, 3,000 Artillery by Békir Pasha, and about 4,800 Bachi Bozuks (irregulars) were commanded by Solyman Pasha.

The Army of Ibrahim Pasha, consisting of 43,000 men, was encamped along the extent of the left of the Turkish Army, at a distance of 6,000 metres; the ground which covered the left of the Ottoman camp was very uneven, which rendered the battle, in that direction, extremely disadvantageous to the Egyptian Army.

Hafiz Pasha having been informed that several regiments composed of Syrians intended to come over to his ranks, opened a cannonade, on the 23rd of June, at 11 o'clock in the evening, upon the Egyptian camp, in order to throw it into disorder and to facilitate the desertion of the abovementioned corps; for this purpose, four batteries of 24-pound howitzers were carried in the silence of the night to within 1,000 metres of the Egyptian camp, and discharged 260 shells; these projectiles threw the camp of Ibrahim into disorder and confusion; the points against which the fire was directed, and which had been determined upon at 5 o'clock in the evening by the European Officers of the Staff of Hafiz Pasha, were the tents of Ibrahim and Solyman Pasha, which were easily to be distinguished, as the Egyptian troops had no tents. Those two Pashas lost no time in mounting their horses in order to prevent the confusion, which had become very great.

Several hundred Syrians deserted to the Ottoman camp, and several small divisions of Infantry were marching with the same intention; but the activity which Solyman Pasha displayed, at the advanced posts, prevented a greater number of fugitives from leaving the camp.

Ibrahim Pasha felt the necessity of bringing matters to a conclusion by a general engagement; consequently, the Egyptian Army was under arms at day break, and a division in six columns in good order was directed against the rear of the Ottoman camp. The first column consisted of 60 guns, marching by sections; the second of Infantry (the directing column), composed of 12 battalions, marched in divisions at whole distance; the 3rd and 4th columns of Infantry, each column of six battalions, marched in double close column, deployed at whole distance; the 5th and 6th columns, composed of nine regiments of Cavalry, marched in column by squadrons at half distance.

Solyman Pasha had placed between the spaces of the Infantry in front and in rear, eight battalions in close double columns, to sustain the attacks which the Turks might have made against the front or the rear of the columns; he had also placed in front two batteries of twelve 36-pounder howitzers, which were fired with much precision.

The intention of Solyman Pasha was guessed at by a Staff Officer of Hafiz Pasha; the former intended to form an oblique line on the extreme left of the Ottoman lines; the direction of these lines had been changed to the left face in the rear at an angle of about sixty degrees; but the heads of the columns of Ibrahim Pasha not having been able to reach as far as the Village of Nezib, having been prevented from doing so by the well-sustained fire of the Turkish Artillery, Solyman Pasha then ordered all the troops to face to the left in order of battle, and the Egyptian General manœuvred under the terrible fire of the Turkish Artillery (a remarkable circumstance) with as much order as if he had been on parade.

At this moment a very sharp fire of 304 guns was exchanged at a distance of 1,200 metres; this cannonade lasted an hour and three quarters; the Egyptian Artillery which fired very rapidly, having exhausted its ammunition waggons and chests, was obliged to slacken its fire, until the ammunition of the reserve arrived; this was a critical moment for the Egyptian Army; sixteen battalions of the right of the 1st and 2nd lines had already fled in the midst of this great disorder; at that moment a European, a Staff Officer of Hafiz Pasha, advised him to march with the bayonet against the Egyptians; whilst Hafiz Pasha hesitated, Solyman Pasha, assisted by his aides-de-camp, sword in hand, forced the fugitives to re-form in line under the deadly fire of the Turkish Artillery.

The cartridges for the cannon of Ibrahim Pasha having arrived, a well-sustained fire of grape-shot was exchanged at a distance of 600 metres.

At this moment, the Bachi Bozuks of Hafiz fled in the greatest disorder: Hafiz Pasha and his Staff Officers fell upon the fugitives with the sword in order to make them return; but this energy on the part of the General-in-chief was useless; and the Turkish troops, who were under a terrible fire of grape-shot, began to give way.

The disorder increased still more, notwithstanding the activity and bravery of Hafiz Pasha and the devotion of his European officers to his service; a large body of Infantry, which during the action had shown sufficient coolness and courage, left the field of battle, throwing away a great number of muskets. The Turkish Cavalry which had not charged, owing to the bad management of its General-in-chief, was carried away by the flight of the Bachi Bozuks and of the Infantry; however it alone effected its retreat in order, and the Seraskier Hafiz Pasha retreated upon Marash with the remainder of his Army.

The Turkish Army left upon the field of battle more than 100 pieces of artillery, its camp baggage, and its ammunition; the military chest, amounting to 45,000 purses (five millions and a half of francs) was, however, saved.

Of the five European Officers who were in the service of Hafiz Pasha, M. Petit was made prisoner in a charge of Cavalry, while he was re-forming in line several batteries which were retreating, wishing to prevent their being taken by the enemy.

There are strong reasons for supposing that the Baron de Molke, a distinguished Staff Officer, was killed.

The Ottomans had 4,000 men put *hors de combat*, dead and wounded; in the Army of Ibrahim Pasha, 3,200 men were also put *hors de combat*, but the wounded were nearly all mortally wounded.

Justice must be done to the Turkish Infantry, which showed much courage and resistance; but which unfortunately was not supported.

The battle was very bloody, for the Ottoman Army lost the eighth of its effective force.

The loss of the battle is attributed to the following causes:—Because the advice which the European Officers gave was not listened to, namely, 1°. That the Ottoman troops ought not to leave a hillock which was situated at 800 metres in advance of the centre of their front; 2°. That they ought to have charged with the bayonet when the Egyptian Army had slackened its fire and had had four of its regiments put to the rout.

Because the Cavalry did not take part in the engagement; it might, by deploying *en échelon* by regiments, the left in front, have formed in concave order upon the heads of the columns of Ibrahim Pasha, and might have produced a great effect, since the three different species of arms might have acted together upon the principal point of the battle.

No. 167.

Mr. Consul Moore to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 31.)

My Lord, *Beyrout, July* 1, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship, copy of a letter addressed to me this morning by Mahmoud Bey, the Governor of Beyrout, announcing a complete victory gained by Ibrahim Pasha over the Ottoman forces under the command of Hafiz Pasha.

The letter of Mahmoud Bey gives no particulars; but from private sources, it is understood that the battle took place on the 24th ultimo, at Nezib, about nine hours from Aleppo, an engagement of minor importance having preceded it the day before, with some advantage, it is said, to the Ottoman arms.

The result of the general battle was, the flight of Hafiz Pasha with the wreck of his army to Roum Kale leaving on the field the artillery (120 pieces of cannon, it is reported), provisions, ammunition, and tents. Most of the troops are said to have laid down their arms.

According to private accounts from the Egyptian army, received by Bahri Bey, an employé of this Government, high in confidence of Ibrahim Pasha, his Highness was marching on Koniah.

Public rejoicings in all parts of Syria have been ordered in celebration of the victory of Ibrahim Pasha.

The country, which was daily falling into a state of disorder in every direction, will doubtless now, on the news of the defeat of the Sultan's forces, return to a state of tranquillity.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) N. MOORE.

Inclosure in No. 167.

The Governor of Beyrout to Mr. Consul Moore.

Monsieur le Consul, *Beyrout, le 24 Rebi-akhir,* 1255.

JE viens de recevoir à l'instant l'ordre suprême en date du 18 courant, extrait d'un ordre du Généralissime à Son Excellence Chériff Pacha, qui annonce que le jour de Lundi, 13 Rebi, 1255, Son Altesse s'est dirigée à la tête de l'Armée Egyptienne (que Dieu daigne toujours rendre victorieuse) vers l'Armée Constantinopolitaine, et y sont arrivés une heure après le lever du soleil.

L'Armée de Constantinople a été détruite après une bataille qui a duré deux heures; ils ont laissé sur le champ de bataille, canons, munitions, et tentes, et ont pris la fuite; et par la grâce de Dieu nous n'avons aucune crainte. Son Altesse a ordonné la publication partout de cette glorieuse victoire, afin de la célébrer joyeusement, et d'illuminer le pays un jour et une nuit; de la saluer par les salves d'artillerie et l'allégresse, que les habitans s'adonnent à la joie et au plaisir; connaissant votre attachement et votre sympathie, ainsi que l'union du même désir, nous vous annonçons cette nouvelle, afin que vous participiez les heureuses conséquences.

(Signé) MAHMOUD BEY,
Gouverneur de Beyrout.

(Translation.)

The Governor of Beyrout to Mr. Consul Moore.

Monsieur le Consul, *Beyrout, Rebi-akhir* 24, 1255.

I have this instant received the supreme order, dated the 18th inst., extracted from an order of the Generalissimo to his Excellency Sherif Pasha, which reports that on Monday, Rebi 13, 1255, his Highness proceeded at the head of the Egyptian army (may God deign to render them always victorious!) towards the army of Constantinople, and reached it an hour after sunrise.

The army of Constantinople has been destroyed after a battle which lasted two hours; they have left on the field of battle cannon, ammunition, and tents, and have taken flight; and by the grace of God we have no fear. His Highness has ordered that this glorious victory should be published every where, in order that it may be cheerfully celebrated, and that the country should be illuminated for a day and a night, and that it should be saluted with salvos of artillery, and merriment, and that the inhabitants should give themselves up to joy and pleasure. Knowing your attachment and sympathy, as well as your uniting in the same desire, we announce this intelligence to you, in order that you may participate in the happy results.

(Signed) MAHMOUD BEY,
Governor of Beyrout.

No. 168.

Mr. Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 31.)

(Extract.) *Damascus, July* 5, 1839.

I HAD the honour of addressing your Lordship my last despatch per Beyrout steamer, on the 7th ultimo.

Mr. Pro-Consul F. H. S. Werry, at Aleppo, will doubtless inform your Excellency of the important events which have occurred between the armies of the Sultan and Mehemet Ali on that frontier, since I had last the honour of addressing your Lordship.

Having taken the liberty to address unreservedly your Lordship, on the circumstances which have apparently led to the collision between the two armies, I have only now to describe the prospects which this change of position of the Contending Powers offers, in connection with the immediate relations of this country and its interests, which have been thereby so deeply implicated. The state of the country in the immediate neighbourhood of this city, in the centre and in the south of Syria, is from the result of the defeat of the Sultan's Army, relieved from the effervescence and degree of disorder into which it was thrown; and it is presumable that the malcontents of the north, who had taken so active a part against the Egyptian Government, will also retire; but by the latest accounts from Aleppo, Aintab remained in possession of the Sultan's forces under Solyman Pasha of Marash, while the battalion of Egyptian Infantry was shut up in the citadel.

The future movements of his Highness Ibrahim Pasha and his army are what now engross public attention, and may equally be an object of the greatest interest on which your Lordship may wish to receive intelligence. On this very important point I have no positive information to offer your Lordship: none but public rumour, and the appearances of the general state of affairs produced by the untoward event, from which induction can be made. It is reasonable to think, that in the new position in which his Highness Ibrahim Pasha is placed, independent of awaiting fresh instructions from Mehemet Ali, the first objects which will engage his attention are, to look after the débris of the Sultan's Army; the second, to release the parts of the Egyptian territory occupied by the Sultan's troops in its immediate vicinity; the third, to compose the disturbed state of the lower ranges of the Taurus, extending from Marash to Byass, and the vigilant superintendence of the Adana district menaced by the Sultan's forces from Koniah, embracing the insurrection of the extensive mountains by which that province is bordered. Under such a view of his Highness Ibrahim Pasha's position, it does not appear probable that he will move either to the east of the Euphrates or northwards, leaving that river on his right, apart the greatest considerations which the peremptory commands of the Great Powers may impose on Mehemet Ali in transmitting orders to his Highness Ibrahim Pasha to retreat into the Egyptian limits. It is nevertheless prudent to examine what are the chances for success, should Mehemet Ali and his son, his Highness Ibrahim Pasha, flushed with victory, decide on pursuing a direct line of operations, either north or south from his present position.

By the defeat of the Sultan's Army, the disturbed state of the northern mountains may soon subside; this will permit him, should his views be directed northwards, to march by Kaissarieh on Koniah, ordering the forces in the Adana district to penetrate the defile of the Taurus, thereby placing the Sultan's Army under Hadji Halil Pasha, between the two, which would insure its surrender, and leave the road open to Ibrahim Pasha to Constantinople, at the head of a large army; and I am not aware that the Sultan, single-handed, can oppose an army to prevent it, or at best, only a weak force, the destruction of which would aggravate the unfortunate position in which the Sultan is already placed; and it may be here opportunely remarked, that the population of the Sultan's territories, either north or south, to Constantinople, or through Mesopotamia to Bagdad and Babylonia, would welcome his Highness Ibrahim Pasha's march in the same sense, and with the same advantage, as the Sultan's Seraskier hoped to possess himself of Syria.

However improbable it may appear, that Mehemet Ali should hazard the prosecution of a northern line of operations, I am disposed to think, for his immediate views, he would rather risk facing the measures of Russia, than, to avert it, incur the anger of Great Britain, by directing immediately his views to the south through Mesopotamia, to seize the Pashalic of Bagdad, against which, but from an immediate restraint from Great Britain, there is nothing to prevent its being now accomplished. The last advices from Bagdad and Mesopotamia, fully authorize this induction being made.

From these hypotheses it would appear deducible, that Mehemet Ali will, to avert the combined anger of the Great European Powers, in justifying himself for the heavy responsibility he has been necessitated to incur, in defeating the Sultan's Army, act with that judgment and moderation which his position demands, and retire within the limits of his territories, to thereby claim at their hands their intervention, for the final adjustment of the question pending between the Sultan and himself.

In respect to the occupation of the points on the Southern Arabian shore, to the Persian Gulf, which formed a preliminary and distinct question between Great Britain and Mehemet Ali, it is presumable from the same chain of reasoning, that he must have already, according to our demands, abandoned those appropriations, on the supposition that the friendship of no European Power is so dear to him as that of Great Britain, with whom he is more closely connected than any other, and on which depends his sole, future, and positive existence.

The Government here, conformable to the previous instruction from his Highness Ibrahim Pasha, continues its military preparations; great exertions are making to raise 3,000 Irregular Cavalry, under five different chiefs; but the scarcity of horses and money retards its completion. I hear 1,500 Irregular Bedouin Cavalry are arriving from Egypt; 1,000 camels are also being purchased; all these preparations are for the north.

No. 169.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 31.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, July* 11, 1839.

HER Majesty's steamer "Rhadamanthus," Captain Wakefield, arrived here on the 7th instant, having been sent by Admiral Sir Robert Stopford to obtain intelligence.

The "Rhadamanthus" left Malta on the 2nd instant with the squadron, from which it separated on the 4th, and was to rejoin the Admiral off the south point of the island of Cyprus.

On the evening of the 8th instant, a Greek vessel came in from Constantinople, with positive intelligence of the death of the Sultan; and the Pasha despatched immediate orders to Ibrahim Pasha to suspend all hostilities. He said that he expected a person from Constantinople to announce officially the death of the Sultan, and that he would send Halil Effendi to compliment the young Sultan, and to assure him of his (Mehemet Ali's) fidelity and obedience.

At noon of the 9th instant, arrived here a Turkish corvette, sent from off Stankio by Achmet Mushir Pasha, the Capudan Pasha, and having on board Sherif Aga, the Kiaya of the Capudan Pasha, who was the bearer of a letter from Achmet Pasha to Mehemet Ali. Sherif Aga is father of the Riala Bey, who was lately at Cairo.

The Pasha told myself and colleagues, that Achmet Pasha had announced the news of the death of Sultan Mahmoud, and the accession of his eldest son the Sultan Abdul Medjid, which took place on the 1st of July. The Capudan Pasha had demanded at the same time of Mehemet Ali, the permission to come to Alexandria accompanied by his fleet, consisting of nine sail of the line, twelve frigates, and some smaller vessels, and having on board 6,000 land troops. The Viceroy added, that he came here in quality of a friend, that he had in consequence granted to him the permission to come, and that he would send his large steamer, the "Nile," to convey him; that the Capudan Pasha did not at all appear satisfied with the elevation of Hosrew Pasha to the post of Grand Vizier, and might perhaps have the wish or intention to leave his fleet (to give it over) in Egypt.

Later in the evening we heard from some of the persons about the Viceroy, that Achmet Pasha was coming to place his fleet at the disposition of Mehemet Ali; that he (Achmet Pasha) had declared himself ready to co-operate for the elevation of Mehemet Ali to the situation of Vékil of the young Sultan, Mehemet Ali being, in his opinion, the only person capable of governing the Turkish Empire in the present circumstances; they added, that Mehemet Ali had received favourably the offers of the Capudan Pasha, and that he had desired him (engagé) to come to Alexandria; that however he had not consented to go to Constantinople in person, but would send there one of his family, *quelqu'un des siens*, which caused it to be supposed that he meant one of his sons.

The Turkish corvette saluted in passing the Pasha's fleet, which is cruizing in sight of this port. On the evening of the 9th instant, Sherif Aga returned to the Capudan Pasha in the "Nile" steamer.

The "Rhadamanthus" left this for the Admiral at day-break on the 10th instant, with the foregoing intelligence, and copies of my despatches of the 6th instant, to your Lordship.

On the morning of the 10th, a Turkish steamer arrived here from Constantinople with despatches for Mehemet Ali from Hosrew Pasha, and which were brought by Akiff Effendi, first secretary to the Council.

Before reading those pieces, Mehemet Ali, at our demand, gave us the following explanations relative to the reports which were bruited the evening before. "If Achmet Pasha wishes to deliver over to me the fleet of the Sultan, I will not accept it, and I will send it back to the Sultan; if Achmet Pasha wishes my interference to reconcile him with Hosrew Pasha, I will endeavour to do so; and if I do not succeed, he may remain here, and the fleet will depart without him. As to the post of Vékil, you may well believe that I have no intention of changing my present situation in Egypt for that of Vékil; and if I stated the intention of sending *un des miens* to Constantinople, it is Halil Effendi to whom I alluded, and who will be charged to compliment the Sultan in my name."

Having received the letter of Hosrew Pasha, he read it in my presence. It announced the accession to the throne of Sultan Abdul Medjid, and the pardon accorded by the Sultan to Mehemet Ali for the differences which he had had with his father; that he would send to him the Nichan Iftikhar, in token of his especial favour, and would also grant to him the hereditary succession of Egypt and dependencies; in fine, that the troops of the Sultan had received orders to retire from the frontiers of Syria, and that the Sultan engaged the Viceroy to contribute to the prosperity of the Ottoman Empire, &c., &c.

At the reception of this letter, Mehemet Ali caused an order to be prepared for Ibrahim Pasha, by which he enjoins him to withdraw his troops to this side of the Euphrates, and as far as Marash, looking on the war as now at an end. His son is to occupy this military line until further orders.

Mehemet Ali says he wishes to have possession of Marash, which is only about three hours beyond his present frontier, because it gives him the means of keeping in order the mountaineers of Giaour Dagh, who have always, although in his present territory, been very troublesome; and he says, that he will pay the Sultan for that accession of territory twice the tribute which that district pays at present.

The Pasha says, that he is confident that all differences will now be firmly settled without the intervention of the Great Powers; and he professes great respect for, and submission to, the young Sultan; and he adds, that so soon as the succession and all other points shall be arranged, he will call Ibrahim Pasha to Egypt, and he himself will proceed to Constantinople, in order to pay his personal homage to his Sovereign.

I hope there will not be difficulty in an amicable arrangement between the young Sultan and his powerful vassal; and I believe that all the persons about the Sultan will contribute and aid in this, as they are all now disposed to court Mehemet Ali; and Hosrew Pasha, who was his most bitter and inveterate foe, now expresses a hope that all old enmities between them may be buried in oblivion; and, in fact, not only has Mehemet Ali strong friends in the Divan, but he is regarded by all parties as the only person who can help the Sultan to sustain the Ottoman Empire.

The step taken by the Capudan Pasha appears to have been caused as well by his hostility to Hosrew Pasha, and his fear of losing his employment, as also, perhaps, by the wish to supplant Hosrew Pasha; and his knowledge of the enmity between Hosrew Pasha and Mehemet Ali probably led him to believe that the latter might be induced to join him against Hosrew Pasha.

The forts and the fleet have fired salutes during the last three days in the morning, noon, and evening; and the Pasha sent orders to Abbas Pasha to do the same at Cairo, and to illuminate that city in celebration of the accession of the young Sultan.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

No. 170.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received July* 31.)

(Extract.) *Alexandria, July* 13, 1839.

I HAVE read with great attention the several inclosures in your Lordship's despatch, of the 15th of June; and I now take the liberty to submit to your Lordship some observations which have occurred to me on a perusal of them.

In the letter of the Reis Effendi to Viscount Ponsonby, inclosed in his Excellency's despatch, of the 1st of May, the Sultan gives as a reason for his military preparations and fortifications, the levies of troops by Mehemet Ali, and the redoubts, &c., erected by him on the frontier. But surely the Sultan must have been aware that Mehemet Ali could not, and dared not to, attack the Sultan, as in such case he would have had arrayed against him all the Great Powers. The Sultan had consequently nothing to fear from Mehemet Ali; and the interest of the Sultan was clearly to allow Mehemet Ali to exhaust his resources, seeing that he had nothing to dread from an attack by the Pasha, and by alleviating the condition of the population of Asia Minor, to contrast their condition with that of the oppressed Mussulmans of Syria. It was, however, clearly the object of Russia to urge the Sultan to weaken himself by useless preparations and expences.

Besides, the preparations of Mehemet were defensive, as he was persuaded that it could not reckon on the support of the Great Powers in the event of his being attacked by the Porte, and he wished therefore to be prepared. Sound policy, therefore, should have dictated to the late Sultan to have allowed Mehemet Ali to have exhausted his resources; instead of which the Sultan played the game of Russia, in all except being the aggressor.

In regard to the desire of the Sultan for Mehemet Ali to give up Adana, Damascus, Aleppo, Seyda, Jerusalem, and Naplous, I do not think he would have consented to do so, and at present he will be still less disposed to listen to such a proposal.

In respect to the opinion of the Sultan's officers, as mentioned in Viscount Ponsonby's despatch of May 20, "That all the Syrians are enemies to the Pasha," that is true only in respect to the Mussulmans, on account of the conscription and the greater favour now shown to Rayahs; but is far from being the case in regard to the non-Mussulman population.

In respect to the inclosure from M. Cochelet, in Earl Granville's despatch of June 5, a similar document was sent to me, and forms Inclosure No. 3 in my despatch to your Lordship, of 19th May last.

The Pasha has more than once told myself and Colleagues, that he would not assert his independence, in order to avoid any direct collision or dispute with any of the Great Powers; and I know that he has said the same to M. Cochelet, in my presence and in that of his Colleagues; and I am quite sure that Mehemet Ali never specified England alone as the cause, although M. Cochelet may have advanced that to his Government as his own opinion.

I have more than once had the honour to mention to your Lordship the endeavours of M. Cochelet and of all the French in Egypt to persuade the Pasha of the desire of England to possess Egypt, and that our capture of Aden was the preliminary to this object.

No. 171.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 31.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, July* 13, 1839.

NO details have yet been received by Mehemet Ali from Ibrahim Pasha, of the late general action in Syria, and I have only the report of Mr. Pro-Consul Werry of Aleppo, which I do not send to your Lordship, as that gentleman informs me that he has transmitted a detailed account to your Lordship.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

P.S.—I transmit a copy of a letter from Solyman Pasha to the French Consul at Aleppo, giving some details of the late battle.

Inclosure 1 in No. 171.

Solyman Pasha to the French Consul at Aleppo.

Nézib, 14 *Rebi-akhir,* 1255.
(25 *Juin,* 1839.)

Monsieur le Consul,

EN apprenant notre départ du camp de Dombek après qu'Antab eut été pris par l'Armée Turque et qu'un bataillon Egyptien y eut été fait prisonnier, lorsque sur tous les points les mouvemens de l'Armée Turque étaient hostiles, et obligeaient Son Altesse le Général-en-Chef à se porter en avant, en apprenant notre départ, dis-je, vous avez dû vous attendre à de graves et rapides évènemens. La journée d'hier a répondu à cette attente. Avec l'intention d'attaquer l'Armée Turque, dès notre arrivée à Mazar, nous avions trouvé sa position trop forte pour l'aborder de front. Nous avons dû la tourner. Nous nous sommes donc portés vers la gauche par une marche de flanc, de manière à venir ensuite la prendre à revers et tomber sur l'arrière de son flanc droit. Notre manœuvre a été heureuse; et dans la bataille que nous avons livrée hier, et qui a duré de 4 heures à 4 heures et demie, avec une chaleur très-vive, l'Armée Turque a été mise dans la déroute la plus complète. Tous les canons, la plus grande partie de ses fusils, ses tentes, ses bagages, tout a été pris. Je ne puis vous dire encore le nombre des prisonniers: il est si considérable que notre camp en est surchargé. Voilà un grand résultat. Je m'empresse de vous en informer, pensant que vous apprendrez avec plaisir un évènement qui prépare la fin de cet état de crise et d'incertitude politique dont souffrent tant d'intérêts.

Veuillez agréer, &c.,
(Signé) LE GENERAL SOLYMAN,
Le Major-Général de l'Armée Egyptienne.

(Translation.)

Solyman Pasha to the French Consul at Aleppo.

Nezib, Rebi-akhir 14, 1255.
(*June* 25, 1839.)

Monsieur le Consul,

ON hearing of our departure from the Camp of Dombek, after Aintab had been taken by the Turkish army, and that an Egyptian battalion had been made prisoners there, while the movements of the Turkish army on all points were hostile and obliged His Highness the General in Chief to advance; on hearing of our departure, I say, you must have expected serious and speedy events. This expectation was yesterday fulfilled. Intending to attack the Turkish army on our arrival at Mazar, we found its position too strong to attack in front; it was necessary for us to turn it, we therefore proceeded towards the left by a flank movement, so as to come upon them from behind and fall upon the rear of their right flank. Our manœuvre was successful, and in the battle which we fought yesterday, and which lasted from four hours to four hours and a half with great vigour, the Turkish army was put to the most complete rout. All the cannon and the greatest part of their muskets, their tents, their baggage, all have been taken. I cannot yet tell you the number of prisoners; it is so considerable, that our camp is crowded with them. This is a great result. I hasten to inform you of it, thinking that you will learn with pleasure an event which prepares the end to this state of political crisis and uncertainty from which so many interests suffer.

Have the goodness to accept, &c.,
(Signed) GENERAL SOLYMAN,
Major-General of the Egyptian Army.

Inclosure 2 in No. 171.

Solyman Pasha to the French Consul at Aleppo.

Nézib, 16 *Rebi-akhir*, 1255.
(27 *Juin*, 1839.)

Monsieur le Consul,

AVANT-HIER, en vous annonçant le résultat de la bataille de Nézib, je ne pouvais encore vous préciser le nombre de nos prisonniers: il s'élève à 10,000. Nous avons ramassé jusqu'à présent à peu près 12,000 fusils; mais beaucoup restent encore dispersés çà et là ou cachés dans la rivière. La totalité des fusils perdus par l'armée doit aller au-delà de 15,000. Nous avons compté aussi 104 pièces de canon laissées par elle, mais il nous en reste sans doute quelques unes à trouver, car l'Armée Turque avait plus d'artillerie que cela, et je ne pense pas qu'elle en ait rien pû sauver.

Veuillez agréer, &c.,
(Signé) LE GENERAL SOLYMAN,
Le Major-Général de l'Armée Egyptienne.

(Translation.)

Solyman Pasha to the French Consul at Aleppo.

Nezib, Rebi-akhir 16, 1255.
(*June* 27, 1839.)

Monsieur le Consul,

IN acquainting you the day before yesterday with the result of the battle of Nezib, I was then unable to inform you of the precise number of prisoners we have taken; it amounts to 10,000. We have collected up to the present time nearly 12,000 muskets, but many still remain scattered here and there, or concealed in the river. The whole amount of the muskets lost by the army, must exceed 15,000. We have counted also 104 pieces of artillery left by the Turkish army, but, doubtless, there still remain some for us to find, for the Turkish army had more artillery than that, and I do not think that it could have saved any.

Be so good as to accept, &c.,
(Signed) GENERAL SOLYMAN,
Major-General of the Egyptian Army.

No. 172.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 31.)

(Extract.) *Paris, July* 29, 1839.

I HAVE received your Lordship's despatches to the 26th of July.

No intelligence from Constantinople, from Alexandria, or from the fleets in the Levant, has reached the French Government of a later date than that which was conveyed by the Marseilles telegraph, and which has been already communicated to your Lordship.

Marshal Soult, this morning, read to me a despatch from the French Agent at Malta, containing accounts from Alexandria of the 14th, from which it appears that the "Rhadamanthus" steam-vessel had been sent by Sir Robert Stopford to Alexandria, and must, upon its return to join the British fleet, have conveyed intelligence of the intention of the Capudan Pasha to place the Ottoman fleet under the protection of Mehemet Ali.

This intention was communicated to Admiral Lalande on the 8th instant, by Achmet Pasha; and Marshal Soult calculates that the instructions sent to the French Admiral by his Government, in regard to the Turkish fleet, if it should leave the Dardanelles, could not have reached him before the 12th.

No. 173.

Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, August* 1, 1839.

I HAVE to state to your Excellency, that Her Majesty's Government are of opinion, all things considered, that the death of the Sultan, and the defeat of the Turkish Army, rather increase than diminish the force of the reasons which had previously led the Five Powers to think it necessary that Syria should be restored to the direct rule of the Sultan; because the end for the attainment of which that measure was intended, remains equally important and desirable; and the dangers which are to be averted have not been changed by late events. That end is the maintenance of the Turkish Empire; the danger by which that Empire is threatened is the usurped Power of Mehemet Ali; and if the possession of Syria was thought to render Mehemet Ali dangerously strong with relation to the Sultan during the life of Mahmoud, a vigorous and experienced Sovereign, still more must the possession of Syria render Mehemet Ali too strong with relation to his Sovereign, when that Sovereign is a minor, and has been enfeebled by the defeat and dispersion of his army, and by the defection of his fleet.

If indeed the only object of the Five Powers were to determine how Syria could best be administered, and if they had any right to take upon themselves the settlement of such a question, much might be said both ways, as to whether it would be most for the advantage of Syria to be governed by a Pasha appointed directly by the Sultan, or to be governed by a person appointed by Mehemet Ali, under an authority delegated to him by the Sultan; although it may safely be said that little doubt could exist on this point, if Mehemet Ali were to continue to subject the Syrians to the many and severe oppressions which they have hitherto suffered under his rule.

But this is not the question which the Five Powers have to deal with; the object they have in view is to maintain the integrity of the Turkish Empire; and they have a right to maintain that integrity, because its maintenance is necessary for upholding the balance of Power in Europe, and is essential to the preservation of peace in the world. The Five Powers therefore, as it seems to Her Majesty's Government, ought not to consider the integrity of the Turkish Empire as less important, merely because for the moment the throne happens to be filled by a minor. They should look to permanent interests and not to temporary accidents; and as they possess the means of effectually supporting Turkey, they ought to employ those means to accomplish that purpose.

The youth of the Sultan is a temporary inconvenience; his army, his navy, and his finances, may progressively be organized upon a better system, if Turkey shall continue for some years to enjoy peace under protection of the Five Powers; and so long as the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire shall be maintained, there is no reason why that

Empire should not occupy a respectable situation among the Powers of the world; or why it should not be capable of defending itself, if assisted by such aid as it would be sure to receive if it were to be attacked.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 174.

Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, August* 1, 1839.

THE Five Powers appear to be all equally of opinion, that Syria, Candia, and Arabia, ought to be immediately restored to the direct rule of the Sultan, in consideration of the grant of the hereditary Government of Egypt to Mehemet Ali; but some of the Five Powers appear to doubt whether the alliance would have the means of inducing Mehemet Ali to acquiesce in such an arrangement if he should strongly object to it. It appears however to Her Majesty's Government, that such doubts have no sufficient foundation. It can hardly be supposed that so shrewd and sagacious a man as Mehemet Ali, so accustomed to calculate chances, to weigh relative means, and to avoid needless risks, could seriously persuade himself that he was able to cope single-handed with the Five Powers and the Porte united; or that he would prefer the inevitable ruin which a struggle against such odds would bring upon him, rather than enjoy the certain advantages which the arrangements of the Five Powers would secure to him. It is therefore hardly to be supposed that the moral force of the union of the Five Great Powers would not be adequate to bring about peaceably a full execution of the intended arrangement; but, if Mehemet Ali should resist, a little reflection will suffice to show what ample means of coercion the Five Powers possess. The fleet of Mehemet Ali, his communication with Syria, his commercial marine, his capital, are all at the mercy of the combined squadron; his fleet might be taken and given over to the Sultan; all communication by sea between Egypt and Syria might be cut off; and though it is no doubt physically possible for him, with time and expence, to send supplies to Syria by land across the Desert, yet there would be no great difficulty on the part of the Allies in cutting off that communication also, by occupying some position on the coast in the line of march.

There are some hundreds of merchantmen under the Egyptian flag sailing in the Mediterranean; these are almost all loaded with the personal property of the Pasha, for he is the great monopolizer of the produce and of the commerce of Egypt; all these would either be shut up in Alexandria, or be captured by the Allies; nor would any difficulty arise as to blockading Alexandria, and preventing the ingress and egress even of neutrals, because, although the Five Powers could not well declare war against Mehemet Ali, who is only the subject of a Sovereign, and although, therefore, the Five Powers could not exercise against the Pasha the right of blockade, which is a belligerent right, yet it would be easy for the Sultan to declare a blockade of the coast of Egypt and Syria, which, as Sovereign, he would have a right to declare in rebellion and to blockade; and the Turkish fleet would be fully able to make such a blockade effective against neutrals, while the Egyptian fleet was prevented by the allied squadrons from undertaking any offensive operation. Moreover, if the blockade should not accomplish the intended purpose, it must be recollected that, while Ibrahim's Army is in Syria, Egypt is comparatively defenceless; that the defeat of the Turkish Army at Nezib has by no means annihilated all the military means of the Sultan; that a considerable part of the army of Hafiz made good its retreat; that there was a large body in the rear which was not in the battle; and that the Sultan had, at Constantinople and elsewhere, reserves to a large amount. From these resources, it would be easy to collect a respectable body of Turkish troops for a landing at Alexandria under the protection of the combined squadron; and the troops so landed, if directed, as in that case it might be insisted upon that they should be, by European officers, would be able to overcome all local resistance, and to make themselves masters of Alexandria. That Mehemet Ali, by pertinaciously clinging to Syria, might find himself dispossessed of Egypt; and if once such a blow was struck at the very heart of his power, his Syrian Army would melt away, and his Syrian authority would cease to exist.

But Mehemet Ali would be just as able to foresee these operations, as the Five Powers would be to plan them; and whatever show of resistance he might make, and however high the language which at first he might hold, it is in the greatest degree improbable that he would ensure the entire ruin of himself and his family by an infatuated resistance to the force of an overwhelming necessity.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 175.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, August* 1, 1839.

THE various despatches of which I send your Excellency copies in my despatch, of this day, will fully explain to you the view which Her Majesty's Government have taken of the present state of affairs in Turkey and in the Levant, and the course which they think it will be most expedient for the Five Powers to pursue with regard to those matters.

The communications from other Governments, of which copies are likewise sent to you in the same despatch, will also show that there exists on these great and important affairs an almost entire identity of opinion between the Five Cabinets; and it is therefore to be presumed that some specific measures will speedily be agreed upon between them with reference to these affairs.

The first step to be taken in consequence of an agreement between the Five Powers will probably be to make some communication to the Porte. Any decision of this kind which may be come to, will be finally concluded at Vienna, and in order to save time will be communicated from thence to the Representatives of the Five Powers at Constantinople. I have, therefore, to instruct your Excellency to carry into execution any measure which you may be informed by Lord Beauvale has been agreed to by him on behalf of the British Government, and has also been concurred in by the Austrian Government, and by the Representatives of the other Three Powers at Vienna.

It will be of great importance that in any step to be thus taken at Constantinople, or in any communication which is to be made by the Representatives of the Five Powers, those Representatives should act not only simultaneously in point of time, but identically in point of manner; in order that there should not be any appearance of divergence in the execution of a measure in the arrangement of which there has been entire unanimity.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 176.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 2.)

My Lord, *Therapia, July* 10, 1839.

I HAVE received officially from the Sublime Porte, copy of a letter from the Grand Vizier to Mehemet Ali, and have the honour to forward it to your Lordship.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 176.

The Grand Vizier to Mehemet Ali Pasha.—July 5, 1839.

(Traduction.)

IL y a déjà quelques jours que j'ai écrit à votre Excellence pour lui annoncer l'avènement au Trône Impérial du très-majestueux, très-magnifique et très-puissant Sultan, Abdoul Medjid Khan, notre Seigneur et Maître, par suite de la mort de celui qu'il a plu à la Providence d'appeler à meilleure vie.

Sa Hautesse, douée de droiture et de sagacité, qualités dont le ciel l'a favorisée, a dit aussitôt qu'elle fut montée au trône :

" Le Pacha d'Egypte, Méhémet Ali Pacha, s'étant permis certains procédés offensans envers feu mon glorieux père, il s'est passé jusqu'à présent beaucoup de choses; et dernièrement encore, on a entrepris des préparatifs. Mais je ne veux pas que la tranquillité de mes sujets soit troublée, et que le sang Musulman soit versé. J'oublie donc le passé ; et pourvu que Méhémet Ali Pacha remplisse exactement les devoirs de la sujétion et du vassalage, je lui accorde mon pardon Souverain, je lui destine une décoration magnifique et semblable à celle de mes autres illustres Vizirs, et j'accorde la succession héréditaire de ses fils au Gouvernement de l'Egypte."

Telles sont les paroles grâcieuses que Sa Hautesse a proférées ; et comme j'ai été nommé Grand Vizir, honneur que je ne mérite pas, et que votre Excellence est une de mes anciennes connaissances, la volonté que Sa Hautesse vient d'exprimer n'a pu, vu l'amitié sincère que je vous porte, que me causer une vive satisfaction.

Des ordres ont été sur le champ expédiés au Séraskier de l'Orient, son Excellence Hafiz Pacha, de faire faire halte à son armée ; et la Flotte Impériale qui était sur le point d'appareiller des Dardanelles, a été retenue. Conformément aux ordres de Sa Hautesse, on prépare la décoration qui vous est destinée, et le firman de votre investiture, et nous vous les enverrons plus tard.

En attendant, le très-distingué Akiff Effendi, Secrétaire du Conseil de la Porte, est expédié auprès de votre Excellence, pour vous annoncer ces joyeuses nouvelles, et vous faire connaître en détail les sentimens que Sa Hautesse a bien voulu exprimer à votre égard.

Nous espérons en Dieu que sous les auspices du très-majestueux Sultan régnant, notre Seigneur et Maître, qui est établi par le ciel, les populations de toutes les parties de l'empire jouiront de la plus grande tranquillité. Mais il est clair que la réalisation de cet espoir dépend de l'union parmi les Musulmans. C'est pourquoi il faut, d'après la prudence et la sagesse qui vous caractérisent, et conformément aux ordres de Sa Hautesse, que le passé soit enseveli dans l'oubli, et que votre Excellence retire ses armées et mette désormais ses soins à maintenir cette union ; et c'est dans cet espoir que je vous écris cette dépêche.

(Translation.)

The Grand Vizier to Mehemet Ali Pasha.—July 5, 1839.

IT is already some days since I wrote to your Excellency to announce to you the accession to the Imperial Throne of the most majestic, most magnificent, and most powerful Sultan, Abdul Medjid Khan, our Lord and Master, in consequence of the death of him whom it has pleased Providence to call to a better life.

His Highness, endowed with uprightness and with wisdom, qualities with which Heaven has favoured him, said as soon as he ascended the throne:

"The Pasha of Egypt, Mehemet Ali Pasha, having been guilty of certain offensive proceedings against my late glorious father, many things up to the present time have taken place; and latterly also, he has made preparations. But I do not wish that the tranquillity of my subjects should be disturbed, and that Mussulman blood should be spilt. I forget, then, the past; and provided that Mehemet Ali Pasha shall exactly fulfil the duties of submission and of vassalage, I grant him my Sovereign pardon, I design for him a magnificent decoration, and similar to that of my other illustrious Viziers, and I grant the hereditary succession of his sons to the Government of Egypt."

Such are the gracious words which His Highness has spoken; and as I have been appointed Grand Vizier, an honour which I do not deserve, and as your Excellency is one of my old acquaintances, the wish which His Highness has just expressed cannot fail, considering the sincere friendship which I entertain for you, to cause me a lively satisfaction.

Orders have been forthwith sent to the Seraskier of the East, his Excellency Hafiz Pasha, to halt his army; and the Imperial fleet, which was on the point of sailing from the Dardanelles, has been detained. According to the orders of His Highness, the decoration which is intended for you is being prepared, and the firman of your investiture, and we will send them to you hereafter.

In the meanwhile the most distinguished Akiff Effendi, Secretary to the Council of the Porte, is sent to your Excellency to announce to you this joyful news, and to inform you in detail of the sentiments which His Highness has been pleased to express as regards you.

We trust in God that, under the auspices of the most magnificent reigning Sultan, our Lord and Master, who is established by Heaven, the people of all parts of the Empire will enjoy the greatest tranquillity. But it is evident, that the realization of this hope depends on the union among the Mussulmans. On this account it is necessary, according to the prudence and wisdom which characterise you, and agreeably to the orders of His Highness, that the past be buried in oblivion, and that your Excellency withdraw your armies and give heed to maintain this union; and it is in this hope that I have addressed you this despatch.

No. 177.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 2.)

My Lord, *Therapia, July* 10, 1839.

I HAVE heard no more news respecting the Army of Hafiz Pasha, and nothing of the movements of Ibrahim Pasha.

There are no news yet come from the Ottoman fleet, but I hear the Sublime Porte has sent a Hatti Scheriff by some agent to be read to the officers and crews of the vessels, ordering them to return to Constantinople.

Public tranquillity continues undisturbed.

The messenger who was the bearer of your Lordship's despatches to the 17th of June, arrived late last night, and will be kept here till I can state, with some precision, the state of affairs.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 178.

Baron de Bourqueney to Viscount Palmerston.

My Lord, *Hertford House, le* 1*er Août*, 1839.

PAR sa dépêche d'avant-hier, le Maréchal Soult me charge de vous donner lecture de la lettre qu'il adresse à notre Consul-Général à Alexandrie, sous la date du 27 Juillet. Pour ne pas vous importuner, je vous en envoie copie, et je le fais avec d'autant plus d'empressement, que vous trouverez la pensée de ces instructions parfaitement conforme à la déclaration du Maréchal à Lord Granville.

Agréez, &c.,
(Signé) BOURQUENEY.

(Translation.)

Baron de Bourqueney to Viscount Palmerston.

My Lord, *Hertford House, August* 1, 1839.

MARSHAL SOULT, by his despatch of the day before yesterday, instructs me to read to you the letter which he has addressed to our Consul-General at Alexandria, dated the 27th of July. In order not to importune you, I send you a copy of this letter, and I do this with the more satisfaction, since you will find the spirit of these instructions in perfect conformity with the declaration of the Marshal to Lord Granville.

Receive, &c.,
(Signed) BOURQUENEY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 178.

Marshal Soult to the Consul-General of France at Alexandria.—(Communicated by Baron de Bourqueney.)

Monsieur, *Paris, le 27 Juillet*, 1839.

J'AI reçu les dépêches que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire jusqu'au No. 115 inclusivement. Celles de M. de Lurde me sont également parvenues.

Le Gouvernement du Roi voit avec peine, que les avantages obtenus par Méhémet Ali, loin de lui inspirer la modération qui conviendrait si bien à la position forte et glorieuse dans laquelle il se trouve placé, semblent avoir éveillé dans son esprit et des espérances et des projets dont rien dans ces derniers tems n'avait indiqué l'existence.

Le langage qu'il a tenu à M. de Lurde est certainement en accord avec l'intention si récemment exprimée par lui dans les instructions envoyées à Ibrahim Pacha, de s'en remettre pour la conclusion de sa querelle avec la Porte, aux négociations qu'allaient entamer les Puissances Européennes. Ces instructions par cela même qu'elles nous avaient été officiellement communiquées, et qu'un de mes officiers d'ordonnance en avait été rendu porteur, constituent à notre égard un engagement qui n'a pu être rompu par des faits auxquels nous sommes complètement étrangers.

Le Gouvernement du Roi veut croire que le Vice-Roi, promptement remis de l'exaltation qu'ont pu lui causer des succès aussi rapides que

complets, reviendra à des dispositions plus dignes de sa sagesse et de son expérience; qu'il ne voudra pas poursuivre par la force, le but de son ambition, et qu'il comprendra que les conditions même que la violence pourrait arracher à la détresse et aux terreurs de la Porte, n'auraient en réalité aucun caractère définitif, et ne donneraient à la Puissance qu'il a fondée, que des bases bien insuffisantes, si elles n'étaient sanctionnées par l'approbation des Puissances Européennes.

La nécessité de cette approbation ne résulte pas, Monsieur, d'une protection arbitraire de ces Puissances. S'il ne leur est pas possible de laisser les affaires de l'Orient se régler sans leur concours, c'est que leurs intérêts essentiels et directs sont trop fortement engagés; c'est qu'elles ne pourraient tolérer aucune combinaison qui, dans une forme ou sous un prétexte quelconque, porterait atteinte à l'indépendance, à l'intégrité, de l'Empire Ottoman, ou aux droits de la dynastie régnante. Cet Empire, dans l'état de faiblesse auquel il se trouve réduit, n'a pourtant pas cessé d'être un des élémens essentiels de l'équilibre politique, une des garanties de la paix générale, et à ce titre il a un droit absolu à notre protection.

Pour vous prouver à quel point les vues des Puissances sont arrêtées à ce sujet, je vous envoie la copie de deux déclarations qui viennent d'être échangées entre les Cours de Londres et de Paris. Celle qui porte ma signature a été envoyée aussi à Vienne, à Berlin, à St.-Pétersbourg, et je puis d'autant moins douter de la cohésion du Cabinet Autrichien que c'est lui qui le premier a eu l'idée de cette espèce d'engagement réciproque.

Veuillez, Monsieur, faire part à Méhémet Ali du contenu de cette dépêche. Appellez toute son attention sur les considérations si graves qui y sont développées. Dites-lui bien que quelle que soit la sévérité de notre langage, elle est encore fort au-dessous du degré de mécontentement que sa persistance dans des prétentions incompatibles avec l'intérêt général inspirerait aux autres Cabinets, déjà trop portés à se défier de ses intentions. Dites-lui, que si en cette occasion comme en beaucoup d'autres, la France est la première à lui faire entendre des conseils que peut-être dans le premier moment il trouvera rigoureux, c'est précisément parceque la bienveillance dont nous sommes animés à son égard nous fait voir avec un vif regret les voies dangereuses où il commence à entrer, et parceque nous voudrions qu'il ne s'y engageât pas au point de compromettre ses grandes et belles destinées.

Il me tarde de connaître l'accueil qu'il aura fait aux propositions d'accommodement contenues dans la lettre que lui a écrite le nouveau Grand Vizir. Je n'hésite pas à dire qu'elles me paraissent parfaitement propres à devenir tout au moins la base d'une négociation sérieuse. Je ne doute pas que M. l'Amiral Roussin ne vous ait envoyé le texte de la lettre vizirielle. Je le désire d'autant plus que celle qu'il vous a écrite lui-même, pour vous annoncer la démarche de la Porte, aurait pu, par la manière dont elle était rédigée, vous faire supposer qu'il s'agissait simplement de confier à Méhémet Ali l'investiture viagère de l'Egypte.

P.S. 28 *Juillet*.—Je vous envoie ci-joint, Monsieur, copie des instructions que M. le Ministre de la Marine adresse aujourd'hui même à l'Amiral Lalande. Elles sont relatives à la défection du Capitan Pacha; vous n'avez point à en donner communication actuelle au Vice-Roi, mais la connaissance que vous y puiserez de nos intentions, vous servira de règle pour réclamer fortement auprès de Son Altesse contre tout acte ou toute disposition qui, de sa part, tendrait à mettre obstacle au retour de la flotte Turque à Constantinople, et la soutiendrait dans sa désobéissance aux ordres de sa Cour.

(Translation.)

Marshal Soult to the Consul-General of France at Alexandria.—(Communicated by Baron de Bourqueney.)

Sir, *Paris, July* 27, 1839.

I HAVE received the despatches which you have done me the honour to write to me, to No. 115 inclusive: M. de Lurde's despatches have also reached me.

The King's Government sees with pain, that the advantages obtained by Mehemet Ali, far from inspiring him with that moderation which would so well become his strong and glorious position, seem to have awakened in his mind hopes and projects, of which there had been nothing latterly to indicate the existence.

The language which he has held to M. de Lurde is certainly in accordance with the intention so recently expressed by him in the instructions sent to Ibrahim Pasha, to rely for the termination of his quarrel with the Porte upon the negotiations about to be entered upon by the European Powers. The fact that those instructions were officially communicated to us, and that one of my Staff Officers was made the bearer of them, created an engagement with regard to us which cannot be broken by the occurrence of events to which we are entirely strangers.

The King's Government is willing to believe, that the Viceroy, quickly recovering from the excitement which his successes, as rapid as they were complete, may have caused him, will return to sentiments more worthy of his wisdom and of his experience; that he will not endeavour to attain the object of his ambition by force; and that he will perceive that even the conditions which violence might extort from the reverses and fears of the Porte would not in reality have a definitive character, and would form but a very insecure foundation for that power which he has created, unless they were sanctioned by the approbation of the European Powers.

The necessity for that approbation does not result, Sir, from the arbitrary protection of those Powers. If it is not possible for them to leave the affairs of the East to settle themselves without their concurrence, it is because their essential and direct interests are too deeply involved; it is because they could not tolerate any combination, which in any way, or under any pretext whatsoever, should assail the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire, or the rights of the reigning dynasty. That Empire, even in the state of weakness to which it is reduced, has nevertheless not ceased to be one of the essential elements of the balance of power,—one of the guarantees of general peace; and for these reasons has an absolute right to our protection.

In order to prove to you the extent to which the views of the Powers on this subject are settled, I send you copies of two declarations which have been exchanged between the Courts of London and Paris. The one that bears my signature has also been sent to Vienna, Berlin, and St. Petersburgh; and I have the less reason to doubt of the concurrence of the Austrian Cabinet, since it was that Cabinet which first broached the idea of this sort of reciprocal engagement.

I have to request you to make Mehemet Ali acquainted with the contents of this despatch. Call his entire attention to the important considerations detailed therein. Tell him that, severe as our language may be, it yet falls far short of the dissatisfaction with which he will, by his perseverance in pretensions incompatible with the general interest, inspire the other Cabinets, who are already but too much disposed to mistrust his intentions. Tell him, that if on this occasion, as on many others, France is the first to make him hear counsels, which he may at first deem harsh, it is precisely because the goodwill which we feel towards him causes us to view with deep regret the dangerous courses upon which he is about to enter; and because we are desirous that he should not so far commit himself as to compromise his great and high prospects.

I shall be anxious to learn in what manner he receives the propositions for accommodation which were contained in the letter addressed to him by the new Grand Vizier. I have no hesitation in saying, that those propositions appear to me perfectly adapted for forming, at any rate, the basis of a serious negotiation. Admiral Roussin will no doubt have furnished you with a copy of the Vizier's letter. I desire this the more, because the letter which he himself addressed to you, announcing the proceeding adopted by the Porte, might, by the manner in which it was drawn up, have led you to suppose that there was merely question of conferring on Mehemet Ali the Pashalik of Egypt for life.

P.S.—*July* 28. I send you herewith, Sir, copy of the instructions, dated this day, addressed by the Minister of Marine to Admiral Lalande; they relate actually to the defection of the Capudan Pasha; you need not communicate these instructions to the Viceroy; but the knowledge of our intentions which you will derive therefrom will serve for your guidance in protesting strongly to His Highness against any act or measure on his part which would throw difficulties in the way of the return of the Turkish fleet to Constantinople, and would support it in its disobedience to the orders of its Court.

Inclosure 2 in No. 178.

The Grand Vizier to Mehemet Ali.

(Traduction.)

AINSI que le portait la lettre qui a été adressée à Votre Excellence il y a quelques jours, Sa Hautesse le très-magnifique, très-formidable, et très-puissant Sultan Abdoul Medjid Khan, étant monté sur le Trône Impérial, que la prédestination divine avait laissé vacant, la sagesse dont elle est naturellement douée lui a dicté, au moment même de son avènement, le langage qui suit: "Le Gouverneur de l'Egypte, Méhémet Ali Pacha, avait commis quelques actes de nature à indisposer mon glorieux père; divers évènemens sont survenus, et des préparatifs ont été faits. Cependant, pour préserver de toute atteinte le bien-être des populations que m'a confiées la Providence, et dans l'unique but d'épargner le sang Musulman, j'oublierai tout le passé, j'accorderai à ce Gouverneur son pardon, je lui enverrai une décoration semblable à celles de mes autres Vizirs, et je lui concéderai la Province d'Egypte comme devant passer par l'héritage à ses enfans, sous la condition de remplir entièrement les devoirs de la soumission et de l'obéissance." . . . .

(Translation.)

The Grand Vizier to Mehemet Ali.

AS was signified in the letter which was addressed to your Excellency some days ago, His Highness, the most magnificent, the most formidable, and most powerful Sultan Abdul Medjid Khan, having mounted the Imperial throne, which divine predestination had left vacant, that wisdom with which His Highness is naturally endowed, at the very moment of his accession, dictated to him the following language:—"The Governor of Egypt, Mehemet Ali Pasha, had committed several acts of a nature to render my illustrious father ill-disposed towards him; various events took place, and preparations have been made. Nevertheless, in order to preserve from any attack the welfare of those populations which Providence has entrusted to my care, and with the sole object of sparing Mussulman blood, I will forget the past; I will grant that Governor his pardon; I will send him a decoration similar to those of my other Viziers; and I will grant to him the Province of Egypt, to pass as an heritage to his children, upon condition of his fulfilling entirely the duties of submission and obedience."

No. 179.

Viscount Palmerston to the Baron de Bourqueney.

Foreign Office, August 3, 1839.

LORD PALMERSTON presents his compliments to the Baron de Bourqueney, and has the honour to inclose drafts of the proposed instructions to the Admirals in the Levant, in order that M. de Bourqueney may forward them to Paris to-night.

Inclosure 1 in No. 179.

Sketch of the proposed Instructions to the two Admirals in the Mediterranean.

Foreign Office, August 3, 1839.

TO go immediately to Alexandria, and to take up a position off the port, so as to prevent the Egyptian fleet from entering, if they should be outside the harbour, or from coming out, if they should be within.

The Admirals should then state to Mehemet Ali that their respective Governments, who are the Allies of the Sultan, and who are determined to uphold the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire, have ordered them to demand from him the immediate restitution of the Turkish fleet, in order that it may be sent back without delay to Constantinople.

The Admirals should say, that no Turkish officer or man who may think that his personal safety would be endangered on his return to Constantinople, should be required to go back thither, but that all such persons might remain in Egypt; and if without some such persons there should not be hands enough to work the ships, the Admirals should require that a sufficient number of hands should be put on board to work the fleet as far as Rhodes or any other port of deposit, giving their formal guarantee, that all Turkish officers and men who might wish to return to Egypt should be sent back thither from Rhodes.

If the Pasha should refuse to comply with this demand, the Admirals should have recourse to any measures of compulsion which they may think within their power, and advisable for the purpose of inducing the Pasha to yield.

In such case, the Admirals should begin with the mildest methods of coercion, and should progressively increase the severity of the pressure, as circumstances may require; and they should, in the last resort, take possession of the Egyptian fleet if they should be unable to obtain the acquiescence of the Pasha without such a measure. If this should be done, they should send the ships to Constantinople; the ships to be kept by the Sultan.

Such part of the crews as would not be wanted to navigate the ships to Constantinople to be landed immediately in Egypt, in exchange for so many of the crews of the Turkish ships as might be willing to go back to Turkey; and the rest of the Egyptians, if they should not choose to enter into the Turkish service, to be sent back to Egypt when no longer wanted to navigate the ships.

The capture of the Egyptian fleet ought not however to induce the Admirals to desist from exacting from the Pasha the surrender of the Turkish ships; and they should continue to use measures of coercion to produce that result, and would be authorized to detain all merchant ships sailing under the Egyptian flag.

But the Admirals should recollect that England and France not being belligerents, the combined squadron is not to interrupt the commerce of neutrals.

The Admirals should be left a discretionary power to depart from the letter of these instructions, adhering always to their spirit; and they should abstain from employing force, if it is possible to accomplish their objects without it.

Inclosure 2 in No. 179.

Supplementary Instruction to the Admirals.

Foreign Office, August 3, 1839.

IF, when the Admirals receive these instructions, circumstances should have arisen to render the presence of the combined fleet immediately necessary at the Dardanelles, in the Sea of Marmora, or in the Bosphorus, the Admirals will of course postpone acting upon the other instruction of this day, until after the more pressing service shall have been accomplished ; and if while they are carrying the other instruction of this date into execution, they should find that the occupation of Constantinople by a Russian force, or any other circumstances, would render it inexpedient to send to Constantinople the Egyptian or the Turkish ships which they may obtain possession of at Alexandria, the Admirals in such case should be authorized to send such ships to be held in safe deposit in any other Turkish port.

No. 180.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 3.)

My Lord, *Paris, August* 1, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to forward to your Lordship copy of a despatch from the French Consul-General at Alexandria to Marshal Soult, which has been communicated to his Excellency by the Marseilles telegraph.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

Inclosure in No. 180.

Telegraphic despatch from Marseilles, August 1, 1839.

Le Consul-Général à M. le Président du Conseil des Ministres.

Alexandrie, 16 *Juillet.*

LA flotte Turque est venue le 14, sous le commandement du Capitan Pacha, se mettre à la disposition de Méhémet Ali. Le Vice-Roi a dit qu'il ne la rendrait à la Porte que lorsque le Grand Vizir Hosreff Pacha serait éloigné des affaires, et qu'on lui aurait accordé l'hérédité des pays qu'il gouverne.

L'Armée Egyptienne a reçu l'ordre de se retirer derrière l'Euphrate.

(Translation.)

The Consul General to the President of the Council of Ministers.

Alexandria, July 16.

THE Turkish fleet, under the command of the Capudan Pasha, arrived on the 14th, in order to place itself at the disposal of Mehemet Ali. The Viceroy has said that he would not restore it to the Porte, until the Grand Vizier Hosrew Pasha should be removed from office, and the hereditary Government of the countries which he rules should be conferred on himself.

The Egyptian Army has received orders to retire behind the Euphrates.

No. 181.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 5.)

My Lord, *Paris, August* 2, 1839.

I THIS morning stated to Marshal Soult, that Her Majesty's Government had learnt with great satisfaction, by the report of my conversation with his Excellency on Friday last, that the French Government coincided with that of Her Majesty, in the opinion that the late events should not alter the course which the European Powers had previously intended to pursue, in regard to the affairs of the East; but I would not conceal from him, that your Lordship had observed, that the despatch addressed to M. de Bourqueney on the same subject, and communicated by him to you, was not quite consonant with the sentiments he had expressed in conversation to me. I had not finished my sentence when the Marshal interrupted me by saying he retracted no opinion he had given to me; he thought now, as he did then, that the Powers of Europe should continue to act according to their previous intention, should consider what, under the circumstances, was best to be done for the maintenance of the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire, regarding as *non avenu* any arrangement which the Sultan may have acceded to, under the influence of the consternation caused at Constantinople by the late disastrous events. The object of his despatch to M. de Bourqueney was, he said, to elicit an opinion (provoquer une opinion) from you, as to the measures to be taken under the actual state of affairs.

A change had certainly been made in the position of Mehemet Ali, which would render much more difficult the obtaining from him his renunciation of possessions which the English and French Governments may think it desirable should be given up to the Sultan.

The Marshal then adverted to the different proposals which had been suggested at Berlin, and at Vienna, as a basis of an arrangement between Turkey and Egypt. He himself was disposed to think, that the ground upon which we should propose to negotiate with Mehemet Ali should be, his obtaining the hereditary right to his family of governing Egypt, on condition of his abandoning the other Pashalics, now under his dominion; but that some latitude must be given to our Representatives at Vienna, to accede to terms more favourable to Mehemet Ali; a maximum, however, of concession to the Pasha being laid down, which they must not exceed.

I asked the Marshal whether, since intelligence had arrived of the actual surrender of the Turkish fleet into the hands of Mehemet Ali, the French Government had taken into consideration, whether it might not be expedient that the French and English Governments should send new instructions to the Admirals of their fleets, in reference to that event. Admiral Duperré, the Minister of Marine, happening to be at that moment at the Foreign Office, Marshal Soult invited him to join us; and a conversation ensued, as to the power and means of the combined fleet to compel Mehemet Ali to restore the Turkish fleet to the Sultan, and the objections that might occur to the blockading Alexandria. Admiral Duperré, though by no means disinclined to the adoption of the measure of blockade, doubted the prudence, unless assured that the Russian fleet from the Black Sea would not enter the Bosphorus, of the French and English fleet occupying a position so distant from the Dardanelles. He was decidedly of opinion, that precautions should be taken by the Admirals to prevent the Egyptian fleet, or the Turkish fleet under the Capudan Pasha, from entering the Straits of the Dardanelles, with intentions hostile to the Sultan's Government at Constantinople.

This question, I collected from the conversation of the two Ministers, had already been mooted in the Cabinet Council, and was to be resumed at a Council of the Ministers this evening.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 182.

Sir George Hamilton to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 5.)

My Lord, *Berlin, July* 31, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatches to the 22nd of July, together with their inclosures.

Count Bresson has shown me a note which he has been ordered by the Duke of Dalmatia to address to the Prussian Government on the present state of the affairs of the East, exactly similar to that which M. de Bourqueney had transmitted to your Lordship on the 19th instant, and of which you have furnished me with a copy.

Although not instructed by your Lordship to make any similar formal communication to the Prussian Government on the present state of affairs in the East, I thought it my duty to suggest to Baron Werther, the advantages that would be gained by an early declaration of the intended policy of Prussia, and that instructions should be forwarded to her Representative at Vienna, with as little delay as possible, in the spirit of your Lordship's note of the 22nd instant, in answer to that of M. de Bourqueney.

Baron Werther informed me, that he approved highly of your Lordship's views, coinciding with those of the French Government, for the maintenance of the balance of Power in Europe; and he stated that he should inform the King at Töplitz, of the sentiments of Her Majesty's Government; and for this purpose he requested that I would allow him to take a copy of your Lordship's note to M. de Bourqueney, with which request I thought it right to comply.

No answer has yet been received by the French Minister to his official Note, and I suppose he will not receive any until sufficient time has elapsed to enable this Government to communicate with the Austrian Cabinet.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GEORGE B. HAMILTON.

No. 183.

Sir George Hamilton to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 5.)

(Extract.) *Berlin, July* 31, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship, that the Russian Minister called upon me this afternoon, and read to me some despatches he had received this morning from Count Nesselrode, and copies of those he had written to M. de Kisseleff, in answer to your Lordship's despatch to Lord Clanricarde, of the 9th instant; as also a report from M. de Bouténeff, of the communications made to the Ambassadors of the Five Powers at the Porte, by Nouri Effendi.

As your Lordship will be already in possession of the information the despatches contain, I need not further allude to them; but Baron Meyendorff read me a letter from Count Nesselrode, dated the 25th instant, in which he said that the defeat of Hafiz Pasha, and the defection of Achmet Pasha, would make no change whatever in the intentions and disposition of the Emperor, taken before the news of those later events had come to his knowledge; that His Imperial Majesty considered that the fleets of England and France were quite sufficient to insist upon the Turkish fleet repassing the Dardanelles without his assistance; and that he had no wish whatever to propose that his squadron should join ours in the Mediterranean. Count Nesselrode said, that the Emperor was of opinion that the death of the Sultan, and the indication of moderation and conciliation shown by his successor, would, in the end, have the happiest effects, and that he was without alarm as to the termination of the affairs of the East; and that he thought the mind of Mehemet Ali would be favourably acted upon by the early step taken by Abdul Medjid, of offering to make the Pashalic of Egypt hereditary in his family, and would render him more easy to be treated with hereafter.

His Excellency then said, "We understand that the English and French Governments intend to propose that the Five Powers shall make a declaration of their determination to maintain the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire, under the present dynasty, and that none of them would seek to profit by the present state of things, for the purpose of gaining any acquisition of territory. As far as the independence of the Turkish Empire is concerned, and the latter proposition, that Russia, among the rest, should not seek to profit by the present state of things, the Emperor would instantly sign any instrument which would record such a determination on his part; but guaranteeing the integrity of the empire was another thing; that it perhaps might fall upon Russia at a moment most inconvenient to herself to be called upon, as the nearest neighbour, to bring back a rebellious vassal under the dominion of the Sultan, and the Emperor might be exposed to numerous inconveniences by entering into such a compact."

I remarked to Baron Meyendorff, that the Emperor was already bound somewhat in this manner by the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi; but he said, "We are at liberty by that Treaty to judge of the *casus fœderis;* for instance, if the Porte was to make an unjust aggression, we are not bound to protect it from the effects of it, as the inconveniences to which such a position might give rise were foreseen when the Treaty was made."

The conversation then ended, and I informed Baron Meyendorff, that I should report his observations to your Lordship, and he told me that I was perfectly at liberty to do so.

No. 184.

The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 5.)

(Extract.) *St. Petersburgh, July* 27, 1839.

ABOUT two hours after I had despatched messenger Webster on the 20th instant, Count Nesselrode communicated to me the information he had that morning received, that Nouri Effendi had called together the Envoys of the Five Great Powers at Constantinople, and had submitted to them, upon the part of the Turkish Government, as a plan for the settlement of the differences between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, the same proposition as your Lordship had instructed Lord Beauvale to suggest at Vienna. The news appeared to give his Excellency much pleasure; and he blamed the Ambassadors, to whom the proposal was communicated, for having simply stated that they would report it to their respective Governments, and not having expressed at once their satisfaction at the proposition of the Divan.

Count Nesselrode discussed with me the probability that France would desire better terms than those offered, for the Pasha of Egypt, and particularly his retention of St. John d'Acre. But he said the precise terms of the final conditions to be imposed upon the parties would virtually depend upon Her Majesty's Government.

Count Fiquelmont, who left St. Petersburgh yesterday for Vienna, on his road to Italy, has had a long conversation with the Emperor, chiefly, I understand, upon the Turco-Egyptian Question, and he appeared well satisfied with what had passed upon the occasion.

No. 185.

The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 5.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, July* 27, 1839.

COUNT NESSELRODE communicated to me this morning the latest information he has received from Constantinople and the Levant; giving an account of the defeat and flight to Malatia of the Turkish Army, and of the insubordinate, if not traitorous, conduct of Achmet Pasha, commanding the fleet of the Sultan. I have not seen Count Nesselrode; but I conversed on these occurrences with Count Matuszevic, who brought for my perusal a copy of the despatch which is to be sent this evening to M. Kisseleff, and to be communicated to your Lordship. The chief object of it appears to be, to change the place of conference of the Plenipotentiaries of the Great Powers from Vienna to Constantinople. The Russian Government seem still very confident that a settlement of the disputes between Mehemet Ali and the Porte may, and will, be easily effected, notwithstanding the late success of the Pasha's arms. Russia would not refuse her assent to the Pashalic of Syria being conferred for his life upon Ibrahim Pasha, if the Sultan should consent to such a demand.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) CLANRICARDE.

No. 186.

Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

My Lords, *Foreign Office, August* 5, 1839.

I HAVE to signify to your Lordships the Queen's commands, that an instruction, to the following effect, be forthwith addressed to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's Naval Forces in the Mediterranean.

Sir Robert Stopford will go immediately to Alexandria, and take up a position off the port, so as to prevent the Egyptian fleet from entering, if they should be outside the harbour, or from coming out, if they should be within.

Sir Robert Stopford will then state to Mehemet Ali, that the British Government, which is the Ally of the Sultan, and which is determined to uphold the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire, has ordered him to demand from Mehemet Ali the restitution of the Turkish fleet, in order that it may be sent back without delay to Constantinople.

Sir Robert Stopford will say, that no Turkish officer or man who may think that, in consequence of the part he may have taken in carrying the fleet to Alexandria, his personal safety would be endangered on his return to Constantinople, should be required to go back thither; but that all such persons might remain in Egypt. If, however, the assistance of some such persons should be necessary, in order to work the ships, Sir Robert Stopford will require that a sufficient number of hands should be put on board to work the fleet as far as Rhodes, or any other Turkish port of deposit, giving his formal guarantee, that all such Turkish officers and men, who might wish to return to Egypt, should be sent back thither when the ships should have reached their destination.

If Mehemet Ali should refuse to comply with this demand, Sir Robert Stopford should have recourse to any measures of compulsion which he may think within the extent of his power, and advisable, for the purpose of inducing the Pasha to yield.

In such case, Sir Robert Stopford should begin with the mildest methods of coercion, and should progressively increase the severity of the pressure, as circumstances may require; and he should, in the last resort, take possession of the Egyptian fleet, if he should be unable to obtain the acquiescence of the Pasha without such a measure. If this should be done, Sir Robert Stopford should send the ships so taken to Constantinople, to be kept by the Sultan; such parts of the crews as would not be wanted to navigate the ships to Constantinople, should be landed immediately in Egypt, in exchange for such portion of the crews of the Turkish ships as might be willing to go back to Turkey: and the rest of the Egyptians, if they should not choose to enter into the Turkish service, should be sent back to Egypt, when no longer wanted to navigate the ships.

The capture of the Egyptian fleet ought not, however, to induce Sir Robert Stopford to desist from exacting from Mehemet Ali the surrender of the Turkish ships; and Sir Robert Stopford should continue to use measures of coercion to produce that result: for which purpose he would be authorized to detain all merchant ships sailing under the Egyptian flag. But Sir Robert Stopford should recollect that Great Britain, not being a belligerent, he is not entitled to interrupt the commerce of neutrals.

Sir Robert Stopford should have a discretionary power left him, to depart from the letter of these instructions, provided he adheres to their spirit; and he should abstain from employing force as long as he may think it possible to accomplish without it the object which he is to attain.

Similar instructions will be given to the French Admiral, with whom Sir Robert Stopford should concert and co-operate.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 187.

Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

My Lords, *Foreign Office, August* 5, 1839.

I HAVE to signify to your Lordships the Queen's commands that, in addition to the instructions contained in my other letter of this day's date, a further instruction should be addressed to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, stating, that if, when he receives the above-mentioned instructions, circumstances should have arisen to render the presence of the combined British and French fleets immediately necessary at the Dardanelles, in the Sea of Marmora, or in the Bosphorus, Sir Robert Stopford will, of course, postpone acting upon the other instructions contained in my letter to your Lordships of this date, until after the more pressing service shall have been accomplished; and if, while Sir Robert Stopford is carrying the other instruction of this date into execution, he should find that either the occupation of Constantinople by a Russian force, or any other circumstance, would render it inexpedient to send to Constantinople the Egyptian or the Turkish ships which he may obtain possession of at Alexandria, Sir Robert Stopford, in such case, should be authorized to send such ships to be held in safe deposit in any other Turkish port.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 188.

Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

My Lords, *Foreign Office, August* 5, 1839.

THE instructions for Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, contained in my other letter of this day's date, have been framed in conjunction with the French Chargé d'Affaires; but Baron de Bourqueney could not take upon himself the responsibility of agreeing to them on behalf of his Government. Baron de Bourqueney sent copies of them to Paris on Saturday evening, for the consideration of the French Government.

But I have settled with Baron Bourqueney that these instructions should be sent by a messenger immediately to Earl Granville, with instructions to Earl Granville to send on the messenger and the instructions to Malta, if the French Government should agree to what is proposed, so that by such means several days might be gained in the arrival of the instructions. If the French Government should object to any part of the instructions, and should wish for alterations, the messenger will in that case wait at Paris till the two Governments shall have come to an understanding.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 189.

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, August* 5, 1839.

I HEREWITH transmit to your Excellency, copies of two letters which I have addressed to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, containing instructions for the guidance of the Admiral commanding Her Majesty's squadron in the Mediterranean, in the present state of the affairs in the Levant.

These instructions have been prepared by me, in concert with M. de Bourqueney; but M. de Bourqueney could not take upon himself the responsibility of agreeing to them on behalf of his Government. He sent copies of them, however, to Paris on Saturday evening, for the consideration of his Government; and I have settled with him that these instructions should be sent immediately to your Excellency, in order that you may send on the messenger and the instructions, if the French Government should agree to what is proposed; by which means several days may be gained in the arrival of the instructions.

If the French Government should object to any part, and should wish for alterations, then the messenger will wait at Paris till the two Governments shall have come to an understanding.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 190.

Viscount Palmerston to Sir George Hamilton.

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 6, 1839.

I HAVE received your despatch of July 24, reporting the substance of your conversations with Baron Werther, upon the present state of affairs in the Levant; and I have to instruct you to express to that Minister the sincere gratification which is felt by Her Majesty's Government in finding that the views and opinions of the Cabinets of London and of Berlin upon the Affairs of the Levant are so entirely the same; and that the course of policy which it appears in the present crisis to be so important for the Five Powers to pursue, will be supported by the weight and authority of Prussia. Baron Werther will, no doubt, have already been informed that the French Government is of opinion that the defeat of the Turkish Army, the defection of the fleet, and the timidity of the Divan, ought to make no alteration in the course which the Five Powers had intended to pursue before those events were known; and you will state to Baron Werther, that in that opinion Her Majesty's Government entirely concur.

Those unfortunate events cannot in any degree diminish the great interest which Europe has in maintaining the Ottoman Empire in its integrity and independence as an essential element of the balance of power; nor can those events diminish in any sensible degree the means which the Five Powers, if united, must necessarily have, of carrying into effect any arrangement which they may unanimously agree upon as necessary for the accomplishment of the great objects which they have in view. But those events, by rendering more apparent the dangers to which the Ottoman Empire would be exposed, if left to itself, and by showing more clearly the imminence of those dangers, afford additional proofs of the necessity of union, vigour and promptness on the part of the Five Powers.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 191.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received August* 6.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, July* 17, 1839.

INCLOSED I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship copy of two despatches received by me from his Excellency Viscount Ponsonby, together with copy of my reply thereto, and which has been sent this day to Constantinople by the same steamer which brought Viscount Ponsonby's despatch.

I have endeavoured to be as explanatory as possible in my despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador, and which consequently obviates the necessity of any further observations on my part to your Lordship.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Inclosure 1 in No. 191.

Viscount Ponsonby to Colonel Campbell.

Sir, *Therapia, July* 5, 1839.

ON the 3rd instant, the Representatives of the Five Great Powers were invited to meet the Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs, at his house on the Bosphorus. When they were assembled, his Excellency Nouri Effendi stated, that the Sultan had commanded him to assure the Ministers, in his Highness's name, of his esteem and friendship for the Sovereigns they represented, and his warm desire to cultivate by every means the good understanding that existed between the Ottoman Porte and their Governments.

His Excellency proceeded to say, he was commanded to make known to the Ministers of his Allies and friends, that the Sultan being animated by the wish to put an end to the calamities which press heavily upon his people, in consequence of the conduct of the Pasha of Egypt, and the anger it had excited in the bosom of the late Sultan Mahmoud, had determined to send one of the eminent men of his Court to offer the Egyptian Pasha pardon for the past, and assurance of favour for the future (of which the Sultan sent a decoration as the mark and evidence), and to promise that his Highness would confer upon the Pasha and his family the hereditary Government of Egypt, to be held by the Pasha and his descendants as vassals, on the condition that Syria, &c., &c., should be immediately restored to the Sultan.

Nouri Effendi asked the opinion of the Representatives, who replied, that they would rejoice in the restoration of peace, and were warmly desirous of the prosperity of his Highness; that being uninstructed by their Governments, they could not give any opinion as to the terms which the Sublime Porte was about to propose to the Pasha, but they would not fail to report to their Governments the communication they had received.

Questions were asked to ascertain precisely the nature of the proposal intended to be made to the Pasha; and it was distinctly understood, that the Sultan would grant to Mehemet Ali the hereditary Government of Egypt, within the boundaries that were formerly the limits of that country; that is, as I understand it, the limit that used to circumscribe the country as a Pashalic.

It was asked if it was intended to leave Mehemet Ali in possession of Syria, or of Mecca, or Medina, or of St. John d'Acre, and the reply was in the negative. The Representatives thought it right to confine themselves to inquiries directed solely to the perfect elucidation of what was stated to them, and not to enter at all into the discussion of the merits of the proposition.

Nouri Effendi desired the Ministers to write to the Consuls of their respective Governments, and the Ministers agreed to notify the facts, and what had taken place, to the Consuls.

There were questions asked as to the state of the armies in Syria, and Nouri Effendi said, that orders had been sent which would be received by Hafiz Pasha in about ten days, peremptorily commanding him to refrain from hostilities.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 191.

Viscount Ponsonby to Colonel Campbell.

Sir, *Therapia, July* 7, 1839.

I INCLOSE a letter which will inform you of what has taken place. The statement comes from Admiral Lalande, who was visited by the second in command of the Ottoman fleet, Osman Bey, bearer of a message from Ahmed Pasha.

It seems Ahmed asserts that the Sultan was murdered by Hosrew, now Grand Vizier, and Halil Pasha. That those persons intend to give up this country to Russia; that it is necessary to oblige the Sultan to appoint another Ministry.

The Capudan Pasha proposed to go to Candia, but as Admiral Lalande pointed out to the messenger, Osman Bey, that Candia belonged to Mehemet Ali, and to carry the Ottoman fleet there would be to deliver it up to that Pasha, Osman seemed struck with the remark, and said the Capudan Pasha would go to Rhodes.

Admiral Lalande said he had no orders to interfere by force with the movements of the Ottoman fleet. He has ordered a French brig of war to observe the motions of that fleet.

The French Ambassador communicated the facts to the Sublime Porte, and has assured the Sultan of the devotion of the French Government to the cause of the Sultan, &c., &c. He has advised the Porte to send couriers in all haste to Hafiz Pasha, and I believe he has advised that orders should be given for the recall of the army back to this country. I shall give advice that the army be left where it is, because that part of the Empire ought not to be exposed to become the prey of Mehemet Ali.

The Ambassador has desired the French Consul-General to place before Mehemet Ali the expediency of his remaining quiet, and to show him that all the Great Powers must interfere in this crisis, and his part is to be acquiescent.

I have to beg of you to say, that the Pasha will do well to reflect upon the inadequacy of his own means to resist the force of the United Sovereigns, and that his wisdom will direct him to avoid the consequences that may attend imprudence.

I have assured the Porte of the firm support of the British Government.

I have only the shortest time for writing, therefore I confine myself to the principal facts. It is not easy to believe Ahmed Pasha has taken this step (unless he be mad) without having some support somewhere, but as yet there are no signs here of any disposition to make a disturbance; I think the end may be, that Ahmed Pasha will offer the fleet to Mehemet Ali. It is to be seen whether or not he will be able to give it to him.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 3 in No. 191.

Baron Roussin to Viscount Ponsonby.

[See Inclosure 1 in No. 148.]

Inclosure 4 in No. 191.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Alexandria, July* 16, 1839.

ON the morning of the 14th instant, I had the honour to receive your Excellency's despatches of the 5th and 7th instant, which were sent to me by M. Cochelet, the French Consul-General.

I soon after called on M. Cochelet, who I found had received despatches of the same nature from Admiral Roussin, who had also sent a letter from Baron Stürmer to M. de Laurin; but not any letter had come for Count Medem.

I then proposed to M. Cochelet, that as his instructions and mine, and probably those of M. de Laurin, were similar, and as also the object and views of Count Medem were identical, we should go collectively to wait on the Pasha to give effect to our instructions; and the more so, as our Ambassadors had collectively conferred with Nouri Effendi.

M. Cochelet thought it would be better for us to act separately, and wished to go alone.

About 4 P.M. on the same day, a fleet of nineteen vessels of war came in view, and as this could be no other than the fleet of the Capudan Pasha, I again called on M. Cochelet to urge that we should wait on the Pasha, and should have a communication with him before he could see the Capudan Pasha, who could not possibly enter the port before the next morning (the 15th).

M. Cochelet was unwell and could not leave his house, but he was desirous that I should call on the Pasha with my Colleagues of Austria and Russia, and fix an audience for us and M. Cochelet together on the next morning.

I immediately called on M. de Laurin and Count Medem, and we proceeded together to the palace, where we had a long conversation with Mehemet Ali, and the substance of which is detailed in the Résumé inclosed.

On the following morning (15th), I went early to the palace, and found the Pasha looking at the Turkish fleet, which was about six or seven miles off; whilst his own fleet of eleven sail of the line, two large frigates, and a brig, which was nearer shore and to the westward, was standing towards the Turkish fleet.

The "Nile" steamer was at the same time seen nearer shore, standing for the port, with the Capudan Pasha's flag at the main, and the boat of the Capudan Pasha with his flags towing astern by the steamer.

The Pasha then asked me if I had any objection to defer my conference and that of my Colleagues with him till the evening, as he must receive the Capudan Pasha, and on my reply in the affirmative, he sent off a similar request to my Colleagues. M. Cochelet, however, arrived as the messenger was leaving the room.

I told my dragoman, whom I found at the palace, to remain, to report to me the ceremony of the reception of the Capudan Pasha; and I have now the honour to inclose his report thereof.

On the evening of yesterday (15th), my three Colleagues and myself waited on Mehemet Ali (Boghos Bey and Artin Bey were present), and we remained with him an hour and a quarter.

The whole of this conversation is given so fully in the Résumé, that it leaves me nothing to add, but to express my hopes that your Excellency will perceive that I have endeavoured to carry into effect the desires expressed to me in your despatches of the 5th and 7th instant.

It is clear that the enmity between Mehemet Ali and Hosrew Pasha is too bitter to admit of any reconciliation; and that Mehemet appears to feel that there cannot be any security for him, or any good understanding between the Sultan and him, so long as Hosrew Pasha is in power.

Whether the Pasha has had any understanding or previous concert with the Capudan Pasha to induce him to the traitorous step which he has taken, I have not been able to ascertain, but I think it very far from improbable; at any rate, he was known to have been in correspondence with him, when it was supposed that he, Achmet Mushir Pasha, was coming here with proposals from the

late Sultan to Mehemet Pasha; and besides, Achmet Pashá was known to be hostile to Hosrew Pasha.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

P. S.—The Captain of the Sultan's steamer which conveyed Akiff Effendi from Constantinople, waited this morning upon the Capudan Pasha to ask his orders, as he was to leave this day on his return. The Capudan Pasha replied,—"I have no orders to give you myself; you are only to follow those already given to you. I did not come here as a rebel, but seeing that the true way to save the empire was to come here, I have done so, as all the nation feels that the counsels of Mehemet Ali, and not those of Hosrew Pasha, can restore the Ottoman Empire."

Inclosure 5 in No. 191.

Résumé succinct de deux entretiens qui ont eu lieu entre le Pacha d'Egypte et les Consuls-Généraux des Quatre Grandes Cours.

LE 14 Juillet, vers les 5 heures du soir, la flotte Turque avec le Capitan Pacha à son bord, parut en vue d'Alexandrie. Sur cette nouvelle, les Consuls-Généraux d'Autriche, d'Angleterre, et de Russie, se rendirent chez le Vice-Roi, à l'effet de l'exhorter à ne point se laisser aller à quelque mesure irréfléchie, et d'obtenir de la part de Son Altesse des promesses tranquillisantes sur sa conduite future. M. le Consul-Général de France ayant été retenu chez lui par suite d'une indisposition, avait chargé ses Collègues de porter également la parole en son nom. Cette séance, au reste, ne devait être que le prélude de la réunion générale fixée au lendemain suivant.

Nous commençâmes par représenter au Vice-Roi, combien les accusations portées par Achmet Pacha contre Hosreff et Halil Pacha, dans le but de colorer et justifier sa défection, et notamment les bruits répandus sur l'empoisonnement du Sultan Mahmoud, étaient dénués de fondement, et peu conformes avec les dépositions des médecins Européens qui avaient traité Sa Hautesse durant le cours de sa maladie.

Passant en outre à la situation actuelle des affaires, nous lui dîmes que les Représentans des Grandes Puissances, dans le but d'éviter jusqu'au dernier moment une intervention armée, et désirant la solution pacifique de la Question Orientale, l'engageaient sérieusement à s'arranger à l'amiable avec le Sultan; que déjà Sa Hautesse venait de lui donner un témoignage éclatant de sa magnanimité, en lui concédant l'hérédité de l'Egypte; que c'était maintenant au Pacha à faire preuve de bonne volonté et de soumission envers son Souverain, et de hâter le dénouement paisible de cette lutte. Qu'à cet effet le renvoi immédiat de la flotte serait le gage le plus palpable de sa loyauté.

Méhémet Ali nous répondit:—"Je ne prétends point disculper Achmet Pacha; ses allégations peuvent bien ne pas être fondées, et je présume, en effet, que tout ce qu'il m'avait écrit doit être attribué plutôt à la haine que lui inspire Hosreff Pacha. Quant à la concession faite par le Sultan, je ne la considère point comme un trait de générosité de sa part, mais comme un acte de nécessité. Tant que Hosreff Pacha sera à la tête des affaires, je dois me méfier de toutes ses assertions, et je ne puis compter sur une réconciliation franche. Je dois viser en conséquence au positif, et ne point me contenter de promesses et de sermens; comment pourrais-je me fier à Hosreff qui est mon ennemi mortel?"

Nous représentâmes à Son Altesse qu'elle était trop expérimentée dans les affaires pour se laisser duper; que les promesses écrites de son Souverain le mettaient à l'abri de tous les artifices du Grand Vizir; qu'il était de son intérêt de ne point provoquer des désordres à Constantinople, qui pourraient naître facilement par la nouvelle de la perte de l'Armée Turque, de la défection de la flotte, et de l'incertitude dans laquelle l'on se trouvait sur l'attitude du Vice-Roi. Que le meilleur moyen de rétablir la sécurité de la capitale, serait de restituer la flotte à Sa Hautesse, et d'envoyer sans délai une personne à Constantinople chargée de faire, en son nom, acte de soumission envers le Grand Seigneur, et lui exprimer les vœux que Son Altesse pourrait nourrir. Qu'Achmet Pacha ayant quitté les Dardanelles après avoir reçu l'ordre de se rendre avec sa flotte à Constantinople, avait commis un acte de haute trahison, et qu'il répugnait aux Représentans des Grandes Cours de croire, qu'en acceptant l'escadre des mains du Capitan Pacha, il voulut se rendre son complice.

Ici le Pacha se récria vivement contre un pareil argument, alléguant qu'en tems de guerre il était bien permis de recevoir les déserteurs. Nous lui répondîmes que la défection d'Achmet Pacha avait eu lieu après l'expédition de la lettre du Grand Vizir qui annonçait l'oubli du passé au nom du Sultan Abdoul Medjid, l'envoi du Firman, et la concession de l'hérédité pour l'Egypte; que d'ailleurs le Vice-Roi avait envisagé lui-même la paix comme rétablie, puisqu'il avait donné ordre à son fils Ibrahim Pacha, dès la réception de la lettre du Grand Vizir, de se retirer avec ses troupes en-deçà de l'Euphrate.

"Oui," répondit Méhémet Ali, "je ne suis plus en hostilité avec le Sultan, qui est, comme je vous l'ai déjà dit, innocent et pur comme un diamant; mais je suis en guerre avec ses Ministres, qui n'ont point été nommés par la volonté de la nation, et ont usurpé par des intrigues les premières places du pays, et prétendent maintenant dicter la loi."

A ces raisonnemens du Pacha, nous répliquâmes que selon la connaissance que nous avions des hommes à Constantinople, Hosreff Pacha nous paraissait la seule personne capable de diriger les affaires dans un moment aussi critique que l'était toujours le changement d'un règne en Turquie; que les vœux de la nation n'y étaient pour rien; qu'elle n'avait jamais été consultée, et qu'en conséquence, il était difficile de connaître son opinion; qu'il s'agissait avant tout d'imposer au peuple dans un moment de crise, et qu'en général l'histoire de l'Empire Ottoman nous offrait l'exemple que l'avènement au trône d'un Sultan ne s'était jamais opéré sans secousse, sans effusion de sang, et sans un changement de Ministres.

La conversation roula encore assez longtems sur le caractère et les capacités des différens hauts dignitaires de la Turquie, et sur les reviremens qui, selon l'avis du Pacha, seraient favorables pour consolider le Gouvernement actuel. Puis, ayant fait quelque tour dans la chambre, le Vice-Roi reprit:—"Mon intention n'est point d'envoyer pour le moment un fonctionnaire à Constantinople pour complimenter le Sultan sur son avènement au trône, mais je vous prie de transmettre aux Représentans des Quatre Grandes Puissances près la Porte Ottomane, la déclaration suivante, savoir:

"Que dans deux jours, Akiff Effendi repartira pour Constantinople. Il sera porteur d'une lettre de félicitation et de soumission de ma part au nouveau Sultan Abdoul Medjid. J'écrirai également une lettre à Hosreff Pacha dans laquelle je lui représenterai:—1°. Que feu le Sultan Mahmoud m'avait fait dans le tems, par l'entremise de Sarim Effendi, des propositions bien plus avantageuses que celles que Sa Hautesse m'a adressées aujourd'hui, puisqu'il m'avait proposé alors l'hérédité de l'Egypte de même que celle de l'Eyalet de Seyda et du Sandjack de Tripoli. 2°. Que dans les circonstances actuelles, je sollicite l'hérédité de l'Egypte avec celle de la Syrie et de Candie, c'est-à-dire, de tout ce que je possède maintenant, comme je l'avais annoncé précédemment. 3°. Qu'à cette condition, et si l'on veut agir de bonne foi envers moi, je serai le plus fidèle des serviteurs et des vassaux de Sa Hautesse, et je la défendrai quand et contre qui elle voudra.

"C'est dans ce sens que je me propose d'écrire à Constantinople. Je ne ferai point mention dans ma lettre au Grand Vizir, de la flotte, par bienséance, mais je vous prie de vouloir bien assurer, Messieurs les Ambassadeurs et Ministres, que je n'ai jamais eu l'intention de la garder ou de m'en servir dans un but hostile contre le Sultan; je m'engage au contraire, formellement à la restituer dès que mes propositions auront été acceptées. Dans ce cas, tous les bâtimens composant l'Escadre de Sa Hautesse jusqu'au dernier, seront renvoyés à Constantinople. Quant aux amiraux Ottomans, ceux qui craindraient de retourner en Turquie, pourront rester en Egypte qui fait partie de la même monarchie. Une fois que le Sultan aura consenti à ma prière, et que Hosreff Pacha aura été éloigné de la direction des affaires, je n'hésiterai pas sur la première invitation de Sa Hautesse à me rendre à Constantinople, et ce ne sera pas avec l'Escadre que je m'y transporterai, mais seul sur un bateau à vapeur, et dans le but unique de présenter en personne mes hommages à mon Souverain et lui offrir mes services.

"Enfin je vous déclare, que si l'on n'agrée pas mes propositions, je ne ferai point la guerre, mais je me maintiendrai dans ma position actuelle, et j'attendrai."

Ainsi se termina notre première conversation avec Méhémet Ali.

Notre seconde réunion, fixée d'abord au lendemain matin, fut remise ensuite à l'après-midi, à cause du débarquement d'Achmet Pacha, qui fut reçu le même jour par le Vice-Roi. Deux heures avant le coucher du soleil, les quatre Consuls-Généraux d'Autriche, d'Angleterre, de France, et de Russie, se rendirent simultanément chez le Pacha. Dans cet entretien, des tentatives furent renouvelées pour engager Méhémet Ali à se désister dès à présent de la flotte, et à la rendre à son légitime propriétaire; mais cette fois encore nos représentations furent en pure perte.

Il protesta de ses intentions conservatrices; récapitula de nouveau la déclaration qu'il nous avait faite la veille; y apporta quelque modification dans les expressions, et s'efforça surtout à nous convaincre de la nécessité de la chûte de Hosreff Pacha.

Il disait à ce sujet:—" Aussi longtems que le Grand Vizir restera en place, il n'y aura pas de véritable raccommodement entre le Sultan et moi. Que Sa Hautesse nomme Grand Vizir qui elle voudra, et je serai le premier à coopérer à la consolidation de son trône. Je ne brigue point pour moi ce poste, car je le réfuserai si on me l'offrait, mais je désire ardemment l'éloignement d'un homme qui est détesté par la nation entière, et auquel tous les moyens sont bons pour arriver à son but, même le fer et le poison. Tant que les Représentans des Quatre Grands Cabinets soutiendront Hosreff Pacha, il pourra rester en place, mais le jour où il ne jouira plus de leur protection, il tombera. Aujourd'hui, si la tranquillité n'est point menacée à Constantinople, c'est grâces à l'appui des Grandes Puissances; que Hosreff se retire, et la tranquillité se maintiendra dans la capitale sans leur coopération. Je viens d'écrire au Grand Vizir une lettre particulière, par laquelle je lui donne le conseil de quitter les affaires et de demander sa démission. Cette lettre sera remise à Akiff Effendi, que j'expédie demain pour Constantinople. Par le prochain bateau à vapeur Français j'écrirai dans le même sens à la sœur du Sultan Mahmoud, et la Validé Sultane, car en leur envoyant mes lettres par Akiff Effendi, Hosreff Pacha serait homme à les soustraire."

Avant de quitter le Vice-Roi, il nous engagea de profiter du départ pyroscaphe Ottoman pour Constantinople, afin de transmettre nos Rapports à nos Ministres respectifs.

(Translation.)

Brief Summary of two Interviews which took place between the Pasha of Egypt, and the Consuls-General of the Four Great Courts.

ON the 14th of July, towards 5 o'clock in the evening, the Turkish fleet, with the Capudan Pasha on board, appeared in sight of Alexandria. Upon this being known, the Consuls-General of Austria, England, and Russia repaired to the Viceroy, in order to exhort him not to allow himself to adopt any inconsiderate measure, and to obtain from His Highness some tranquillizing promises with respect to his future conduct. The Consul-General of France, being kept at home by indisposition, had requested his Colleagues to speak in his name. This meeting, moreover, was only to be a prelude to the general meeting fixed for the ensuing day.

We began by representing to the Viceroy how groundless were the accusations which, with the view of giving a colour to and justifying his defection, Achmet Pasha had brought against Hosrew and Halil Pasha, particularly the reports spread abroad respecting the poisoning of Sultan Mahmoud, so little in conformity with the depositions of the European doctors who had attended His Highness during the course of his illness.

Passing then to the present position of affairs, we told him that the Representatives of the Great Powers, with the view of avoiding armed intervention to the last moment, and desiring the peaceable solution of the Eastern Question, seriously entreated him to come to an amicable arrangement with the Sultan; that His Highness had already given him a striking proof of his magnanimity by granting him the hereditary

Government of Egypt; that it was now the Pasha's turn to give a proof of goodwill and submission towards his Sovereign, and to accelerate the peaceful solution of this struggle. That for this purpose the immediate restitution of the fleet would be the most evident pledge of his good faith.

Mehemet Ali replied to us: "I do not pretend to exculpate Achmet Pasha; his assertions may indeed not be well founded; and I dare say that all that he has written to me ought rather to be attributed to the hatred with which Hosrew Pasha inspires him. As to the concession made by the Sultan, I do not consider it as a mark of generosity on his part, but as an act of necessity. As long as Hosrew Pasha shall be at the head of affairs I must mistrust all his assertions, and I cannot reckon upon a sincere reconciliation. I must therefore aim at something positive, and not content myself with promises and oaths. How could I put faith in Hosrew who is my mortal foe?

We represented to His Highness, that he was too experienced in business to allow himself to be duped; that the written promises of the Sultan sheltered him from the artifices of the Grand Vizier; that it was his interest not to excite disorders at Constantinople, which might easily spring up upon the news of the loss of the Turkish Army, of the defection of the fleet, and of the uncertainty which was felt respecting the attitude of the Viceroy. That the best method of re-establishing the security of the capital would be to restore the fleet to His Highness, to send to Constantinople without delay some person, charged to make in his name his submission to the Grand Signor, and to lay before him the wishes of His Highness. That Achmet Pasha, having quitted the Dardanelles, after having received the order to proceed with the fleet to Constantinople, had committed an act of high treason; and that the Representatives of the Great Courts felt repugnance to believe that he was willing to make himself an accomplice of the Capudan Pasha by accepting the fleet at his hands.

Here the Pasha loudly protested against such an argument, alleging that, in time of war, it was permitted to receive deserters. We replied to him, that the defection of Achmet Pasha had taken place after the sending of the Grand Vizier's letter, which announced, in the name of the Sultan Abdul Medjid, the oblivion of the past, the forwarding of the firman, and the grant of the inheritance of Egypt; that, moreover, the Viceroy had himself looked upon peace as re-established, since he had given orders to his son Ibrahim Pasha, upon the receipt of the Grand Vizier's letter, to retire with his troops on this side of the Euphrates.

"Yes," answered Mehemet Ali, "I am no longer in hostility with the Sultan, who, as I have already told you, is innocent and pure as a diamond; but I am at war with his Ministers, who have not been named by the voice of the nation, and who by means of intrigues have usurped the chief posts of the country, and now pretend to dictate the law."

To this reasoning of the Pasha, we replied, that according to the knowledge which we possessed of persons at Constantinople, Hosrew Pasha appeared to us to be the only man capable of directing affairs at such a critical moment as a change of reign in Turkey always was; that the wishes of the nation went for nothing in this; that it had never been consulted, and that therefore it was difficult to know its opinion; that above all things it was important to overawe the people at a critical moment; and that the history of the Ottoman Empire in general, afforded us an example, that the accession of a Sultan to the throne had never taken place without a shock, without shedding of blood, and without a change of Ministry.

The conversation turned for some time longer upon the character and the capacity of the different great dignitaries of Turkey, and upon the changes which, according to the Pasha, would be favourable to the consolidation of the present Government. Then having taken a few turns up and down the room, the Viceroy proceeded:—"It is not my intention for the present to send an officer to Constantinople to compliment the Sultan on his accession to the throne, but I beg you to transmit to the Representatives of the Four Great Powers at the Ottoman Porte, the following declaration, namely:—

"That in two days Akiff Effendi will set out again for Constantinople. He will be the bearer of a letter of congratulation and of submission from me, to the new Sultan Abdul Medjid. I shall also write a letter to Hosrew Pasha, in which I shall represent to him:—1st. That the late Sultan Mahmoud made to me at one time, through the medium of Sarim Effendi, much more advantageous proposals than those which His Highness has now addressed to me, since he then proposed to me the hereditary Government of Egypt, as well as that of the district of Seyda, and of the Sandjack of Tripoli. 2ndly. That, under present circumstances, I ask for the hereditary Government of Egypt, with that of Syria and of Candia, that is to say, of all that I now possess, as I had previously announced. 3rdly. That on this condition, if I am treated with good faith, I will be the most faithful of the servants and vassals of His Highness, and I will defend him whenever and against whomsoever he may wish.

"It is in this sense that I propose to write to Constantinople. I shall not mention the fleet in my letter to the Grand Vizier, from a feeling of propriety, but I beg you to have the goodness to assure the Ambassadors and Ministers, that I have never had the intention of keeping it, or of making use of it for a hostile purpose against the Sultan; on the contrary, I formally engage to restore it, the moment my proposals shall have been accepted. In this case, all the vessels composing the squadron of His Highness, to the very last, shall be sent back to Constantinople. As for the Ottoman Admirals, those who may fear to return to Turkey, may remain in Egypt, which forms a part of the same monarchy. If once the Sultan agrees to my prayer, and Hosrew Pasha shall have been removed from the direction of affairs, I shall not hesitate to proceed to Constantinople on the first invitation of His Highness, and it will not be with the squadron that I shall go thither, but alone in a steamer, and with the sole object of presenting my homage in person to my Sovereign and offering him my services.

"Finally I declare to you, that if my proposals are not accepted, I will not make war, but I will maintain myself in my present position, and I will wait."

Thus ended our first conversation with Mehemet Ali.

Our second meeting, fixed in the first instance for the ensuing morning, was afterwards put off to the afternoon, on account of the landing of Achmet Pasha, who was received the same day by the Viceroy. Two hours before sunset, the Four Consuls-General of Austria, England, France, and Russia, proceeded simultaneously to the Pasha. In this interview renewed endeavours were made to induce Mehemet Ali to give up the fleet forthwith, and to restore it to its lawful owner; but here, again, our representations were entirely thrown away.

He declared his conservative intentions; recapitulated afresh the declaration which he had made to us the evening before; modified in some degree the expressions contained in it, and endeavoured above all to convince us of the necessity for the fall of Hosrew Pasha.

On this subject he said, "As long as the Grand Vizier remains in office, there will be no real reconciliation between the Sultan and me. Let His Highness name whom he will Grand Vizier, and I will be the first to co-operate for the consolidation of his throne. I do not aspire to that post myself, for I should refuse it if it were offered to me; but I ardently wish for the removal of a man who is detested by the whole nation, and who avails himself of any means, even the sword and poison, to attain his end. So long as the Representatives of the Four Great Cabinets support Hosrew Pasha, he may remain in office, but the day that he ceases to enjoy their protection he will fall. If, at this moment, tranquillity is not threatened at Constantinople, it is owing to the support of the Great Powers. Let Hosrew retire, and tranquillity will be preserved in the capital without their co-operation. I have just written a private letter to the Grand Vizier, in which I advise him to retire from affairs, and to tender his resignation. This letter will be given to Akiff Effendi, whom I despatch to Constantinople to-morrow. By the next French steamer I shall write to the same effect to the sister of Sultan Mahmoud, and the Validé Sultana; for, if I send them my letters by Akiff Effendi, Hosrew Pasha is capable of withholding them.

Before leaving the Viceroy, he requested us to take advantage of the departure of the Turkish steamer for Constantinople, to send our reports to our respective Ministers.

Inclosure 6 in No. 191.

Detail of First Interview of the Capudan Pasha with Mehemet Ali.

(Translation.)

ON the 14th of July, at 4 o'clock P.M., appeared the Sultan's fleet off Alexandria, in number of nineteen sail.

On the 15th, at 9 o'clock A.M., the Egyptian steamer the "Nile" entered the western harbour, having on board Mushir Achmet Pasha, the Admiral of the said fleet. Immediately, Mehemet Ali's first Secretary, named Houssein Pasha, was sent from the palace in the Pasha's own boat, to meet and bring him on shore. When the "Nile" steamer anchored, Mushir Achmet went into the boat, and immediately a salute of nineteen guns was fired by the "Nile," which salute was repeated by the forts the moment he landed, when he was received by the Pasha's civil officers of rank, and he rode upon the Pasha's own horse; and thus preceded by the said officers, cawasses, and chiaushes, went to the Pasha's palace between two files of the troops that were placed all the way. As soon as he entered the palace gate, Mehemet Ali walked out of his room to meet him, when the Admiral seeing him, unbuckled his sword, gave it to one of the officers behind him, and walked respectfully towards the Viceroy, and bowed to the ground as if meaning to kiss his dress, while the Viceroy embraced and kissed him, saying "Welcome, brother." After this, they walked arm in arm into the Viceroy's room, all the officers following them. They sat near each other on the middle of the sofa. The Capudan Pasha then told his Highness that, for a long time past, it was his wish to have the honour of seeing him. After coffee and pipes, the Viceroy dismissed all the bystanders, and this was at half-past 9 o'clock; when Sherif Aga, the Capudan's Pasha's Kiaja, who was still within, walked up to the Viceroy, and, kissing his feet, told him, "Now you are both together, with your leave I retire," meaning that he had accomplished his object, and fulfilled his duty so far. His Highness and the Capudan Pasha remained by themselves in the room till half-past 10 o'clock, after which the Capudan Pasha walked out of the room bare-footed, his own servant not being there to give him his shoes, and was obliged to walk about twenty paces without shoes, until his servant brought them, as well as his sword, upon which he went to the Mussappi Serai (the palace for guests), accompanied in the same way as he had arrived. When he entered the palace assigned to him, all the civil officers, as well as Houssein Pasha, kissed his foot, and he asked them to take seats and gave them coffee, telling them, "Thank God, my wishes to meet the Viceroy are accomplished, and you may know that I have obtained his Highness's permission for the landing of the Vice and the Rear Admirals."

With the Capudan Pasha ten officers landed, two of whom are Beys (Colonels), and one is the brother of Osman Pasha, the Ex-Egyptian Admiral who deserted to Constantinople more than five years ago.

No. 192.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received August* 6.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, July* 17, 1839.

THE fleets of the Capudan Pasha and of Mehemet Ali are still cruizing together in sight of Alexandria.

Yesterday morning, about sixty of the principal officers of the Sultan's fleet came on shore, and were presented to Mehemet Ali by the Capudan Pasha.

Mehemet Ali addressed them and said, "My sons, from henceforward all differences between Constantinople and Egypt must be removed from your hearts, and we must consider ourselves as one entire body. Our Sovereign is a young and pure jewel, and we must support him and aid our nation with all our hearts, and all fidelity."

The officers expressed much satisfaction, and requested permission to adopt the uniform worn by the Egyptian Navy, instead of their own (which is in the Russian form), to which the Pasha replied, that they might do in that as appeared best to themselves.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

No. 193.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received August* 6.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, July* 17, 1839.

CAPTAIN CAILLIER, the Aide-de-camp of Marshal Soult, reached Ibrahim Pasha on the 1st of July, near Aintab, and delivered to him the order from Mehemet Ali to suspend the advance of his army.

Ibrahim Pasha then represented, that his actual position was not at all a military one, and moreover, that he could not there procure forage for his horses, on which Captain Caillier consented to his taking a position at Marash.

I have the honour to inclose translation of a letter from Ibrahim Pasha to Mehemet Ali; but since then Ibrahim Pasha has received the order to evacuate the country to the east of the Euphrates, and he has in consequence withdrawn all his troops from Orfa and Bir, and has not now a single soldier beyond the Euphrates.

The late victory has been more complete than was at first supposed, and, in fact, the Turkish Army of Hafiz Pasha no longer exists.

It is most certain that if Hafiz Pasha had gained the battle, the Turks in Aleppo, in Damascus, and in the principal towns in Syria, had made their arrangements to massacre all the Europeans and native Christians in Syria.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Inclosure in No. 193.

Ibrahim Pasha to Mehemet Ali.

Cara Bunar, le 19 *Rebi-el-akhir*, 1255.
(Traduction.) (1*er Juillet*, 1839.)

J'AI pris connaissance de la dépêche que Votre Altesse m'a adressée le 5 Rebi-el-akhir, 1255 (17 Juin, 1839), par M. Caillier, Aide-de-camp de Son Excellence le Maréchal Soult, Président du Conseil, et Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de France.

Hafiz Pacha ayant envoyé contre Antab Solyman Pacha de Marache, et

s'étant emparé de cette place, en y fesant bloquer notre garnison, j'ai attaqué le 12 Rebi-el-akhir (24 Juin), le gros de l'Armée Turque, et mes précédens rapports ont rendu compte de cette affaire dont les résultats sont aujourd'hui connus de Votre Altesse.

Elle m'ordonne par sa dépêche précitée, de m'arrêter là où je me trouverais, et de ne point avancer. Cependant les observations que je vais lui soumettre la convaincront de la nécessité absolue où je me suis vu de quitter mes positions et de me diriger sur Marache.

1°. Le lieu où je me trouvais étant à cinq ou six heures au-delà d'Antab, et une autre portion de mon armée étant campée à Ouront près de Nézib, en gardant nos positions, nous aurions péri infailliblement par le manque de vivres. Ainsi la nuit que M. l'Aide-de-camp s'est trouvé auprès de moi, c'est avec mille peines que l'on a pu fournir à chaque cavalier la demi ration pour sa monture ; et si nous étions demeurés jusqu'au lendemain, nos chevaux seraient restés à jeune. Sur nos derrières, Alep est la seule ville un peu voisine d'où l'on pourrait tirer des vivres, et elle est encore à une distance de quatre jours. Pour faire transporter des vivres d'Alep, il aurait fallu attendre dix jours: quatre pour l'aller, quatre pour le retour, un pour le chargement à Alep, et un pour le déchargement au camp. Je n'avais d'ailleurs à ma disposition ni charrois ni bêtes de somme, et il en eut fallu pour la subsistance de mon armée 7,000 à 8,000, qu'il m'était impossible de me procurer.

2°. Ainsi que Votre Altesse a pu le voir par les lettres reçues d'Adana, qui lui ont été transmises par le dernier courrier, l'ennemi fesait des dispositions pour marcher aussi par Koulek: on ignore encore s'il a opéré ce mouvement ou non; mais s'il vient à l'opérer, de la position où je me trouvais il m'était impossible de l'atteindre ni à pied ni à cheval.

3°. Enfin, en retournant à Alep, j'aurais l'air (ce qui serait inouï) de reculer après la victoire, mes côtés resteraient découvertes, et l'ennemi pourrait encore nous inquiéter, en repassant la frontière avec un reste de troupes plus ou moins disposé à revenir.

Marache et Ourfa étant bien fournis de vivres, il devenait indispensable pour moi de les occuper, afin de faire subsister mon armée, sans compter que dès que l'ennemi attaquera Koulek, j'aurai de là l'avantage de pouvoir l'atteindre.

Tels sont les motifs qui m'ont absolument forcé d'occuper Marache et Ourfa. J'ai fait part de toutes ces explications à M. l'Aide-de-camp, qui a pu juger par lui-même de l'état des choses.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.,
(Signé) IBRAHIM PACHA.

(Translation.)

Ibrahim Pasha to Mehemet Ali.

Cara-Bunar, 19*th Rebi-el-akhir*, 1255.
(*July* 1, 1839.)

I HAVE taken cognizance of the despatch which your Highness addressed to me on the 5th of Rebi-el-akhir, 1255, (June 17, 1839,) by M. Caillier, Aide-de-Camp of his Excellency Marshal Soult, President of the Council, and Minister for Foreign Affairs of France.

Hafiz Pasha having sent Solyman Pasha of Marash against Aintab, and having made himself master of that place, by blockading our garrison there, I attacked the main body of the Turkish Army on the 12th of Rebi-el-akhir (June 24), and my previous reports have given an account of that affair, the results of which are at this time known to your Highness.

Your Highness enjoins me, by your above-cited despatch, to halt wherever I might be, and not to advance. The observations, however, which I am about to lay before you, will convince you of the absolute necessity in which I have found myself of leaving my positions, and moving upon Marash.

1st. The place where I was, being five or six hours beyond Aintab, and another part of my army being encamped at Ouront near Nezib, if

we had retained our positions, we should have infallibly perished for want of provisions. Thus the very night the Aide-de-Camp was with me, it was with the greatest difficulty that each horseman could be furnished with half a ration for his horse; and if we had remained until the following day, our horses would have fasted. In our rear, Aleppo is the only town somewhat in the vicinity from whence provisions could be drawn, and even that is four days distant. In order to transport provisions from Aleppo, we must have waited ten days; four for going, four for returning, one for loading at Aleppo, and one for unloading in the camp. Moreover, I had neither cars nor beasts of burden at my disposal, and for the subsistence of my army, from 7,000 to 8,000 of them would have been required, which it was impossible for me to procure.

2dly. As your Excellency may have seen by the letters received from Adana, which were forwarded to you by the last courier, the enemy made preparations for marching also by Koulek: it is not yet known whether or no he has executed that movement; but if he should do so, it was impossible for me, from the position in which I was, to reach him either on foot or on horseback.

3rdly. Lastly, by returning to Aleppo, I should have the appearance of retreating after a victory (which would be a thing never heard of), my flanks would remain exposed, and the enemy might again disquiet us, by repassing the frontier with a remnant of an army more or less inclined to return.

Marash and Orfa being well furnished with provisions, it became indispensable for me to occupy them, in order to subsist my army, not to mention, that so soon as the enemy shall attack Koulek, I shall from thence have the advantage of being able to come up with him.

These are the reasons which have absolutely forced me to occupy Marash and Orfa. I have communicated all these explanations to the Aide-de-Camp, who has been able to judge for himself of the state of affairs.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) IBRAHIM PASHA.

No. 194.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 6.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, July* 17, 1839.

WITH my official letters of 5th and 7th July, from Viscount Ponsonby, I had also the honour to receive a letter, and as the matter of it is official, and important at this moment, I have thought it my duty to send to your Lordship a copy of that letter, as well as of my reply thereto.

The Pasha will not come to any terms so long as Hosrew Pasha remains in power; and he has written to him to demand his retirement from office; and I really cannot but think that this concession on the part of Hosrew Pasha is now called for by circumstances.

The only army now in the Turkish Empire is that of Mehemet Ali, and the Porte is also without a fleet. It is true that the want of those could easily be remedied by the Great Powers; but it must be borne in mind as a certain fact, that such is the influence of Mehemet Ali in the Turkish Empire, he could raise up in his favour not only Constantinople, but every part of Turkey; and, if he desired it, he could, by those means, overthrow Hosrew Pasha at his will.

These facts, and the actual crisis, are so important, that I have deemed it proper, even at the risk of being thought presumptuous, to submit my opinions to your Lordship, trusting to your goodness to excuse the liberty which I have taken.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Inclosure 1 in No. 194.

Viscount Ponsonby to Colonel Campbell.

(Extract.) *Therapia, July* 5, 1839.

I THANK you for the intelligence contained in your last communication. You will have been prepared by what I wrote to you, for the fatal termination of the Sultan's illness. It is evident that the disease had existed many months, and it is doubtful if a remedy could have been successfully applied later than in the last Autumn. His life might have been prolonged had he been more taken care of lately, but the mortal blow had been struck long ago. He was not aware, himself, of his situation, and those about him were also ignorant of it, so that he continued to do everything calculated to hasten a catastrophe. He went off at last rapidly. It is astonishing how much and how generally he is lamented. It is not when a man is dead, and no longer the dispenser of rewards and punishments, that the voice of flattery is raised. It, therefore, is reasonable to believe, that a man so lamented, was really esteemed when alive. It is certainly the greatest loss the Rayahs could suffer. He always protected them, and even at the expence of offending his own people. He had great qualities derived from nature. He had great views for the country he governed, but he stood alone, and could not find instruments to do the work well he desired to have performed. No man was ever placed in more difficult circumstances; but I am entirely convinced he would have ultimately been successful over all his enemies had he lived, and I do not except Mehemet Ali, although there are reports here that Ibrahim has gained a victory, and Hafiz Pasha been defeated, and I think such an event very probable.

There is most perfect tranquillity here, and a willing obedience given as yet to the new Government, which is in fact entirely in the hands of Hosrew Pasha, appointed Grand Vizier, with all the authority that formerly belonged to that post. I send an official letter containing the report of what took place at a meeting called by the Sublime Porte of the Representatives of the Five Great Powers with the Minister of Foreign Affairs. I left out one thing which I now mention, namely, that if Mehemet Ali or his son choose to come here, the Sultan will receive him with honour and courtesy.

I never believed that Mehemet Ali would act otherwise than he has done. He must advance or he must fall. The European Powers will betray their own interests if they suffer him to advance. The conclusion seems to me clear. His power is a house of cards, and any of the Governments can destroy it with a breath. He has been raised to importance by the want of knowledge of these countries, and the erroneous system of policy that was its consequence. People are grown wiser.

Inclosure 2 in No. 194.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Ponsonby.

(Extract.) *Alexandria, July* 16, 1839.

MY official despatches will inform your Lordship of all that has been arranged with the Pasha on the subject of your Lordship's despatches of 5th and 7th instant.

I fully concur in the opinion expressed in your Lordship's private communication of the 5th, that the late Sultan was far before the age in which he lived; and had his energies been better directed, he might have contributed more successfully towards the reconstruction of the Turkish Empire. But the feeling of revenge towards Mehemet Ali that predominated in all his actions, has, I fear, inflicted more evils on that Empire than many years of wise government can remedy.

It was scarcely to be expected that a man of strong feelings like Sultan Mahmoud, could be brought to forget the humiliation to which he had been exposed in his former contest with the Pasha of Egypt. The intense hold which that sentiment had of his mind, can best be judged of by the declaration he had made, that he would sooner become a vassal of Russia than relinquish the hope of revenge. With such impressions, all attempts at reconciliation became fruitless. But when your Lordship is in possession of the details of the battle of the 24th ultimo, and of what has taken place since, I think you will be of opinion that the war had much more the character of a personal than a national quarrel. And now that the hand of Providence has removed one of the causes by which so disastrous a struggle has been so long maintained, it would be the greatest calamity that could befall the Turkish Empire, were the same rancorous spirit to be transmitted, through Hosrew Pasha, to the new Sultan.

I will not venture to set up my own opinion against that of your Lordship, as to the ultimate success of Sultan Mahmoud against Mehemet Ali; but whatever might have been the result, one thing appears certain, that at the present moment, the power of Mehemet Ali seems more than ever consolidated by all the efforts that have been made to overthrow it.

Now, however, that all motives for jealousy have ceased at Constantinople, (except, perhaps, in the breast of Hosrew Pasha, and a very few of his immediate adherents,) I trust your Lordship will pardon me for indulging a hope, that you may be induced to bring the weight of your influence to the noble task of accomplishing a reconciliation with Mehemet Ali, which, in my humble opinion, is almost all that is required for the regeneration of the Ottoman Empire. Mehemet Ali gave the first impulse to reform in Turkey. Under his administration, rapid progress has been made in civilization, in education, and in the formation of an efficient army and navy. The recovery of the Holy Cities from the Wahabees, and the heavy expence he has incurred to keep Arabia in subjection, all these circumstances, which have rendered his name conspicuous among Mahomedans, contribute a claim to some consideration for himself and family, which he cannot be expected to forego in his present position. Indeed, it may be said, that his ambition has always been to restore his nation to its former power, and to place it in a situation to resist encroachments; and had Sultan Mahmoud taken advantage of that sentiment of *amour-propre* so prominent in Mehemet Ali's character, and confided implicitly in his patriotic views, he might have secured the cordial co-operation of the latter in every national undertaking. Previous to the late contest, and ever since, Mehemet Ali has evinced so much deference for the will of the European Powers, that there does not exist any good ground for suspecting him of views of aggrandizement, beyond what he has already declared that he considers his family entitled to, for the services rendered by him to his nation; and if he ever entertained any such designs, he is fully aware that the Powers of Europe, who are interested in maintaining the integrity of Turkey, would never support him in them.

The concessions expected by Mehemet Ali once secured to him, and a Ministry appointed at Constantinople possessing the entire confidence of the nation, there can be no doubt that the most beneficial results might be obtained from his energy and enlightened views, in supporting the Government of Abdul Medjid; whilst by fomenting the spirit of animosity that has so long prevailed in the counsels of the Porte, incalculable mischief may ensue, and the remaining strength of Turkey may be wasted in civil war.

On the whole, my Lord, I trust that late events have placed the British Government in a situation to give an immense impulse to the regeneration of the Turkish Empire, and that your Lordship will have the merit of laying the foundation of this grand work.

No. 195.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 6.)

(Extract.) *Alexandria, July* 17, 1839.

COUNT LURDE, Secretary to the French Embassy at Constantinople, and who arrived here from Paris a few days ago, called on the Pasha last night to take leave, before going to Constantinople in the French steamer this day.

In the course of conversation, Count Lurde used strong expressions in regard to the Capudan Pasha, whom he called a traitor; and Mehemet Ali replied with considerable warmth, "That he would have been a traitor if he had given up his fleet to Russia; but that it was to avoid that, that he had come to Alexandria, as a faithful subject of the Sultan, and to unite with him for the service of the Sultan, and for the good of the Ottoman Empire."

Captain Walker, of the British Navy, who is serving on board the Capudan Pasha's ship, has just called upon me, and told me, that when the fleet was out of the Dardanelles, the Capudan Pasha received his commission by a steamer, and orders to proceed to the Island of Rhodes, where he would receive ulterior orders.

The Capudan Pasha learnt from the Captain of the steamer, that Tahir Pasha was at Rhodes with a commission to supersede him, and to return the fleet to Constantinople; on which the Capudan Pasha assembled his officers, and told them, that he was convinced that Hosrew Pasha and Halil Pasha wanted to give up the fleet to Russia; and that it would be better to remain outside, where they could have the aid of the British and French fleets, and join Mehemet Ali; and Captain Walker says, the whole of the officers of the fleet were of the Capudan Pasha's opinion.

No. 196.

Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

My Lords, *Foreign Office, August* 7, 1839.

I AM to signify to your Lordships the Queen's commands, that a further instruction be addressed to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, with reference and in addition to the instructions last sent to him, in conformity with my letters to your Lordships of the 5th instant.

Sir Robert Stopford is to be informed, that by accounts received from the Mediterranean, subsequent to those upon which those last instructions were founded, it appears that the Turkish fleet had not gone into the harbour of Alexandria, as had been reported, but was at anchor outside, in conjunction with the Egyptian squadron; and consequently, that the Turkish fleet was still in the power of its own officers, and not in the power of Mehemet Ali.

It appears further, that the Turkish officers had been led to go to Alexandria by a mistaken notion which had been instilled into them by the Capudan Pasha, that if the fleet returned to Constantinople, it would be given up to the Russians.

Sir Robert Stopford will, therefore, not only call upon Mehemet Ali to deliver up the Turkish fleet, if it should be in any way under his controul, but he will also enter into communication with the officers of the Turkish ships; he will explain to them the falseness of the pretence under which they have been persuaded to fail in their duty towards their Sovereign; and he will use every argument to prevail upon them to return to their allegiance. He will point out to them that the course which they have pursued is calculated to weaken and degrade the Turkish Empire. He will represent to them that England and France have no other object in these matters than to uphold the Sultan's authority, and to maintain the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. He will call upon the Turkish officers to separate their ships from the Egyptian fleet, and to unite with the British and French squadron in defence and support of the Sultan's authority; and he will make them understand, that any act of hostility against the Sultan, on the part of the Egyptian or Turkish squadrons, either singly or united, would be resisted to the utmost by the squadrons of the Allies.

Sir Robert Stopford will avoid any engagement with the Turkish and Egyptian fleets unless in self-defence; because the object of the British Government is to preserve the Ottoman Fleet, and not to destroy it; and, therefore, Sir Robert Stopford will not use force, unless he is so superior in strength as to put resistance out of the question.

It would, however, be desirable that Sir Robert Stopford should, if he can do it with safety to his ships, take up a position, pending the negotiations, so as to cut off the communication between the port of Alexandria and the Turco-Egyptian Fleet.

The great object of Her Majesty's Government being to persuade the

Turkish fleet to return to its allegiance, Sir Robert Stopford will not lightly give up that object as unattainable, even if his first efforts to accomplish it by negotiation should be ineffectual; and he will not hesitate to send a small vessel to Constantinople, if he should think that any communication to be had with the Turkish Government could lead to an amicable arrangement. But, pending the negotiation, he will keep close to the Turkish fleet, and follow it wherever it may go; and he will endeavour to remain master of its movements. There could be no objection to its going to any Turkish port outside the Dardanelles, even before it should have made its submission to the Sultan, provided it were accompanied into such port by the allied squadron.

Sir Robert Stopford, understanding from these instructions that the wish of Her Majesty's Government is to restore the Turkish fleet to the Sultan, but not to employ force towards that fleet, unless it should proceed to acts of hostility against its sovereign, will use his discretion, according to circumstances, in carrying the views of Her Majesty's Government into effect.

Sir Robert Stopford will observe, that the previous instructions of the 5th of August were founded upon the supposition, that on his arrival at Alexandria he would find the Turkish fleet within the power, and dependent on the will of Mehemet Ali; and therefore Sir Robert Stopford was ordered, in a certain contingency, to take possession of the Egyptian Fleet as a means of compelling Mehemet Ali to surrender the Turkish ships. But if Sir Robert Stopford should, upon arriving at Alexandria, find the Turkish ships outside the harbour, and at the disposal of their own officers, and not dependent upon the will of Mehemet Ali, then and in such case there would be no valid reason why Sir Robert Stopford should commit any act of hostility against the Egyptian ships; and he will in such case consider as cancelled that part of his former instruction which enjoins him in a particular contingency to take possession of the Egyptian ships.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 197.

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, August* 7, 1839.

WITH reference to my despatch, of the 5th instant, I herewith transmit to your Excellency, a copy of a further letter which I have addressed to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, containing additional instructions for the guidance of the Admiral commanding Her Majesty's squadron in the Mediterranean.

Your Excellency will communicate these instructions to the French Government, and if they concur in them, you will send on the original instructions, transmitted to you herewith, to the Mediterranean, together with the former ones forwarded to you with my despatch of the 5th instant.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 198.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 7.)

My Lord, *Paris, August* 5, 1839.

MARSHAL SOULT read to me this morning despatches received yesterday from Alexandria, containing a detailed report of two conferences between the Pasha of Egypt and the Consuls of Austria, of France, of Great Britain, and of Russia, relating chiefly to the restitution of the Ottoman fleet to the Sultan.

Your Lordship will have learnt from the paper of which Count Medem allowed me to take a copy, and which I transmitted yesterday, that the efforts of the Consuls to persuade Mehemet Ali to send back the Turkish fleet immediately and unconditionally to Constantinople, were not successful; and as you will have received from Colonel Campbell his statement of what passed in the conferences, it is unnecessary for me to write what I may remember of the account given of them by M. Cochelet. I must not, however, omit to mention, that the French Consul is strongly impressed with the commanding position to which late events have raised Mehemet Ali; and is persuaded that the Viceroy, conscious of the power he possesses, will not be induced to recede in any essential point from the conditions of a reconciliation with his Sovereign, put forward in the communication which he requested the Consuls at Alexandria to address to the Representatives of their respective Governments at Constantinople.

M. Cochelet states, that the Pasha has at this moment not less than sixty vessels of war at his command, of which more than a third are ships of the line, and that his army amounts to 200,000 men.

The Marshal read to me a letter from his Aide-de-camp, Captain Caillier, reporting his conversations with Ibrahim Pasha, relative to the execution of the orders, of which he was the bearer, from Mehemet Ali, to arrest the march of the Egyptian Army wherever it might be, when those orders reached him. It appears from this letter, that Ibrahim Pasha had determined, after his victory over Hafiz Pasha, to send a part of his army as far as Koniah, and that he had directed Solyman Bey to proceed with another corps to Malatia; the difficulty of finding provisions and forage for his army in the Aleppo country, rendered Ibrahim Pasha very reluctant to conform to his father's orders; but Captain Caillier's representations induced him to order the corps which was to have marched upon Koniah, not to go beyond the district of Marash, and to recall Solyman Bey, leaving only a small force in Orfa and in Bir.

Admiral Roussin's last despatches from Constantinople contain little more, Marshal Soult told me, than a relation of the ceremonies which took place at the girding the Sultan with the sword of Osman.

Marshal Soult then asked me, if I had heard from your Lordship this morning; and upon my replying negatively to this question, he said, that probably before the evening a courier would arrive with despatches, transmitting to me copies of instructions which Her Majesty's Government proposed should be given to the Admirals commanding the British and French fleets in the Levant; that he had just received a despatch from M. de Bourqueney informing him, that, in a conference with your Lordship, at which Lord Minto assisted, you had given him a copy of an instruction with a supplement, proposed to be sent to Admiral Stopford, directing the measures to be taken by the combined fleet with reference to the Ottoman fleet, which the Capudan Pasha had given up to Mehemet Ali.

The Marshal then put this copy into my hands, observing to me, that the question was one of most grave importance, inasmuch as the consequence of its adoption might be the lighting up a general conflagration in the East. After reading the proposed instructions, I said, that without doubt the measures proposed were of a vigorous character, but that timely vigour often tended to avert danger and difficulties which a more timid policy might create.

He said, that he should immediately send off M. de Bourqueney's despatch to the King at St. Cloud, and that its contents would afterwards be submitted to the consideration of the Cabinet Council.

It was, however, evident from the tone of Marshal Soult's conversation, that his first impression is not in favour of the adoption of the proposed instructions.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 199.

Count Nesselrode to M. de Kisseleff.—(Communicated by M. de Kisseleff, August 8.)

Monsieur, *St.-Pétersbourg, le $\frac{15}{27}$ Juillet,* 1839.

PAR mon courier du 8 de ce mois, je vous ai communiqué la dépêche de Lord Palmerston, dont le Marquis de Clanricarde a été chargé de me remettre copie, en retour de nos dernières ouvertures relatives aux affaires d'Egypte.

Je vous ai prévenu, Monsieur, que je ne tarderai point à vous transmettre la réponse que l'Empereur m'ordonnerait de faire à cette communication.

En m'acquittant aujourd'hui de ce devoir, je vous invite avant tout à exprimer à Lord Palmerston combien l'Empereur se plait à apprécier l'accueil amical que le Ministère Anglais a fait à nos propositions du 3 Juin dernier, destinées à assurer la paix du Levant, en renfermant l'action du Pacha d'Egypte dans un cercle qu'il ne lui serait point permis de franchir sans se mettre en état d'hostilité avec l'Europe entière.

Nous nous félicitons sincèrement de voir que nos idées sur cette importante question se soient entièrement rencontrées avec celles du Cabinet Anglais.

En effet, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique a été pénétré comme nous de l'indispensable nécessité d'aller d'abord au plus pressé en maîtrisant les faits, c'est à dire, en empêchant que la lutte entre le Sultan et le Pacha d'Egypte ne devînt menaçante pour la sécurité de l'Empire Ottoman. C'est à conjurer ce danger qu'ont été dirigés et nos efforts et les démarches décisives que l'Angleterre et la France ont jugé nécessaires de faire à Alexandrie.

Les remontrances que les Représentans des Cabinets Alliés ont été appelés à adresser à Méhémet Ali, ont pleinement répondu à notre attente. Ibrahim Pacha a reçu l'ordre d'arrêter la marche de ses troupes. Les hostilités ont été suspendues, grâces à l'unanimité des efforts que les Cabinets de l'Europe ont faits pour les reprimer.

Ce premier résultat une fois obtenu, il restait aux Grandes Puissances une tâche non moins importante à remplir : celle de consolider désormais le repos de l'Orient au moyen d'un arrangement pacifique entre la Porte et le Pacha.

Nous partageons complètement l'opinion que Lord Palmerston a énoncée sur la nécessité d'un pareil accommodement. Vous savez déjà, Monsieur, que notre auguste Maître s'est empressé de donner son assentiment aux bases de cette pacification, telles qu'elles avaient été proposées d'abord par le Cabinet de Vienne. Elles ne diffèrent pas essentiellement de celles projetées par le Ministère Anglais. D'après le plan du Prince Metternich, la Porte reprendrait possession de la Syrie, soit du vivant de Méhémet Ali, soit après sa mort. Selon l'opinion de Lord Palmerston, la rétrocession immédiate de la Syrie serait considérée comme la condition absolue de tout accommodement durable entre la Porte et l'Egypte.

Pour notre part, nous n'hésiterons pas, Monsieur, à adhérer à l'une ou à l'autre de ces combinaisons, pourvu qu'elle ait été librement adoptée par la Porte elle-même. Cette condition constitue à nos yeux la base de tout arrangement auquel notre auguste Maître serait appelé à prendre part. C'est ici le seul point où nos opinions semblent différer de celles qui se trouvent exposées dans la dépêche de Lord Palmerston du 9 Juillet. D'après la manière de voir du Ministère Anglais, "ce serait aux Cinq Puissances à échanger d'abord leurs idées sur l'arrangement définitif à conclure entre la Turquie et l'Egypte ; et ce serait à la suite d'un pareil échange d'idées, qu'on annoncerait aux deux parties l'opinion des Cinq Cours par leurs Représentans à Constantinople et à Alexandrie ; et l'on finirait ainsi par vaincre la répugnance que l'une ou l'autre des deux parties aurait pu manifester dès l'origine, à l'égard de l'arrangement qui leur aurait été proposé."

Ce plan d'action, qui établirait une entière parité entre le Sultan et le Pacha, ne serait pas sans inconvénient à nos yeux, car il admettrait comme une éventualité possible, que nous eussions à combattre et à vaincre une résistance qui nous serait opposée de la part du Sultan, tandis que c'est uniquement en sa faveur et de son aveu que pourrait légitimement s'exercer une intervention Européenne, destinée à raffermir l'existence de l'Empire Ottoman.

Par conséquent, pour rester entièrement fidèles au principe de conservation qui fait la base de la politique des Cinq Grandes Puissances à l'égard des affaires de l'Orient, et pour ne point courir le risque de se trouver en contradiction avec les vues du Gouvernement Ottoman, il nous semblerait préférable de commencer d'abord par nous assurer si le plan de pacification projeté par les Cabinets Alliés est réellement de nature à obtenir l'assentiment du Sultan. Ce n'est qu'après avoir acquis la certitude d'une adhésion complète et spontanée de ce Souverain, que les Cabinets de l'Europe pourraient procéder à s'entendre ultérieurement sur les mesures à adopter en commun, afin d'imposer au Pacha d'Egypte les conditions d'accommodement librement adopté par la Porte.

Telles sont les réflexions que nous allions communiquer à Lord Palmerston, en réponse à sa dépêche du 9 Juillet, lorsqu'une expédition de Constantinople, en date du $\frac{\text{21 Juin}}{\text{6 Juillet}}$ (dont je vous ai transmis le résumé par mon dernier courrier), est venue nous annoncer les déterminations que le Divan a jugé nécessaire de prendre pour amener l'affaire d'Egypte à une solution prompte et décisive.

Ces déterminations, dictées par un véritable esprit de conciliation et de sagesse, simplifient de beaucoup la question que les Cabinets Alliés avaient à cœur de résoudre. Guidée par une juste appréciation de ses vrais intérêts, la Porte est allée au-devant des propositions que les Cinq Puissances étaient à la veille de lui faire. Elle a pris l'initiative des démarches qu'il s'agissait de faire à Alexandrie. Elle a résolu d'offrir à Méhémet Ali l'hérédité de l'Egypte en retour de la rétrocession de la Syrie. Enfin, elle a réuni en conférence les Représentans des Cabinets Alliés, pour leur annoncer ces résolutions, et pour réclamer leur appui moral en faveur des offres d'accommodement qu'elle vient de faire au Pacha.

De cette manière, la base de la négociation a été posée par la Porte elle-même. C'est elle qui a spontanément ouvert la délibération, et qui de fait en a fixé le siège à Constantinople, là où il convenait seul de mettre en discussion les intérêts qui concernent directement le sort à venir de l'Empire Ottoman.

Aujourd'hui où cette grave délibération vient de s'ouvrir sous les plus favorables auspices, de l'aveu de la Porte, et avec le concours unanime des Représentans des Cabinets Alliés, nous devons attendre avec calme les réponses que le Pacha fera aux propositions qu'il vient de recevoir de la part de la Porte.

Ici trois éventualités se présentent à notre esprit:

1°. Méhémet Ali peut accéder purement et simplement aux offres qui lui ont été faites;—en ce cas, toutes les difficultés s'applanissent d'elles-mêmes.

2°. Méhémet Ali, sans rejeter absolument les termes de l'arrangement projeté, peut essayer d'obtenir de la Porte des conditions plus favorables. En ce cas, une négociation s'établira à Constantinople entre les deux parties; et ce sera alors aux Représentans des Cabinets Alliés à interposer leurs bons offices, toutes les fois que le Divan en reconnaîtra l'opportunité; enfin,

3°. Méhémet Ali peut se refuser obstinément à toute réconciliation avec la Porte. Si, contre notre attente, cette dernière supposition venait à se réaliser, le Divan croirait devoir recourir à l'assistance des Représentans Alliés pour réclamer leur appui, afin de vaincre la résistance du Pacha; en ce cas, nous reconnaîtrions comme juste et comme nécessaire que les Grandes Puissances unissent leurs efforts pour contraindre le Pacha d'Egypte à souscrire à un arrangement équitable, qui aura obtenu en même tems et l'aveu de la Porte et le suffrage de toutes les Puissances de l'Europe.

Voilà, Monsieur, la marche qui nous semble à la fois la plus simple et la plus sûre pour conduire à une conclusion satisfaisante le différend regrettable qui depuis longtems met en danger la sécurité de l'Empire Ottoman, et tient en suspens la paix de l'Europe.

L'Empereur vous charge, Monsieur, de porter à la connaissance du Ministère Anglais l'ensemble des considérations contenues dans la présente dépêche. Vous voudrez bien en remettre copie à Lord Palmerston, en lui exprimant l'espoir que les opinions de notre Cabinet, qu'énonce cette dépêche, seront accueillies par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique, avec la même satisfaction avec laquelle notre Auguste Maître a daigné recevoir la communication dont M. le Marquis de Clanricarde vient d'être l'organe.

Recevez, &c.,

(Signé) NESSELRODE.

(Translation.)

Count Nesselrode to M. de Kisseleff.—(*Communicated by M. Kisseleff*, *Aug.* 8.)

Sir, *St. Petersburg, July* $\frac{15}{27}$, 1839.

BY my messenger of the 8th of this month, I communicated to you the despatch from Lord Palmerston, with a copy of which the Marquess of Clanricarde was directed to furnish me, in reply to our late overtures on the Affairs of Egypt.

I informed you, Sir, that I should not delay to transmit to you the reply which the Emperor might direct me to make to this communication.

In fulfilling this duty to-day, I have to request you in the first place to express to Lord Palmerston how glad the Emperor is to acknowledge the friendly reception given by the British Government to our propositions of the 3d of June last, the object of which was to secure the peace of the Levant, by confining the action of the Pasha of Egypt to limits which he would not be allowed to pass without placing himself in a state of hostility with all Europe.

We congratulate ourselves sincerely that our ideas on this important question should have so completely coincided with those of the English Cabinet.

The Government of Her Britannic Majesty has in fact, as well as we ourselves, been convinced of the indispensable necessity of applying ourselves in the first instance to what was most urgent, by bringing matters within our controul, that is to say, preventing the struggle between the Sultan and the Pasha of Egypt, from becoming dangerous to the security of the Ottoman Empire. It is to avert this danger that our efforts, as well as the decisive steps which England and France have considered it necessary to take at Alexandria, have been directed.

The remonstrances which the Representatives of the Allied Cabinets have been called upon to make to Mehemet Ali, have completely answered our expectations. Ibrahim Pasha has received orders to stop the march of his troops. Hostilities, thanks to the unanimity of the efforts made by the Cabinets of Europe for their repression, have been suspended.

This primary object once attained, the Great Powers have still a task of not less importance to perform: that of henceforth consolidating the repose of the East by means of a pacific arrangement between the Porte and the Pasha.

We entirely coincide in the opinion which Lord Palmerston has pronounced as to the necessity of such an arrangement. You are already aware, Sir, that our August Master hastened to give his assent to the bases of this pacification as proposed in the first instance by the Court of Vienna. They do not essentially differ from those contemplated by the English Government. According to Prince Metternich's plan, the Porte would resume possession of Syria, either during Mehemet Ali's life-time or after his death. According to Lord Palmerston's opinion, the immediate giving up of Syria should be considered as the absolute condition of any lasting arrangement between the Porte and Egypt.

As far as we are concerned, we shall not hesitate, Sir, to accede to either one or the other of these combinations, provided it shall have been freely adopted by the Porte itself. This condition forms in our opinion the basis of any arrangement in which our August Master should be called upon to take a part. This is the only point in which our opinions appear to differ from those expressed in Lord Palmerston's despatch of the 9th of July. According to the view taken of this matter by the British Minister, "it would be for the Five Powers in the first instance to communicate to each other their opinions with respect to the definitive arrangement to be concluded between Turkey and Egypt; and it would be as a consequence of such communication of ideas that the opinion of the Five Powers would have to be announced to the two parties, by means of their Representatives at Constantinople and at Alexandria; and thus the repugnance which either one or the other of the two parties might from the commencement have evinced with regard to the arrangement which might have been proposed to them, would finally be overcome."

This plan of action, which would establish an entire parity between the Sultan and the Pasha, would not, according to our opinion, be without inconveniences, inasmuch as it would admit as a possible contingency that we should have to combat and conquer a resistance opposed to us by the Sultan, whereas it is solely in his favour and with his consent, that a European intervention, having for its object to strengthen the existence of the Ottoman Empire, can legitimately take place.

In order, consequently, to remain true to the principle of conservation which forms the basis of the policy of the Five Courts as regards the

Affairs of the East, and not to run the risk of finding ourselves opposed to the views of the Ottoman Government, it would appear to us preferable to commence, in the first place, by ascertaining whether the plan of pacification projected by the Allied Cabinets is really of a nature to obtain the assent of the Sultan. It is not till after the Cabinets of Europe shall have acquired the certainty of a complete and willing accession on the part of that Sovereign, that they will be able to come to an ulterior understanding as to the measures to be adopted in common, in order to impose upon the Pasha of Egypt the conditions of arrangement freely agreed to by the Porte.

Such are the reflections which we were on the point of communicating to Lord Palmerston in reply to his despatch of the 9th of July, when despatches from Constantinople dated $\frac{24\text{ June,}}{6\text{ July,}}$ (of which I sent you the abstract by my last courier,) made us acquainted with the determination which the Divan has thought it necessary to take in order to bring the Egyptian affair to a speedy and decisive solution.

These determinations, dictated by a genuine spirit of conciliation and wisdom, simplify greatly the question, the solution of which the Allied Cabinets have at heart. The Porte, induced by a just appreciation of its true interests, has anticipated the propositions which the Five Powers were on the point of making to it. It has taken the lead in regard to the steps which it was proposed to take at Alexandria. It has resolved to offer to Mehemet Ali the inheritance of Egypt in return for the cession of Syria. Finally it has called together in conference the Representatives of the Allied Cabinets, for the purpose of announcing these resolutions to them, and of requesting their moral support to the offers of arrangement which it had made to the Pasha.

The basis of negotiation has thus been laid down by the Porte itself. It has of its own accord opened the deliberation, and has virtually fixed its locality at Constantinople, the only place where it was fitting that interests, having direct reference to the future fate of the Ottoman Empire, should be discussed.

It is our duty, now that this important deliberation has been opened under the most favourable auspices with the sanction of the Porte, and with the unanimous consent of the Representatives of the Allied Powers, calmly to await the replies which the Pasha shall make to the propositions which he has received on the part of the Porte.

Three possible contingencies here occur to us:—

1. Mehemet Ali may wholly and simply accede to the offers that have been made to him: in that case all difficulties will of themselves be removed.

2. Mehemet Ali may, without absolutely rejecting the terms of the proposed arrangement, endeavour to obtain more favourable conditions from the Porte. In this case, a negotiation between the two parties will be opened at Constantinople; and it will then be for the Representatives of the Allied Cabinets to lend their good offices whenever the Divan shall see occasion for them. Lastly—

3. Mehemet Ali may obstinately refuse all reconciliation with the Porte. If, contrary to our expectation, this latter supposition should turn out true, the Divan may consider itself justified in having recourse to the Allied Representatives for support in order to overcome the resistance of the Pasha; in such case we should think it right and necessary that the Great Powers should unite their efforts to compel the Pasha of Egypt to agree to an equitable arrangement, which shall have obtained at once the sanction of the Porte as well as the concurrence of all the Powers of Europe.

This, Sir, is the course which to us appears to be the most simple and the most certain to lead to a satisfactory termination of the unfortunate difference which has for a long time placed the security of the Ottoman Empire in danger, and has kept the peace of Europe in suspense.

The Emperor directs you, Sir, to bring the whole of the considerations embodied in this despatch to the knowledge of the English Government. You will furnish Lord Palmerston with a copy of the same, and you will express a hope, that the opinions of our Cabinet contained in this despatch, will be received by the Government of Her Britannic Majesty with the same satisfaction with which our August Master has been pleased to receive the communication of which the Marquess of Clanricarde was the channel.

Receive, &c.,
(Signed) NESSELRODE.

No. 200.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received August* 9.)

(Extract.) *Vienna, July* 30, 1839.

PRINCE METTERNICH'S last intelligence from Constantinople is of the 17th instant. Nothing positive was then known there about the fleet. It was in the neighbourhood of Rhodes, and a merchantman had brought the report of its having been seen in company with the Egyptian fleet. This was not credited, but much anxiety was felt upon the subject by the Turkish Ministers.

M. de Bouténeff had received a fresh instruction for transmission to Count Medem, directing him to address himself again to Mehemet Ali, and renew to him, in the Emperor's name, the menace, that if he overstepped the districts of Orfa and Diarbekir, a Russian Army would enter Asia Minor to oppose him.

No. 201.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received August* 9.)

My Lord, *Vienna, July* 30, 1839.

A LETTER of the 17th instant from Lord Ponsonby, informs me that Nouri Effendi and his colleagues say, that it is fit the Porte should settle the affairs of their country like Mussulmans, amongst each other, and avoid the interference of the Europeans, for which reason, terms of a more agreeable nature should be offered to Mehemet Ali. Your Lordship will have seen that this distrust of the Christian Powers had been divined by Prince Metternich, and that in the communication enjoined to the Internuncio, he has done his best to counteract it. With a view to second his efforts, I have sent to Lord Ponsonby copies of my declaration of the 27th of July, and of Prince Metternich's answer, requesting his Lordship not to use them otherwise than confidentially, and to give no copies until the step I have taken shall have been sanctioned by Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

No. 202.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received August* 9.)

(Extract.) *Vienna, July* 30, 1839.

ON the 27th, I sent my declaration to Prince Metternich, and on the following day received his answer. Copies are inclosed.

There is but one word in my declaration which is not authorized by your Lordship's despatch: it is that of reciprocity of declarations between all the Powers. Being in the French note, and highly valuable in itself, I did not hesitate to adopt it. The more nearly the steps taken by France and England can coincide, the better.

P.S.—I annex copy of Count St. Aulaire's note and its inclosure.

Inclosure 1 in No. 202.

Lord Beauvale to Prince Metternich.

Vienna, July 27, 1839.

THE Austrian Ambassador in London having communicated to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, a despatch from his Highness the Chancellor of Court and State, wherein the principles which direct the counsels and determine the conduct of Austria in the affairs of Turkey, are laid down, the British Government feels itself called upon to notify its perfect adhesion to the views and intentions therein enounced.

The Undersigned, Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna, has, in consequence, been empowered to declare, and does declare in the name of his Court, that it is determined to maintain the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire under the present dynasty; and as a necessary consequence of such determination, that it will not seek to profit by the present state of things, for the purpose of gaining any acquisition of territory or any exclusive influence.

The British Government confidently anticipates, that this declaration will be reciprocated by the other European Courts, its friends and allies, which have already given proofs of the wisdom and disinterestedness of their views on the present occasion, and in the first instance, by that of His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty, to which the honour of having originated this proposition belongs.

(Signed) BEAUVALE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 202.

Prince Metternich to Lord Beauvale.

Vienne, ce 28 *Juillet,* 1839.

LE Soussigné a l'honneur d'accuser à son Excellence my Lord Beauvale, la réception de l'office qu'il lui a adressé en date d'hier.

L'Empereur, dans les instructions qu'il a fait adresser le 3 de ce mois à son Ambassadeur près Sa Majesté Britannique, a développé avec une entière franchise les principes qui ont invariablement guidé sa politique à l'égard de la Porte Ottomane, et qui continueront à lui servir de règle. En donnant si explicitement son plein assentiment à ces principes, le Gouvernement Britannique répond non seulement aux vœux, mais également à l'attente de Sa Majesté Impériale. Convaincu que l'heureuse identité de vues dont ont fait preuve, dans la présente crise, les Puissances qui, par une saine politique, sont le plus directement appelées à influer sur les destinées de l'Empire Ottoman, offre le moyen le plus efficace d'en assurer la conservation, le Cabinet Impérial à accueilli avec une bien vive satisfaction, l'assurance, qu'à l'égard de cette question, l'une des plus graves du jour, il existe une parfaite uniformité de principes entre lui et le Cabinet Britannique.

Le Soussigné a l'honneur d'inviter son Excellence my Lord Beauvale à vouloir bien porter cette assurance à la connaissance de sa Cour, et il le prie en même tems, d'agréer pour lui celle de sa haute considération.

(Signé) METTERNICH.

(Translation.)

Prince Metternich to Lord Beauvale.

Vienna, July 28, 1839.

THE Undersigned has the honour to acknowledge to his Excellency, Lord Beauvale, the receipt of the Note which he yesterday addressed to him.

The Emperor has explained with the most perfect frankness, in the instructions which he addressed on the 3rd instant to his Ambassador at the Court of Her Britannic Majesty, the principles which have invariably guided his policy with regard to the Ottoman Porte, and which will continue to regulate his conduct. The British Government, in so explicitly giving its full assent to these principles, has not only responded to the wishes, but likewise to the expectations of His Imperial Majesty. Convinced that the fortunate identity of views, manifested at the present crisis by the Powers who, in accordance with sound policy, are chiefly called upon to exercise an influence on the destinies of the Ottoman Empire, offers the most effectual means for ensuring its preservation, the Imperial Cabinet has received with very lively satisfaction the assurance that, with regard to this question, one of the most important questions of the day, a perfect uniformity of principle exists between themselves and the British Cabinet.

The Undersigned has the honour to request Lord Beauvale, to have the goodness to bring this assurance to the knowledge of his Court, and he, at the same time, requests him to accept the assurance of his high consideration.

(Signed) METTERNICH.

Inclosure 3 in No. 202.

Count St. Aulaire to Prince Metternich.

Vienne, le 23 *Juillet,* 1839.

L'AMBASSADEUR du Roi des Français a reçu l'ordre de communiquer à Son Altesse Monsieur le Chancelier de Cour et d'Etat, la dépêche dont ci-joint copie.

En déclarant qu'il veut l'intégrité et l'indépendance de l'Empire Ottoman sous la dynastie actuellement régnante, et qu'il est disposé à faire usage de ses moyens d'action et d'influence pour assurer le maintien de cet élément si nécessaire de l'équilibre politique, le Gouvernement du Roi ne fait qu'adhérer aux sentimens exprimés si souvent, et récemment encore dans des termes également précis, au nom de Sa Majesté Impériale et Royale.

Mais il a jugé que les circonstances actuelles donneraient de l'utilité à la manifestation écrite et réciproque de ces sentimens de toutes les Puissances, et il a voulu, pour sa part, s'acquitter de ce devoir sans perdre un jour.

(Signé) ST. AULAIRE.

(Translation.)

Count St. Aulaire to Prince Metternich.

Vienna, July 23, 1839.

THE Ambassador of the King of the French has received instructions to communicate to His Highness the Chancellor of Court and State, the despatch of which a copy is hereunto annexed.

The Government of the King, in declaring that it wishes the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire under the actually reigning dynasty, and that it is ready to use its means of action and influence, for the purpose of ensuring the maintenance of this indispensable element of the political balance, only announces its adherence to the principles so often already expressed, and again recently expressed in terms equally precise, in the name of His Imperial and Royal Majesty.

But the Government of the King has thought, that the actually existing circumstances would render useful a written and reciprocal manifestation of this sentiment, on the part of all the Powers, and it was anxious on its part to fulfil this duty without losing a day.

(Signed) ST. AULAIRE.

Inclosure 4 in No. 202.

The Duc de Dalmatie to Count St. Aulaire.

Monsieur le Comte, *Paris, le* 17 *Juillet*, 1839.

DANS la crise si grave où la mort du Sultan Mahmoud, survenant au milieu des évènemens qui ont marqué les derniers mois de son règne, vient de jeter l'Empire Ottoman, l'union des Grandes Puissances de l'Europe pouvait seule offrir une garantie suffisante pour rassurer les amis de la paix. Des communications échangées depuis quelques semaines, ont heureusement prouvé que cette union est aussi complète qu'il était possible de le désirer. Tous les Cabinets veulent l'intégrité et l'indépendance de la monarchie Ottomane sous la dynastie actuellement régnante; tous sont disposés à faire usage de leurs moyens d'action et d'influence pour assurer le maintien de cet élément si essentiel de l'équilibre politique; et ils n'hésiteraient pas à se déclarer contre une combinaison quelconque qui y porterait atteinte. Un pareil accord de sentimens et de résolutions devant suffire, lorsque personne ne pourra plus en douter, non seulement pour prévenir toute tentative contraire à ce grand intérêt, mais même pour dissiper des inquiétudes dont la seule existence constitue un danger véritable, par suite de l'agitation qu'elles jettent dans les esprits, le Gouvernement du Roi croit que les Cabinets feraient quelque chose d'important pour l'affermissement de la paix, en constatant dans des documens écrits qu'ils se communiqueraient réciproquement, et qui nécessairement ne tarderaient pas à avoir une publicité plus ou moins complète, l'exposé des intentions que je viens de rappeler. En ce qui nous concerne, Monsieur le Comte, je déclare formellement que ce sont, que ce seront, invariablement les nôtres, et je vous autorise à laisser à Monsieur de Metternich une copie de la présente dépêche, après lui en avoir donné lecture. Je ne doute pas que le Gouvernement Autrichien, dans la réponse qu'il croira sans doute devoir faire à la lettre par laquelle vous lui transmettrez cette dépêche, n'adhère de son côté, de la manière la plus formelle, à cette profession de foi, si parfaitement conforme à l'expression souvent reproduite de sa politique. Si, comme j'ai lieu d'espérer, les Cabinets de Londres, de Pétersbourg, et de Berlin, répondent de même aux communications semblables que je vais leur faire parvenir, le but que se propose le Gouvernement du Roi se trouvera atteint.

Sa Majesté voulant donner un témoignage non équivoque des dispositions dont elle est animée à l'égard de la Porte, m'a ordonné d'envoyer à Monsieur l'Amiral Roussin, sans attendre l'avis officiel, ni même la confirmation directe de la mort du Sultan Mahmoud, les lettres de créance qui l'accréditent auprès du nouvel Empereur.

Agréez, &c.,
(Signé) DUC DE DALMATIE.

(Translation.)

The Duc de Dalmatie to Count St. Aulaire.

Monsieur le Baron, *Paris, July* 17, 1839.

IN the very serious crisis into which the death of the Sultan Mahmoud, occurring in the midst of the events which have characterized the last months of his reign, has thrown the Ottoman Empire, the union of the Great Powers of Europe could alone offer a guarantee sufficient to reassure the friends of peace. The communications, which during a few weeks have been interchanged, have happily proved that this union is as complete as it is possible to desire it. All the Cabinets wish for the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Monarchy under the dynasty now reigning; all are disposed to employ their means of action and of influence to ensure the maintenance of this essential element of the political equilibrium; and they would not hesitate to declare themselves against any combination whatever which might impair it.

As such an agreement of sentiments and determinations must be sufficient, when there can be no longer any doubt of it, not only to prevent any attempt

being made at variance with this great interest, but even to dispel the uneasiness of which the mere existence produces a real danger, by reason of the disquiet which it occasions in the public mind, His Majesty's Government considers that the Cabinets would effect something important towards the settlement of peace, by recording, in written documents, to be reciprocally communicated to each other, and which necessarily would not be long before they acquired a publicity more or less complete, the declaration of the intentions which I have just mentioned. So far as we are concerned, M. le Baron, I formally declare, that such are, and such will invariably be our intentions, and I authorize you to leave with Prince Metternich a copy of this despatch after having read it to him. I entertain no doubt that the Austrian Government, in the answer which it will assuredly think it fitting to return to the letter, by which you will transmit to it this despatch, will on its part adhere in the most formal manner to this profession of faith, which is in such perfect conformity with its often repeated enunciation of its policy. If, as I have reason to hope, the Cabinets of London, Petersburgh, and Berlin, reply in the same manner to the communications of a like nature which I am about to forward to them, the object which His Majesty's Government proposes to itself will be accomplished.

His Majesty being desirous of giving an unequivocal proof of the feelings with which he is animated with respect to the Porte, has ordered me to send to Admiral Roussin, without waiting for official intelligence, nor even for the direct confirmation of the death of Sultan Mahmoud, the letters of credence accrediting him to the new Emperor.

Receive, &c.,
(Signed) DUC DE DALMATIE.

No. 203.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received August* 9.)

My Lord, *Vienna, July* 30, 1839.

COUNT ST. AULAIRE informs me, that Prince Metternich has declined to make common cause with France under certain circumstances in her demand for the passage of the Dardanelles; saying, that it would destroy his position of the *juste milieu*, and consequently his means of usefulness. Count St. Aulaire is apprehensive, that this will create much irritation in the French Government. It will be desirable to calm this as much as possible. The demand, if not made in concert with England, ought not to have been made at all; but they committed the additional error of announcing that I should be instructed to concur in it; they obtained a sort of promise under this expectation, and when it was falsified, it of course turned against themselves.

I have reason to apprehend, that in consequence of this incident, the orders to the Austrian squadron to place itself under the command of Sir Robert Stopford will be modified, and that it will preserve an independent position, leaning in doubtful cases more to the British Admiral than the French one.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

No. 204.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received August* 9.)

(Extract.) *Vienna, August* 1, 1839.

I INCLOSE a series of queries which M. de St. Aulaire has sent to his Court.

Inclosure in No. 204.

Queries addressed by Count St. Aulaire to his Government.

EGYPTE.

TOUTES les Puissances paraissent d'accord de laisser héréditairement l'Egypte à Méhémet Ali et à sa descendance.

CANDIE.

L'Ile de Candie suivra-t-elle le sort de l'Egypte?

SYRIE.

1°. La Syrie suivra-t-elle le sort de l'Egypte?

2°. La Syrie laissée viagèrement à Méhémet, conformément à l'arrangement de Kutahia, retournera-t-elle à la Porte, à la mort du possesseur actuel?

3°. Opérerait-on un partage, provisoire ou définitif, de la Syrie entre le Sultan et le Vice-Roi?

4°. Pourrait-on proposer, pour assurer ce partage, l'occupation temporaire de quelque point de la côte par des troupes Françaises et Anglaises?

ARABIE.

Ibrahim conservera-t-il les Pachalics de la Mecque et de Médine? Mêmes questions que pour la Syrie.

TRIBUT.

Méhémet Ali et ses Successeurs restant vassaux de la Porte, on devra déterminer la quotité du Tribut qu'il aura à payer pour ses diverses possessions.

SOUVERAINETÉ DU SULTAN.

Quels seront les droits de Souveraineté que conservera le Sultan, soit dans l'administration intérieure, soit sur les forces de terre et de mer de son Vassal?

Méhémet Ali aura-t-il un Pavillon, le droit d'alliance, le droit de paix et de guerre, le droit de battre monnaie? &c.

Possibilité d'assimilation aux Souverains des Régences barbaresques, tant pour les questions ci-dessus que pour les questions relatives à la suprématie réligieuse du Sultan.

Nécessité de régler la succession de Méhémet dans sa famille par un acte qui serait de son vivant, du Vice-Roi, ratifié par la Porte.

Rédigera-t-on en instrument authentique, les déclarations des Puissances sur leur volonté de maintenir l'intégrité et l'indépendance de l'Empire Ottoman?

Pour la garantie à donner par les Puissances à la Convention conclue ou à conclure entre le Sultan et Méhémet Ali, quelles formes devra-t-on adopter de préférence?

La reconnaissance de la neutralité perpétuelle et de l'inviolabilité de l'Empire Ottoman, par rapport aux Puissances Européennes, et *vice-versâ*, ne pourrait-elle pas suffire comme garantie, avec cet avantage qu'elle ne lierait pas d'une manière trop-gênante vis-à-vis de la Porte?

Nécessité que les Représentans des Quatre Cours à Vienne, reçoivent des instructions assez détaillées, et des pleins-pouvoirs assez étendus, pour se prononcer définitivement sur les points de la Question d'Orient, et donner les directions convenables à Constantinople et à Alexandrie.

Possibilité de maintenir virtuellement à Vienne la réunion diplomatique, pendant le délai nécessaire pour l'entier applanissement des difficultés actuelles, et de celles qui naîtraient de l'application des résolutions Européennes.

(Translation.)

Queries addressed by Count St. Aulaire to his Government.

EGYPT.

ALL the Powers appear agreed to leave Egypt hereditarily to Mehemet Ali and his descendants.

CANDIA.

Is the island of Candia to follow the fate of Egypt?

SYRIA.

1. Is Syria to follow the fate of Egypt?
2. Is Syria, left for life to Mehemet in accordance with the arrangement of Kutaya, to revert to the Porte on the death of its actual possessor?
3. A division of Syria, either provisional or definitive, be made between the Sultan and the Viceroy?
4. Might it be proposed, with a view to secure this partition, that some point of the coast should be temporarily occupied by French and English troops?

ARABIA.

Is Ibrahim to retain the Pashalics of Mecca and of Medina? Same questions as with respect to Syria.

TRIBUTE.

As Mehemet Ali and his successors are to remain vassals of the Porte, the amount of the Tribute which he will have to pay for his various possessions ought to be fixed.

SOVEREIGNTY OF THE SULTAN.

What are to be the rights of sovereignty which the Sultan is to retain, as well with respect to the internal administration, as with respect to the military and naval forces of his vassal?

Is Mehemet Ali to have a flag, the right of forming alliances, the right of peace and war, the right of coining? &c.

The possibility of assimilating him to the rulers of the barbaresque Regencies, as well with respect to the above points, as to questions relative to the religious supremacy of the Sultan.

Necessity of settling the succession of Mehemet Ali in his family by an Act, which shall, during his, the Viceroy's life, be ratified by the Porte.

Are the declarations of the Powers, with respect to their intention to maintain the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire, to be recorded in an authentic document?

What forms ought to be chosen for the guarantee to be given by the Powers to the Convention concluded, or to be concluded, between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali?

Would not the acknowledgment of the perpetual neutrality and inviolability of the Ottoman Empire, as far as regards the European Powers, and *vice versâ*, be a sufficient guarantee, with this additional advantage, that it would not bind the parties to the Porte in a too inconvenient manner?

Necessity of furnishing the Representatives of the Four Powers at Vienna with sufficiently detailed instructions, and with sufficiently extended powers, to enable them to decide definitively on all points of the Oriental Question, and to give suitable directions at Constantinople and Alexandria.

Possibility of virtually keeping assembled at Vienna the diplomatic meeting during the time which may be necessary for the entire removal of existing difficulties, and of such difficulties as may arise from the carrying into effect of the European resolutions.

No. 205.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 9.)

(Extract.) *Vienna, August* 1, 1839.

PRINCE METTERNICH'S latest accounts from Constantinople, assure him that the Divan have determined to close with Mehemet Ali, and to make no notification to the Representatives of the Christian Powers until peace is concluded.

From this the ambition of Mehemet Ali may save us. He now looks to nothing less than being Sultan. The object of the Divan in this determination was, to avoid the interference of the Christian Powers. In the same spirit, all the Turkish Ambassadors at their Courts are to be recalled, and the Chargés d'Affaires re-established as before. Prince Metternich is well satisfied with Lord Ponsonby and Admiral Roussin, who have recommended a reference to the Christian Powers. He has sent a strict injunction to Baron Stürmer to conform to this course.

There are many rumours announcing revolt in other provinces of the Turkish Empire. The Capudan Pasha is understood still to nourish the project of returning to Constantinople, in order, in conjunction with other Pashas, to change the Government. The position where his fleet was last seen, is supposed to indicate an intention of going over to Mehemet Ali.

No. 206.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 9.)

My Lord, *Vienna, August* 1, 1839.

I HAVE now the honour to transmit copy of Prince Metternich's answer to Count St. Aulaire's note of the 23rd ultimo.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

Inclosure in No. 206.

Prince Metternich to Count St. Aulaire.

Vienne, le 24 *Juillet*, 1839.

LE Soussigné, &c., &c., a l'honneur d'accuser à son Excellence M. l'Ambassadeur de France, &c., la réception de l'office qu'il lui a fait celui de lui adresser hier, et il s'empresse d'y faire la réponse suivante :

L'Empereur ayant à cœur de s'expliquer en toute occasion avec une entière franchise sur ce qu'il croit pouvoir être utile au maintien de la paix générale, et ayant considéré l'évènement du décès du Sultan Mahmoud comme pouvant faire naître des chances de perturbations graves dans l'Empire Ottoman, dont la réaction ne tarderait pas à se faire sentir bien au-delà des frontières de cet Empire, n'a point hésité à charger le Soussigné, au moment même où Sa Majesté Impériale a eu lieu de se convaincre que la vie de Sa Hautesse était dans un danger imminent, de faire connaître aux Cours de France, de Grande Bretagne, de Russie, et de Prusse, sa ferme détermination de suivre la ligne politique clairement définie dans les points suivans :

1°. Sa Majesté Impériale a déclaré qu'elle était décidée à ne pas s'écarter de la résolution qu'elle avait prise, de vouer tous ses soins et ses efforts à la conservation intacte de l'Empire Ottoman sous la dynastie actuellement régnante, et à vouer à ce but tous les moyens d'influence et d'action dont elle pourra disposer.

2°. Qu'il résultait de cette détermination, que Sa Majesté Impériale se déclarerait contre toute combinaison qui porterait atteinte à l'indépendance de l'autorité souveraine du Sultan, et à l'intégrité de son Empire.

3°. Que l'Empereur désirait que les autres Puissances prissent une détermination semblable à celle qu'il venait d'énoncer, et qu'à cet effet, Sa Majesté Impériale sera constamment prête à s'entendre avec elles, afin de s'assurer par la franchise de leur concours, les moyens d'atteindre le but qu'elle se propose.

Rien ne saurait être plus satisfaisant pour l'Empereur que l'entier assentiment du Cabinet Français aux principes qui, dans une circonstance aussi riche dans ses conséquences possibles, servirait de règle à la conduite du Cabinet Impérial.

Le Soussigné prie M. l'Ambassadeur de vouloir bien transmettre cette assurance à son Gouvernement, et il saisit, &c.

(Signé) METTERNICH.

(Translation.)

Prince Metternich to Count St. Aulaire.

Vienna, July 24, 1839.

THE Undersigned, &c., &c., has the honour to acknowledge, to his Excellency the Ambassador of France, &c., the receipt of the note which his Excellency did him the honour to address to him yesterday, and he hastens to return to it the following reply:—

The Emperor being anxious on all occasions to explain himself with the most perfect frankness with respect to what he thinks may contribute towards the maintenance of general peace, and considering the event of the death of the Sultan Mahmoud, as calculated to give rise to the possibility of serious disturbances in the Ottoman Empire, the reaction of which would not fail to cause itself to be felt far beyond the frontiers of that Empire, hesitated not to desire the Undersigned, at the very moment when His Imperial Majesty had reason to convince himself that the life of His Highness was in imminent peril, to make the Courts of France, Great Britain, Russia, and Prussia acquainted with his firm resolve to follow the political course clearly laid down in the following points:—

1st. His Imperial Majesty declared, that he was determined not to depart from the resolution he had taken, of devoting all his care and efforts to preserve the Ottoman Empire under the actually reigning dynasty inviolate, and to devote to this object all the means of influence and action at his disposal.

2ndly. That it followed from this determination, that His Imperial Majesty would declare himself against every combination which should endanger the independence of the Sovereign authority of the Sultan, and the integrity of his Empire.

3rdly. That the Emperor wished, that the other Powers should take a determination similar to the one which he had announced, and that His Majesty will be ever ready to come to an understanding with them on this matter, in order to secure, by the sincerity of their co-operation, the means of attaining the object he has in view. Nothing could be more satisfactory to the Emperor than the entire assent of the French Cabinet to the principles which, on an occasion so fruitful in possible consequences, would constitute a rule of conduct for the Imperial Cabinet.

The Undersigned requests the Ambassador to have the goodness to transmit this assurance to his Government, and he avails himself, &c.,

(Signed) METTERNICH.

No. 207.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 9.)

(Extract.) *Vienna, August* 1, 1839.

I COMMUNICATED to Prince Metternich the substance of your Lordship's letter of 23rd July, and am happy to announce to you that he concurs in the whole of your Lordship's views, and in the deductions to be drawn from them. At the same time he is waiting for despatches, which he expects from Russia, and therefore preached great prudence of conduct in the mean time. I replied, that for two months we had been behindhand with events; that, intending the integrity of the Turkish Empire, we were doing nothing to support it; that it would be much more difficult to restore it after it should have been broken into, than to arrest events at the point where they now stand; that the disposition of the Turkish Ministers to get rid of our assistance, and the tendency to revolt among the Pashas, required that we should show ourselves in a more imposing attitude than we had hitherto taken; that as an application of these reasonings, I had reduced to writing the results which naturally flow from the premises we had adopted in common; and I put into his hands the paper of which I have the honour to inclose a copy. As he read it he agreed with every word, but said he could not sign it without Russia; for that if a collective step were taken at Constantinople to which M. de Bouténeff should not be a party, the Turks would remark his absence, and it would do more harm than good. He therefore proposed that the paper should be sent separately by himself to M. de Stürmer, and by M. de St. Aulaire and me to our colleagues at Constantinople, in order that they might act upon it individually. I represented the inadequacy of this course and its uncertainty: but perceiving a doubt in his mind whether M. de St. Aulaire would concur in the step I had proposed, I asked him whether I should carry from him an invitation to that Ambassador to speak with him upon the subject in the morning. To this he assented. I found M. de St. Aulaire a warm advocate of the plan, which he considered himself as fully authorized to concur in by his instructions. What I would suggest to my Government would be, that full powers and instructions should be sent to M. de St. Aulaire and myself to sit down and treat either five together, or four, or three. In these views M. de St. Aulaire concurs with me, and will send the same recommendation to his Government.

Inclosure 1 in No. 207.

Project of a Declaration between the Powers, as proposed by Lord Beauvale.

THE Powers, regarding the integrity of the Turkish Empire as a necessary element in the balance of power in Europe, and considering any attempt against that integrity as endangering the state of peace which they are determined to maintain, will regard any Pasha who shall raise the standard of revolt against his Sovereign, as committing an act of hostility against themselves.

As a consequence of this basis, and considering the negotiations between the Porte and Mehemet Ali as having been imposed upon the former by a necessity which it could not controul, the Powers have determined to take the results of that negotiation (be they what they may) into consideration, with reference to the principles established above, and will assign to them no value whatever, except in as far as they shall be found conducive to the objects which the Powers have in view, and which they will employ their utmost efforts to attain.

Inclosure 2 in No. 207.

Project, as altered by M. de St. Aulaire.

THE Powers, regarding the integrity of the Turkish Empire as a necessary element in the balance of power in Europe, and as a condition of the state of peace which they are determined to maintain, will regard any attempt against this integrity as an act of hostility against themselves.

As a consequence of this basis, and considering the negotiation between the Porte and Mehemet Ali, as having been imposed upon the former by a necessity which it could not controul, the Powers have determined to take the results of that negotiation (be they what they may) into consideration, with reference to the principles established above, and will assign to them no value whatever, except in as far as they shall be found conducive to the objects which the Powers have in view, and which they will employ their utmost efforts to attain.

No. 208.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 9.)

(Extract.) *Vienna, August* 2, 1839.

PRINCE METTERNICH has just communicated to me a despatch from Baron Werther, adhering entirely to the views of Austria, and assenting to the negotiation here, provided it is agreed to by the other Powers.

M. de Bresson had made a declaration similar to those made at London and here, inviting at the same time a reply from the Prussian Government. Baron Werther, however, before acceding to this request, had referred it to Vienna, to know what had been done here, intending to conform thereto.

No. 209.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 10.)

My Lord, *Paris, August* 8, 1839.

THE messenger Aspain arrived here at 1 o'clock yesterday, and delivered to me your Lordship's despatches, of the 5th instant, with their inclosures.

Immediately on the receipt of them, I went to the Foreign Office and communicated to Marshal Soult your despatch which directed me to send on the messenger, provided the French Government agreed to the proposal of Her Majesty's Government.

His Excellency had received on Monday last from M. de Bourqueney, copies of the inclosures in that despatch; and your Lordship will have learnt by the report I made that day of the tenour of Marshal Soult's conversation, that the French Government would, in all probability, object to giving to Admiral Lalande, instructions similar to those which Her Majesty's Government propose to send to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, for his guidance in the present state of affairs in the Levant.

The objections, the Marshal told me, were fully stated in a despatch addressed to M. de Bourqueney, which he read to me, and which had been sent off on the previous evening to London, to be communicated to your Lordship.

His Excellency said, that he had written this despatch after the Council of Ministers had maturely deliberated upon the subject to which it related; and he could not but believe, he added, that the accounts from Alexandria, which reached London subsequently to the drawing up of the proposed instructions to Sir Robert Stopford, would occasion some change in the view taken of this matter by Her Majesty's Government. From those accounts, he said, it appeared that hostilities had ceased between the Sultan and the Pasha, although the conditions of peace had not been settled; and that Mehemet Ali had given orders to Ibrahim Pasha to withdraw the Egyptian troops from the left side of the Euphrates, and had declared, that even if the proposals made by him to the Divan were not accepted, he would abstain from all aggressive movements, and only maintain the possession of those countries which his troops now occupied. The Marshal thought, that during this suspension of hostilities, it would be rash and dangerous to have recourse to the extreme measure of firing upon the Egyptian fleet to obtain the immediate restoration of the Turkish fleet.

The danger to be apprehended was, that Mehemet Ali, after the capture or destruction of his fleet, after we had exhausted on an incidental point, our means of pressure upon him, would not be restrained from pushing further his victories by land, and exciting insurrection in Asia Minor, as well as in the European dominions of the Sultan.

This, my Lord, is the substance of the grounds on which Marshal Soult objected to adopt the instructions Her Majesty's Government proposed to give to the Admirals in the Levant; but there is no doubt that the decision of the French Government on this question has been much strengthened by the well-founded apprehension, that the destruction of the Egyptian fleet by France would raise a clamour in this country, fatal to the existence of a Ministry under whose orders it had been effected.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 210.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received August* 12.)

My Lord, *Paris, August* 9, 1839.

THE messenger Cookes arrived here this morning soon after 10 o'clock, and delivered to me your despatch of the 7th instant inclosing a copy of a letter addressed by your Lordship to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, containing instructions in addition to those of which I received a copy on Wednesday last, for the guidance of the Admiral commanding Her Majesty's squadron in the Mediterranean.

I lost not a moment in reading in translation to Marshal Soult, these additional instructions, observing to him, that they were conformable to the despatch which he had written to M. de Bourqueney, in reply to the communication of the instructions which Her Majesty's Government proposed to send to Sir Robert Stopford, upon first hearing that the Turkish fleet was in the power of Mehemet Ali. The Marshal expressed his concurrence in my observation, and appeared much pleased with the prospect of the French and British Admirals acting under similar instructions. His Excellency said, that the Ministers were to meet in Council at 2 o'clock; and he requested me to leave with him a copy of the instructions, in order that he might submit them to their consideration, and that he would call upon me after the Council, to inform me of the result of their deliberations.

I have since received from the Marshal a copy of a telegraphic despatch from M. de Bourqueney, stating that the English Cabinet withdraws its first project of instructions, and will concert with the French Government fresh instructions to be drawn up within the limits traced in Marshal Soult's despatch to M. de Bourqueney, and also a note from his Excellency, deferring until 10 o'clock this evening his interview with me.

Marshal Soult, upon my proposing to him to delay by a telegraphic order the departure of the steam-boat from Marseilles, said it was too late, but that he would at the Council make arrangements with the Minister of Marine, for a steam-vessel to be ready at Toulon for the conveyance of the despatches to the British and French Admirals in the Levant.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

P. S.—Marshal Soult called here this evening, and informed me, that the Cabinet Council had heard with much satisfaction the contents of your Lordship's letter to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, but had determined to wait M. de Bourqueney's report of his communication with your Lordship on the subject, (which they expected to receive to-morrow,) before they prepared their instructions for Admiral Lalande.

G.

No. 211.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received August* 14.)

My Lord, *Paris, August* 12, 1839.

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your despatches to the 9th of August.

Marshal Soult received this morning two short despatches from Admiral Roussin, dated the 22nd of July, for the conveyance of which, the French Ambassador writes that he had availed himself of the services of an English courier. It is to be presumed, therefore, that your Lordship is already in possession of the information they contain, which, in fact, amounts to little more than that at that date, Constantinople was in a state of tranquillity; and that Akiff Effendi had returned from Alexandria with Mehemet Ali's answer to the proposition of peace made by the Sultan. The Ambassador states that in this answer the Pasha professes perfect submission to the Sultan, and that he had had coin stamped with the image of his Sovereign; but he requires not only that the hereditary government of Egypt, which had been offered to him, should be conceded, but also the hereditary government of all the other Pashalics in his possession. Admiral Roussin makes no mention of the further demand by Mehemet Ali, that Hosrew Pasha should be dismissed from office, nor does he give any account of the impression created in the Divan, by the Pasha's counter-project of peace.

A telegraphic despatch was also received this morning from Marseilles, stating the arrival of a steam-boat from the Levant, giving intelligence of the British and French fleets being united near to Tenedos, and of the Turkish fleet having entered the port of Alexandria.

Marshal Soult read to me a draft of instructions to Admiral Lalande, which had been prepared, and which he purposed to submit to the consideration of the Cabinet this evening. They are drawn up in the spirit of the additional instruction to Sir Robert Stopford, contained in your letter of the 7th of August to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

The Marshal also read to me M. de Bourqueney's report of a conversation with your Lordship, in which you alluded to the disposition of the French Government to acquiesce in conditions of an arrangement between Mehemet Ali and the Sultan, more favourable to the Pasha than Her Majesty's Government thought it expedient to concede.

His Excellency took this occasion of again assuring me, that the French Government had really no desire to aggrandize the power of Mehemet Ali; "but," said he, "we cannot be blind to the *nécessité des faits*. We acknowledge the right of the Sultan, and we wish the restoration to him of all to which he is entitled by that right; but if we insist upon the restitution of more than Mehemet Ali will concede, we risk accelerating the crisis which we apprehend, and producing that conflagration and general war among the Powers of Europe, which they are all desirous to avert."

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 212.

The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received August* 12.)

(Extract.) *St. Petersburgh, August* 3, 1839.

ON Wednesday last the French Ambassador called upon Count Nesselrode, to communicate a despatch from the Duc de Dalmatie on the affairs of Turkey, similar to that of which your Lordship received a copy from M. de Bourqueney.

M. de Barante had a long conversation with the Vice-Chancellor upon the subject of the despatch; but he did not gather any intimation of what would be the formal reply of the Russian Government to the communication which he had made, and I do not believe that the answer has yet been drawn up, or determined upon.

M. de Barante did not conceal from the Russian Minister, that his Government had instructed the French Ambassador at Constantinople to make a demand for leave to pass the Dardanelles, and an offer of the services of the French squadron, to the Sultan, in case his Highness should require the assistance of any European Power.

No. 213.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 12.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, July 20,* 1839.

I COMMUNICATED to the Grand Vizier the account of Achmet Pasha's proceedings, as I received it in a letter from Captain Wakefield to Mr. Consul Lander, which I inclose in copy. I took this opportunity to inform the Grand Vizier, that some of the Ottoman Ministers had expressed an opinion that the Porte ought to negotiate with Mehemet Ali directly, in order to avoid the interference of the Great Powers. I asserted the impolicy of the opinion, adding, that it could not be carried into effect with success by the Porte, because the Great Powers were too directly interested in the arrangements to be made between the Sublime Porte and Mehemet Ali, to permit them to be executed, unless they were in unison with the general good. I said, that happily the general good imperiously demanded from the Great Powers, that the integrity of the Ottoman Empire should be maintained, and that the independence of the Ottoman Government should be established upon solid bases. I inclose herewith the Grand Vizier's answer.

Inclosure 1 in No. 213.

Captain Wakefield to Mr. Consul Lander.

"*Rhadamanthus,*" *Besika Bay,*
Tuesday, July 16, 1839.

Dear Sir,

I FORWARD the despatches by Mr. Ward.

We left the Turkish fleet 100 miles to the southward of Rhodes, steering south, in company with the "Nile" Egyptian war-steamer. Sherif Aga had been to Alexandria from the Capudan Pasha, and was sent back in the "Nile," as it was supposed in consequence of the Viceroy's having agreed to the terms of the communication which had been offered by the Capudan Pasha. The small Turkish steamer entered Alexandria as we came out.

The Capudan Pasha had twenty-two sail with him, eight of the line.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) ARTHUR WAKEFIELD.

Inclosure 2 in No. 213.

M. Frederic Pisani to Viscount Ponsonby.

(Extrait.) *Péra, ce* 19 *Juillet,* 1839.

J'AI l'honneur de rendre compte à votre Excellence de l'entrevue que je viens d'avoir avec le Grand Vizir, et dans laquelle je lui ai dit exactement tout ce que votre Excellence m'avait ordonné de lui faire savoir.

Son Altesse a appris avec le plus grand intérêt les nouvelles de la Flotte Turque du 13 courant; elle est indignée de la conduite du Capitan Ahmed Pacha.

Le Grand Vizir, après avoir longuement parlé de la fatalité qui a présidé à

la nomination d'Ahmed Pacha comme Grand-Amiral, et de Hafiz Pacha comme Généralissime, a tenu le langage suivant :—

"Son Excellence Lord Ponsonby nous assure que l'Angleterre prendra des mesures pour faire rendre la flotte au Sultan. J'espère en effet, pour l'honneur des Gouvernemens justes et éclairés, qu'ils ne souffriront jamais le scandale qu'Ahmed Pacha vient de donner au monde, et que l'Angleterre surtout, contribuera puissamment à la restitution, à son maître légitime, d'une flotte dont l'indigne chef croit pouvoir en disposer. Comment M. l'Ambassadeur peut-il croire qu'il ait passé par la tête à quelques membres du Ministère Ottoman de faire un arrangement avec Méhémet Ali, sans se concerter avec les Grandes Puissances?—et que peuvent faire les Ministres sans moi? Vous savez, qu'à peine le Sultan Abdoul Medjid eût-il pris les rènes du Gouvernement, qu'il a exprimé à l'égard de Méhémet Ali des sentimens pleins de bienveillance que nous nous sommes empressés de porter à la connaissance de MM. les Représentans des Grandes Puissances.

"Après les mauvaises nouvelles arrivées de l'armée, j'ai donné à M. l'Ambassadeur les assurances les plus positives, que quand même Ibrahim Pacha serait venu à Scutari, nous ne donnerions pas à Méhémet Ali un pouce de terrain, sans avoir consulté les Grandes Puissances. Je lui réitère mes assurances à cet égard.

"Les détroits de la Mer Noire et des Dardanelles sont très-rigoureusement fermés à tous les bâtimens de guerre étrangers; et les commandans des forts de l'un et l'autre détroits ont ordre de tirer sur les bâtimens de guerre, de quelque nation que ce soit, qui, plus de deux ou trois ensemble, voudraient forcer le passage. Pour à présent nous restons dans l'inaction, ce qui se combine avec les conseils de Lord Ponsonby, jusqu'à ce que nous pourrons voir plus clair dans cette question; alors nous réfléchirons sérieusement sur la convenance de demander, si cela devenait nécessaire, la médiation des Grandes Puissances. En attendant, je dirige tous mes efforts vers deux buts, savoir, de maintenir la tranquillité publique, qui, grâce à Dieu, ne laisse rien à désirer, et de rassembler autant de forces qu'il est possible.

"Je vous prie, M Pisani, de faire savoir tout cela à M. l'Ambassadeur, avec bien des complimens de ma part."

(Translation.)

M. Frederic Pisani to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Pera, July* 19, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to give an account to your Excellency of the interview which I have just had with the Grand Vizier, and in which I told him exactly everything which your Excellency had desired me to make known to him.

His Highness has learnt with the greatest interest the news respecting the Turkish fleet of the 13th instant; he is indignant at the conduct of the Capudan Ahmed Pasha.

The Grand Vizier, after having spoken at length of the fatality which had presided over the nomination of Ahmed Pasha as High Admiral and of Hafiz Pasha as Generalissimo, held the following language :—

"His Excellency Lord Ponsonby assures us, that England will take measures to restore the fleet to the Sultan. I hope, in fact, for the honour of the just and enlightened Governments, that they will never suffer the scandal which Ahmed Pasha has just exhibited to the world, and that England above all, will contribute powerfully to the restitution to its lawful owner, of a fleet which the unworthy Commander thinks that he can dispose of. How can the Ambassador believe that a design has entered into the head of some of the Members of the Ottoman Ministry to make an arrangement with Mehemet Ali without concerting with the Great Powers? And what can the Ministers do without me? You know, that the Sultan Abdul Medjid had scarcely assumed the reins of government, when he expressed, with respect to Mehemet Ali, sentiments full of benevolence, which we hastened to communicate to the Representatives of the Great Powers.

After the arrival of the bad news from the army, I gave the Ambassador

the most positive assurances, that even if Ibrahim Pasha should come to Scutari, we would not give to Mehemet Ali an inch of land, without having consulted the Great Powers. I repeat to him my assurances in this respect.

"The straits of the Black Sea and of the Dardanelles are very rigorously closed to all foreign ships of war; and the Commandants of the forts of both straits have orders to fire upon the ships of war, of whatever nation they may be, who, being more than two or three together, should wish to force a passage. For the present we remain inactive, which agrees with the counsels of Lord Ponsonby, until we shall be able to see more clearly in this question; then we shall reflect seriously on the expediency of asking, if that should become necessary, the mediation of the Great Powers. In the meanwhile, I direct all my efforts towards two points, namely, to maintain public tranquillity, which, thank God, leaves nothing to desire, and to collect as large a body of forces as possible.

"I beg you, M. Pisani, to make all this known to the Ambassador, with many compliments on my part."

No. 214.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received August* 12.)

My Lord, *Therapia, July* 20, 1839.

I INCLOSE, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copies of a despatch to me from Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, and my reply to it, based upon the instructions Her Majesty's Government gave to the Admiral, and which your Lordship communicated to me.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 214.

Admiral Sir Robert Stopford to Viscount Ponsonby.

"*Princess Charlotte,*" *off the South end of Cyprus,*
My Lord, *July* 11, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Excellency with my arrival here with the squadron under my command, in pursuance of a private intimation from Lord Minto, signifying his desire for the squadron to assemble in this neighbourhood, and to await further orders.

As the accounts of the Sultan's death, and the defeat of his army, which reached me this morning from Candia, and have been confirmed by the "Rhadamanthus," from Alexandria, may render it necessary for the squadron to take up another position, I have to request your Excellency will be pleased to favour me with such information for my further guidance, as you may judge fit to give me under those altered circumstances.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) ROBERT STOPFORD,
Admiral.

Inclosure 2 in No. 214.

Viscount Ponsonby to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford.

Sir, *Therapia, July* 19, 1839.

I HAD yesterday evening the honour to receive your despatch dated the 11th of July, 1839, to which I hasten to reply, that Her Majesty's instructions to you appear to have provided for the case of the loss of a battle by the Sultan's forces in Syria; that they also provide for anything attempted to be done by the Pasha of Egypt tending to prolong and aggravate hostilities; and I do not see anything (of which I have knowledge) that would induce alteration in the views of Government; but there is one new event of which you no doubt will have cognizance,—the union of Achmet Pasha with the Pasha of Egypt,—which, it is to be presumed from the report of Lieutenant Wakefield, has been settled.

I think the spirit and the end of your instructions indicate that it would be proper to consider the Ottoman fleet, thus removed from the authority of its legitimate Sovereign by the rebellious act of the Capudan Pasha, as being thereby subjected to the vigorous exertion of your power; and I think it would be right to take all safe and proper means to prevent that fleet being delivered up to the Pasha of Egypt, if there should be fortunately still time left for so doing; and I am of opinion it will be equally advantageous and just to restore it to the Sultan.

I have stated my opinion in consequence of your desire, and I have only to add that there is perfect tranquillity here.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 215.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 12.)

My Lord, *Therapia, July* 21, 1839.

COLONEL CAMPBELL will have reported to your Lordship, that the Ottoman fleet is anchored with the Egyptian fleet off Alexandria, and that Akiff Effendi, the bearer of the proposals made by the Sublime Porte to the Pasha of Egypt, had left Egypt on his return to Constantinople; I have to acquaint you that he arrived here this day. I cannot tell you what answer he brought, but I hope to do so by the Vienna post.

Your Lordship will have learnt from Colonel Campbell the professions of loyalty made by Mehemet Ali, and I need not advert to the subject. I will mention a possible occurrence, that the Ottoman and Egyptian fleets united may come here; I am satisfied they could not be opposed at the Dardanelles, with any degree of vigour; if they were to come, I think they might be submitted to here, and the Sultan might be advised to disgrace his Ministers, and throw the administration of the Government into the hands of Achmet Pasha and the dependents of Mehemet Ali.

Your Lordship will judge of the effect of such an event.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

P. S. *July* 22.—I have received no intelligence from Colonel Campbell.

No. 216.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 12.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, July* 22, 1839.

I FORWARD reports I have this moment received from the Dragoman.

Inclosure 1 in No. 216.

M. Frederic Pisani to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Péra, ce* 22 *Juillet*, 1839.

J'AI l'honneur de rendre compte à Votre Excellence de ce que je viens d'apprendre des Mousteshars, Nouri Effendi et Sarim Effendi, après le retour d'Akiff Effendi, arrivé hier d'Alexandrie.

Méhémet Ali versa des larmes lorsqu'Akiff Effendi lui parla de la mort du Sultan Mahmoud. Il fit faire ensuite, pendant trois jours, des réjouissances

publiques pour célébrer l'avènement au trône du Sultan Abdoul Medjid; il fit substituer le nom du nouveau Sultan à celui du Sultan Mahmoud dans la Prière solemnelle du Vendredi dans les Mosquées; il promit de faire battre monnaie au coin d'Abdoul Medjid ; et il protesta de sa soumission au Sultan comme un de ses fidèles Vizirs, et de son dévouement à la Porte, à laquelle il promet de rendre par la suite de grands services. Mais Son Altesse demande en même tems un Bérat qui confère le gouvernement héréditaire dans sa famille, de toute l'Egypte et de toute la Syrie, enfin de tous les pays soumis aujourd'hui à son autorité.

Méhémet Ali a envoyé à son fils Ibrahim Pacha l'ordre de se retirer sur le terrain compris dans ses confins de la Syrie, et demande que la Porte retire son armée en la faisant revenir sur la rive droite de l'Euphrate. Son Altesse parle de venir à Constantinople pour faire ses hommages au Sultan, mais il y met la condition *sine quâ non* du Bérat qu'il demande préalablement.

Akiff Effendi ayant dit à Méhémet Ali Pacha qu'il allait écrire à son Gouvernement pour lui communiquer les demandes de Son Altesse, le Pacha lui conseilla de venir à Constantinople pour en informer la Sublime Porte de vive voix, et de retourner à Alexandrie avec les instructions qu'elle lui aura données.

Méhémet Ali intercède en faveur du Capitan Achmet Pacha, et prie la Porte de lui pardonner la démarche qu'il vient de faire en cédant à des craintes imaginaires qu'il s'était mises dans la tête.

La Porte va délibérer sur cette grande question de l'Orient.

Je suis, &c.,
(Signé) FREDERIC PISANI.

(Translation.)

M. Frederic Pisani to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Pera, July* 22, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency what I have just heard from the Moustechars, Nouri Effendi and Sarim Effendi, since the return of Akiff Effendi, who arrived yesterday from Alexandria.

Mehemet Ali shed tears when Akiff Effendi spoke to him of the death of Sultan Mahmoud. Subsequently he caused public rejoicings to be made during three days, to celebrate the accession of Sultan Abdul Medjid to the throne; he caused the name of the new Sultan to be substituted for that of Sultan Mahmoud in the solemn prayer of the Friday in the Mosques; he promised to coin money with the die of Abdul Medjid; and he made protestations of his submission to the Sultan as one of his faithful Viziers, and of his devotion to the Porte, to which he promises hereafter to render great services. But His Highness, at the same time, demands a Bérat, conferring upon his family the hereditary Government of the whole of Egypt, and of the whole of Syria, in short, of all the countries now subject to his authority.

Mehemet Ali has sent orders to his son Ibrahim Pasha to retire upon the territory included within his limits of Syria, and he demands that the Porte shall withdraw its army, by causing it to return upon the right bank of the Euphrates. His Highness talks of coming to Constantinople to pay his homage to the Sultan, but he attaches to his so doing the indispensable condition of the Bérat, which he demands in the first instance.

Akiff Effendi, having told Mehemet Ali Pasha, that he was about to write to his Government to communicate to it His Highness' demands, the Pasha recommended him to come to Constantinople, in order to acquaint the Sublime Porte therewith by word of mouth, and to return to Alexandria with the instructions with which the Porte shall have furnished him.

Mehemet Ali makes intercession in favour of the Capudan Achmet Pasha, and requests the Porte to pardon him the step he has taken in giving way to imaginary apprehensions which he had got into his head.

The Porte is about to deliberate upon this Great Question of the East.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) F. PISANI.

Inclosure 2 in No. 216.

M. Frederic Pisani to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Péra, ce* 22 *Juillet,* 1839.

LA Porte est assez disposée à traiter avec Méhémet Ali sur les bases suivantes, proposées, dit-elle, par le Prince de Metternich, et approuvées par le Cabinet de St. James.

1°. Le Gouvernement de l'Egypte donné héréditairement à Méhémet Ali.

2°. Le Gouvernement de toute la Syrie donné à Ibrahim Pacha.

3°. A la mort de Méhémet Ali, Ibrahim Pacha aura le Gouvernement de l'Egypte, et la Syrie rentrera de nouveau sous l'autorité immédiate de la Porte, comme cela était autrefois.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.,
(Signé) FREDERIC PISANI.

(Translation.)

M. Frederic Pisani to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Pera, July* 22, 1839.

THE Porte is disposed to treat with Mehemet Ali on the following bases, proposed, as it says, by Prince Metternich, and approved by the Cabinet of St. James':—

1st. The Government of Egypt given hereditarily to Mehemet Ali.

2ndly. The Government of the whole of Syria given to Ibrahim Pasha.

3rdly. At the death of Mehemet Ali, Ibrahim Pasha shall have the Government of Egypt, and Syria shall again come under the immediate authority of the Porte, as was the case in former times.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) F. PISANI.

No. 217.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 12.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, July* 18, 1839.

I HAVE had the honour to receive your Lordship's despatch, of 25th June.

In reference to Earl Granville's despatch, of 15th June, your Lordship will have known how unfounded are the reports of the occupation either of Orfa, or of Bassora, by any Egyptian troops.

In regard to the expulsion from Mecca of two dignitaries appointed by the Sultan to reside in the Sacred City, the facts are as explained in the inclosed paper given to me by the Pasha.

Your Lordship will see by that paper, that the two dignitaries, Osman Pasha and Sheriff, were sent by the Porte to Medina, in place of eunuchs, as had ever been the custom, and that they have been busy in intrigues against Mehemet Ali, and for which purpose, there is reason to suppose, they were sent by the Porte.

Those dignitaries are, however, still in their situations at Medina, from which they have never been removed.

As to the seventeen persons who were brought from Medina to Cairo, they were residents there, and not persons sent there in the employ of the Porte; and they were dealt with, as would have been any turbulent subjects in other parts of Mehemet Ali's Governments.

In regard to Viscount Ponsonby's despatch of May 22, it appears, either that Nouri Effendi has been most grossly deceived, in regard to what was passing in different districts of the Turkish Empire, or that he has desired to impose on Her

Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople. And my despatches will have evinced to your Lordship the groundlessness of many of the complaints urged by the Porte, against Mehemet Ali.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Inclosure in No. 217.

Report of Mehemet Ali relative to Dignitaries of the Porte at Medina.

LES Arabes de Judeide ont tué le général, et volé les provisions de bouche expédiées de Médine au Nedj. Pendant qu'on travaillait à contenir et à faire rentrer dans le devoir ces pillards, les différentes tribus qui habitent aux environs de Médine se sont soulevées, et sont venues cerner la Ville Sainte. La nuit qui suivit cette aggression, le Cheik-el-Harem, Osman Pacha, se trouvait hors de Médine dans un jardin. Le Gouverneur de la ville s'empressa de le faire prévenir de ce qui se passait et de l'engager à rentrer; Osman Pacha refusa de le faire. Le jour suivant, ce même Osman Pacha voyant que, contrairement à ses prévisions, Médine allait résister, se rendit à la ville et dit au Gouverneur qu'il n'était pas besoin de préparer la défense et de faire faire des sorties aux troupes; que les Cheiks des tribus insurgées l'étaient venus voir la veille au soir; qu'il se chargeait d'être médiateur, et d'arranger les différends. Cette circonstance fit bien comprendre qu' Osman Pacha était d'intelligence avec les révoltés.

En second lieu, Feyssol-ebn-el-Turki avait fait porter par son frère à Kourchid Pacha, Général-en-Chef de l'Armée du Nedj, une lettre du Pacha de Bagdad, qui l'exhortait à tenir bon contre le Général Egyptien, et l'assurait qu'il irait à son secours. Osman Pacha et l'Administrateur du Tombeau, Chérif Bey, ayant eu connaissance de cette démarche de Feyssol, envoyèrent dire à Feyssol, dans le but d'entraver les opérations de Kourchid Pacha, qu'il se gardât bien de faire sa soumission, et que la Sublime Porte ne manquerait pas de lui venir en aide dans sa résistance. Feyssol, séduit par cette promesse, réussit à faire échapper d'auprès de Kourchid Pacha son frère, porteur de la lettre dont j'ai parlé, et persista dans la voie des hostilités: on sait quelle grande perte d'hommes il en est résulté.

Chérif Bey distribuait de l'argent, donnait des honoraires à dix-sept habitans de Médine qui n'avaient aucune espèce de charge. Il fesait aussi des présens en montres, en pélisses d'honneur, en argent même, aux Cheiks de Gebel-Chemis, et à ceux des tribus environnantes, de telle sorte qu'il n'y avait plus à douter que les mouvemens et les révoltes de ces tribus étaient le résultat des manœuvres d'Osman Pacha et de Chérif Bey. Je jugeai dès-lors que, pour mettre fin à un pareil état de choses, il devenait nécessaire que ces deux Envoyés de la Porte fussent éloignés des lieux Saints. J'envoyai en conséquence le Général d'Artillerie Sélim Pacha, avec deux régimens d'Infanterie et un corps de troupes irrégulières; 1°. Pour apaiser la révolte; 2°. Pour inviter les deux agens de Constantinople à donner leur démission, et à demander à la Porte qu'on les remplace par des eunuques, comme les choses se fesaient auparavant. Sélim Pacha avait ordre de ne pas obliger les deux fonctionnaires susdits à se retirer avant l'arrivée des ordres de la Porte à ce sujet. Je me trouvais au Soudan lorsque les lettres de démission venues de Médine parvinrent au Caire; j'en fus informé; à mon retour au Caire, j'appris que les troubles des environs de la Cité Sainte étaient apaisés. Les circonstances dans lesquelles nous nous trouvions ne me permettant guère d'expédier ces lettres à Constantinople, je les retins. Les deux Envoyés restèrent à leur poste, vaquant à leurs offices comme auparavant; je leur ai même fait parvenir un à compte de mille bourses, conformément à l'intention de la Porte, ainsi qu'elle me l'avait fait connaître.

Je n'étais pas dupe des menées de la Porte dans cette partie de mon Gouvernement; j'avais deviné ses projets, lorsqu'elle envoya, au lieu d'eunuques comme par le passé, Osman Pacha et Chérif Bey aux Lieux Saints. Si je ne m'opposai pas à l'admission de ces deux agens, c'est que je voulais voir où cela irait; et les faits ont pleinement justifié mes prévisions.

Lorsque j'entretiens à si grands frais des forces aussi considérables pour assurer respect et inviolation aux Saints Lieux, et tranquillité dans les pays

environnans, dans l'intérêt du peuple Musulman, il n'est pas convenable que la Porte fasse des intrigues pour y semer le trouble et la profanation. Dieu et les hommes condamnent une pareille conduite.

Je demande que Osman Pacha et Chérif Bey soient rappelés, et que dorénavant il soit envoyé, comme par la passé, des eunuques à leur place.

Les dix-sept personnes qui servaient à Médine les menées des deux envoyés, ont été mandées au Caire où elles restent en liberté, entretenues par mon trésor. Osman Pacha et Chérif Bey continuent d'exercer sans entraves leurs fonctions aux Lieux Saints.

(Translation.)

Report of Mehemet Ali relative to Dignitaries of the Porte at Medina.

THE Arabs of Judeida have killed the General and plundered the provisions sent from Medina to the Nedj. While efforts were making to cause these robbers to return to their duty, the different tribes which dwell in the neighbourhood of Medina rose and came and blockaded the Holy City. The night after this aggression the Sheik-el-Harem, Osman Pasha, was at a garden outside of Medina. The Governor of the city hastened to acquaint him with what was passing, and to urge him to return; Osman Pasha refused to do so. The following day, this same Osman Pasha, seeing that, contrary to his anticipation, Medina was going to offer resistance, repaired to the city and told the Governor that it was not necessary to make preparations for defence, and to cause the troops to move out; that the Sheiks of the insurgent tribes had been to visit him the evening before; that he undertook to be mediator, and to arrange the differences. This circumstance showed clearly that Osman Pasha had an understanding with the insurgents.

In the second place, Feyssol-ebn-el-Turki had caused his brother to carry to Kourshid Pasha, Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the Nedj, a letter from the Pasha of Bagdad, which exhorted him to hold out against the Egyptian General, and assured him that he would go to his assistance. Osman Pasha, and the Guardian of the Tomb, Cherif Bey, having become acquainted with this proceeding of Feyssol, sent word to Feyssol, with the view of impeding the operations of Kourshid Pasha, that he should by no means make his submission, and that the Sublime Porte would not fail to come to his aid in his resistance. Feyssol, seduced by this promise, succeeded in procuring the escape from Kourshid Pasha, of his brother, the bearer of the letter of which I have spoken, and persisted in his hostilities: it is known how great a loss of life was the result of this.

Cherif Bey distributed money, gave rewards to seventeen inhabitants of Medina, who had no kind of office. He also made presents of watches, dresses of honour, and even of money to the Sheiks of Gebel-Chemis, and to those of the surrounding tribes, so that there no longer remained any doubt that the movements and revolt of these tribes were the result of the manœuvres of Osman Pasha and of Cherif Bey. I then judged it necessary, in order to put an end to such a state of things, that these two Envoys of the Porte should be removed from the Holy Cities. I consequently sent the General of Artillery Selim Pasha, with two regiments of Infantry and a body of irregular troops:—1st. To put down the revolt; 2ndly. To invite the two Agents from Constantinople to give in their resignation, and to request the Porte to replace them by Eunuchs, as was formerly the case. Selim Pasha had orders not to oblige the two functionaries abovementioned to retire, before the arrival of directions from the Porte on this subject. I was in the Soudan, when the letters of resignation coming from Medina, arrived at Cairo; I was informed of it; on my return to Cairo I learnt that the troubles in the neighbourhood of the Holy City were appeased. The circumstances in which we were placed scarcely allowing me to forward these letters to Constantinople, I kept them. The two Envoys remained at their post, attending to their duties as heretofore. I even furnished them with a credit of 1,000 purses agreeably to the intention of the Porte as it had made it known to me.

I was not the dupe of the dealings of the Porte in this part of my Government; I had guessed its projects, when it sent Osman Pasha and Cherif Bey to the Holy Cities, instead of sending Eunuchs as heretofore. If I did not oppose the admittance of those two Agents, it was because I wished to see how far things would go; and the facts have fully justified my anticipations.

While I am maintaining such large forces at so great an expence, to ensure the respect and the inviolability of the Holy Cities, and the tranquillity of the neighbouring country in the interest of the Mussulman people, it is not fitting that the Porte should carry on intrigues for the purpose of promoting troubles and profanation therein. God and mankind condemn such conduct.

I demand the recall of Osman Pasha and Cherif Bey, and that henceforward Eunuchs be sent in their place, as was the case heretofore.

The seventeen persons who promoted the intrigues of the two Envoys at Medina, have been sent for to Cairo, where they remain at liberty, maintained by my treasury.

Osman Pasha and Cherif Bey continue to exercise their functions without impediment at the Holy Cities.

No. 218.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 12.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, July* 18, 1839.

IN reference to your Lordship's despatch, of June 25 and its inclosures, I have the honour to inform your Lordship, that Admiral Sir Robert Stopford writes to me, off Cyprus, July 12, that the subject of his despatches being no longer valid in consequence of the late important events, and the Pasha of Egypt having declared his intention of stopping further hostilities in consequence of the Sultan's death, he (the Admiral) proposes returning with the squadron off the Dardanelles, in pursuance of Admiralty orders.

I suppose that the Admiral was not aware of the arrival here of the fleet of the Capudan Pasha.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

No. 219.

The Duc de Dalmatie to the Baron de Bourqueney.—(Communicated by the Baron de Bourqueney.)

Monsieur, *Paris, le* 6 *Août*, 1839.

J'AI reçu hier la lettre que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'adresser avec le projet d'instructions aux Amiraux qui vous a été remis par Lord Palmerston, pour être présenté à l'approbation du Gouvernement du Roi. Le Conseil qui vient d'en délibérer, n'a pas jugé qu'il fut possible d'adhérer complètement à ce projet. Je crains que le Cabinet Britannique, sous la première impression des fâcheuses nouvelles arrivées d'Alexandrie, ne se soit pas suffisamment rendu compte de l'ensemble de la situation. Les hostilités sont évidemment terminées en Orient. Ni par terre, ni par mer, personne n'annonce en ce moment l'intention de les continuer, ou plutôt de les reprendre. D'un côté, on n'en a plus les moyens, à supposer, ce qui est douteux, qu'on en eût la volonté. De l'autre, on n'y a aucun intérêt, et l'on sait assez qu'on ne pourrait le faire sans s'exposer à de très-graves conséquences, sans compromettre gratuitement une fort belle position. Dans cet état de choses, la défection de la Flotte Ottomane a certainement de fâcheux et très-regrettables inconvéniens auxquels nous devons essayer de remédier; mais elle ne constitue pas un de ces dangers imminens propres à justifier des mesures aussi extrêmes que celles qu'on nous propose. Cette flotte dans les mains de Méhémet Ali, n'est aujourd'hui qu'un dépôt, un gage à l'aide duquel il se promet d'obtenir à la fois l'investiture héréditaire de tout ce qu'il possède. La France et l'Angleterre, tout en insistant fortement sur l'invitation que nous avons déjà fait parvenir à Méhémet Ali par

nos Consuls, de restituer les vaisseaux Turcs, doivent sans doute prendre des mesures pour que, dans le cas peu probable où il recommencerait la guerre, il ne peut s'en faire un instrument d'attaque contre la Porte; et le meilleur moyen peut-être de lui en ôter l'envie, c'est de lui déclarer formellement, que désormais les Escadres Française et Anglaise agiront uniquement dans le but de protéger le Sultan contre ses agressions ou d'envahissemens quelconques. Toute démarche, toute démonstration faite dans le sens que je viens d'indiquer, aurait notre approbation entière, parceque nous y voyons une utilité réelle et de grandes chances d'efficacité. Mais la mesure d'hostilité contre Méhémet Ali ne faciliterait pas le plan que l'Angleterre et la France se sont proposé de concert. En détruisant l'Escadre Egyptienne, non seulement, nous n'en donnerions plus de force à la Porte, mais nous n'aménerions pas le Vice-Roi à se désister de la moindre de ses prétentions. La puissance matérielle et morale qu'il exerce aujourd'hui sur terre, rend son action bien moins dépendante qu'on ne le suppose de ses forces maritimes. L'attaquer lorsqu'il n'attaque pas, ce serait risquer de le pousser à quelque parti extrême. Certain, lorsqu'on lui aurait enlevé ses vaisseaux, de n'avoir plus rien à craindre de l'Europe qui, en effet, aurait épuisé contre lui, dans un but comparativement bien secondaire, tous ses moyens de coaction, il en conclurait naturellement qu'il n'a plus rien à ménager envers Elle; et en supposant qu'il ne se décidât pas à faire marcher Ibrahim sur Constantinople même, il lui suffirait, pour susciter une diversion terrible, de provoquer dans l'Asie Mineure, en Macédoine, en Albanie, quelque soulèvement de nature à ramener la question de l'intervention Russe. On sait malheureusement que les instrumens ne lui manqueraient pas à cet effet, et qu'il n'aurait peut-être pas besoin, pour y parvenir, de remuer un seul de ses soldats. De telles éventualités valent certainement la peine qu'on les pèse mûrement avant de se décider à les braver. J'ajouterai, Monsieur, qu'à Londres on semble trop se préoccuper de l'agrandissement de Méhémet Ali, parce qu'on veut toujours considérer ce côté de la question sous l'aspect qu'il aurait s'il s'agissait d'un Etat Européen. Sans doute entre les mains d'un homme tel que le Pacha d'Egypte, la possession de territoires trop considérables peut avoir des dangers qui expliquent et justifient les efforts des Puissances pour mettre un terme à ses empiètemens. La France est la première à le reconnaître, et Elle n'a cessé de travailler à contenir les projets, à modérer les prétentions de ce Pacha; mais il ne faut pas s'exagérer le mal; l'Empire Ottoman même, divisé administrativement par des stipulations auxquelles la clause de l'hérédité, quelque expresse qu'elle fût, pourrait bien d'ailleurs ne pas donner un caractère de permanence définitive; l'Empire Ottoman, uni, malgré le partage plus ou moins durable, par le lien puissant des mœurs et de la religion, n'en continuera pas moins à former en face des Puissances Européennes, ce grand corps dont l'existence a toujours été jugé indispensable au maintien de l'équilibre politique. Les forces qu'il possède, dans l'une et l'autre de ses divisions actuelles, concourent également à ce but; et je ne crains pas de dire, qu'en ruinant le Pacha d'Egypte, on travaillerait efficacement à la destruction de l'Empire Ottoman. Notre politique aujourd'hui, comme dès le commencement de cette crise, doit veiller avant tout à ce que Constantinople ne reçoive de protection extérieure qu'avec notre commun concours.

Telles sont, Monsieur, les objections qu'a suggéré au Gouvernement du Roi la proposition du Cabinet de Londres, et qui ne lui ont pas permis d'y adhérer entièrement. Veuillez les faire connaître à Lord Palmerston, en lui indiquant la marche qui nous parait préférable. Elle consiste, vous le voyez, à réclamer de nouveau la restitution de la Flotte Ottomane, et dans le cas ou Méhémet Ali s'y refuserait, à lui déclarer qu'il doit dorénavant considérer les Escadres Alliées comme uniquement et spécialement chargées de repousser toute tentative dirigée contre le territoire ou l'autorité de la Porte. Le Cabinet Anglais en y réfléchissant, reconnaîtra, je n'en doute pas, qu'une telle attitude suffit aux besoins du moment, que sans rien compromettre, elle atteindra, suivant toute apparence, le but que la France et l'Angleterre ont en vue, et que, placés à notre grand regret dans l'impossibilité d'accéder sans réserve, au projet du Gouvernement Britannique, nous ne pouvions mieux lui prouver notre confiance absolue et l'intime accord de notre politique avec la sienne.

Recevez, &c.,

(Signé) MARECHAL DUC DE DALMATIE.

(Translation.)

The Duke de Dalmatia to the Baron de Bourqueney.—(Communicated by the Baron de Bourqueney.)

Sir, *Paris, August* 6, 1839.

I RECEIVED yesterday the letter which you did me the honour to address to me, with the project of instructions to the Admirals, which has been put into your hands by Lord Palmerston, to be submitted for the approval of the King's Government. The Council which has been in deliberation thereupon, has deemed that it was not possible to adhere entirely to this project. I fear that the British Cabinet, under the first impression made by the unhappy news received from Alexandria, has not sufficiently taken into account the whole position of affairs. Hostilities are evidently at an end in the East. Neither by land, nor by sea, does any one at present announce an intention of continuing them, or rather of recommencing them. On the one hand, the means no longer exist, supposing, which is not probable, that there were the inclination to do so. On the other hand, they have no interest in it, and it is well known that it could not be done without the risk of very serious consequences, nor without gratuitously compromising a very good position. In this state of things, the defection of the Ottoman fleet certainly does entail unhappy and very deplorable consequences, which we ought to try to remedy; but it does not constitute one of those imminent dangers which could justify such extreme measures as those proposed to us. That fleet in the hands of Mehemet Ali is now but a security, a pledge by means of which he proposes to himself to obtain at once the hereditary investiture of all that he holds. France and England, while strongly pressing the invitation which we have already made to Mehemet Ali through our Consuls, to deliver up the Turkish ships, ought undoubtedly to adopt such measures as that, in the improbable event of his recommencing war, he may not be able to use them as an instrument of attack against the Porte; and the best means perhaps of depriving him of the wish to do so, would be to declare to him formally, that henceforth the French and English squadrons will act solely with the view of protecting the Sultan against his aggressions, or from any invasions whatsoever. Every step, every demonstration made in the spirit of what I have pointed out, would have our entire approbation, because we see therein real utility, and great chance of success. But to commence hostility against Mehemet Ali would not tend to facilitate the attainment of the object which England and France have conjointly proposed to themselves. By destroying the Egyptian squadron, not only should we add no strength to the Porte, but we should not induce the Viceroy to relinquish the least of his pretensions. The physical and moral power which he now exercises by land, renders him in his operations much less dependent on his maritime force than is supposed. To attack him when he does not attack, would be to risk the urging him to some extreme course. Certain as he would be, when deprived of his ships, of having nothing further to fear from Europe, when, in fact, she had exhausted against him, for an object comparatively of very secondary importance, all her combined means of operation, he would naturally conclude, that he had no further occasion to pay any regard to her; and supposing that he should not decide on making Ibrahim march on Constantinople itself, he need only, for the purpose of making a serious diversion, excite in Asia Minor, in Macedonia, in Albania, some revolt of a nature to bring on again the question of Russian intervention. We know, unfortunately, that the instruments for this purpose would not be wanting to him, and that he would not perhaps have occasion, for the attainment of it, to employ a single soldier of his own. Such contingencies are certainly well worthy of being weighed maturely before we decide on risking them. I will add, Sir, that in London too much stress seems to be laid on the aggrandisement of Mehemet Ali, in consequence of always choosing to view that side of the question in the light in which it would be if a European State were concerned. No doubt, in the hands of such a man as the Pasha of Egypt, the possession of too considerable an extent of territory may involve dangers to account for and to justify the efforts of the Powers, to put a stop to his aggressions. France is the first to acknowledge it; him, and she has unremittingly laboured to restrain the designs, and to moderate the pretensions, of this Pasha:

but we must not exaggerate the evil; the Ottoman Empire itself, divided administratively by stipulations to which the question of succession, however precise it might be, cannot, indeed, give a character of real permanence; the Ottoman Empire, united, notwithstanding the more or less durable distribution, by the powerful tie of manners and religion, will continue nevertheless to form, with regard to the European Powers, that great body the existence of which has always been deemed indispensable to the maintenance of the balance of power. The forces which it possesses, throughout its actual divisions, combine alike to this end; and I do not hesitate to say, that overthrowing the Pasha of Egypt would effectually work the destruction of the Ottoman Empire. Our policy at the present time, as from the commencement of this crisis, should take care above all things, that Constantinople receives no foreign protection but with our common concurrence.

Such, Sir, are the objections to the proposition of the Cabinet of London which have occurred to the King's Government, and which have prevented it from entirely concurring therein. Be so good as to communicate them to Lord Palmerston, pointing out to him at the same time the course which we prefer to adopt. It consists, you will see, in requiring afresh the restitution of the Ottoman fleet, and in case Mehemet Ali should refuse, in declaring to him that he must thenceforth consider the allied squadrons as solely and specially charged to repel every attempt made against the territory or the authority of the Porte. The English Cabinet, will, I have no doubt, perceive on reflection, that such an attitude is all that is required for the present emergency; that without compromising anything, it will attain, according to all appearance, the object which France and England have in view, and that, being, to our deep regret, unable to accede without reserve to the project of the British Government, we could not give any better proof of our entire confidence and of the intimate connection between our policy and its own.

Accept, &c.,
(Signed) MARECHAL DUC DE DALMATIE.

No. 220.

The Duc de Dalmatie to Baron Roussin.—(Communicated by the Baron de Bourqueney.)

M. le Baron, *Paris, le 7 Août,* 1839.

DEPUIS la dernière expédition que je vous ai adressée, nous avons appris l'entrée de la flotte Turque dans le port d'Alexandrie, le refus fait par Méhémet Ali d'accéder aux propositions de la Porte, et les conditions exorbitantes qu'il met aujourd'hui à un arrangement. Je n'ai pas besoin de vous dire que ni la France ni les autres Puissances ne peuvent approuver de telles exigences. Nous nous concertons en ce moment avec le Cabinet de Londres, sur les dispositions qu'elles peuvent rendre nécessaires de notre part; et j'ai chargé M. Cochelet de déclarer au Vice-Roi, dans les termes les plus formels, qu'alors même qu'il arracherait à la détresse de la Porte des conditions incompatibles avec la dignité du Sultan, ou propres à compromettre l'avenir de l'Empire, elles n'obtiendraient pas l'assentiment des Puissances Européennes, si nécessaire cependant pour donner quelque valeur et quelque solidité à un tel arrangement.

C'est assez vous dire, M. le Baron, que le Gouvernement du Roi persiste dans les vues que vous y avez trouvées;—que la Porte ne se hâte pas de conclure avec Méhémet Ali; qu'elle ne fasse rien surtout sans le concours de ses Alliés: tels sont les conseils que vous ne devez pas cesser de lui faire entendre, les seuls qui se concilient avec ses intérêts évidens; et il lui sera d'autant plus facile de les suivre, que le Vice-Roi, au milieu de toutes ses exigences, annonce pourtant l'intention de ne pas les appuyer par la force des armes. Rien n'oblige donc les Ministres du Sultan à se hâter.

Je vous ai transmis par le dernier paquebot, la réponse de l'Angleterre à notre déclaration en faveur de l'indépendance et de l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman. Celle de l'Autriche m'est parvenue depuis: elle est également satisfaisante.

Les Trois Cours sont unanimes à proclamer la nécessité d'un concert

Européen pour régler les affaires de l'Orient. La Russie seule, qui avait d'abord paru admettre la convenance de ce concert, cherche maintenant à éluder, sous des prétextes plus ou moins spécieux, les conséquences du principe qu'elle n'ose pas contester directement. Un *statu quo* dépourvu de sanction, exposé par conséquent à de nouvelles et promptes vicissitudes, c'est incontestablement ce qui lui convient le mieux dans l'Orient. Il se pourrait donc qu'un arrangement direct entre la Porte et Méhémet Ali entrât dans ses vues; que loin de le contrarier, elle y donnât secrètement la main; et s'il était vrai, comme quelques indices donnent lieu de le supposer, que Nouri Effendi se fut rallié à la politique du Cabinet de St.-Pétersbourg, il y aurait lieu de concevoir des inquiétudes dans ce sens. Je ne doute pas que vous n'y veilliez avec soin.

Veuillez aussi ne pas perdre un moment de vue l'attitude militaire et navale de la Russie, du côté de la Mer Noire. Dans le cas où les mouvemens que vous remarqueriez vous paraitraient indiquer un projet de se porter sur Constantinople, vous en donneriez sur le champ avis à M. l'Amiral Lalande qui viendrait aussi prendre position à Ténédos avec son escadre, pour être prêt à franchir le détroit des Dardanelles, si les Russes arrivaient dans le Bosphore.

Vienne étant en ce moment le point central des négociations auxquelles donne lieu la Question d'Orient, comme aussi le lieu où l'on est le plus promptement informé de l'ensemble des circonstances qui peuvent en modifier la marche, le Cabinet Britannique a autorisé d'une part Lord Beauvale à donner à Lord Ponsonby les informations et les avis propres à le diriger utilement, et de l'autre, a prescrit à ce dernier Ambassadeur de se conformer aux directions qu'il recevra de son Collègue. Vous voudrez bien, M. le Baron, avoir égard également aux communications de M. le Comte St. Aulaire, qui a ordre de suivre avec vous une correspondance régulière.

Veuillez agréer, &c.,
(Signé) MARECHAL DUC DE DALMATIE.

(Translation.)

The Duc de Dalmatie to Baron Roussin.—(Communicated by the Baron de Bourqueney.)

Monsieur le Baron, *Paris, August* 7, 1839.

SINCE the last despatch which I addressed to you, we have received intelligence of the entry of the Turkish Fleet into the Port of Alexandria, of the refusal of Mehemet Ali to agree to the propositions of the Porte, and of the exorbitant conditions he now proposes for an arrangement. I need not inform you that neither France nor the other Powers can approve of such exactions. We are at this present moment concerting with the Cabinet of London on the measures that these proceedings will render it necessary for us to take; and I have instructed M. Cochelet to declare to the Viceroy in the most formal manner, that even if he were to extort from the exigencies of the Porte, conditions incompatible with the dignity of the Sultan, or that would compromise the future existence of the Empire, yet those conditions would never receive the sancton of the European Powers, which is so requisite for giving weight and solidity to any such arrangement.

It is sufficient to say, M. le Baron, that the King's Government continue to entertain the views which you have found set forth in that despatch. Let the Porte be in no hurry to conclude an arrangement with Mehemet Ali; above all, let it do nothing without the concurrence of the Allies. Such are the counsels you ought not to cease to press upon the Porte, the only counsels reconcileable with its true interests; and it will be the easier for it to follow them, since the Viceroy, amidst all his exactions, announces nevertheless his intention not to support them by force of arms. There is therefore no necessity for haste on the part of the Sultan's Ministers.

I transmitted to you by the last packet, the answer of Great Britain to our declaration in favour of the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. The answer of Austria has since reached me, it is equally satisfactory.

The Three Courts are unanimous in proclaiming the necessity of a European Concert for settling the affairs of the East. Russia alone, who had at first

appeared to admit the expediency of such a concert, now endeavours, upon pretexts more or less specious, to elude the consequences of a principle she dare not openly contest. A *status quo*, destitute of sanction, and on that account exposed to fresh and sudden vicissitude, is incontestably that which best suits the purposes of Russia in the Levant. It might therefore so happen, that a direct arrangement between the Porte and Mehemet Ali would be in conformity with her views; that so far from interposing to prevent it, she might secretly promote it; and if it were true, as some indications would lead one to suppose, that Nouri Effendi has come round to the policy of the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, there would be some grounds for apprehension on this score. I have no doubt that you will carefully direct your attention to this subject.

Also, do not for a moment lose sight of the military and naval attitude of Russia in the Black Sea. In case of any movements on their part, appearing to you as indicating an intention to advance upon Constantinople, you will instantly communicate the intelligence to Admiral Lalande, who will take up a position with his squadron at Tenedos, to be ready to pass through the Straits of the Dardanelles, should the Russians enter the Bosphorus.

Vienna being at this moment the central point of the negotiations arising out of the Eastern Question, and being also the place where the first intelligence will be received of all the circumstances which may modify the course of these negotiations, the British Cabinet has on the one hand authorized Lord Beauvale to give to Lord Ponsonby all the information and intelligence that may be useful for his guidance; and, on the other, has enjoined this latter Ambassador to conform to the instructions he may receive from his Colleague. You will have the goodness, M. le Baron, to pay equal attention to the communications of the Count St. Aulaire, who is instructed to maintain a regular correspondence with you.

Accept, &c.,
(Signed) MARECHAL DUC DE DALMATIE.

No. 221.

The Duc de Dalmatie to Amiral Duperré.—(Communicated by the Baron de Bourqueney.)

Monsieur l'Amiral et cher Collègue, *Paris, le* 13 *Août*, 1839.

LES évènemens qui ont mis la flotte Turque au pouvoir du Vice-Roi d'Egypte ayant déterminé le Gouvernement du Roi et celui de Sa Majesté Britannique à se concerter sur les mesures à prendre pour prévenir les graves et fâcheuses conséquences qui pourraient en résulter, je dois vous donner connaissance des déterminations auxquelles ils se sont arrêtés, afin que vous puissiez en informer M. l'Amiral Lalande, et le mettre en mesure de concourir, en ce qui le concerne, à l'exécution du plan convenu entre les deux Cours.

Les Consuls-Généraux de France et d'Angleterre demanderont, de nouveau, formellement à Méhémet Ali, la restitution ou le renvoi des bâtimens appartenant à la Porte. Dans le cas où il s'y refuserait, ils lui annonceront que désormais les escadres combinées ont pour mission spéciale de protéger la portion de l'Empire Ottoman qui relève directement de Sa Hautesse contre toute agression patente ou déguisée dont elle serait l'objet de la part des forces navales Egyptiennes.

Pour appuyer la demande des Consuls-Généraux et prendre éventuellement l'attitude que rendrait nécessaire le refus du Vice-Roi, les Amiraux se concerteront entre eux soit pour se rendre eux-mêmes devant Alexandrie avec le nombre de bâtimens qui leur paraitra convenable, soit pour y envoyer seulement une force suffisante, suivant ce qui passera à Constantinople, et qu'ils jugeront la présence de tous les deux, ou de l'un d'eux, nécessaire aux Dardanelles. En tout cas, ils prendront, selon les circonstances, les dispositions nécessaires dans le but de surveiller la flotte Egyptienne, de suivre et au besoin de contenir tous ses mouvemens, de l'isoler de la flotte Ottomane, et aussi, autant que possible, de couper toute communication entre le port d'Alexandrie et les vaisseaux Turcs, en évitant toutefois de faire naître l'occasion d'un conflit que ni les uns ni les autres ne rechercheront certainement.

Les Amiraux se mettront de plus en rapport avec les Capitaines des bâtimens

Turcs. Comme il parait qu'un des motifs qui ont décidé ces derniers à se placer sous la protection du Vice-Roi, c'est l'opinion erronée répandue parmi eux, que le Ministère du nouveau Sultan se proposait de livrer la flotte à la Russie, les Amiraux leur expliqueront la fausseté de ce bruit; ils emploieront tous les argumens possibles pour les faire rentrer sous l'autorité de leur Souverain; ils leur feront remarquer que la France et l'Angleterre, qui leur donnent ce conseil, sont, de toutes les Puissances, les plus intéressées à l'intégrité et l'indépendance de l'Empire Ottoman; et ils ne leur cacheront pas que les escadres alliées s'opposeraient par la force à toute entreprise dirigée contre l'autorité du Sultan; ils leur offriront enfin de s'interposer pour leur faire obtenir du Gouvernement de la Porte toutes les garanties qu'ils croiraient devoir exiger pour leur sûreté personnelle avant de rentrer dans l'obéissance.

A cet effet et en général, s'il y avait lieu de croire que quelque communication directe avec le Gouvernement Turc pût faciliter un arrangement à l'amiable, les Amiraux n'hésiteraient pas à envoyer à Constantinople un, ou successivement plusieurs bâtimens légers; mais pendant le cours de la négociation, ils se tiendront auprès de la flotte Ottomane et la suivront partout où elle pourra se diriger, de manière à rester maîtres de ses mouvemens. Si même, avant d'avoir fait sa soumission au Sultan, elle voulait se rendre dans un port Turc quelconque en dehors des Dardanelles, soit à Rhodes, soit à Marmorice, il n'y aurait pas de raison pour s'y opposer. Le principe que les Amiraux ne devront jamais perdre de vue, c'est que le but des Gouvernemens alliés étant de rendre au Sultan la flotte Ottomane, et non de la détruire, le seul cas où il y aurait lieu d'employer la force contre elle ou contre la flotte Egyptienne, ce serait que l'une ou l'autre de ces deux flottes en vînt à des hostilités positives contre son Souverain le Sultan, ou contre les territoires qui relèvent directement de Sa Hautesse.

Si la flotte Ottomane était entrée dans le port d'Alexandrie, et que Méhémet Ali se refusât à la rendre à son Souverain ou à la laisser sortir pour la destination indiquée, les Amiraux se borneraient à laisser des bâtimens pour l'observer, en tel nombre qu'ils jugeront convenable.

Je vous disais tout-à-l'heure, Monsieur l'Amiral et cher Collègue, que les Commandans de l'Escadre devaient se faire suivre sur la côte d'Egypte par les forces nécessaires au succès de leur mission. Il me semble d'ailleurs évident que tout en réunissant sur ce point un nombre de vaisseaux propre à suffire très largement à toutes les éventualités, ils peuvent laisser sur la côte de l'Asie Mineure assez de bâtimens pour surveiller aussi, avec toute l'efficacité désirable, ce qui se passera de ce côté, et obtenir dans les cas prévus, c'est-à-dire si les Russes se présentaient à Constantinople, ou si les escadres alliées étaient appelées par le Sultan, la libre entrée de la Mer de Marmara. Il ne faut pas oublier qu'après tout, c'est là la question principale, et par conséquent que de ce côté l'observation doit être incessante.

Soyez assez bon, Monsieur l'Amiral, pour me communiquer les instructions que vous croirez devoir adresser à M. l'Amiral Lalande par suite des résolutions dont je viens de vous faire part.

Agréez, &c.,

(Signé) MARECHAL DUC DE DALMATIE.

(Translation.)

The Duc de Dalmatie to Admiral Duperré.—(Communicated by the Baron de Bourqueney.)

Monsieur l'Amiral and Dear Colleague, *Paris, August* 13, 1839.

THE events which have placed the Turkish fleet in the power of the Viceroy of Egypt, having determined the Government of the King and that of Her Britannic Majesty to concert upon the measures to be taken, with a view to prevent the serious and untoward consequences which might result from them, I have to inform you of the determinations at which they have arrived, in order that you may communicate them to Admiral Lalande, and enable him to assist, as far as concerns him, in the execution of the plan agreed upon between the two Courts.

The Consuls-General of France and England will again formally demand of Mehemet Ali, the restitution or the return of the vessels belonging to the Porte. In the case of his refusal, they will announce to him, that thenceforward the combined squadrons are specifically appointed to protect that portion of the Ottoman Empire which depends immediately upon the Sultan, against every aggression, whether overt or concealed, which may be the object of the Egyptian naval forces.

In order to support the demand of the Consuls-General, and eventually to assume the attitude which the refusal of the Viceroy may render necessary, the Admirals will concert between them, as to whether they should themselves repair to Alexandria with the number of vessels which may appear to them to be necessary, or whether they should only send there a sufficient force; according to what shall occur at Constantinople, and according as they shall judge the presence of both or of one of them to be required at the Dardanelles. In any case, they will make, according to circumstances, the necessary arrangements, with a view to watch the Egyptian fleet, to follow, and, if necessary, to controul all its movements, to separate it from the Ottoman fleet, and also, as much as possible, to cut off all communication between the Port of Alexandria and the Turkish vessels, avoiding nevertheless to give any opportunity for a conflict, which certainly neither the one party nor the other will seek for.

The Admirals, moreover, will place themselves in communication with the Captains of the Turkish vessels. As it appears that one of the motives which have decided the latter to place themselves under the protection of the Viceroy, is an erroneous opinion current amongst them, that the Ministry of the new Sultan intended to deliver up the fleet to Russia, the Admirals will explain to them the falsity of this report: they will employ all the arguments possible to bring them again under the authority of their Sovereign: they will point out to them that France and England, who give them this advice, are, of all the Powers, those most interested in the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire; and they will not conceal from them, that the Allied squadrons will oppose by force every enterprise directed against the authority of the Sultan; and, finally, they will make them the offer of their interposition, to obtain for them, from the Government of the Porte, all the guarantees which they may think proper to require for their personal security, before returning to their obedience.

For this purpose, and as a general rule, if there should be reason to think that any direct communication with the Turkish Government would facilitate an amicable arrangement, the Admirals will not hesitate to despatch one vessel, or several light vessels in succession, to Constantinople; but, during the course of the negotiation, they will keep near the Ottoman fleet, and will follow it whithersoever it may proceed, so as to remain masters of its movements. If, even before having made its submission to the Sultan, it should wish to proceed to any Turkish port whatever without the Dardanelles, either to Rhodes or to Marmorice, there would be no reason for opposing it. The principle which the Admirals should never lose sight of is, that the object of the Allied Governments being to restore the Ottoman fleet to the Sultan, and not to destroy it, the only case in which force should be employed against it, or against the Egyptian fleet, would be that, wherein either one or the other of these two fleets should commit actual hostilities against their Sovereign the Sultan, or against the territories which depend directly upon His Highness.

If the Ottoman fleet should have entered the port of Alexandria and Mehemet Ali should refuse to restore it to his Sovereign, or to allow it to go out for the destination already mentioned, the Admirals should confine themselves to leaving some vessels, in such number as they may think fit, to observe it.

I have already stated to you, M. l'Amiral and dear Colleague, that the Commanders of the squadron should cause sufficient forces, for the successful execution of the service, to follow them to the coast of Egypt. It appears to me, indeed, evident, that while they unite in this point a number of vessels amply sufficient to provide for every contingency, they will be able to leave a sufficient number of vessels on the coast of Asia Minor to observe with proper efficiency what may pass on that coast, and to obtain, in the case anticipated, that is to say, if the Russians should appear at Constantinople, or if the Allied squadrons should be summoned by the Sultan, the free entrance into the Sea of Marmora. It must not be forgotten that this, after all, is the principal question, and that, consequently, watchfulness on this point should be incessant.

Be good enough, Monsieur l'Amiral, to communicate to me the instructions which you may think necessary to address to Admiral Lalande, in consequence of the resolutions of which I have just informed you.

Receive, &c.,
(Signed) MARECHAL DUC DE DALMATIE.

No. 222.

Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, August* 15, 1839.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch, of the 30th of July, inclosing a copy of the declaration which your Excellency had addressed on the 27th to the Austrian Government, upon the subject of the policy of Great Britain with respect to the affairs of the Levant, I have to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve of that declaration.

Her Majesty's Government likewise approve of your having sent copies of this declaration, and of Prince Metternich's answer, to Lord Ponsonby, as reported in your despatch, of the 30th ultimo.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 223.

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, August* 16, 1839.

I HAVE to instruct your Excellency to draw the attention of the French Government to the fact, that the confidential communications which have recently been going on between the British and French Cabinets, upon the subject of the orders to be given to the two squadrons in the Mediterranean, in consequence of the defection of the Turkish fleet and its reception by Mehemet Ali, have, by some means or other, been made known to the French newspapers: that this has happened while the matter in question was still undetermined between the two Governments; and that the communication made to the French papers has by the parties to whom it was made, been converted into a handle for misrepresentation, and for hostile and unfounded attacks against Great Britain.

Her Majesty's Government think it only necessary to observe, that serious inconveniences must arise from such breaches of official confidence, and that such premature disclosures of negotiations between the two Governments, must tend to render difficult any combined and concerted action between them.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 224.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 17.)

My Lord, *Therapia, July* 27, 1839.

THE Minister of Justice, Hadji Saib Effendi, is on the point of being sent to the Pasha of Egypt with instructions, which are to be decided upon, to-morrow, at a Great Council. Saib Effendi is to sail in a Turkish steam-boat the day after to-morrow, at the latest. The Porte has promised me a copy of these instructions. I have been assured that their nature has not yet been determined upon; but the Porte may only wish to conceal it from me until they are actually off.

Ibrahim Pasha is advancing on Asia Minor. Maggiun Aga, one of the officers who command the Egyptian van-guard, has written to the Governor of Sverick, a letter (which the latter transmitted to the Porte, and which the Chief Dragoman has seen) which says:—"His Highness the Generalissimo Ibrahim, having confided to me the Government of Orfa, Diarbekir, and Harpout, I am repairing thither with a considerable body of troops. On the receipt of this letter you will lose no time in finding and sending to me 600 camel-loads of barley, &c."

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 225.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received August* 17.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, July* 26, 1839.

I EXPECT that, long before this arrives in London, the settlement between Mehemet Ali and the Porte will have been made. The answer to be given to-morrow to the demands of the Pasha of Egypt may not be satisfactory to him: but I think that either the Pasha will insist upon his demands, and the Porte will yield to them; or the Pasha will take what is offered, and defer exacting the full measure until after he shall have completely established his authority in Constantinople, which he will do with very little delay. Perhaps this latter mode of acting may be the best for him; because the proceeding can be so managed that the grant will have the air and the form of an act springing spontaneously from the Porte; and as such it will be less subject to the criticism of foreign Governments. I consider the Ottoman Empire to be delivered over to Mehemet Ali.

In the absence of instructions to direct my conduct, I remain passive, after having taken those steps (reported in my late despatches) which were intended to delay any settlement that should not be in concurrence with the interests and counsels of England and France.

Her Majesty's Government has learned from Colonel Campbell the demands made by Mehemet Ali. I am informed, and I think correctly in substance, that the answer to be given by the Porte is, "The hereditary government of Egypt to be granted to Mehemet Ali, and the government of Syria to be granted to Ibrahim Pasha till the death of Mehemet Ali, when the government of Syria is to be again at the disposal of the Porte."

This answer given by the Porte would be inconsistent with the promises made to me by the Grand Vizier.

No. 226.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received August* 17.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, July* 29, 1839.

I INCLOSE copy of a Collective Note signed by the Representatives of Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, and myself, on the 27th instant.

The Note was yesterday presented by the Dragomans of the Five Powers to the Sublime Porte, and cheerfully and gratefully received by the Grand Vizier, on the 28th. I inclose Dragoman Pisani's report to me of what took place on that occasion.

Baron Stürmer received Prince Metternich's instructions on the morning of the 27th, and the Note, signed, was ready in the evening. I beg leave to express with all humility my approbation of the activity and promptitude with which the Baron acted; and I consider the measure to be the most salutary step that could have been taken. It was also most fortunately well-timed, for the Ottoman

Ministers had actually resolved upon concessions to the Egyptian Pasha, which would have been at this moment on their way to Alexandria, and which would have mischievously complicated the affairs of this country. This measure has given force and courage to the Grand Vizier to resist the Pasha, and to maintain the rights and interests of the Sultan. It will also, I think, insure the tranquillity of the Capital, and the security, therefore, of the foreign and Christian populations and inhabitants. It opens the road for all that may be considered right to be done by Her Majesty's Government. It has placed Her Majesty's Government in a position that enables it to secure the future integrity and independence of Turkey.

I fear the state of Asia Minor is very unsatisfactory, but it is natural that it should be so after the late events. It is not to be imagined that Mehemet Ali will neglect any means in his power to augment disorder everywhere, but he is himself the source of all the dangers and difficulties, and if he be forced to desist from pursuit of his ambitious plans, order will be easily restored. If Her Majesty's Government will secure Constantinople against all attack, there will be no just cause for alarm from anything that can be done to disturb the peace, or alter the balance of power in Europe; but if that main object be neglected, there must be, eventually, a complete failure of all that is attempted to preserve the common interests, and to escape a war at some future, and probably not distant, period.

P. S.—I inclose a translated copy of the Pasha of Egypt's letter to the Grand Vizier.

Inclosure 1 in No. 226.

Collective Note of the Five Powers.

Constantinople, ce 27 *Juillet,* 1839.

LES Soussignés ont reçu ce matin de leurs Gouvernemens respectifs des instructions, en vertu desquelles ils ont l'honneur d'informer la Sublime Porte, que l'accord sur la Question d'Orient est assuré entre les Cinq Grandes Puissances, et de l'engager à suspendre toute détermination définitive sans leur concours, en attendant l'effet de l'intérêt qu'elles lui portent.

(Signé) PONSONBY,
Ambassadeur d'Angleterre.

BARON DE STURMER,
Internonce d'Autriche.

COMTE KONIGSMARCK,
Ministre de Prusse.

BARON ROUSSIN,
Ambassadeur de France.
A. BOUTENEFF,
Ministre de Russie.

(Translation.)

Collective Note of the Five Powers.

Constantinople, July 27, 1839.

THE Undersigned have received, this morning, from their respective Governments instructions, in virtue whereof they have the honour to inform the Sublime Porte, that agreement among the Five Great Powers on the Question of

the East is secured, and to invite it to suspend any definitive resolution without their concurrence, waiting for the effect of the interest which those Powers feel for it.

(Signed) PONSONBY,
Ambassador of England.
BARON DE STURMER,
Internuncio of Austria.
COUNT KONIGSMARCK,
Minister of Prussia.
BARON ROUSSIN,
Ambassador of France.
A. BOUTENEFF.
Minister of Russia.

Inclosure 2 in No. 226.

M. Frederic Pisani to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Péra, ce* 28 *Juillet,* 1839.

JE m'empresse de rendre compte à Votre Excellence du résultat de la mission dont mes Collègues les Premiers Drogmans de France, d'Autriche, de Prusse, et de Russie, et moi, avons été chargés auprès de Son Excellence le Moustéchar Nouri Effendi, résultat, comme Votre Excellence va voir, extrêmement satisfaisant.

Nous avons remis la Note Collective signée hier par leurs Excellences les Représentans des Grandes Puissances, et relative à la Question d'Orient, au Moustéchar, à qui nous avons, en même tems, présenté une traduction Turque de la susdite Note. Le Moustéchar ayant lu la Note, a fait quelques observations qui dénotaient qu'il en était très-satisfait, et il est allé la faire voir au Grand Vizir, qui n'a pas tardé à nous faire chercher.

Nous avons trouvé Son Altesse avec les Moustéchars Nouri Effendi et Sarim Effendi. Son Altesse a parlé dans les termes les plus obligeans des offres bienveillantes des Grandes Puissances, et de leurs excellentes dispositions envers la Porte. Nous avons assuré les Ministres que les Grandes Puissances, extrêmement intéressées à la Question d'Orient, sont résolues de la terminer, tout en consultant la dignité de la Sublime Porte et l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman. Les Ministres ont été on ne peut plus satisfaits de ce que nous venions de leur dire, et le Grand Vizir, surtout, en a exprimé toute sa reconnaissance, en disant: "Voilà, en effet, comment des Gouvernemens doivent en agir envers les autres Gouvernemens." Après quoi, Son Altesse nous a dit que la notification que nous venions de faire à la Sublime Porte par une Note Officielle revêtue des signatures des Représentans des Cinq Grandes Puissances, ne laissait plus aucun lieu à envoyer Saïb Effendi à Alexandrie; mais qu'attendu qu'il faut une réplique à la réponse de Méhémet Ali, envoyée par le canal d'Akiff Effendi, elle va lui écrire, qu'aussitôt après l'arrivée d'Akiff Effendi à Constantinople, la Sublime Porte s'est occupée de cette affaire, et qu'elle était à la veille de prendre une détermination, mais que MM. les Interprètes des Cinq Grandes Puissances se sont présentés à la Porte avec une Note Officielle, pour l'engager, au nom de MM. les Représentans de ces Puissances, de ne prendre aucune détermination sans leur concours, ce à quoi Elle a dû adhérer pour ne pas manquer aux égards qu'exige d'Elle la sollicitude témoignée ainsi par les Grandes Puissances.

Le Grand Vizir nous a chargés, my Lord, de prier nos Ministres respectifs d'écrire des lettres analogues aux Consuls à Alexandrie; et nous avons assuré Son Altesse que MM. les Représentans s'empresseront d'écrire dans le même sens à MM. les Consuls.

Le Grand Vizir et les deux Moustéchars ont décidé, comme mesure très-convenable, que la lettre de Son Altesse sera portée à Méhémet Ali par le Capi Kiaja, c'est-à-dire l'Agent de ce Pacha près la Porte, qui fera le voyage dans un bateau à vapeur de la Marine Ottomane, lequel devra partir après-demain; et Son Altesse a exprimé le désir que, de la même manière que le Capi Kiaia doit remettre la lettre Viziriale à Méhémet Ali, une personne au choix de MM. les

Représentans soit destinée à se rendre à Alexandrie par la même occasion, chargée des dépêches de leurs Excellences pour les Consuls.

Nous avons promis au Grand Vizir de porter fidèlement à la connaissance de nos Ministres respectifs tout ce que Son Altesse venait de nous dire, et nous nous sommes retirés.

Je suis, &c.,
(Signé) FREDERIC PISANI.

(Translation.)

M. Frederic Pisani to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Pera, July* 28, 1839.

I HASTEN to give your Excellency an account of the mission to his Excellency the Moustechar Nouri Effendi, with which my Colleagues, the Dragomans of France, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, and myself were entrusted, —a result, as your Excellency will see, extremely satisfactory.

We delivered to the Moustechar the Collective Note relative to the Eastern Question, signed yesterday by their Excellencies the Representatives of the Great Powers; presenting him, at the same time, with a Turkish translation of the said Note. The Moustechar having read the Note, made some observations which showed that he was very well satisfied with it, and he went to show it to the Grand Vizier, who presently sent for us.

We found His Highness with the Moustechars Nouri Effendi and Sarim Effendi. His Highness spoke in the most obliging terms of the kind offers of the Great Powers, and of their excellent dispositions towards the Porte. We assured the Ministers that the Great Powers, being deeply interested in the Eastern Question, are resolved to bring it to a conclusion, having respect, at the same time, for the dignity of the Sublime Porte, and for the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. It was impossible for the Ministers to be better satisfied than they were with what we had said to them, and the Grand Vizier especially expressed all his gratitude, saying, "See, in truth, how Governments ought to act towards other Governments." Afterwards His Highness said to us that the notification which we had just made to the Sublime Porte by an Official Note, signed by the Representatives of the Five Great Powers, rendered it no longer necessary to send Said Effendi to Alexandria; but that as it was necessary to make some reply to the answer of Mehemet Ali, sent by Akiff Effendi, he would write to him, that immediately after the arrival of Akiff Effendi at Constantinople, the Sublime Porte had occupied itself with this affair, and was on the eve of taking a decision thereupon; but that the Interpreters of the Five Great Powers presented themselves to the Porte with an Official Note, inviting it, in the name of the Representatives of those Powers, not to take any resolution without their concurrence, to which the Porte could not but assent, in order not to be wanting in the consideration which the solicitude thus evinced by the Great Powers requires of it.

The Grand Vizier commissioned us, my Lord, to request our respective Ministers to write corresponding letters to the Consuls at Alexandria; and we assured His Highness, that the Representatives would readily write to the same effect to the Consuls.

The Grand Vizier and the two Moustechars have decided, as a very proper course, that His Highness' letter should be conveyed to Mehemet Ali by the Capi Kiaja; that is to say, the Agent of that Pasha at the Porte, who will make the voyage in a steam-vessel of the Ottoman Navy, which will start the day after to-morrow; and His Highness expressed a desire, that in the same way as the Capi Kiaja is to deliver the Vizirial letter to Mehemet Ali, so a person selected by the Representatives should be appointed to proceed to Alexandria by the same opportunity, with their Excellencies' despatches to the Consuls.

We promised the Grand Vizier faithfully to make known to our respective Ministers everything that His Highness had said to us, and we withdrew.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) FREDERIC PISANI.

Inclosure 3 in No. 226.

Mehemet Ali to the Grand Vizier.

(Traduction.)

J'AI reçu la lettre que Votre Altesse m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire pour me faire savoir que par suite de la mort dont, par l'ordre du destin, une tête auguste vient d'être frappée, Sultan Abdoul Medjid, notre Seigneur et Maître, a succédé au Trône Impérial; qu'en même tems que Sa Hautesse a bien voulu m'offrir mon pardon, Elle m'a aussi destiné une décoration semblable à celles des autres illustres Vizirs; que l'Egypte m'est donnée pour être gouvernée par ma famille et pour droit d'hérédité; que Votre Altesse a envoyé à Son Excellence Hafiz Pacha, Généralissime de l'Orient, de faire faire halte à l'Armée Impériale; qu'attendu la position délicate dans laquelle la Sublime Porte se trouve, il est devenu nécessaire que la Nation Musulmane soit unie par tous les liens possibles, et que l'on fasse disparaître cette désunion qui l'afflige; et que le Secrétaire du Conseil de la Porte, Son Excellence Akiff Effendi, a été expédié ici pour entrer dans les détails sur la manière d'établir la sûreté réciproque qui dépend de l'union entre les deux parties.

Que le ciel daigne conserver notre Padishah et bienfaiteur sur le trône, et lui accorder ses faveurs divines: tels sont les vœux que je ne cesse de faire.

Après la bataille qui s'est livrée, comme on sait, dans les plaines de Nézib, avec le Généralissime de l'Orient, j'ai écrit à mon fils Ibrahim Pacha, que s'il a déjà passé sur la rive droite de l'Euphrate, il eut à repasser ce fleuve sans délai.

Votre Altesse sait sans doute, comme tout le monde le sait aussi, que quant à moi rien ne saurait m'être plus agréable que de voir se réaliser un moment plus tôt cette union et cette bonne intelligence dont Votre Altesse parle, afin que, suivant mon ancien usage, je recommence à rendre des services à la Sublime Porte et à lui donner de nouveaux témoignages de mon dévouement. Mais lorsque sous le règne du Sultan défunt, Sarim Effendi, alors Beylikgi de la Chancellerie Impériale, vint ici chargé d'une mission, il m'annonça que Sa Hautesse allait me conférer à perpétuité le gouvernement de toute l'Egypte, et ceux de la province de Seyda et du Sandjack de Tripoli de Syrie. Votre Altesse n'ignore pas que considérant mes services passés, je n'ai pas accepté les offres qui m'étaient faites, et que j'ai prié que toutes les provinces et tous les Sandjacks qui se trouvaient déjà soumis à mon Gouvernement me fussent donnés à perpétuité à moi, et après moi, à mes fils et petits-fils.

Sans parler ici de nos anciennes liaisons d'amitié, et de nos relations, qui ne cesseront jamais, j'aime à croire que réfléchissant, d'après l'intelligence des affaires et la perspicacité que vous caractérisent, sur la position délicate de la Sublime Porte, sur la sincérité de mes sentimens, et sur les avantages d'assurer la tranquillité de la Nation Musulmane, Votre Altesse agira envers moi d'une manière analogue aux circonstances actuelles, amenées par les décrets du Ciel.

La lettre que Votre Altesse m'a écrite parle seulement de l'Egypte: elle ne fait aucune allusion aux autres choses, et je vois clairement par les discours d'Akiff Effendi, qu'il n'a aucune mission, aucune autorisation relativement à ma demande, savoir, que toutes les Provinces et tous les Sandjacks me soient donnés à perpétuité. Ainsi il a été jugé qu'il était inutile pour lui de rester ici, et que plutôt que d'entrer en correspondance avec la Sublime Porte, il valait mieux qu'il s'en retournât pour faire connaître à Votre Altesse, de vive voix, mes sentimens; et c'est ce qui j'ai l'honneur de vous faire savoir par cette lettre.

Le 5 *Djemazi-ul-evel*, 1255.—(16 *Juillet*, 1839.)

(Translation.)

Mehemet Ali to the Grand Vizier.

I HAVE received the letter which Your Highness has done me the honour to write to me, to communicate to me that, in consequence of the death by which, agreeably to destiny, an August personage has been stricken, Sultan Abdul

Medjid, our Lord and Master, has succeeded to the Imperial Throne; that at the same time that His Highness has been pleased to offer me pardon, he has also designed for me a decoration similar to that of the other illustrious Viziers; that Egypt is given me to be governed by my family, and by hereditary right; that Your Highness has sent to his Excellancy Hafiz Pasha, Generalissimo of the East, to cause him to halt the Imperial Army; that considering the delicate situation in which the Sublime Porte is placed, it has become necessary that the Mussulman nation should be united by all possible ties; and that the disunion by which it is afflicted, should be made to disappear; and that the Secretary of the Council of the Porte, his Excellency Akiff Effendi, has been sent hither to enter into details upon the manner of establishing that reciprocal security which depends upon the two parties being united.

May Heaven preserve our Emperor and benefactor on the throne, and grant him its Divine favours: such are the vows which I cease not to make.

After the battle, which, as it is known, took place in the Plains of Nezib, with the Generalissimo of the East, I wrote to my son Ibrahim Pasha, that if he had already passed over to the right bank of the Euphrates, he should recross the river without delay.

Your Excellency is doubtless aware, as all the world is, that as far as I am concerned, nothing could be more agreeable to me than to behold that union and good understanding of which your Excellency speaks, realized as soon as possible, in order that, agreeably to my ancient habit, I may begin again to render services to the Sublime Porte, and to give it fresh proofs of my devotion. But when, during the reign of the late Sultan, Sarim Effendi, at that time the Beylikgi of the Imperial Chancery, came here on a mission, he announced to me that His Highness was about to confer on me in perpetuity the government of all Egypt, and those of the Province of Seyda, and of the Sandjak of Tripoli of Syria. Your Excellency is not ignorant that, in consideration of my past services, I did not accept the offers made to me, and that I requested that all the Provinces and Sandjaks which were already governed by me, should be given to me in perpetuity, and, after me, to my sons and grandsons.

Without speaking in this place of our ancient connections of friendship, and of our relations, which will never cease, I flatter myself that Your Highness, reflecting, with the knowledge of affairs, and the penetration by which you are characterised, upon the delicate position of the Sublime Porte, upon the sincerity of my sentiments, and upon the advantage of securing the tranquillity of the Mussulman nation, will act towards me in a manner consistent with existing circumstances, which have been brought on by the decrees of Heaven.

The letter which Your Highness has written to me, speaks only of Egypt; it makes no allusion to other matters, and I clearly perceive by the language of Akiff Effendi, that he has no commission, nor authority with reference to my demand, namely, that all the Provinces and all the Sandjaks should be given to me in perpetuity. Therefore it has been considered useless for him to remain here; and that, rather than that he should enter into a correspondence with the Sublime Porte, it was better that he should return to communicate my sentiments verbally to Your Highness; and that is what I have the honour to impart to you by this letter.

The 5th Djemazi-ul-evel, 1255.—*July* 16, 1839.

No. 227.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received August* 17.)

My Lord, *Therapia, July* 29, 1839.

I INCLOSE copy of my letter to Her Majesty's Agent and Consul-General at Alexandria, transmitting a copy of the Collective Note of the 27th instant.

The French Ambassador had written to the French Consul-General a letter, and Baron Stürmer had expressed his own notion, and that of the Ministers of Prussia and Russia, that some efforts should be made by us all to obtain the restoration of the Ottoman Fleet. I wrote to Baron Stürmer a note, of which I inclose copy, and stated to Admiral Roussin my opinion, that the Collective Note having been agreed to by the Porte, it was not competent to us to make any arrangements without further instructions from our Governments, in whose hands the affair was now entirely placed; that therefore I could not approve of any proposition being made to Mehemet Ali, and had confined myself to the simple notification of the fact of the Collective Note, and the adhesion of the Porte to the proposal therein contained.

I think there might arise inconveniences from any step we might take in present circumstances.

In my despatch to Admiral Stopford, of which a copy is also annexed, one possible inconvenience is mentioned.

The French Ambassador admitted my view, but has acted upon his own. It was not proposed that we should write a collective nor an identic letter to the Consuls at Alexandria; and I thought myself at liberty, therefore, to act as I have done, and Her Majesty's Government thereby is wholly uncommitted.

The French Ambassador was apparently anxious to send his aide-de-camp with the despatches, to which I, for one, readily consented.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 227.

Viscount Ponsonby to Colonel Campbell.

Sir, *Therapia, July* 29, 1839.

I INCLOSE copy of a Collective Note signed by the Representatives of the Five Great Powers.

It was yesterday delivered to the Sublime Porte, and the Porte, without delay, gave its formal adhesion to the proposition therein contained.

You will acquaint the Pasha of Egypt with this fact. The Representatives of Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, have directed the Consuls-General of their respective Governments to communicate the above fact to the Pasha; and it is desired by all that the Consuls-General should act conjointly in performing what is desired of them.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 227.

Viscount Ponsonby to the Baron de Stürmer.

My dear Baron, *July* 29, 1839.

I SEND back Admiral Roussin's letter, and I send you the letter I have written to the British Consul-General.

I think it better to avoid saying one word that is not absolutely necessary for making known the fact. I have no authority from my Government to take any measures for effecting any arrangement between the Porte and the Pasha; and our act of the 27th instant has placed the arrangement entirely in the hands of the Great Powers themselves, and our Governments are alone competent to act now. The Porte has acceded to what we proposed. I think it proper to avoid committing my Government; and therefore I say nothing about the restitution of the fleet. I do not like to reduce my Government, in communication with Mehemet Ali, to a level with the Pasha. I cannot treat him as I should treat the Sultan; and it seems to me sufficient to cause the fact of our proceedings here to be notified to him. I offer him no advice. I am not Ambassador near the Pasha of Egypt. You will perceive that I have not the least fault to find with Admiral Roussin's letter. It is not a collective act we have to perform, excepting in so far as the sending officially the copy of our Collective Note to the Porte, and notifying the acceptance by the Sublime Porte of the proposition contained therein.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 3 in No. 227.

Viscount Ponsonby to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford.

Sir, *Therapia, July* 29, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for your information, a copy of a Collective Official Note, signed by the Ministers of the Five Great Powers, which was yesterday presented to the Sublime Porte, and received by the Ottoman Ministers with the highest satisfaction.

It appears to me that, in accordance with your instructions, the paramount object of Her Majesty's Government is to prevent a collision between the Porte and the Pasha of Egypt; and I presume that the act done by the Great Powers, as now reported to you, is to be considered as an additional reason for the adoption of every measure that may tend to prevent any attack being made by the Egyptians upon the Sultan.

It would be rash to assume that Mehemet Ali may not be induced, by what has now been done, to make attempts to overthrow the Government of this country; and it is possible that he may have recourse to some means that may be furnished him by the Ottoman fleet: for instance, he might at once send back that fleet, having secured for himself the attachment of the officers commanding it, which it is certain he has attempted to do, if not succeeded in effecting; and the fleet, in that case, might be employed at Constantinople to overawe the Sultan, and change the Government, so as to establish in authority men devoted to the party and the views of Mehemet Ali. I should think it may be a question as to the expediency of allowing the Ottoman fleet to come up to Constantinople, before the Grand Vizier shall have had knowledge of the situation of things in it, and time to take such measures as he may think proper. I will communicate with the Grand Vizier on this point, and report to you upon it.

There is another contingency worthy of consideration, namely, the possibility, some say the probability, that Ibrahim Pasha may advance with his army to menace the capital. If that were to happen, it might be considered proper for Her Majesty's servants to offer and give all the protection and support possible to the Sultan and his Government; and I think it would be easily in the power of Her Majesty's servants to secure the capital against all attack from without, and from almost every chance of domestic tumult, and the efforts of the partizans of Mehemet Ali to produce revolution.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 228.

The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 19.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, August* 10, 1839.

THE departure of the steam-boat allows me barely time to inform your Lordship of a conversation which I have just had with Count Nesselrode. His Excellency sent for me to let me know the intelligence he had just received from Constantinople and Alexandria. And as it appeared to us possible that this despatch might reach your Lordship as soon as any news of the same date from Egypt, his Excellency permitted me to take the copies of reports of two interviews between the Pasha of Egypt and the Consuls-General of the Four Powers at Alexandria, and between the Pasha and the Consul-General of Austria, which I have the honour to inclose.

Count Nesselrode told me that his accounts from Constantinople, up to the

30th of July, stated that that capital enjoyed perfect quiet, and the rumours we had heard of revolts in the Turkish provinces had not been confirmed.

His Excellency expressed his surprise and regret that Achmet Pasha should not have been met, and stopped by our Admiral before he reached Alexandria, and that the French Admiral Lalande had allowed him to pass with the Turkish fleet unopposed.

Count Nesselrode asked me if I supposed my Government would persist in maintaining the conditions we had proposed, of a definitive settlement of the differences between the Porte and Mehemet Ali, in the altered condition of their affairs, and of the tone of the Pasha.

I replied, that Her Majesty's Government did not see that the recent events that had occurred necessitated any other change in the views and conduct of the Five Great Powers, than an increase of vigour and promptitude in their interposition to uphold the Turkish Empire.

Count Nesselrode assured me of his readiness to concur in that view; but his Excellency added, that it remained to consider by what steps it should be supported, provided, as appeared probable, our diplomatic exertions at Alexandria proved fruitless.

Count Nesselrode expressed his regret that the French and English combined fleet had repaired to Tenedos instead of remaining off Alexandria.

His Excellency showed me a copy of his reply to the communication addressed by the French Government to each of the Four Powers, and proceeded to speak of the demand made by the French Ambassador at Constantinople to pass the Dardanelles. He showed me the despatch he had written to Count Medem thereupon; and he said he had no doubt that the whole of the Turkish affairs would be settled quietly and satisfactorily, provided the French fleet was kept out of the Dardanelles. He said the demand was ill-timed and ill-advised, and that he was sorry it had been made.

I reminded his Excellency that it was made only conditional upon one contingent, which appeared very unlikely to arise; and that upon the general wisdom of the policy,—as regarded Turkey or the rest of Europe,—by which the Dardanelles were to be kept closed, I knew the British Government agreed with what he said upon it, however necessary an exceptional case of infringing that rule might be.

On the whole, Count Nesselrode repeated the same assurances I had previously received and reported to your Lordship, and in which I believe; namely, that the Russian Government are most desirous of avoiding any military demonstration, or any necessity for carrying into execution the main clause of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi.

I have to apologise to your Lordship for the hurry which is evident in this despatch.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) CLANRICARDE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 228.

[See Inclosure 5 in No. 191.]

Inclosure 2 in No. 228.

The Consul-General of Austria in Egypt, to the Internuncio at Constantinople.

(Extrait.) *Alexandrie, le* $\frac{7}{19}$ *Juillet*, 1839.

DANS un entretien que j'ai eu hier le $\frac{6}{18}$, avec Méhémet Ali, je lui ai posé les deux questions suivantes:

1°. Quel serait le parti qu'il prendrait, si la Porte ne consent pas à éloigner des affaires Hosreff Pacha, ni à accorder à Méhémet Ali l'hérédité de toutes ses possessions?

2°. Quelle serait sa conduite, si la Porte accédait à l'une et à l'autre de ces demandes?

Réponse ad 1^{m}. "Dans le cas de refus de la Porte, je resterai tel que je suis, c'est-à-dire, je garderai toutes les provinces que je possède en occupant encore en sus Ourfa et Diarbékir; je garderai aussi la flotte Ottomane, persuadé que les Grandes Puissances n'emploieront contre moi que des mesures négatives; mais si elles voulaient recourir à des mesures coërcitives, je suis résolu à me défendre à outrance.

Ad 2^{m}. "Si la Porte adhère à mes demandes, je laisse la Syrie et les autres provinces à mes enfans pour les gouverner à leur guise, et je me rendrai à Constantinople, pour mettre mon zèle et mes services aux pieds de mon Souverain; je n'accepterai pas le poste de Grand Vizir, ni aucun autre emploi actif, je ne veux être que son premier Conseiller, pour l'aider à gouverner son Empire, pour introduire des réformes utiles, remédier aux abus invétérés en Turquie, et y faire règner la justice, la sécurité, et l'abondance."

En conclusion, Méhémet Ali a prié M. Laurin de porter fidèlement cet entretien à la connaissance de l'Internonce."

(Translation.)

The Consul-General of Austria in Egypt to the Internuncio at Constantinople.

(Extract.) *Alexandria, July* $\frac{7}{19}$, 1839.

IN a conversation which I had yesterday the $\frac{6}{18}$th with Mehemet Ali, I put to him the two following questions:—

1°. What course would he adopt if the Porte should not consent to dismiss Hosrew Pasha from office, or to grant to Mehemet Ali hereditary succession of all his possessions?

2°. What line of conduct would he pursue if the Porte should accede to both of these demands?

Answer to 1st. "In the event of the refusal of the Porte, I will remain as I am, that is to say, I will keep all the provinces I possess, occupying besides Orfa and Diarbekir; I will keep also the Ottoman fleet, being certain that the Great Powers will only take negative measures against me: but if they choose to have recourse to coercive measures, I am resolved to defend myself to the utmost."

Answer to the 2d. "If the Porte accedes to my demands I will leave Syria and the other Provinces to my children to govern as they like, and will go to Constantinople to place my zeal and my services at the feet of my Sovereign. I will not accept the post of Grand Vizier nor any other active employment; I only wish to be his chief Counsellor, to assist him in governing his Empire, to introduce useful reforms, to apply remedies to inveterate abuses in Turkey, and to cause justice, security, and plenty to reign in that country."

In conclusion, Mehemet Ali requested M. Laurin to give a faithful account of this conversation to the Internuncio.

No. 229.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 18.)

My Lord, *Paris, August* 16, 1839.

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatches to the 13th of August.

I had an interview with Marshal Soult this morning; his Excellency received despatches yesterday from Admiral Roussin and from M. Cochelet, the French Consul-General at Alexandria. The former, he said, contained scarcely any intelligence that had not previously reached Paris. The French Ambassador, it seems, had not been made acquainted with the answer which the Porte had given to Mehemet Ali's propositions for peace.

M. Cochelet writes, that the Turkish fleet had entered the port of Alexandria, and that a great number of the officers belonging to it, and who were walking about the streets, had adopted the dress of the Egyptian officers of marine.

Count Medem, the Russian Consul-General in Egypt, states in a letter to his brother at Paris, that the Egyptian fleet is also gradually retiring into port, in consequence of the apprehension felt by Mehemet Ali of its being attacked by the English and French fleets, if it remained at sea.

This intelligence, Marshal Soult said, made him feel indifferent in regard to sending the instructions to Admiral Lalande which had been prepared.

I asked the Marshal whether he meant that no further representations should be made to the Pasha respecting the restoration of the Turkish fleet to the Sultan. He said, far from it; indeed, he had thought of despatching another of his aides-de-camp to Mehemet Ali to remonstrate against the course in which he was proceeding, particularly with reference to his demand of the dismissal of the Grand Vizier Hosrew Pasha, and to the letters which he had written to seventeen different Pashas to join with him in insisting on a compliance with that demand.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 230.

Sir George Hamilton to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received August* 19.)

(Extract.) *Berlin, August* 14, 1839.

I COMMUNICATED to Baron Werther the contents of your despatch of the 6th of August; and his Excellency entirely agreed with your Lordship's opinion, that the present unfortunate state of affairs in the East ought to make no alteration in the course which the Five Powers had intended to pursue. He stated that Prussia would follow the line of conduct pointed out to her by Great Britain and Austria; and that he had entire confidence in the measures which those Governments should decide upon adopting. He stated that he was convinced, that Russia was acting honourably and without *arrière-pensée* at this conjuncture.

It appears that M. de Tatistcheff has left Petersburgh for Vienna; Baron Werther therefore is of opinion, that he will have received the Emperor's orders to concert with Lord Beauvale and Prince Metternich; and he said that the Emperor had lately talked without reserve to Count Fiquelmont, and much to that Minister's satisfaction, on the Turkish Question.

I feel, however, that I should, on the occasion of this despatch, be wanting in my duty, were I to conceal from your Lordship that I find much apprehension exists here among those who take an interest in the affairs of the East, and who are acquainted with their present state, as to the consequences that may ensue, dangerous to the peace of Europe, should Mehemet Ali be driven to desperation by the adoption of coercive measures against him, before all means of conciliation had been resorted to. It is considered that, as long as he is on amicable terms with the Five Powers, he is comparatively harmless, and unable to light the flames of war; but, if reduced to extremity, he has it instantly in his power, by advancing his troops on Constantinople, to create a complication of evils throughout Europe, either by still further destroying the power of the Sultan and exciting a revolution at Constantinople, or by bringing down the intervention of a Russian armed force.

Such are the opinions that I have heard expressed, and I am sure I need not apologize to your Lordship for reporting them.

No. 231.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received August* 20.)

My Lord, *Paris, August* 18, 1839.

THE inclosed paper* is a copy of a note which, on the 28th ultimo, was presented to the Sublime Porte, signed by the Representatives of the Great European Powers at Constantinople.

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* See Inclosure 1 in No. 226.

Marshal Soult received a copy of it this morning in a despatch from Admiral Roussin, and obligingly lost no time in communicating it to me.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 232.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 21.)

My Lord, *Paris, August* 19, 1839.

MARSHAL SOULT read to me this morning a despatch from M. de Bourqueney, by which I learnt that your Lordship had received despatches from Constantinople of the 29th ultimo, and had been made acquainted with the Collective Note of the Representatives of the Great European Powers to the Sublime Porte, relative to the suspension of the negotiations with Mehemet Ali, before intelligence of it had reached the French Government.

In the same despatch, M. de Bourqueney mentions the proposition made by your Lordship, that, in the event of Mehemet Ali's refusal to restore the Turkish fleet to the Sultan, the British and French Consuls should withdraw from Alexandria. To this proposition Marshal Soult decidedly objected; he said, that the departure of the French and British Consuls, while those of Austria and of Russia remained, could not fail to inspire in the mind of Mehemet Ali the hope that Russia and Austria no longer acted in concert with Great Britain and France, and might encourage the Pasha to persevere in insisting upon conditions of peace with his Sovereign, which the appearance of a continued union between the Great Powers of Europe might induce him to give up. I observed, that your Lordship seemed to look to arrangements being made at Vienna for the simultaneous withdrawal of the Consuls of the other Great Powers. His Excellency then said, that we should be exhausting, to obtain the restoration of the Turkish fleet, those means of intimidation which might be more advantageously employed in obtaining acceptable terms of peace; but he seemed not disinclined to acquiesce in any decision that might be taken in regard to the Consuls at Alexandria, to which the Austrian Government was a party.

Count Medem put this morning into the hands of the Duc de Dalmatie a copy of a despatch from Count Nesselrode, in which the Russian Minister adverts to the communication made to him by M. de Barante, with respect to the entrance of the combined French and English Fleet into the Sea of Marmora; he answers that communication as if the Ambassador had announced as positive the intention of the combined Fleet to pass the Dardanelles, and not as contingent upon the Russian Fleet entering the Bosphorus; and proceeding upon this hypothesis, Count Nesselrode dwells upon the necessity of the Russian Government adopting measures for the independence of Turkey, and on the danger arising therefrom to the peace of Europe.

The Marshal requested Count Medem to point out to his Government, that it was only in the case of a Russian armament passing into the Bosphorus that the French fleet would proceed to the Sea of Marmora, and that he was perfectly willing that both ends of the canal of Constantinople should be closed against the entrance of foreign ships of war.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 233.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 21.)

My Lord, *Paris, August* 19, 1839.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch of August 16, by which I am directed to draw the attention of the French Government to the fact that the confidential communications between the two Governments respecting the orders to be given to the English and French Admirals in the Levant, have by some

means or other been made known to the French newspapers, I have to state, that this morning, before I made any allusion to this subject, Marshal Soult reverted to it, and assured me, that it had given him more pain and vexation than could have been felt by your Lordship on the occasion. I said to him, that after he had expressed himself so strongly upon this matter, it was unnecessary for me to execute an instruction I had received from you, to represent the serious inconvenience which might arise from confidential communications between the two Governments being prematurely made public, and becoming matter of discussion in the newspapers.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 234.

Count Nesselrode to Count Medem.—(Communicated by M. de Kisseleff, August 19, 1839.)

M. le Comte, *St. Pétersbourg, le* $\frac{\text{25 Juillet}}{\text{6 Août}}$, 1839.

AU milieu des évènemens qui semblent de jour en jour aggraver davantage l'état des affaires du Levant, l'Empereur a jugé nécessaire, que ses Représentans fussent exactement instruits et du jugement qu'il porte sur la situation actuelle de l'Empire Ottoman, et des déterminations qu'il a prises pour prévenir les dangers qui menacent aujourd'hui de compromettre le repos de l'Orient.

C'est d'ordre exprès de notre Auguste Maître, que je me fais un devoir, M. le Comte, de vous faire connaître ses pensées et ses déterminations, de la manière la plus positive.

L'Empereur a la conscience d'avoir fait tout ce qui était en son pouvoir pour empêcher un conflit entre la Turquie et l'Egypte. Il a adressé au Sultan Mahmoud les représentations les plus sérieuses pour le détourner de l'idée de s'engager dans une lutte dont notre Auguste Maître prévoyait les conséquences déplorables.

L'évènement n'a que trop réalisé nos prévisions et justifié nos remontrances. La journée du $\frac{13}{25}$ Juin a détruit l'armée Turque. La trahison du Capitan Pacha a mis le comble aux malheurs qui ont marqué le terme du règne du Sultan Mahmoud.

Malgré tant de désastres, son fils Abdoul Medjid est monté sur le trône, sans que son avènement ait été accompagné de scènes de désordre et de troubles dont l'histoire de Turquie nous offre de si fréquens exemples. Loin de là, les derniers rapports de notre Ministre à Constantinople attestent, que la solemnité du couronnement a été célébrée par des témoignages unanimes de respect et de fidélité, au milieu de cette immense population de la capitale de l'Empire Ottoman, dont la sécurité n'a pas été troublée un seul instant.

Dans cet état de choses, l'Empereur ne désespère nullement du salut de la Porte, pourvu que les Puissances de l'Europe sachent respecter son repos, et que par une agitation intempestive, elles ne finissent par l'ébranler, tout en voulant la raffermir.

Peu de mots suffiront, M. le Comte, pour vous exposer à cet égard notre pensée toute entière.

La situation où la Porte se trouve aujourd'hui, quelque difficile qu'elle soit, n'est pas neuve pour elle. Durant une longue série d'années elle a toujours commis les mêmes fautes, éprouvé les mêmes désastres. Mais guidée par un secret instinct de sa propre conservation, elle a toujours su éviter le moment fatal qui devait amener sa chûte.

Aujourd'hui, dirigée par la même pensée de conservation, elle est à la veille de transiger encore une fois avec Méhémet Ali. Déjà, elle lui a fait parvenir à cet effet des offres de conciliation, dont elle s'est empressée de faire part aux Représentans des Cinq Grandes Puissances. De plus, elle leur a demandé leur appui à Alexandrie, pour déterminer le Pacha à accepter les propositions qu'elle vient de lui adresser.

De cette manière, la tâche que les Cabinets de l'Europe sont appelés à remplir, leur a été clairement indiquée par la Porte elle-même. Ils doivent appuyer ses démarches à Alexandrie; décider Méhémet Ali à les accepter; ne point permettre qu'il impose au Sultan des conditions plus onéreuses; en un mot, placer le Pacha dans la nécessité d'adopter les bases d'un arrangement définitif que l'Europe est autorisée à considérer comme solide, parcequ'il est équitable.

Voilà, M. le Comte, la tâche que les Cabinets de l'Europe auront à remplir. Pour atteindre ce but, il faut que tous leurs efforts soient concentrés à Alexandrie. Tourner leur action vers Constantinople, ce serait diriger leurs forces du côté d'où le danger ne vient pas. Là, il ne faut ni agitation diplomatique, ni déployement de forces militaires: il ne faut que du repos.

Cette conviction a dicté les déterminations de l'Empereur. Au milieu de l'agitation générale que la crise du Levant a fait naître, il n'a éprouvé ni inquiétude, ni impatience d'agir. Il n'a fait aucune démonstration. Il n'a envoyé à Constantinople ni un vaisseau, ni un soldat, dans la ferme persuasion, que son calme ferait à la Porte plus de bien que ne lui en aurait fait son armée et sa flotte.

Telle est l'attitude que l'Empereur a prise.

Or, si la Russie, dont les intérêts les plus directs se trouvent engagés dans la crise actuelle, et dont les frontières touchent immédiatement à celles de la Turquie, ne se montre aujourd'hui ni inquiète, ni impatiente de paraître sur le théâtre des évènemens, il nous semble qu'à plus forte raison les Puissances dont la sécurité n'est nullement compromise, et que de grandes distances séparent de l'Empire Ottoman, peuvent, sans le moindre inconvénient, adopter la même attitude, et modérer leur action.

Dans cette attente, notre Auguste Maître se plait à croire que le Gouvernement Français, guidé par la politique pleine de prévoyance qu'il a suivie jusqu'à ce jour, ne cherchera point à compliquer la situation de l'Empire Ottoman par un déployement de forces navales, qui, au lieu d'imposer la paix à Alexandrie, viendrait la troubler à Constantinople.

Si malheureusement l'espoir que l'Empereur est en droit de fonder sur la modération du Gouvernement Français ne se réalisait pas; si l'apparition d'une Escadre étrangère dans la Mer de Marmora venait aggraver l'état des choses à Constantinople; la marche que la Russie aurait à suivre ne serait pas douteuse. En présence d'une flotte étrangère, le Ministre de l'Empereur protesterait formellement contre la violation flagrante de la fermeture des Dardanelles: principe que la Porte a considéré de tout tems comme une règle fondamentale de sa politique, et qu'elle s'est engagée envers nous à maintenir invariablement; il déclarerait qu'il regardait cette violation comme contraire à l'indépendance de la Porte, suspendrait immédiatement ses fonctions, et quitterait Constantinople. Alors, il ne resterait plus à l'Empereur qu'à prendre les mesures qu'il jugerait nécessaires pour rétablir la Porte dans son entière indépendance, et la mettre à même de remplir ses engagemens envers nous, libre de toute contrainte étrangère.

Telles seraient, M. le Comte, les conséquences inévitables de l'apparition d'une Escadre Française dans la Mer de Marmora.

Comme il importe plus que jamais que les Cabinets de l'Europe se rendent compte à eux-mêmes de leur position relative, et qu'ils fassent preuve à cet égard de la plus grande sincérité les uns envers les autres, notre Cabinet a pensé qu'il devait au Gouvernement Français un exposé clair et positif des déterminations que nous serions forcés de prendre, si l'éventualité dont je viens de faire mention, venait jamais à se réaliser. En ce cas, le parti que nous aurions à prendre, ne dépendrait pas de notre libre choix; il nous serait imposé par les nécessités de notre politique aussi bien que par les intérêts les plus directs de notre empire. Un coup-d'œil jeté sur la carte expliquera la différence qui existe à cet égard entre la position géographique de la Russie et celle des Puissances de l'Occident.

En effet, lorsqu'en 1833 une Escadre Russe vint jeter l'ancre dans le Bosphore, sa présence ne pouvait être considérée ni comme une menace dirigée contre la Marine Française, ni comme une atteinte portée à la prospérité commerciale de Marseille. Mais si aujourd'hui une Escadre Française paraissait à Constantinople, sa présence réagirait directement sur Odessa et sur Sévastopol.

Le Ministère Français est trop éclairé et trop équitable pour ne pas reconnaître la différence de position que je viens de signaler. En 1833, nous avons protégé la Porte sans braver les Puissances de l'Occident. En 1839, les escadres étrangères, sans protéger la Porte, viendraient insulter la Russie.

Il nous suffit d'avoir clairement établi cette distinction, qui nous dispense

d'entrer à ce sujet dans de plus amples développemens. D'ailleurs, notre intention n'est point ici de provoquer une discussion quelconque sur une éventualité qui, nous l'espérons, ne se réalisera pas; notre unique désir est simplement de mettre le Cabinet Français à même de se pénétrer des intentions et des intérêts qui servent de règle à la politique de la Russie. Eclaircir mutuellement la position des Cabinets, c'est incontestablement le moyen le plus sûr de maintenir le parfait accord si heureusement établi entre eux: union désirable, parcequ'elle renferme en elle, ainsi que M. le Duc de Dalmatie dans une de ses communications récentes l'a si bien observé, la garantie la plus solide pour rassurer les amis de la paix.

C'est dans cet esprit de conciliation et de parfait accord, que vous êtes chargé de vous acquitter auprès de M. le Président du Conseil, de la communication contenue dans la présente dépêche dont vous voudrez bien lui donner lecture et remettre copie.

Recevez, &c.,
(Signée) NESSELRODE.

(Translation.)

Count Nesselrode to Count Medem. (Communicated by M. de Kisseleff, August 19, 1839.)

M. le Comte, *St. Petersburgh*, $\frac{\text{July 25,}}{\text{August 6,}}$ 1839.

IN the midst of the events which seem from day to day to aggravate more seriously the state of affairs of the Levant, the Emperor has considered it necessary that his Representatives should be exactly apprized, both of the opinion which he has formed of the present situation of the Ottoman Empire, and of the resolutions which he has taken to counteract the dangers which threaten at the present time to compromise the peace of the East.

It is by the express order of our August Master, that I make it my duty, M. le Comte, to acquaint you, in the most positive manner, with his thoughts and determinations.

The Emperor feels conscious of having done all in his power to prevent a conflict between Turkey and Egypt. He addressed to Sultan Mahmoud the most serious representations, in order to deter him from the idea of engaging in a struggle of which our August Master foresaw the deplorable consequences.

The event has but too far realised our anticipations and justified our remonstrances. The action of the $\frac{13}{25}$ of June, has destroyed the Turkish Army. The treason of the Capudan Pasha has filled up the measure of the misfortunes which have marked the close of Sultan Mahmoud's reign.

Notwithstanding so many disasters, his son Abdul Medjid has ascended the throne, without his accession being accompanied with those scenes of disorder and of trouble, of which the history of Turkey offers us such frequent examples. Far from this being the case, the latest reports from our Minister at Constantinople attest, that the solemnity of the coronation has been accompanied by unanimous demonstrations of respect and of fidelity in the midst of that immense population of the capital of the Ottoman Empire, the tranquillity of which has not been troubled for a single moment.

In this state of affairs, the Emperor in no wise despairs of the safety of the Porte, provided that the Powers of Europe know how to respect its tranquillity, and that they do not by inopportune agitation end by unsettling, at the same time that they wish to consolidate, it.

Few words will suffice, M. le Comte, to place before you our whole opinion in this respect.

The situation in which the Porte finds itself at present, however difficult it may be, is not novel. During a long course of years, it has always committed the same faults, and experienced the same disasters. But, guided by a secret instinct for its own preservation, it has always known how to avoid the fatal moment which would bring on its fall.

At the present day, actuated by the same idea of preservation, it is on the eve of once more entering into an arrangement with Mehemet Ali. It has already caused to be made to him for this purpose offers of conciliation, which it has hastened to communicate to the Representatives of the Five Great Powers. Further, it has asked for their support at Alexandria, in order to persuade the Pasha to accept the proposals which it has just made to him.

In this manner, the work which the Cabinets of Europe are called upon to perform, has been clearly pointed out to them by the Porte itself. They have to support its overtures at Alexandria; to prevail upon Mehemet Ali to accept them; not to allow him to impose more onerous conditions on the Sultan; in one word, to place the Pasha under the necessity of adopting the bases of a definitive arrangement which Europe is authorized to consider as stable, because it is an equitable one.

This, M. le Comte, is the work which the Cabinets of Europe will have to perform. To attain this end, it is necessary that all their efforts should be concentrated at Alexandria. To direct their action towards Constantinople, would be to direct their efforts to the side from which the danger does not come. There, neither diplomatic agitation is necessary, nor the display of military force; tranquillity alone is wanting.

This conviction has dictated the resolutions of the Emperor. In the midst of the general agitation which the crisis in the Levant has produced, he has experienced neither uneasiness nor impatience to act. He has made no demonstration; he has not sent to Constantinople a single ship, or a single soldier, in the firm persuasion that his inaction would do the Porte more good than his army or his fleet could have done.

Such is the attitude which the Emperor has taken.

Wherefore, if Russia, whose most direct interests are engaged in the present crisis, and whose frontiers are immediately adjacent to those of Turkey, appears at the present time to be neither uneasy, nor impatient to appear on the theatre of events, it seems to us, that much more can the Powers, whose safety is in no way compromised, and who are separated by great distances from the Ottoman Empire, adopt, without the least inconvenience, the same attitude, and moderate their action.

In this expectation, our August Master flatters himself that the French Government, guided by the policy full of foresight which it has pursued up to this day, will not endeavour to complicate the situation of the Ottoman Empire by a display of naval force, which, instead of preserving peace at Alexandria, would unsettle peace at Constantinople.

If, unfortunately, the hope which the Emperor has reason to found upon the moderation of the French Government, should not be realized; if the appearance of a foreign fleet in the Sea of Marmora should come to aggravate the state of affairs at Constantinople; the course which Russia would have to pursue would not be doubtful. In the presence of a foreign fleet, the Emperor's Minister would formally protest against the flagrant violation of the principle of the closing the Dardanelles; a principle which the Porte has at all times considered as a fundamental rule of its policy, and which it has engaged itself to us invariably to maintain; he would declare that he regarded this violation as contrary to the independence of the Porte; he would immediately suspend his functions, and quit Constantinople. Then it would only remain for the Emperor to take such measures as he might consider necessary to re-establish the Porte in its entire independence, and to enable it to fulfil its engagements towards us, free from all foreign constraint.

Such, M. le Comte, would be the inevitable consequences of the appearance of a French squadron in the Sea of Marmora.

As it is more than ever necessary that the Cabinets of Europe should give an account to themselves of their relative positions, and that they should give proofs in this respect of the greatest sincerity towards one another, our Cabinet has thought that it was its duty to give to the French Government a clear and positive explanation of the steps which we should be obliged to take, in the event of the case of which I have just made mention ever being realized. In this case, the part which we should have to take, would not depend on our own free choice; it would be imposed on us by the exigencies of our policy, as well as by the most direct interests of our Empire. A glance thrown upon the map will explain the difference which exists in this respect between the geographical position of Russia, and that of the Western Powers.

In fact, when a Russian squadron anchored in the Bosphorus in 1833, its presence could neither be considered as a threat directed against the French Navy, nor as a blow struck at the commercial prosperity of Marseilles. But if, at the present moment, a French squadron should make its appearance at Constantinople, its presence would react directly upon Odessa and Sevastopol.

The French Ministry is too enlightened and too just not to acknowledge the difference of position which I have just pointed out. In 1833 we protected the Porte without offering any affront to the Western Powers. In 1839, the foreign squadrons, without protecting the Porte, would come to insult Russia.

It is sufficient for us to have clearly established this distinction, which dispenses us from entering upon this subject in fuller particulars. Besides, our intention now is not to provoke any discussion whatever with respect to a contingency, which we hope will not be realised; our desire is simply to enable the French Cabinet to comprehend fully the intentions and the interests which serve as a rule for the policy of Russia. Mutually to clear up the position of the Cabinets, is incontestably the surest means of maintaining the perfect agreement so happily established among them; a union desirable, because it contains in itself, as the Duke of Dalmatia in one of his recent communications has so well observed, the most solid guarantee for reassuring the friends of peace.

It is in this spirit of conciliation and of perfect concord, that you are authorized to make to the President of the Council the communication contained in the present despatch, which you will have the goodness to read to him, and of which you will give him a copy.

Receive, &c.,
(Signed) NESSELRODE.

No. 235.

Viscount Palmerston to the Marquess of Clanricarde.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, August* 20, 1839.

M. DE KISSELEFF communicated to me yesterday a copy of the despatch from Count Nesselrode to Count Medem, of the $\frac{25\text{ July}}{6\text{ August}}$, which, it appears from your despatch of August 10, Count Nesselrode himself has shown to your Excellency.

With reference to that part of the despatch which relates to the passage of the Dardanelles by a French squadron, I read to M. de Kisseleff the three instructions to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, of which I inclose copies*, in order to show to M. de Kisseleff that the Russian Government had misconceived the nature of the demand which the British and French Ambassadors at Constantinople were instructed to make,—that in certain contingencies the fleets of their respective nations might be permitted to pass the Dardanelles. I pointed out to M. de Kisseleff that such demand was not made with any view of hostility against Sevastopol or Odessa, but solely for the protection of Constantinople, and not upon the principle of separate action on the part of England and of France, but for the purpose of maintaining a joint action on the part of the Five Powers.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

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* See Nos. 90, 117, and 120.

No. 236.

Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Bulwer.

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 20, 1839.

I HAVE to instruct you to state to the French Government, with reference to the communications which have passed between the two Governments, about the measures to be taken for restoring to the Sultan the Turkish fleet, that in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, the Collective Note presented to the Porte, on the 28th ultimo, by the Representatives of the Five Powers, affords a strong reason to Great Britain and France for pursuing a different course on this important matter from that which they had before contemplated.

The Governments of England and France are friends and allies of the Sultan, and have spontaneously and formally declared their determination to uphold the independence and integrity of the Turkish Empire under its present dynasty, and to oppose themselves to any combination which might be calculated to trench upon that integrity and independence. But it is manifest that Mehemet Ali, by retaining the Turkish fleet, avowedly as a means of extorting from the Sultan the concession of certain demands, does openly attack the independent political action of the Sultan, and does, by a combination with the traitorous Commander of the Turkish fleet, endeavour to possess himself of the means of destroying the integrity of the Turkish Empire. Her Majesty's Government is therefore of opinion, that the Governments of France and England are bound, no less by a regard for their recent declarations, and a respect for their own honour, than by considerations of sound policy, to compel Mehemet Ali to give back to his own lawful Sovereign the ships of that Sovereign, which he now, in violation of every principle of duty and good faith, persists in retaining for purposes hostile to that Sovereign. But as the Five Powers have now, by the Note of the 27th ultimo, placed themselves collectively in the situation of mediators between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, it is the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, that all further steps in this matter ought to be taken, if possible, collectively by the Five; and that the decision as to such steps should emanate from Vienna, which is the central point of the negotiation, instead of from London or Paris.

Her Majesty's Government, therefore, are about to send immediately instructions to Lord Beauvale, to propose to the Representatives of the other Four Powers the steps which, under all circumstances, appear to Her Majesty's Government the fittest to be taken with respect to the Turkish fleet; and to state to the Representatives of those Powers, that it is the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, that the restoration of that fleet by Mehemet Ali should be insisted upon as an indispensable preliminary to any negotiation whatever upon any other point.

The course which Her Majesty's Government would propose for the attainment of this object is, that the Consular Agents of the Five Powers at Alexandria should be instructed by the Ambassadors and Ministers at Vienna, formally, and in a Collective Note, to demand from Mehemet Ali the immediate restitution of the Turkish ships, together with such of the officers and men as may be willing to return to their allegiance; that if this demand be complied with, the Turkish ships should be placed under the care and custody of the combined English, French, and Austrian squadron; the Admirals of which would take care not to permit any of those Turkish ships to go up to Constantinople, without being first certain by communications with the Turkish Government, that the fidelity of the officers and men could be relied upon, and that there would be no danger of their again revolting against the Porte, in the event of their being sent back to Constantinople.

If any doubt should be entertained on this point, the ships should be kept at Rhodes or elsewhere outside of the Dardanelles, or they should be accompanied to Constantinople by some ships of the combined fleet; or else they should be sent back with merely officers and men enough to navigate them, and perhaps a guard belonging to the Allies on board each ship.

The Consular Agents should have no power to negotiate as to the surrender of the Turkish ships, nor to allow Mehemet Ali more than a stated period,—

twenty-four or forty-eight hours, to give a decisive answer. They should make him aware that, if that answer should be negative, they would be obliged immediately to leave Alexandria; and if he should refuse to comply with the demand made, they ought at once, and altogether, to embark on board the fleet, and to go to Smyrna, or to any other place, from whence they might be able to return to Alexandria, if their departure should have the effect of obtaining compliance with their demands.

But it is possible that Mehemet Ali might still persist in retaining the Turkish ships, trusting that the Allied Powers would not follow up the recall of their Consular Agents by any ulterior measures; and in such case it is the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, that the honour of the Five Powers, a regard to good faith on their part towards the Sultan, and considerations of the highest importance connected with the great interests of Europe, require that further measures should be adopted. The measures which might, in the first instance, be resorted to, are:—

First, To prevent any vessel under Egyptian flag from entering into, or coming out of, the port of Alexandria; and to enforce a similar measure with respect to the ports of Syria.

Secondly, To seize, detain, and hold in deposit, all merchant ships found anywhere under the Egyptian flag, either at sea or in any of the ports of Syria where they could be captured without any material difficulty.

Thirdly, To take possession of the Island of Candia, in the name of the Sultan, and to re-establish the Sultan's direct authority in that Island.

Fourthly, To declare to Mehemet Ali, that the combined squadron will defend the Turkish Empire against any attack on his part, as effectually as if it were a Turkish fleet.

Her Majesty's Government will give instructions to Sir Robert Stopford to take any, or all, of these steps, if he shall be directed so to do by Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna, as far as the force under his command may enable him to do so, either with, or without, the co-operation of any one of the other squadrons, if the result of the communications which may take place between Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna and his Colleagues, should lead that Ambassador to consider it expedient to do so; and you are instructed to invite the French Government to send similar instructions and authority to their Ambassador at Vienna, and to their Admiral in the Mediterranean.

The French Government will perceive that the measures above proposed apply to the case of the Turkish ships being inside the harbour of Alexandria, and within the power of Mehemet Ali. If, on the contrary, the Turkish ships should be outside of the harbour and within the power of their own officers, then Her Majesty's Government would propose, that the course to be pursued should be such as has already been agreed upon for that contingency by the French and English Governments:—that is to say, the combined fleet should interpose, if possible, between the Turkish squadron and the port of Alexandria, so as to prevent them from entering. The Admirals should endeavour, by personal communication, to persuade the Turkish officers to return to their allegiance; they should employ all possible means of negotiation for this purpose, and should, if necessary, send small vessels to Constantinople, with any communications which might appear likely to contribute to an arrangement. They should abstain from any attack on the Turkish ships, unless necessary in order to prevent those ships from committing hostilities against the Turkish territory; but they should follow the Turkish ships with a sufficient force wherever they might go, in order to watch their movements, and to remain masters of those movements. There could be no objection to allow those ships to go to any Turkish port outside of the Dardanelles, even before they had made their submission to the Sultan, provided a sufficient part of the allied squadron were to accompany them thither. But Her Majesty's Government are of opinion, that the instructions for this case, like those for the case first supposed, ought to emanate from Vienna; and Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna will, therefore, be desired to communicate also upon this part of the case, with his Colleagues at Vienna.

You will give a copy of this despatch to the Duc de Dalmatie.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 237.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, August* 21, 1839.

I HAVE the satisfaction to acquaint your Excellency, that Her Majesty's Government highly approve of the Note which your Excellency, in conjunction with the Representatives of Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, addressed to the Porte on the 27th of July, and of which a copy is inclosed in your despatch of the 29th of July.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 238.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 23.)

My Lord, *Therapia, July* 30, 1839.

BY invitation from the Mousteshar Nouri Effendi, the Representatives of the Five Great Powers met his Excellency at his Kiosk this day.

The Mousteshar asked them where it was intended to hold the meeting for the arrangement of the affairs of this country; whether it was to be at Constantinople, or Vienna, or elsewhere; and whether an Ottoman Minister was invited? To this it was answered, that the Representatives had not yet received any information on the subject.

The Mousteshar then said,—"The Porte is without armies, the Ottoman fleet has deserted, what can the Porte do if Mehemet Ali should attack? Will the Great Powers defend the Porte?"

It was replied, that the Great Powers had determined to prevent a collision between the belligerents, and therefore the Great Powers could not permit the Pasha to attack the Porte. The French Ambassador, in answering the above question, did not distinctly enough express himself to satisfy the Mousteshar, and I felt it necessary to say, that the instructions given to the English and French Admirals, did, in my opinion, impose upon them the obligation to defend this country against any attack that the Pasha might venture to make, and in this view I was fully supported by the Austrian, and Russian, and Prussian Ministers, and by the French Ambassador. M. de Bouténeff fully and freely concurred in a position stated by the Internuncio, that the Sublime Porte having consented to the proposition made in the Collective Note of July 27, was under an obligation to the Five Great Powers, not to attempt to have any secret understanding with Mehemet Ali; but to communicate fairly with them and act in concurrence. The Mousteshar admitted the obligation.

There was a good deal said, of which the above is the substance.

The questions of the Mousteshar were just and natural, and I hope the answers have been satisfactory, and that the last reply removed the apprehension apparently entertained in some degree, that the Porte might be left unprotected against the Pasha.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 239.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 23.)

My Lord, *Therapia, July* 30, 1839.

I INCLOSE an account given by Dr. Ainsworth and his companions, of the disposition of the Egyptian soldiers under Ibrahim Pasha, which is founded upon the report of deserters from Ibrahim's army, who came to Hafiz Pasha's camp, where the Doctor was, up to the fatal battle. I think the disposition of the soldiers is of importance when the adoption of measures that may be taken in Syria are in consideration. I beg to recall the fact I stated, from the best authority, long ago, that the Egyptian soldiers desired above all things to escape by any means from the military service of Mehemet Ali.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 239.

Captain Conolly to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Therapia, July* 29, 1839.

DR. AINSWORTH and his friends, Messrs. Russell and Rassam, say, that the least exhibition of military skill on the part of Hafiz Pasha, the least chance in the extraordinary mêlée, that ended in his defeat, might have caused the complete defeat of Ibrahim Pasha, as deserters from his camp a day or two before agreed in declaring that their Egyptian comrades, so far from wishing to oppose the Sultan, only desired a fair opportunity of laying down their arms; and if from want of support by these cold soldiers, or through any other accident, Ibrahim had been beaten, he would have been without an open road of retreat. As it is, they represent the rout of Hafiz to be complete. The last they saw of this Commander-in-chief, was when he was cutting down some of his own recruits, who were trying to leave the field. Even at this desperate moment, Dr. Ainsworth says, he might have recovered the day, if he would have attended to the advice of the Prussian officers, to make a good charge with another column of his unbroken men.

The road was covered with fugitives from his army, and retirers from the corps of Izzet Pasha. Many of the latter were comfortably riding on hired horses, doubtless paying the costs with their shares of Izzet Pasha's military chest.

The Kourds, these gentlemen say, fired upon them and on the Turkish fugitives, and may be considered in a state of complete revolt.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) A. CONOLLY.

No. 240.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, August* 23, 1839.

I HAVE received this morning, and have laid before the Queen, your Excellency's despatches to the 30th July.

With reference to the first of those despatches, I have the satisfaction to acquaint your Excellency, that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve of the answers which, in conjunction with the Representatives of the other Great Powers, your Excellency returned to the questions put to you by the Turkish Minister, in the conference which you had with him on the 30th of July.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 241.

Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

My Lords, *Foreign Office, August* 23, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordships, that the Five Powers having agreed to concert together upon the affairs of the Levant, and Vienna being the place where the communications and negotiations on these affairs will centre, it may become important with a view to the saving of time, that the Admiral commanding Her Majesty's squadron in the Mediterranean, should be instructed to execute any measures which he may be informed that Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna has consented to on the part of Great Britain, as arising out of the concert between the Allied Powers. I have therefore to signify to your Lordships Her Majesty's pleasure, that instructions be given to Sir Robert Stopford that, until further orders, he should carry into effect any instructions which he may receive on the above-mentioned affairs from Lord Beauvale.

I have to request that your Lordships will send me a duplicate of the instructions which you may give to Sir Robert Stopford in consequence of this letter, in order that I may send that duplicate to Lord Beauvale to be forwarded by him to Sir Robert Stopford, together with any communication which Lord Beauvale may have occasion to make to the Admiral upon the matters in question.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 242.

Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

My Lords, *Foreign Office, August* 23, 1839.

WITH reference to my other letter of this day's date, I have the honour to acquaint your Lordships, that the instructions issued to Sir Robert Stopford in pursuance of my two letters of the 5th of August, and of my further letter of the 7th of August, have been suspended at Paris, and are now to be considered as cancelled; and that Her Majesty's Minister at Paris has been instructed to return the packets addressed to Sir John Louis, in which your Lordships' letters to Sir Robert Stopford were inclosed.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 243.

Viscount Palmerston to Colonel Campbell.

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 23, 1839.

THE Five Powers having agreed to concert together upon the affairs of the Levant, and Vienna being the place where the communications and negotiations on these affairs will centre, I have to instruct you to carry into effect any instructions which you may receive on the above-mentioned affairs from Lord Beauvale.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 244.

Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Bulwer.

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 23, 1839.

THE instructions to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford contained in the packets addressed to Sir John Louis, which were sent to Paris on the 5th and 7th of August, being cancelled in consequence of my letter to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, of which a copy is inclosed, I have to instruct you to return to me those packets by the first messenger.

You will at the same time return to me the two packets addressed to Lord Ponsonby, and sent to Paris on the days above-mentioned, and numbered on the outside, Nos. 110 and 113; and the two packets addressed to Sir Robert Stopford, and stated in the memoranda sent to Paris to contain copies of the instructions to the Admiralty.

You will retain the remaining packets addressed to Lord Ponsonby, and those addressed to Sir Robert Stopford, and stated to contain despatches for Colonel Campbell, until further orders.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 245.

Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

My Lords, *Foreign Office, August* 24, 1839.

WITH reference to my letter of yesterday, conveying to your Lordships the Queen's commands, that Admiral Sir Robert Stopford should be directed to carry into effect any instructions which he may receive on the affairs of the Levant from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna, I am to acquaint your Lordships, that it is Her Majesty's pleasure that Admiral Sir Robert Stopford should not be precluded from executing any instructions given to him by Lord Beauvale, and arising out of the negotiations at Vienna, provided the measures to be taken shall be such as Sir Robert Stopford may think himself to have adequate means to execute, even though the French Admiral should not receive corresponding instructions from his own Government, or from the French Ambassador at Vienna.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

P. S.—I have to request that your Lordships will send me a duplicate of the instructions which you may give to Sir Robert Stopford in consequence of this letter.

No. 246.

Sir George Hamilton to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 26.)

(Extract.) *Berlin, August* 21, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch of August 13th, together with its inclosures.

Baron Werther has informed me, that he has sent to the Prussian Chargé d'Affaires in London, a copy of the official answer of the Prussian Government to the note addressed to him by the French Minister, on the attitude to be taken by the Five Powers in the Turco-Egyptian Question, with orders to communicate it to your Lordship. The contents of this note cannot fail to be highly satisfactory to Her Majesty's Government.

No. 247.

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 25.)

My Lord, *Paris, August* 23, 1839.

I HAD the honour of giving Marshal Soult, this morning, a copy of the despatch which your Lordship addressed to me on the 20th of August, with the instruction that it should be communicated to the Marshal.

I at the same time made him verbally acquainted with its contents.

He agreed entirely in considering that the Note delivered by the Representatives of the Five Powers at Constantinople, had made a great change in the state of the Eastern Question; that it would be most desirable to endeavour to preserve the same joint system of action between the Five Powers; and that

Vienna would be the best place for arriving at common conclusions, and concerting common operations.

I then said, that I considered the Note of the more importance, inasmuch as that it at once bound the Five Powers in alliance with the Sultan for preserving his rights, and maintaining the integrity of his Empire; and that therefore it left no doubt either as to the general spirit with which Mehemet Ali should be met, or as to the paramount necessity of the immediate restoration of the Ottoman Fleet, by the retention of which the rights of the Sultan were so evidently violated, and the integrity of his Empire endangered.

In this observation also he generally agreed, as well as in the propriety of the five Consuls at Alexandria jointly demanding the Ottoman Fleet's restitution. But he seemed to hesitate as to the propriety of their departure in case of a refusal, though the one step seems almost necessarily the consequence of the other. The Marshal concluded, however, by saying, that, after he had duly read and considered your Lordship's communication, he would then fully state and explain his sentiments on the subject.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) HENRY LYTTON BULWER.

No. 248.

Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, August* 25, 1839.

THE important Note which was presented to the Porte on the 28th ultimo, by the Representatives of the Five Powers at Constantinople, forms an epoch in the affairs of the Levant, and seems to fix definitively the mode of proceeding which the Five Powers should adopt, in conducting their negotiations, and in planning their measures about these affairs.

The Note abovementioned proclaims the union of the Five Powers, and their determination to act together and in concert, with a view to effect a final arrangement of the differences between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali; and that Note originated out of communications, of which Vienna was the centre.

It appears, therefore, to Her Majesty's Government, that it is on every account most desirable that the Five Powers should continue to act together, and that Vienna should continue to be the point at which the negotiation should be carried on.

Her Majesty's Government have, therefore, proposed to the Government of France, that instead of sending, as the Two Governments had intended to do, from London and from Paris, instructions to the British and French Admirals in the Mediterranean, and to the British and French Consuls-General at Alexandria, for the purpose of demanding from Mehemet Ali the restitution of the Turkish fleet, or for the purpose of endeavouring to prevail upon the officers of that fleet to return to their duty, a different course should be pursued; and that the measures to be taken for the purpose of obtaining from Mehemet Ali restitution of the Turkish fleet, should be concerted by the Representatives of the Five Powers at Vienna, and should, if possible, be taken by the Five conjointly.

I send accordingly to your Excellency, copies of those proposed instructions, and of the correspondence which passed thereupon, in order to put you fully in possession of the views and sentiments of Her Majesty's Government on this matter, and of those of the Government of France, as far as they have been made known to that of Her Majesty: and your Excellency will see that all these proposed instructions have been withdrawn, in order that a new course may be taken at Vienna.

Your Excellency will, therefore, immediately place yourself in communication on this matter with the Austrian Government, and with your other colleagues. You will state, that it is the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, that the Five Powers are bound by honour and good faith towards the Sultan, to recover for him his fleet before any further negotiation takes place with Mehemet Ali for a final arrangement, because the possession of the Turkish fleet gives to Mehemet Ali an advantage in any such negotiation which he ought not to be permitted to retain.

The Five Powers have formally pledged themselves to each other to uphold the independence of the Ottoman Empire under its present dynasty; but how can the Sultan be considered as retaining even the semblance of independent authority, if one of his subjects is to be allowed to keep forcible possession of the whole naval force of the Turkish Empire, for the avowed purpose of using that naval force, either morally or physically, as a means of extorting from his Sovereign concessions which the Sovereign, if he were not thus stripped of the means of self-defence, would not be disposed to grant?

It seems to Her Majesty's Government that all the professions which the Five Powers have made of regard for the Sultan, and of a determination to protect and support him, would be deservedly considered as empty mockery, if those Powers were not to use all the means at their command to give back to the Sultan his fleet; and Her Majesty's Government is also of opinion, that the Five Powers are bound by a regard to what is due to themselves, to make the restitution of that fleet an indispensable preliminary to any other arrangement whatever.

The course which Her Majesty's Government would wish to suggest to the other Four Powers for this purpose is, that the allied squadrons should be ordered to repair to Alexandria, leaving at the entrance of the Dardanelles such a force as might be sufficient, if invited up for that purpose by the Sultan, to bar the passage of the Bosphorus to the troops of Ibrahim, should that general advance through Asia Minor, and threaten an attack upon Constantinople. That the fleet, upon arriving at Alexandria, should take up, if possible, such a position as to command the entrance into the harbour, so as to be able to prevent any ships of war from going in or coming out, which would be the more easy, because it is understood that no line-of-battle ship can go into or come out of the harbour without taking out her lower-deck guns.

The combined fleet, upon arriving at Alexandria, would find the Turkish fleet either in the harbour and within the power of Mehemet Ali, or out of the harbour and within the power of its own officers.

If the Turkish ships should be out of the harbour, and in the power of their own officers, then Her Majesty's Government would recommend that the Admirals should pursue the course which is suggested for that case in the supplementary instructions prepared for Sir Robert Stopford, and in the letter from Marshal Soult to the French Minister of Marine.

But if the Turkish ships should be in the harbour, and therefore within the power of Mehemet Ali, Her Majesty's Government would suggest, that the Consuls-General of the Five Powers should, by a Collective Note, demand from Mehemet Ali the immediate surrender of the Turkish ships, fixing a definite period of time within which a decided answer should be given.

If the ships should be surrendered, such of their officers and men as chose to return to their duty, should be allowed to come out with them; but it would be imprudent in the Admirals to allow the ships to go at once to Constantinople, because Mehemet Ali might have gained the officers and crews over to his side, and the ships, when off Constantinople, might turn against the Sultan, and might declare for Mehemet Ali. It would, therefore, be safer to keep the Turkish ships to cruize for some time in company with the combined squadron, or to send them to Rhodes, or to some other Turkish port, in company with part of the allied force, which should remain with them to watch and controul their movements.

If, however, Mehemet Ali should refuse to surrender the ships, Her Majesty's Government propose that the Consuls-General of the Five Powers should immediately leave Alexandria and embark, as a demonstration of the serious displeasure of the Allies; and a private intimation might be given beforehand to Mehemet Ali, that such a step would be the necessary consequence of the refusal.

The inferior consular agents might remain, for a time, for purposes of commercial routine.

If this measure should have no effect in producing compliance on the part of Mehemet Ali, various other methods of coercion might be employed, without any positive attack upon the Egyptian ships.

In the first place, all communication might be cut off between Egypt and

Syria; and all ships and vessels under the Egyptian flag might be prevented from entering or leaving any Egyptian or Syrian port.

In the next place, all merchant ships under the Egyptian flag, might be seized and detained, to be held in deposit until compliance were obtained.

Thirdly, a detachment from the allied fleet might proceed to Candia, and establish there the direct authority of the Sultan, engaging, on the part of the Five Powers, to obtain for the population of Candia the same privileges and immunities which were granted by the late Sultan to the people of Samos.

Any one, or all, of these measures might be ordered at the discretion of the Representatives of the Five Powers at Vienna; and your Excellency is authorized to give to Sir Robert Stopford any instructions to this effect which you may deem expedient.

Her Majesty's Government are most anxious to proceed in this matter in concert with the other Four Powers, and are ready to make some sacrifices of opinion in order to arrive at unanimous action. But if your Excellency should find it impossible to obtain an unanimous assent of your colleagues to any course of proceeding on this matter which would be consistent with the principles upon which the British Government is acting, or which could be likely to attain the objects in view, your Excellency is authorized to act in concert with a less number than the Four, if you shall find that any reasonable and effectual course of proceeding is assented to by such a proportion of the Five as may give to that course adequate moral weight and sufficient physical means.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 249.

*Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale.**

My Lord, *Foreign Office, August* 25, 1839.

NOTHING has hitherto happened to alter the opinion of Her Majesty's Government as to the nature of the final settlement which it would be desirable for the Five Powers to effect between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, nor to change the belief of Her Majesty's Government, that if the Five shall agree to press any given arrangement upon Mehemet Ali, the union of the Five will carry with it a moral weight sufficient to obtain from Mehemet Ali acquiescence in their decision.

The British Government is still of opinion, that there can be no security for the peace of Europe, as far as that peace depends upon the affairs of the Levant, until Syria shall have been restored to the direct rule of the Sultan; because, till then, the Porte cannot be safe from those aggressions on the part of the Pasha, which would lead to the direct interference of Russia in Turkey, and to consequent differences and collisions between the Powers of Europe; and the British Government is therefore of opinion, that the Pasha ought to be compelled to evacuate Syria, in exchange for the hereditary government of Egypt; and that the Five Powers have means of inducing compliance on his part, without occasioning events that would, as some persons seem to apprehend, bring on the very evil which all parties wish to avert.

And first, with respect to the arrangement itself; if Mehemet Ali is not to give up Syria, what are the alternatives? Why, first, that matters should be left exactly as they now are and lately have been; that is to say, that Mehemet Ali should continue in his present position as established by the arrangement of Kutaya, holding the Pashalics of Egypt and Syria at the annual will and pleasure of the Sultan, not by the formal tenure of annual appointment, but by the real tenure of the power of the sword. But to continue this state of things would be to do nothing, except to leave in still greater force all the dangers which have caused of late so much disquietude to the Powers of Europe. I say in greater force, because the Pasha being now stronger as against the Porte than he was last year, he would be more able, and therefore more likely, to execute the intention which he then proclaimed of declaring himself independent; and thus the Five Powers would have taken great pains to establish among themselves perfect unanimity and entire concert about the affairs of the Levant, for the mere purpose of doing absolutely nothing;—a result which might just as well have been the consequence of disagreement as of union, and which would justly expose them not only to the derision, but to the censure, of all the world.

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* Similar despatches were addressed, on the 27th of August, to Lord Clanricarde, Sir George Hamilton, and Mr. Bulwer.

The other alternative would be, that the Sultan should give to Mehemet Ali now, the grant of the hereditary government of Egypt, upon condition that Ibrahim should promise, that on the death of Mehemet he will evacuate Syria and Candia, and the Holy Cities. But would any man attach the slightest value to such a promise; and would not the grant of the hereditary government of Egypt be justly looked upon as a gratuitous and unrequited concession made by the Sultan to his subject, at the recommendation of the Five Powers, who set out by professing a chivalrous and disinterested determination to protect the Sultan against all encroachment?

Such an arrangement, moreover, would virtually and practically be to grant to Mehemet Ali the hereditary government of all that he now occupies; for if the Five Powers permit Mehemet to retain Candia, and Syria, and Arabia, because the Five are not strong enough to force him to evacuate those countries now, can it be supposed that the Sultan alone will be strong enough five or six years hence, at the death of Mehemet Ali, to do that which the Five Powers united cannot undertake at present? Or is it probable that the Five Powers will be more disposed then to help the Sultan in this matter than they now are? seeing that in the interval Mehemet and Ibrahim will of course have very much strengthened their position in the countries which they are then to be required to evacuate, and that even if the Five Powers should then be as unanimous as they now are, the difficulty to be overcome would have much increased during the interval.

Such an arrangement, therefore, would be practically an unconditional submission to all Mehemet Ali's demands; and if the Five Powers are prepared to advise the Sultan so to comply, it is difficult to see what is to be gained in point of honour by any of the parties to such a proceeding, by attempting to disguise the submission under the flimsy pretence that a part of the concession is only temporary, and limited to the life of Mehemet Ali. In such a case, Mehemet Ali would again urge the plea which he set up last year, and would say that he could not leave his family exposed after his death to the caprices of the Porte; and he would declare himself independent, as the only way to secure his family from future contingencies.

In fact, the natural and necessary consequence of any arrangement which should leave Mehemet Ali in possession of what he now occupies, must evidently be his casting off his nominal allegiance to the Sultan, and his declaring himself an independent sovereign. His desire for independence cannot be diminished by continuing him in his present extended state of occupation, but his means of asserting that independence will be greatly increased thereby; and thus the Five Powers, having set out in their negotiations on these matters by loudly proclaiming their steadfast determination to maintain the integrity of the Turkish Empire, will have effected as a first carrying out of that declaration the dismemberment of a vast and important portion of that empire.

If it be absolutely necessary that the Sultan should submit to such terms, he must, of course, bow to stern necessity; but far better would it be that he should do so from his own weakness, than from the advice and intervention of friends, who, professing to help, would interfere only to despoil.

But far preferable to such a dismemberment of the Turkish Empire would be a change in its dynasty, by the substitution of the family of Mehemet for that of the Sultan; and it would be wiser for the Powers of Europe to allow Mehemet Ali to march with his army and sail with his fleet to Constantinople, and to depose the Sultan, and to set himself up in his stead, than it would be for those Powers to pursue the course to which I am now adverting. For in such a case, though the dynasty were changed, the Turkish Empire would remain, with its territory undiminished and its resources unbroken; it would still be a substantive Power, capable of defending itself, and competent to maintain its place in the political community of States.

But such a course is impossible, for many reasons which it is needless to detail; and it appears to Her Majesty's Government that, consistently with the declarations of the Five Powers, and with a due regard for the great European objects which those Powers have in view, there is no other course open for them to pursue, but to carry into execution the arrangement which, giving to Mehemet Ali the hereditary government of Egypt, would restore to the direct authority of the Sultan all the other portions of the Turkish Empire now held and occupied by the Pasha.

Mehemet Ali would, of course, in the first place object to such an arrangement; he would threaten all kinds of violent proceedings, and would declare that he would fight to the death in order to resist what was demanded.

But he is far too shrewd and sagacious a man not to be able to measure the great disparity between his own force and that of the Five Powers acting in union with the Sultan, and carrying with them Christian strength and Mahomedan feeling.

The Allies would begin by the mildest means of coercion, and would avoid as long as possible any measures which would place the Pasha upon anything like a footing of equality with the instruments of pressure which they might use; but it is surely impossible seriously to contend that, if the Five Powers were united and determined, they would not succeed after a certain time, and probably without any very violent means, in obtaining the full submission of the Pasha to the arrangement which they were resolved to execute.

The fact is, that any one or two of the Five Powers, if acting cordially with Turkey, would be fully able, in no great length of time, and without any very great exertion, to compel the Pasha to acquiescence; but that which could not so be accomplished without the employment of a considerable military force, might, probably, if the Five Powers were united, be brought about by little more than the action of moral influence alone.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 250.

Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, August* 25, 1839.

I TRANSMIT herewith to your Excellency, for your information, a copy of two letters which I have addressed to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, signifying the Queen's pleasure, that Admiral Sir Robert Stopford should be ordered to execute any measures which he may be directed by your Excellency to carry into effect.

I likewise inclose two duplicates of the Letters of Instruction which the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty will have in consequence issued to Sir Robert Stopford, and which your Excellency will send on to that officer with the first orders which you may find it necessary to give to him.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 251.

Baron Werther to Count Bresson.—(Communicated by Baron Werther, August 26.)

Monsieur le Comte, *Berlin, le* 16 *Août,* 1839.

JE me suis empressé de placer sous les yeux du Roi, mon auguste Maître, la lettre que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'adresser à la date du 24 Juillet, ainsi que la dépêche de M. le Duc de Dalmatie du 17, qui s'y trouvait jointe en copie.

Sa Majesté a daigné me charger de vous exprimer, M. le Comte, qu'Elle a vu avec une véritable satisfaction dans cette communication, un nouveau gage de la sollicitude désintéressée que les Grandes Puissances Européennes vouent à la conservation de la Monarchie Ottomane sous la dynastie actuellement régnante. Comme le Roi, mon auguste Maître, est persuadé que l'Empire Ottoman forme l'un des élémens les plus essentiels de l'équilibre politique de l'Europe, la Prusse usera de toute l'influence dont elle dispose, pour contribuer à préserver de toute atteinte l'intégrité et l'indépendance de cet Empire et l'autorité souveraine du Sultan. La Prusse ayant de tout tems suivi cette ligne à l'égard de la Turquie, ne s'en départira pas dans les graves conjonctures du moment actuel; elle n'hésitera donc pas à accorder son appui moral aux efforts que feront les Cabinets qui exercent une action directe sur l'Orient, pour atteindre le but sur lequel d'ailleurs, d'après l'intime conviction du Roi, mon auguste Maître, toutes les Grandes Puissances sont parfaitement d'accord.

Je saisis, &c.,
(Signé) WERTHER.

(Translation.)

Baron Werther to Count Bresson.—(*Communicated by Baron Werther, August* 26.)

Monsieur le Comte, *Berlin, August* 16, 1839.

I HASTENED to lay before the King, my august Master, the letter which you did me the honour to address to me, dated the 24th July, together with the despatch from the Duc de Dalmatie, of the 17th, a copy of which accompanied your letter.

His Majesty has deigned to instruct me to inform you, M. le Comte, that he has seen, with real satisfaction, in that communication a new pledge of the disinterested solicitude which the Great European Powers entertain for the preservation of the Ottoman Monarchy under the reigning dynasty. As the King, my august Master, is convinced that the Ottoman Empire is one of the most essential elements of the balance of power in Europe, Prussia will exert all the influence at her disposal in order to contribute to defend from every attack the integrity and independence of that Empire and the sovereign authority of the Sultan. Prussia, having always followed that course with regard to Turkey, will not depart from it during the present serious juncture; she will not, therefore, hesitate to lend her moral support to the efforts which the Cabinets that exercise a direct influence in the East will make, to attain the object on which moreover the King, my august Master, is firmly convinced that all the Great Powers are perfectly agreed.

I take, &c.,
(Signed) WERTHER.

No. 252.

Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Bulwer.

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 27, 1839.

I INCLOSE to you, for your information, a copy* of an Instruction which I have addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna, respecting the mode of proceeding to be adopted by the Five Powers, in conducting their negotiations, and planning their measures about the affairs of the Levant; and I have to instruct you to communicate the substance of this instruction to Marshal Soult.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

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* See No. 248, p. 315.

No. 253.

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received August* 29.)

My Lord, *Paris, August* 26, 1839.

FROM a conversation I had this morning with Marshal Soult, I am induced to apprehend, that the French Government will now throw obstacles in the way of the selection of Vienna as the place for settling and agreeing upon the affairs of the East; nor will it allow its Ambassador the power to give instructions to the French Admiral in the Mediterranean. The cause of this is to be sought in the difference which really exists in the views of the French Government as to the manner of dealing with Mehemet Ali, and those which are entertained by the other Powers; and I think it probable that the Marshal, seeing this, will endeavour to escape from the necessity of either opposing, or consenting to, any resolution to which those Powers, if negotiating together, might come conjointly.

It appears, indeed, possible, that the Cabinet of France may create a question out of the Note lately presented by Count Medem, and thus endeavour to direct attention from Alexandria to St. Petersburgh.

At all events, I fear that no decided measures of a coercive character will be employed by France for limiting the ambition of the Viceroy, or for restoring the fleet of the Sultan.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 254.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received August* 29.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, July* 26, 1839.

I WAITED yesterday, in company with the Austrian Consul-General, on Mehemet Ali, whom I found in his Divan with the Capudan Pasha and M. Cochelet.

The conversation was at first general, and the Capudan Pasha, who has now put aside his former dress and adopted one similar to that worn by Mehemet Ali, remarked that he could not be blamed at Constantinople for his change of dress, as there also they had resumed their ancient costumes.

Soon after the Capudan Pasha retired, and Mehemet Ali then entered upon the subject of his relations with the Porte, and of his desires and opinions with respect to Hosrew Pasha.

He told my two Colleagues and myself, that if the Sultan were to send to him the grand decoration, and at the same time to concede to him the succession in his family (*l'hérédité*) of all his present Governments (he does not, I believe, demand the Pashalic of Mecca and Medina, which in fact is vested in Ibrahim Pasha, and not in Mehemet Ali), he would accept the decoration as a mark of respect and homage to his Sovereign, but he would not accept the succession of his Governments, so long as Hosrew Pasha was retained in power or place; and that he would remain in his present position; but if Hosrew Pasha were removed, he would then immediately send back the fleet of the Capudan Pasha to Constantinople; would recall Ibrahim Pasha to Egypt; and would, without any hesitation, proceed, himself, in his steamer to Constantinople, to pay his homage to his Sovereign, and to give his best aid and counsels in what would add to the glory of the Sultan, and to the power and welfare of his Empire.

Mehemet Ali has written to the different Pashas of Pashalics (sixteen, I believe, in number), to urge them to be faithful to their young Sultan, and to give their best services for the good of the Empire; but calling on them, at the same time, to assist in promoting the removal from power of Hosrew Pasha, as no security for any good can be held out, or can take place, so long as that Seraskier remains at the head of affairs.

From this may be seen the strong enmity existing between Mehemet Ali and Hosrew, and which is of very long standing; and on this point he is as may be expected, fully seconded by the Capudan Pasha, who most probably will have written to all his friends and partisans, to the same effect and purport.

I learn that Ibrahim Pasha is at Marash with the head-quarters of his army, and that the corps which he had sent to Orfa, before the arrival of Captain Caillier, will be withdrawn to the west of the Euphrates, as soonas possible.

The greater part of the Capudan Pasha's fleet are anchored in this port, and the remainder will also be brought in, as will also be the fleet of Mehemet Ali.

Hosrew Pasha has written to the Capudan Pasha to say, that if he will return with his fleet to Constantinople, no notice will be taken of his late defection, and that a full pardon and oblivion of the past will be accorded.

The Capudan Pasha has replied, that he has not been, nor does he intend to be, disloyal to his Sovereign; that what he has done has been for the interest of the Sultan and of the Turkish Empire, and to remove the fleet out of the power of the intrigues of Hosrew Pasha; and that he will not return so long as the latter remains in power.

It has been remarked, that in the letter of Hosrew Pasha to the Capudan Pasha, he addresses him as "Effendem Sultanem," and only addresses Mehemet Ali as "Sultanem;" and those who understand the Turkish language say, that the address to the Capudan Pasha, of "Effendem Sultanem," is of a higher style than the address to Mehemet Ali.

Perhaps this may have been done expressly, in order to flatter the Capudan Pasha; but I cannot but think from what I know of Mehemet Ali, that he will have been much annoyed by this mark of distinction made between him and the Capudan Pasha, and the more so, in the actual state of affairs, and the present position of all the parties.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

No. 255.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 29.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, July* 28, 1839.

M. COCHELET, the Consul-General of France, received by the French steamer from Constantinople, on the 25th instant, a letter from Admiral Roussin, transmitting four letters to the respective addresses of Mustapha Pasha, the next in command to the Capudan Pasha, of the Patrona Bey, of the Capitana Bey, and of the Reala Bey.

Admiral Roussin wrote to M. Cochelet, that Hosrew Pasha had given those letters to him, in order that they might be sent to the Consul-General for their sure delivery by him.

M. Cochelet gave them to Mehemet Ali, who, after seeing the Capudan Pasha, sent for the four Admirals to whom the letters were addressed, and gave them to them. These letters, which were from Hosrew Pasha, were torn up by those with apparent indignation.

I shall not remark on the conduct of Admiral Roussin, in wishing to impose on M. Cochelet such a task, nor on the conduct of M. Cochelet, in giving the letters to Mehemet Ali.

I have now the honour to transmit to your Lordship, the translation of a letter from Mehemet Ali to Hosrew Pasha, in consequence of his sending the letters to the four Admirals, and by which your Lordship will be made fully aware of the substance of them.

I further transmit the translation of a letter sent by Mehemet Ali to the principal Pashas of the Porte, and amongst others to the Pasha of Tripoli, in which Mehemet Ali calls on them to make common cause against Hosrew Pasha.

A corvette of the Viceroy has been sent to Salonica, with five of Mehemet

Ali's confidential officers, who are charged with those letters for the Pashas of Salonica, Roumelia, Silistria, Albania, Monastir, and other places.

Your Lordship will perceive, that Mehemet Ali must be well aware of the co-operation of those Pashas in his views and feelings, when he openly sends a corvette and confidential officers to them.

Mehemet Ali told me three days ago, that he was having made a translation of parts of the "Code Civil" of France, to be ready when the dismissal or retirement from affairs of Hosrew Pasha should enable him to go to Constantinople; and that he would then propose to the Sultan some analogous changes, but above all, the most perfect security for property and persons of every class and religion, and also a pure, impartial, and speedy administration of justice; and that he hoped still to see Turkey sufficiently strong to support itself against any efforts of Russia.

The Pasha appears resolved not to recede from his demand for the removal of Hosrew Pasha, nor will he accept of less than the hereditary succession in his family, of Egypt, all Syria, and Candia, for which he would pay tribute, and be a faithful vassal to the Sultan; and he evidently hopes to be able to arrange all this with the Sultan in an amicable manner, provided that his great enemy Hosrew Pasha be removed.

In regard to the hereditary succession to Syria, it is possible that the Porte may refuse it; but I am fully convinced, that if the Porte were now to obtain possession of Syria, on the same footing as before its occupation by Mehemet Ali, that country would for many years be the scene of the direst anarchy and misery, and all European commerce would be destroyed and rendered impossible.

I am aware, my Lord, that such is not the opinion at Constantinople, nor, indeed, of all Her Majesty's Consular Servants in Syria; but it is the deliberate opinion which I have formed from what I have seen, and from facts which I have heard, and to the accuracy of this opinion I would readily pledge myself.

Ibrahim Pasha has received invitations from all the leading people in Asia Minor, to send troops to protect them from the brigandage which most unfortunately reigns in that country; but he will not send a soldier across the Euphrates.

The whole of the Turkish and Egyptian fleets are now in this port, and some of the large Turkish ships have had part of the guns and stores taken out, as otherwise they could not have entered.

The Pasha has ordered two palaces to be prepared for some personages of distinction, who are expected in a steamer from Constantinople, with a mission to the Viceroy. It is reported that Halil Pasha, the brother-in-law of the young Sultan, is one of those, and that the others are two principal Ulemas.

Mehemet Ali is so fully and so well informed of what passes at Constantinople, and in every part of Turkey, that I have never yet known him to be mistaken in the intelligence which he has communicated to myself and colleagues; and thus he always anticipates, and is prepared for every event and circumstance. In fact, there is not a secret for him in the Divan at Constantinople.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Inclosure 1 in No. 255.

Mehemet Ali to Hosrew Pasha.

(Suivent les titres.)

(Traduction.)

VOUS m'avez adressé, par Akif Effendi, une lettre où vous me dites que les circonstances étant changées, les griefs qui nous tenaient séparés doivent être mis en oubli comme s'ils n'avaient jamais existé, et que nous fassions cause commune.

La connaissance que j'ai depuis longtems de votre nature ne me permettant pas d'avoir confiance en ces paroles, je vous ai répondu que vous voulussiez bien ou changer de sentimens et de conduite, ou offrir votre démission. Dans le même tems que je vous écrivais cela, je me disais: "Cet homme-là ne pourra pas s'empêcher de manifester son caractère par quelque acte qui prouvera qu'il n'est pas changé." Et voilà que l'évènement vient justifier ma prévision! En effet, à peine avez-vous eu connaissance de l'arrivée de la Flotte Impériale dans les eaux d'Alexandrie, que vous vous êtes empressé d'expédier au Général Mustafa et aux trois autres officiers supérieurs, des lettres où vous représentez le Capitan Pacha comme traître, et, tout en blâmant leur conduite, vous les exhortez à se saisir de lui et à retourner à Constantinople avec la Flotte. Ce fait seul ne doit-il pas me convaincre que je ne me suis pas trompé dans le jugement que j'ai porté de vous? Si vous pensez que Méhémet Ali ne vous connait pas, ou qu'on le trompe sur votre compte, vous êtes dans l'erreur: Il ne vous connait que trop!

La démarche que vous reprochez au Capitan Pacha ne lui appartient pas en propre. Le Général et les trois officiers supérieurs dont il a été parlé, tous enfin, ont agi d'un commun accord, après en avoir délibéré en conseil.

Ces mêmes officiers supérieurs, et peut-être d'autres encore, ont témoigné par écrit, de leur libre participation à cet acte.

Les quatre lettres envoyées par Votre Altesse ont été fidèlement remises à leurs adresses.

Ces officiers ne sont pas passés à l'étranger pour mériter que vous les traitiez comme vous le faites.

Il était plus convenable et plus conforme à votre dignité que vous leur disiez: "Qu'informé de l'éloignement de la Flotte, vous aviez appris avec plaisir qu'elle était venue mouiller à Alexandrie qui est un port de l'Empire; qu'entre nous tous désormais il ne saurait y avoir séparation; que dans les conjonctures présentes, nous devions nous unir et agir de concert en toutes choses; que vous aviez informé Sa Hautesse de leur arrivée sur les côtes d'Egypte, et qu'Elle s'en était montrée contente; enfin, qu'en se dirigeant vers ce point, ils étaient entièrement dans nos idées d'union."

Un pareil langage les aurait rassurés, flattés, et aurait confirmé ce que vous avancez dans la lettre que vous m'avez adressée par Akif Effendi; mais, c'est inutile; votre naturel ne vous permet pas d'avoir de la fixité dans les idées, et je suis toujours plus fortifié dans mon opinion sur vous.

L'action du Capitan Pacha et des autres personnes sous ses ordres, n'est pas (ce qu'à Dieu ne plaise) un crime de félonie envers Sa Hautesse. Chacun d'eux avait pénétré, comme moi, votre caractère, et aucun n'avait confiance en vous. Vous voyez donc bien que ce n'est pas seulement Méhémet Ali qui se méfie de vous, mais je pourrais dire la nation entière. Mais sachant cela, j'ai voulu préserver le pays de troubles et de dangers en vous engageant à vous démettre du Vizirat et de rentrer dans la vie privée. Cette résolution serait honorable pour vous et avantageuse pour tous. En souvenir de nos anciens rapports, j'ai voulu vous répéter ce conseil.

C'est maintenant à vous de réfléchir sur ce que vous avez à faire. En vous retirant des affaires, consentez à délivrer les grands, et la nation en général, d'une pénible méfiance.

(Translation.)

Mehemet Ali to Hosrew Pasha.

(Titles.)

YOU have addressed me, through Akif Effendi, a letter in which you tell me, that circumstances being changed, the grievances which held us separate ought to be buried in oblivion, as if they had never existed, and that we should make common cause.

The knowledge which I have long since had of your nature not permitting me to have confidence in these words, I answered you, that you should be so good as either to change your sentiments and your conduct, or to offer your resignation.

At the same time that I thus wrote to you, I said to myself,—"That man will not be able to forbear showing his character by some act which will prove that he is not changed:" and behold the result has justified my anticipation! In fact, scarcely had you knowledge of the arrival of the Imperial fleet in the waters of Alexandria, than you hastened to send to General Mustafa, and to the three other superior officers, letters in which you represented the Capudan Pasha as a traitor, and, at the same time that you blamed their conduct, you exhorted them to arrest him, and to return to Constantinople with the fleet. Ought not this act alone to convince me, that I am not deceived in the judgment which I have held of you? If you think that Mehemet Ali does not know you, or that he is deceived about you, you are mistaken: he knows you but too well.

The proceeding with which you reproach the Capudan Pasha does not belong to him peculiarly. The General and the three superior officers of whom it has been spoken, all, in fact, have acted by common agreement, after having considered it in council.

These same superior officers, and perhaps others besides, have expressed, in writing, their free participation in this act.

The four letters sent by Your Highness have been faithfully delivered according to their addresses.

These officers have not passed over to a foreign country so as to deserve that you should treat them as you do.

It was more suitable and more conformable to your dignity that you should say to them,—"That, informed of the removal of the fleet, you had learnt with pleasure that it was moored at Alexandria, which is a port of the Empire; that between us all there could henceforth be no separation; that in the present juncture we ought to unite ourselves and to act in concert in everything; that you had informed His Highness of their arrival on the coast of Egypt, and that he had shown himself content with it; in short, that in proceeding hither they were acting entirely in conformity with our ideas of union."

Such language would have reassured and flattered them, and would have confirmed what you set forth in the letter which you addressed to me through Akif Effendi: but it is useless; your nature does not allow you to have firmness in your ideas, and I am always more confirmed in my opinion of you.

The deed of the Capudan Pasha, and of the other persons under his orders, is not (God forbid) a crime of felony against His Highness. Each of them divined, like myself, your character, and none had confidence in you. You see well, then, that it is not Mehemet Ali only who mistrusts you, but I may say the whole nation. But knowing this, I have wished to save the country from troubles and from dangers, in begging you to resign the office of Vizier and retire into private life. This resolution would be honourable for you and advantageous for all. In remembrance of our former relations, I have wished to repeat to you this advice.

It is now for you to reflect on what you have to do. By retiring from office, consent to free the higher classes, and the nation in general, from a painful state of mistrust.

Inclosure 2 in No. 255.

Circular addressed by Mehemet Ali to the Chief Pashas of the Porte

(Suivent les titres.)

(Traduction.) 13 *Djemmad-Evel*, 1255.

SANS doute qu'à cette heure votre Excellence est informée que Sultan Abdoul-el-Medjid Khan, notre tout-puissant Seigneur, s'est assis sur le trône de son vénéré père, passé à meilleure vie. Que sa mémoire vive longtems parmi les hommes! Cette nouvelle me fut apportée par Akif Effendi, Secrétaire du Haut Conseil de la Sublime Porte, envoyé auprès de moi en mission. Aussitôt après que ce glorieux avènement me fût notifié, tous les forts d'Alexandrie et les bâtimens en rade l'annoncèrent à la population, par des salves d'artillerie qui continuèrent trois jours consécutifs, se répétant trois fois entre le lever et le coucher du soleil. Il en a été de même au Caire et dans tous les chef-lieux des pays que je gouverne. J'écrivis en

même tems à mon fils bien-aimé Ibrahim Pacha, et aux Gouverneurs des provinces, qu'ils eussent à faire faire dans toutes les mosquées, grandes et petites, les prières usitées en pareille occasion pour notre nouveau Seigneur, très-haut et très-pur.

Le Séraskier d'Orient, Hafiz Pacha, à la tête d'un corps d'armée considérable, a été excité par les intrigues de Hosreff Pacha à passer l'Euphrate; et d'après les instructions qu'il a reçues, ce Général a fomenté des troubles et suscité des révoltes à Payass, à Giaour-daghi, et dans le district d'Antab. Afin d'épargner le sang Musulman, je mis tout en œuvre pour ne pas donner lieu, le premier, aux hostilités, et j'écrivis plusieurs fois dans ce sens à mon fils. Cependant, lorsque Solyman Pacha de Marache fut venu occuper Antab, et que j'eus des motifs de croire que les mouvemens séditieux pouvaient, à force d'intrigues, se propager dans l'intérieur du pays, si je continuais à rester dans la même inaction, et qu'ainsi seraient compromis et peut-être perdus tous les heureux fruits que mon zèle et mes efforts de tant d'années avaient fait éclore et prospérer sous le soleil bienfaisant de notre Auguste Seigneur, je me décidai, dans cette extrémité, de chaudes larmes aux yeux, et un glaive aigu au cœur, de donner l'ordre à mon courageux fils Ibrahim Pacha, de ne plus hésiter à combattre, ajoutant que, si la victoire nous restait fidèle, il passât l'Euphrate, réunît les troupes d'Adana au grand corps d'armée, qu'il le divisât ensuite en deux colonnes, dont l'une marcherait sur Marache et pousserait en avant, et dont l'autre s'avancerait vers Ourfa et Diarbékir. Mais à peine ai-je eu connaissance de l'avènement au trône de notre jeune Souverain Abdoul Medjid, que, sans en attendre la notification officielle, je me dis: "Que tout ce qui est passé soit passé;" et je m'empressai de transmettre contr'ordre à mon fils, en lui enjoignant de ne pas poursuivre les résultats de la victoire de Nézib, et de ramener l'armée en deçà de l'Euphrate, si déjà elle l'avait franchie. Je demandai ensuite à Dieu qu'il protégeât notre honoré Seigneur, qu'il le fit vivre des jours sans fin, et que, sous son ombre tutélaire, tous ses serviteurs fidèles, grands et petits, eussent les biens de la vie en abondance, et jouissent d'une félicité sans bornes.

Mais un homme s'est montré, Hosreff Pacha, le seul artisan de tous les maux dans lesquels l'Empire est plongé depuis trop longtems, qui, faisant tourner les difficultés du moment au profit de ses coupables projets, s'est comme arrogé, de son autorité privée, le titre éminent de Grand Vizir, et j'ai lu dans l'Ordonnance Impériale, qu'il en remplira les fonctions avec de pleins-pouvoirs. Ce fameux personnage, depuis son entrée aux affaires jusqu'à aujourd'hui, non seulement n'a rien fait d'utile pour le Trône Impérial, ni pour la nation, mais même toute sa carrière présente une suite d'actions fatales à l'Etat, aux peuples, et à moi. Tout le monde sait quels services importans et nombreux je me suis toujours empressé de rendre au très-majestueux Sultan que Dieu nous avait donné; tout le monde sait aussi de quelle manière j'en ai été récompensé. Lorsque Hosreff Pacha, en 1240, vint à Alexandrie, quel accueil ne lui fis-je pas, dans l'espoir que sa vieille haine contre moi céderait à mes procédés généreux, et qu'il me serait plus facile d'appeler sur moi, par son entremise amie, la bienveillance de notre honoré Seigneur. Combien je me trompais! A peine de retour à Constantinople, cet illustre Pacha remua toute la somme de fiel accumulé depuis longtems contre moi, et en ne portant aux pieds du Souverain que des mensonges et d'odieuses calomnies, il réussit à mettre la désunion entre Sa Hautesse et un homme qui disposait de forces imposantes de terre et de mer: et vous savez combien de sang Musulman ses perfidies ont fait verser. A cela ne s'est point borné son génie malfaisant: il a causé la ruine d'un nombre immense de familles puissantes et dévouées, et il a converti leurs maisons en demeures de hibous. Il a fait plus encore: par l'effet de ses honteux manèges et de ses funestes inspirations, les heureuses qualités que la nature avait départies à notre Maître, de longue mémoire, s'étaient changées en penchans peu conformes à la dignité Impériale. Sans tenir compte des circonstances, sans nécessité, Hosreff Pacha a suggéré et nourri l'idée de faire des guerres imprudentes, sans autre but que de préparer la dissolution de l'Empire et de semer la discorde entre les Grands. Tous ces méfaits sont restés impunis.

Cette fois-ci encore il s'est mis en avant, et il a dit: "Moi seul et pas un autre." Or, comme notre grâcieux Souverain est encore dans un âge fort tendre, Hosreff Pacha, n'obéissant plus qu'à son caprice, va lâcher la bride à ses passions haineuses, et les manifester, sans retenue, par des actes qui doivent conduire la nation Musulmane à sa perte. Telle est sa coûpable pensée. Quand on étudie avec réflexion la conduite qu'il a tenue jusqu'à ce jour, il est facile de pressentir celle qu'il tiendra à l'avenir. L'Amiral Achmet Pacha a été le premier à préjuger de ses actes futurs par ses actes passés. "Hosreff Pacha," s'est-il dit, "est un être dangereux et gonflé de venin. La flotte que Sa Hautesse a formée avec tant de peine, irai-je, dans les circonstances critiques où nous nous trouvons, la mettre entre les mains d'un homme qui bientôt aura détruit tout ce qui a été si péniblement opéré? Non! je ne le ferai pas. Je me rendrai à Alexandrie; les deux flottes de l'Empire s'uniront: c'est le moyen de servir utilement le Souverain et la nation." Les officiers de l'Escadre Ottomane partageaient les sentimens de leur chef, et toutes choses ayant été concertées en commun, le signal du départ fut donné; et huit jours avant la date de cette lettre, nos yeux ont vu vingt-cinq voiles Impériales embellir la rade d'Alexandrie. Les deux escadres, aujourd'hui réunies et confondues, croisent devant les passes du port. Elles appartiennent toutes les deux à Sa Hautesse. Son Excellence le Capitan Pacha, comme vous ne devez pas en douter, a été reçu ici avec la distinction due à son haut rang, et il continue d'être traité avec les mêmes égards. Quant à moi, ancien et fidèle serviteur de l'Empire, je ne pouvais plus me résigner à voir un homme tel que Hosreff Pacha agir dorénavant de la même manière qu'il l'a fait par le passé. En conséquence, mon devoir m'a commandé de lui écrire pour l'engager à offrir sa démisiosn, et avec cette réponse j'ai fait repartir l'Envoyé Akif Effendi. J'ai adressé en même tems des lettres à l'illustre Tante et à la glorieuse Mère de notre bien-aimé Seigneur, au Cheik-el-Islam, l'incorruptible défenseur des lois, ainsi qu'au noble Halil Pacha, les conjurant de prendre en considération le malheureux état de la nation, et d'agir pour éloigner Hosreff Pacha des affaires, et lui donner un remplaçant. A cause de l'amitié que j'ai toujours portée aux Pachas dévoués aux intérêts de la nation Musulmane, j'ai voulu leur faire part des démarches que j'ai faites; et comme Votre Excellence compte au nombre des plus grands et des plus fidèles, je lui envoie la présente lettre par un de mes Agas. Lorsque, par la grâce de Dieu, elle lui sera parvenue heureusement, Votre Excellence jugera convenable, je l'espère, de concourir à l'éloignement de Hosreff Pacha des affaires, et par là, elle aidera à atteindre le but que doivent se proposer les vrais Osmanlis,—la tranquillité du pays et la prospérité de l'Empire.

(Translation.)

Circular addressed by Mehemet Ali to the chief Pashas of the Porte.

(Titles.)

13th Djemmad-Evel, 1255.

WITHOUT doubt, by this time your Excellency is informed that Sultan Abdul-el-Medjid Khan, our all-powerful Lord, is seated on the throne of his revered father, who has passed to a better life. May his memory long live among men! This news was brought me by Akif Effendi, Secretary of the High Council of the Sublime Porte, sent to me on this mission. As soon as this glorious event was notified to me, all the forts of Alexandria and the ships in the roadstead announced it to the population by salutes of artillery, which continued three days consecutively, being repeated three times between the rising and setting of the sun. It has been the same at Cairo, and in all the chief places of the countries which I govern. I wrote at the same time to my much loved son, Ibrâhim Pasha, and to the Governors of the Provinces, that they were to cause to be made in all the mosques, great and small, the prayers usual on a like occasion for our new Lord, most high and most pure.

The Seraskier of the East, Hafiz Pasha, at the head of a considerable army, had been excited by the intrigues of Hosrew Pasha to pass the Euphrates; and according to the instructions which he received, this General has fomented tumults, and aided revolts at Pyass, at Giaour-daghi, and in the district of

Aintab. In order to spare Mussulman blood, I used all my exertions in order not to be the first to give occasion for hostilities, and I wrote many times to this effect to my son. Nevertheless, when Solyman Pasha of Marash had come to occupy Aintab, and that I had reason to believe that seditious movements might, by means of intrigues, be propagated in the interior of the country, if I continued to remain still inactive, and that thus all the happy fruits which my zeal and my efforts for so many years had made to bud and prosper under the beneficent sun of our August Lord, might be endangered, and perhaps destroyed, I decided, in this extremity, with warm tears in my eyes, and with, as it were, a sharp sword in my heart, to give the order to my courageous son, Ibrahim Pasha, to refrain no longer from fighting; adding, that if victory should continue faithful to us, he should pass the Euphrates, unite the troops from Adana with the main army, which he should then divide into two columns, one of which should march upon Marash, and push onwards, and the other should advance against Orfa and Diarbekir. But hardly had I knowledge of the accession to the throne of our young Sovereign Abdul Medjid, than, without waiting for the official notification of that event, I said to myself, "Let all that has passed be passed;" and I hastened to send counter orders to my son, enjoining him not to follow up the results of the victory of Nezib, and to bring back the army on this side of the Euphrates, if it had already crossed that river. I then prayed God to protect our honoured Lord, that he would make him live for ever, and that, under his protecting shadow, all his faithful servants, great and small, should have the goods of life in abundance, and enjoy happiness without bounds.

But a man, Hosrew Pasha, has appeared the sole artificer of all the evils into which the Empire has for a long time been plunged, who, turning the difficulties of the moment to the advancement of his own culpable designs, has assumed, as it were, to himself, on his own authority, the eminent title of Grand Vizier; and I have read in the Imperial Ordinance, that he will fulfil the functions of it with full powers. This famous personage, since his entry into affairs until to-day, has not only never done anything useful for the Imperial throne or for the nation, but even all his career presents a train of actions fatal to the State, to the people, and to me. All the world knows what important and numerous services I have always been eager to render to the most magnificent Sultan whom God had given us; all the world knows also in what manner I have been rewarded. When Hosrew Pasha, in 1240, came to Alexandria, what reception did I not give him, in the hope that his ancient hatred against me would yield to my generous proceedings, and that it might be more easy for me to attract to myself, by his friendly intervention, the goodwill of our honoured Lord! How was I deceived! Scarcely had this illustrious Pasha returned to Constantinople, when he roused up the whole mass of animosity for some time accumulated against me, and in carrying to the feet of the Sovereign nothing but lies and odious calumnies, he succeeded in sowing disunion between His Highness and a man who had at his disposal imposing land and sea forces; and you know how much Mussulman blood his perfidies have made to flow. His mischievous spirit did not confine itself to this; he has caused the ruin of an immense number of powerful and devoted families, and he has converted their houses into dwellings for owls. He has done more; by the effect of his hateful intrigues and of his fatal suggestions, the good qualities which nature had bestowed upon our Master, of long memory, changed into inclinations little consistent with the Imperial dignity. Without regard to the circumstances, without necessity, Hosrew Pasha has suggested and nourished the idea of making imprudent wars, for no other purpose than to prepare the dissolution of the Empire, and to sow discord among the great. All these misdeeds have remained unpunished.

This time, again, he has put himself in front, and he has said, "I only, and no other." Now, as our gracious Sovereign is still in a very tender age, Hosrew Pasha, obeying only his caprice, will give rein to his odious passions, and will manifest them, without restraint, by acts which must conduct the Mussulman nation to its destruction. Such is his wicked design. When one studies with reflection the conduct which he has pursued up to this day, it is easy to anticipate that which he will pursue in future. The Admiral, Achmet Pasha, has been the first to conjecture his future acts from his former acts. "Hosrew Pasha," said he, "is one likely to be dangerous and swollen with venom. The fleet which His Highness had formed with so much trouble shall I, in the critical circumstances in which we are, go and place it in the hands of a man who will soon have destroyed all that which has been so laboriously effected? No! I will not do it. I will proceed to Alexandria; the two fleets of the Empire shall unite; this is the way of usefully serving the Sovereign of the nation." The officers of the Ottoman squadron partook of the sentiments of their Chief, and everything having been agreed in common, the signal for departure was given; and, eight days before the date of this letter, our eyes saw twenty-five Imperial ships embellishing the roadstead of Alexandria. The two squadrons now united and mingled together, cruize before the mouth of the port. They both belong to His Highness. His Excellency the Capudan Pasha, as you cannot doubt, has been received here with the distinction due to his high rank, and continues to be treated with the same respect. As for me, an ancient and faithful servant of the Empire, I could no longer reconcile myself to seeing such a man as Hosrew Pasha act henceforth in the same manner which he has done formerly. In consequence, my duty has enjoined me to write to him, to request him to offer his resignation, and I have made the Envoy, Akif Effendi, return with this answer. I have addresed, at the same time, letters to the illustrious Aunt and glorious Mother of our much loved Lord, to the Sheik-el-Islam, the incorruptible defender of the laws; also to the noble Halil Pasha: conjuring them to take into consideration the wretched state of the nation, and to act so as to displace Hosrew Pasha from office, and to give him a successor. On account of the friendship which I have always borne towards the Pashas devoted to the interests of the Mussulman nation, I have wished to communicate to them the proceedings which I have adopted; and as your Excellency counts among the number of the greatest and most faithful, I send you the present letter by one of my Agas. When, by the grace of God, it shall have happily arrived, your Excellency will judge it advisable, I hope, to concur in the dismissal of Hosrew Pasha from office, and by that means you will assist in attaining the object which the true Osmanlis ought to propose to themselves, —the tranquillity of the country and the prosperity of the Empire.

No. 256.

Mr. Acting-Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received Aug.* 29.)

My Lord, *Aleppo, July* 30, 1839.

I DO myself the honour to inclose herewith, for your Lordship's information, copies of my despatches of the 15th and 23rd instant, to Viscount Ponsonby, together with copies of their several inclosures, in a letter I received from Captain Davies, of Her Majesty's ship "Dido," under date of the 5th instant; my answer to him of the 15th instant; a letter addressed to Captain Davies by Mr. Vice-Consul Hays of the 3rd instant; and a letter I addressed to his Excellency Solyman Pasha, relating to Mr. Ainsworth and Mr. Russell; as also extract of a letter I wrote to Mr. Vice-Consul Hays, on the 10th instant; all of which will, I hope, meet with your Lordship's approval.

Since closing the above despatches to his Excellency the Ambassador, I have to inform your Lordship, that M. Caillier, Marshal Soult's Aide-de-camp, who has been with his Excellency the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha, at Marash, reached this from thence on the 28th instant. He left his Excellency the Seraskier at Marash, on the 25th instant, at which time the Egyptian forces continued on the frontiers, stationed as I had the honour of mentioning in my despatch of the 15th instant to his Excellency the Ambassador.

M. Caillier, I hear, states that a great portion of the forces are suffering very much from fever, occasioned by the late great exposure, the want of water, and the very great heats of this year, which are unprecedented.

I am told that M. Caillier remains here until he receives an answer from his Government to despatches he has written; the reason of his leaving his Excellency at Marash, is attributed to his being unwell, caused by his late exposure to the great heats of the summer.

I beg leave further to inform your Lordship, that his Excellency Solyman Pasha, (Colonel Sèves,) who had obtained leave from his Excellency the Seraskier to come to Aleppo and recruit his health after his late fatigues, of which his Excellency was feeling the bad effects at Aintab, had left that place for this; but half way his Excellency changed his course, and proceeded to Nezib and Birejick; some say that it was in consequence of a post that reached him from the Seraskier, with orders to repair in that direction; others assert that this change of route of his Excellency was voluntary, wishing to again see Nezib and the field of battle, in order to take some notes which he required.

It is further reported, that his Excellency the Seraskier intended to leave Marash soon, and go to Aintab, but his arrival there is not yet positively known.

His Excellency the Seraskier is very much vexed against the inhabitants of Aintab for the late rebellious spirit they showed to his Government, and has in consequence, for a punishment, ordered the Ferdeh Tax in that town to be taken three times over.

I am happy to acquaint your Lordship, that his Excellency Ismael Bey, Governor of this town, who has undertaken operations against the malcontents of Richa and Jessir Soghr, on the Latakia road, has successfully terminated the affair, and that district is again perfectly quiet. His Excellency has proceeded to Hamah and Homs, and from thence returns here.

So that the whole of this consular district is now much quieter than it has been of late, although in the Alexandretta district irregularities continue to be practised from time to time by those mountaineers.

There are no correct advices at present as to where his Excellency Hafiz Pasha is, though it is generally believed that he is in the direction of Malatia with the remains of his army.

I am also informed by a respectable country merchant of this place, who has dealings on the other side of Orfa, that letters have been received here from the direction of Diarbekir, from the villages of Siverik and Chermook, which state that the Koords and Turcomans in that neighbourhood are all up in arms, and that it is impossible for any person to go from thence either to Diarbekir or Malatia.

I have also to acquaint your Lordship, that Maggiun Bey, who was sent by his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha to Orfa, continues to be there, and has, I am told, been joined by his Excellency Selim Pasha, who commanded the forces in the Adana district, and has been replaced for the time by his Excellency Achmet Menekly Pasha, late Minister of War.

This Government has, within the last two or three weeks, sent a very large force of Irregulars in the direction of Orfa; but I do not hear, for the moment, of the regular force being increased.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) F. H. S. WERRY.

P.S.—I am this moment informed, just as I am closing my packet, that his Excellency Solyman Pasha has reached this, which I hasten to submit to your Lordship.

Inclosure 1 in No. 256.

Mr. Acting-Consul Werry to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Aleppo, July* 15, 1839.

I HAD the honour of addressing your Lordship under the 1st instant, transmitting copy of a dictated narration made to me by a M. Petit, in the Sultan's Seraskier's service, and who was present at the engagement which took place under the 24th ultimo, between the Turkish and Egyptian forces, which details I hope, ere now, will have reached your Lordship's hands.

Captain Davies, of Her Majesty's ship "Dido," having informed me, under date of the 5th instant,—copy of which, with my answer thereto. under this day's date, I beg to inclose herewith for your Lordship's information, —that he would, on his return from a cruize on the coast, take any communication I might have for your Excellency relating to the movements of the Egyptian army, I avail of it to lay before your Lordship the further movements of the Egyptian forces under the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha, since the engagement between the two armies under the 24th ultimo, which I have elicited from a good channel, and one that has the appearance of being correct.

His Excellency the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha, after having taken possession of all the provisions, ammunition, and military stores, &c., found in the Turkish camp at Nezib, proceeded with a small force to the banks of the Euphrates, opposite Birejick, where the Osmanli army had another depôt, which the Seraskier took possession of; and then sent across the river a Musselim to Bir, to take charge of that town; and, it is said, ordered another one to proceed to Orfa for the same purpose.

His Excellency then directed Mahomed Bey, Colonel of the Annadis, to cross the Euphrates with his troops, and put under his charge four regiments of regulars and some artillery, with orders to leave part at Bir for the service, and advance himself with the rest to Orfa, and there wait for orders.

This has now been confirmed, by the arrival of several persons who reached this on the 13th instant, with a caravan from Orfa, and who state that, when they left that place, the colonel of the Bedouin Cavalry, with two Infantry regiments, one of Cavalry, and a few pieces of artillery, had reached there, and were very well received: that on passing through Bir, they observed that the force there was composed of about a regiment of Infantry, with some few artillery. They add, that when they left Orfa, the Egyptian forces had not advanced any further in that direction.

His Excellency Ibrahim Pasha, with all the army, left Nezib on the 28th ultimo, and proceeded to Aintab, which place he reached without any opposition; Solyman Pasha, of Marash, flying when he heard of the approach of the Egyptian arms. His Excellency the Seraskier from thence advanced with some of the Cavalry and Light Artillery on Marash, which place he also reached, and was very well received.

I beg leave to inform your Lordship, that M. Caillier, Marshal Soult's aide-de-camp, who is on a mission to his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha, and who reached this, on the 26th ultimo, left again on the 28th for Nezib, hoping to find there his Excellency; but on his arrival, he found that the Seraskier had left that place; consequently, M. Caillier, I hear, proceeded after his Excellency the Seraskier, and did not come up with him, until he reached Marash. No authentic advices have been received here by any person from M. Caillier, as to the issue of his mission; but it is generally reported, that on M. Caillier's reaching and presenting to his Excellency the letter he was bearer of from his Highness the Viceroy Mehemet Ali, his Excellency immediately acquiesced in its contents, which were, that he was not to advance any further after receipt of his Highness's letter.

The last advices from Marash, state that his Excellency the Seraskier continued there, and would not, from all appearances, march any further forward, in consequence, it is said, of the letter he received from the Viceroy by the French Envoy.

I learn that the French Consul here has received a letter from Solyman Pasha (Colonel Sèves), who says, that his Excellency the Seraskier is at Marash with some Cavalry, and that he is at Aintab with four regiments of Infantry; the remainder of the forces, with the exception of four regiments that are at Bir and Orfa, are *échelonnées* from Aintab along the northern frontiers, as far as Adana, and again from Aintab to Nezib.

The roads of this district are still very unquiet: a few days back some discontent had manifested itself in the direction of Richa and Jessir Soghr, on the road from hence to Latakia, at which latter place the inhabitants rose and killed the Musselim with some of his attendants. In consequence of this reaching the Seraskier's ears, the governor of this town received orders from his Excellency to proceed immediately to that district with some Irregular Cavalry, and quell the disturbances in that neighbourhood.

I was informed yesterday by the Government here, that his Excellency Ismael Bey had reached Richa, and had destroyed 120 of the malcontents of that place, sending here a great many others prisoners, and several loads of arms that were seized: and further, that his Excellency had gone from thence to Jessir Soghr, in search of those who killed the Musselim of that place, whom he is determined to punish, and purposes to destroy that village and its inhabitants, for, I hear, they have at all times shown symptoms of discontent. The 18th Regiment of Infantry reached this yesterday from the main army; they have received four months' pay, and were marched out this morning for Jessir Soghr, where they are to co-operate with the Irregulars under his Excellency Ismael Bey, against the malcontents of that district.

By Mr. Vice-Consul Catziflis's last advices under the 10th instant from Tripoli, he advises that his district had reassumed its tranquillity, and that the Mutualis fled on the approach of the Egyptian troops that were sent down to act against them.

The Alexandretta district, by Mr. Vice-Consul Hays' advices of the 3rd instant, had assumed a more tranquil appearance. Mustook Bey had fled from Byass, though the mountaineers continued still, from time to time, to commit irregularities. I inclose copy of a letter addressed by Mr. Vice-Consul Hays to Captain Davies, of Her Majesty's ship "Dido," and which will fully inform your Lordship as to the state of the mountaineers in that district.

The town of Aleppo is perfectly quiet.

In consequence of the intercepted state of the roads in the direction of Adana, there are no late advices from thence, with regard to the movements of the Egyptian arms on that northern frontier and the defile of the Taurus. The Government say, that they have received of late no advices from that quarter; but it is currently reported in the town that, at the time the engagement took place between the two armies at Nezib, the body in the defile of the Taurus advanced also under his Excellency Selim Pasha, and a collision took place between them and the Osmanli column on the Koniah line, under Hadji Halil Pasha, in which some say, that the Egyptians met with a reverse and were obliged to retreat back to the defile; others again advance that the Osmanli troops were also defeated on that line; but now that the roads from hence to Adana are again beginning to be open, I hope the first arrivals from thence will bring us some news. I shall not fail to transmit immediately to your Lordship, whatever advices I may receive thereon from Mr. Vice-Consul Jones of that district.

The general and prevalent opinion here among the public is, that the Sultan's Seraskier, his Excellency Hafiz Pasha, after the defeat of his troops at Nezib, directed his course, with several Pashas and Viziers, on Malatia, where it is said, he found Izzet Pasha, who was advancing on that line with 30,000 men.

There have been no arrivals from that quarter since the battle; but I hear, that several persons are soon expected, from whom I shall not fail to obtain every information on that point.

I have not yet received an answer to the letter I addressed his Excellency Solyman Pasha, copy of which I beg to inclose for your Lordship's information, respecting the fate of Mr. Ainsworth and Mr. Russell, who, according to M. Petit, as I had the honour of informing your Lordship, under the 29th ultimo, were in the Turkish camp the day of the engagement.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) F. H. S. WERRY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 256.

Mr. Acting-Consul Werry to Viscount Ponsonby.

(Extract.) *Aleppo, July* 23, 1839.

I HAD the honour of addressing your Lordship under the 15th instant, which despatch I sent to Alexandretta, to be forwarded to your Lordship by Her Majesty's ship "Dido," together with copy of my letter, under that day's date, to Captain Davies in command of that vessel.

I have to acquaint your Lordship, that I learn from M. Guys, the French Consul here, that he has received a letter from M. Caillier, who tells him, that he is still at Marash with his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha, and where he will remain, until he receives an answer from Paris to despatches he has written to the Government *viâ* Egypt.

The French Consul further adds, that from what he has elicited, Ibrahim Pasha is likely to continue at Marash, and keep his forces stationed on the frontier for some time longer, in consequence of advices, that there are still several bodies of the Sultan's troops moving about Asia Minor, whose direction his Excellency wishes to ascertain previous to retiring his troops, and is occupied in vigilantly watching their movements; thus the Egyptian forces who fought at Nezib, having made a junction with the column at Adana and on the defile line, are stationed on the frontiers, so as to form a cordon, extending from Adana along the whole range of the Taurus to Marash, and from that line to the Euphrates, besides four regiments of regulars, who have crossed the river and have advanced, under Mahomed Bey, as far as Orfa. Some persons of the country say, that a Mussellim under this Government is in authority, even beyond Orfa, at a place called Samsat. But I am assured, that his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha, after the interview he had with M. Caillier, sent immediately orders to the officer in command of the forces which had advanced to Orfa, to march no further forward on that line.

The last two or three days this Government has received orders from his Excellency the Seraskier, to send all the Irregular Cavalry at present here to Orfa: so that detachments of these troops have been leaving this daily since then.

I also learn from the Government here, that his Excellency Solyman Pasha, who has been at Aintab since the engagement, will be here in the course of a day or two. With regard to the movements on the Sultan's territory, it is currently reported and believed, that his Excellency the Seraskier Hafiz Pasha, after the battle which took place at Nezib, retreated with all his Pashas and the remains of his army, not amounting to 4,000 men, to Malatia, and where, it is asserted, he continues, having been joined by Izzet Pasha with about 30,000 men; and that Hadji Halil Pasha who had advanced on the Koniah line towards the defile, had also retreated back to Koniah. And, I am assured by a person of credit, that no collision ever took place on that line between the Turkish and Egyptian forces.

Yesterday a letter was received by the Government from his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha at Marash, inclosing a firman, received from his Highness the Viceroy of Egypt, stating that the Sultan Mahmoud had been succeeded by Sultan Abdul Medjid, who had ascended the throne; and ordering that prayers should be read at the different mosques on the occasion; and a salute of twenty-one guns was fired three times during the day, on Sultan Medjid's ascending the throne.

I am happy to be able to inform your Lordship, that the irregularities that have been lately committed in the Richa and Jessir Soghr districts, on the Latakia road, have entirely subsided. This Government having received advice from his Excellency Ismael Bey, Governor of this town, who went with a force to act against these malcontents, and clear those passes, that he had entirely dispersed the discontented spirits of that district, and that those roads were again tranquil and perfectly secure; that the inhabitants of both these places had given in their submission, and had come forward for pardon, with a promise of remaining quiet and faithful to the Government. Thus the whole of this Consular district is now pretty tranquil to what it has been, although some irregularities have been lately committed by the inhabitants of two towns.

Inclosure 3 in No. 256.

Mr. Acting-Consul Werry to Captain Davies.

(Extract.) *Aleppo, July* 15, 1839.

I BEG leave to inform you, that from intelligence I obtained from the Major-General of the forces, his Excellency Solyman Pasha, while here, the total amount of forces under his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha, that assisted at the battle of Nezib, are 43,000 men, 39,000 of which are regulars, and 3,000 to 3,500 irregulars, with 156 pieces of artillery.

At Adana, and in the defile of the Taurus, there are about 15,000 men, 10,000 of which are regulars, and the remainder irregulars.

There are also on the mountains of Tripoli, called Akkar, two regiments of Infantry, and one of Cavalry, acting against the Mutualis inhabiting those mountains, and who have lately evinced discontent.

At Byass there is also a regiment of Infantry.

Inclosure 4 in No. 256.

Mr. Vice-Consul Hays to Captain Davies.

(Extract.) *Alexandretta, July* 3, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to grant receipt of your letter under date, Her Majesty's ship "Dido," Alexandretta, July 2, informing me of your having received official information from Mr. Acting-Consul Werry at Aleppo, of the defeat of the Turkish Army by his Highness Ibrahim Pasha, and requesting me to inform you, whether, after that event and the flight of Mustook Bey, and the desertion of his followers, which I had the honour to communicate to you verbally, I consider the property of Her Majesty's subjects likely to be in danger for the present at Alexandretta.

I beg to state, that I do not think the British property at Alexandretta to be in danger for the present, as I consider that the defeat of the Turkish Army and the flight of Mustook Bey, will deter the mountaineers and other disaffected persons in this district from venturing into the plains, although the events of the last two days prove, I am sorry to state, their still unsettled condition.

These events have been the murder of three persons near Serisekili, about half-way between this place and Byass, on the 30th ultimo; and yesterday, about the same place, an attack of the Government post, under an escort of two mounted police (Buluk Bashis force), in which one of the police was killed, and the other badly wounded, with also two balls in his horse; the fate of the post has not yet been ascertained, the wounded man having been able only to escape back to Alexandretta.

Accounts received from Byass on the 28th ultimo, state that Mustook Bey, on receipt of news of the defeat of the Turkish Army, was deserted by all his followers, and with difficulty made his escape across the frontiers.

I am unable to state particularly the number of land forces under the command of his Highness Ibrahim Pasha; but from the best information I have been able to obtain, the estimated number before the commencement of hostilities was about 65,000 regulars and 15,000 irregulars, which, it appears, have been increased, since the defeat of the Turkish Army, by the enrolment of deserters from that camp into the Egyptian Irregular Cavalry.

With regard to the information you require, whether I am aware of any ships of war building or about to be built within the province of

Syria, I beg to inform you, that there is no establishment for the building of ships of war within the province of Syria; but I understand from Mahomed Bey, the head builder at Alexandretta, who was here last month, for the purpose of examining the timber of these mountains, and selecting the best adapted for ship-building purposes, that orders were issued for laying down twelve ships of the line and frigates, with the least possible delay, at Alexandretta.

I shall feel obliged by information of your probable movements, that I may transmit such to Mr. Acting-Consul Werry, at Aleppo, for his guidance.

Inclosure 5 in No. 256.

Mr. Acting-Consul Werry to Solyman Pasha.

Général, *Alep, le* 3 *Juillet,* 1839.

M. PETIT, Français, Instructeur attaché à l'Armée Turque de Hafiz Pacha, et qui a été fait prisonnier, se trouvant maintenant à Alep, il m'a dit qu'il avait vu au camp des Osmanlis deux Anglais nommés Mr. Ainsworth et Mr. Russell, qui, en voyageant pour lever des plans de géographie, se sont trouvés au milieu du camp Turc, apparemment en venant du côté de Biredjick, car, m'a-t-il dit, que depuis quelque tems ces deux Anglais voyageaient dans l'Asie Mineure pour compte de la Société Géographique de Londres; il m'a ajouté ensuite, qu'après la bataille, lui (M. Petit) se trouvant chez vous, on vous porta dans ce moment là, des papiers écrits en Anglais (apparemment appartenants aux susdits Messieurs), et que vous eutes la bonté de dire, en les voyant, "Eh bien, je les transmettrai au Consul Anglais d'Alep;" en conséquence de ce, je prends la liberté, Général, non seulement de vous prier de me faire passer ces papiers par la première sûre occasion, mais de vouloir bien m'obliger de prendre toutes les informations possibles sur le compte de ces Messieurs, pour m'en donner des nouvelles, c'est-à-dire savoir ce qu'ils sont devenus. Il m'a été dit que M. Molinari vient d'acheter une selle à l'Anglaise d'un de vos soldats (Hanadis), et cette circonstance me donne de fortes inquiétudes sur le sort des dits Anglais.

J'ose attendre de votre bonté accoutumée, que vous pourrez me donner quelques nouvelles positives des susdits Messieurs, dont je connais l'un très-particulièrement. Dans l'attente d'être honoré d'une réponse agréable, agréez-en d'avance, Général, mes remercimens les plus sincères, ainsi que mes excuses de la peine que je vous donne, et je vous prie de me croire avec les sentimens de la plus haute considération, &c.

(Signé) F. H. S. WERRY.

(Translation.)

Mr. Acting-Consul Werry to Solyman Pasha.

General, *Aleppo, July* 3, 1839.

MONSIEUR PETIT, a Frenchman, an instructor attached to the Turkish Army of Hafiz Pasha, and who was taken prisoner, being now at Aleppo, has told me that he saw in the camp of the Osmanlis two Englishmen, Mr. Ainsworth and Mr. Russell, who, travelling for the purpose of taking geographical surveys, arrived in the midst of the Turkish camp, apparently coming from the direction of Biredjick, for he told me that for some time past these two Englishmen have been travelling in Asia Minor in behalf of the Geographical Society of London; he then added, that after the battle, while he (M. Petit) was with you, some papers written in English (apparently belonging to the above-mentioned gentlemen) were brought to you, and that you had the goodness to say, on seeing them, "Well, I will transmit them to the English Consul at Aleppo;" in consequence of this, I take the liberty, General, not only to request you to send me these papers by the first safe opportunity, but also to oblige me by obtaining all possible information respecting these gentlemen, in order to give me some intelligence with regard to them, that is to say, to let me know what has become of them. I have been told that M. Molinari has just bought an English saddle from one of your soldiers (Hanadis), and this circumstance gives me great uneasiness as to the fate of these Englishmen.

I venture to expect from your accustomed kindness, that you will be able to give me some positive intelligence respecting the above-mentioned gentlemen, one of whom I know very intimately. In the expectation of being honoured with a favourable answer, receive in anticipation, General, my most sincere thanks, as well as my apologies for the trouble which I am giving you; and I beg you to believe me, with sentiments of the highest consideration, &c.,

(Signed) F. H. S. WERRY.

No. 257.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received August* 29.)

(Extract.) *Alexandria, July* 30, 1839.

HAVING seen it asserted in the speeches of some French Deputies, that Ibrahim Pasha was only the adopted son of Mehemet Ali, I mentioned it to him, and asked him if Ibrahim Pasha was his own son, or if he was the son of his wife by a former husband.

The Pasha replied, that his wife never had any other husband but himself, and that she bore to him five children, all born at Cavalla in Roumelia, the native town of himself and of his wife. That the eldest child, a female, who has been dead for some years, was the wife of Moharem Bey (now here). Ibrahim Pasha was the second, and the others were Toussoon Pasha and Ismael Pasha (both dead), and Nayli Hanim, the widow of the late Defteretan.

The Pasha added, that all his other children were the offspring of separate and different mothers.

No. 258.

Mr. Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received August* 29.)

My Lord, *Damascus, August* 2, 1839.

IT appears that Bir and Orfa were taken possession of by the Egyptian troops, previous to Ibrahim Pasha having reoccupied Aintab, and having himself advanced to Marash. The Egyptian Government continues to be actively employed in making preparations on the Aleppo frontier, by sending to the different points occupied by the forces, considerable supplies of ammunition and military stores, I presume with the intention to be in an attitude more effectually to bring to a conclusion the pending Question between Mehemet Ali and the Sultan, which the recent composition of the Sultan Medjid's Ministry would not indicate as likely to be easily accomplished favourably to Mehemet Ali.

I make no doubt your Lordship will be particularly informed on the advantages the present positions occupied by the Egyptian forces offer to Mehemet Ali, either for immediate offensive, or future aggressive, operations. The former, viewed distinctly from any connexion with the latter, would appear necessary, not only for the defence of the north of Syria, but absolutely requisite to govern and control the whole of that border. The malcontents of the lower ranges of the Taurus, extending from and above Marash to Byass and northward along the Adana province, as well as south to Beylan and Alexandretta, never can be kept in check without Marash is placed in the hands of whatever Power is called on to govern the Aleppo Pashalic: and unless this post is put in the hands of the Egyptian Government, a warfare will always exist on those mountains. Bir and Orfa, considered in the same sense, are essential, though not to a parallel extent as the occupation of Marash is, to control the mountaineers, to constrain, control, and govern the Arab tribes east of the Euphrates, and prevent them from passing that river on the line to Dair; the occupation of the two former places by the Sultan's troops rendered the southern desert frontier of the Aleppo Pashalic a continual field for the incursions and depredations of the Arab tribes, and prevented the Egyptian Government, with all the irregular Bedouin Cavalry force employed on that service, from protecting it effectually. The district of Orfa is also one of great agricultural resource, on which at all times the Pashalic of Aleppo, conjointly with its own, relied for its supplies of grain; and notwithstanding the extension of agriculture in Syria, Orfa would derive considerable advantage by the sale of its harvests at Aleppo, of which the late occupation of that district by the Sultan's authorities have deprived the population on both sides.

The occupation of Marash, Bir, and Orfa, by the Egyptians, considered as giving aggressive power to that Government, differs in its relative advantage. Marash does not offer, more than Aintab, means to the Egyptians to prosecute offensive operations; both lie on the direct road to Malatia, or to Kaisserieh to Koniah. Marash is consequently immediately requisite to the Egyptian Government for the proper governing and protection of the lower ranges of the Taurus; while allowed to remain in the hands of the Sultan, it offers the means of immediate aggression on the Egyptian territory, both in a military and insurrectionary point of view, as the late operations of Hafiz Pasha on that line fully establish.

With respect to the aggressive advantage the possession of Bir and Orfa offers to the Egyptians, either to the north of Mesopotamia and Anatolia, or to the south of the former to Babylonia, it is self-evident; and it may only remain for your Lordship to decide whether it is politic or expedient that Mehemet Ali should establish his depôts to the east of the Euphrates, having the free passage of that river, to enable him to carry his operations in either direction; if to the south, which will at once bring him in connexion with Koordistan, and eventually with Persia, should he not pursue aggressive measures towards Babylonia, will enable him to exercise considerable influence throughout that line of country; and if to the north of Mesopotamia and Anatolia, will equally awaken the jealousy of Russia and the Sultan, or enable the former to be in intelligence with Mehemet Ali; while placed within his old limits in Syria on this side of the Euphrates, unconnected with any views north or south in Mesopotamia, he will be in a position distinct and separate from all other Powers, and more within the control and under the influence of Great Britain. This is supposing Mehemet Ali is, or may be, destined to be an instrument in the hands of the Governments of Western Europe, or such others as by a defensive pacific policy may form a balance in opposition to the views of Russia in the Levant and the East.

With a view to diminish the burdens levied on the population of Syria, also to prevent both the Sultan and Mehemet Ali endangering the pacific policy of the European Powers, by the presence of imposing armies on the northern frontier, it might be advisable for both Powers to maintain such forces only between Malatia and Diarbekir on one side, and Aleppo on the other, as are sufficient to hold and govern the intermediate countries in a pacific sense; and that, with the exception of the force at Aintab and Marash, but weak garrisons should be kept at Bir and Orfa, leaving the space between the Euphrates and Aleppo, as it was before, without any. Though it should not be considered that these countries can be held or governed without the presence of a regular military force, which will always necessitate the Egyptians to have a strong force at

Aleppo; and the Sultan, for the same reason, will require similar forces at Diarbekir and Moussul, otherwise the line to Bagdad will soon be interrupted by the Koords, Sinjars, and other population. The distinction and difference would be in keeping up in these countries a force sufficient to govern and control, and not one to undertake aggressive operations between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali; and in this pacific sense, if both the Sultan and Mehemet Ali could be brought to consider that it would be productive of the establishment and the prolongation of amicable relations between them, neither Mesopotamia or Syria need be overburdened with the maintenance of excessive large armies.

Mr. Pro-Consul at Aleppo will, I presume, inform your Lordship of the measures taken by the Egyptian Government to extinguish the insurrectionary movements at Richa and Jessir Soghr. I hear this has been accomplished; and the force of 12,000 men, regulars and irregulars, employed on that service, is on its march hither, first to act against the Mutualis on the Balbec line, which have been now some time in insurrection. The Emir Gewad Harfoush fled from hence, after having made his submission to the Government; and it is said he has been killed in a recent rencontre between him and the Egyptian irregulars. This force, commanded by his Excellency Ismael Bey of Aleppo, will afterwards, passing through Damascus, proceed to the Haouran, where a portion of the inhabitants of the Agloun district refuse to pay taxes or listen to the Government; and also against a body of Druses who are now in arms at the Ledgea, in consequence of the Emir Guionblate having been recently seized and decapitated here with seven others, for having been found in arms infesting the roads. This Emir was cousin to the one of that family who is at Constantinople, and who has been a long time in intelligence with the malcontent Druses in these parts. Government will experience some further delay and difficulty in completely extinguishing these insurrections: the population generally disbelieving the death of the Sultan and the accession of Abdul Medjid; and still less will they listen to the defeat of Hafiz Pasha; in other respects, Damascus, and indeed the surrounding country, is tolerably quiet.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) N. W. WERRY.

No. 259.

Mr. Consul Moore to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received August* 29.)

My Lord, *Beyrout, August* 3, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship, that his Excellency Said Bey, the son of the Viceroy of Egypt, commanding the corvette "Damenhoor," arrived at this place on the 30th ultimo. His Excellency intends to visit Tripoli, and may probably cruize off this coast for a month or two.

On the 23rd ultimo, Mahmoud Bey, the Governor of Beyrout, notified publicly the accession of Sultan Abdul Medjid to the throne of Constantinople, and salutes were fired on the occasion during three successive days.

In this immediate neighbourhood all is tranquil; but on the Acre and Caiffa roads assassinations and robberies have been frequent of late. The Mutualis are also in arms in detached bodies, and have committed disorders in various directions. I fear it may be some time ere perfect tranquillity is restored in Syria.

By our latest advices, Ibrahim Pasha was at Marash.

Her Majesty's ship "Dido," Captain Davies, touched at this place on the 27th ultimo in search of Admiral Stopford. I informed Captain Davies that he would in all probability find the Admiral at Tenedos; he accordingly sailed for that destination.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) N. MOORE.

No. 260.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 29.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, August 7*, 1839.

A STEAMER of the Porte arrived here from Constantinople on the 5th instant, conveying Mujed Bey, the Capi Kiaja (Chargé d'Affaires) of Mehemet Ali to the Porte, and also Captain Anselme, attaché to the French Embassy at Constantinople.

The latter brought to me communications from his Excellency Viscount Ponsonby, as also similar communications from the Ambassadors of the Great Powers to their Consuls-General here.

I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship the copy of the despatch of Viscount Ponsonby to me, together with its inclosures Nos. 1 and 2.

I replied to Viscount Ponsonby by the French steamer which left at daylight this morning, and have the honour to transmit copy of my despatch to his Excellency, No. 3, together with copies of the inclosures sent to his Excellency, inclosures Nos. 4, 5, and 6.

Inclosure No. 4 is the Procès-Verbal of the interview of my colleagues and myself with the Pasha yesterday morning, and inclosures 5 and 6 are the documents alluded to in the Procès-Verbal.

I request to call your Lordship's attention to inclosure No. 6, by which you will perceive that the Porte was ready to accede to Mehemet Ali's demands in respect to the hereditary succession in his family of Syria, &c., when the collective communication from the Ambassadors of the Great Powers induced the Porte to leave the entire decision of the Oriental Question in the hands of the Great Powers.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Inclosure 1 in No. 260.

Viscount Ponsonby to Colonel Campbell.

Sir, *Therapia, July* 29, 1839.

I INCLOSE copy of a Collective Note signed by the Representatives of the Five Great Powers.

This Note was yesterday delivered to the Sublime Porte, and the Porte, without delay, gave its formal adhesion to the proposition contained therein.

You will acquaint the Pasha of Egypt with this fact. The Representatives of Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, have directed the Consuls-General of their respective Governments to communicate the above fact to the Pasha, and it is desired by all that the Consuls-General should act conjointly in performing what is desired of them.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 260.

Collective Note of the Five Powers.

[See Inclosure 1 in No. 226.

Inclosure 3 in No. 260.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Alexandria, August* 6, 1839.

I HAD the honour to receive yesterday, by the steamer of the Sultan, your Excellency's despatch of 29th July, together with the Collective Note signed by the Representatives of the Five Great Powers.

The procès-verbal which I have now the honour to transmit, together with its two inclosures, will put your Excellency in possession of the proceedings of my colleagues and of myself on this occasion.

M. Cochelet was of opinion, that we should address a Collective Note to the Pasha; but this was overruled by my colleagues of Austria, and Russia, and myself, and we therefore limited ourselves to the letter of your Lordship's despatch which was, "to acquaint the Pasha with the fact;" as we thought, that if we gave a note to the Pasha we might fall into the fault of either saying too much or too little.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) P. CAMPBELL.

Inclosure 4 in No. 260.

Procès-Verbal of Interview of the Consuls-General with Mehemet Ali.

LE 6 Août, à 9 heures du matin, Messieurs les Consuls-Généraux d'Autriche, d'Angleterre, de France, et de Russie, se rendirent chez le Pacha d'Egypte, à l'effet de lui notifier, à l'invitation qui leur avait été adressée à ce sujet par les Représentans de leurs Gouvernemens respectifs à Constantinople, la Note Collective adressée à la Sublime Porte le 27 Juillet, de la part de leurs Excellences, et dont ils venaient d'être munis simultanément par leurs Ministres respectifs.

Cette Note portait que la Porte Ottomane, d'après l'idée qui lui avait été annoncée par les Ambassadeurs et Ministres des dites Grandes Puissances, avait donné une adhésion formelle à la proposition de suspendre toute détermination définitive sans leur concours dans la Question Orientale et d'attendre l'effet de l'intérêt que les Grands Cabinets lui portent.

Le Gérant du Consulat-Général de Prusse se trouvant retenu chez lui par suite d'une indisposition, avait chargé le Consul-Général de Russie de faire connaître au Vice-Roi la participation de sa Cour à cette démarche.

A peine arrivés au palais et en présence de Son Altesse, les quatre Consuls-Généraux s'acquittèrent simultanément de la tâche qui leur était envoyée. Après avoir écouté la lecture de la Note Collective susmentionnée, Méhémet Ali leur annonça qu'il avait déjà eu connaissance de cette pièce par les informations qui lui avaient été adressées directement de Constantinople, et observa que la copie qu'il en avait reçue par Hosreff Pacha contenait quelque variété; savoir, au lieu de la "Question Orientale," on y avait mis la "Question Egyptienne;" et au mot "d'intérêt" on y avait substitué ceux de "dispositions bienveillantes." Cette pièce, rédigée en langue Turque, nous fut remise en traduction et en copie par le Vice-Roi et se trouve jointe à ce Procès-Verbal. En échange, Son Altesse demanda une copie de la Note Collective telle qu'elle nous avait été adressée, ce qui lui fut accordé.

Les Consuls-Généraux engagèrent ensuite le Vice-Roi à prendre note de cette dernière note, et lui annoncèrent que les Grandes Puissances feraient connaître par la suite à leurs Représentans, les résolutions qu'elles adopteraient dans leur haute sagesse et d'un commun accord, pour régler définitivement la Question Orientale d'après des principes d'équité, de convenance, et de stabilité pour l'avenir. Qu'en attendant la réception d'instructions directes et précises de leurs Cabinets, Son Altesse apprécierait sans doute les sentimens qui avaient dicté cette démarche de la

part des Cours Européennes, motivée sur le désir uni de rétablir et de conserver la tranquillité de l'Orient.

"Oui," répondit Méhémet Ali, "j'aime à croire que les Puissances d'Europe me jugeront avec équité, et en ce cas elles ne trouveront aucune difficulté de ma part à me soumettre à leur décision ; d'ailleurs, je n'ai que deux mots à articuler, ils vous sont connus : c'est l'hérédité de la Syrie et l'éloignement de Hosreff Pacha ; quant au premier point, il m'avait déjà été accordé, et Saïb Effendi était au moment d'être expédié à Alexandrie avec cette nouvelle, lorsque la médiation des Grandes Cours fit arrêter son départ. C'est Hosreff Pacha lui-même qui m'en donne l'avis, et Moufid Bey en a reçu l'assurance verbale de Sa Hautesse elle-même."

Sur la demande des Consuls-Généraux, la copie de la lettre du Grand Vizir constatant le fait précité, leur fut remise, et elle se trouve également jointe en traduction à ce Procès-Verbal.

Cet entretien n'avait duré guère au-delà d'une demi heure ; le Vice-Roi semblait fortement préoccupé, et sa contenance trahissait l'inquiétude que lui fesait éprouver l'ingérence des Grandes Puissances dans les Affaires d'Orient.

(Translation.)

Minute of Interview of the Consuls-General with Mehemet Ali.

ON the 6th of August, at 9 A. M., the Consuls-General of Austria, England, France, and Russia, waited upon the Pasha of Egypt, for the purpose of notifying to him, in conformity with instructions which had been addressed to them upon this subject by the Representatives of their respective Governments at Constantinople, the Collective Note addressed to the Sublime Porte on the 27th July by their Excellencies, and with which they had been simultaneously furnished by the Ministers of their respective Governments.

This Note set forth that the Ottoman Porte, in consequence of the intention which had been communicated to it by the Ambassadors and Ministers of the above-mentioned Great Powers, had given its formal adhesion to the proposition to suspend taking any final decision respecting the Oriental Question without their concurrence, and to await the result of the interest which the Great Cabinets feel for it.

The Acting Consul-General of Prussia being confined to his house in consequence of indisposition, had charged the Consul-General of Russia to make known to the Viceroy the participation of his Court in this measure.

Immediately upon their arrival at the palace, and in the presence of His Highness, the four Consuls-General simultaneously fulfilled their mission. After having heard the above-mentioned Collective Note read to him, Mehemet Ali informed them that he had already been made aware of this document by communications direct from Constantinople, and observed, that the copy of it which he had received through Hosrew Pasha differed in some degree; viz:—in lieu of "the Oriental Question" was put "Egyptian Question;" and for the word "interest," the words "benevolent dispositions" had been substituted. This document was drawn out in the Turkish language, and a copy thereof, as also a translation, were given to us by the Viceroy. They will be found appended to this Procès-Verbal. His Highness, in exchange, desired to have a copy of the Collective Note, such as it had been sent to us. This was complied with.

The Consuls-General then requested the Viceroy to take into consideration this last-mentioned document, and announced to him, that the Great Powers would hereafter make known to their Representatives the resolutions which, in their high wisdom and with a common accord, they should adopt, to settle finally the Eastern Question upon principles of equity, propriety, and future stability. And that, awaiting the reception of direct and precise instructions from their Cabinets, His Highness would, doubtless, appreciate the feelings which had prompted this measure on the part of the European Courts, founded, as it was, upon their

united desire to re-establish and to maintain the tranquillity of the East.

"Yes," replied Mehemet Ali, "I am inclined to believe that the Powers of Europe will judge me with equity; and in that case they will not find any difficulty on my part to submit myself to their decision. Moreover, I have but two words to say, and they are already known to you,—the hereditary Government of Syria, and the removal of Hosrew Pasha. With respect to the first, it had already been granted to me; and Saib Effendi was on the point of being sent to Alexandria with this news, when the mediation of the Great Powers caused his departure to be stopped. It is Hosrew Pasha himself who gives me this intelligence, and Moufid Bey has received a verbal assurance of it from His Highness in person.

At the request of the Consuls-General, a copy of the letter from the Grand Vizier, stating the above-mentioned fact, was given to them, and a translation thereof is likewise appended to this Procès-Verbal.

This interview lasted little more than half an hour. The Viceroy appeared to be much pre-occupied, and his appearance betrayed the uneasiness which the interference of the Great Powers in the affairs of the East caused him to experience.

Inclosure 5 in No. 260.

Translation from the Turkish, of the Note sent by the Porte to Mehemet Ali, as that received by it from the Representatives of the Great Powers.

LES Cinq Ambassadeurs des Puissances, Soussignés, conformément aux instructions qu'ils ont reçues hier de leurs Cours respectives, se félicitent d'avoir à annoncer aux Ministres de la Sublime Porte que l'accord des Cinq Grandes Puissances touchant la Question Egyptienne est certain, et ils prient que la Sublime Porte, en attendant le fruit de leurs dispositions bienveillantes, ne décide absolument rien sur la susdite question sans leur recours.

(Translation.)

Translation from the Turkish, of the Note sent by the Porte to Mehemet Ali, as that received by it from the Representatives of the Great Powers.

THE Five Ambassadors of the Powers, Undersigned, conformably to the instructions which they received yesterday from their respective Courts, are happy to have to announce to the Ministers of the Sublime Porte that the accordance of the Five Great Powers respecting the Egyptian Question is certain, and they entreat that the Sublime Porte, whilst awaiting the result of their benevolent dispositions, should not decide anything at all *(ne décide absolument rien)* with respect to the above-mentioned question without reference to them.

Inclosure 6 in No. 260.

Hosrew Pasha to Mehemet Ali.

(Suivent les titres.)

(Traduction.)

J'AI reçu par le retour d'Akif Effendi la réponse de Votre Altesse à la lettre que j'ai eu l'honneur de lui adresser par cet Envoyé, et j'en ai compris le contenu, ainsi que celui du rapport du même Akif Effendi sur les conférences qui ont eu lieu entre Votre Altesse et lui. J'ai déposé l'une et l'autre aux pieds de Sa Hautesse, qui en a pris connaissance, et je les ai communiquées ensuite aux principaux dignitaires de la Sublime Porte réunis en Conseil. Nous nous sommes réjouis en apprenant que

Votre Altesse, qui est un ancien feudataire de l'Empire, qui lui a rendu des services plus réels que tous les autres, qui, pour cette raison, est devenue l'un des plus grands de nos collègues, avait la noble pensée de faire cause commune avec les membres les plus influens et les plus dévoués de la nation Musulmane, et nous avons prié Dieu qu'il exauçât nos vœux communs d'union pour le bonheur de l'Empire. Dans sa réponse, qui renferme une espèce de reproche, Votre Altesse fait observer que dans la lettre que j'eus l'honneur de lui faire remettre par Akif Effendi, je ne parlais de la transmission par hérédité que des provinces Egyptiennes; mais ce n'était là qu'une forme employée pour annoncer à Votre Altesse son pardon. Du reste, Akif Effendi n'avait pas mission de traiter les affaires; il était seulement chargé de vous porter la nouvelle la plus désirable de toutes,—de votre rentrée en grâce; c'est pourquoi j'omis de donner à Votre Altesse de plus amples explications. Quoiqu'il en soit, tous les grands dignitaires de la Sublime Porte voulant, avec moi, que vous ayez la sécurité et toutes les garanties nécessaires, et étant prêts à associer leurs efforts aux vôtres pour la prospérité de l'Empire, après avoir pris les Ordres Suprêmes de Sa Hautesse, notre Auguste Maître, j'avais donné l'ordre à son Excellence Saïb Effendi, Ministre de la Justice, de se rendre auprès de Votre Altesse, à l'effet de s'entendre avec elle sur les demandes qu'elle a présentées, sur les services qu'elle a l'intention de rendre, et sur les mesures à prendre dans les conjonctures actuelles. Cet Envoyé allait partir sur le bateau à vapeur, lorsque les Ambassadeurs des Cinq Grandes Puissances ont remis à la Sublime Porte une Note signée par eux, dont la traduction se trouve dans la présente lettre. Son contenu fait connaître que les Cinq Grandes Puissances se sont mises d'accord pour discuter et régler les Affaires d'Orient. Immédiatement après la présentation de cette Note, les hauts dignitaires de la Sublime Porte se sont réunis de nouveau en Conseil, et ont été d'avis que l'ingérence des étrangers dans une affaire de suzerain à vassal est une chose assez peu convenable; mais considérant que les Cinq Grandes Puissances s'en étant déjà occupées de concert, le refus de leur médiation, contraire aux usages Européens, serait offensant pour elles, et pourrait attirer des embarras et du trouble à la nation Musulmane, vu l'état général des choses; réfléchissant, de plus, qu'à la suite de l'obtention de votre grâce et des projets d'union qui s'effectuent, les garanties d'un concours extérieur deviennent superflues, et que, dès-lors l'intervention ou la non-intervention des Puissances dans l'arrangement des affaires n'est d'aucune importance, les Grands assemblés, tout en faisant des vœux pour que nous n'ayons jamais à recourir aux étrangers, n'ont pas jugé à propos dans les circonstances actuelles, de repousser la demande imprévue des Cinq Ambassadeurs, et y ont donné leur adhésion. Nous avons désiré, et la volonté de Sa Hautesse est, que vous soyez informé avant tout de ce qui vient d'avoir lieu. C'est pourquoi le départ de l'Envoyé dont il a été question, se trouve suspendu. J'ai pris la liberté d'écrire la présente lettre à Votre Altesse, et je l'expédie par le bateau à vapeur. Après que Votre Altesse aura pris connaissance de son contenu, ainsi que des communications adressées par les Ambassadeurs aux Consuls-Généraux, je la prie de vouloir bien me faire connaître son opinion.

Ce 20 *Djemazi-el-evel*, 1255.

P. S.—Il a été convenu que votre Chargé d'Affaires à Constantinople, Moufid Bey, se chargerait de porter lui-même cette lettre à Votre Altesse, pour lui en développer de vive-voix le contenu. Votre Altesse connaîtra ainsi plus facilement les choses.

(Translation.)

Hosrew Pasha to Mehemet Ali.

(Titles.)

I HAVE received, by Akif Effendi on his return, Your Highness' answer to the letter which I had the honour of addressing to you by that Envoy, and I have understood its contents, as also those of the report by

the same Akif Effendi of the Conferences which took place between Your Highness and him.

I have laid both at the feet of His Highness, who took cognizance of them, and I communicated them, afterwards, to the Principal Dignataries of the Sublime Porte assembled in Council. We were highly pleased at learning that Your Highness, who is an ancient Feudatory of the Empire, who has rendered to it more real services than all the other Feudatories, and who, for this reason, has become one of the greatest of our colleagues, had the noble idea to act in common with the most influential and most devoted members of the Mussulman Nation, and we prayed God to fulfil our united vows for the prosperity of the Empire. Your Highness, in your answer, which contains a kind of reproach, observes, that in the letter which I had the honour of transmitting to you by Akif Effendi, I only mentioned the hereditary transmission of the Egyptian Provinces; but this was only a formula made use of to announce to Your Highness your pardon. Moreover, the mission of Akif Effendi was not to treat of affairs; he was only charged to convey to you the most desirable news of all,—your being readmitted into favour; it was on this account that I omitted giving to Your Highness any fuller explanation. However, all the High Dignitaries of the Sublime Porte desiring, with me, that you should have all necessary security and guarantee, and being ready to join their efforts to yours for the prosperity of the Empire, after having taken the supreme commands of His Highness, our August Master, I had given orders to His Excellency Saib Effendi, Minister of Justice, to wait upon Your Highness, for the purpose of coming to an understanding with you on the demands presented by Your Highness, on the services which you intend to render, and on the measures to be taken under present circumstances. That Envoy was on the point of departing with the steam-boat, when the Ambassadors of the Five Great Powers presented to the Sublime Porte a Note signed by them, of which a translation is inclosed in this letter. Its contents show that the Five Great Powers have come to an understanding to discuss and regulate the Affairs of the East. Immediately after the presentation of this Note, the High Dignitaries of the Sublime Porte met again in Council, and were of opinion that the interference of strangers in matters between a Sovereign and his vassal is far from being right; but, taking into consideration that the Five Great Powers have already been conjointly occupied with this subject, and that the refusal of their mediation, contrary to the usages of Europe, would offend them and might be the cause of inconvenience and trouble to the Mussulman Nation, considering the general state of things; bearing in mind also, that after your pardon and the projects of union which are about to be carried into effect, the guarantees of a foreign co-operation become superfluous, and consequently the intervention or non-intervention of the Powers in the arrangement of affairs is a matter of no importance;—the High Dignataries assembled, whilst anxiously hoping that we never need have recourse to strangers, have not deemed it expedient, under the present circumstances, to reject this unexpected demand of the Five Ambassadors, and have agreed to it. We have desired, and it is the pleasure of His Highness, that you should immediately be informed of what has taken place. On this account the departure of the Envoy abovementioned has been suspended. I have taken the liberty of writing the present letter to Your Highness, and I send it by the steam-boat. When Your Highness shall have become acquainted with its contents, and with the communications of the Ambassadors to the Consuls-General, I request you will let me know your opinion.

This 20th Djemazi-el-evel, 1255.

P.S.—It has been agreed that your Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople, Moufid Bey, should take this letter himself to Your Highness, to explain *vivâ voce* its contents. Your Highness will then learn the state of things with greater facility.

No. 261.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 29.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, August* 7, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship the copy of a letter written by me to Viscount Ponsonby, in reply to two notes from his Excellency, and which may be considered as semi-official.

Your Lordship will perceive that it was reported at Constantinople, that Ibrahim Pasha was advancing to Diarbekir, Harpoot, &c., but I can assure your Lordship that Ibrahim Pasha, according to the reports from Captain Caillier, and to every information received by my colleagues and myself from Syria, remains in the positions in which he was at the arrival of Captain Caillier at his head-quarters; and Mehemet Ali has assured me, that Ibrahim Pasha will not send a single soldier in advance; and I have already had the honour to inform your Lordship, that Ibrahim Pasha has refused to attend to the invitations sent to him by different authorities in Asia Minor, to send troops to their different districts.

I have more than once taken the liberty to intrude upon your Lordship my opinion relative to the hereditary succession of Syria to Mehemet Ali, which, I think, would be most advantageous to the Porte itself, and would tend to strengthen rather than to weaken it. But the chief reason for my opinion is, the misery which would ensue to the Christian and Jewish population in Syria, if that country were to be constituted as before: and I feel convinced, that not only would Syria then become a scene of anarchy and bloodshed, but European commerce also would be entirely destroyed.

This, my Lord, is not my own opinion alone, but it is also that of all my colleagues, and of the best-informed European merchants. Were Syria to be yielded in hereditary succession to Mehemet Ali, the case would be very different from that of Wallachia, Moldavia, &c., as not only do the Princes of those provinces profess the Greek religion, but they are also, from their geographical position, exposed to the powerful and immediate action of Russia; whereas, on the contrary, Syria is in quite a different position in those respects; and I cannot but take the liberty of expressing my intimate conviction to your Lordship, that the cession of Syria, in succession to Mehemet Ali, would not only be much to the advantage of Syria and of European commerce, but would also tend to strengthen the Ottoman Empire itself.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Inclosure in No. 261.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Ponsonby.

(Extract.) *Alexandria, August* 6, 1839.

I HAVE had the honour to receive your Excellency's two notes of the 26th and 27th of July.

Your Lordship informs me (and M. de Bouténeff writes the same to Count Medem), that Ibrahim Pasha is advancing to Diarbekir, Harpoot, &c., &c. I think I can positively assert that Ibrahim Pasha is not advancing, although such a report has been widely spread at Constantinople, where the reports regarding the Pasha are not usually correct, and are often too much exaggerated.

Ibrahim Pasha had, before the arrival of M. Caillier at his head-quarters, sent a corps to Orfa, but this corps will be brought (if not already so) to this side of the Euphrates; but he has not sent, nor will he send, any troops to Diarbekir, Harpoot, &c., &c.

It is not improbable (as your Lordship states), that the late successes of Mehemet Ali may hasten the destruction of the Turkish Empire, if the Government be not sufficiently wise to adopt the only course now likely to ward off such a catastrophe. I mean, by availing itself of the counsels and effective assistance which he has it in his power to afford.

The state of disorganization represented by the late accounts from Smyrna and Constantinople, to exist among the remains of the army in Asia Minor, though partly brought about by the defeat of the main body of the army, must have had its original cause in the precipitate measures resorted to by Sultan Mahmoud for bringing into the field a force greatly exceeding the resources of the country, destitute of officers, and without the elements of military discipline, which can alone keep an army together under difficult circumstances.

The interference of the European Powers in the ultimate settlement of Eastern Affairs, which the Pasha was the first to invoke, will now furnish a satisfactory guarantee against any views of aggrandizement he may have been supposed to entertain; and the army he possesses is in such a state of efficiency as to supply a sufficient force for the immediate protection of the Empire, and ample materials for the reorganization of the Turkish Army on a more improved system.

But unless Hosrew Pasha be removed, it will be in vain to look for any improvement in the management of affairs at Constantinople. He has inherited all the inveterate enmity of Sultan Mahmoud against Mehemet Ali, without any of his virtues, and would not hesitate to plunge the country into all the horrors of civil war, in order to gratify his ambition and revenge. On the other hand, Mehemet Ali and his son Ibrahim Pasha are now looked up to by the nation as the only individuals possessing the means of regenerating the Ottoman Empire. Mehemet Ali has expressed his readiness to support any administration not under the influence of Hosrew Pasha, and the confidence reposed in him by all parties would give a strong impulse to the work of reform.

The Pasha considers the union of the Turkish and Egyptian fleets as the most vital blow that could be struck against the designs of Russia, and it is viewed in that light by all the Sultan's officers here; as two or three more years of training under European instruction would render them quite a match for the Russian Navy, if they are not so already.

No. 262.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 29.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, August* 8, 1839.

WITH reference to my despatch of yesterday, I have now the honour to transmit to your Lordship the translation of a letter from Mehemet Ali to Hosrew Pasha, in reply to the letter which forms inclosure No. 6 in my despatch.

This letter appears to me to be of great importance, inasmuch as it proves that the Sultan had already accorded to Mehemet Ali all his demands, when the mediation of the Great Powers put a stop to any further proceedings.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Inclosure in No. 262.

Mehemet Ali to Hosrew Pasha.—(August 6, 1839.)

(Traduction.) (Suivent les titres.)

J'AI reçu la lettre que Votre Altesse m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser par mon Chargé d'Affaires Moufid Bey.

Votre Altesse m'informe qu'elle a pris connaissance du contenu de la dépêche que je lui adressai par Akif Effendi, et du rapport du même Envoyé; que les hauts dignitaires de la Sublime Porte réunis en Conseil, après avoir reçu communication de ma dépêche et du rapport d'Akif Effendi, étaient convenus, pour donner suite à ma demande, pour mettre à jour la nature des services que je pouvais rendre à l'Empire, et déterminer les mesures à prendre dans les circonstances actuelles, d'envoyer auprès de moi le Ministre Saïb Effendi par le bateau à vapeur, lorsque sur ces entrefaites, les Ambassadeurs des Cinq Grandes

Puissances ont présenté à Votre Altesse une note, dont vous me dites mettre la traduction dans votre dépêche, ajoutant que les Consuls-Généraux des Cinq Grandes Puissances résidant à Alexandrie me feraient des communications analogues, et que les rapports verbaux de mon Chargé d'Affaires me feraient mieux comprendre tout ce dont il s'agit.

Messieurs les Consuls-Généraux, qui ont reçu des dépêches de la part de leurs Ambassadeurs respectifs, m'ont communiqué leurs instructions, et mon Chargé d'Affaires m'a aussi fait part de ce qu'il devait me dire.

Mon seul but, mon unique désir, sont de faire ma soumission, et de rendre des services à notre magnanime et tout-puissant Seigneur et Maître. Mais j'ai très-humblement supplié Sa Hautesse qu'en considération de ma qualité d'ancien serviteur de l'Empire, et de mes services passés, sa générosité voulût bien remplir deux vœux que j'osai lui adresser. Je prie Dieu qu'il conserve l'auguste personne de notre Souverain sur le trône aussi longtems que le monde durera!

Lorsque mon Chargé d'Affaires a reçu l'ordre de se rendre auprès de moi, il a obtenu la faveur d'être admis à baiser les pieds de Sa Hautesse notre magnanime Seigneur, qui lui a dit: "Moufid Bey, fais mes complimens au Pacha; la prière qu'il a adressée au trône d'obtenir l'hérédité pour l'Egypte avec ses dépendances, je la lui accorde, et j'ai donné l'ordre qu'on réglât cette affaire."

Ces paroles bienveillantes de Sa Hautesse ont réjoui mon cœur, en ce qu'elles remplissent mon vœu le plus cher, l'obtention de l'hérédité, et me glorifient ainsi entre les Grands de l'Empire.

Ensuite, lorsque les dignitaires de la Sublime Porte étaient réunis en Conseil, ils ont répété à Moufid Bey: "Notre Seigneur et Maître vient d'accorder tout ce que Méhémet Ali Pacha avait sollicité aux pieds du trône, l'hérédité de l'Egypte avec toutes ses dépendances, et voilà que les Ambassadeurs des Cinq Grandes Puissances viennent de présenter cette note, dont il est nécessaire que Méhémet Ali prenne connaissance."

En suite de ce qui a été dit et fait, je me réjouis de ce que l'un de mes deux vœux est exaucé, et je vois que pour le second, on a eu l'air de le négliger pour le moment; nonobstant, j'espère qu'il me sera également accordé par la haute bienveillance de Sa Hautesse. Dans ce cas, je ne pense pas que l'on ait besoin de recourir à la médiation des Cinq Grandes Puissances.

Votre Altesse connaîtra encore mon opinion par ce que lui diront Messieurs les Ambassadeurs, d'après les dépêches qu'ils recevront de Messieurs les Consuls-Généraux résidant à Alexandrie. C'est pour dire ces choses à Votre Altesse que j'ai l'honneur de lui faire présenter cette humble dépêche par mon Chargé d'Affaires Moufid Bey, &c., &c.

(Translation.)

Mehemet Ali to Hosrew Pasha.—(*August* 6, 1839.)

(Titles.)

I HAVE received the letter which Your Highness did me the honour to address to me by my Chargé d'Affaires Moufid Bey.

Your Highness informs me, that you have taken cognizance of the contents of the despatch which I addressed to you by Akif Effendi, and of the Report of that Envoy; that the High Dignitaries of the Sublime Porte in Council assembled, after my despatch and the report of Akif Effendi had been communicated to them, had resolved to send to me by the steamer the Minister Saib Effendi, in order to give effect to my demand, to bring to light the nature of the services which I could render to the Empire, and to decide upon the measures to be taken under present circumstances; when in the meanwhile the Ambassadors of the Five Great Powers presented a Note to Your Highness, of which you tell me you send me a translation in your despatch, adding, that the Consuls-General of the Five Great Powers residing at Alexandria, would make an analogous communication to me, and that the verbal reports of my Chargé d'Affaires would better enable me to understand all that was going on.

The Consuls-General who have received despatches from their respective Ambassadors, have communicated their instructions to me, and my Chargé d'Affaires has also told me what he had to report to me.

My only object, my sole desire, is to make my submission, and to do service to our magnanimous and all powerful Lord and Master. But I entreated His

Highness very humbly, that in consideration of my character of an old servant of the Empire, and of my former services, he would of his generosity grant two prayers which I ventured to address to him. I pray God to preserve the August person of our Sovereign upon the throne as long as the world shall last!

When my Chargé d'Affaires received directions to join me, he obtained the favour of being admitted to kiss the feet of His Highness our Magnanimous Lord, who said to him; "Moufid Bey, make my compliments to the Pasha; I grant the prayer which he has addressed to the throne, that he may obtain the inheritance of Egypt with its dependencies, and I have given orders that this affair may be arranged."

These benevolent words of His Highness have rejoiced my heart, inasmuch as they fulfil my most cherished wish, the acquisition of the hereditary Power, and thus exalt me among the grandees of the Empire.

Afterwards, when the Dignitaries of the Sublime Porte were assembled in Council, they repeated to Moufid Bey, "Our Lord and Master has granted all that Mehemet Ali had solicited at the foot of the throne,—the inheritance of Egypt with all its dependencies; and now the Ambassadors of the Five Powers have presented this Note, of which it is necessary that Mehemet Ali should take cognizance."

From what has been said and done, I rejoice that one of my two wishes is granted, and I see that, with respect to the second, it appears to have been for the moment neglected; I hope, notwithstanding, that it will also be granted to me through the great benevolence of His Highness. In that case I do not think that it will be necessary to have recourse to the mediation of the Five Great Powers.

Your Highness will again learn my opinion by what the Ambassadors will tell you according to the despatches which they will receive from the Consuls-General residing at Alexandria. It is in order to say these things to your Highness, that I have the honour to present this humble despatch to you by my Chargé d'Affaires, Moufid Bey.

No. 263.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received August* 30.

My Lord, *Therapia, August* 6, 1839.

I INCLOSE translated copy of a letter from the Grand Vizier to Mehemet Ali, transmitting the Collective Note of July 27.

I also inclose herewith, translated copy of a letter from Mehemet Ali to the Grand Vizier, in reply to the letter sent by Akiff Effendi immediately after the accession of Abdul Medjid.

The insolence of this letter is remarkable, and the writer shows the contempt he entertains for our understandings, by the absurdity of his assertions and doctrines. To say that Achmet Pasha is not guilty of treason in having carried off the Sultan's fleet, because he brought it to Alexandria, which is a port belonging to the Ottoman Empire, is an assertion that will hardly pass current even in Europe. To dictate the dismissal of the Grand Vizier is no great evidence of his submission to the Sultan, particularly in the man who has repeatedly applied to foreign Powers to recognize his independence, and who now demands the hereditary possession of a third of the Ottoman Empire. It would seem that Mehemet Ali has so long duped and deceived people, that he has no apprehension of their discovering the grossest fallacies.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 263.

The Grand Vizier Hosrew Pasha to Mehemet Ali.—*July* 31, 1839.

[See Inclosure 6 in No. 260.]

Inclosure 2 in No. 263.

Mehemet Ali to the Grand Vizier Hosrew Pasha.

[See Inclosure 1 in No. 255.]

No. 264.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 29.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August* 7, 1839.

WITH reference to your instructions of July 13, I have to acquaint your Lordship, that the French Ambassador is of opinion that it is not expedient to make the communication to the Sublime Porte at this moment, because the Ministers of Austria, Russia, and Prussia, may not think right to concur in it; and the Ambassador, therefore, would defer the measure until an emergency shall call for it. I have suggested that he and I should make separately a verbal communication to the Grand Vizier, stating that we have authority from our Governments to give the protection of the fleet to the Sublime Porte, if it be demanded; and I offered as my reasons the fact, that Ibrahim Pasha can reach Scutari in twenty days; that Mehemet Ali has now received notice of the Collective Note; that he may direct Ibrahim to march, in order, by the operation of fear, to induce the Sublime Porte to make an arrangement with him; and because I think it necessary to give the Grand Vizier sure ground for relying upon the support of England and France, without which he may yield to intimidation.

I have no doubt that in spite of appearances and overt acts, there may be exertions made by some parties to bring about an arrangement between the Porte and the Pasha. I feel confident that the Grand Vizier ought to have our support, to give him the power to repress the action of Mehemet Ali's partisans in this country, and that with our support there is nothing to fear for domestic tranquillity.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 265.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 29.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August* 7, 1839.

HAFIZ PASHA has been removed from the command of the army, and is now at his Pashalic of Sivas. Seidullah Pasha, a younger man, commands, and has with him about 8,000 Regular Infantry and 4,000 Cavalry. The position he occupies will not enable him to prevent Ibrahim advancing by Koniah.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 266.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 31.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August* 7, 1839.

I AM happy to state, that the Prussian officers have arrived here safe two days ago.

Count Königsmarck told me that he had learned from those officers a fact which I think is of great importance with a view to future proceedings; it is, that 5,000 of Ibrahim Pasha's troops joined Hafiz Pasha after the battle of Nezib, many of them enlisting in the Sultan's Guards, and others elsewhere. This is a striking proof of the feelings prevalent in the Pasha's army. It is also stated that, generally speaking, those subjects of the Sultan who had gone over to the Egyptians, have returned as fast as possible to their proper allegiance.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 267.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received August* 31.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, August* 7, 1839.

ON the 31st of July, I received a report from the Dragoman, stating that Nouri Effendi and Sarim Effendi had told him that Ibrahim Pasha was within five days' march of the Bosphorus, &c., &c. I received almost at the same time a note from the Internuncio, stating that he had heard the same thing, and also I heard from the French Ambassador a similar account. I replied to M. de Stürmer, that I saw no remedy except the bringing up the fleets to defend the passage of the Bosphorus, and maintain the authority of the Porte in the city.

I called on the French Ambassador, and stated the same opinion to him. He objected to it, in consequence of his being without authority to direct the French Admiral to take that step, and because he had been assured by Mehemet Ali, that his troops should not advance, and therefore he did not credit the statement made by the Ottoman Ministers. I replied, that his Excellency and myself were instructed to prevent a collision between the parties, and that assuredly a march upon Constantinople was a collision, and came strictly within the letter of our instructions. We had a long discussion, at the close of which it was settled that we should see Baron de Stürmer. I accordingly called upon him, and he agreed that it was necessary to save the capital and Government, and that the fleets presented the only means. I said that, under that conviction, I was determined to call on the British Admiral to come up; that I hoped the French Ambassador would concur in the measure; that I begged he (the Internuncio) would inform M. de Bouténeff of what I had said; and that it was to be hoped he would take a similar step; that this measure was to be executed with the concurrence of the Sublime Porte.

I do not think it necessary to trouble your Lordship with the arguments I used, for it is obvious that if the capital and Government were not saved from the power of Mehemet Ali, all the measures already taken, and all the policy adopted by Her Majesty's Government and by the other Governments, would be abortive.

The French Ambassador saw Baron de Stürmer in the evening, and on his return told me he would co-operate with me if necessary, but wished to have previously a meeting of the Five Representatives; and the meeting was fixed accordingly for the next day.

I received at night a note from the Internuncio, saying that M. de Bouténeff had made inquiries, and found that there was no truth in the report of Ibrahim's advance. (I inclose a note from the Dragoman, in which the affair is stated.) The Internuncio still desired the meeting, and it took place, and what had before been said was repeated; and I renewed my declaration that in case the capital should be threatened by the advance of Ibrahim, I would take upon myself to apply to the British Admiral, and would throw upon him the responsibility of refusing to come up, which I, however, felt certain he would not hesitate to do. The French Ambassador and the Internuncio both agreed in the necessity for protecting the Porte, &c., &c. M. de Bouténeff said, that it would not have been in his power to co-operate in the measure I had proposed, because he had no authority to act, and must have referred to his Government, and could not receive an answer in less than a month.

The motives which directed my conduct were these: I did not give credit to the entire accuracy of the statement of the Ottoman Ministers, but I did suppose that they had intelligence showing that Ibrahim Pasha would move down this way; I thought it would be inexcusable to leave for a moment unapplied the only means that can secure us against the multiplied evils of Ibrahim's presence. I was glad also to have an opportunity to manifest my determination to bring up the fleet in case of necessity.

Inclosure 1 in No. 267.

M. Frederic Pisani to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Péra, ce* 31 *Juillet*, 1839.

J'AI parlé hier à Nouri Effendi sur la sage mesure à prendre, savoir, que les Flottes Anglaise et Française viennent dans le Bosphore dont elles sont fort peu éloignées, pour empêcher, si le cas se présentait, les troupes Egyptiennes de passer en Europe. J'ai eu occasion de voir ce matin, à la Porte, Nouri Effendi et Sarim Effendi, qui étaient ensemble. Ils trouvent cette mesure tout-à-fait inutile, en même tems qu'elle serait extrèmement nuisible, car elle ne ferait qu'accroître la confusion dans la ville. Mais voici des nouvelles intéressantes reçues ce matin. Six régimens Egyptiens sont déjà à Conia; il ne faudrait que cinq ou six jours, disent les Ministres, pour que l'Armée Egyptienne arrive à Constantinople. La Porte est tranquille du côté de la mer, vû que les Flottes Anglaise et Française doivent empêcher la Flotte Egyptienne d'entrer dans le Bosphore; mais le langage des Représentans des Cinq Puissances est bien loin de rassurer la Porte sur ses craintes de l'Armée d'Ibrahim. Dans l'opinion de la Porte, aussitôt que les lettres qu'il s'agit d'expédier à Alexandrie y seront arrivées, et que Méhémet Ali aura vu la réponse du Grand Vizir, le Pacha enverra immanquablement à Ibrahim l'ordre de marcher sur Constantinople pour porter un grand coup. La Porte est convaincue que des lettres et des paroles, et même des menaces, ne sont capables d'arrêter le projet de Méhémet Ali. Cela étant, la Porte pense qu'il faut différer le départ du bateau à vapeur, car elle est, dit-elle, sûre que Méhémet Ali, fort irrité de la réponse qu'il s'agit de lui donner, ferait marcher son armée de terre contre Constantinople, mesure incalculable dans ses résultats.

Nouri et Sarim ont prié Monsieur Lapierre d'attendre l'issue du conseil qui se tient chez le Moufti, pour voir si le bateau à vapeur part ou non; ce qui fait voir que le conseil a pour objet l'Affaire Egyptienne, malgré les assurances données hier, qu'il s'agissait d'une autre affaire.

Je suis, &c.,
(Signé) F. PISANI.

(Translation.)

M. Frederic Pisani to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Pera, July* 31, 1839.

I SPOKE yesterday to Nouri Effendi respecting the prudent measure to be taken, that is, that the English and French fleets should enter the Bosphorus, from whence they are not far distant, to hinder, if the case should arise, the Egyptian troops from crossing over into Europe. I have had the opportunity this morning, of seeing at the Porte Nouri Effendi and Sarim Effendi, who were together. They consider this measure as perfectly useless, and at the same time extremely injurious, as it would only increase the confusion in the city. But the following interesting news has been received this morning: six Egyptian regiments are already at Koniah; it only requires five or six days, say the Ministers, for the Egyptian Army to arrive at Constantinople. The Porte is at ease with respect to the sea, as the English and French fleets will prevent the Egyptian fleet from entering the Bosphorus; but the language of the Representatives of the Five Powers is very far from relieving the Porte from its fears of the Army of Ibrahim. It is the opinion of the Porte, that as soon as the letters which it intends to send to Alexandria shall have arrived there, and Mehemet Ali shall have seen the answer of the Grand Vizier, he will infallibly send orders to Ibrahim to march upon Constantinople to strike a great blow. The Porte is convinced that neither letters, nor language, nor even menaces are capable of arresting the intention of Mehemet Ali. That being the case, the Porte thinks proper to delay the departure of the steam-boat; for it is certain, it says, that Mehemet Ali, greatly enraged at the answer which it is proposed to give to him, would march his land forces against Constantinople, a measure of which the results are incalculable.

Nouri and Sarim have requested M. Lapierre to await the issue of the Council held at the Mufti's house, to see whether the steam-boat goes or not, which makes it evident that the object the Council has in view is the Egyptian affair, in spite of the assurances given yesterday that it related to other business.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PISANI.

Inclosure 2 in No. 267.

M. Frederic Pisani to Viscount Ponsonby.

De la maison de Sarim Effendi,
à Sheïlan Akindissi, Jeudi, 1*er Août.*

My Lord,

LE paquebot Turc est parti hier à 6 heures du soir.

C'est Sarim Effendi, en présence de Nouri Effendi, qui nous a donné à M Lapierre et à moi, les nouvelles de Conia.

Je viens de voir Sarim Effendi, qui dit aujourd'hui que nous avons mal compris. Il prétend avoir dit que les troupes Egyptiennes sont à Adana, où Ménekli Ahmed Pacha est nommé Gouverneur, ayant sous ses ordres six régimens avec de l'artillerie. Adana est à dix-huit heures de Conia. Ali Pacha de Conia est avec un corps d'armée à peu de distance des gorges du Mont Taurus, Koulek Boghaz.

Nouri Effendi est à sa ferme aux "Eaux Douces." Le Grand Vizir vient d'envoyer un homme aux "Eaux Douces," pour l'inviter à se rendre chez son Altesse à Constantinople, ainsi que Sarim Effendi.

Je suis, &c.,
(Signé) F. PISANI.

(Translation.)

M Frederic Pisani to Viscount Ponsonby.

Sarim Effendi's House, at Sheilan Akindissi,
Thursday, August 1.

My Lord,

THE Turkish packet sailed at six o'clock in the evening.

It was Sarim Effendi who gave to M. Lapierre and me the news from Koniah, in the presence of Nouri Effendi.

I have just seen Sarim Effendi, who says to-day that we have misunderstood him. He asserts that he said that the Egyptians are at Adana, where Menekli Ahmed Pasha is appointed Governor, having under his orders six regiments with Artillery. Adana is eighteen hours from Koniah. Ali Pasha of Koniah, with a division of the Army, is at a short distance from the passes of the Taurus, Kulek Boghaz.

Nouri Effendi is at his farm at "the Sweet Waters." The Grand Vizier has just sent a man to "the Sweet Waters," to invite him to come to His Highness at Constantinople, together with Sarim Effendi.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PISANI.

No. 268.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 31.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August* 8, 1839.

THE Representatives of the Five Powers were invited to meet his Excellency Nouri Effendi this day at Kalender, where we all attended in consequence. The business was to communicate to the Representatives a letter from Mehemet Ali to the Grand Vizier, in which the Pasha of Egypt calls for the retreat of that high functionary from the post he occupies.

It was asked by the Representatives (the French Ambassador), if it was intended to bring forward this matter as a personal question between the Grand Vizier and the Pasha, or one of a public nature? The Mousteshar replied, that it was purely public, being a question of an attempt made by Mehemet Ali to dictate to the Porte the choice of a Grand Vizier; that if the dictation were submitted to now, it would be again exercised as interest or caprice might suggest; that it was an insolent and intolerable pretension of Mehemet Ali to supersede, by his own will, the sovereign rights of the Sultan.

The Representatives all expressed the same opinion, strongly condemnatory of the proceedings of the Egyptian Pasha. They all expressed the hope that the Sultan would treat the demand with contempt; they all spoke of the Grand Vizier as the man the best fitted, by his experience and his qualities, to be at this particular moment the chief of the Ottoman Ministry; and said, that if it should become necessary to give stronger evidence of their opinion, they would not be backward to give it. They desired the Mousteshar to make known these things to the Sultan.

In the course of conversation, the Mousteshar stated his wish, that the Representatives should write to the Consuls at Alexandria to have the sentiments of the Representatives made known to Mehemet Ali; but it was thought by the Representatives, that it was not proper for them to take any step in the matter beyond that already taken; and that it was not consistent with the dignity of the Representatives to enter into correspondence upon such a subject with the Pasha of Egypt.

The Representatives were warm in their expression of disapprobation of Mehemet Ali's conduct. There was a good deal of comment upon the doctrine brought forward by Mehemet Ali, in his letter, to rebut the charge of treason made against the Capudan Pasha by the Grand Vizier. Every one treated it as a contemptible absurdity in point of argument.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 269.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received August* 31.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August* 10, 1839.

I INCLOSE copy of a despatch, dated 7th instant, which I sent on that day to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, in reply to one from him, desiring information.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 269.

Viscount Ponsonby to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford.

(Extract.) *Therapia, August* 7, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for your information, copies of two despatches* from Lord Palmerston to me, and copies of one from me to his Lordship.† I have not yet had an answer from the French Ambassador to the suggestion of making a verbal communication to the Grand Vizier, but I hope I may have one before Lieutenant Stopford leaves this to-morrow. The service the fleet is likely to be called upon to perform seems to be to prevent the passage of the channel between Asia and Europe by the troops of Ibrahim Pasha; and to give such evidences of the cordial and powerful support by England of the Sultan's Government, as should check and prevent the action and success of Mehemet Ali's party in Constantinople.

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* See Nos. 90, and 117.

† See No. 264.

Ibrahim Pasha can be at Scutari with his army in twenty days' march from Koniah. It may be the policy of Mehemet Ali to order that movement when he receives the communication of the Collective Note. He may think it better for his interest to endeavour to frighten the Porte into an arrangement with him without the concurrence of the Great Powers; and I think a movement by Ibrahim will have that effect, unless the Porte should be supported and ensured against the danger. Mehemet Ali may, on the other hand, wait till he learns what terms the Great Powers are likely to agree to give him, and direct his efforts to the creation of differences between them, and of a rupture of the plan of universal co-operation. If Mehemet can force the Porte to treat with him alone (by the effect of fear), he will place the Great Powers in embarrassments more difficult, perhaps, to remedy, than it would be to deal with a difference amongst them as to terms.

I will take the best means in my power to inform you of Ibrahim's motions. I fear he will have the advantage if he acts with promptitude, and that the time will be spent in discussion here which, if employed in acting, would make his attempts wholly useless.

No. 270.

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 2.)

(Extract.) *Paris, August* 30, 1839.

I HAD the honour, in my despatch of August 26, to express to your Lordship my apprehensions that the French Government might not assent to the idea of settling the affairs of the East, through the mediation of the Ambassadors of the Five Powers at Vienna; that that Government might possibly raise a question in respect to the Dardanelles, which would prevent the concentration of the European efforts at Alexandria; and that finally, I could not hold out any hopes that Marshal Soult would adopt any vigorous measures of coercion, whether for restraining the ambition of the Viceroy of Egypt, or for restoring to the Sultan his fleet.

I shall now take the liberty of giving to your Lordship my reasons for forming an opinion which may require apparent qualifications, but which I still fear that your Lordship will find substantially correct.

And I am the more inclined to do this from considering, on the one hand, that it is of importance that your Lordship should know as clearly and distinctly as possible, the real feelings and intentions of this Government; and believing, on the other, that these feelings and intentions will not be stated to your Lordship so clearly or so distinctly as would be desirable at the present crisis.

In order to give your Lordship the views which I entertain, and which I venture to submit to your attention, I should begin by doing justice to Marshal Soult, and stating, that I believe he most sincerely entertains an attachment to British connexion, and is most desirous to maintain, in all circumstances, the friendly relations which subsist between the two countries. So that the form in which any objections to your Lordship's suggestions are raised, will always rather disguise than lay open the real extent of the differences in respect to them, which, when the moment of action or decision on any practical point may arise, will be found to exist.

For instance, in respect to the plan which your Lordship proposed for obtaining possession of the Ottoman fleet, the French Government may say, "nothing could be more desirable than the rescue of that fleet from Mehemet Ali, but the means proposed for effecting such an excellent result are objectionable," (nor will it be difficult to give reasons for this, since nothing can be suggested to which objections also will not occur).

If pressed to give an answer, as to whether they will agree to any plan for coercing the Viceroy, the French Cabinet may first observe, "that that must depend upon what the plan is;" but, if still further pressed, the question of the Dardanelles, to which I alluded, may be resorted to, and the following line of argument may be taken.

"The condition of Mehemet Ali is merely a part of the general Oriental Question, which, in fact, concentrates itself at Constantinople, and is forced on us by considerations of Russian interference with the affairs of the Porte. We do not say, then, that we will not adopt means towards compelling Mehemet Ali to restore the fleet, or to accept reasonable conditions from the Sultan; but in looking to this part of the question, we must not forget the principal and vital one, viz., that of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus.

"While we are pressing Mehemet at Alexandria, Ibrahim may march to Constantinople; what then is to occur? The Russian note lately received forces this upon us. Until the Five Powers are agreed upon this point, it is impossible to come to any determination on the other."

It will be useless, I fear, to say what I firmly believe, from some knowledge of the man [Ibrahim], and some experience of the general character of Oriental politicians;

"The march to Constantinople, which you apprehend, will never occur; the Viceroy will talk high, but will be found submissive, if he but see the Great Powers united."

I fear it will be useless to urge this argument, so ably stated in your Lordship's despatch of August 27, and which I have already lost no opportunity of urging, because the opposition to it is rather taken as the means of putting off a disagreeable step, than as the reason for opposing one from which danger is really apprehended. And now, in respect to the Conference at Vienna, I should very probably be wrong if I stated that the French Government will decidedly object to such a conference, though I believe the Marshal is himself unfriendly to it, and that a party in the Cabinet is likewise so. But if the French Government does not oppose the Conference, it will, I feel confident, endeavour so to limit its object, as to strip it of all dignity, and render it of small effect.

"Our Ambassador," the French Ministry will say, "shall have the power of considering in conjunction with your Representative and the Representatives of the other Great Powers, what steps may be peaceably taken for obtaining the Sultan's fleet, and also on what conditions the Viceroyalty of Egypt, &c., should be established, but we cannot give him the power to decide on any measures to be adopted for obtaining or enforcing such conditions: we cannot, therefore, give him any power over our fleet in the Mediterranean; and though we ourselves do not say that we will not in the end adopt coercive measures, we do not pledge ourselves to do so, nor indeed can we do so, until the whole question,—that portion of it relative to the Dardanelles and Russia, as well as that portion which relates to Egypt and Mehemet Ali,—is decided."

By such a course, I think your Lordship will perceive that the proceedings at Vienna, as far as France is concerned, would, as I have ventured to observe, lose the greatest part of their importance and consideration; and the object of such proceedings may be regarded as eluded, if not opposed. The French Government imagine also that Prince Metternich himself will approve of their limitations, and not deem it necessary or expedient to concert in common the means of carrying out the arrangement which the Powers may undertake in common to frame and to propose. I state this, because I believe it to be the impression here, but it does not seem to me to be true.

Because, if it be even possible to conceive that the Great Powers might have considered the affairs of the East as a Turkish Question to be settled by the Turks themselves, and thus left things to their fate, it is hardly possible to suppose that these Powers, after having adopted the state of the East as a European Question, interfered in the arrangements which the Porte was about to conclude, and engaged them to consider and to recommend other arrangements of a more fitting character, would there stop, and say, "Here is our recommendation—these are the terms, and the only terms you should accord; but if you ask us how you are to obtain these terms, we can only reply that, stripped of your fleet, and deprived of your army, you are to obtain them as you can."

This is the difficulty of the position in which the French Government places itself,—a difficulty which it seeks to avoid, by proposing or consenting to measures of procrastination, during which it may hope that a part of the question at all events, if not the whole of it, will arrive by itself at some termination.

In stating, however, thus positively my conviction that the French Government will find means of avoiding the adoption of any measures for coercing the Viceroy, which may be proposed, I should improperly convey my meaning if I left it to be imagined that there is so powerful a disposition in the French

Cabinet to take part with Mehemet Ali, that nothing would be attempted to obtain, even by peaceable means, the restitution of the Sultan's vessels, and the abandonment of a portion of the Viceroy's demands, more especially that portion which relates to Hosrew Pasha's dismissal. On the contrary, I believe that such concessions, as a means of arranging the remaining question of Syria, would be willingly obtained, and will be seriously and sincerely tried for by the French Cabinet, through representations to Mehemet Ali; but through representations only.

I have thus endeavoured, my Lord, to put you as much as possible in possession of what I believe may be really expected from this Government on the question which now occupies so much of your Lordship's attention; and at the hazard of being prolix, I have entered into what I fear may appear lengthy explanations.

It only remains for me to say, that I shall neither lose any opportunity, nor neglect any means, of enforcing the views of Her Majesty's Government, and the representations relating thereto, with which I may be honoured by your Lordship.

No. 271.

Lord William Russell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 3.)

My Lord, *Berlin, August* 28, 1839.

I HAVE just seen Baron Werther, who has received despatches from Alexandria of the 6th instant. The Consuls had presented the Note of the Five Powers, signed at Constantinople on the 27th ultimo, and had been received by Mehemet Ali with assurances of good will and moderation. He said, however, that two things must be secured to him:—the inheritance of Syria to his family, and the dismissal of Hosrew Pasha.

I asked Baron Werther if he thought it would be wise to sacrifice Hosrew Pasha. He thought not; first, because he was the only man in Turkey capable of directing public affairs; secondly, because it would ill-become the Five Powers to allow themselves to be dictated to by Mehemet Ali.

Baron Werther asked me why the British fleet remained off the Dardanelles, instead of being off Alexandria to support the negotiations of the Five Powers?

The Prussian officers who were at the battle of Nezib have returned to Constantinople. They state that Hafiz Pasha would not have been defeated had he known how to command his troops; that the Turkish Army was superior to the Egyptian; and that 5,000 Egyptian troops deserted to the Turks after the battle.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) WILLIAM RUSSELL.

No. 272.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, September* 4, 1839.

I HAVE received your despatch of August 7, by which it appears, that in consequence of the intelligence which the Turkish Ministers communicated to you on the 31st of July, of the near approach of Ibrahim Pasha to Constantinople, you had proposed to your Colleagues to bring up the British and French fleets for the defence of the passage of the Bosphorus; and I have to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve your conduct in that matter.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 273.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, September* 4, 1839.

WITH reference to your despatch of August 8, I have to acquaint your Excellency, that Her Majesty's Government approve the language which your Excellency and your Colleagues held to the Turkish Minister on the 8th of August, respecting the demand made by Mehemet Ali that the Grand Vizier should be dismissed from his office.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 274.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 5.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August* 13, 1839.

LAST night I had a message from the Grand Vizier by a confidential person, desiring me to request the British Admiral to free Salonica from a brig of war sent there by Mehemet Ali, and from which five or six emissaries had been disembarked, sent by the Pasha of Egypt to excite the people to revolt against the Ottoman Government.

The Grand Vizier said that this occurrence had been officially reported by Izzet Pasha, the Governor of Salonica. I sent the Grand Vizier word that I would consider the matter and let him know my opinion; that it was necessary I should act in concurrence with my colleagues, &c., &c. This day, whilst the Baron de Stürmer was with me, I received another statement of the affair of the brig of war, which I showed to the Baron, who said he had similar information. I asked his Excellency if he did not think that the Five Powers were under obligation to protect the Sublime Porte against the Pasha of Egypt, now that the Great Powers had, as it were, prohibited the Porte from making peace with Mehemet Ali or carrying on hostilities, and thereby had left the Sublime Porte exposed defenceless to the attempts of that Pasha? The Internuncio replied in the affirmative, and agreed with my proposition to recommend to the Commanders of the British and French Naval Forces to free Salonica from the presence of the Egyptian ship of war.

I immediately sent to the French Ambassador the account I had received of the affair; I told him my view of the subject, and that the Internuncio concurred in it. The Ambassador answered that he approved of it and would write to Admiral Lalande. I wrote instantly a letter to the Commander of Her Majesty's squadron, of which I inclose copy, and sent it by the speediest conveyance to the Austrian steamer; but that vessel had just left the harbour before my letter arrived, and it was to be sent by the first sailing vessel to Besika Bay. Baron Stürmer went from me to the French Ambassador, and his Excellency had the goodness to promise me, that on his return to Buyukdere, he would acquaint M. de Bouténeff with what had been done.

I received this evening a note from the French Ambassador which I inclose in original.

In my letter to the Grand Vizier, I recommended that he should seize and confine the emissaries of Mehemet Ali at Salonica, but that he should not take any severer measures.

The two inclosed letters contain his Highness the Vizier's answer to my communication.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

P.S., *August* 14.—I inclose a report just arrived from Her Majesty's Consul at Salonica. I will write to him to put Mustapha Nouri Pasha on his guard against the intrigues of Mehemet Ali. Mustapha is one of the best and most enlightened of the Turks. I have taken pains to make the Grand Vizier sensible of the good services Mustapha has done in quieting Albania, and preventing a rebellion there, which I believe was on the point of breaking out, in consequence of the misconduct of Mustapha's predecessor.

P.

Inclosure 1 in No. 274.

Viscount Ponsonby to the Senior Officer commanding Her Majesty's Squadron at Besika Bay.

Sir, *Therapia, August* 13, 1839.

I LEARN from authority, that a brig of war belonging to the Pasha of Egypt is in the neighbourhood of Salonica, and has landed emissaries in the country, for the purpose of exciting the population to insurrection. I bring this matter before you, and take the liberty to say, that it is my opinion, that in consequence of the arrangements made between Her Majesty's Government, in common with the Great Powers, and the Sublime Porte, it is incumbent upon us to take possession of that brig, and thereby prevent the prosecution of designs exactly in contradiction to the declared policy of Her Majesty's Government.

I have communicated the fact herein mentioned to his Excellency the French Ambassador, who has the same opinion I have expressed.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 274.

Baron Roussin to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord et cher Collègue, *Thérapia, le* 13 *Août*, 1839.

JE viens de recevoir de Salonique le même avis que votre Excellence et M. l'Internonce. J'avais déjà expédié ma lettre à M. le Contre-Amiral Lalande pour qu'il agisse exactement comme l'Amiral Stopford, pour détourner le bâtiment Egyptien de sa mission en Albanie.

Ce fait me rappelle ce que nous fîmes, l'Angleterre et nous, en Mars, 1833. Nous fîmes amener nos pavillons à Smyrne à la première nouvelle de l'arrivée des agens de Méhémet Ali dans cette ville. Les circonstances sont les mêmes et notre conduite aussi.

Agréez, &c.,
(Signé) BARON ROUSSIN.

(Translation.)

Baron Roussin to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Therapia, August* 13, 1839.

I HAVE just received from Salonica the same intelligence as your Excellency and the Internuncio. I had already sent my letter to Rear-Admiral Lalande, that he may act exactly like Admiral Stopford, in order to turn back the Egyptian vessel from its mission to Albania.

This circumstance reminds me of what we, England and France, did in March 1833. We caused our flags to repair to Smyrna, at the first news of the arrival of the Agents of Mehemet Ali in that city. The circumstances are the same, and so is our conduct.

Accept, &c.,
(Signed) BARON ROUSSIN.

Inclosure 3 in No. 274.

Mr. Redhouse to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *August* 14, 1839.

UPON communicating the contents of your Lordship's letter to his Highness the Grand Vizier, his Highness instructed me to return to your Lordship his thanks for the zealous promptitude with which your Lordship had attended to his Highness's reclamation. His Highness further declared, that any greater severity than seizure of their persons, against the emissaries, should not be permitted by him, as it was not only contrary to prudence, but also to his well-known disposition.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) W. REDHOUSE.

Inclosure 4 in No. 274.

M. Etienne Pisani to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Péra, ce* 14 *Août*, 1839.

LE Grand Vizir après avoir pris connaissance du contenu de la lettre que j'ai remise à Mr. Redhouse, m'a fait prier de passer chez lui pour me charger de dire à votre Excellence que la teneur de cette lettre lui a fait le plus grand plaisir; que maintenant il est convaincu plus que jamais des véritables sentimens et de l'intérêt que prend l'Angleterre aux affaires de la Turquie; et qu'il est on ne peut plus reconnaissant de l'intérêt particulier que votre Excellence porte à sa personne.

Je suis, &c.,
(Signé) ETIENNE PISANI.

(Translation.)

M. Etienne Pisani to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Pera, August* 14, 1839.

THE Grand Vizier, after having taken cognizance of the contents of the letter which I delivered to Mr. Redhouse, begged me to call upon him to desire me to tell your Excellency, that the tenor of this letter has given him the greatest pleasure; that he is now more than ever convinced of the true feelings of England, and of the interest which she takes in the affairs of Turkey; and that he cannot be too grateful for the interest which your Excellency feels for him.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) ETIENNE PISANI.

Inclosure 5 in No. 274.

Mr. Consul Blunt to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Salonica, August* 9, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency, that a Turkish transport arrived here on the 7th instant, from the Dardanelles, with letters from the Pasha of that place for the Kaimakam of Salonica. The transport immediately commenced loading rice and arobes.

Yesterday, a brig-of-war, to all appearance Turkish, entered the gulf, and grounded on the flats. The boats of the transport immediately went to her assistance, and she was got off, and entered the port in the evening. On coming to anchor she saluted the castles, and the salute was returned. This morning every one was surprised to learn that the brig-of-war was Egyptian, and sent by Mehemet Ali. She is nineteen days from Alexandria, and has been put in quarantine.

It is reported, my Lord, that there is a person of distinction on board, sent purposely to communicate with Mustapha Pasha. I regret that I have not been able to learn any more certain particulars relating to the mission of this brig-of-war, to communicate to your Lordship.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) C. BLUNT.

P. S.—I have just been informed, that the brig from Egypt has on board persons from Mehemet Ali, for Mustapha Pasha, the Roumeli Valisi, Adrianople, Scodra, and other places.

No. 275.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 5.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August* 14, 1839.

I HAVE heard from the Grand Vizier, that Ibrahim Pasha is obliged to send his despatches from Marash to Scanderoon under the guard of an escort of some hundred men.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 276.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston—(Received September 6.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, August* 15, 1839.

HAVING waited yesterday on the Pasha with Captain Wakefield, of Her Majesty's steamer "Rhadamanthus," I found M. Cochelet, the French Consul-General, with Mehemet Ali.

Captain Wakefield having told the Pasha that he meant to proceed on the following day to join the Admiral, M. Cochelet observed, that it was mentioned in his private letters received that morning from Paris, that official instructions were to be sent to the British and French Admirals in the Mediterranean, to proceed with their squadrons to Alexandria, to demand that the Turkish fleet be sent back to Constantinople.

Mehemet Ali replied, that the moment that the two squadrons should appear in sight of this place, he would send immediate orders to his son Ibrahim Pasha to move forward with his army, and he requested M. Cochelet to write that such was his determination; and the Pasha, then addressing himself to Captain Wakefield, requested him to say the same thing to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford.

The Pasha then added, that if Hosrew Pasha was dismissed, he would immediately send the Turkish fleet to Constantinople, and that he would send his son Said Bey in his corvette along with the fleet.

The Pasha repeated what he had already said, and requested us to consider it as his positive determination.

M. Cochelet has written this intelligence to Admiral Lalande by Captain Wakefield, and will communicate it to his Government by the French steamer which will leave this on the 17th instant.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

No. 277.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 6.)

(Extract.) *Alexandria, August* 16, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch, of the 15th of July, transmitting for my information copies of three despatches addressed by your Lordship to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Vienna and St. Petersburgh, and to Her Majesty's Minister at Berlin, explaining the views of Her Majesty's Government with respect to the affairs of the Levant.

It is probable that the death of Sultan Mahmoud, and the other important events that immediately preceded or followed that occurrence, may have produced some change in the views of Her Majesty's Government, respecting the measures to be adopted for establishing the future relations between the Sublime Porte and Mehemet Ali. I nevertheless feel it my duty to submit to your Lordship's consideration, with all deference, some observations on the immediate subject of those despatches.

The intention expressed by Mehemet Ali to occupy Orfa and Diarbekir as a security against future aggression on the part of the Sultan, was communicated to the Consuls-General of all the Four Great Powers, and is referred to in my despatch dated 14th June last; but your Lordship will have learnt from my subsequent reports, that after the death of Sultan Mahmoud, Mehemet Ali no longer looked upon the occupation of Orfa and Diarbekir as a necessary guarantee, and had instructed Ibrahim Pasha not to send any troops in that direction. That disposition may be considered as a confirmation of what I have previously stated to your Lordship, that Mehemet Ali did not entertain any design against Bagdad.

With respect to the event contemplated in your Lordship's despatch of the 9th of July, to Lord William Russell, of a coalition between Russia and Mehemet Ali against the Sultan, in which case a Russian force from Gumri might unite with the troops of Mehemet Ali at Diarbekir, and invade Asia Minor, I feel myself justified in assuring your Lordship, from the knowledge I have acquired of Mehemet Ali's character and views, that such a combination could never be anticipated with any degree of satisfaction or tranquillity by a man whose constant ambition has been to relieve his country from the yoke of Russia, and who has too much experience of the friendship of that Power, not to feel that, by having the Russians, instead of the Turks, for neighbours, he would have no security for the possession of Syria or even of Egypt.

Her Majesty's Government appears desirous to place the relative territorial position of the Sultan and Mehemet Ali on such a footing as to guard against future encroachments on either side; and with that intention it is proposed that the Egyptian forces should evacuate Syria, and thus place the Desert between them and the Turkish territory.

Mehemet Ali thinks that the deference he has shown for the opinion of the Great Powers of Europe, in avoiding a conflict with Sultan Mahmoud, as long as his personal safety would allow him to do so, and the moderation he has evinced in not taking advantage of the successes he has lately obtained, or of the general expression of public opinion in his favour throughout the Empire, are sufficient pledges that he will not hereafter act in opposition to the pacific views of the Great Powers, and that his conduct would entitle him to their favourable consideration. His expectations on this point have been considerably strengthened by the opinion recently expressed in the Council of State, as to the propriety of granting to his family the hereditary succession to the government of the territories he now occupies; and I am fully persuaded that no arguments will induce him to recede from the assertion of those claims, which he is assured would have been acceded to under any other administration than that of Hosrew Pasha, and would have been forced even upon the latter, had it not been for the interposition of the Great Powers at Constantinople.

In my despatch "Separate," of the 7th of August, as well as in previous despatches, I have already taken the liberty to submit to your Lordship some reasons in favour of allowing Syria to remain under the permanent authority of Mehemet Ali and his family, and nothing has occurred to weaken the opinion I then ventured to offer to your Lordship's consideration. By granting those

concessions to Mehemet Ali, he may become the means of re-organizing the Turkish Empire; whilst, by a contrary policy, his interests must remain opposed to so desirable a consummation.

No. 278.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 6.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, August* 16, 1839.

INCLOSED I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship, a translation of the instructions sent by the Porte to Hafiz Pasha, for his guidance in the operations intended against Mehemet Ali during the late campaign.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Inclosure in No. 278.

Instructions given by the Sultan to Hafiz Pasha, found at the Turkish Head-Quarters after the battle of Nezib.

Plan de la marche de l'Armée du Sultan contre l'Egypte, en neuf Articles.

PUISQUE le Gouvernement Egyptien ne se soumettra jamais à son Souverain, l'été prochain il est bien probable qu'il se déclare et obtienne d'être indépendant. Comme tous mes efforts et tous mes calculs ne m'ont porté aucune utilité, il n'y aura que la guerre qui me rendra maître de cette province et qui l'unira à l'Empire des Osmanlis, et pour son exécution et son succès il faut prendre de bonnes dispositions.

ARTICLE I.

Pour le bon succès de cette entreprise il faut établir des lois rigoureuses; dans le réglement il sera promis des grades de Séraskier à tous les Ferik Pachas, s'ils ne trahissent et n'intriguent pas; mais s'ils manquent à leurs devoirs ils seront immédiatement renvoyés du service.

ARTICLE II.

D'après ce plan, l'armée doit être composée de 60,000 à 70,000 hommes, avec 120 pièces de canons, ainsi qu'il suit: 40,000 Infanterie, 15,000 Cavalerie, 5,000 Artillerie et corps du Génie; et pour le reste 10,000 de troupes irrégulières.

ARTICLE III.

Partout où l'ennemi sera rencontré, il devra être battu par l'Artillerie; il est nécessaire que le Généralissime exerce journellement l'Artillerie en ligne de bataille.

ARTICLE IV.

Pour empêcher les Egyptiens de faire un coup de main sur Marache, il est nécessaire que cette ville soit fortifiée et gardée par beaucoup de troupes; après avoir pris ces mesures, le Généralissime marchera droit sur Alep et de là à Damas, et ensuite à Acre, pour prendre possession de cette forteresse et ne pas perdre de tems pour s'emparer de toutes les dites villes. Après la prise d'Acre, il faut laisser dans cette place un grand nombre de soldats et marcher en droite ligne sur l'Egypte. La prise d'Acre sera considérée la première conquête de cette guerre; cette entreprise pourra avoir son succès peut-être avant quatre à cinq mois; et si le Gouvernement Egyptien ne rentre pas sous la domination de l'Empire, que le Généralissime sache que la guerre sera indéfinie, et il faut qu'il prenne des mesures en conséquence; car la prise de l'Egypte étant la seconde conquête, il faut au moins quatre à cinq mois pour le succès de cette seconde entreprise; à ce compte, l'importante possession de la Syrie et de l'Egypte employera en tout onze mois ou un an.

ARTICLE V.

Selon les notions que nous avons, Solyman Pacha n'est pas content de sa position. Un homme si important doit être éloigné du camp. Il faut donc envoyer auprès de lui un officier pour tâcher par tous les moyens, de le faire venir dans notre quartier. Solyman Pacha étant Européen, il faut envoyer auprès de lui un de nos officiers Français pour tâcher de le faire passer chez nous.

ARTICLE VI.

Méhémet Ali jusqu'à présent n'a donné de grades aux Arabes que jusqu'à celui de capitaine, tandis qu'aux Chrétiens il donne ceux de Colonel, Général, et Pacha; dans notre camp il y a des Arabes qui ont le grade de Pacha, par conséquent, celui qui déserte vers nous avec trente soldats, il faut lui donner le grade de Lieutenant, et celui qui désertera avec trente à cent soldats, le faire Capitaine; et si un Commandant déserte avec son bataillon, le nommer Colonel; et ceux qui intrigueront dans l'Armée Egyptienne pour révolter les soldats, soit officier, soit Colonel, obtiendraient chez nous de hauts grades. Afin que ce projet ait son exécution, il est nécessaire d'écrire des proclamations et de les faire parvenir au camp Egyptien par des espions.

ARTICLE VII.

Les Druses, les Mutoualis, qui se trouvent dans l'Armée Egyptienne, les chefs des peuplades et le peuple qui sont sous la domination de Méhémet Ali, doivent être encouragés par des promesses pour embrasser notre parti. Il faut donc seconder leurs intentions et leur accorder tout ce qu'ils désirent; et pour mieux réussir dans cette entreprise, il est nécessaire que Hafiz Pacha porte avec lui 7,000 à 8,000 bourses pour distribuer de l'argent là où il le jugera convenable et utile.

ARTICLE VIII.

Dans l'armée de Méhémet Ali Pacha il y a beaucoup d'employés Européens par le moyen desquels on pourra connaître tous ses plans et ses projets. Il est nécessaire pour être bien informé, d'envoyer auprès d'eux des espions, afin que le succès de la guerre qui va s'ouvrir l'été prochain ne laisse aucun doute.

ARTICLE IX.

Pour faire un débarquement de 10,000 à 12,000 hommes à Tripoli, il faut que l'Escadre se mette en mouvement, et aussitôt que le corps d'armée marchera de Marache, il est nécessaire d'entrer en intelligence avec les Druses, les Mutoualis, et autres Cabaïles. Pour le succès de cette entreprise, il faut préparer trente à quarante pièces de canons de campagne, 10,000 à 15,000 fusils, avec les munitions et matériel, pour être expédiés par mer à la première demande. Les personnes chargées de cette entreprise doivent employer tous leurs soins afin que ces affaires puissent se terminer le plus tôt possible.

(Translation.)

Instructions given by the Sultan to Hafiz Pasha, found at the Turkish Head-Quarters after the battle of Nezib.

Plan of march of the Army of the Sultan against Egypt, in nine Articles.

SEEING that the Egyptian Government will never submit to its Sovereign, it is very probable that in the approaching summer it may declare and obtain its independence. As all my efforts and all my calculations have been useless, there is nothing but war which will render me master of that Province, and which will unite it to the Empire of the Osmanlis, and for its execution and success good dispositions must be taken.

ARTICLE I.

For the success of this enterprise, rigorous laws must be established; in the Public Orders the grade of Seraskier shall be promised to all the Ferik Pashas, if they do not betray their trust or intrigue; but if they fail in their duties, they shall be immediately turned out of the service.

ARTICLE II.

According to this plan, the Army ought to consist of from 60,000 to 70,000 men, with 120 pieces of cannon, as follows: 40,000 Infantry, 15,000 Cavalry, 5,000 Artillery and Engineers, and the remaining 10,000 irregular troops.

ARTICLE III.

Wherever the enemy shall be met, he should be attacked by the Artillery; it is necessary that the Commander-in-Chief should exercise the Artillery daily in line of battle.

ARTICLE IV.

To prevent the Egyptians from making a sudden attack upon Marash, it is necessary that this town be fortified and guarded by a strong body of troops; after having taken these measures, the Commander-in-Chief will march upon Aleppo, and from thence to Damascus, and then to Acre, to take possession of that fortress, and not to lose time in obtaining possession of all the said towns. After the capture of Acre, he must leave a strong body of troops in that place, and march direct upon Egypt. The taking of Acre shall be considered the first conquest of this war; this enterprise may, perhaps, be accomplished within four or five months; and if the Egyptian Government does not return under the dominion of the Empire, let the Commander-in-Chief know that the war will be indefinite, and he must take measures in consequence; for the conquest of Egypt being the second achievement, four or five months will be necessary for the success of this second enterprise; according to this calculation, the important possession of Syria and Egypt will require eleven months or a year to accomplish.

ARTICLE V.

According to the information we have, Solyman Pasha is not content with his position. A man of so much importance should be got rid of. An officer should be sent to him to endeavour by all means to gain him over to our side. Solyman Pasha being a European, one of our French officers must be sent to him to endeavour to gain him over to us.

ARTICLE VI.

Mehemet Ali, up to the present time, has given no higher grade to Arabs than that of Captain, whilst to Christians he gives the rank of Colonel, General, and

Pasha; in our camp, there are Arabs who have the rank of Pasha; such being the case, he who deserts to us with thirty soldiers, shall receive the rank of Lieutenant; and he who deserts with from thirty to one hundred soldiers, the rank of Captain; and if a Commandant deserts with his battalion, the rank of Colonel; and those who intrigue in the Egyptian Army to make the soldiers revolt, whether he be an Officer or Colonel, shall obtain high grades with us. In order to put this project into execution, it is necessary to write proclamations and to scatter them in the Egyptian camp by means of spies.

ARTICLE VII.

The Druses, the Mutualis, who are in the Egyptian Army, the Chiefs of tribes, and the people who are under the dominion of Mehemet Ali, should be encouraged by promises to embrace our party. Accordingly their intentions should be seconded, and they should be granted all they desire; and the better to succeed in this enterprise, it is necessary that Hafiz Pasha should have with him 7,000 or 8,000 purses, to distribute money where he judges it convenient and useful.

ARTICLE VIII.

In the army of Mehemet Ali Pasha, there are a great many European *Employés*, by means of whom all his plans and projects may be known. It is necessary, in order to be well informed, to send spies among them, in order that the success of the war, which is about to open in the approaching summer, may be ensured.

ARTICLE IX.

In order to disembark 10,000 or 12,000 men at Tripoli, the squadron must be put in movement, and as soon as the *corps d'armée* shall march from Marash, it is necessary to enter into communication with the Druses, the Mutualis, and other Cabaïles. For the success of this enterprise, thirty or forty pieces of field artillery, from 10,000 to 15,000 muskets, with ammunition and *matériel*, must be prepared to be sent by sea on the first demand. The persons charged with this enterprise should employ all their diligence in order that these affairs may terminate as soon as possible.

No. 279.

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 9.)

My Lord, *Paris, September* 6, 1839.

YOUR Lordship will probably have been informed of the communication which Count Appony recently made to Marshal Soult, expressive of the regret of the Cabinet of Vienna, at Admiral Roussin's having suggested the arrival of a combined squadron at Constantinople, and strongly deprecating such a measure.

The Count was at the same time instructed to state, that Prince Metternich would see with great pleasure the withdrawal of the French and English Fleets from the entry of the Dardanelles; and that the Austrian Commander, at all events, would have orders to retire to Rhodes.

Marshal Soult, I understand, replied by observing, that he was not at this moment disposed to change the present position of the French fleet, which occupied that position with the view of bringing France as near Constantinople as Russia was at Sevastopol; the intentions of the French Government being those which he had frankly stated at St. Petersburgh, viz., to enter the Sea of Marmora on the one side, if the Russians entered the Bosphorus on the other. "Before, however, giving you any decided answer on this subject," (said the Marshal,) "which relates to one portion of the Eastern Question, let me ask you, Count, what your Government would do in two cases, bearing upon the same question?

"1st. If the Russians, our fleets being withdrawn as you desire, arrive at Constantinople; or if Mehemet Ali, advancing, threatens that capital, how will your Cabinet view these things, and what course would it take respecting them?

"2ndly. If we enter into coercive measures, as you seem to desire, (Count Appony had said something on this subject,) against the Viceroy of Egypt, will the Government of Austria join and bear a proportionate part in such measures?" Count Appony saying that he was unable to answer these questions, the Marshal begged him to apply to his Government respecting them; and said, that until they were answered, the Count must see that the Cabinet of France could not make any explicit or decisive explanations as to its own policy.

Such, I believe, is the substance of the conversation which passed between the Count and the Marshal.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 280.

The Hon. W. Fox Strangways to Sir John Barrow.

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 9, 1839.

I AM directed by Viscount Palmerston to transmit to you the accompanying copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Agent and Consul-General at Alexandria, stating that Mehemet Ali had declared that the moment the British and French squadrons should appear in sight of Alexandria, he (Mehemet Ali) would send immediate orders to his son, Ibrahim Pasha, to move forward with his army.

In laying this despatch before the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, Lord Palmerston directs me to request that you will point out to their Lordships that it will be desirable that Admiral Sir R. Stopford should leave at, or near, the Dardanelles, a small detachment of his squadron, to be ready to go up to Constantinople, if called for by the Turkish Government, in order to protect Constantinople against any threatened attack of Ibrahim Pasha.

I am to add, that Lord Palmerston will send a copy of Colonel Campbell's despatch herewith inclosed, and of this letter, to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna, by a messenger who will be despatched from hence to-morrow.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) W. FOX STRANGWAYS.

No. 281.

Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Bulwer.

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 10, 1839.

I HAVE to acquaint you that, on the 4th instant, I had a long conversation with Count Sébastiani upon the Affairs of the Levant.

I read to him my two despatches to Lord Beauvale of the 25th ultimo, saying that those two despatches would explain to him the views and opinions of Her Majesty's Government upon Turkish Affairs, and the course which Her Majesty's Government is prepared to pursue on those matters.

As Count Sébastiani and I have always spoken and acted towards each other with unreserved confidence, we did not attempt to disguise, in this conversation, that the feelings of the British and French Governments, with regard to the course to be pursued towards Mehemet Ali, are somewhat different, and that the French Government leans much more towards the Pasha than the British Government does; but Count Sébastiani did not seem to be prepared for the statement made in the last passage of my despatch to Lord Beauvale, of August 25, that Her Majesty's Government, although most anxious to continue to act in these matters in concert with the other Four Powers, is yet ready, if such unanimity cannot be obtained, to act in concert with a less number than the four, if any reasonable and effectual course of proceeding should be assented to by such a proportion of the Five as may give to that course adequate moral weight, and sufficient physical means.

Count Sébastiani observed that this was a very important decision, and implied a separation from France, and a dissolution of the alliance of the Five Powers. I said that it did not appear to me to go to that extent: that the Five Powers might continue agreed as to their general policy and ultimate views, but might not all be equally willing to take an active part in each of the particular and successive measures by which the result was to be arrived at: that instances of this kind had happened upon other occasions; as, for example, in the course of the Belgian Negotiation, England and France were of opinion, in 1832, that active measures ought to be taken to obtain the evacuation of Antwerp by the Dutch, while Austria, Prussia, and Russia, did not approve of such a course; England and France, however, took the active measures which they thought necessary, although Austria, Prussia, and Russia, declined to be parties thereto; but that circumstance did not dissolve the Alliance, nor prevent the Five Powers afterwards from taking up the negotiation again, and bringing it to a satisfactory end. So, on the present occasion, England might agree with Austria, Prussia, and Russia, in thinking it necessary to employ against Mehemet Ali active measures to which France, for reasons of her own, might be unwilling to become a party; but the unwillingness of France ought not to prevent the other Powers from moving on towards the attainment of an object deeply important to the general interests of Europe; and I said, that although England is most anxious to continue to act in concert with France, yet England is by no means bound to stand still in concert with France, if France should decline to move forward, while other Powers are willing to advance.

We then proceeded to discuss the objects which the Five Powers have in view, and the measures by which those objects might be attained. Those objects I stated to be, as explained in the two despatches to Lord Beauvale, the restitution of the Turkish fleet, and the limitation of the authority of Mehemet Ali to the hereditary government of Egypt.

Count Sébastiani said, that the French Government entirely concur in thinking these two objects desirable, and are of opinion, that the Turkish fleet ought to be restored to the Sultan, and that the smallest possible amount of concession, in the way of permanent arrangement, ought to be made to Mehemet Ali; but with respect to the fleet, the French Government does not think that its restitution ought to be made the object of a separate demand, or a preliminary to the negotiation for a general settlement; but that Government would prefer suspending the demand for the fleet, and leaving that fleet in the hands of Mehemet Ali, until the Five Powers should have come to an agreement, both as to the nature of the final arrangement to be proposed to Mehemet Ali, and as to the means of obtaining his assent to that arrangement; and the French Government thinks that then would be the time to demand the restoration of the fleet. The reasons assigned by Count Sébastiani for proposing this delay were, that the Turkish fleet would only be a burden to Mehemet Ali, who would soon be tired of paying and feeding its officers and men; that if it returned now to Constantinople it might again become treacherous, and declare for Mehemet Ali at a place where its treason might be much more dangerous; and lastly, because we could only employ the same means of coercion to compel the restitution of the fleet, which could be employed to enforce the general arrangement; and it would not be wise to exhaust our means upon the smaller object.

With respect to the final arrangement, Count Sébastiani said, that the French Government would be for the smallest extent of concession with which Mehemet Ali would be contented; but he seemed to imply, that France is disinclined to be a party to any active measures of coercion against Mehemet Ali; and he seemed to doubt that any measures which the Five Powers could resort to would be effectual.

I stated that we differ with the French Government as to the time at which the restitution of the Turkish fleet ought to be demanded, and are of opinion, that the Five Powers are bound in honour not to delay, and to omit no effort to restore that fleet to the Sultan: that so long as Mehemet is allowed to retain that fleet, the Sultan never can believe that the Five Powers are sincere in their professions of friendship and protection; and Mehemet Ali never will think that those Powers are in earnest in their declarations of a determination to maintain the independence and integrity of the Turkish Empire: that on the one hand, therefore, the Porte will not place its full confidence in the Allies; and on the other hand, Mehemet Ali, who, though he has suspended open war against the

Sultan, is actively carrying on secret war against him, and intriguing with all the provincial Pashas to excite them to rebellion, will have an unanswerable argument to urge to those Pashas in support of his instigations; for he will say, with apparent reason, that the Five Powers would never allow him to continue to retain the Turkish fleet, if they were not secretly on his side; he will consequently represent to those Pashas, that they would only be anticipating the real wishes of the Allies by following the example of the Capudan Pasha, and revolting against the Sultan.

I said, that as to the idea that the Turkish fleet would be a burden to Mehemet Ali, it is plain that if he thought so, and if he did not, on the contrary, think that the possession of that fleet was an advantage to him, he would make a merit of sending it back of his own accord, and would thus lay in a claim to favour from the Sultan, and to consideration from the Allies. But it is manifest, from the pains he has taken to secure that fleet by taking it into harbour, and by even landing part of its furniture and equipments, that he looks upon the possession of it as a powerful instrument of negotiation, if not of war.

I admitted that if the fleet were restored, there would be prudence in not sending it at once to Constantinople; but I said, that all we require are the ships and their equipments, and that we do not want the men; and that it would be easy for the combined squadrons to find sailors enough to navigate the ships back to Constantinople, or to Rhodes, or to some other place where they might be placed in safe-keeping. With regard to the means of coercion which could be employed to obtain restitution of the fleet, I said it is true that we could only employ for that purpose the same means which we might have to employ afterwards for enforcing a final arrangement; but that did not strike me as constituting an objection; for, in the first place, there is a greater likelihood of our being unanimous in the employment of those means for the recovery of the fleet, because even if there should exist different opinions as to the expediency of compelling Mehemet Ali to evacuate Syria, I presumed that no impartial or disinterested man anywhere could deny, that it would be perfectly proper to compel Mehemet Ali to surrender a fleet, which belongs not to him but to his Sovereign; which he has obtained not by victory in battle, but by treason; which he accepted upon a pretext which he knew to be false, namely, that unless he received it, it would be given up to the Russians; and which, if now delivered up by him to the English and French Admirals, would certainly be in safe-keeping, and would not be handed over to any authority but that of the Sultan.

Thus, then, the necessary means of coercion could be more easily employed for a purpose which all are agreed about, than for one about which some of us may differ; and so far from there being any danger that our means of coercion would thus be exhausted on a minor point, and would no longer be available for the larger one, it is apparent, on the contrary, that if our means of pressure, or the fear of them, should have succeeded in compelling Mehemet Ali to yield about the fleet, we should have gained a great moral advantage over him; and he would be much more likely to be compliant afterwards upon other points.

I said to Count Sébastiani, that he himself, when he was assuring me of the sincerity and earnestness of the French Government in this matter, had reminded me that France had declared that she would consider any hostile act of Mehemet Ali against the Sultan as an act of hostility against France herself; but what, I asked, was the forcible retention of the Turkish ships, but an act of hostility against the Sultan? What, for instance, would France say, if the French Fleet were to mutiny and go to Malta: and if the British Government were not merely to refuse to deliver up the crews for punishment, which of course could not be expected, but were to insist upon keeping possession of the ships and all their equipments? Would not the French nation indignantly declare such a proceeding to be an act not only grossly insulting, but eminently hostile to France?

I said, that Her Majesty's Government are for all these reasons of opinion, that the Five Powers ought to demand the restoration of the fleet in the first instance, and without further delay, and not to postpone that demand till the Five shall have come to an agreement as to the nature of the final arrangement. But then, in what way is the demand to be made, and how is compliance to be enforced, if in the first instance it is withheld? I said, that the manner and means had been already pointed out by Her Majesty's Government. We think that the demand should be made by the Consuls-General of the Five Powers at

Alexandria, and by a Collective Note, in order that there may not be the slightest shade of difference between the expressions to be used by each of the Five.

That if the demand shall not be fully and unconditionally complied with in twenty-four or forty-eight hours, we think the Five Consuls-General ought immediately to leave Alexandria, and to embark on board the Fleet; and that a certain time, perhaps four or five days, ought then to be given to the Pasha, to enable him to meditate upon the full import of this first demonstration of the displeasure of the Five Powers.

That if after a proper time this step should fail to produce compliance, then the allied squadron should prevent any vessel under Egyptian flag, either of war or of commerce, from entering or leaving any Egyptian or Syrian port; the squadron taking care not to meddle with any other flag but the Egyptian, in order that no complaints should be made by neutrals; this measure, I observed, would have a double effect:—first, it would cripple Mehemet Ali's pecuniary resources, which depend very much upon his trade; in the next place it would cut off at the root all military supplies for the army of Ibrahim in Syria.

If it was thought necessary to render the pressure of this measure more stringent, the allied squadron might seize and detain all merchant-ships under the Egyptian flag, of which a good many are to be found in the Levant; and such vessels might be sent to Rhodes, to be there held in safe-keeping.

If after a certain time, perhaps a month or six weeks, this pressure should prove inadequate, the next step of coercion might be the occupation of the Island of Candia by a Turkish force, protected by the allied squadron; a clear understanding being previously had with the Porte, that at the moment of occupation, there should be granted to the inhabitants of Candia, both Turks and Greeks, the same institutions which have been given to the people of Samos.

I said, that if all these measures were to fail, the Five Powers would then have to consider what further steps they should take, but that there would be ample time for such consideration; and that it did not appear at all necessary to plan beforehand, anything more than the above-mentioned measures.

Count Sébastiani did not seem to think that his Government would altogether like to join in such a course; and he treated the measures as being some of them insufficient, and others as likely to overshoot their mark. He thought the withdrawal of the Consuls-General might indeed be resorted to, if the step were taken by the Five Powers jointly; but he doubted its producing any effect. He thought the blockade would be ineffectual, because he did not believe that Mehemet Ali had many merchant-vessels under the Egyptian flag; and because, even if communication with Syria by sea were cut off, Ibrahim might advance and find resources in the country he might occupy; and, moreover, supplies might be sent him by land.

But Count Sébastiani said, he thought his Government would feel the most serious objections to an attempt upon Candia, because any endeavour to overthrow the Pasha's authority there, and to establish that of the Sultan, would lead to an outbreak among the Greek population of the island, for the purpose of uniting themselves to the Kingdom of Greece. For, he said, the Greeks form a majority in Candia, and the Turkish minority are all for Mehemet Ali, so that nobody would be for the Sultan.

I said, that I could not think that the withdrawal of the Consuls-General would be regarded by Mehemet Ali as a trifling measure; that we knew he had exhibited marks of great uneasiness when he received the copy of the Collective Note presented to the Porte on the 28th July, by the Representatives of the Five Powers at Constantinople; and that it is probable that the withdrawal of the Consuls-General would induce him to surrender the Turkish fleet. But that the naval measures, if resorted to, would be severely felt by him; that his finances are already much embarrassed, as is proved by the long arrears due to many of his troops; and that those finances would greatly suffer from such a measure; that it is well-known that, though an irregular army got together in the Oriental fashion, may subsist itself as it goes along, an army disciplined and organised in the European manner, as that of Ibrahim is, cannot move or act without constant supplies of various kinds, and without having a secure line of communication in its rear for the conveyance of those supplies. The army of Ibrahim in Syria has hitherto received its supplies from Egypt by sea, a short and easy, and cheap line of communication; but if the sea line were cut off, all the supplies would have to be sent by land, first across the Desert, and then through a long tract of country infested by marauders and insurgent tribes, through which it would require immense means of transport to convey military stores; and where the convoys would be liable to be plundered at every step, unless escorted by large bodies of troops.

It must be obvious how such a difficulty would cripple the operations of Ibrahim's army; and instead of a naval blockade leading to his advance to Constantinople, it would much more probably compel him, after a time, to fall back. But even supposing, that Ibrahim should make a dash at Constantinople, and march at once and rapidly by Koniah upon Broussa, a small detachment of the allied squadron placed in the Bosphorus, would make it impossible for him to cross over, and would probably, by its presence, maintain tranquillity in Constantinople; and then if Ibrahim, foiled in his attempt, were obliged to retreat, his army would suffer greatly from all those causes which expose to harassment an army retreating through a long line of unfriendly country.

I stated, that the periodical returns which we receive from our Consuls in the Levant, show that there are a good many merchant ships sailing under the Egyptian flag; and the seizure and detention of them would be a serious inconvenience to the Pasha.

With regard to the occupation of Candia, and the restoration of that island to the direct authority of the Sultan, I said that I did not see how that operation could tend to separate that island from the Turkish Empire, and to transfer it to the Kingdom of Greece: that it is well-known that Mehemet has at present a very small garrison in that island, and that there seems to be no reason why the Turkish and Greek population should prefer the authority of Mehemet with very imperfect local institutions, or rather with none at all, to the authority of the Sultan with local institutions like those of Samos, which, for all practical purposes of security of person and property, are almost tantamount to absolute independence.

I said, however, that this last measure would certainly require to be well considered before it was resolved upon, and that it should not be undertaken unless we could arrange proper and adequate means of execution, in which, undoubtedly, I did not see any difficulty; but if the Five Powers should determine to demand the Turkish fleet, and upon a refusal on the part of Mehemet Ali, they should resolve first to withdraw their Consuls-General, next to shut up the ports of Egypt and Syria, and then to seize and detain all Egyptian merchantmen, they might very well postpone the consideration of any further measures till the result of those first steps should be ascertained.

Count Sébastiani said he would report to his Government the substance of our conversation.

You will show this despatch to Marshal Soult.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 282.

Viscount Palmerston to Colonel Campbell.

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 13, 1839.

I HAVE received and laid before the Queen your despatches to the 16th of August.

With reference to your despatch, of the 15th of August, I have to instruct you to state to Mehemet Ali, in writing, that Her Majesty's Government is well satisfied that he is so sagacious and so well able to calculate consequences, that he will carefully abstain from taking the steps which he is reported in that despatch to have announced his intention to take, in the event of the appearance of the combined squadron off Alexandria.

For the Pasha must be well aware, that he is not in a position, which, either geographically or politically, or with reference either to military or to naval considerations, can enable him with impunity to set at defiance the Governments of Europe, and more especially the Maritime Powers.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 283.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received September* 13.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August* 18, 1839.

ADMIRAL SIR ROBERT STOPFORD came up to Constantinople in the "Confiance" steamer, on the 15th, and intends to return to the fleet in a few days. Yesterday he had an interview with the Grand Vizier.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 284.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received September* 13.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, August* 19, 1839.

ON the 17th, in the morning, M. de Bouténeff read to me, by order of his Government, your Lordship's instructions to Lord Clanricarde, exposing the views of Her Majesty's Government for the final settlement of affairs between the Sublime Porte and Mehemet Ali; and also Count Nesselrode's reply, sent through M. de Kisseleff at London. To the first condition upon which the Emperor of Russia gives his concurrence, namely, "that the consent and approbation of the Porte be given," I observed, that the measure stated by your Lordship is almost identically that which was offered spontaneously by the Porte to Mehemet Ali, a few days after the accession of Sultan Abdul Medjid; and therefore there is an unequivocal proof that it is approved of by the Porte.

No. 285.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received September* 13.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, August* 20, 1839.

I HAVE just received from the Sublime Porte, and inclose to your Lordship, copy of a letter from Mehemet Ali to the Grand Vizier.

The Porte declares that the assertion made by the Pasha is false, and that the truth is, that the Sultan yielded nothing to him but Egypt alone.

It appears from what I learn, that Mehemet Ali is inclined to adjourn his demand for the deposition of Hosrew.

It will appear in this letter that there is a strong desire to settle the question without the intervention of the Great Powers.

Inclosure in No. 285.

Mehemet Ali to the Grand Vizier.

[See Inclosure in No. 262, p. 347.

No. 286.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received September* 13.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, August* 21, 1839.

I HAVE just learnt, that in a Council at which some of the Ulema assisted, with other members of the Porte, it was finally resolved to limit the offers to Mehemet Ali to the concession of Egypt as an hereditary government; and that this decision was so agreeable to the Sultan that he desired to know the names of those who had voted in support of it. I believe this result may be attributed to the firmness of the Powers in the support of the Sultan; and in part also to the fact, that the Pashas who received the letters from Mehemet

Ali have sent those letters to the Grand Vizier, with strong declarations of their loyalty and devotion to the Sultan.

It appears to me the moment is not yet come for the partisans of Mehemet Ali to advance further: prudence requires that the Grand Vizier should be first got rid of by them in some way or other.

I have had a most satisfactory conversation with Baron de Stürmer, and beg to offer my humble tribute of applause to his zeal and ability.

I inclose two official Notes I sent in to the Porte this day. The situation of affairs made it necessary, in my opinion, to adopt this formal mode of communication.

Inclosure 1 in No. 286.

Viscount Ponsonby to Nouri Effendi.

Therapia, August 21, 1839.

THE Undersigned, &c., having received from the British Ambassador at Vienna the inclosed copy of a declaration made by his Excellency in the name of his Court, thinks it expedient to communicate officially that document to the Sublime Porte.

The Sublime Porte will perceive that this declaration engages the British Government to maintain the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire under the present dynasty, and not to seek to profit by the present state of things for the purpose of gaining any acquisition of territory, or any exclusive influence.

The Undersigned has to state, that his Excellency the French Ambassador at Vienna has made a similar declaration, and that the Chancellor of Court and State, Prince Metternich, has officially approved of and adopted the obligations contracted by those declarations.

The Sublime Porte will receive with satisfaction this indisputable manifestation of the sincerity with which the Three Courts are resolved to support all the rights and interests of Sultan Abdul Medjid and his Empire.

The Undersigned, &c.,

(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 286.

Viscount Ponsonby to Nouri Effendi.

Therapia, August 21, 1839.

THE Undersigned, &c., has the honour to represent to his Excellency Nouri Effendi, for the information of the Sublime Porte, that he has heard rumours, which he thinks are well founded, that efforts have been made to induce the Sublime Porte to enter into negotiations with the Pasha of Egypt, for the purpose of making arrangements with that Pasha for the settlement, as pretended, of the political differences between the Sublime Porte and the said Pasha; and further, it is rumoured, that the Sublime Porte may have listened to counsel recommending that mode of proceeding.

The Undersigned considers it his duty to remind the Sublime Porte, that the Sublime Porte is bound by positive engagement to the Five Great Powers, not to enter into negotiation, nor to make any arrangement with the Pasha Mehemet Ali, without the knowledge and consent of the Great Powers.

The Undersigned, &c., has to call to the attention of the Sublime Porte the important fact, that the arrangement to be made between the Sublime Porte and the Pasha is not a matter involving only the interests of the Sublime Porte and its subjects, but is a matter that concerns and touches most nearly the interests of the Five Powers: and therefore, that the Five Powers, it is to be presumed, cannot see with indifference their rights and interests disposed of by the Sublime Porte, without their special knowledge and concurrence in what shall be done.

The Undersigned, &c.,

(Signed) PONSONBY.

o. 287.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received September* 13.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, August* 22, 1839.

I COMMUNICATED to his Excellency the French Ambassador, my Official Notes to the Sublime Porte, of yesterday's date, and of which copies were inclosed in my preceding despatch.

His Excellency said, that he intended to make a communication to the Porte similar to mine on the subject of the declaration made at Vienna by the Ambassadors; that with respect to the arrangement of the differences between Mehemet Ali and the Porte, without the consent of the Five Powers, he thought it unnecessary at this moment to repeat what had already been signified to the Porte by the Collective Note, but he did not object to the step I had taken.

No. 288.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received September* 13.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, August* 22, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to inclose a Note, addressed by the Sublime Porte to the Representatives of the Five Powers, which I have just received.

Inclosure in No. 288.

Official Note addressed by the Sublime Porte to the Representatives of the Five Great Powers.

(Traduction.)

TOUT le monde sait qu'aussitôt après l'avènement du Sultan au Trône Ottoman, Sa Hautesse a proclamé le pardon de Méhémet Ali, et qu'Elle a accordé l'hérédité de l'Egypte dans la famille de ce Pacha.

Un personnage était déjà destiné à aller entamer les négociations nécessaires, lorsque les Représentans des Cinq Grandes Puissances à Constantinople ont donné à la Sublime Porte une Note Collective, par laquelle ils l'informaient que les Cinq Puissances sont d'accord entre elles d'arranger la Question Egyptienne à l'unanimité.

En conséquence, la Sublime Porte a fait savoir à Méhémet Ali cet état de choses, et elle attendait les communications qui allaient lui être faites par les Cinq Puissances.

Mais sur ces entrefaites, Méhémet Ali a demandé l'hérédité de tous les pays qu'il a en son pouvoir, il retient la Flotte Impériale jusqu'à ce qu'il ait obtenu ce qu'il désire, il a demandé et il persiste à demander des nominations et des changemens qui ne dépendent que de la seule volonté du Souverain, et il a écrit et envoyé des lettres aux Vizirs dans l'Anatolie et la Roumélie, pour les exciter à la révolte. Telles sont les propositions dures et les procédés violens qu'il s'est permis: manière d'agir contraire à la soumission et à l'obéissance.

Cela étant, il appartient toujours aux Cinq Puissances d'arranger cette affaire, et la Sublime Porte demande qu'il soit pris des mesures pour faire consentir Méhémet Ali à ce qui suit: à rendre la Flotte Impériale; à se désister de la prétention de l'hérédité de la Syrie; à revenir à de meilleurs sentimens relativement au changement du Viziriat—changement qui dépend de la volonté de Sa Hautesse; à cesser de chercher à susciter des désordres; à ce que cette affaire soit négociée et arrangée ici par l'entremise des Cinq Puissances; et à attendre les actes de faveur qui émaneront du Trône Impérial. La Porte demande aussi que MM. les Représentans communiquent tout ce qui a été dit plus haut à leurs Cours respectives, sans le moindre délai, et qu'ils demandent les instructions nécessaires.

Tout cela ayant été porté à la connaissance des Légations d'Autriche, de

Russie, de Prusse, et de France, nous en informons aussi Son Excellence l'Ambassadeur de la Cour de la Grande Bretagne, et c'est ce que nous faisons en lui présentant cette Note officielle.

Le 13 *Djémazi-ul-akhir,* 1255 (22 *Août,* 1839).

(Translation.)

Official Note addressed by the Sublime Porte to the Representatives of the Five Great Powers.

ALL the world knows that immediately after the Sultan's accession to the Ottoman throne, His Highness proclaimed the pardon of Mehemet Ali, and bestowed the inheritance of Egypt in the family of the Pasha.

A person was already fixed upon to proceed and open the necessary negotiations, when the Representatives of the Five Great Powers at Constantinople gave in a Collective Note to the Sublime Porte, by which they informed it, that the Five Powers had unanimously agreed among themselves to settle the Egyptian Question.

In consequence, the Sublime Porte made Mehemet Ali acquainted with this state of things, and awaited the communications which were about to be made to it by the Five Powers.

But in the meanwhile Mehemet Ali has demanded the inheritance of all the countries which are in his power; he keeps possession of the Imperial fleet until he obtains what he desires; and he has required, and he persists in requiring, certain appointments and changes which depend solely upon the will of the Sovereign; and he has written and sent letters to the Viziers of Anatolia and Roumelia to excite them to revolt. Such are the harsh propositions and the violent proceedings which he has allowed himself to adopt; a manner of acting at variance with submission and obedience.

This being the case, it still belongs to the Five Powers to arrange this affair, and the Sublime Porte asks that measures may be taken to make Mehemet Ali consent to what follows: to restore the Imperial fleet; to renounce his pretensions to the hereditary government of Syria; to adopt more reasonable views with regard to the change of the vizirial office,—a change which depends entirely upon the will of His Highness; to cease endeavouring to stir up disorders; to agree that this affair should be negotiated and arranged here, through the medium of the Five Powers; and to wait for the acts of grace which will emanate from the Imperial Throne. The Porte further requests the Representatives to communicate without delay all that is said above to their respective Courts, and to ask for the necessary instructions.

All this having been communicated to the Missions of Austria, Russia, Prussia, and France, we also inform his Excellency the English Ambassador thereof, as we hereby do in this official Note.

13*th Djemazi-ul akhir,* 1255 (*August* 22, 1839).

No. 289.

Lord William Russell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 13.)

(Extract.) *Berlin, September* 4, 1839.

I COMMUNICATED to Baron Werther, and have since sent to him a copy of your Lordship's despatch, of the 27th ultimo, to Sir George Hamilton. His Excellency said, the principles and opinions set forth in that despatch had his entire approbation; but he contemplated with considerable fear the difficulty and danger of putting them into execution. He said, your Lordship had better information on the latter point than he could have, and he consequently relied on success.

I have not yet been able to procure a copy of the report of the battle of Nezib, made by the Prussian officers, but the following is the substance:—They state, that if Hafiz Pasha had remained in his entrenched camp, he was secure; but the late Sultan and the Mollahs forced him to expose himself in the plain, and even then he was certain of victory, had he known how to handle his troops: but the soldiers had no confidence in their Chief, and the Chief no power over his soldiers; and their mutual distrust led to weakness and defeat. The Prussian officers further state, that there was the same confusion amongst the troops of Ibrahim Pasha, and that the Syrian regiments attempted to pass over to the Ottoman Army during the battle. This prevented the Egyptians from following up their victory.

No. 290.

The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received September* 13.)

(Extract.) *St. Petersburgh, August* 22, 1839.

COUNT NESSELRODE told me yesterday, that he had that morning received a courier from London; that the English Government took the same view of the affairs of Turkey as that of Russia; that the French Government, in reply to a proposition made by your Lordship, had refused to be a party to coerce Mehemet Ali, who had become more and more insolent, and positive in his demands upon the Sultan.

Count Nesselrode says, there is nothing to impede Ibrahim Pasha's victorious career, and no reason why Mehemet Ali might not be, at this moment, master of Constantinople.

The language I have continued to hold is, that Mehemet Ali must be treated only as a refractory vassal, whose ambition it is necessary to check by direct and active interference; that the integrity of the Turkish Empire, and the rule and independence of the reigning Sultan, must be maintained, in order to preserve the peace of Europe.

Your Lordship may rest assured, that the Russian Government cordially agree in this view, and will act upon it sincerely and honestly.

No. 291.

The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received September* 13.)

(Extract.) *St. Petersburgh, August* 27, 1839.

AT Count Nesselrode's desire, I called upon his Excellency this morning, when he informed me that the Emperor, having reason to believe that the British Government was better disposed towards Russia, and entertained a more favourable and just opinion of his views and policy than heretofore, was desirous of improving this disposition to the utmost, and of strengthening the good understanding, which so happily existed; and, therefore, as the Russian Ambassador was absent from London, His Imperial Majesty had directed Baron Brunnow to visit London, previously to repairing to his post at Stutgardt, to communicate fully with your Lordship, and to offer the most unreserved explanations of the views and policy of this country upon any point upon which your Lordship might wish to have them, or which you might desire to discuss.

Count Nesselrode said, that unless he were himself to proceed to London, it would not be possible for the Emperor to send thither any person more thoroughly acquainted with the foreign affairs and policy of Russia than Baron Brunnow.

He will set out on Thursday upon his journey, which he will perform by land, as far as Rotterdam, and will probably arrive in England immediately after this despatch.

I did not hesitate to assure Count Nesselrode and Baron Brunnow, of the satisfaction Her Majesty's Government would feel at the sentiments expressed on the part of the Emperor, and of the sincere pleasure with which, I was convinced your Lordship would welcome Baron Brunnow in England.

No. 292.

The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received September* 13.)

(Extract.) *St. Petersburgh, August* 28, 1839.

COUNT NESSELRODE entered, yesterday, into a long conversation with me upon the state of affairs in Turkey; and his Excellency showed me the last despatches he had received from Constantinople, from Paris, and from London.

Count Medem's despatch detailed the conversation to which it referred with great apparent accuracy; and the language of the French Miniter was clear and positive. He said, the French Government would on no account join in coercing by force of arms the Pasha of Egypt; and deemed it better, that the Sultan should accede to Mehemet Ali's demands (which the Marshal recapitulated), than that an armed interference should be effected to prevent the dismemberment of the Turkish Empire.

Count Nesselrode showed me a copy of Mehemet Ali's reply to Hosrew Pasha, and a report of his sending emissaries to excite other Pashas against that Minister, and characterised the whole of his conduct as the height o arrogance; and his Excellency added, that these affairs were getting daily into a more critical state.

I said, that although the question appeared, from the intelligence he had communicated, to assume a more grave and difficult aspect, it became, however, more simple, and was reduced to this,—what Powers are prepared to act against Mehemet Ali? and what is the safest and most judicious mode of action? We were committed in hostility against the Pasha (by the seizure of a brig, which his Excellency had just reported to me), and in such hostility, at present, we appeared to stand alone; but I was sure, that even if we were to be alone in such a course, Her Majesty's Government would support the just rights and interests of the Sultan. Count Nesselrode said, in a manner that showed it was a decision which had been maturely formed, "You may be sure that we shall not desert you in such a case." This was only what I expected.

Count Nesselrode showed me M. de Kisseleff's report of your Lordship's assent to changing from Vienna the seat of communications and negotiations that the Turkish affairs may require.

On the whole, I found Count Nesselrode yesterday more at his ease upon the state of the Turco-Egyptian Question, than he had been, because, although it appeared more difficult than ever to settle without some act or demonstration of armed intervention, there appeared a chance of Russia and England acting in concert.

P.S.—Since writing this despatch, I have obtained an extract of Count Medem's report of his conversation with Marshal Soult, to which I have alluded. And I send it to your Lordship, because Marshal Soult is stated to have announced, on the part of the French Government, two principles of action, which I take to differ, *toto cœlo*, from those adopted by Her Majesty's Government:—the one, that it were better to concede his own terms to Mehemet Ali, than to coerce him by force; the other, that the battle of Nezib, and the defection of the Turkish fleet, justify the Pasha in demanding, and the Five Powers in acquiescing in, terms different from those approved of before the occurrence of these events.

Inclosure in No. 292.

Extract of a despatch from the Count P. Medem to Count Nesselrode, reporting a conversation with Marshal Soult.

M. LE MARECHAL me fit part du sens des instructions qu'il venait d'expédier au Consul-Général de France à Alexandrie. Il doit commencer par déclarer à Méhémet Ali, que sa demande concernant le renvoi de Hosreff

ne saurait aucunement être prise en considération, et que la France lui donnait le conseil d'abandonner des prétentions de ce genre, ainsi que de restituer la flotte Ottomane, ce qui serait la meilleure manière de se recommander à son Souverain, et en même tems à la bienveillance des Puissances qui y reconnaîtraient un gage de ses dispositions conciliantes et du prix qu'il mettait à leur approbation.

Sur mon observation que je ne voyais dans ces instructions que des conseils auxquels le Pacha restait libre d'avoir égard ou non, le Ministre me demanda ce qu'il y aurait eu à y ajouter.

Je lui répondis qu'il me semblait que M. Cochelet aurait pu être autorisé, le cas échéant, à tenir au Pacha un langage plus péremptoire, en lui donnant à entendre que la France avait à sa disposition les moyens d'appuyer des conseils bien intentionnés s'il se refusait à les suivre.

Soult.—Et si le Vice-Roi persistait à s'y refuser?

Moi.—Dans ce cas extrême, on aurait recours à l'emploi de mesures coërcitives, pour le forcer à accepter les conditions de paix qu'on aurait jugées seules propres à établir d'une manière stable et satisfaisante les relations entre le Souverain et le Pacha.

Soult.—Et qui se chargera d'appliquer ces mesures?

Moi.—Nécessairement ce rôle serait dévolu aux deux Puissances maritimes qui ont dans les mers du Levant des forces navales suffisantes pour arriver à leurs fins, soit en établissant un blocus, soit en se portant à des hostilités contre Méhémet Ali.

Soult.—Je n'hésite pas à vous déclarer, que nous ne nous porterons jamais à un pareil acte d'agression, déjà par la raison que nous ne voulons pas courir le risque d'irriter le Vice-Roi au point de le pousser peut-être à reprendre l'offensive contre la Turquie, ce qui amènerait des complications trop sérieuses pour ne pas nous engager à éviter tout ce qui serait de nature à les provoquer. D'ailleurs, un blocus ne servirait à rien et serait tout entier au désavantage de notre commerce. Pour enlever la Syrie au Vice-Roi il faudrait y envoyer une armée considérable, ce qui n'est ni dans notre intention, ni dans notre pouvoir. La Russie serait seule en position de se charger d'une semblable entreprise, mais nous la croyons trop sage pour la supposer disposée à se jeter dans une expédition aussi lointaine et aussi hasardeuse. Notre avis est donc d'employer par la voie diplomatique tous les argumens de persuasion, afin de rendre Méhémet Ali plus traitable; mais à l'emploi de la force, nous n'y consentirons point. Et qui oserait prendre sur soi la responsabilité d'avoir tiré le premier coup de canon? Lorsque M. le Comte de Nesselrode signa les dépêches dont vous venez de me donner communication, et dont je m'empresserai de porter le contenu à la connaissance du Roi, il ignorait encore les résultats de la bataille de Nézib, la destruction de l'armée Ottomane, et la défection de la flotte. Nul doute que depuis il n'ait modifié ses opinions sur la limite des concessions à accorder au Vice-Roi d'Egypte, vainqueur de son adversaire sur terre et sur mer, et bien décidé à s'assurer les meilleures conditions possibles. Il en résulte que s'il persévère dans sa prétention de conserver à titre héréditaire tout ce qu'il possède actuellement, nous pensons qu'il sera d'une politique prudente de le lui concéder, et d'arriver ainsi au plus ôt à cette transaction qui doit régler définitivement les rapports entre le suzerain et le vassal.

(Translation.)

Extract of a Despatch from the Count P. Medem to Count Nesselrode, reporting a conversation with Marshal Soult.

THE MARSHAL communicated to me the purport of the instructions which he had just forwarded to the Consul-General of France at Alexandria. He is to begin by declaring to Mehemet Ali, that his demand respecting the dismissal of Hosrew can in no wise be taken into consideration, and that France advised him to abandon pretensions of this sort, as well as to restore the Ottoman Fleet, which would be the best means of recommending himself to his Sovereign, and at the same time to the goodwill of the Powers, who would see therein a

pledge of his conciliatory disposition, and of the value which he attached to their approbation.

On my observing that I only saw in these instructions advice which the Pasha was free to follow or not, the Minister asked me what there could have been added to them.

I replied to him, that it seemed to me that M. Cochelet might have been authorized, in the event of such a case occurring, to hold more peremptory language to the Pasha, by giving him to understand that France had the means at her disposal to enforce well-meant advice, if he refused to follow it.

Soult.—And if the Viceroy should persist in his refusal?

I.—In that extreme case recourse would be had to the employment of measures of coercion, to force him to accept conditions of peace which had been considered to be the only fitting ones to establish the relations between the Sovereign and the Pasha in a secure and satisfactory manner.

Soult.—And who will undertake to carry these measures into execution?

I.—Necessarily this part will devolve on the two Maritime Powers who have a sufficient Naval Force in the Levant to attain their end, either by establishing a blockade, or by proceeding to hostilities against Mehemet Ali.

Soult.—I do not hesitate to declare to you, that we will never lend ourselves to such an act of aggression, for this reason that we are unwilling to run the risk of irritating the Viceroy to the degree, perhaps, of driving him to renew offensive operations against Turkey, which would bring on complications too serious for us not to wish to avoid every thing of a nature to bring them about. Moreover, a blockade would be of no use, and would be entirely to the disadvantage of our commerce. In order to wrest Syria from the Viceroy, it would be necessary to send a considerable army thither, which it is neither our intention nor in our power to do. Russia alone would be in a situation to undertake such an enterprise; but we believe her to be too wise to imagine that she is disposed to enter upon so distant and so hazardous an expedition. Our advice is, therefore, to employ every argument of persuasion in the way of diplomacy, in order to make Mehemet Ali more tractable; but as for the employment of force, we will never consent to it. And who would take upon himself the responsibility of having fired the first shot? At the time when Count Nesselrode signed the despatches which you have just communicated to me, and the contents of which I shall hasten to bring to the knowledge of the king, he was still ignorant of the result of the battle of Nezib, of the destruction of the Ottoman Army, and of the defection of the Fleet. No doubt he has since modified his opinions as to the extent of the concessions to be made to the Viceroy of Egypt, the conqueror of his adversary by sea and by land, and fully determined to obtain the most favourable conditions. It follows, that if he perseveres in the pretension of retaining hereditarily all that he now possesses, we think that it will be prudent policy to grant it to him, and thus to arrive as quickly as possible at that arrangement which is definitively to regulate the relations between the Sovereign and the Vassal.

No. 293.

The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 13.)

(Extract.) *St. Petersburgh, August* 31, 1839.

BARON BRUNNOW called yesterday to take leave of me.

He is the bearer of a letter from His Imperial Majesty to the Queen.

As regards the Turco-Egyptian Question, I believe your Lordship will be perfectly satisfied with Baron Brunnow's language: and your Lordship may rely upon his words, as those of one possessing the entire confidence of his Government.

I do not fear to repeat my conviction, that the Russian Government will act in the affairs of Turkey, on the present occasion, in entire accordance with the policy Great Britain has declared, and sincerely for the maintenance of the Sultan's Empire.

No. 294.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 13.)

(Extract.) *Vienna, September* 3, 1839.

ALTHOUGH it is not probable that the final settlement of the affairs of Turkey and Egypt will come under discussion at an early period, I yet think it desirable to lose no time in calling your Lordship's attention to the difference between the terms demanded by the Porte in its official Note of the 22nd of August, and those dwelt upon in your Lordship's despatch of the 25th of August.

The Official Note makes no objection to granting Syria for life to Mehemet Ali, provided it is not given hereditarily. If the Five Powers were agreed upon obtaining its immediate restitution, this would create no difficulty; but such not being the case, those who wish to secure it to Mehemet Ali, either permanently or for life, will not fail to take advantage of this demand made by the Porte, to argue that we are not authorized to insist upon better terms for the Sultan, than those which he requires for himself.

The answer to this is to be found in various of your Lordship's despatches. The Powers do not interfere only for the benefit of the Sultan, but to secure peace and a durable state of possession in the East; still the limited demand made by the Porte will not fail to stand in the way of obtaining more. The state of the affair does not warrant me in asking for a further instruction in consequence; but I think it probable that the first step in any joint negotiation which may be brought to bear at Vienna, would be to apply to the Porte to learn the conditions which the Sultan is willing to accord to Mehemet Ali.

No. 295.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, September* 14, 1839.

YOUR Excellency's despatches to the 22d of August, have been received and laid before the Queen.

I have to acquaint your Excellency, that Her Majesty's Government approve of your Excellency having addressed to Nouri Effendi the Notes, of which copies are inclosed in your Excellency's despatch of the 21st of August.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 296.

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 15.)

My Lord, *Paris, September* 13, 1839.

I HAVE had the honour of receiving your Lordship's despatch of the 10th of September.

With regard to what your Lordship observes in respect to General Sébastiani seeming unprepared for the statement made in the last passage of your Lordship's despatch of August 25, to Lord Beauvale, I have to remark, that the contents of that despatch were duly, according to your Lordship's desire, communicated to Marshal Soult; and I have on more than one occasion pointed out the importance of that particular passage to the Marshal, and likewise to M. Désages. I shall now, in conformity with your Lordship's orders, show to Marshal Soult the despatch which I have just received, and which contains the substance of your Lordship's conversation with General Sébastiani.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 297.

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 15.)

(Extract.) *Paris, September* 13, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship, that it is the intention of the French Government to recall Admiral Roussin from Constantinople. M. de Pontois, a gentleman who has occupied for some time the situation of Minister at the United States, is to replace Admiral Roussin, but with merely the title of Envoy Extraordinary.

No. 298.

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 15.)

(Extract.) *Paris, September* 13, 1839.

M. DE LANGSDORFF, a relative of M. de St. Aulaire, and Secretary of Embassy at Vienna, being about to return to his post with particular instructions to M. de St. Aulaire, called on me Wednesday morning last. The Baron said, the views of France and England being identic with respect to Constantinople, the only subject of difference that could exist was, the conduct to be pursued between Mehemet Ali and the Sultan; "and I think," said M. de Langsdorff, "that your Government considers this part, which is the minor part of the question, too strongly." I replied, that my Government were anxious to provide, not merely for a temporary exigency, but for the permanent position of the Ottoman Empire; and that, considering the present position of the Pasha of Egypt, in relation with that general object, the limits to be set to his power, and the course to be adopted in respect to him, was a question of the first importance; besides, the Collective Note lately delivered, placed the Governments who were parties to it, in a decided position, and bound them to pursue prompt and energetic measures. But that this was not all, for that which I especially regretted, looking as he (the Baron) did, at the union of the two Powers of France and England as most desirable in this and all other matters, was the impossibility I had as yet found of arriving at any clear notions of what course the French Government really did deem it advisable to pursue; that the views of Her Majesty's Government were distinct and positive, and had been fully explained.

They considered that by the Note which the Great Powers had delivered to the Porte, those Powers had bound themselves in alliance with the Sultan, and were engaged to procure him such terms as friends and Allies ought to procure for a State to which they volunteered assistance; and that with this object Her Majesty's Government had, in the first place, proposed plans for restoring to the Sultan his fleet; had in the next stated, that the hereditary viceroyalty of Mehemet Ali should be confined to Egypt, and agreed to consider all these questions, and the means of effecting them, at Vienna. But as yet, while France knew distinctly what our Government would do, I frankly confessed, that I only knew what the French Government would not do; which rendered it the more difficult to endeavour to combine the united efforts of the two Governments into any common course. The Baron admitted that something must be done to vindicate the honour of the Governments of Europe after their common Note; but could not state to me anything that his Government had determined to do with this object.

I have thought it right to communicate this conversation, although necessarily it was not of an official character, to your Lordship, as well on account of Baron Langsdorff's position at Vienna, as on account of his being sent there sooner than he had intended to return, in order to carry to M. de St. Aulaire the most recent and complete information in respect to the views of the French Government; while he had requested to see and to talk with me previous to his departure.

From scattered observations, and the general tone of Baron Langsdorff's conversation, I should conclude, that the French Government were most desirous to come to some arrangement with us in respect to the position of the Viceroy of Egypt, to which that personage might be prevailed upon, through a representation that it was for his own interests, to consent; but I still remain persuaded that the French Government do not, and are not likely to feel disposed to aid us in enforcing any conditions upon Mehemet Ali, which he might reject as unfavourable.

I should also think that the Baron imagined that Austria might agree with France in respect to some general plan of pacification less favourable to the Porte than your Lordship would desire.

Upon the whole, the impression which I retained from the conversation alters none of my previous opinions.

The possibility of getting France into some vigorous system of action will entirely depend upon our getting the other Powers to consent to such a system. Even in that case, the French Ministry would wish to stand aloof.

No. 299.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 16.)

(Extract.) *Vienna, September* 8, 1839.

THE delay in Count Fiquelmont's arrival, and that which has been necessary in order to transfer affairs into his hands, have rendered it impossible to answer your Lordship's despatches of the 25th August at an earlier period.

Upon the arrival of those despatches, my first care was to inform Prince Metternich, through his Secretary, of their contents, and by this channel I learnt that he persisted in the opinion that the first measure ought to be a demand for the restitution of the fleet.

My next step was to communicate with the French Ambassador, who had at that time received no fresh instructions, but was anxious to co-operate with me as far as those already in his hands would permit. Two days afterwards his instructions arrived, and I then learnt from him that they had restricted rather than extended his powers; that, if he joined in a demand for the restitution of the fleet, he could not follow it up by any measure of coercion; that he was not authorized even to withdraw the Consul; and that all propositions of the sort must be referred to Paris. Upon this ground he urged me strongly to enter upon the general question, instead of making that of the fleet a preliminary.

Upon inquiry, I found that he was as little authorized to resort to action upon the general question as upon the special one; it was equally evident that our views upon it were entirely different, and I therefore declined acceding to his proposal.

I told the Ambassdor that if he could not go along with me in demanding the restitution of the fleet,—a step which would have the concurrence of the whole world,—it would be idle to set out with him upon another road, on which he would be sure to abandon me before we reached the first stage.

Having occasion the same day to write to him, I took advantage of the opportunity to tell him the truth of the situation in plainer terms than your Lordship's position would allow you to employ. I expressed my conviction that this question would resolve Europe into its elements; and as he had assumed England to be passionately hostile to Mehemet Ali, I told him that this was an error accredited by the French Press; that the public is indifferent, while the Ministry is pronounced for the unity of the Ottoman Empire;

quoting your Lordship's own words, that that unity, if it could be attained under Mehemet Ali, would be accepted; but that this being impossible, we should persist in supporting it under the Sultan; and I added that, if our two countries had been united in their views, they would not have had a difficulty to encounter, whereas, if they remained disunited, they would fail in everything.

Some days passed after this before I could see Count Fiquelmont. He believes that anything reasonable which is agreed to here by the Three Powers, or even by England and Austria, will, at Constantinople, receive the accession of Russia; and he thinks this would apply to the order to the Consuls at Alexandria to withdraw, if their demand for the fleet was rejected.

One great difficulty of engaging Russia to make common cause with us, arises, in his opinion, from the aspect of menace towards her assumed by England and France; and he went into long reasonings to show the expediency of removing the fleets from the mouth of the Dardanelles.

The difficulties I opposed to him were purely of a material nature. Whither, I asked, would you have them go? They must not show themselves off Alexandria without orders to act. In all cases, a naval force must be left near at hand to defend the passage into Europe against Ibrahim.

The English fleet is destined to execute the resolves of the Conference here; where then can it so well be placed for communication as in the neighbourhood of the Ambassador at Constantinople?

He was unprepared with an answer to these statements, and requested, that at least the attitude of the fleet might be divested of the character of suspicion and menace towards Russia which it had at first borne.

I assured him that this was already done, and quoted your Lordship's despatch to Lord Clanricarde of August 20, and various instructions, in which the passage of the Dardanelles is made to depend upon the call of the Sultan. Count Fiquelmont's request would, in my opinion, under any circumstances, be reasonable.

We agreed that it would be unwise to do anything without having made a further effort to gain the accession of France; and I proposed that the Austrian Ambassador at Paris should concert with our Minister there, the language most likely to produce an effect; and that each should employ it separately. I further stated, that in my opinion it behoved us to represent that we did not look upon the instruments which had been exchanged, as mere waste paper; that we considered ourselves bound by the Collective Note to the Porte, and were determined, as far as our power went, to redeem our pledge; and that we called upon those Powers who had contracted equal obligations with ourselves, to assist us in fulfilling them. He concurred in these propositions, and said, that as soon as he had seen the French Ambassador, he would send orders to Count Appony to act upon them. I then observed to him, that if this attempt should fail, it would be necessary for England and Austria to resolve what course to pursue. He concurred in this; and it was agreed between us, that I should submit the question to my Government, and that it should be taken into consideration in the mean time by that of Austria. I therefore beg to call the attention of Her Majesty's Government to this subject, and shall await your Lordship's instructions upon it.

No. 300.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 16.)

(Extract.) *Vienna, September 8, 1839.*

IN obedience to your Lordship's instructions, I have given copy of your despatch of August 25, to Count Fiquelmont. The reasonings of that despatch are unanswerable; but how far they will influence the conduct of the Courts with whom we are acting, seems doubtful. The first plan traced by Austria did not contemplate the immediate restitution of Syria to the Sultan. She has since adopted our view of the eligibility of such a course, without, however, pronouncing herself as to its practicability, or as to the means of attaining it. The official reports from Paris, state the French Government to have pronounced its determination never to fire a shot against Mehemet Ali; and to have canvassed the Representatives of other Powers with the view of influencing their Courts to join in the same resolution. The French Government has further stated its opinion to be, that all which Mehemet Ali asks, —Syria, Arabia, and Candia,—should be granted hereditarily to his family. Russia, though assenting to the propriety of your Lordship's proposition, has done so with a doubt as to the possibility of carrying it into effect. Instead, therefore, of being able to present it to Mehemet Ali with the joint weight of the Five, it seems more probable that only Four can be induced to concur in it; and of those Four two partly from motives of complaisance. Under these circumstances, I have to request your Lordship to inform me how far I am to consider your despatch as containing a final instruction; and whether under any circumstances and to what extent it may be deviated from. All depends upon France. If her cordial concurrence and perseverance in the demand could be counted upon, there would be no doubt of its ultimate success. Is this possible in the present temper of France?

I am too deeply impressed with the conflicting difficulties and complications with which this whole question is surrounded, to form any very positive opinion upon it; but I think it my duty to submit it to your Lordship under all the aspects in which it presents itself.

No. 301.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 16.)

(Extract.) *Vienna, September* 8, 1839.

THE details given in a preceding despatch will have acquainted your Lordship with the circumstances which have prevented my acting upon the instructions conveyed in your other despatch of August 25. The consequent delay being unavoidable, I profit by it for the purpose of further reference to your Lordship.

Your despatch proceeds upon the idea that the Five Powers are acting together. Now this is so far from being the case, that it can only be said of England and Austria. Your Lordship's despatch partly provides for this situation, authorizing me to act, under prescribed conditions, with a less number. If this smaller number should consist of Austria and France, I should feel no difficulty; but if it were to consist, as is not impossible, of Austria and Russia, how am I then to understand your order?

If neither France nor Russia can be brought to concur with England and Austria in a common course of action, the two latter Powers will then be called upon to decide for themselves what line they are to take. The period which has already elapsed since the Collective Note was presented, will not allow this to be much longer deferred; and if the return of the present messenger should bring no means of uniting a sufficient number of the Powers to proceed to act, I would submit to your Lordship the propriety of furnishing me with instructions as to the course which you may think fit to direct me to propose to Austria to pursue in common with ourselves. It has been suggested by some that an intimation to Mehemet Ali, that no arrangements made in his favour by the Porte without the assent of the European Powers would be recognized, might decide his conduct. I doubt it, even if made by the Five; from two or three of them he would value it little. Another course might be, to advise the Porte to withhold even the grant of hereditary right in Egypt, remaining rather as she is than submitting to ruinous concessions. This would involve the burthen of the permanent defence of Constantinople, and would leave a wide door open for internal mischances in the Turkish Empire, and for disunion among the Christian Powers. In short, I can see no good solution to the question; and yet the case is, I fear, the one most likely to occur, and for which it behoves the Two Powers to provide.

The best chance, perhaps, of putting it off would be to limit our proposition to France, in the first instance, to a demand for her concurrence in calling for the restitution of the fleet, and in withdrawing the Consuls if it should be refused. She can scarcely deny this; and if she grants it, the Five Powers will be enabled to present themselves again to Mehemet Ali, acting in unison. Whether this is worth while, whether each further advance, if it is to lead to ultimate disunion and disappointment, is calculated to be other than an aggravation of the exposure to shame and ridicule to which they are already liable, is a question which I would submit to your Lordship's serious consideration. Should you decide to adopt the course I have suggested, the position of Russia would yet be anomalous. The Four would come to an agreement here, and she would have to be invited at Constantinople.. But if a case were to occur in which Austria and England were to resolve upon acting without France, provided Russia would join them, how could they decide upon measures here in uncertainty as to the answer she might give at Constantinople? I place these difficulties before your Lordship, because it is possible that your representations at St. Petersburgh, if you should think fit to make any, might have weight in causing their removal.

Your Lordship's despatch further points out the measures of compulsion which might be eventually resorted to by the fleet.

It appears certain that the case which would present itself would be, that of the Turkish and Egyptian fleets being both within the harbour of Alexandria. In this case, the measure indicated is, the cutting off of all communication under the Egyptian flag between Egypt and Syria, and preventing vessels under that flag from leaving any Egyptian or Syrian port. It will, therefore, be proper that, in transmitting such an order to Sir Robert Stopford, I should be directed to acquaint him with the manner in which Her Majesty's Government proposes that it should be carried into effect.

No. 302.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 16.)

My Lord, *Vienna, September* 9, 1839.

I LAST night received an invitation from Count Fiquelmont, to wait upon him this morning to receive communication of despatches just arrived from St. Petersburgh. Being prevented by indisposition from going myself, I sent Mr. Crampton, to whose report I beg to refer your Lordship.

According to this document, the conditions on which Russia offers her assent are three:—

1. The Five Powers must agree.
2. The conditions must be fixed by the Porte itself.
3. If they are such as would require coercion towards Mehemet Ali, the means of exerting it must be undeniable.

This at once brings us to the requests enounced by the Porte in her official Note. The demands therein enumerated come clearly within the scope of the instruction to M. de Bouténeff. While it is a question of withholding assent to the demands of Mehemet Ali, the Porte is strong. If we are to call upon him to recede from what he possesses, then the difficulty begins. From these premises, I would venture to submit to your Lordship, a plan of conduct to which the assent of the Five Powers could hardly be refused.

The first step in it would be the demand for the restitution of the fleet, to be followed immediately by the departure of the Consuls, and the suspension of diplomatic intercourse with the Pasha, if it were refused. In this case, the Porte would withhold the grant of hereditary succession in Egypt, and the Powers would provide for the defence of Constantinople; but to do this effectually, and without danger of disunion among themselves, it would be necessary to regulate with Russia the means to be employed.

If the Pasha, finding his position uneasy, should recommence hostilities against the Porte, then would be the moment to put the fleets in activity by blockading Alexandria, and interrupting the communication between it and Syria. I propose to reserve this operation for the case specified:—1st. In order to obtain the adhesion of France; 2ndly. Because there are many things which have more weight in expectation than in action.

I do not believe that if Mehemet Ali refuses the fleet to the Consuls under the alternative of their departure, he would surrender it to a blockade; and if your Lordship should adopt this opinion, it will be well to send the order to the Consuls by a single ship, rather than by the fleet.

These measures would complete the first act of the affair. Either the Pasha would give way about the fleet, receiving thereby a heavy blow, or he would find himself placed singly in face of all Europe united with the Sultan against him.

There will be time enough to submit the further conduct of the affair to your Lordship, when that of its commencement shall have been determined upon.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

Inclosure in No. 302.

Report of communication made by Count Fiquelmont to Mr. Crampton.

(Extract.) *Vienna, September* 9, 1839.

HAVING waited upon Count Fiquelmont, his Excellency placed in my hands the copy of an instruction addressed by the Russian Government to M. de Bouténeff, dated St. Petersburgh, August $\frac{16}{28}$, and which had been communicated to Count Fiquelmont by Count Tatistcheff.

The following is, as nearly as I can recollect, its substance:—

M. de Bouténeff is instructed to state generally the Emperor's full concurrence in the desire of the Five Powers to settle the differences between the Porte and Mehemet Ali, and his readiness to enforce any measures on which the Five Powers may agree for this purpose.

M. de Bouténeff is, however, directed, in the first place, not to adhere on the part of Russia, to any measures to which the Porte itself shall not have consented; more than this,—that he is to consider the Porte itself as the best judge of what its own safety requires, and not to concur in any plan which would oblige it either to ask for more, or to accept of less, than it itself thinks requisite.

In the second place, M. de Bouténeff is instructed not to consent to any measures for the execution of which it would be necessary to coerce Mehemet Ali, unless such coercion shall appear to him to be practicable, and that the means and instruments of it shall have been previously provided and agreed upon by the Five Powers, and that the Russian Government shall judge these means to be sufficient to effect the common object*. The instruction does not allude to any particular mode of coercion except that of the blockade of Alexandria by the French and English fleets, to which measure M. de Bouténeff is directed to signify the Emperor's consent.

His Imperial Majesty again alludes to the Belgian Question, as illustrative of the bad effects of the Great Powers of Europe combining to summon a Party to execute measures when they are not agreed among themselves as to the means of enforcing them in case of refusal.

The Emperor expresses his warm assent to the firm language held on this subject by Lord Palmerston, and informs M. de Bouténeff, that he has given orders to Baron Brunnow to repair to London, in order to express his satisfaction with, and to confirm so desirable an unity of opinion between the Two Cabinets on this important principle.

When I had read this document, Count Fiquelmont said, by way of summing up its contents, "Vous voyez que la Russie veut se mettre non pas devant la Porte mais derrière elle; l'Empereur, dont on connait le caractère, e veut pas de *demi-mesures*.†

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* It is not expressly stated that a reference to St. Petersburgh upon this subject would be required; but the general tenour of the instruction would seem to indicate such a necessity.

† You perceive that Russia wishes to place herself not before, but behind, the Porte; the Emperor, whose character is known, has no wish for half measures.

No. 303.

Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, September* 18, 1839.

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch, of the 3rd instant, I have to inform your Excellency, that the Note from the Porte therein referred to, makes no difference in the views of Her Majesty's Government. That Note is important as an official request of the Porte for the aid and support of the Five Powers; but considering the present circumstances of Turkey, and the feebleness and timidity of the Divan, that Note ought not to prevent the Five Powers from endeavouring to obtain an arrangement more favourable to the Sultan, than that described in the Note. The reasons given by your Excellency in your despatch, why the Five Powers should so act without being restrained by the Note, are considered unanswerable by Her Majesty's Government; and your Excellency is instructed to recommend and urge such a course to the Representatives of the other Four Powers, for the conclusive reasons which you yourself assign.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 304.

Lord William Russell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 18.)

(Extract.) *Berlin, September* 11, 1839.

THE language held to the Prussian Government by M. de Brunnow, during his passage through Berlin, made a very favourable impression, inasmuch as it led them to believe that he carried with him instructions from the Emperor of Russia that would give satisfaction to Her Majesty's Government, and enable the British and Russian Governments to act on the Eastern Question with perfect identity.

Your Lordship may easily imagine how gratifying this information was to the Prussian Government. In all the conversations I have had with Baron Werther, he has given me to understand that he highly approves the view your Lordship has taken of this question, and is anxious to further its execution by every means in his power.

M. de Brunnow spoke to me with great frankness; and it struck me that the views of the Emperor of Russia would coincide with those of Her Majesty's Government.

No. 305.

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 19.)

My Lord, *Paris, September* 16, 1839.

I DO myself the honour to inclose to your Lordship, copies of the despatch addressed to Count Medem, and of that containing instructions to M. de Bouténeff, which Count Medem was instructed to communicate to Marshal Soult.

The Marshal, I understand, received the communication made to him, as one which would receive his attentive consideration.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 305.

Count Nesselrode to Count Medem.

Monsieur le Comte, *St. Pétersbourg, le* 16 *Août,* 1839.

LE Prince Gagarin m'a exactement remis l'expédition que vous m'avez adressée sous la date du $\frac{27\text{ Juillet}}{8\text{ Août}}$; M. le Baron de Barante a bien voulu me communiquer de son côté les instructions que le Cabinet des Tuileries a récemment transmises à ses Représentans à Vienne, Constantinople, et Alexandrie.

Veuillez, M. le Comte, exprimer à M. le Président du Conseil, le juste intérêt que nous attachons aux communications que M. l'Ambassadeur de France a été chargé de nous faire. Elles viennent entièrement à l'appui des explications que M. le Duc de Dalmatie a bien voulu vous offrir verbalement. D'une part, elles attestent le vif désir que le Gouvernement Français éprouve de voir la crise du Levant promptement terminée par un arrangement pacifique et durable; de l'autre, elles nous font acquérir la certitude que le Cabinet des Tuileries, loin d'accorder aux intérêts du Pacha d'Egypte une injuste préférence, n'hésite point à se prononcer formellement en faveur de la cause du Sultan.

L'accord qui subsiste ainsi entre les intentions de la France et celles des autres Cabinets de l'Europe, nous autorise à croire que les efforts réunis de tous réussiront encore une fois à éloigner les dangers dont l'existence de l'Empire Ottoman semble menacée.

Quelle que soit la gravité de ces dangers, nous ne désespérons nullement du salut de la Turquie, pourvu que les Grandes Puissances de l'Europe persistent unanimement dans la ferme résolution de soutenir la cause du Sultan, et qu'elles impriment à cet effet aux démarches de leurs Représentans à Alexandrie un caractère d'énergie, qui peut seul réussir à vaincre la résistance du Pacha d'Egypte.

S'il en était autrement, les remontrances des Cabinets de l'Europe ne produiraient aucune impression sur l'esprit de Méhémet Ali. Il ne se prêterait à aucune concession équitable. Il resterait en possession, et de la flotte Ottomane, et du territoire qu'il a occupé même au-delà des limites posées par l'arrangement de Kutahia. En un mot, il ne tiendrait aucun compte des offres de conciliation dont les Représentans Alliés viennent de se rendre l'organe. Leur intervention en faveur de la Porte, demeurerait ainsi impuissante et stérile; de sorte que l'Europe verrait avec surprise et avec regret, que les Cabinets réunis de Paris, de Londres, de Vienne, et de St. Pétersbourg se reconnaissent dans l'impossibilité de vaincre la résistance d'un Pacha d'Egypte isolément opposée à la volonté unanime de toutes les Grandes Puissances.

Nous abandonnons au Cabinet des Tuileries de juger de l'impression qu'un pareil fait devrait produire sur l'opinion de tous les pays, ainsi que des conséquences regrettables qui en résulteraient pour l'autorité morale de tous les Gouvernemens.

Cette considération est si grave, elle intéresse de si près la dignité des Cours de l'Europe, qu'il nous suffit de l'avoir signalée ici, pour être persuadés qu'elle ne saurait manquer de fixer l'attention sérieuse du Cabinet des Tuileries.

Nous ne méconnaissons pas, il est vrai, les motifs que M. le Duc de Dalmatie vous a exposés, M. le Comte, et qui inspirent au Gouvernement Français un éloignement réel pour l'adoption de mesures coercitives contre l'Egypte. Mais une fois que les Représentans Alliés ont spontanément offert leur intervention à la Porte, et que celle-ci l'a acceptée, il serait impossible de disconvenir que les Cabinets de l'Europe ont contracté envers le Sultan l'engagement moral d'assurer à ce Souverain des conditions plus avantageuses que celles qu'il aurait pu obtenir, s'il avait conclu un arrangement direct avec le Pacha, ainsi que le Divan en avait eu d'abord la pensée, détermination que la Porte aurait déjà mise à exécution depuis longtems, si les Représentans Alliés ne l'en avaient empêché, en lui offrant leur intervention.

Il en résulte nécessairement que le Sultan, pour avoir renoncé à l'avantage d'une transaction immédiate, pour avoir consenti à rester sous le poids d'une incertitude de jour en jour plus accablante et plus dangereuse; en un mot, pour avoir placé sa confiance dans les promesses des Cabinets Alliés, se trouve aujourd'hui pleinement en droit d'attendre que ces promesses ne restent pas sans effet.

Or, comment les Grandes Puissances répondront-elles à cette juste attente du Sultan, si elles ne se déterminent point à adopter envers l'Egypte une attitude plus prononcée et plus décisive?

Nous nous bornerons, M. le Comte, à livrer cette question à l'examen consciencieux du Cabinet Français.

De notre côté, nous ne saurions mieux lui faire connaître les principes et les vues qui dirigent la politique de notre Auguste Maître, qu'en vous autorisant à communiquer à M. le Duc de Dalmatie les directions dont Sa Majesté a cru devoir munir son Représentant à Constantinople.

Vous trouverez ci-joint le résumé des instructions que je viens de transmettre à ce Ministre. Elles lui laissent une entière latitude pour concourir, de concert avec ses collègues, à faciliter un arrangement définitif entre la Turquie et l'Egypte; mais elles lui prescrivent aussi les bornes, au-delà desquelles il lui serait impossible de porter ses démarches, à moins d'avoir acquis la certitude, que ses collègues ont reçu de leurs Cours les pouvoirs nécessaires, afin d'appuyer leurs remontrances à Alexandrie, par des mesures propres à faire respecter la médiation des Grandes Puissances de l'Europe.

M. de Bouténeff ne tardera pas à faire connaître à l'Amiral Roussin, comme à ses autres collègues, l'esprit dans lequel il lui est prescrit d'agir. L'intention qui a présidé à la rédaction des instructions qu'il vient de recevoir, ne saurait être méconnue. Elle n'a qu'un seul but: celui d'imprimer à l'intervention de l'Europe dans les affaires d'Egypte un caractère d'énergie qui soit de nature à vaincre la résistance de Méhémet Ali; à faire respecter les résolutions unanimes des Cabinets; enfin, à consolider le repos du Levant, au moyen d'un accommodement prompt et équitable.

Ce but étant d'accord avec les vœux de toutes les Puissances, nous espérons que leurs Représentans à Constantinople recevront des directions qui les mettront en mesure d'agir dans le même sens que notre Ministre; et que la réunion de leurs efforts, dirigés vers le même but d'une manière conforme à la dignité des Grandes Puissances, ne tardera point à amener la crise actuelle à une solution satisfaisante pour l'Egypte, équitable pour la Porte, et honorable pour l'Europe.

Tels sont les vœux que notre Cabinet n'hésite pas à émettre, dans la ferme persuasion qu'ils s'accordent avec l'intérêt bien entendu de toutes les Puissances amies de la paix.

Veuillez, M. le Comte, énoncer cette pensée envers M. le Duc de Dalmatie, en lui donnant lecture de la présente dépêche, ainsi que du résumé des instructions à M. de Bouténeff, qui s'y trouve annexé.

Recevez, &c.,
(Signé) NESSELRODE.

(Translation.)

Count Nesselrode to Count Medem.

Monsieur le Comte, *St. Petersburgh, August* 16, 1839.

PRINCE GAGARIN has duly delivered to me the despatches which you addressed to me, under date of the $\frac{27\text{ July}}{8\text{ August}}$. The Baron de Barante has, on his part, been good enough to communicate to me the instructions which the Cabinet of the Tuileries has recently transmitted to its Representatives at Vienna, Constantinople, and Alexandria.

You will be so good, M. le Comte, as to express to the President of the Council, the just interest which we attach to the communications which the Ambassador of France has been directed to make to us. They entirely corroborate the explanations which the Duke de Dalmatie has been good enough to give you verbally. On the one hand they prove the anxious desire felt by the French Government, to see the crisis in the Levant speedily settled by a pacific and

durable arrangement; on the other hand, they furnish us with the certainty that the Cabinet of the Tuileries, far from giving to the interests of the Pasha of Egypt an undue preference, does not hesitate formally to declare itself in favour of the cause of the Sultan.

The agreement which thus subsists between the intentions of France and those of the other Cabinets of Europe, justifies us in believing, that the combined efforts of all will once more succeed in warding off the dangers with which the existence of the Ottoman Empire appears to be menaced.

However great may be these dangers, we in no wise despair of the safety of Turkey, provided that the Great Powers of Europe unanimously persist in the firm resolve to support the cause of the Sultan; and provided they, with this view, give to the steps to be taken by their Representatives at Alexandria a character of energy which alone can overcome the resistance of the Pasha of Egypt.

If this is not done, the remonstrances of the European Cabinets would produce no impression on the mind of Mehemet Ali. He would not consent to any equitable concession. He would remain in possession of the Ottoman fleet, as well as of the territory which he has occupied, even beyond the limits laid down by the arrangements of Kutayah. In one word, he would not even take into consideration the offers of conciliation, of which the Allied Representatives have been the organ. Their intervention in favour of the Porte would thus remain ineffective and without result; so that Europe would see with surprise and regret, that the united Cabinets of Paris, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburgh acknowledge themselves unable to conquer the resistance of a Pasha of Egypt singly opposed to the unanimous will of all the Great Powers.

The Cabinet of the Tuileries may judge what impression such a fact must produce on the opinion of all countries, and how much to be regretted will be the consequences which will thence result to the moral authority of all Governments.

This consideration is of such importance, it so closely affects the dignity of the Courts of Europe, that we consider it sufficient to have noticed it here, in order to feel convinced that it will not fail to attract the serious attention of the Cabinet of the Tuileries.

We do not, it is true, undervalue the motives which the Duc de Dalmatie has stated to you, and which cause the French Government to feel a real disinclination for the adoption of coercive measures against Egypt. But the Allied Representatives having once spontaneously offered their intervention to the Porte, and the latter having once accepted it, it would be impossible to deny, that the Cabinets of Europe have morally bound themselves to the Sultan, to insure to that Sovereign more advantageous conditions than he would have been able to obtain, if he had concluded a direct arrangement with the Pasha, as was first contemplated by the Divan; a course which the Porte would long ago have already carried into execution, had not the Allied Representatives, in offering their intervention, prevented it.

It thence necessarily follows that the Sultan, having renounced the advantages of a direct arrangement, having consented to remain under the weight of a daily more overwhelming and dangerous uncertainty; in a word, having placed his confidence in the promises of the Allies, is now fully justified in expecting that those promises shall not remain without effect.

But how are the Great Powers to meet that just expectation of the Sultan, if they will not resolve to assume a more marked and decisive attitude towards Egypt?

We shall confine ourselves, M. le Comte, to leaving this question to the conscientious examination of the French Cabinet.

As far as we are concerned, we cannot make that Cabinet more thoroughly acquainted with the principles and views which direct the policy of our august Master, than by authorizing you to communicate to the Duc de Dalmatie the instructions with which His Majesty has thought it fitting to furnish His Representative at Constantinople.

You will find hereunto annexed a summary of the instructions which I have addressed to that Minister. They give to him perfect liberty to assist, in concert with his Colleagues, in facilitating a definitive arrangement between Turkey and Egypt; but they likewise prescribe to him the limits beyond which it would be impossible for him to extend his endeavours, unless he should have acquired the certainty that his Colleagues have received from their Courts the necessary powers for supporting their remonstrances at Alexandria by measures calculated to cause the mediation of the Great Powers of Europe to be respected.

M. de Bouténeff will not delay to make Admiral Roussin, as well as his other Colleagues, acquainted with the sense in which he is directed to act. The object in view in framing the instructions which he has just received, cannot be misunderstood. That object is solely to give to the intervention of Europe in the affairs of Egypt a character of energy, which may be calculated to overcome the resistance of Mehemet Ali; to cause the unanimous resolution of the Cabinets to be respected; finally, to consolidate the tranquillity of the Levant, by means of a speedy and equitable arrangement.

This object being in conformity with the wishes of all the Powers, we hope that their Representatives at Constantinople will receive directions which will enable them to act in the same sense as our Minister; and that the union of their endeavours directed towards the same object in a manner conformable to the dignity of the Great Powers, will ere long bring the present crisis to a satisfactory end as regards Egypt, to an equitable one as regards the Porte, and to an honourable one as regards Europe.

Such are the wishes which our Cabinet does not hesitate to entertain, in the firm persuasion that they are in accordance with the well-understood interest of all the Powers friendly to peace.

You will have the goodness, M. le Comte, to communicate this opinion to the Duc de Dalmatie, by reading to him the present despatch, as well as the summary of the instructions to M. de Bouténeff, which are thereunto annexed.

Receive, &c.,
(Signed) NESSELRODE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 305.

Count Nesselrode to Monsieur de Bouténeff.

L'EMPEREUR, pour répondre au désir que vous m'avez témoigné d être muni d'une instruction précise, au milieu de la crise du moment, m'a donné l'ordre de vous adresser la présente dépêche.

Elle a pour objet de vous recommander itérativement, Monsieur, d'employer tous vos soins à accélérer autant que possible, la conclusion d'un arrangement définitif entre la Porte et l'Egypte. Notre Auguste Maître désire que cette transaction ait lieu aux conditions les moins défavorables possibles pour le Sultan, car ce sont les intérêts de ce Souverain que nous devons soutenir de tous nos efforts.

Mais c'est à lui seul qu'appartient aussi le droit de déterminer en dernier ressort, l'étendue des sacrifices qu'il lui convient de faire ou de ne pas faire, pour assurer la tranquillité intérieure de ses Etats.

Nous ne devons et nous ne pouvons pas nous ériger en arbitres de ce qui concerne de si près l'intérêt vital de la Porte elle-même; c'est elle seule qui doit en être juge. Dans cette persuasion, l'Empereur croit devoir vous réserver toute la latitude nécessaire pour concourir, de concert avec vos collègues, à faciliter un arrangement pacifique entre la Porte et l'Egypte, et pourvu que les conditions de cette réconciliation aient obtenu la libre adhésion du Sultan; car s'il en était autrement, vous risqueriez de faire renaître pour nous, les mêmes difficultés contre lesquelles nous avons eu à lutter dans l'Affaire Belge, et vous rentreriez vous-même dans le cercle vicieux dans lequel la Conférence de Londres s'est placée dès l'instant où elle s'est décidée à imposer au Roi des Pays Bas les conditions d'un accommodement auquel ce Souverain refusait sa sanction.

L'Empereur vous recommande spécialement, Monsieur, d'éviter l'écueil que je viens de vous signaler, afin de ne point retomber dans les mêmes embarras où nous avons été placés dans le cours des longues et pénibles délibérations relatives à la Question Belge.

L'expérience que nous avons acquise durant cette négociation doit vous conseiller aussi d'éviter un autre inconvénient, celui de contracter envers la Porte, l'engagement prématuré d'imposer péremptoirement à Méhémet Ali les conditions d'un arrangement définitif, à moins d'avoir acquis d'avance, la certitude que les Représentans des autres Cours ont la ferme volonté et le pouvoir de combiner ensemble avec vous les mesures d'exécution nécessaires pour obliger le Pacha d'Egypte à souscrire aux termes d'une pacification que vos collègues et vous, d'accord avec la Porte, auraient unanimement reconnu comme juste et comme irrévocable.

En effet, ce serait compromettre gravement la dignité des Puissances Européennes, que de reculer devant la résistance que Méhémet Ali tenterait d'opposer aux résolutions des Représentans Alliés, malgré la publicité que leurs démarches aurait acquise à la face de l'Europe entière. Si vos collègues se trouvaient en mesure de faire auprès du Pacha d'Egypte, de nouvelles démarches auxquelles la présence des Escadres Anglaise et Française devant Alexandire prêterait un caractère décisif et péremptoire, l'Empereur vous autoriserait pleinement à y donner votre adhésion la plus franche et la plus cordiale, au nom de la Russie.

(Translation.)

Count Nesselrode to M. de Bouténeff.

IN order to comply with the desire which you have expressed to me, to be furnished in the present crisis with a precise instruction, the Emperor has directed me to address to you the present despatch.

The object of this despatch is once more to recommend to you, Sir, to use all your efforts to accelerate, as much as possible, the conclusion of a definitive arrangement between the Porte and Egypt. Our August Master wishes this arrangement to be effected on conditions as little as possible unfavourable to the Sultan, for it is the interests of that Sovereign which we are bound to support with all our power.

But it likewise belongs to him alone, finally to determine what may be the extent of sacrifices which he may or may not be able to make, in order to ensure the internal tranquillity of his States.

We may not, and we cannot, constitute ourselves judges of that which so closely concerns the vital interests of the Porte itself; of that it must be itself the judge. Under this conviction, the Emperor thinks it right to allow you all latitude to act in concert with your colleagues in facilitating a pacific arrangement between the Porte and Egypt, provided that the conditions of this reconciliation shall have obtained the unfettered sanction of the Sultan; for otherwise you would run the chance of drawing upon us similar difficulties to those which we had to contend with in the Belgian affair; and you would yourself re-enter the false position in which the Conference of London placed itself, from the moment at which it decided to impose upon the King of the Netherlands the conditions of an arrangement to which that Sovereign refused his consent.

The Emperor specially enjoins you, Sir, to avoid the danger I have pointed out to you, in order not to be again placed in the same embarrassments in which we found ourselves during the long and painful deliberations relative to the Belgian Question.

The experience which we have acquired during the course of that negotiation, ought also to teach you to avoid another danger; namely, that of contracting towards the Porte a premature engagement peremptorily to impose on Mehemet Ali the conditions of a definitive arrangement, unless you should previously have acquired the certainty that the Representatives of the other Courts are really willing, and possess the power of concerting together with you, the measures of execution requisite, in order to oblige the Pasha of Egypt to agree to the terms of a pacification, such as your colleagues and you, in conjunction with the Porte, shall have unanimously considered as just and as irrevocable.

It would, indeed, seriously compromise the dignity of the European Powers, to retrace their steps in consequence of the resistance which Mehemet Ali might endeavour to offer to their resolutions, notwithstanding the publicity which the steps taken by the Allied Representatives might have acquired in the face of all Europe. If your colleagues should be in a position to take some fresh steps with respect to the Pasha of Egypt, to which the presence at Alexandria of the English and French squadrons should give a decisive and peremptory character, the Emperor fully authorizes you to give, in the name of Russia, your most frank and cordial sanction thereto.

No. 306.

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received September* 19.)

My Lord, *Paris, September* 16, 1839.

IN a conversation I had with Marshal Soult, in respect to the position of affairs in the East, and when I was pressing upon him the necessity of acting with promptitude and vigour for their settlement, he said that he should shortly be able to communicate, in a precise form, the views of the French Government thereupon; and he confessed that the Pasha of Egypt should neither be allowed to retain the districts of Adana and Marash, nor the Island of Candia. "But," said the Marshal, "to obtain Syria from him is, I believe, out of the question." I asked the Marshal, whether he would consider himself bound to provide for the execution of any arrangement for which the French Government did declare itself, and which the Porte accepted? But although his Excellency did not absolutely say, that should Mehemet Ali refuse to accept the conditions of which France approved, force should not be employed to compel him to do so, neither would he say, that force should be employed for such an object; and I still think that Her Majesty's Government can hardly hope that the French Cabinet will, under any circumstances, be persuaded to employ measures of coercion against the Viceroy.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 307.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received September* 19.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August* 26, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship a duplicate translation of the Official Note addressed by the Sublime Porte to the Five Great Powers, on the 22nd instant, as well as a copy of my reply.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 307.

[See Inclosure in No. 288.]

Inclosure 2 in No. 307.

Official Note from Viscount Ponsonby to the Sublime Porte.

Therapia, August 23, 1839.

THE Undersigned, Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, has had the honour to receive from his Excellency the Mousteshar Nouri Effendi, a Note from the Sublime Porte, under date of the 22d August, which the Undersigned, in accordance with the desire of the Sublime Porte, has this day transmitted to his Court.

The Undersigned is confident that the British Government will receive with the greatest satisfaction, this evidence of the confidence reposed by the

Sublime Porte in the Five Great Powers; and that the result of this wise measure adopted by the Sublime Porte will be in every respect advantageous to its rights and interests.

The Undersigned, &c.

(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 308.

Viscount Palmerston to the Marquess of Clanricarde.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, September* 19, 1839.

I RECEIVED, on the 13th instant, your Excellency's despatches from the 22nd to the 31st of August, and I have the satisfaction to acquaint your Excellency, that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the language held by your Excellency as reported in those despatches.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 309.

Viscount Palmerston to the Marquess of Clanricarde.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, September* 19, 1839.

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch of the 27th August, stating that the Emperor of Russia has determined to send Baron Brunnow to London, I have to instruct your Excellency to assure Count Nesselrode, that Her Majesty's Government have learnt, with much gratification, the motives which have led His Imperial Majesty to send Baron Brunnow to this country at the present moment; and your Excellency will state, that Baron Brunnow will be received with the greatest cordiality, not only from the high character which he bears, but from the knowledge which Her Majesty's Government possesses that the Baron enjoys the full confidence of Count Nesselrode.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 310.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 21.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, September* 2, 1839.

NO changes have taken place here since my last despatches of the 16th August to your Lordship, and all is perfectly tranquil; but the Pasha holds the same language as before with respect to Hosrew Pasha and to the Turkish fleet.

Ever since the communication was made to the Pasha, that the Great Powers had undertaken the settlement of the Eastern Question, I have abstained as much as possible from entering with the Pasha into any of the points connected with it.

The Pasha has, however, told my colleagues, that Ibrahim Pasha had written to him to say, that his present position was a bad one during the winter, and that he must either advance or retire before that season; and he asks his father's orders on the subject, and his father has directed him not to move for the present; but I am assured that Ibrahim Pasha has collected supplies, and made every preparation which could be required for a forward movement by his army.

I saw the Pasha four days ago, when he told me that if in the course of a month or six weeks he should not learn that the arrangement between the

Porte and himself was in a train of settlement, Ibrahim Pasha must advance with his army. That Ibrahim had written to say that his army could not, in its present position, receive supplies to pass the winter, and that he must either advance or retire. I asked why the army could not then return to its late positions of Aleppo, Aintab, &c., to which the Pasha replied that it could more easily get supplies in Asia Minor.

I mentioned that the Pasha had stated to myself and colleagues, that the army would remain in the positions which it occupied at the period when Captain Caillier should arrive at Ibrahim Pasha's head-quarters, to which he replied, that the army had halted there, and would, for a reasonable time, await the decision of the Congress at Vienna.

I then asked the Pasha how far Ibrahim Pasha would advance in the event of such a movement, to which he replied, that as he himself was not acquainted with that country, or with its resources, he must leave that entirely to Ibrahim Pasha's own discretion and judgment.

Mehemet Ali added that many deputations, and amongst them some Ulemas, had come to Ibrahim Pasha to urge him to advance, and had told him that if the Russians moved on to oppose him, the whole population, men, women, and boys, of Asia Minor would take up arms against the Russians; and the Pasha said that if Circassia, with only half a million of souls, could resist Russia, he felt sure that Ibrahim Pasha, aided by all the population of Asia Minor, could prevent their progress.

The Pasha does not appear at all uneasy as to the results for him of the present state of affairs; and I believe that he keeps up constant communication with the leading persons in Asia Minor and in Turkey in Europe, who all appear disposed to attend to all his suggestions, and to conform implicitly to his directions; and I believe firmly that the whole Mussulman population of Turkey looks up to him with awe and respect, and that even in Constantinople itself, the influence of his name is very great, and carries much weight with it.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

No. 311.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 21.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, September* 5, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that Captain Caillier, who was sent by Marshal Soult to Ibrahim Pasha, returned to this place on the 2nd instant, on his way to Paris, and says that Ibrahim Pasha occupied his former position at Marash, and has also a corps at Orfa.

Ibrahim Pasha mentioned to Captain Caillier the necessity of changing his position for the facility of supplies, and mentioned that if his father consented, he would propose occupying Diarbekir, but not to move further north than was absolutely necessary.

Captain Caillier has told me, that Ibrahim Pasha professes the strongest allegiance and obedience to the Sultan, and that he will defend the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and of the Sultan's supremacy, even against Mehemet Ali himself, but at the same time, that he will not forego the hereditary succession to Syria, even if Mehemet Ali himself should do so.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL

No. 312.

Lord William Russell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 23.)

(Extract.) *Berlin, September* 18, 1839.

BARON WERTHER having frequently asked me, with apparent mortification, why the British fleet appeared more disposed to enter the Dardanelles than to assist in coercing Mehemet Ali to comply with the wishes of the Five Powers, I was glad to be able to furnish an answer, by being put in possession of Colonel Campbell's despatch to your Lordship, dated August 15, in which he stated that Mehemet Ali would direct Ibrahim Pasha to march on Constantinople the instant the English and French squadrons appeared in sight of Alexandria. Baron Werther said, that if we were deterred from acting against Mehemet Ali by that threat, he had triumphantly set at defiance the Five Powers. I told his Excellency that we should commit a serious fault if we proceeded to act before we had ascertained that the French Government positively declined to act with us. The Baron replied, that he was certain the French Government would not act with us. In that case, I said, we must act with the Powers which agree with us; and we have the means of forcing Mehemet Ali to accede to our terms. "Undoubtedly we have," he replied, "if you will cease to be so very distrustful of Russia; but as long as that distrust exists, we have no means of preventing Ibrahim Pasha from marching on Constantinople, and creating anarchy by the intrigues and money of Mehemet Ali." I told him your Lordship had no distrust of Russia, and I was convinced that you would accept the assurances M. de Brunnow was charged to give you with the confidence and loyalty they merited.

I begged of Baron Werther to instruct the Prussian Minister at Paris to make known to the French Cabinet the King of Prussia's approval of the policy of the British Cabinet towards the East, and His Majesty's desire that France should not separate from the Five Powers. His Excellency said he had already so done, and would repeat his instructions.

No. 313.

Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Bulwer.

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 23, 1839.

IN a conversation which I had with Count Sébastiani a week ago, Count Sébastiani endeavoured to persuade me to consent, on the part of Her Majesty's Government, to propose to the Sultan and Mehemet Ali an arrangement, by which Mehemet Ali should become hereditary Governor of Egypt and of Southern Syria, as far north as a line drawn from Damascus to Beyrout, leaving, as I understood him, the former city to the Sultan, and giving the latter place to the Pasha; while, on the other hand, Mehemet should evacuate all the other territories now held by him; and the Count stated that France would be willing to concur in coercive measures to enforce the execution of such an arrangement.

To this I replied, that such an arrangement would have the great disadvantage of containing within itself the seeds of future contention; that the line drawn from Damascus to Beyrout would be a mere arbitrary line, and would establish no definite frontier between the Two Parties; that it would give Mehemet Ali a *tête de pont*, as it were, in Syria, which would both tempt and assist him to future encroachments; that the probable differences between him and the Arab tribes would furnish him with a constant pretext for keeping up an army in Syria: and that all the objections which apply to the present state of things, as established by the arrangement of Kutaya, would apply in a proportionate degree to the arrangement thus suggested by Count Sébastiani. I said, that if the Five Powers are to take this matter in hand, and to employ force, or the threat of force, to compel acquiescence on the part of Mehemet Ali, it is on every account most desirable that the arrangement which they may determine to carry into effect should be one calculated to accomplish the great object which they have in view, and to secure the peace of Europe against the dangers by which it would be threatened, if future conflict were to arise in Syria between the Sultan and the Pasha of Egypt; but that it would reflect little honour upon the alliance, if the Five Powers were to make a great effort to accomplish an evidently imperfect result.

I said, that moreover I did not understand upon what principle France could be ready to co-operate in coercive measures for the purpose of enforcing this incomplete settlement, and should decline so to co-operate for the purpose of enforcing a settlement which she herself admits to be far better, and which, because it is far better, she would prefer, if Mehemet Ali could be persuaded willingly to accede to it.

I said, that the main objection put forward by France to coercive measures for the purpose of compelling Mehemet Ali to content himself with Egypt, is, that if such measures were to be employed for such a purpose, Mehemet would immediately order Ibrahim to advance upon Constantinople, and then would follow all the difficulties and embarrassments which such a step on his part would necessarily produce; but, I said, the only reason we have for thinking that Mehemet Ali would take such a step is, that he has said he would; but if we are to go by what he has said, it is equally certain that he would order Ibrahim to march for the purpose of resisting the modified arrangement proposed by France; because what Mehemet Ali has really said is, that he will not abandon the smallest part of what he now occupies; and that he will resist by all means in his power any attempt to deprive him of any portion of it. Either, therefore, we are to go by what Mehemet Ali says, or by what we think it is likely he will do. In the former case, the incomplete settlement would be just as difficult of enforcement as the more complete one; in the latter case, we may reasonably expect that, if the Five Powers are united, the complete arrangement will be as easy of attainment as the incomplete one could possibly be.

Count Sébastiani admitted that Mehemet Ali might resist the arrangement he had suggested, and disclaimed, on the part of the French Government, any peculiar knowledge of the intentions of Mehemet Ali, or any authority to negotiate on behalf of the Pasha with the other Powers: but, he said, the decision of the French Government turned very much upon domestic considerations; and that his Government might be able to justify, towards the Chambers and the public, the employment of coercive measures against the Pasha, if it could be shown that the Pasha had not been driven absolutely to despair, and that France had made for him the best arrangement which could be obtained.

I said, that considering what Mehemet Ali is, and from what condition he sprung, I certainly thought that the hereditary Pashalic of Egypt would at least be a "beau désespoir;" but that, from what the Count had then said, it would appear that the first object of France was the Pasha, and not the Sultan; and that although the French Government had made a spontaneous declaration that its leading aim was, "to maintain the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire under its present dynasty; and that France would employ all its influence and means of action, in order to maintain the security of this essential element of the balance of power; and that they would not hesitate to oppose any combination which should be hostile to that independence and integrity," nevertheless, it would seem that the object of France was to uphold Mehemet Ali rather than the Turkish Empire; and I observed, that this tallied with a remark which had been made very early at Vienna, that the views of England and France differed in this respect: that England wished to make the best bargain for the Sultan, and France the best bargain for Mehemet Ali.

Count Sébastiani assured me, that I was quite mistaken if I entertained such a supposition, and that the objects aimed at by France were nothing more or less than those which she had stated in her declaration.

He then pressed me to come to some practical conclusion which he might be able to communicate to his Government.

I said it was impossible for me to give him any such answer as he wished, because, in the first place, I could not take upon me to do so without consulting my colleagues and ascertaining their decision; and, secondly, because matters were not yet in such a state as to enable the Cabinet to come to a decision. I said, that I thought it likely that we should in the first place ascertain whether the other Three Powers agree with us, or with France; and, in the former case, whether they would be willing to co-operate with us for the practical execution of our common views; and if we found they were willing to do so, we might possibly accept their co-operation and go on.

But if they do not agree with you, said Count Sébastiani, or will not co-operate with you, will you then unite with France to carry into effect the arrangements which I have suggested?

I said it would be time enough for the Government to determine that question when the case arose, and it was impossible to decide it beforehand.

He asked what, then, should be the communication he should make to his Government? I said he had better report exactly what had passed between us; and that it would be for his Government to consider what course would suit them best. That if the other Three Powers should agree with us, which I thought probable, it would surely be better for France to face all the internal difficulties which keep back its Government, and to join frankly and freely the other Four Powers; but if, for reasons of which the French Government alone can judge, such a course would be impossible, France might stand aloof while the other Four were carrying into execution an arrangement which even France herself has approved of, and she might then join the Allies again in the other arrangements which might require to be made when the territorial settlement had been effected.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 314.

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 23.)

My Lord, *Paris, September* 20, 1839.

COUNT MEDEM informed me this morning, that yesterday, in an interview with Marshal Soult, (who was about to send a courier to St. Petersburgh,) he pressed the Marshal strongly to make some statement of the views of the French Government in regard to an arrangement between the Porte and the Viceroy of Egypt, and that Marshal Soult said that he was employed on such a document. "Then," said Count Medem, "your Excellency must have fixed the basis of it; may I request to be informed thereupon?" At last, he learnt that the views of the French Government, in respect to such a settlement, were those of which I spoke in my despatch of September 16; viz., the abandonment of all pretensions over Hosrew Pasha's employment; the restoration of the Ottoman fleet; the resignation of Adana, Marash, and the Island of Candia, on the part of the Viceroy, together with some arrangement in respect to Syria, which would divide that country into Pashalics, of which the sons of Mehemet should have the separate Governments entailed upon their male offspring respectively, with the condition, that these Pashalics, on failure of direct male issue, should fall back, as each such case should occur, to the Porte. I asked Count Medem whether the Marshal had said what he would do, supposing Mehemet Ali should refuse to subscribe to such conditions. He said, that he had put this question to the Marshal, but could obtain from him no more direct answer than that if Mehemet Ali positively refused to accept such an arrangement as that he spoke of, then the French Government would feel less objection to the employment of coercive measures. Count Medem has communicated the result of this conversation to his Government.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 315.

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 23.)

My Lord, *Paris, September* 20, 1839.

COUNT MEDEM received a communication from his brother this morning, which he was kind enough to show me.

By Count Alexander Medem's letter, it would appear that Mehemet Ali had first declared to the other Consuls, (the Consul-General of Russia not being present,) that unless there seemed some probability of an arrangement within a month's time, he should order his son, at the expiration of that period, to march on to Constantinople; that in consequence of this communication, Count Alexander Medem had had an interview with the Viceroy, and requested him to state distinctly his intentions; and that Mehemet Ali had replied, by observing, that if within a month's time some arrangement under the intervention of the Five Powers had not commenced, he could have no doubt that the conclusion of such an arrangement would be a work of much time, and that, unable to maintain his troops where they were, he should then advance them to Orfa and Diarbekir; but that under no circumstances should he pass the Taurus, unless measures of coercion were adopted against him.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 316.

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 26.)

My Lord, *Paris, September* 23, 1839.

AS I had understood from the French Government, that it had been their intention to leave Captain Caillier in Egypt until the settlement of affairs, and as I learnt he was returning, I asked M. Désages what was the occasion of this change. M. Désages told me, that Captain Caillier seeing that the Viceroy had stopped his army, and had proclaimed the new Sultan, considered his mission terminated, and being unwell, resolved to come back to France. "And though on other reasons," said M. Désages, "we might regret this, yet, if Mehemet Ali should take any desperate course, it is quite as well that M. Caillier should not be with him."

I have, &c.,
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 317.

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 29.)

(Extract.) *Paris, September* 27, 1839.

I HAVE had the honour of receiving your Lordship's despatches to the 24th of September.

With respect to the language which General Sébastiani held to your Lordship about a week ago, I have to inform your Lordship, that Marshal

Soult has generally stated to me, that Mehemet Ali might make and ought to make, great concessions; has lately declared, that he should propose a plan in which such concessions would be comprehended; and has never declared that force should not be employed, though he would never affirm that it should be so; making this question depend upon the satisfactory resolution of two others, viz., the common accord of the Great Powers as to the conditions that should be imposed upon the Pasha, and an amicable understanding between the said Powers as to the part they should take in the possible contingency of Ibrahim's march on Constantinople. But as the Marshal knew that an amicable understanding on this point seemed unlikely: its being made the necessary preliminary to any discussion of the measures for executing an arrangement between the Porte and Mehemet Ali, did, in fact, indefinitely adjourn the consideration of such measures, and in this manner indefinitely adjourn the whole question.

As I could never understand the Marshal to express himself more decidedly on this matter, I may confess that I was rather surprised to find that "General Sébastiani had endeavoured to persuade your Lordship to propose to the Sultan and Mehemet Ali an arrangement by which Mehemet Ali should become hereditary Governor of Egypt and of Southern Syria, as far north as a line drawn from Damascus to Beyrout, stating that France would be willing to concur in coercive measures to enforce the execution of such an arrangement."

I cannot help saying that I am almost inclined to believe, that General Sébastiani, although he pressed your Lordship for an answer which he might give to his Government, did not speak according to any positive instructions from his Government,—a conjecture which I hazard with the more confidence since the despatch containing the views of the French Government on the affairs of the East, was not sent to London earlier than last Monday, while that despatch merely expresses the views of which I had the honour to acquaint your Lordship in my despatch of September 16, with, however, this important exception, that Marshal Soult having told me that the Island of Candia ought to be immediately surrendered to the Sultan, now says in his official communications to the different Cabinets, that Candia should be surrendered to the Porte after Mehemet's death. There is nothing said, however, in this recent declaration of the opinions of the French Government, as to any willingness to employ measures of coercion, should such become necessary, to carry even their own project into execution,—a fact which would be of no importance, since the one case would seem implied in the other, had not the French Government always placed, as I have had the honour of observing to your Lordship, so many conditions in the way of the ultimate employment of force, as to render the chance of resorting to it almost an impossibility; thereby weakening and almost destroying the effect of any simple declaration against the Viceroy's pretensions.

As your Lordship will, I understand, have transmitted to you a copy of the Note sent to the French Ambassadors in London and Vienna, you will be able to compare the contents of that Note with General Sébastiani's prior observations.

And now, my Lord, passing by the incident, and arriving at the general question in its present position, I should state, that in an interview I had this morning with Marshal Soult, we entered into the subject of M. de Brunnow's mission, and the conversation which had in consequence taken place between your Lordship and General Sébastiani. I asked Marshal Soult to inform me of the substance of that conversation, as it had been reported by General Sébastiani. The Marshal said, you will see by reading this despatch, which is an answer to it. I accordingly did read a despatch which General Sébastiani has orders to communicate to your Lordship, and which, turning entirely upon the part which Russia would take to herself, in sending, in case of need, a force for the protection of Constantinople, declares, as the Marshal did himself personally declare to me, that France never would consent to this measure. "I stand," said the Marshal, "by my old declaration, that if a Russian fleet appear in the Bosphorus, a French fleet shall arrive there also. This declaration," continued the Marshal, "has been likewise the declaration of England, and by it I abide."

I observed to the Marshal, that I considered, and thought that Her Majesty's Government might consider, that there was a good deal of difference between what Russia might do by herself and for herself, and what she might do with the consent and as the agent of the other Great Powers; and that, in fact, by accepting any such mission, she took no exclusive part in Eastern Affairs.

The Marshal did not concur in these observations; but considered, on the contrary, that though the form under which Russia would obtain her object might in this new convention be changed, that the attainment of that object would still be its result; that she would thus acquire the position to which she aspired, of appearing as alone capable of protecting Constantinople; that consequently, the Porte would sink into that state of dependence upon the Russian Empire from which it had been the object of France to deliver her: while he, the Marshal, had always considered the Question of the East as one which was to be settled, and considered rather with the view of limiting the power of Russia than that of the Pasha of Egypt; the second seeming to him an inferior object to the first. I observed, that as the Marshal, agreeing with us as to the principle of protecting the Sultan against Mehemet Ali, seemed to differ from us as to the means of doing so, so we, agreeing with him as to the necessity of keeping the power of Russia within reasonable bounds, might also differ from him as to what would be the wisest course for attaining that object. But this I begged the Marshal particularly to observe, that whereas the presence of Russia at Constantinople, if the result of a convention between that Empire and other Powers, would, as I had already remarked, be in many other respects different from her entering into the Bosphorus in merely her own right, so more especially would it be different by making the other Powers with which this convention was entered into, parties to the proceedings. So that France, by opposing Russia in such a case, would be opposing her Allies: a course which I could not persuade myself that the French Government would willingly adopt.

The Marshal did not answer directly to this remark; and I thought it better to let the conversation drop for the moment, since the more the French Government themselves consider the position in which France would be placed by standing alone and aloof amidst the general settlement of a question in which she began by assuming so forward and important a part, the more likely is it that all parties will endeavour to associate this country with the other Great Powers of Europe in any course of which those Powers may generally approve; and it may be better, therefore, not to take the first word of this Government, on the new position which affairs have taken, as the last.

The communication of M. de Brunnow, and the manner in which the French Government seem to think it will be considered by Her Majesty's Government, have, indeed, created such a sensation here, and seem so to have confounded all previous speculations, that it is difficult at this first moment to say what will definitively be the result. On the one hand, the feeling in this country is very strong against Russia; at the same time the opinion of the press, and of the men who conduct the public journals and general literature of France, is decidedly, as I have already had the honour of informing your Lordship, favourable to Mehemet Ali, who is considered, I can hardly say why, as the natural ally of France in the East.

Judging from these circumstances, then, I should be inclined to say at once, that if Her Majesty's Government, agreeing with the propositions which I understand M. de Brunnow to have made, should enter into a convention with the Governments of Russia and Austria for limiting Mehemet Ali's power to Egypt, and for compelling him to withdraw his forces within such limits, and if such a convention were to assign to Russia, as her part in the means of execution, the protection of Constantinople, France would not be a party to such convention, and that she would protest against the appearance of a Russian force in the Bosphorus, should the case arise of any such force appearing there; in every other respect maintaining the position of a neutral. This I take the liberty of saying might, I think, be naturally expected from France.

No. 318.

Viscount Palmerston to Colonel Campbell.

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 26, 1839.

YOUR despatches to the 5th of September, have been received and laid before the Queen.

With reference to your despatch of the 2nd of September, I have to instruct you to state to Mehemet Ali, that Her Majesty's Government feels persuaded that he is so well able to calculate consequences, that he will not expose himself to those which would follow from any further acts of hostility on his part against the Sultan.

I have further to state to you, that the opinion which, it appears from your despatches, you have formed of the power and influence of Mehemet Ali in Turkey, and which opinion is probably founded upon statements made to you by Mehemet Ali himself, is believed by Her Majesty's Government to be incorrect and exaggerated.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 319.

Viscount Palmerston to Colonel Hodges.

(Extract.) *Foreign Office, September* 27, 1839.

I HAVE the satisfaction to acquaint you, that the Queen has been graciously pleased to appoint you to be Her Majesty's Agent and Consul-General in Egypt, in the place of Colonel Campbell, who retires from the service on account of his health.

It is essential for the public service, that you should proceed to Egypt with as little delay as possible; I have, therefore, to desire that you will make your preparations for that purpose, and that you will commence your journey to Alexandria without loss of time.

Your Commission and Instructions will be forwarded to Alexandria; and on your arrival, you will receive from Colonel Campbell, the whole of the official correspondence of the Consulate; and I have to desire that you will consider the instructions therein contained as addressed to yourself, and will make them the guide of your conduct.

Previously to your departure from Vienna, you will wait upon Her Majesty's Ambassador, and receive from his Excellency, such instructions as he may think it right to give to you for the guidance of your conduct in Egypt.

No. 320.

Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, September* 27, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Excellency, that the Queen has been graciously pleased to appoint Colonel Hodges, now Her Majesty's Consul-General in Servia, to be Her Majesty's Agent and Consul-General in Egypt, in the place of Colonel Campbell.

I transmit to your Excellency, a copy of a despatch which I have addressed to Colonel Hodges, directing him to proceed to Egypt without delay; and I have to desire that your Excellency will give to Colonel

Hodges such instructions as you may judge proper, for the guidance of his conduct in Egypt, and that you will place him fully in possession of the views and opinions of Her Majesty's Government with respect to the the affairs of Turkey and Egypt, as explained in the various communications which have been addressed to you.

Colonel Hodges will leave in your Excellency's possession, the originals of the official correspondence of the Consulship in Servia.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 321.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 27.)

My Lord, *Therapia, September* 5 1839.

I INCLOSE a Report which Captain Walker has made of the occurrences during the progress of the Ottoman fleet from the Dardanelles to Alexandria.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 321.

Captain Walker to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Therapia, August* 4, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to state for your information, all the particulars relative to the late extraordinary conduct of the Capudan Pasha, as well as the movements of the Turkish fleet, from the time of its departure from the Dardanelles until its arrival at Alexandria.

On the morning of the 4th of July, the Capudan Pasha received the official notification of the death of Sultan Mahmoud, and the accession of his son, upon which occasion, all the ships dressed with flags and fired a royal salute; and in the afternoon of that day, the fleet, consisting of eight ships of the line, twelve frigates, one corvette, four brigs, two schooners, three fire-ships, and one steam-vessel, weighed and stood out of the Dardanelles. As we had been for a long time under orders for the coast of Syria, all supposed that to be our destination; nor was I aware that such was not the case, until our arrival in Besika Bay, when the Capudan Pasha informed me, that the Sultan had been poisoned, and four of the principal officers of his household beheaded; that this had been done by the Russian party, who had assumed the Government; and that to avoid the fleet falling into the hands of Russia, he intended to cruise outside the Dardanelles, so as to be ready to act with England and France. On the following morning, the 5th, he weighed, and when off Tenedos, fell in with Admiral Lalande, whose force consisted of two ships of the line, and a brig; after the usual salutes had been exchanged, the French Admiral, accompanied by the Prince de Joinville, came on board to visit the Capudan Pasha. I was afterwards informed by him, that he had communicated all to the French Admiral, who highly approved of his plans, and that the Capudan Pasha intended to proceed to Rhodes. I then requested him to allow me to send letters on board the "Vanguard," which was in sight, so as your Excellency, as well as Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, might be made acquainted with his intentions; but his reply was, that the French Admiral had promised to communicate all particulars to your Lordship, as well as to the English Admiral; and that he was anxious that the "Vanguard" should remain with the fleet, as well as the French brig which Admiral Lalande had ordered to accompany him.

Nothing of consequence occurred during our run down to Rhodes, which we passed on the night of the 7th, except the departure of the Kiaja

Bey, on the 6th, in a corvette, who, I was informed, was sent to communicate with Hafiz Pasha, the Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish Army.

On the 11th, when off Castel Nosso, we were joined by the French steamer of war "Papin," having on board the Mousteshar of the fleet, who was the bearer of the Capudan Pasha's commission under the new Government, which was immediately read, in the presence of the Admirals and crew of the flag-ship, upon which occasion all the Turkish ships saluted, as well as the French brig of war; soon after which both French vessels parted company.

On the morning of the 12th, the Egyptian steamer of war, "Nile," joined us, having on board the Kiaja Bey, who, I have since ascertained, was sent to Mehemet Ali, and not to Hafiz Pasha, as I had been informed. He communicated with the Capudan Pasha, and in the afternoon, the fleet made sail to the southward, accompanied by the Egyptian steamer; the "Vanguard" having hoisted a Turkish flag, I was sent to her in a brig, when Sir Thomas Fellowes informed me of his intention of joining Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, who was off Cyprus. On the morning of the 13th, the "Vanguard" parted company to the eastward, after having communicated with the "Rhadamanthus," which was passing through the Turkish fleet. So anxious was the Capudan Pasha to get to the southward, that he carried such a press of sail, as obliged him to leave behind a line-of-battle ship and frigate, which were bad sailers; and the "Nile" steamer, being sent to those ships, to order them to rendezvous off Alexandria, was the first intimation I received as to the Capudan Pasha's intention of proceeding there. When I spoke to him on the subject, he told me that he had received by the Kiaja Bey, a letter from Mehemet Ali, who offered to put the Egyptian fleet under his command; but before doing so he wished to consult with him as to the best steps to be taken for the good of the Turkish Empire, and that he (the Capudan Pasha) meant to proceed off Alexandria for that purpose. On the following day, the 14th, we fell in with the Egyptian fleet, consisting of eleven ships of the line, three frigates, and two brigs, which were cruising about ten miles off Alexandria, and so ignorant were the Admirals and Captains of the change in the Capudan Pasha's plans, that many of the ships cleared for action; and my firm belief is, that not more than four officers belonging to the fleet, were aware of his intention of joining Mehemet Ali. No salutes were exchanged, but on the morning of the 15th, when the Capudan Pasha landed at Alexandria, from the steamer "Nile," all the forts saluted, which was returned by the Turkish flag-ship, after which both fleets stood off for the night.

On the 16th, the Turkish fleet anchored off the western entrance of Alexandria, about six miles from the town, when all the Admirals and Captains went on shore to wait upon Mehemet Ali. I also landed, and did not again return to the fleet; and on the 17th, when the Capudan Pasha proposed to me to cruise with the united fleets, I declined, stating as a reason, that I was not authorized, by the British Government, to serve under Mehemet Ali; to this he replied, that it was still the Sultan's fleet, but united with the Egyptian for the good of the Turkish Empire.

On the 18th, when the "Confiance" arrived, I informed the Capudan Pasha of my intention of proceeding to Constantinople. He then asked me if it were not possible to remain, and on my replying that I could not, he appeared much hurt.

I have now, my Lord, stated, to the best of my recollection, all the particulars respecting this extraordinary affair; and have only to add, that I left Alexandria on the 20th, in the "Confiance," and arrived here on the 2nd of August.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) B. W. WALKER, R.N.

No. 322.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 27.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, September* 6, 1839.

THE party of Mehemet Ali spread abroad the notion, that the Mussulman interest would be sacrificed by the Great Powers, and therefore that an arrangement should be made without their intervention between the Sultan and the Pasha. Lord Beauvale's declaration at Vienna, of July 27th, offered the best refutation of the assertions of the party. I resolved, therefore, to make the declaration public; and, I am happy to say, that, so far as I can judge of the matter, the effect has been very good.

No. 323.

Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Bulwer.

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 28, 1839.

I HAD yesterday another conversation with Count Sébastiani on Turkish Affairs. The Count showed me, by order of his Government, the copy of a despatch which has recently been addressed by the French Government to Count St. Aulaire.

This despatch states, that the French Government has at last settled its opinion on the Turkish Question, and has determined the plan of arrangement between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, which it wishes to suggest for the consideration of the Allies. This plan, however, it proposes as a thing to be discussed, and subject to modification.

The plan is, that Mehemet Ali should evacuate the small district of Adana, making his frontiers the mountain range called Amanus; and that Candia should be held by Mehemet for his life only; but that the Sultan should give him an hereditary tenure in all the other territories which he now occupies. With respect to Candia, the French Government suggests that at the death of Mehemet Ali, one of his younger sons might be made hereditary Pasha of that island.

The arguments by which this scheme is supported are, that Mehemet is becoming very strong, and that might is entitled to respect, as well as right; that immediate peace in the Levant is absolutely necessary, and that the only way of obtaining it is to give to Mehemet all, or nearly all, he asks. That this arrangement would greatly strengthen the Sultan, because Mehemet Ali, if he were satisfied with his condition, would always be ready to defend the Sultan against foreign attack. That this scheme would leave the Sultan all that is really essential to him, that is to say, nominal sovereignty and acknowledged rights.

That, moreover, no power founded upon the life of a man so old as Mehemet, and who has not in his favour the religious veneration which binds the Mussulmans to the Sultan, could be very lasting; and that at some time or other the Sultan might do in Syria and Egypt that which the late Sultan did recently at Tripoli, namely, send an expedition and resume possession of the country.

When I had read the despatch, I said to Count Sébastiani that as we have always spoken to each other without reserve, I could not refrain from observing, that the course taken of late upon this Turkish Question by the French Government, is to me perfectly incomprehensible; that it is at variance with the true interests of France, and full of inconsistencies.

Perhaps, I said, he would tell me, that the French Government is as good a judge as I can be, of what are the true interests of France, and upon that point, therefore, I would say no more. But I reminded him that France having started by a spontaneous declaration that she was determined to employ all her means of action to maintain the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire, she now proposes to dismember that Empire, and by cutting off a large portion of it, thus necessarily to throw the Sovereign, who is to rule the remainder, into the arms of foreign Powers for support and protection. Count Sébastiani denied that the proposed arrangement would be a dismemberment, because the rights of sovereignty would be reserved for the Sultan; and he said, that, as a security against Mehemet Ali's throwing off his allegiance, it might be stipulated by treaty, that the Five Powers should prevent Mehemet and his successors from ever declaring themselves independent. I said, that I called that arrangement a dismemberment of an Empire which divides its resources, military and pecuniary, into two parts, to be swayed and applied by two different and separate authorities and wills, of which one will and authority might choose to apply its portion of those resources hostilely against the other: and that as to the stipulation which he suggested, I could not imagine, that either the Sultan could trust to it, or that Mehemet Ali would be restrained by it; because neither of them could think it likely that the Five Powers would be disposed to interfere by force of arms, some years hence, to prevent Mehemet from casting off his nominal subjection, if those Powers should pronounce the employment of force against Mehemet Ali to be impossible now.

I observed, that the effect of such an arrangement would be to establish in the heart of the Turkish Empire a power which would not have advanced so far if it had not been ambitious, and which being ambitious would necessarily wish to advance further; for I could not acquiesce in the doctrine of the French despatch, that the best means of restraining ambition is to yield all to its demands; on the contrary, the demands of ambition increase in proportion as they are gratified. But the result would of course be, that the Sultan would be swayed by two passions: the fear of further attack, and the desire to get back what he had lost; and he would cling to that Power which was most likely to afford him protection against future dangers, or assistance to recover his legitimate authority. That this Power would be Russia; and that thus France, which professes to be actuated by the strongest wish to rescue the Sultan from the exclusive influence of Russia, is, in fact, proposing an arrangement by which that influence would be permanently riveted.

But I said that what is remarkable in this scheme is, that emanating from a Cabinet which has recently professed its determination to uphold the Ottoman Empire under its present dynasty, the scheme is all in favour of Mehemet Ali, and all against the Sultan. For, in fact, the proposal substantially is, that the Sultan shall give to Mehemet an hereditary tenure in Egypt, Syria, and Arabia, and in all that Mehemet either now has, or means hereafter to acquire, upon the single condition that Mehemet shall now evacuate the little district of Adana, which might be covered by a pocket-handkerchief; and that some contingent arrangement, to take place at Mehemet's death, should be made about Candia. But what earthly motive could the Sultan have for agreeing to such an arrangement? and would it not be infinitely better for the Sultan that things should remain as they have been since the arrangement of Kutaya, and that the Porte should take the chance of future events? I said that, if I was the adviser of the Sultan, I should certainly recommend him to decline such an arrangement as this.

Count Sébastiani said, that this plan was by no means one upon which France insists; and that he thought his Government would be equally well content with the plan which he had mentioned to me on a former occasion, and by which the hereditary Government of Mehemet would be bounded to the north by a line drawn across Syria between Damascus and Beyrout.

To that I restated the objections which I had mentioned to him before, namely, that it would be an imperfect arrangement; that it would place the two parties in contact without any natural frontiers interposed between them; and that it would leave Mehemet in possession of the Holy Cities, which the French Government had specially mentioned as places which ought to be restored to the direct rule of the Sultan; and that if coercion is to be employed, it is better to employ it to effect a complete, instead of an incomplete, settlement.

We then discussed at length the proposals made by Baron Brunnow, and the course which it would be expedient for England and France to take thereupon, and Count Sébastiani dwelt upon the circumstance that the convention which Baron Brunnow had proposed, would be limited to the present occasion, and would therefore afford no security for the future. To this I replied, that my notion was, that upon that convention should be grafted stipulations by which the Five Powers should engage for a limited period, say ten years to come, to concur in upholding and protecting the Turkish Empire.

The Count caught eagerly at that suggestion; said that such a plan would be entirely in conformity with his views; that he should wish such a convention to be for twenty years; that he would immediately write to his Government to suggest the idea to them, and that he thought that it might make the whole difference in their view of the matter. He said that he had written to Paris the week preceding, to report the substance of Baron Brunnow's communications, and that he expected an unfavourable answer; but that we must not be discouraged by that, but must wait to hear the reply to the communication which he would now make to his Government in consequence of the conversation we had had together.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 324.

Count Sébastiani to Viscount Palmerston.

Mon cher Vicomte, *Londres, le* 28 *Septembre*, 1839.

VOUS trouverez ci-jointe une dépêche que je viens de recevoir, et que j'ai ordre de vous communiquer: c'est la réponse à celle que j'avais écrite pour donner à mon Gouvernement connaissance des propositions de la Russie. Elle est positive dans la résolution que la France a prise de ne pas y accéder. Je voudrais partager l'espoir qu'elle exprime encore de voir l'Angleterre revenir à son premier et veritable Allié.

Tout à vous,
(Signé) SEBASTIANI.

(Translation.)

Count Sébastiani to Viscount Palmerston.

My dear Viscount, *London, September* 28, 1839.

YOU will find annexed a despatch which I have just received, and which I am directed to communicate to you: it is the answer to that which I wrote to make known to my Government the propositions of Russia. It is positive as to the resolution which France has taken not to agree to those propositions. I would fain participate in the hope therein expressed of again seeing England return to her first and true Ally.

Ever yours,
(Signed) SEBASTIANI.

Inclosure in No. 324.

The Duc de Dalmatie to Count Sébastiani.

Monsieur le Comte, *Paris, le* 26 *Septembre*, 1839.

J'AI reçu les dépêches que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire. Les craintes que nous avions conçues sur le succès de la tactique employée par le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg pour séparer l'Angleterre et la France, et conquérir ainsi dans la Question d'Orient des auxiliaires bien inattendus, semblent sur le point d'être justifiées par l'évènement. Ce n'est pas sans un étonnement douloureux que nous voyons un homme aussi éclairé que Lord Palmerston, accueillir avec tant de complaisance un projet tel que celui qui lui a été présenté par M. de Brunnoff: un projet qui, au prix d'une vaine et illusoire concession de principe annullée immédiatement en fait par l'acte

même qui est censé la consacrer, tend à donner une sanction Européenne à la position exceptionnelle que la Russie s'arroge depuis trop longtems à Constantinople. Accepter, consigner dans une convention formelle la promesse de ne pas renouveler le Traité d'Unkiar Skélessi, contre lequel la France et l'Angleterre ont protesté si expressément il y a six ans, ce serait en quelque sorte annuller cette protestation, et reconnaître la validité de l'acte contre lequel elle était dirigée. Proclamer dans cette même convention le principe de la clôture des deux détroits, si solemnellement consacré par le tems, par le consentement unanime des nations, et même par les engagemens écrits, ce ne serait pas lui donner une force nouvelle, ce serait bien plutôt l'affaiblir, en la classant au nombre de ces stipulations accidentelles que les circonstances amènent et qu'elles peuvent emporter. Ce qu'il faut à ce principe, incessamment menacé par l'ambition d'une grande Puissance, ce sont des garanties qui en assurent l'inviolabilité, ou du moins qui assurent que lors qu'il sera absolument nécessaire d'y déroger, cette dérogation ne pourra compromettre les grands intérêts qu'il était destiné à protéger. Nous n'avons cessé de le répéter: de telles garanties ne peuvent résulter que de l'admission simultanée des forces de toutes les Cours Alliées dans les eaux de Constantinople. C'est là le but auquel nous nous étions efforcés d'arriver, et auquel, un moment, l'Angleterre et l'Autriche avaient paru tendre avec nous. Au lieu de cela, que nous propose-t-on? Précisément ce que nous repoussions tous d'abord, ce que la France continue à repousser comme le triomphe complet de la politique du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg qui n'a jamais demandé autre chose: on veut que les forces Russes seules pénétrent dans le Bosphore, tandisque celles de la France et de l'Angleterre s'éloigneraient des Dardanelles pour aller menacer le Pacha d'Egypte; et ce qui est plus étrange, on prétend nous faire croire que l'exclusion dont nous serions ainsi l'objets cesserait d'avoir pour nous un caractère offensant par cela seul que nous y aurions donné notre consentement. Certes, en exigeant cette exclusion, la Russie révèle sa pensée; si elle n'avait d'autre désir que de mettre fin aux embarras du moment, si, satisfaite de l'influence naturelle que sa situation lui donnera toujours dans l'Empire Ottoman, elle n'aspirait pas à s'y créer peu-à-peu des droits particuliers au détriment de toutes les autres Puissances, il est impossible de concevoir d'où pourrait naître la répugnance à voir flotter les pavillons des Cours Alliées à côté du sien sous les murs de Constantinople. Le Traité même d'Unkiar Skélessi n'y mettrait pas d'obstacle. Qu'elle y consente, et la Question d'Orient sera dégagée de sa plus sérieuse difficulté. Mais telle n'est pas sa pensée. Elle veut, je l'ai déjà dit, au moyen d'un précédent établi d'un consentement commun, amener l'Europe à sanctionner la position exceptionnelle qu'elle a d'abord essayé de se créer sans la participation des autres Cours. Ce qu'on lui concéderait aujourd'hui en fait, elle le réclamerait plus tard comme un droit, et nous serions certainement bien plus mal placés pour lui refuser, dans des conjonctures analogues, l'espèce de privilège dont nous aurions une fois reconnu en sa faveur la convenance et la nécessité. Il y a plus: ce refus deviendrait presque impossible, parceque après un tel précédent, il prendrait le caractère d'un caprice malveillant. Nous ne pouvons donc, M. le Comte, donner notre assentiment aux propositions de M. de Brunnoff. Jamais, de notre aveu, une escadre de guerre étrangère ne paraitra devant Constantinople, sans que la nôtre ne s'y montre aussi. C'est à cette seule condition que nous pouvons autoriser l'infraction du principe de la clotûre des détroits, et toute autre combinaison rencontrerait, dans l'opinion énergique et unanime de la France, des obstacles qui ne permettraient pas au Gouvernement du Roi de s'y associer, lors-même qu'il ne partagerait pas, comme il la partage, en effet, cette répugnance nationale si vive et si profonde.

Veuillez, M. le Comte, donner lecture de cette dépêche à Lord Palmerston. Le Cabinet de Londres n'ayant pas encore pris de résolution définitive sur la grave question qui y est traitée, nous aimons à croire que de plus mûres réflexions lui feront repousser les propositions de la Russie. En tout cas, la détermination du Gouvernement du Roi est irrévocable. Quelles que soient les conséquences d'un déplorable dissentiment, dût-il avoir pour effet l'accomplissement du projet favori de la Russie, celui de nous isoler de nos Alliés, ce n'est pas nous qui en aurons encouru la responsabilité. Nous resterons sur notre terrain. Ce ne sera pas notre faute si nous n'y retrouvons plus ceux qui s'y étaient d'abord placés à côté de nous.

Le dernier paquebot de l'Orient ne nous a apporté aucune information nouvelle de quelque gravité, mais celles qui me sont parvenues confirment de plus en plus l'opinion que j'ai depuis longtems exprimée sur la ferme volonté de Méhémet Ali, de repousser par tous les moyens les conditions trop rigoureuses qu'on voudrait lui imposer. Ce qui n'est pas moins certain, c'est le nombre et la puissance des adhérens qu'il compte dans toutes les parties de l'Empire Ottoman. Il ne faut peut-être qu'un moment pour l'embrâser tout entier et pour précipiter l'Europe elle-même dans de terribles ébranlemens. C'est là le danger, l'immense danger que nous redoutons, et dont la prévision dirige toutes nos démarches. Puissent les autres Gouvernemens l'apercevoir enfin comme nous.

Agréez, &c.,
(Signé) MARECHAL DUC DE DALMATIE.

(Translation.)

The Duc de Dalmatie to Count Sébastiani.

Monseiur le Comte, *Paris, September* 26, 1839.

I HAVE received the despatches you have done me honour to write to me. The fears we entertained of the success of the tactics employed by the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh for separating England and France, and thus acquiring unexpected auxiliaries upon the Eastern Question, seem upon the point of being justified by the event. It is not without feelings of painful astonishment that we perceive a man of such enlightened judgment as Lord Palmerston entertain with so much complacency a project like the one proposed to him by M. de Brunnow; a project which, at the price of an idle and illusory concession of principle to be in fact immediately annulled by the very act which is supposed to establish it, tends to give an European sanction to the distinctive position which Russia has for too long a period arrogated to herself at Constantinople. To accept, and to record in a formal Convention, the promise not to renew the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, against which Treaty France and England, six years ago, so strongly protested, would be in some measure to annul that protest, and to recognize the validity of the Act against which it was directed. To proclaim in that same Convention the principle of closing the two straits, a principle so solemnly sanctioned by time, by the unanimous consent of nations, and even by written engagements, would not be to add new force to it, but rather to weaken it, by bringing it within that class of accidental stipulations which circumstances produce, and which circumstances may destroy. What this principle requires, threatened as it continually is by the ambition of one great Power, is, that guarantees should be given which will ensure its inviolability, or which will, at any rate, provide that, whenever it shall become absolutely necessary to deviate from that principle, such deviation shall not compromise the great interests which the principle was designed to protect. We have never ceased to repeat the fact: such guarantees can only result from the simultaneous admission of the Forces of all the Allied Courts into the waters of Constantinople. That is the end at which we have used all our endeavours to arrive, and to which, at one time, England and Austria appeared to be going along with us. Instead of that, what do they propose to us? Precisely what we all rejected at first; what France continues to reject as being the complete triumph of the policy of the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, which has never sought for anything else: it is desired that the Russian forces should alone penetrate into the Bosphorus, whilst those of France and England should remove from the Dardanelles to go and menace the Pasha of Egypt; and what is still more strange, they wish to make us believe, that the exclusion of which we should thus be the objects, would cease to bear the character of being offensive to us, merely because we should have given our consent to it. Certainly, in requiring such an exclusion, Russia reveals her intentions: if she had no other desire than that of putting an end to the present difficulties; if, satisfied with the natural influence which her situation

will always give her in the Ottoman Empire, she did not aspire to create for herself there, by degrees, exclusive rights to the detriment of all the other Powers, it is impossible to conceive whence could arise the repugnance to seeing the flags of the Allied Courts floating side by side with her own under the walls of Constantinople. Even the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi would present no obstacle to that. Let her consent to that, and the Eastern Question will be disembarrassed of its most serious difficulty. But such is not her wish. She wishes, as I have already observed, by means of a precedent established by common consent, to bring Europe to sanction the distinctive position which she has from the first tried to create for herself without the participation of the other Courts. What at the present time would be conceded to her in fact, she would afterwards demand as a right; and we should certainly be in a much worse situation, for refusing to her, in analogous circumstances, a description of privilege, the expediency and necessity for which we had once admitted in her favour. Nay, more; that refusal would become almost impossible, because, after such a precedent, it would assume the character of malevolent caprice. We cannot, then, M. le Comte, give our assent to the propositions of M. de Brunnow. Never, with our consent, shall a foreign squadron of war appear before Constantinople, unless ours appears there also. It is on this condition alone that we can authorize the infringement of the principle of the closing of the Straits; and every other arrangement would meet with obstacles in the powerful and unanimous opinion of France, which would not allow the King's Government to lend itself thereto, even if it did not partake, as in fact it does, of that national repugnance which is so strong and so deep.

Be so good, M. le Comte, as to read this despatch to Lord Palmerston. The Cabinet of London having not yet come to any final determination on the important question which is treated herein, we are inclined to think that more mature reflection will cause it to reject the propositions of Russia. At all events, the determination of the King's Government is irrevocable. Whatever may be the consequences of a deplorable difference of opinion, should it effect the accomplishment of the favourite project of Russia, that of separating us from our Allies, we shall not have incurred the responsibility of it. We will keep our ground. It will not be our fault if we no longer find there those who at first placed themselves side by side with us.

The last packet from the East has brought us no new intelligence of any importance; but that which has reached me, confirms more and more the opinion which I have long expressed, of the firm determination of Mehemet Ali, to repel by all possible means the too rigorous conditions which it might be wished to impose upon him. What is no less certain, is the number and strength of the adherents whom he reckons in all parts of the Ottoman Empire. A moment perhaps may suffice to set the whole of it in a blaze, and to precipitate Europe itself into dreadful commotions. There is the danger, the immense danger, which we dread, and the anticipation of which directs all our movements. Would that the other Governments may at length view it as we do.

Accept, &c.,
(Signed) MARECHAL DUC DE DALMATIE.

No. 325.

Count Medem to Count Nesselrode.—(Communicated by Baron Brunnow.)

M. le Comte, *Alexandrie, le $\frac{14}{26}$ Août*, 1839.

LA situation des affaires n'a subi aucune modification depuis l'expédition de mon dernier rapport. Le Pacha continue à observer la même attitude, à tenir le même langage, et à persister, comme par le passé, dans ses prétentions hors de mesure.

J'ai cru devoir, vû la face nouvelle que la Question Orientale vient de prendre, par le fait de l'ingérence des Cinq Grandes Puissances, m'abstenir autant que possible, d'entrer dans de nouvelles discussions politiques avec le Pacha. Il me semble d'autant plus utile, M. le Comte,

d'attendre les résolutions des Cabinets d'Europe avant de poursuivre nos pourparlers avec Méhémet Ali, que l'état de malaise et d'irritabilité dans lequel il se trouve, rendrait aujourd'hui toute argumentation aussi gratuite qu'inefficace.

Les dernières nouvelles parvenues de Syrie sont toutes à la guerre. Ibrahim Pacha y fait, dit-on, des préparatifs immenses, et s'approvisionne comme s'il s'agissait très-prochainement d'une expédition lointaine. Il vient d'écrire à son père pour lui demander l'autorisation éventuelle d'avancer avec son armée, alléguant que l'approche de la saison rigoureuse ne lui permettait pas de conserver sa position actuelle, et le mettait dans l'obligation, ou de reculer, ou de se porter en avant. Méhémet Ali n'a point consenti à la demande de son fils, mais il a dit hier à mon Collègue d'Autriche, "qu'il attendrait encore un mois, et que si d'ici là les Grandes Cours n'auraient point adhéré à ses dernières propositions, il ferait marcher son armée sur Konia."

Les émissaires que Méhémet Ali avait chargé de missions secrètes pour les Pachas de Macédoine et de Roumélie, n'ayant point obtenu la permission de débarquer à Salonique, ont dû renoncer à se rendre à leur destination, et sont retournés depuis quelques jours à Alexandrie, avec le même brick Egyptien sur lequel ils s'étaient embarqués.

Depuis quelque tems, des symptômes de mécontentement se sont déclarés parmi les troupes de terre et la marine Turque stationnés dans cette ville; la nostalgie, les diverses maladies auxquelles elles sont assujetties depuis leur arrivée en Egypte, et plus encore la mauvaise qualité des alimens, comme l'absence d'un bon traitement médical, paraissent avoir contribué à exaspérer la soldatesque Ottomane.

Je suis, &c.,
(Signé) MEDEM.

(Translation.)

Count Medem to Count Nesselrode.—(Communicated by Baron Brunnow.)

M. le Comte, *Alexandria, August* $\frac{14}{26}$, 1839.

THE situation of affairs has not undergone any change since I sent off my last despatch. The Pasha continues to maintain the same attitude, to hold the same language, and to persist, as hitherto, in his inordinate pretensions.

Considering the new aspect that the Eastern Question has assumed in consequence of the interference of the Five Great Powers, I have thought it my duty to abstain, as much as possible, from entering into fresh political discussions with the Pasha. It appears to me the more advantageous, M. le Comte, to wait for the determination of the Cabinets of Europe before we continue our interviews with Mehemet Ali, because the state of indisposition and irritability in which he is, would at present render all discussion as gratuitous as it would be ineffectual.

The last news from Syria are all warlike. They say that Ibrahim Pasha is making immense preparations there, and is laying in provisions, as if there was a question of a distant expedition very soon. He has recently written to his father to ask him to authorize him eventually to advance with his Army, alleging that the approach of severe weather did not allow him to continue in his present position, and obliged him either to retreat or to advance. Mehemet Ali has not assented to the demand of his son; but he said yesterday to my Austrian Colleague,—"That he would wait another month; and that if within that time the Great Courts should not have acceded to his last proposals, he would cause his Army to march upon Koniah."

The emissaries whom Mehemet Ali had charged with secret missions for the Pashas of Macedonia and Roumelia not having obtained permission to disembark at Salonica, have been obliged to give up proceeding to their destination, and came back a few days ago to Alexandria on board the same Egyptian brig in which they sailed.

Symptoms of discontent have for some time shown themselves amongst the Turkish soldiers and sailors stationed in the town; nostalgia, the different

diseases to which they have been subject since their arrival in Egypt, and what is worse, the bad quality of their provisions, as well as the want of good medical treatment, appear to have contributed to exasperate the Ottoman soldiery.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) MEDEM.

No. 326.

Viscount Palmerston to Colonel Hodges.

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 3, 1839.

IN addition to Her Majesty's Commission and to the consular instructions with which you are furnished, I inclose to you a letter which, by Her Majesty's commands, I have addressed to the Viceroy of Egypt, announcing your appointment.

You will deliver this letter to the Viceroy in your first audience.

I also inclose for your information a copy of the letter.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 327.

Viscount Palmerston to His Highness the Vizier Mehemet Ali Pasha, Viceroy of Egypt.

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 3, 1839.

THE Queen, my Sovereign, having thought fit to recall Colonel Campbell from the situation which he has for some time held as Her Majesty's Agent and Consul-General in Egypt; and Her Majesty being desirous to convince your Highness of the personal respect and regard with which she is animated towards your Highness, as well as of her desire to cement and strengthen the friendship and good understanding which have so long subsisted between Great Britain and the Ottoman Porte, and to cultivate and promote the relations between this country and the territories of which the government has been confided to your Highness, Her Majesty has commanded me to acquaint your Highness, that she has selected Colonel Hodges, lately Her Majesty's Consul-General in Servia, to be Her Majesty's Agent and Consul-General in Egypt.

Colonel Hodges, who will deliver this letter to your Highness, is in every way qualified, by his former services, to do justice to Her Majesty's choice, by keeping up and improving the friendship which so happily subsists between Great Britain and the Ottoman dominions; and Her Majesty trusts that your Highness will give your countenance and protection to Colonel Hodges, and that you will afford to him every attention and assistance, to enable him to execute the duties which Her Majesty has confided to him.

I entreat your Highness to be assured of the anxious desire which I feel for the welfare and prosperity of your Highness; and I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 328.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received October* 4.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, September* 10, 1839.

I PAID a visit to Rechid Pasha this morning, to congratulate him on his return, and we had a long conversation. He told me, that Marshal Soult had expressed to him his desire to co-operate in all things for the good of the Sultan, and he seemed to think, that the support apparently given to

Mehemet Ali springs from the newspapers and the dissatisfied parties, and not from the Ministers. He spoke strongly against leaving Syria in the power of Mehemet Ali, or of Ibrahim, upon any terms, or under any modification of title, saying, that it would amount to a partition of the Empire and bring on the destruction of the reigning dynasty. He approved of what we have done here, and of the Sublime Porte remaining entirely passive until the questions in doubt should be cleared up by the Great Powers. He expressed his entire confidence in the goodwill and friendship of England, and was anxious to learn if I had any intelligence respecting the measures determined upon by the British and French Governments. He asked if the fleets were to go before Alexandria, and what they were to do; and if it were not true, that the British Government had proposed to force Mehemet Ali to surrender the Ottoman fleet. I replied, that I had not received information on these points, but expected it immediately. He said, he wanted the British Government to do some act that would confirm what he had stated to be, "the kind intentions of that Government;" for many persons endeavoured to persuade the Porte and the world, that England would do nothing, whatever England might say; and also to establish the belief, that France and England disagreed. He said, that we had done right to support the Grand Vizier; that to have permitted Mehemet Ali to remove him from his post would have been to abandon the rights of the Sultan, and establish a system of Government wholly dependent on Mehemet Ali. He said, there were no appearances of any disposition in the capital that were at all alarming, but that there was no want of distribution of money by Mehemet Ali, to procure creatures and their service.

No. 329.

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 7.)

(Extract.) *Paris, October 4, 1839.*

I HAD the honour of receiving your Lordship's despatches to the 1st of October. With respect to your Lordship's interview with General Sébastiani, I can only say, with great regret, that he neither holds the language nor speaks in the tone of the Government here.

General Sébastiani first proposes to your Lordship, that the boundary line of the Egyptian Power should be drawn from Beyrout to Damascus, and declares, that the French Government will aid by force, if necessary, to compel the Viceroy to submit to these terms; a week afterwards he proposes in the name of his Government, that Mehemet Ali's sway should extend as far as the Amanus (that part of the ridge of Mount Taurus which runs from the Bay of Issus to the Euphrates), making no mention of the employment of means of coercion to enforce even the small concessions to which Mehemet Ali would thus be obliged to submit. Finally, he says, that his Government would as soon agree to one plan as the other, while the difference between the two plans is so great, that if that Government has any opinion at all, it must be in favour of one plan or the other, and cannot be equally in favour of both. Indeed, I am sure that at this moment it would not consent to General Sébastiani's original proposition.

I venture to observe, therefore, that he seems either to be uninformed of the views of his Government, or not quite accurately to represent them, or to have instructions to hold a sort of language which, making everything uncertain and contradictory, keeps the whole question in a state of indecision and suspense, which the French Cabinet, embarrassed by contending difficulties, may possibly feel disposed to prolong. At the same time, the General is perfectly right in stating that, though the French Government has expressed an opinion, that opinion is not to be considered peremptory or conclusive; indeed the time has not yet arrived at which any opinion expressed by the French Cabinet can be so considered. For my own part, I mentioned to your Lordship in my despatch of September 27, that Marshal Soult having first stated to Count Medem and myself that he was in favour of the immediate restoration of

Candia to the Sultan, did, but a few days afterwards, (in his recent declaration,) propose that the surrender of this valuable island should not take place till the period of Mehemet's death.

I have no doubt that the French Government is inclined to join in any proposition which it thinks Mehemet Ali will consent to, and to take part in none to which it believes it will be necessary to force the Pasha's compliance.

Thus, the point of view in which the French Government will regard any conditions to be proposed to Mehemet Ali, is evident and unchangeable, while its opinion in regard to those conditions is as yet doubtful and liable to alteration. For Mehemet Ali, under some circumstances, would consent to what, under others he would refuse; and there is, consequently, in the French Counsels a mixture of positiveness and of vagueness; positiveness as to what will not be done, vagueness as to what may, which your Lordship will easily understand.

No decision, therefore, is to be expected from this Government as the result of its own opinions; those opinions depending on the effect of a variety of external causes by which they are to be determined. It is principally by the course which the other Governments pursue, by the concert between themselves which they may establish, that the policy of France will be guided; and it is only when there are decision and certainty elsewhere, that anything like certainty or decision is to be expected here.

Should it be possible for the other Governments to come to any clear understanding, confining the pretensions of Mehemet Ali, and providing the means for carrying such understanding into effect, then the French Government, disliking the isolated state in which by its refusal to join in any general arrangement it would be placed, and considering also that measures of coercion would not be necessary, if Mehemet Ali saw the impossibility of resisting such measures, might consider the question differently from at present.

At all events, I feel, my Lord, that I cannot too distinctly state that the other Cabinets must form their decision in order to obtain a decision from the French Cabinet, and that they must not wait for a decision from the French Cabinet in order to form their own.

In this conviction, I feel sure, rests the solution of the present difficulties, and the chance of bringing them to a favourable termination.

The project proposed by M. de Brunnow of assigning to Russia, in any system of warlike co-operation, the protection of Constantinople, was certain at first to be discountenanced. But notwithstanding that the language still held on this subject is most adverse to admitting the Russians under any circumstances into the Bosphorus, I do not consider that the repugnance expressed in this matter is insurmountable. Here again, the conduct of the French Government will ultimately be guided by its opinion as to whether Mehemet will, or will not, resist the conditions proposed to him. If he do not resist such conditions, the presence of the Russian fleet will not be necessary at Constantinople, and the French Government will then find it easy to justify its sanction of an improbable occurrence for the sake of establishing an important principle, such as no doubt would be established by the expiration of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, and the understanding that Russia would act in the affairs of the East in concert with the other Great Powers of Europe.

In short, the more I consider the subject, the more readily I venture, my Lord, to repeat my conviction, that the acquiescence of France in any course which your Lordship would approve, must be sought for in the union of the other Cabinets, and in the power thus obtained of acting upon the fears of Mehemet Ali, and thereby removing the fears of France, which shrinks, and will continue to shrink, from being brought into any active measures of hostility against the Viceroy.

Were it advisable, when the other Governments were agreed upon their course, to state to this Government what that course would be, and to observe, that if France stood aloof, such course would be rigorously pursued; but that if the French Government joined in the proceedings of the other Powers, some definite concessions might be made with respect to the opinions it had expressed as to the limits to be assigned to the Viceroyalty of Egypt; this, I think, by placing the French Government in a favourable position for replying to those who would attack it for joining a confederation against the Pasha, would be the most certain mode of obtaining its frank and prompt accession to the common policy adopted; nor do I think, in such case, that the concessions to be made need be great. As to the policy of making them at all, however, I do not of course venture to express an opinion, and have only been led to make the foregoing remark by the desire that your Lordship should be as fully acquainted as possible with all the means which my situation suggests to me, for preventing this Government from separating itself from the other Powers of Europe, as well as with all the difficulties which lie in the way of this object.

I should now observe, that, when recently at Fontainebleau, with Count Medem and Count Appony, the general result of our observations was, that the French Government was mortified by the conduct of Russia, and annoyed by that of England; that it had come to no positive resolution, but that its present disposition, should Russia, Austria, and England, agree to act according to the propositions of M. de Brunnow against Mehemet Ali, was towards withdrawing its fleet from the Dardanelles, adopting a neutral position, and trusting to accidents for the opportunity of interfering again in such a manner as would be popular in France, and in that sense effective. We none of us, however, considered the mind of the French Government wholly made up; and my own opinion is, that it imagines that Austria, while favourable to the assistance proposed by Russia, will not be so positive in restricting Mehemet Ali to Egypt as ourselves; that in this manner new combinations and propositions may arise, or that things may even be left in their present position. While such is the state of things, it is not France which by any decided resolution, will give them a more positive aspect. Marshal Soult spoke to me, on the morning of my departure, of the conversation which your Lordship had had with General Sébastiani, respecting which I had not, at that time, received any information. And his Excellency seemed to consider, that your Lordship had made some proposition to General Sébastiania for guaranteeing the existence of the Ottoman Empire for ten or twenty years. To this the Marshal objected in the strongest terms, as seeming to imply, that at the end of that period, the existence of the said Empire might be called in question, thereby weakening, instead of strengthening, a State which we have hitherto treated as permanently necessary to the balance of power in Europe. On receiving your Lordship's despatch this morning, I lost no time in calling on M. Désages, the Marshal being still at Fontainebleau, and explaining to him what I conceive to be clearly your Lordship's meaning, corresponding, as it does, with the views which the French Government have at various former times expressed; namely, that it might be advisable to enter into a general alliance for the maintenance and protection of the Porte during that crisis of its reforms and regeneration, through which it has for the next few years to struggle; thereby removing it from the sole protection of one Power, and at the same time aiding the tranquil development of those resources which only require to be properly cultivated and directed, in order once more to form a strong and independent Empire.

M. Désages, looking at your Lordship's suggestion in this light, seemed to consider it was one which the French Government would view with satisfaction, but could not express any decided opinion during the absence of the Marshal.

I should observe to your Lordship, that I have had, this evening, a conversation with Count Appony, who seems generally to concur in the opinions expressed in this despatch.

No. 330.

Mr. Consul Young to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 7.)

My Lord, *Jerusalem, August* 19, 1839.

I THINK it is my duty to report to your Lordship, that this district remains in a very disturbed state. The Sheik Abdrachman Aamar has made so formidable an appearance in the neighbourhood of Hebron, that the

Governor and Sheik of that place have left, and are now in this city. Hebron is therefore left without any magisterial authority, and all intercourse between this and Hebron has for the past ten days been cut off.

I am assured that the above-named Sheik has at his command between three and four thousand armed men, and that he had been endeavouring to raise the Tahyr and Tarabin tribes (from the neighbourhood of Gaza) to join him, but had not been successful; he has, however succeeded in disturbing the south and more eastern districts.

Three men of his party, with their arms, were taken on the 15th instant, and brought into town. And yesterday, one from a village two hours distant, where there has been a disturbance, and an attempt to kill the Sheik. They succeeded in killing one of his relatives, and then they all fled to the mountains to join Abdrachman Aamar, except the one who has been brought in.

The intercourse between one part of the country and another is much impeded by the insecurity of the roads, which are everywhere infested by the disaffected.

Such, my Lord, is the feeling against the Egyptian Government in this district,—chiefly owing to the conscriptions that have been made for the army,—that it is difficult to conceive how the people are ever to be pacified or governed under the present order of things.

The Syrians are a very different race of people from the Egyptians, and the natural face of their country favours the determined spirit of opposition which they evince towards the present Government, as they find shelter in the mountains, which are not easy of access to regular troops; and as a last resource, many fall back upon the Desert, rather than submit, depending on a future day for a favourable opportunity to return.

A continuance of this state of things must soon depopulate the country of its Mussulman inhabitants; and unless the Government establish some system of colonization, or unless they afford encouragement either to Christians or Jews, the land will literally be left without inhabitants to cultivate it.

Her Majesty's Vice-Consul at Jaffa informs me, that a French gun-brig, came to an anchor off the town on the 10th instant at sunset. The French Vice-Consul communicated with her commander, by going off in a boat. She got under weigh at sunrise the following morning, and is reported to have come from Beyrout, and to have returned there, calling in at Caiffa.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WM. I. YOUNG.

No. 331.

Mr. Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 7.)

My Lord, *Damascus, August* 30, 1839.

THE last despatch I had the honour of addressing your Lordship was under the 2nd instant.

Since then the measures taken by his Highness Ibrahim Pasha have tended to reduce the insurgents infesting the country north of this city. Ismael Bey, Governor of Aleppo, and the Caftan Bey arrived here, through that line of country, with a force of about 6,000 troops. The Emir Gewad, the Mutuali insurgent, was constrained to place himself in the hands of the Emir Bechir, who delivered him up to the local Government here, and he was decapitated with seven other of his adherents.

Ali Agha Hazneh Kealibi, an influential personage of this city and a favourite of Ibrahim Pasha, was put on his trial, convicted of conspiring against the Government here, and was publicly beheaded.

His Excellency Ismael Bey and the Caftan Bey have continued their march to the Haouran and Agloun districts. I hear the former is for the present tolerably quiet; but the inhabitants of the latter, comprising 200 villages, have taken arms, and refuse to pay any kind of taxes, furnish supplies, or acknowledge the Government. Ismael Bey, with his forces, have consequently proceeded there to reduce them to order.

In the other parts of the Damascus district I hear that the state of the country is perfectly tranquil.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) N. W. WERRY.

No. 332.

Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received October* 7.)

My Lord, *Aleppo, August* 24, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, for your Lordship's information, copy of a despatch I addressed Viscount Ponsonby, under the 13th instant, and by which your Lordship will perceive, that nothing whatever of any interest had transpired up to that period.

Since the date of the above despatch, I am unable to lay before your Lordship anything further of any interest.

His Excellency the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha and the Egyptian forces continue on the frontiers as heretofore. Everything remains in *statu quo*, and without any change or movement whatever on any point.

I am happy to be able to state to your Lordship, that this district is now quite tranquil, and the roads are again beginning to become free from the late malcontents that had infested them.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) F. H. S. WERRY.

Inclosure in No. 332.

Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Aleppo, August* 13, 1839.

I HAD last the honour of addressing your Lordship on the 23rd ultimo, and have now to inform you, that on the 28th of the same month, M. Caillier, Aide-de-camp of Marshal Soult, returned from Marash, and starts to-morrow for Latakia, for the purpose of proceeding by the Austrian steamer to Smyrna.

I learn that M. Caillier's mission to his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha has succeeded, his Highness having immediately issued orders for the army not to advance beyond Marash, at which place he still remains, although preparations have been made here for his reception.

The army continues to occupy the frontiers between Aintab and Marash, and the force sent to take possession of Orfa has not advanced beyond that point.

His Excellency Solyman Pasha arrived here a short time ago from Aintab and Nezib, for change of air, and will remain until further orders from his Highness Ibrahim Pasha.

I am sorry it is still out of my power to give your Lordship any satisfactory account of the two Englishmen, Mr. Ainsworth and Mr. Russell, who, I hope and trust, may have retreated with Hafiz Pasha after the battle.

M. Périer, Aide-de-camp of Solyman Pasha, has delivered into my charge several papers found in the camp belonging to those gentlemen, which I have deposited in the Cancelleria until claimed.

According to Mr. Vice-Consul Hays' last reports, his district, as well as the mountains of Giaour-Dagh and those extending to the Defile of the Taurus, are for the moment apparently tranquil.

I can also report the Aleppo district in the same state, since the departure of his Excellency Ismael Bey, the Governor of this place, for the purpose of chastising the rebels who had committed many robberies and murders in different parts between Aleppo and Damascus. He is now disarming the population in that route; and the road to Latakia, which a short time since was very dangerous, is now perfectly safe.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) F. H. S. WERRY.

No. 333.

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston—(*Received October* 10.)

(Extract.) *Paris, October* 7, 1839.

UNDERSTANDING that General Sébastiani had informed his Government that the propositions of M. de Brunnow were declined by Her Majesty's Government, I called on Marshal Soult this morning, who informed me in fact, that he had received a despatch from London, in which his Excellency General Sébastiani stated, that Her Majesty's Government had informed M. de Brunnow, that the propositions of which he had been the bearer, having been considered inadmissible by the French Government, Her Majesty's Government, in consideration of the relations subsisting between the two countries, had not been able to accept them, but had made counter-propositions to the Russian Government, which M. de Brunnow had accepted *ad referendum.*

I do not think that General Sébastiani had entered into any detailed explanation as to what these propositions were; but I could gather from Marshal Soult, that, as far as he understood them, there were points therein from which he disagreed.

I need not say, that being myself as yet uninformed of what had taken place, I only listened on this subject to Marshal Soult's observations.

The Marshal then informed me, that your Lordship had also, in the conversation which General Sébastiani was reporting, alluded to the territorial division between the Viceroy and the Sultan, and had admitted that Her Majesty's Government might consent to the Pachalic of St. Jean d'Acre being annexed to the hereditary government of Egypt, the fortress of St. Jean d'Acre being excepted therefrom, and consigned to the guardianship of the Porte.

I said to the Marshal, that if such had been the conduct of Her Majesty's Government, I trusted that the French Government seeing how desirous Her Majesty's Government were of maintaining the alliance and good understanding which had so long prevailed between the two countries, would itself act in a similar spirit, and meet your Lordship by concessions similar to those which you had made.

The Marshal said, that undoubtedly he was sensible to your Lordship's conciliatory conduct, and that he should be most desirous to imitate it; but that with regard to St. Jean d'Acre, there was no power capable of taking it from Mehemet Ali; that, if even in the hands of a simple Pasha, it might resist any army in Europe for three years; and that, therefore, he could not, as he should explain to General Sébastiani, agree with your Lordship in this particular.

I then asked the Marshal if there were any other concessions different from those opinions which the French Government had lately expressed, which he might now be disposed to make; and how he felt as to the proposition which I understood had been suggested by General Sébastiani, for cutting Syria into two divisions, and giving the lower division, which would be formed by a line drawn from Damascus to Beyrout, to Mehemet Ali?

He said, that he had never heard from General Sébastiani of such propositions, and that he did not think Mehemet Ali would accede to them; that for his own part, he laid a great stress upon Adana; that Adana was most important, as connected with the passes of the Taurus, &c. I then said, that Adana had been previously mentioned, but that I now hoped that the French Government, considering what your Lordship was reported to have said with respect to the Pashalic of St. Jean d'Acre, departing thereby from your original idea, would also, and of its own part, make some similar concession.

To this the Marshal only replied by saying, that he had sent his propositions to Vienna, and that he must await the answer they would receive from that Court.

In continuing the conversation, the Marshal observed, that as to measures of coercion, if the Cabinets were once agreed as to the extent of territory to be allotted to the Viceroy, they would be agreed as to the mode of enforcing their opinion, and that the Cabinet of France would go with the other Cabinets in this part of the question: but that all considerations as to measures of coercion must follow after a territorial arrangement. This language arrives at the same result as before, since, if such a territorial arrangement as Mehemet Ali will agree to, be decided upon, all measures of coercion fall to the ground; and nothing as yet has happened to make me change my constant conviction, that France will not agree to any territorial arrangement that Mehemet Ali is not likely to accept. Here is the essence of the whole question. The Government, as a Government, are not perhaps deeply concerned as to whether the Pasha of Egypt would be content with little or much, and will not urge him to contend for the latter rather than the former; but the nation having a decided predilection for this personage, the Government will hardly dare to force his acceptance of the little, if he persist in struggling for the much. But Mehemet Ali, in what he contends for, will be guided by a consideration of the means for depriving him of it; every thing that intimidates him, and inclines him to yield, will incline the French Government towards imposing upon him concessions which it would not begin by consenting to, or engaging for. The Union of England with the other Powers, or with a portion of the other Powers, will intimidate Mehemet Ali; and in the same proportion encourage France, which waits for emitting any decided opinion until one of the most important elements, out of which such opinion is to be formed, is brought in a clear shape before it. Up to such time, this Government will probably contend for conceding nearly all to Mehemet Ali, because it does not know that Mehemet Ali will yield anything. And this is remarkable, that while France has declared herself the partizan of Turkey, that basis of an arrangement which she has proposed, known of course to the papers,—as all things here are known,—has been at once considered by them all, as favourable to the very party against which the French began by entering the field. I send your Lordship, on this ground, the "Courrier" of this morning, which is not less worthy of notice, since it shows the editor knew of the decision of the English Cabinet when his article was written. This casual information may also be useful to your Lordship, as affording no light argument against the propositions which, put forward to support the Ottoman Empire against the Pasha, are taken up by all the Pasha's party, as favourable to him, and unfavourable to the Ottoman Empire.

If I have made myself clear about the Question of Egypt, I shall have explained to your Lordship my notion, that it is a question which, involving the dislike of the French Government to being engaged in hostile measures against Mehemet Ali, is to be dealt with by removing that apprehension. Every thing which tends to awe the one party to submission, will tend to strengthen the other as to the terms which it will join in exacting.

The interference of Russia, or rather her protection of the Porte, entered so much into the Affairs of Egypt, that it always afforded an excuse for not acting at Alexandria, by bringing forward the position of Constantinople. Independently of this, however, it was chiefly a question of *amour-propre*. The French Government do not so much fear what would really happen from a Russian force entering the Bosphorus, as what would be said of it: And if I may venture to write upon this subject, I would say that, were it desirable to frame any plan for engaging the co-operation of Russia in a manner compatible with the co-operation of France, the chief object to consider, would be the satisfaction of this Government as to the form of the proceeding; for as to the substance, they would be much less difficult.

Marshal Soult spoke to me again as to the idea of guaranteeing or protecting the existence and independence of the Porte for a certain time, which he seemed to object to, as being less than the general guarantee or protection we had already entered into. I stated to his Excellency the manner in which I viewed his proposition as contained in my last despatch; but I did not insist upon the subject, as I concluded that an arrangement of this kind would form part of the general propositions to which the Marshal alluded, and which I should better understand when I saw them together.

The decision of Her Majesty's Government not to accept M. de Brunnow's propositions, will have a favourable effect on the public opinion here, as to the general relations between the countries; but the effect it will have on the Oriental Question itself remains to be seen, and will much depend on the line which Austria takes in the present state of affairs.

No. 334.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 12.)

My Lord, *Vienna, September* 21, 1839.

COUNT FIQUELMONT communicated to me a report from the Austrian Consul at Alexandria, by which it appears, that Mehemet Ali has given orders to Ibrahim Pasha to recommence hostilities, and occupy as much of the Sultan's territories as his means will permit, unless peace should be concluded within a given time. The Count proposed to me to join in declaring to Mehemet Ali, that no advantages obtained by these means would alter his situation, as they would not receive the sanction of the Powers.

I had no difficulty in agreeing to this, and requested him to give me a copy of his instruction to the Internuncio, in order that there might be no difference in our language. This document I transmitted to Lord Ponsonby, with the request, that, after concert with his Colleagues, he would send the necessary orders to Her Majesty's Consul at Alexandria. Of this paper I inclose a copy. I have not failed upon this occasion to urge the adoption of stronger measures, but find nobody to act with. The French Ambassador has no powers, and is interdicted from doing anything against Mehemet Ali. The Russian Ambassador will not even discuss the affair, his Court referring everything to Constantinople.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

Inclosure in No. 334.

Count Fiquelmont to Baron de Stürmer.

M. le Baron, *Vienne, le Septembre*, 1839.

UN de vos rapports du 5 Septembre nous a donné des nouvelles d'Alexandrie en date du 26 Août, qui sont, comme vous le dites, M. le Baron, d'une nature alarmante; le rapport de M. Laurin annexé au votre, nous a fait connaître la résolution que paraissait vouloir prendre Méhémet Ali, de faire occuper par son Armée de Syrie autant de terrain en Asie Mineure qu'Ibrahim Pacha croirait pouvoir le faire. Le premier mobile de cette résolution a été la représentation que fit Ibrahim à son père combien il lui serait difficile, quand la mauvaise saison arriverait, de maintenir son armée concentrée à Marache et dans les environs; qu'il demandait donc l'autorisation de s'étendre et de profiter de la disposition favorable de beaucoup de populations qui lui envoyaient des députations pour demander d'être occupées par des troupes Egyptiennes; ce qui ne serait peut-être véritablement qu'un mouvement motivé par la nécessité de vivre, peut-être employé par Méhémet Ali comme un moyen d'en imposer à la Porte et de la forcer de souscrire à l'arrangement qu'il veut dicter. Ce calcul est naturel, nous pouvons donc l'admettre comme une chance qui va se présenter et que nous devons prendre en considération.

Si nous avions à disposer des forces Européennes qui sont dans le Levant, notre parti serait bientôt pris; nous assignerions les positions à prendre dans un ordre naturel; les rôles alors seraient bien vîte changés. Méhémet Ali se trouverait heureux d'accepter les conditions qu'on voudrait lui faire, car ce ne sont pas les forces qui manquent pour l'y forcer: mais les choses ne sont pas aussi simplement placées; et il n'y a pas unité de but pour toutes les Puissances, il n'y a donc pas le concert qui serait nécessaire pour atteindre celui qui leur est commun. Ce n'est pas à vous, à qui cette absence de concert rend la position si difficile, qu'il faut en dire les causes; vous êtes à la fois placé près des causes et des effets; le désir que nous avons c'est de venir au secours des embarras de votre position, car ce serait aussi venir au secours de la Porte.

La plus grande des difficultés de la situation est celle que les embarras qui se montrent à Constantinople ne peuvent disparaître que par le concert entre des points très-éloignés les uns des autres; il y faut donc du tems, et la Porte est pressée d'en finir; voilà le danger, et le seul danger, car nos correspondances nous donnent déjà la certitude que l'initiative d'une sage et noble modération fera cesser des jalousies que des imprudences pourraient si facilement rendre dangereuses pour tout le monde. Il ne nous reste donc plus qu'un tems très-court à traverser, pour voir s'établir un changement de position décisif en faveur de la Porte. Dans une pareille situation, nous devons désirer de voir éviter toutes les mesures qui, ne prouvant pas le concert le plus intime, exciteraient Méhémet Ali, sans le contenir. Il nous parait peu important que l'armée d'Ibrahim occupe un district de plus ou de moins en Asie Mineure; cela ne changera ni ne décidera la question. Le seul danger serait celui de le voir s'approcher assez près de Constantinople pour y susciter des troubles et pour y faire prendre aux forces Européennes des positions qui, pour défendre cette capitale, amèneraient par leur défaut de concert, des dangers d'une autre nature. Nous le regretterions d'autant plus que, nous le répétons à Votre Excellence, nous avons la certitude qu'une autre situation des choses va résulter des communications qui ont lieu entre les Cabinets. Mais avant que les instructions qu'ont reçues les Représentans des Puissances près de la Porte ne soient modifiées, et que des sentimens de confiance aient remplacé celui de la défiance, nous ne pouvons qu'en appeler à leur sagesse et les conjurer d'éviter toutes les mesures extrêmes; c'est ce que nous vous prions de faire si les évènemens devaient l'exiger. Nous persistons à croire qu'il serait sage de céder au vœu de la Porte elle-même et de faire prendre aux deux escadres une autre position que celle de rester en observation à l'entrée des Dardanelles. Nous croyons avec MM. les Amiraux, que faire paraître les escadres réunies devant Alexandrie sans que cette démonstration soit suivie d'aucun effet, serait compromettant; mais entre les deux positions, il en est une troisième intermédiaire qui donnerait aux escadres la possibilité d'agir selon tous les évènemens qui pourraient arriver, ce serait les parages de l'île de Rhodes, plus rapprochés des côtes de Syrie. Cette position agirait bien plus sur l'esprit de Méhémet Ali, car tout ce qui peut menacer les communications de l'Egypte avec son armée en Asie Mineure lui montrerait tous les dangers de cette position trop avancée, et ferait bien plus d'effet que l'apparition devant Alexandrie, qui, n'étant suivie d'aucun résultat, serait un triomphe pour lui.

Mais ceci, M. le Baron, est une opinion et rien de plus, puisqu'elle reste isolée. Nous devons donc chercher une mesure qui pourrait obtenir l'assentiment et la co-opération de nos Alliés. Les entretiens que nous avons eus ici avec MM. les Ambassadeurs nous ont montré la seule chose que nous puissions faire en attendant que de nouvelles instructions des Cours impriment à notre marche un caractère plus décidé.

Méhémet Ali est un homme qui a fait preuve de plus de sagacité qu'on n'en trouve ordinairement en Orient; on peut donc s'adresser à son intelligence avec la certitude d'être compris. Je vous prie donc, M. le Baron, de vouloir bien charger M. Laurin de lui parler de la manière suivante de sa situation.

Les fautes de la Porte et l'habileté qu'il a su mettre à en profiter, lui ont donné des forces supérieures; il peut en abuser; il peut dans le moment actuel enlever encore à la Porte de plus grands territoires; personne n'est là pour s'y opposer: il peut garder la flotte Ottomane; les Alliés du Sultan n'emploieront pas la force pour la reprendre, car sa destruction serait la suite probable du conflit.

Méhémet Ali peut donc s'il le veut se complaire dans la conviction et dans l'abus de la puissance matérielle ; les Puissances ne feront rien pour la combattre. L'Europe possède une arme plus forte contre Méhémet Ali, c'est, comme nous l'avons dit ailleurs, celle de son avenir. Que veut-il en effet? il ne cesse de répéter, que tout ce qu'il fait n'a d'autre but que celui de fonder l'avenir de sa famille. Croit-il peut-être que la haine personnelle qui l'anime contre Hosreff Pacha soit une bonne base à donner à l'établissement de sa famille ? A-t-il jamais vu un sentiment de cette nature fonder quelque chose de durable ? Plus il a fait d'efforts pour rapprocher l'Egypte de l'Europe, par son administration, par les arts et par le commerce ; plus il a dû apprendre, et mieux il comprendra, que la sanction de l'Europe est nécessaire à l'existence régulière et à la durée d'une position politique quelconque ; qu'il ne se trompe donc pas sur la nature de la supériorité de ses forces, elles ne suffisent pas pour lui donner l'avenir qu'il veut fonder. Si même le Sultan lui accordait toutes les concessions qu'il demande, elles ne suffiraient pas pour consolider sa position, car l'Europe ne la sanctionnerait pas. Il y a un siècle que Méhémet Ali, Chef de Musulmans révoltés, aurait pû fonder un nouvel Empire; il aurait existé dans cet état de séparation et d'isolement qui rendait alors l'Europe peu attentive à des évènemens de cette nature ; Méhémet Ali lui-même a voué sa vie à l'établissement d'un autre ordre de choses ; il a besoin, sous peine de passer comme un météore, de la sanction de l'Europe, et l'Europe ne sanctionnera que ce qui laissera intact le principe de la Souveraineté du Sultan. Si Méhémet Ali fonde l'espoir du succès de sa résistance sur la conviction qu'il parait avoir de la difficulté qu'auront les Puissances d'adopter de concert des mesures actives contre lui, il doit sentir qu'elles se mettraient facilement d'accord pour refuser leur sanction à un ordre de choses qu'elles trouveraient trop onéreux pour la Porte : une mesure négative n'est jamais difficile à prendre.

C'est à rendre cette position intelligible à Méhémet Ali que M. Laurin doit mettre tous ses soins ; nous ne doutons pas que les Agens des Puissances à Alexandrie ne soient autorisés à lui tenir le même langage.

Le but des Puissances après des évènemens aussi désastreux que ceux qui ont suivi la mort du Sultan Mahmoud, a été d'empêcher la Porte de souscrire, dans ce premier moment si difficile, à des conditions trop dangereuses pour son avenir, et de lui donner le tems de reprendre confiance et courage. La moindre des obligations morales que nous avons contractée envers le Sultan, est donc celle que l'arrangement que fera la Porte ne soit au moins pas plus désavantageux que celui dont nous avons empêché la conclusion ; et si la Porte se croyait forcée par sa position intérieure à souscrire à celui que nous avons déjà repoussé, ou à en accepter un plus mauvais encore, vous pouvez, M. le Baron, l'instruire de la déclaration que nous faisons faire à Méhémet Ali, qu'un tel arrangement n'obtiendra jamais la sanction de l'Europe. Les Puissances abandonneront cette position à toutes les incertitudes toujours inséparables de ce qui n'a pour base, ni la nécessité, ni le droit, ni la justice ; nous disons la nécessité, parce que nous ne tenons pas une ambition qui serait sans mesure, pour une nécessité.

L'avènement au trône du Sultan Abdoul Medjid, si paisible et si régulier au milieu de tous les désastres du moment, est une preuve qu'il existe encore pour son Empire un principe de vie bien supérieur à tout ce qui existe dans les camps Egyptiens. Méhémet Ali n'a donc pas pour lui ce principe de nécessité que son esprit Oriental aime quelquefois invoquer sous le nom de fatalisme.

Vous voudrez bien, en donnant connaissance de cette dépêche à MM. vos Collègues, vous entendre avec eux pour lui donner exécution ; si, contre notre attente, vous ne trouviez pas un concert unanime, vous n'en prescrirez pas moins à M. Laurin le langage que nous avons indiqué, et vous en instruiriez la Porte. Nous devons vous prévenir que M. le Ministre de Prusse a été obligé de s'absenter pour deux semaines pour une affaire de famille pressante ; nous ne doutons pas que M. le Comte de Königsmarck trouvera dans l'unanimité des Représentans des Puissances ici un motif suffisant pour se réunir à la démarche à laquelle vous voudrez bien l'inviter.

Recevez, &c.,

(Signé) FIQUELMONT.

(Translation.)

Count Fiquelmont to Baron de Stürmer.

Monsieur le Baron, *Vienna, September* , 1839.

ONE of your reports of the 5th of September has brought us intelligence from Alexandria of the 26th of August, which is, as you say, M. le Baron, of an alarming nature; the report of M. Laurin which is annexed to yours, has made us acquainted with the resolution which Mehemet Ali appeared disposed to take to cause his Syrian Army to occupy as much territory in Asia Minor as Ibrahim Pasha might think practicable. The primary cause of this resolution was the representation made by Ibrahim to his father, showing how difficult it would be for him, when the bad season should arrive, to maintain his army concentrated at Marash, and in its neighbourhood; and demanding for that reason permission to extend his line, and to profit by the favourable disposition of the population of various districts who had sent deputations asking to be occupied by the Egyptian troops; which perhaps would be in reality nothing more than a movement occasioned by the necessity of finding provisions, possibly made use of by Mehemet Ali as a means of influencing the Porte, and of obliging it to accept the arrangement which it is his desire to dictate. This calculation is natural, and we may therefore consider it as a chance which is about to occur, and which we must take into our consideration.

If we had at our disposal the European forces which are in the Levant, our line would soon be taken; we should assign the positions to be taken in their natural order; the parts would then be very soon changed. Mehemet Ali would be happy to accept the conditions which might be offered to him, for there is no want of force to compel him; but matters are not in so simple a position; and there is no unity of purpose among all the Powers, and consequently not the concert necessary for the attainment of the object common to all. It is not necessary to explain to you, who are thereby placed in so difficult a position, the causes of this want of concert; you are placed at once near to the causes of it and to its effects; what we desire is, to aid you in your embarrassment, for that would be equally to aid the Porte.

The principal difficulty of the position is, that the embarrassments which have occurred at Constantinople cannot be removed except by concert between points very far distant from one another; time is therefore required, and the Porte is anxious to finish; this is the danger, the only danger, for our accounts already afford us the certainty that the very adoption of a wise and noble moderation will cause the jealousies to cease, which want of prudence might so easily render dangerous for all the world. Very little time accordingly remains to be passed, before we shall see a decisive change of position take place in favour of the Porte. In such a situation we must desire to see all measures avoided, which, not being indicative of the most thorough concert, might excite Mehemet Ali without controuling him. It appears to us of little importance whether the army of Ibrahim occupies a district more or less in Asia Minor; this will neither change nor decide the question. The only danger would be, that of seeing him approach near enough to Constantinople to excite disturbance there, and to cause the European forces to take up positions for the purpose of defending the Capital, which might, in consequence of their want of concert, produce dangers of another kind. We should regret this the more, inasmuch as, I repeat it to your Excellency, we are certain that another position of affairs will result from the communications now taking place between the Cabinets. But until the instructions received by the Representatives of the Powers at the Porte shall have been modified, and sentiments of confidence shall have replaced sentiments of distrust, we can only appeal to their prudence, and conjure them to avoid all extreme measures; it is this we request you to do, should events require it. We continue to believe, that it would be wise to accede to the wish of the Porte itself, and to cause the two fleets to occupy a different position from that of observation at the entrance of the Dardanelles. We agree with the Admirals, that the appearance of the united squadrons before Alexandria without such demonstration being attended by any result, would be discreditable; but between the two positions there is a third, halfway, which would afford the squadrons the means of acting according to the events which might occur: this would be the vicinity of the island of Rhodes, more contiguous to the coasts of Syria. This position would exercise a much greater influence on the mind of Mehemet Ali, inasmuch as everything likely to endanger the communications of Egypt with his army in Asia Minor, would show him all the dangers of a too advanced position, and would have a much greater effect than the appearance off Alexandria, which, being followed by no result, would be a triumph for him.

This, however, M. le Baron, is merely an opinion, and nothing more, because it stands alone. We must therefore seek for a measure which might obtain the assent and the co-operation of our Allies. The conversations which we have here had with the Ambassadors, have shown us all that we can do until new instructions from the Courts shall have given to our proceeding a more decided character.

Mehemet Ali is a man who has proved himself to possess more sagacity than is usually found in the East; it is, therefore, possible to appeal to his understanding with the certainty of being understood. I therefore request you, M. le Baron, to have the goodness to instruct M. Laurin to speak to him in the following manner of his position.

The faults committed by the Porte, and the cleverness with which he has availed himself of them, have given him a superiority of strength; he may abuse it; he may at this moment deprive the Porte of still greater territories; no one is present to prevent it; he may keep the Ottoman fleet; the Allies of the Sultan will not employ force to recover it, for its destruction would be the probable consequence of the conflict.

Mehemet Ali may, therefore, if he should see fit, plume himself in the consciousness and in the abuse of material force; the Powers will do nothing to oppose that force. Europe possesses a more powerful arm against Mehemet Ali, and that is, as we have elsewhere said, his future position. What, in fact, is his object? He ceases not to repeat, that everything he does has no other object but to secure the future position of his family. Does he, peradventure, imagine that the personal enmity which he feels towards Hosrew Pasha, is a good foundation on which to establish his family? Has he ever seen a sentiment of this nature establish anything durable? The greater have been his efforts to assimilate Egypt to Europe by his administration, by the arts, and by commerce, the more must he have learnt, and the better will he understand, that the sanction of Europe is necessary for the regular existence, and for the permanency of every political position; let him therefore not deceive himself with respect to the nature of the superiority of his forces; they will not suffice to bestow on him the future position which he desires to found. Even if the Sultan were to agree to all the concessions he demands, they would not suffice to consolidate his position, for Europe would not sanction it. A century ago Mehemet Ali, Chief of the revolted Mussulmans, might have founded a new Empire. It would have existed in that state of separation and isolation which at that time rendered Europe little attentive to events of that nature; Mehemet Ali has himself devoted his life to the creation of a different order of things: he requires, unless he is to pass away like a meteor, the sanction of Europe, and Europe will only sanction that which leaves the principle of the Sovereignty of the Sultan untouched. If Mehemet Ali grounds his hope of the success of his resistance on the conviction which he appears to entertain of the difficulty which the Powers will find in adopting, by common consent, active measures against him, he must be aware that they would easily agree in refusing their sanction to a state of things, which they should find too burdensome for the Porte; there is never any difficulty in adopting a negative measure.

M. Laurin should use his best endeavours to render this position intelligible to Mehemet Ali; we do not doubt, that the Agents of the Powers at Alexandria will be authorized to hold the same language to him.

The object of the Powers, after events so disastrous as those which followed the death of Sultan Mahmoud, was to prevent the Porte from agreeing, in the first moment of such difficulty, to conditions too dangerous to its future position, and to give it time to resume confidence and courage. The least, therefore, of the moral obligations which we have contracted towards the Sultan is, that the arrangement to be made by the Porte shall, at all events, not be more disadvantageous than the one, the conclusion of which we prevented; and if the Porte should think itself obliged, by its internal position, to subscribe to the one already rejected by us, or to accept one still worse, you may, M. le Baron, make it acquainted with the declaration which we are causing to be made to Mehemet

Ali, that such an arrangement will never obtain the sanction of Europe. The Powers will abandon such a position to all the uncertainties which are inseparable from that which is grounded, neither on necessity, nor on right, nor on justice; we say necessity, because we do not hold unmeasured ambition to be a necessity.

The accession of Sultan Abdul Medjid to the throne in so peaceable and orderly a manner in the midst of all the disasters of the moment, proves, that a principle of vitality is still inherent in his Empire, greatly superior to anything that exists in the Egyptian camps. Mehemet Ali has not therefore in his favour that principle of necessity which his Oriental spirit is fain at times to invoke under the name of fatalism.

You will have the goodness, in communicating this despatch to your Colleagues, to come to an understanding with them, in order to carry it into effect; if contrary to our expectation you should not find unanimous concurrence, you will, notwithstanding, prescribe to M. Laurin the language which I have pointed out to you, and you will inform the Porte thereof. I must acquaint you, that the Prussian Minister has been obliged to absent himself for a fortnight, owing to some family business of importance; we do not doubt that Count Königsmarck will find, in the unanimity of the Representatives of the Powers in this capital, a sufficient reason for joining in the measure to which you will have the goodness to invite him.

Receive, &c.,
(Signed) FIQUELMONT.

No. 335.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 12.)

My Lord, *Vienna, October* 3, 1839.

THE French Government have made to that of Austria the same proposition for the settlement of the affairs of the East which they have made to Her Majesty's Government.

Count Fiquelmont considers the immediate restitution of Adana and the defiles of the Taurus as a great object to the Porte. He also considers the division of Syria into Pashalics to be conferred at Mehemet Ali's death upon his younger children, as ensuring the reversion of that country to the Sultan; but he thinks that Candia ought to be immediately given up by Mehemet Ali, and that France may probably be induced to extend her proposal to that amount.

The answer of Austria will consist, 1st, Of an inquiry whether France is prepared to enforce her demands, in case Mehemet Ali should decline agreeing to them; and if this is answered satisfactorily, she will then renew the declaration of her concurrence in the smallest amount of concessions by the Porte upon which the Two Powers shall agree.

The instructions, however, to Count Appony and to Prince Esterhazy, will be to favour the conclusion of the agreement traced above. Austria inclines to this course from several reasons. She thinks that it is a great object to finish quickly. She conceives that under this arrangement the Sultan will ultimately inherit the whole possessions of Mehemet Ali, and that in the mean time the Ottoman Empire will be saved from danger.

I should add, that Count Fiquelmont holds that it would give strength and vitality to that Empire, if the intelligence of Mehemet Ali and the Mahommedan feeling still existing in Egypt could be rallied to it, and combined in its defence.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

No. 336.

Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, October* 16, 1839.

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch, of the 3rd of October, I have to state, that it would, no doubt, be a great source of strength to the Turkish Empire, if Mehemet Ali would, in the character of a faithful subject, exert all his energies, and apply all his means, for the purpose of supporting the power and authority of the Sultan; but it is manifest that Mehemet Ali's object is, and long has been, not to support the power and authority of the Sultan, but to extend his own power and authority to the detriment of the Sultan; and no real support can rationally be expected for the Sultan's throne, from a person placed in the situation in which Mehemet Ali stands, and actuated by the motives by which he is inspired.

It is further a great mistake to suppose that there is more Mahommedan feeling in Egypt, than in those parts of the Turkish Empire which are under the direct authority of the Sultan. For, on the contrary, Mehemet Ali has in many ways gone further to break down Mahommedan ascendancy than the late Sultan did; and, as an instance, there are many more Christians employed in offices of emolument and command under Mehemet Ali than in the other parts of the Turkish Empire. It is indeed remarkable how contradictory are the assertions which the partizans of Mehemet Ali are driven to have recourse to; for while at one time and for one purpose they represent him as the great champion of Mahommedan feeling, at another time, and for another purpose, they extol him as the subduer of Mahommedan prejudice, and as a man who has had energy enough to coerce that religious fanaticism which rendered the Mahommedans so overbearing and intolerable to the Christians in all the transactions and intercourse of life.

It is difficult, moreover, to see by what process of reasoning it is possible to arrive at the conclusion, that if the whole of Syria is now left in the possession of Mehemet Ali, upon the condition that at his death it is to be divided into Pashalics for the benefit of his younger children, such an arrangement would secure the reversion of all Syria to the direct authority of the Sultan. For Ibrahim, at the death of Mehemet, would stand precisely in the same situation in which Mehemet now stands; and it is not apparent why Ibrahim should then be more willing than Mehemet now is, to relinquish Syria. But as he would then have the entire command of the resources, military and financial, of all the countries which Mehemet now governs, he would be as strong then as he is now, and just as able to refuse to evacuate Syria. Nothing, then, would be more easy than for Ibrahim, on the death of Mehemet, to persuade the younger children to agree to some other arrangement, to accept some different provision, and to renounce their claim to the Syrian Pashalics; and thus the proposed arrangement would probably have just the opposite effect to that which is supposed.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 337.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received October* 18.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, September* 22, 1839.

ADMIRAL STOPFORD wished that the Porte should be informed, that a violent wind from the south might force the British squadron to anchor under the White Cliffs, and that if it so happened, it must not be considered as an unfriendly act.

Inclosure 1 in No. 337.

Admiral Sir Robert Stopford to Viscount Ponsonby.

"*Princess Charlotte,*" *Besika Bay,*
September 11, 1839.

My Lord,

AS the season is fast approaching, in which this anchorage at Besika Bay will be no longer safe for so many large ships, I beg leave to acquaint your Excellency, that in the event of any bad weather coming on which may endanger the squadron under my command, it is my intention to run up the

Dardanelles off the place known by the name of "the White Cliffs," where I understand the ships may anchor in safety.

But if political circumstances do not require the presence of the squadron at Besika Bay, I should recommend its removal to Vourla before the second week in October. It is, moreover, to be taken into consideration, that owing to the extensive marshy grounds bordering upon the sea coast, this anchorage is proverbially unhealthy after the rains begin.

In the course of a month the ships will require a supply of provisions, for the conveyance of which I must send two ships of the line to Malta.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) ROBERT STOPFORD.

Inclosure 2 in No. 337.

Viscount Ponsonby to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford.

(Extract.) *Therapia, September* 19, 1839.

YOU are already acquainted with the arrangement that the Eastern Affairs should be settled at Vienna, and that Lord Beauvale is directed to correspond with you.

I sent to Vienna your letter, in which you speak of bringing the fleet to the "White Cliffs." I think it inconvenient to speak of that movement to the Porte, without having the authorization of Her Majesty's Government, or that of Lord Beauvale from Vienna.

No. 338.

The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 21.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October* 12, 1839.

A COURIER has arrived here from Paris, and I am informed that he has brought instructions to the Baron de Barante, to propose this arrangement of the Turco-Egyptian Question: that the Viceroy of Egypt shall continue to hold Syria, with the exception of the district of Adana and the defiles of the Taurus, which are to be restored to the Porte, together with Candia.

After the death of Mehemet Ali, the Pashalic of Egypt to revert to one of his sons, and that of Syria to another.

As Count Nesselrode has gone to the Emperor at Czarskoe-Celo, I am unable to inform your Lordship how he received this proposition; but I cannot think it possible that the Imperial Cabinet will accede to it.

Baron Brunnow's report of his communications with your Lordship have given great satisfaction. Count Nesselrode showed me a long despatch from that Minister, in which he expressed regret only at the British Cabinet's not having yet decided upon a course of action to be immediately adopted.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) CLANRICARDE.

No. 339.

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 21.)

My Lord, *Paris, October* 18, 1839.

COUNT MEDEM showed me to-day the communications he had received from M. de Brunnow, and which contained, first, M. de Brunnow's general account of his mission, with reasons why it had been especially directed to Great Britain, which Count Medem read to Marshal Soult.

Secondly, M. de Brunnow's account of his conversation with your Lordship.

Thirdly, The plan, which he, Count Brunnow, had proposed as the means of imposing suitable conditions on the Viceroy.

In both of the two former communications, M. de Brunnow spoke in a fair and sensible manner of the spirit of friendliness with which his propositions to the British Government had been received, as well as the difficulties which attended the entire acceptance of them. Count Medem, at the same time, informed me that he had heard from his brother at Alexandria, that M. Cochelet had officially informed Mehemet Ali, on the part of the French Government, that that Government would never join in employing coercive measures against him. I think, however, that Count Medem was misinformed as to any official communication of this kind having been made to the Pasha.

I should observe, that in the communications which I have had with the Marshal, I have remarked the adoption of a more conciliatory and less positive tone than heretofore; but I have never heard anything inducing me to believe that the French Government will depart from its fixed resolution (however differently that resolution may be expressed) of not joining in any plan of arrangement which it thought Mehemet Ali would resist, and which, consequently, it might be called upon to enforce.

As far as this general resolution is concerned, I still think no alteration likely to take place; but as to the arrangement itself, I believe no positive decision is come to, because a variety of causes on which the strength of Mehemet's resistance depends are still undetermined. The opinion of Austria on these matters is, I believe, the circumstance now especially expected; and on that opinion, which the French Government thinks will be in favour of its own notions, though without any reason of which I am acquainted for such anticipations, the bias of the French Cabinet will depend.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 340.

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 21.)

My Lord, *Paris, October* 18, 1839.

IN a conversation I had a day or two since with Marshal Soult on the state of affairs at Alexandria, he informed me that he learnt from M. Cochelet, that Mehemet Ali was more determined than ever on other matters, but that with regard to Hosrew's dismissal he would probably abandon his original pretensions.

I bring this more especially to your Lordship's attention, having just heard from Count Medem, that the Viceroy had recently stated to Count Alexander Medem, that he entertained great hopes of arriving at a favourable termination of existing difficulties, through an amicable arrangement between himself and the Porte.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 341.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 22.)

My Lord, *Vienna, October* 14, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a despatch from Lord Ponsonby.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) BEAUVALE.

Inclosure in No. 341.

Viscount Ponsonby to Lord Beauvale.

My Lord, *Therapia, September* 30, 1839.

I RECEIVED this day your Excellency's despatch dated Vienna, September 19, 1839, and inclosing copy of Count Fiquelmont's despatch to Baron de Stürmer. I have seen the Baron, and agreed to do whatever he thinks proper to be done on the points to which your Lordship refers; and I will, when a decision is taken, apply in your name to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, to forward the orders to the British Consul-General at Alexandria.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 342.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 17.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, September* 21, 1839.

MR. THURBURN, lately Her Majesty's Consul at Alexandria, called upon me this day. His object was to learn my opinions respecting Egypt, and I thought it right to state them very strongly, because he is one of the most vehement of the supporters of Mehemet Ali in his pretensions. I thought it not unadvisable to show him that I was not misled by the fallacies upon which it has been, and is attempted to establish a belief in the power of the Pasha of Egypt, and in the necessity for giving him Syria, &c., &c., in order to obtain security for Turkey against Russian dominion. He was obliged to admit that the settlement he desired should be made, is the partition of the Turkish Empire, and to argue in support of the good effects of that measure.

No. 343.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 22.)

My Lord, *Therapia, September* 30, 1839.

I INCLOSE copy of an official Note I this night received from the Sublime Porte. It will relieve any doubts or difficulties at Vienna, arising from uncertainty as to the desires of the Sublime Porte.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 343.

Note from the Sublime Porte to the Representatives of the Five Powers.

(Traduction.)

DANS la Note que la Sublime Porte a eu l'honneur d'adresser à Messieurs les Représentans de Cinq Puissances, le 13 Djémadi-ul-akhir (22 Août) dernier, elle a exprimé le désir que, puisque les Grandes Puissances s'étaient chargées de l'arrangement de la Question Egyptienne, elles voulussent bien aviser aux moyens de faire rentrer Méhémet Ali dans ses devoirs, en le décidant à restituer la Flotte Impériale, à renoncer à ses prétentions exagérées, et à attendre l'effet des dispositions qui seraient concertées sous la médiation des Cinq Cabinets et sanctionnées par Sa Hautesse.

Depuis lors la Sublime Porte a constamment reçu des preuves des dispositions bienveillantes des Cinq Cours à son égard; aussi est-elle prête

à rendre pleine justice à leur bonne volonté, tout comme elle est loin de méconnaître les difficultés de plus d'un genre qu'elles peuvent avoir rencontrées dans l'exécution de leurs généreux desseins.

Néanmoins, plus d'un mois s'est écoulé depuis la remise de la dite Note, sans que l'accord qui, grâces à la Divine Providence, s'est établi entre les Cinq Cours, se soit manifesté par aucun acte positif propre à remplir le but qu'elles se sont proposé. Les Hautes Puissances Médiatrices sont trop connues par leur sagesse et leur équité pour qu'elles ne sentissent pas à quel point il est désirable pour le Gouvernement de Sa Hautesse de voir cesser au plus tôt un état de choses pernicieux pour l'Empire Ottoman, et qui, en y jetant tous les jours de nouveaux germes de trouble et de désordre, menace de compromettre la paix du monde.

L'avènement au Trône du Sultan Abdoul Medjid a été signalé par un grand acte de clémence qui accordait à Méhémet Ali le pardon de ses fautes passées, ainsi que l'hérédité de ses enfans pour l'Egypte. Le Pacha a payé ce bienfait avec la plus noire ingratitude. Tout le monde sait qu'il a non seulement refusé de restituer la Flotte Impériale, qui lui a été livrée par la plus lâche des trahisons, mais qu'il cherche à révolutionner les pays soumis au Sultan, et qu'il agit en général d'une manière hostile envers la Sublime Porte. Toutefois, Sa Hautesse, persévérant dans ses intentions généreuses, est encore prête à accorder à Méhémet Ali l'hérédité à ses enfans pour l'Egypte, ainsi que le pardon pour tout ce qu'il a commis jusqu'à ce jour d'inconvenant et de criminel. C'est à ces conditions que le Gouvernement de Sa Hautesse sera toujours disposé à souscrire à un arrangement avec ce vassal. La conduite de celui-ci après la conclusion d'un pareil arrangement décidera à quel point il est digne de faveurs ultérieures, lesquelles cependant ne sauraient être que l'effet spontané de la clémence souveraine.

En communiquant tout ceci à Monsieur l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre, la Sublime Porte le prie de vouloir bien exprimer à son Gouvernement l'espoir qu'elle nourrit de voir les Hautes Puissances Médiatrices prendre au plus tôt les moyens que, dans leur équité, elles jugeront propres à amener l'Affaire Egyptienne à une solution satisfaisante.

(Signé) RECHID.

Constantinople, le 19 *Redjeb,* 1255.
(28 *Septembre,* 1839.)

(Translation.)

Note from the Sublime Porte to the Representatives of the Five Powers.

IN the Note which the Sublime Porte had the honour to address to the Representatives of the Five Powers, on the 13th Djémadi-ul-akhir (22nd August last), it expressed a desire that, since the Great Powers had taken upon themselves the settlement of the Egyptian Question, they would be pleased to devise means for making Mehemet Ali return to his duty, by inducing him to restore the Imperial fleet, to abandon his exaggerated pretensions, and to await the result of the arrangements which might be concerted under the mediation of the Five Cabinets, and sanctioned by His Highness.

Since that time the Sublime Porte has constantly received proofs of the kind feelings of the Five Courts towards it; it is therefore ready to do full justice to their good will, while it is far from being unmindful of the difficulties of more than one description which they may have encountered in the execution of their generous intentions.

Nevertheless, more than a month has elapsed since the delivery of the abovementioned Note, without the concord which, thanks to Divine Providence, has been established between the Five Courts, having been made manifest by any positive act calculated to accomplish the object which they have had in view. The High Mediating Powers are too well known for their wisdom and equity not to feel how desirable it is for His Highness' Government that the earliest possible termination should be put to a state of things which is injurious to the Ottoman Empire, and which, by constantly sowing fresh seeds of confusion and disorder, threatens to endanger the peace of the world.

The accession of the Sultan Abdul Medjid to the throne was distinguished

by a great act of clemency which granted to Mehemet Ali pardon for his past faults, as well as hereditary succession for his children in Egypt. The Pasha has repaid this kindness with the blackest ingratitude. All the world knows that he has not only refused to restore the Imperial fleet, which was given up to him through the basest treachery, but that he seeks to revolutionize the countries subject to the Sultan, and that he acts generally in a hostile manner towards the Sublime Porte. However, His Highness, persevering in his generous intentions, is still ready to grant to Mehemet Ali hereditary succession for his children in Egypt, as well as pardon for all the improper and criminal acts which he has hitherto committed. Upon these conditions His Highness' Government will always be disposed to consent to an arrangement with this vassal. The conduct of the latter, after the conclusion of such an arrangement, will determine to what extent he may be worthy of further favours, which favours, however, can only be the spontaneous result of the sovereign clemency.

In communicating, the above to the English Ambassador, the Sublime Porte requests him to have the goodness to express to his Government the hope which it cherishes, that the High Mediating Powers will take, as soon as possible, the steps which, in their justice, they shall consider calculated to bring the Egyptian affair to a satisfactory solution.

(Signed) RECHID.

Constantinople, Redjeb 19, 1255 (*September* 28, 1839).

No. 344.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 22.)

My Lord, *Therapia, September* 30, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to inclose a Report of an Official Message I have just received from his Excellency Rechid Pasha, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I will report my reply after having communicated with the French Ambassador.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 344.

M. Frederic Pisani to Viscount Ponsonby.

(Extrait.) *Péra, ce* 29 *Septembre*, 1839.

J'AI l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de Votre Excellence, le message officiel dont Réchid Pacha vient de me charger pour elle. Le Pacha m'a parlé dans les termes suivans:

“ Nous entendons dire que les flottes combinées qui se trouvent à présent à Bésika Baie, se disposent à se rapprocher des Dardanelles pour être à l'abri des vents. Le Pacha d'Egypte s'obstine à garder notre flotte que la plus lâche des trahisons lui a livrée ; il fait mine de rejeter les propositions qui lui seront faites par les Puissances amies. Pour ces raisons, la Sublime Porte pense que les flottes combinées serviraient mieux sa cause en se portant sur Alexandrie ; mais la Porte ne veut pas non plus que les flottes combinées s'éloignent trop de ses eaux, et elle voudrait que les flottes eussent à choisir pour leur station, soit le port de Smyrne, soit celui de Vourla, ou enfin quelque rade sur la côte, près de Tchesmé.”

(Translation.)

M. Frederic Pisani to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Pera, September* 29, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to communicate to your Excellency the official message which Rechid Pasha has charged me to deliver to you. The Pasha spoke to me in the following terms:—

"We understand that the combined fleets, which are at present at Besika Bay, are preparing to approach the Dardanelles for shelter. The Pasha of Egypt persists in keeping our fleet, which has been given up to him through the basest treachery; he threatens to reject the proposals which shall be made to him by the friendly Powers. For these reasons, the Sublime Porte thinks that the combined fleets would serve its cause better by going towards Alexandria; but the Porte does not wish that they should remove too far from the Turkish waters, and it would be glad that the fleets should choose for their station, either the port of Smyrna, or that of Vourla, or, in short, any roadstead on the coast, near to Tchesmé."

Inclosure 2 in No. 344.

Viscount Ponsonby to M. Frederic Pisani.

Sir, *Therapia, September* 30, 1839.

I BEG you will inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that having this day received his Excellency's official message of the 29th instant, I will immediately forward it to my Government.

His Excellency is acquainted with the fact that the British squadron has been stationed where it is by the order of the British Government, for the sole purpose of securing the Sublime Porte against the occurrence of any danger; and his Excellency may also know, that by a recent arrangement made for ensuring unity of action amongst the Great Powers, the Admiral is to receive his orders from the British Ambassador at Vienna. This being the case, his Excellency will see that I have not authority to direct the Admiral, but that I have forthwith adopted the only means within my power to demonstrate my desire to perform whatever his Excellency demands of me.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 345.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 22.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, September* 30, 1839.

I INCLOSE copy of a letter from Mehemet Ali to the Grand Vizier. It arrived here by the French steamer on the 24th, and is said to have been written about the 15th of the month.

The inclosed letter marks that Mehemet Ali had begun to feel his own fault in attacking Hosrew in the way he did, and that he may not be disinclined to maintain him in his post.

Inclosure in No. 345.

Mehemet Ali to the Grand Vizier Hosrew Pasha.—(Received at Constantinople, September 24, 1839.)

(Traduction.)

J'AI eu l'honneur de recevoir la lettre responsive de votre Altesse, dans laquelle, en me disant qu'elle n'a d'autre but que le bien du service, elle m'exhorte à réunir nos efforts, et à tâcher d'arriver au bonheur tant dans cette vie que dans l'autre. Dans cette même lettre, votre Altesse m'annonce qu'elle n'a pas encore pu arranger les affaires du moment conformément au dicton suivant: "On aime pourtant toujours à servir les intérêts de ses compatriotes." Très-illustre Seigneur! j'ai été très-étonné de voir qu'après avoir amené l'affaire à ce point (comme vous le savez par la correspondance qui a eu lieu jusqu'ici), vous veuillez tout-à-coup servir les intérêts de vos compatriotes.

Lorsque feu le Sultan Mahmoud, de glorieuse mémoire, a daigné promettre de m'accorder à perpétuité, l'Egypte ainsi que la Province de Saïda et Tripoli, j'ai humblement et respectueusement décliné cette proposition, en le suppliant de m'accorder à perpétuité, la totalité des provinces et districts placés sous mon administration. Votre Altesse savait parfaitement tout ceci, et cependant, dès son avènement au poste de Grand Vizir, elle s'est bornée à m'offrir seulement l'Egypte. En outre, votre Altesse, qui avait été Gouverneur d'Egypte durant dix-huit mois, connaissait très-bien à quel point on respecte parmi les Arabes le principe d'intercession. Néanmoins, lorsque son Excellence le Grand-Amiral Ahmed Pacha est venu ici, vous n'avez pas jugé à propos d'agir avec douceur, et de dire: "Un de mes Collègues s'est fâché contre moi, et s'est rendu auprès d'un autre Collègue. Prenons celui-ci pour médiateur, et cherchons à apaiser celui-là et à rétablir l'union entre nous." Au contraire, vous m'avez écrit de saisir l'Amiral et de vous l'envoyer, et avez, en même temps, adressé aux officiers de la Flotte Impériale des lettres auxquelles on ne se serait pas attendu. Ces procédés de votre Altesse, qui dénotent un manque total d'égard pour une amitié de quarante ans, ainsi que pour la position élevée à laquelle je suis parvenu sous les auspices de la Sublime Porte, m'ont, je l'avoue, blessé au suprême degré, et c'est pour user de représailles que je vous ai invité à donner votre démission. Mais, sans trop m'appesantir sur ces circonstances, je me bornerai à dire, qu'après le retour d'Akif Effendi, votre Altesse a placé l'affaire en question sur un tout autre terrain, en m'écrivant qu'au moment où Saïd Effendi, devait être expedié vers moi, les Représentans des Cinq Puissances avaient remis à la Porte telle et telle Note. Le fait est que depuis quelques années ces Puissances ont toujours engagé la Porte à arranger elle-même ses affaires. Dans la lettre que je viens de recevoir de votre Altesse, il est dit qu'on ne peut accomplir la volonté de notre Prophète qu'en travaillant pieusement pour le bien de notre Auguste Souverain, Vicaire du Prophète, et pour celui de notre nation. Je ne révoque pas en doute que ces paroles ne soient extrêmement convenables et marquées au coin de la vérité. Dieu sait que cette croyance est aussi la mienne! Mais les procédés sus-indiqués de votre Altesse ne sont pas en harmonie avec ses paroles. Il devrait nous suffire, ce me semble, d'avoir été pour cette affaire la fable de tous les journaux. Toutefois, puisque vous déclarez que votre cœur ne récèle pas même une ombre d'animosité, ni d'esprit de vengeance, je dois vous assurer, et le Très-Haut m'en est témoin, que moi aussi je n'ai d'autre désir que celui de signaler ma soumission à la Sublime Porte, et de témoigner de l'amour et de l'attachement à des Ministres qui, comme vous, sont étrangers à toute haîne et à tout sentiment vindicatif. D'après ceci, nos intentions se trouveraient être les mêmes et il n'y aurait de divergence que dans la manière dont elles se manifestent.

Pour décider donc notre différence et prononcer là-dessus conformément à la loi religieuse et politique, comme aussi pour délivrer la nation Musulmane d'un pareil scandale, il nous faut un juge habile, versé dans les lois, pénétré de sentimens religieux, et connu pour sa droiture et son impartialité. Voilà donc que je vous fais aussi cette proposition, mu comme je le suis par mon zèle pour la religion, et par ma sincère amitié à votre égard. S'il plait à Dieu, il éclorra dans votre cœur des sentimens conformes à vos paroles; et en accomplissant l'œuvre salutaire de délivrer les Musulmans de ces embarras et de rendre à tous une sécurité parfaite, vous serez béni par tout le monde, et votre nom, inscrit dans les annales de l'histoire, sera répété avec éloge jusqu'au jour du dernier jugement.

Si votre Altesse est disposée à accéder à cette proposition, elle voudra bien avoir la bonté d'envoyer ici un ou deux Oulémas et Ministres de la Sublime Porte, qui, joignant l'expérience à l'amour du bien, n'aient des égards personnels ni pour vous ni pour moi, et qui, mettant de côté les considérations politiques, soient exclusivement inspirés par leur dévouement à la Sublime Porte et leur attachement pour la nation Musulmane.

Une pareille mesure serait en tout cas utile à la marche de l'affaire et répondrait en même temps à l'intention de votre Altesse, de rendre dans les circonstances actuelles un service salutaire à notre Religion et à notre Gouvernement.

(Translation.)

Mehemet Ali to the Grand Vizier Hosrew Pasha.—(Received at Constantinople, September 24, 1839.)

I HAVE had the honour to receive Your Highness's reply, in which, in informing me that you have no other object but the good of the service, you exhort me to unite our efforts and endeavour to attain happiness as well in this life as in the next. In the same letter Your Highness informs me, that you have not been able as yet to arrange the affairs of the moment conformably with the following saying,—"However, one always wishes to serve the interests of one's fellow-countrymen." Most illustrious Lord! I was greatly surprised to perceive that after having brought the matter to this point (as you are aware from the correspondence which has hitherto taken place), you should desire on a sudden to serve the interests of your fellow-countrymen.

When the late Sultan Mahmoud, of glorious memory, deigned to promise to grant to me in perpetuity Egypt as well as the Province of Saida and Tripoli, I humbly and respectfully declined that proposal, praying him to grant to me in perpetuity the whole of the Provinces and districts placed under my administration. Your Highness knew all this perfectly well; and yet, since your accession to the post of Grand Vizier, you have confined yourself to offering me Egypt alone. Besides, Your Highness, who has been Governor of Egypt for eighteen months, knows very well how much the Arabs respect the principle of intercession. Nevertheless, when his Excellency the Grand Admiral Ahmed Pasha arrived here, you did not think proper to act with mildness, and to say, "One of my Colleagues is angry with me, and has gone to another of my Colleagues; let us take the latter for a mediator, and endeavour to pacify the former, and re-establish friendship between us." On the contrary, you have written to me to seize the Admiral, and to send him to you, and you have at the same time addressed to the officers of the Imperial fleet letters which could not have been anticipated. These proceedings of Your Highness, which denote a total want of regard for a friendship of forty years, as well as for the exalted station to which I have arrived, under the auspices of the Sublime Porte, have, I confess, hurt me in the highest degree, and it is by way of retaliation that I have called upon you to give in your resignation. But without laying too great stress on these circumstances, I shall confine myself to saying, that after the return of Akif Effendi, Your Highness put the matter in question on quite another ground, by writing to me, that at the moment when Saïd Effendi was about to be sent to me, the Representatives of the Five Powers had delivered to the Porte such and such a Note. The fact is, that for some years back these Powers have always advised the Porte to arrange its affairs itself. In the letter which I have just received from Your Highness, it is said, that we can only accomplish the will of our Prophet by labouring piously for the good of our August Sovereign, Vicar of the Prophet, and for that of our nation. I do not question but that these expressions are extremely proper, and bear the stamp of truth. God knows that that belief is mine also! But the above-mentioned proceedings of Your Highness are not in unison with your words. It ought to be sufficient for us, as it appears to me, to have been with respect to this matter the theme of all the newspapers. However, since you declare that your heart does not conceal even a shadow of animosity or revengeful feeling, I must assure you, and the Most High is my witness, that I, on my part, have no other desire than that of marking my submission to the Sublime Porte, and of testifying affection and attachment to Ministers who, like yourself, are strangers to all hatred and to all revengeful feeling. According to this, our intentions should be the same, and there would be no difference, save in the manner in which they are shown.

To decide, therefore, our difference, and to pronounce thereupon in conformity with the religious and political law, as well as to relieve the Mussulman nation from such a scandal, we require a skilful judge, well acquainted with the laws, impressed with religious sentiments, and known for his justice and his impartiality. Here, then, is the proposal which I also make to you, moved thereto by my zeal for religion, and my sincere friendship towards yourself. If it please God, he will cause to spring up in your heart sentiments in accordance with your words, and by accomplishing the salutary work of relieving the Mussulmans from these embarrassments, and by restoring perfect security to all, you will be blessed by all the world, and your name, inscribed in the annals of history, will be spoken of in terms of praise till the day of judgment.

If Your Highness is disposed to accede to this proposal, you will have the goodness to send here one or two Ulemas and Ministers of the Sublime Porte, who uniting experience with a love of goodness, may have no personal attachment to you or to me, and who, setting aside political considerations, may be exclusively inspired with devotion for the Sublime Porte and with attachment to the Mussulman nation.

Such a measure would be under all circumstances useful for the progress of the affair, and would at the same time be in accordance with the intention of Your Highness to render, in the present state of affairs, beneficial service to our religion and to our Government.

No. 346.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received October* 22.)

My Lord, *Therapia, September* 30, 1839.

THE French Ambassador has acquainted me with his being recalled, and that a frigate would be sent for him without delay. I heard this fact with regret.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 347.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received October* 22.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, October* 1, 1839.

I HAVE heard this day from a well-informed person, that there is a great disposition to make an arrangement with Mehemet Ali, and that it will probably be made if he shall show any signs of concession, such as consenting to restore the fleet.

No. 348.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received October* 22.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, September* 26, 1839.

ON the 14th instant the French Consul-General received a despatch from his Government to inform him, that it had been resolved on by the British and French Governments, to direct very strong remonstrances to be made by myself and M. Cochelet to Mehemet Ali, respecting the detention of the Turkish fleet, and to insist upon the Pasha sending it back to Constantinople.

M. Cochelet told me that Marshal Soult had written to him, to say, that I was to receive similar instructions, and that our demands were to be made simultaneously. I told M. Cochelet that I should not fail to inform him of any instructions which I might receive to that effect.

M. de Laurin also informed me, that he had received a despatch from his Court to the effect that such instructions would be sent; and he was directed to support the demands made by the British and French Agents.

The French Consul-General here, as also those French merchants and employés who have access to Mehemet Ali, appear to make it a study to impress him with the strong sympathy of the French Government and nation in his favour, and that it is France alone which supports him, and every article in the French journals to this purport is read to the Pasha.

The Pasha appears to have relinquished his intentions to press for the removal of Hosrew Pasha from his post of Grand Vizier, but he seems resolved not to accept less than the hereditary succession of the provinces which were placed under his government and that of Ibrahim Pasha, at the Peace of Kutaya in the year 1833.

The Pasha left this yesterday for an excursion on the Nile for the benefit of his health, and will return on the 2nd or 3rd of October.

Captain Caillier, who returns to-morrow by the French steamer to France, told me that the Pasha had yesterday said to him, that if he would remain eight days longer in Egypt, he might carry the intelligence to France of an amicable arrangement having been concluded between the Porte and himself, as he expected almost daily to receive the final settlement of the affair from Constantinople.

The state of the country is tranquil, and the rise of the Nile being the best which has taken place for many years, affords the certainty of a most abundant harvest of every sort.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

No. 349.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 22.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, October* 6, 1839.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch of the 13th of September, relative to the declaration of the Pasha's intentions, in the event of the appearance of the combined squadrons off Alexandria, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship the copy of a note which I have written in obedience to your Lordship's instructions.

Boghos Bey informs me, that he has sent a translation of it to the Pasha, who is at present in the Delta, and that he will communicate the reply to me so soon as he shall receive it; but as Her Majesty's steamer leaves to-morrow for Malta, I shall not be able to communicate the reply by that opportunity.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Inclosure in No. 349.

Colonel Campbell to Boghos Bey.

Alexandrie, le 20 *Octobre,* 1839.

LE Soussigné, Agent et Consul-Général de Sa Majesté Britannique, a communiqué au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté la déclaration faite par Son Altesse le Vice-Roi, le 14 d'Août dernier, portant que, "si les Escadres Anglaise et Française paraissaient devant Alexandrie, il ordonnerait à Ibrahim Pacha d'avancer avec son armée."

Le Soussigné a été par conséquent chargé par Son Excellence le Vicomte Palmerston, Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté Britannique pour les Affaires Etrangères, de faire savoir à Méhémet Ali par écrit, que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté est bien convaincu qu'il est si sagace et clairvoyant, et si bien capable de calculer des conséquences, qu'il s'abstiendra soigneusement de prendre les mesures qu'il est dit dans la dite dépêche d'avoir annoncées que c'était son intention de prendre, en cas que les escadres combinées apparussent devant Alexandrie. Car le Pacha doit bien savoir qu'il n'est pas dans une position laquelle, soit par sa situation tant politique que géographique, ou soit sous le rapport des considérations militaires ou navales, peut le mettre en état de défier impunément les Gouvernemens d'Europe, et plus particulièrement les Puissances Maritimes.

Le Soussigné prie Son Excellence Boghos Joussouff Bey de vouloir bien communiquer cette Note à Son Altesse le Pacha et d'en accuser la réception par écrit.

Le Soussigné profite de cette occasion, &c.,

(Signé) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

(Translation.)

Colonel Campbell to Boghos Bey.

Alexandria, October 20, 1839.

THE Undersigned, Agent and Consul-General of Her Britannic Majesty, has communicated to the Government of Her Majesty the declaration made by His Highness the Viceroy, the 14th of August last, to the effect that "if the English and French squadrons should appear before Alexandria, he would order Ibrahim Pasha to advance with his Army."

The Undersigned has been, in consequence, instructed by His Excellency Viscount Palmerston, Her Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to state to Mehemet Ali, in writing, that Her Majesty's Government is well satisfied that he is so sagacious and clear-sighted, and so well able to calculate consequences, that he will carefully abstain from taking the steps which he is reported in that despatch to have announced his intention to take in the event of the appearance of the combined squadron off Alexandria; for the Pasha must be well aware that he is not in a position which, either geographically or politically, or with reference either to military or naval considerations, can enable him with impunity to set at defiance the Governments of Europe, and more especially the Maritime Powers.

The Undersigned requests his Excellency Boghos Joussouff Bey to have the goodness to communicate this Note to His Highness the Pasha, and to acknowledge in writing its receipt.

The Undersigned avails himself of this opportunity, &c.,

(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

No. 350.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, October* 23, 1839.

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch of October 1, stating that you have been informed, that there exists a great disposition to make a private arrangement with Mehemet Ali, I have to instruct your Excellency strongly to urge the Turkish Government to abstain from taking any such step, and to place confidence in the friendly intentions and promised support of the Powers of Europe.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 351.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 24.)

My Lord, *Paris, October* 21, 1839.

I ARRIVED at Paris yesterday, and I this morning called at the Foreign Office to apprise Marshal Soult of my return.

His Excellency received me with great personal cordiality; but upon our entering on political questions, I found with regret, that the language of the Marshal manifested a less anxious desire to act in union and concert with Her Majesty's Government, than appeared in his communications with me on his first undertaking the duties of Minister for Foreign Affairs.

On speaking of the Turco-Egyptian Question, he expressed his regret that the propositions, of which the Baron Brunnow was the bearer from the Court of St. Petersburgh, had been so favourably listened to by Her Majesty's Government; and considering the jealousy which was felt in England of the views and policy of Russia, he was surprised, he said, at your Lordship's having been willing to acquiesce in the occupation, under any circumstances, of Asia Minor by a Russian army. I observed to his Excellency, that the occupation by Russian troops of a province of the Turkish Empire for its protection, under a Convention between the Five Great Powers of Europe, stipulating that those troops should retire from it whenever the other Powers, parties to the Convention, should call upon them to withdraw, was, in fact, a renunciation of the principle of the Unkiar Skelessi Treaty, and of any pretension by the Russian Government, to the exclusive protection of the Turkish Empire. The Marshal would not allow that any reliance could be placed in such a Treaty; "but," added he, "I consider this to be more a question affecting English interests than those of France; but the French Government will certainly never be party to any such Convention."

His Excellency then adverted to the conditions of peace between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, saying, that he had no objection, if more favourable terms for the Sultan could be obtained, than those which the French Government proposed to be adopted as the basis of an arrangement, to agree to them. I asked his Excellency whether the terms he alluded to, as proposed by France, were the concession by the Porte to Mehemet Ali, of the whole of Syria, the Arabian Pashalics, the Pashalic of Candia as well as Egypt? He answered affirmatively; and on my observing that this arrangement would leave the vassal far more powerful than the empire to which he acknowledged allegiance, he said, "We must be guided in these matters, not by what might *moralement* be best, but by facts. You have on one side, Mehemet Ali, with an army 150,000 strong, and twenty sail of the line; on the other you have the Sultan, not able to bring together 15,000 men, and having nothing for him but *prestige*, *souvenir*, and *abstraction*."

His Excellency assured me, that the Courts of Berlin and Vienna were disposed to concur in the opinions of the French Government regarding the conditions of peace. I then put to him the question, whether, if Mehemet Ali should be so unreasonable as not to abate of his present pretension to retain Marash, Adana, and the territory to the east of the Euphrates, the French Government would join in measures of coercion to force upon the Pasha the acceptance of its own proposed conditions of peace? To this question the Marshal replied, "I shall be ready to enter with the other Powers into the consideration of the means of enforcing them; but it is useless, he said, to enter into that consideration until the Powers had agreed upon the conditions to be imposed." I need not remark to your Lordship, that no other interpretation can be given to this language, than that the French Government will not, under any circumstances, be induced to commit hostilities against the Pasha of Egypt. This determination of the Government arises not, I believe, from any wish to aggrandize Mehemet, but from the fear of becoming engaged in a war which would be unpopular in France, and which might very probably provoke the censure, by the Chamber of Deputies, of the Ministers who advised it.

I have forgotten to mention that, in the course of the conversation with the Marshal on this subject, he alluded to your Lordship having said to General Sébastiani, that you would concede to Mehemet Ali a part of Syria up to the walls of St. Jean d'Acre, but not the fortress itself; and he added, "I have no objection to St. Jean d'Acre being taken from the Pasha, but how is the capture to be effected?" England, he imagined, would not spare troops for such an expedition, France will not send any troops, nor will a single soldier be afforded by the Austrian Government for this service.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 352.

Viscount Palmerston to the Marquess of Clanricarde.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, October* 25, 1839.

YOUR Excellency has been already informed, through the Russian Government, of the particulars of the communications which Baron Brunnow was sent hither to make, and of the nature of the answer which Her Majesty's Government gave to those communications; but in order that the details of the negotiation carried on between the Baron and Her Majesty's Government may be upon record, I think it right to recapitulate them in this despatch.

Baron Brunnow arrived in London on the 15th September, and left England on the 12th of October; and during the interval between those two dates, he had several long conversations with myself, and with other members of Her Majesty's Government, upon various matters connected with the relations between Great Britain and Russia.

The substance of all his communications on these different matters, was extremely satisfactory; and nothing could be more conciliatory than his manner upon every occasion. He was frank and unreserved in his conversations; and his mission, whatever may be its result, as to the main point upon which it bore, cannot fail to produce beneficial effects upon the relations between the two Governments.

Baron Brunnow, on his arrival, stated that the principal purpose for which he was sent hither, was to explain frankly and without reserve, to Her Majesty's Government, the views and opinions of the Russian Cabinet upon the affairs now pending in the Levant; and to ask for an equally candid explanation of the views and opinions of Her Majesty's Government.

He said, that the Russian Government had been gratified at finding that the sentiments of the two Cabinets on these matters, as far as they had been mutually explained, appeared to be so nearly alike; and he said, that the Russian Government had witnessed, of late, with great satisfaction, evidences, as they conceived, of greater confidence on the part of the British Government, in the sincerity and good faith of Russia with regard to the affairs of Turkey; that the Emperor felt, that he deserved that confidence, and was anxious to confirm it by the fullest explanations, and thus to draw closer the ties between Great Britain and Russia.

The Baron said, that the Emperor could take but one view of the relative positions of the Sultan and Mehemet Ali; that he looked upon the Sultan as a Sovereign who was his Ally, and intitled to his support; and that he considered Mehemet Ali, as a revolted subject: That he saw that the quarrel between these two, might lead to events which might occasion serious differences between the Powers of Europe, and endanger the general peace; and that he was therefore most anxious that some permanent arrangement should be made between the two parties, which would ensure future tranquillity. That His Imperial Majesty was convinced, that if England and Russia could come to a clear and full understanding on the matters, the arrangement which they might determine to support, would ultimately be carried into effect: That the Russian Government understood that Her Majesty's Government were of opinion, that the arrangement best calculated to prevent future collisions between Mehemet Ali and the Sultan, would be, that, which, conferring upon Mehemet Ali the hereditary Pashalic of Egypt, would restore immediately to the direct authority of the Sultan, all the other portions of the Ottoman Empire now occupied by the forces, and administered by the authorities, of Mehemet Ali. That the Russian Cabinet entirely concurs in preferring this arrangement, and is perfectly ready to co-operate in carrying it into effect; but that compulsion of some kind might become necessary to induce Mehemet Ali to consent to this plan; and that the Emperor not choosing to embark in a plan without seeing his way to the execution of it, and not being willing to begin an undertaking with other parties, without being certain that they had made their minds up to go through with it, in conjunction with him, His Imperial Majesty was desirous, before this arrangement should be proposed to the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, to know what Powers were prepared to concur in the measures which might be necessary in order to carry it into effect.

Baron Brunnow then proceeded to discuss those measures, and to consider what they might be. He stated, that the Russian Government very much approved of the series of coercive measures which had been proposed by Her Majesty's Government, namely, the interception of all communication by sea, between Egypt and Syria; the blockade of the ports of those two provinces; the seizure and detention of all ships under the Egyptian flag; and the occupation of Candia, and its restoration to the direct authority of the Sultan. And he said, that if these measures were taken by a powerful alliance, acting in support of the Sultan's rights, or even if such parties were to intimate to Mehemet Ali their determination to take such measures, should they become necessary, little doubt could be entertained that Mehemet Ali would yield to superior force, and would submit to inevitable necessity. But the Baron said there was a contingency connected with these measures, which could not safely be overlooked. Mehemet Ali had declared, that if coercion were attempted against him, he would immediately order Ibrahim to advance to the shores of the Bosphorus, and to threaten Constantinople. This might be an empty menace, which perhaps never would or could be put into execution; but, on the other hand, Mehemet Ali might, in a moment of desperation, make such an attempt; and it might be the more likely that he should do so, if he thought that such a movement would take the Powers of Europe unprepared, and would create dissensions among them. Consequently, Baron Brunnow said it was of the greatest importance, that England and Russia should settle beforehand what should be done in such an event.

That it was clear that the Sultan was not at present in a state to defend himself against such an attack: his army having been defeated and dispersed, and his fleet having been delivered up to Mehemet Ali. But the Sultan could not be abandoned, and left to be a prey to Ibrahim. That some of the Allies must come to his aid, and that the Emperor thought, that from local position, Russia was the Power which could most easily afford assistance. That Ibrahim would take about twenty days to march from his present positions to the Bosphorus; and that there would be time enough during that period, for a Russian naval force to occupy the Bosphorus, and for a Russian land force, if necessary, to take post on the Asiatic side of the Strait.

Baron Brunnow said, that the Russian Government was well aware of the feeling which exists in this country, about the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, which, whatever may have passed about it, the Emperor nevertheless considers a binding obligation; but in the present case, the Russian Government proposed that the aid to be given, if necessary, by Russia to the Sultan, should be given, not in virtue of the separate engagements taken by the Emperor, but in virtue of the engagements about to be entered into between the Powers of Europe and the Sultan: That this succour, therefore, would be an act of the Alliance, and not of Russia alone; that the Russian force would arrive as the force of the Alliance, and would retire as the force of the Alliance, whenever the purpose for which it came should have been fully accomplished. He said that the Emperor was perfectly willing that all these matters should be settled by a previous convention between the parties concerned; that this convention should define the objects to be attained; should determine the means to be employed; and should assign to each of the co-operating Powers its appropriate share in the execution; and that the arrangement which, on this matter, he, Baron Brunnow, had to propose, was, that all the operations which might become necessary in Egypt and Syria, should be undertaken by England, and Austria, and France; and that whatever might be requisite within the Straits, and in Asia Minor, should be executed by Russia.

He said, that with respect to the Straits of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, he understood that Her Majesty's Government were of opinion, that as a permanent principle and standing rule, the best arrangement would be, that while Turkey is at peace, both of those Straits should be shut against ships of war of all Powers; and he could assure me, that the Emperor would be perfectly ready to agree to such an arrangement, and to consider the Bosphorus as being as much closed against Russian ships of war, as the Dardanelles against the ships of war of other Powers; and the Emperor would willingly agree, that an Article to this effect should be inserted in the proposed convention.

Baron Brunnow further said, that if England and Russia should happily come to an understanding on these matters; and if such a Convention as he had described, were to be signed, he was authorized to say, that in such case the Emperor would not renew the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi.

The Baron further said, in reply to a question which I put, that the Russian Government did not make the accession of France to these arrangements, a *sine quâ non;* and that although the co-operation of France would undoubtedly render the execution more easy, Russia would be perfectly ready to act without France, if France could not be persuaded to concur, and if England was willing to go on without her.

As soon as it was possible to assemble the Cabinet, a meeting of Her Majesty's confidential servants was held, to consider what answer it would be proper to give to these overtures from the Russian Government; and the communication which thereupon it became my duty to make to Baron Brunnow, was to the following effect:—

I stated, that Her Majesty's Government highly appreciate the friendly sentiments towards England, which prompted His Imperial Majesty to send Baron Brunnow with the communication with which the Baron had been charged; and that Her Majesty's Government derives the highest satisfaction from finding that the views and opinions of the two Governments upon the important matters in question, were so entirely in accordance.

That the Russian Government had justly interpreted the feelings of that of Great Britain, when it supposed that the British Cabinet repose full confidence in the sincerity and good faith with which Russia is acting in these affairs; and that Her Majesty's Government are most anxious to give proofs of that confidence. That Her Majesty's Government are ready to adopt the whole arrangement proposed by Baron Brunnow, with the exception of one single point, upon which I had to propose a modification, which, without essentially altering the plan, would remove a difficulty which Her Majesty's Government would otherwise find insurmountable.

I said that Her Majesty's Government continue to think, that the only way of preventing future collisions between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, which might seriously endanger the peace of Europe, was to bring back within the confines of Egypt, the state of occupation of Mehemet Ali; the Sultan at the time granting to the Pasha, as a compensation for the sacrifice which he would thus make, an hereditary tenure in the Pashalic of Egypt. I said that we continue to be of opinion, that if the Five Powers were to agree to assist the Sultan in imposing this arrangement upon Mehemet Ali, the latter would, however reluctant to do so, yield to the force of a confederation which he would know himself unable to oppose, rather than expose himself to the risk of forfeiting by resistance, those advantages which the proposed arrangement would afford him. That even if the French Government were induced, by domestic considerations, to decline being a party to the proposed Convention, yet if such a Convention were signed by the other Four Powers, and were made known to Mehemet Ali, there seems good reason to think, that it would induce him to acquiesce; but that at all events, the means of the Four Powers to enforce the arrangement would be amply sufficient; and that Great Britain was prepared to become a party to such an agreement, and to take a share in the execution.

I said, that with respect to the Straits of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, Baron Brunnow had rightly understood the opinion of Her Majesty's Government; and that this opinion rests upon a general and fundamental principle of the Law of Nations. Every State is considered as having territorial jurisdiction over the sea which washes its shores, as far as three miles from low water mark; and, consequently, any Strait which is bounded on both sides by the territory of the same sovereign, and which is not more than six miles wide, lies within the territorial jurisdiction of that sovereign. But the Bosphorus and Dardanelles are bounded on both sides by the territory of the Sultan; and are in most parts less than six miles wide; and consequently the territorial jurisdiction of the Sultan extends over both of those Straits; and the Sultan has a right to exclude all foreign ships of war from those Straits, if he should think proper to do so. Now, by the Treaty of 1809, Great Britain acknowledged this right on the part of the Sultan, and promised to acquiesce in the enforcement of it; and it is but just that Russia should take the same engagement; and Her Majesty's Government are of opinion, that the exclusion of all foreign ships of war from the two Straits, would be more conducive to the maintenance of peace, than an understanding that the Straits in question should be a general thoroughfare, open at all times to ships of war of all countries.

But, I said, Her Majesty's Government being willing to acknowledge by Treaty, as a general principle, and as a standing rule, that the two Straits should be closed for all foreign ships of war, are of opinion, that if for a particular emergency, one of these Straits should be opened for one party, the other ought, at the same time, to be opened also for other parties; in order that there should be the same parity between the condition of the two Straits, when open and when shut; and, therefore, Her Majesty's Government would expect, that in that part of the proposed Convention, which would allot to each Power its appropriate share of the measures of execution, it should be stipulated, that if it should become necessary for a Russian force to enter the Bosphorus, a British force should at the same time enter the Dardanelles. I said, that this was no proof of any want of confidence in Russia; for, in truth, the very fact of the Emperor becoming party to the proposed Convention, would make it impossible for any one to breathe a doubt as to His Imperial Majesty's good faith; and that, as the bulk of the British squadron would probably be required off the coasts of Egypt or Syria, the smallness of the number of ships that could be spared for going up the Dardanelles, would of itself show that their presence was intended to record a principle and to manifest union, and not to proclaim distrust or to exercise controul.

Baron Brunnow expressed great regret at this decision of Her Majesty's Government, which must necessarily suspend for a time the progress of the negotiation; because his instructions did not provide for this case; and he should therefore be obliged to refer the question for the decision of his Government; and much valuable time would thereby be lost, which ought to be employed in action. But he pressed me much to consider whether this question might not be put aside, and be reserved for future consideration, without preventing the two Governments from proceeding to act upon other points, with respect to which they were agreed; and he expressed a strong desire that the Allied Powers should make an immediate demand for the restoration of the Turkish fleet, or for the contemplated territorial arrangement; or for any other thing upon which they might be agreed; and that if their demand should be refused, they should begin by putting in force those measures of coercion in which they might all concur; leaving the question about the Dardanelles to be settled, if, and when, it should arise.

I said, that Her Majesty's Government had indeed proposed that the demand for the restoration of the fleet should precede the demand for the territorial arrangement, and should be made immediately; because it appeared to us, that whatever differences of opinion might exist as to the territorial arrangement, there could be no difference as to the propriety and justice of demanding and compelling the restitution of the fleet. But Austria and France were against such a course; and both recommended that the question about the fleet should be allowed to merge in the larger question as to the final arrangement; and Her Majesty's Government had yielded to the wish of those two Powers.

But certainly, Austria, Russia, Prussia, and Great Britain, being agreed as to the arrangement which ought to be enforced upon Mehemet Ali, might at once, and without France, if France should be unwilling to join them, call upon Mehemet Ali to submit; and they might begin to execute the progressive measures of coercion, if he should refuse. But in that case, Mehemet Ali might order Ibrahim to march to the Bosphorus; and then would come upon us, in the most inconvenient manner, and without our being prepared for it by any previous agreement, the very difficulty which we were at present unable to solve; and I said, that unless we should come to a satisfactory understanding as to what was to be done in such a contingency, it would not be wise to take steps which might directly tend to make that contingency happen.

The Baron, however, still pressed upon me the great anxiety of his Government, that something should be done; and the strong conviction of that Government, that some act or other would become necessary, on the part of some of the Powers of Europe, within a very short period of time; and from himself, but not by any instruction from his Government, he pressed me to submit to the Cabinet, that Great Britain might, by herself, take some preliminary measures, which, either as demonstrations, or as a commencement of coercion, could not fail to have a decisive influence on Mehemet Ali.

I said that I knew that, in the present state of things, Her Majesty's Government would not begin to act alone in these matters. That we attach very great importance to the attainment of an European concert upon these questions; and that we by no means as yet despair of arriving at such a result; that if it should be found impossible to unite the Five Powers, or a sufficient portion of them, in a common course of action, it would be necessary for the British Government then to consider what it might be fitting for Great Britain to do; but that till the present negotiations should have come to some conclusion, it would be premature for Her Majesty's Government to take into consideration a contingency which has not yet happened.

It was then agreed between Baron Brunnow and myself, that we should each draw up a report of what had passed between us; he, for the information of his Government; I, for the information of your Excellency. I was, however, prevented by a heavy and continued pressure of business, from preparing my despatch; and Baron Brunnow's Report, of which he gave me, confidentially, a copy, and of which I herewith inclose a copy, contains so full and so faithful a report of the conversations to which it relates, that I felt it unnecessary, at the time, to add anything thereto; and my reason for writing this despatch is, that I am desirous of furnishing your Excellency with a statement which, though less full in detail, embraces a greater range of time.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 353.

Baron Brunnow to Count Nesselrode.—(Communicated confidentially by Baron Brunnow.)

(Extrait.) *Londres, ce* $\frac{\text{26 Septembre}}{\text{8 Octobre}}$, 1839.

LE jour même où le Conseil du Cabinet se réunissait à Windsor pour prendre en délibération l'Affaire d'Egypte, j'ai reçu la dépêche du 9 Septembre par laquelle votre Excellence m'a recommandé de lui faire connaître un moment plus tôt les déterminations que le Cabinet Britannique allait arrêter relativement à cette grave question.

Je me suis empressé aussitôt de demander une entrevue à Lord Palmerston. Le billet que je lui ai écrit à ce sujet s'est croisé avec l'invitation qu'il m'a adressée de son côté, de me rendre chez lui en ville, où il allait arriver le lendemain, 2 Octobre.

Je me fais un devoir de soumettre à votre Excellence le résumé de cet entretien, que nous avons repris le jour suivant, 3 Octobre, et dont l'ensemble vous mettra à même, M. le Comte, de vous former une opinion exacte de la nature des vues que le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat pour les Affaires Etrangères a bien voulu me communiquer avec une sincérité à laquelle je ne saurais assez rendre justice.

Il a commencé par me dire que le Conseil avait pris en mûre considération les ouvertures dont j'avais été chargé.

Qu'il n'avait pas hésité à reconnaître et à apprécier vivement la loyauté des intentions qui les avait dictées.

Que sous ce rapport, l'opinion de tous les Membres du Cabinet s'était prononcé unanimement, de manière à rendre l'hommage qui est dû à la droiture des intentions de notre Auguste Maître.

Que le désir manifesté par Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'en venir à une entente amicale avec l'Angleterre relativement aux Affaires d'Orient, répondait entièrement aux vœux du Cabinet Britannique. Mais que celui-ci se voit obligé de ne point perdre de vue bien des considérations qui lui recommandent d'user d'une grande circonspection dans sa marche, afin de ne point heurter de front des opinions qu'il lui importe de ménager.

Lord Palmerston est entré à cet égard dans des explications très-détaillées

que je chercherai, M. le Comte, à reproduire ici, en vous rapportant aussi fidèlement que possible les propres paroles dont ce Ministre s'est servi.

"L'opinion de mes Collègues," m'a-t-il dit, "s'est prononcée hautement en faveur des mêmes principes que vous avez exposés au nom de votre Cabinet pour le maintien de l'indépendance et la conservation de l'Empire Ottoman. Nous désirons comme vous d'agir dans ce but de concert avec vous et d'y consacrer une action commune. Nous serions décidés à agir dans ce sens avec *tous les Cabinets* qui voudraient concourir avec nous au même but. Nous serions préparés à marcher dans cette voie *avec la France* et même *sans elle*, si elle refusait de s'y associer. Nous persistons à croire que nos efforts devraient tendre à faire rentrer le Sultan en possession de la Syrie. Nous ne nous dissimulons pas que ce résultat ne saurait être obtenu sans un déployement de forces destinées à vaincre la résistance du Pacha.

"Cependant nous ne saurions méconnaître non plus, que l'emploi de ces mesures pourrait porter Méhémet Ali à adopter un parti extrême en fesant marcher son armée sur Constantinople.

"Si cette éventualité venait à se réaliser, nous sommes les premiers à admettre la nécessité de voir la Russie interposer ses forces matérielles pour garantir la sécurité de la capitale de l'Empire Ottoman. Mais dans ce cas, mes Collègues ont été d'avis qu'il serait désirable et nécessaire, que l'intervention militaire de la Russie dans le Bosphore n'eût point l'apparence d'exclure notre concours.

"D'après l'opinion unanime du Conseil, l'intervention militaire de la Russie, si elle devenait nécessaire pour la protection et la défense de Constantinople, devrait avoir lieu de telle sorte à pouvoir être combinée avec une certaine co-opération et assistance des forces navales d'Angleterre.

"Ce concours pourrait être déterminé de manière à ne point confondre et à ne point mettre en contact les forces d'une Puissance avec celles de l'autre. Cette distinction résulterait même d'un principe sur lequel nous sommes déjà d'accord. Nous considérons en thèse générale les deux détroits de Constantinople comme fermés au pavillon de guerre des nations étrangères. Or, si par exception à cette règle et dans l'intérêt commun de la défense de l'Empire Ottoman, l'un de ces détroits s'ouvre à vos forces navales, il serait juste et naturel qu'en vertu de la même exception, l'autre de ces détroits admit également les nôtres. Elles n'y paraîtraient nullement dans l'intention de gêner ni de contrôler votre action. Chacun des deux détroits serait placé sous la sauve-garde des Puissances respectives dont les forces resteraient ainsi séparées, et ne se trouveraient pas mises en présence. Vous d'un côté, nous de l'autre, nous serions là pour empêcher que l'Armée Egyptienne ne vînt à franchir le canal de Constantinople. Placées à distance les unes des autres, les forces respectives ne risqueraient point de se trouver en contact. D'ailleurs, la disproportion numérique qui existerait entre elles, démontrerait évidemment que notre co-opération n'aurait rien d'hostile pour vous; car la présence de trois ou quatre vaisseaux que nous y enverrions, ne serait assurément pas faite pour entrer en concurrence avec vos forces de terre et de mer concentrées dans le Bosphore. Tout ce qu'il nous faudrait, serait de constater à la face de la nation, que nous n'avons pas consenti à nous laisser exclure d'une action commune destinée à sauver la capitale de l'Empire Ottoman; que nous n'avons point souscrit formellement à un principe en vertu duquel la Russie serait investi du pouvoir d'exercer seule ce protectorat.

"Ce n'est donc ni par méfiance pour les intentions de l'Empereur, que nous respectons, ni par jalousie pour la Russie, avec laquelle nous désirons sincèrement de marcher d'accord, mais c'est uniquement par les considérations susmentionnés qu'il nous est impossible d'adhérer à un arrangement par lequel nous proclamerions nous-mêmes l'exclusion absolue de notre pavillon là où nous établirions en principe la présence isolée du vôtre."

C'est dans ces termes que Lord Palmerston m'a fait connaître la décision du Conseil. Il me l'a communiquée de manière à me prouver qu'il n'entrait en ce moment dans les vues du Cabinet Britannique aucune méfiance contre les intentions de notre Auguste Maître à l'égard de la Turquie. Mais qu'en émettant l'opinion ci-dessus exposée, ce Cabinet n'avait fait autre chose que de se prémunir contre les attaques qu'il lui est facile de prévoir, s'il se prêtait à des concessions qu'on pourrait représenter comme une atteinte portée à l'honneur de la nation Anglaise.

Après avoir écouté avec une attention sérieuse la communication dont je viens de rendre compte, j'ai répondu aussitôt à Lord Palmerston, que dans un de nos précédens entretiens je lui avais déjà fait connaître les ordres formels dont j'étais muni relativement à la question des pavillons étrangers dans la Mer de Marmora.

Que mes instructions à cet égard étaient trop précises pour qu'il me fût permis de m'en éloigner.

Qu'il ne m'appartenait assurément pas de m'ériger en juge des considérations sur lesquelles se fondait l'avis des Membres du Conseil.

Que si leur détermination à ce sujet était prise, la mienne devait l'être également.

Que la volonté de l'Empereur étant pour moi la seule règle de ma conduite, je devais m'arrêter au point où nous étions parvenus; rapporter fidèlement à ma Cour les réflexions qu'il venait de me communiquer; et réserver entièrement à l'Empereur de porter sur elles un jugement qui n'appartient qu'à lui seul.

Que pour ma part, j'étais persuadé que dans aucun cas, et lors-même que les vues des deux Cabinets ne pouvaient pas s'accorder, notre auguste Maître ne regretterait jamais d'avoir donné à l'Angleterre dans cette circonstance grave une preuve spontanée d'amitié et de confiance.

Que je croyais avoir suffisamment rempli ses intentions, si j'étais parvenu à convaincre le Cabinet Britannique de la sincérité des intentions de Sa Majesté Impériale, ainsi que des dispositions amicales qu'elle a constamment vouées à la Grande Bretagne.

Que si ces dispositions étaient reconnues ici comme elles méritent de l'être, je me féliciterais de n'avoir pas inutilement employé mes soins et mes efforts.

Mais que je croyais avoir atteint maintenant les dernières limites de la tâche qui m'avait été imposée, et que si la décision du Conseil telle qu'il venait de me la faire connaître, était définitivement arrêtée, il ne me restait qu'à suspendre le cours de nos délibérations et à en référer à l'Empereur, en lui soumettant la difficulté que venait d'opposer à mes démarches un obstacle qu'il ne dépendait pas de moi de faire disparaître, à moins de dévier du sens strict de mes instructions, ce que je ne me permettrais de faire dans aucun cas, sans la volonté expresse de l'Empereur.

Lord Palmerston a parfaitement reconnu la valeur et la justesse des motifs qui m'empêchaient de passer outre. Il m'a annoncé qu'il informerait incessamment le Marquis de Clanricarde de tout ce qui venait de se passer entre nous, ainsi que des difficultés qui ne nous avaient point permis d'en venir à un arrangement définitif sur la Question d'Egypte. De mon côté, je l'ai prévenu que je soumettrai à ma Cour un récit fidèle de notre entretien. Et pour m'assurer davantage de l'exactitude avec laquelle j'aurai saisi ses idées, je lui ai annoncé que je placerai sous ses yeux, avant de l'expédier, le rapport que j'allais adresser à votre Excellence. Il m'a promis à son tour qu'il me communiquerait d'avance les dépêches qu'il allait adresser à Lord Clanricarde.

Après vous avoir indiqué, M. le Comte, le point d'arrêt qui a mis obstacle à la poursuite de ma négociation, je m'abstiendrai d'entrer ici dans de plus amples développemens sur les explications que nous avons échangées sur la question théorique et pratique d'une co-opération navale.

Les observations faites de part et d'autre sur cette combinaison n'ont présenté d'ailleurs rien de nouveau. A mes yeux, cette question est totalement épuisée. Chacun est resté de son avis sans convaincre et sans faire céder l'autre. Il n'a certainement pas dépendu de moi de résoudre cette difficulté à la satisfaction mutuelle des deux Cabinets. Tout ce que j'ai pu faire c'est d'empêcher qu'elle ne devînt entre eux un sujet de controverse, et d'éviter par là que ma mission, conçue dans un esprit de sincère bienveillance de la part de notre Auguste Maître, ne finit par provoquer une discussion fâcheuse entre la Russie et la Grande Bretagne.

Cet écueil je crois heureusement l'avoir évité: je dirai plus; j'ai tout lieu d'espérer que ma mission a produit le bon effet qu'elle était destinée à atteindre, et qu'elle a contribué utilement à convaincre le Cabinet Britannique des sentimens élevés qui animent notre Auguste Maître, ainsi que de ses dispositions amicales envers le Gouvernement de la Grande Bretagne.

J'aime à penser que cette impression continuera à réagir favorablement sur les communications ultérieures entre les deux Cours.

Pour le moment, ce qui m'a semblé de la plus grande urgence, c'est de faire en sorte que la suspension de l'arrangement définitif entre l'Angleterre et notre

Cabinet relativement aux affaires de l'Orient, ne devînt une cause d'ajournement pour retarder et pour entrâver les mesures de salut que réclame impérieusement la situation précaire de l'Empire Ottoman.

Sous ce rapport, j'ai tiré un grand parti des réflexions que Sa Majesté l'Empereur a adressées personnellement au Marquis de Clanricarde, ainsi que de celles dont votre Excellence a bien voulu me faire part en m'adressant sa dépêche du 9 Septembre.

Les informations qu'elle m'a communiquées sur l'état d'incertitude et de désorganisation morale où se trouve la Porte, m'ont mis à même d'insister auprès de Lord Palmerston sur la nécessité de prendre enfin quelques mesures énergiques pour réprimer les projets audacieux du Pacha d'Egypte, et pour le disposer à souscrire à une transaction basée sur des conditions équitables.

L'urgence qu'il y a d'adopter à cet effet une attitude plus prononcée est suffisamment reconnue par le Ministère Anglais lui-même. Mais s'il hésite à arrêter à cet égard une détermination énergique, c'est qu'il a à lutter en réalité contre une double difficulté.

La première est, qu'il ne voudrait pas courir la chance de pousser Méhémet Ali à marcher sur Constantinople tant que l'Angleterre n'est point parvenue à s'entendre préalablement avec nous, sur le mode d'une action commune destinée à mettre Constantinople à l'abri d'une invasion ennemie.

La seconde est, qu'il préfèrerait que la France ne restât point en dehors des mesures qui seraient dirigées contre Méhémet Ali, tandis que cette Puissance résiste depuis deux mois à toutes les propositions qu'on lui a faites d'ici pour l'engager à se porter contre le Vice-Roi à l'emploi de la menace et de la force.

Ainsi placé dans la double incertitude, d'une part de ne pouvoir pas compter sur une entente avec nous lorsqu'elle n'existe pas encore, de l'autre sur une co-opération du Gouvernement Français lorsqu'elle a été obstinément refusée jusqu'ici, le Cabinet Britannique éprouve une hésitation qui neutralise les mesures qu'il voudrait prendre pour appuyer et défendre les intérêts de la Porte.

Les motifs de cette hésitation, M. le Comte, expliquent pourquoi l'Angleterre s'est abstenue jusqu'à ce jour d'adopter une attitude décisive à l'égard de l'Egypte.

Cependant il m'a semblé que le moment était venu où cette hésitation devrait céder à des considérations plus graves. En effet, dans un moment où chaque jour de perdu en discussions stériles contribue à aggraver la situation de l'Empire Ottoman et peut la conduire vers sa chûte, j'ai pensé qu'il était de mon devoir de faire un appel direct à la sagesse du Gouvernement Anglais pour le décider à ne point différer plus longtems d'interposer les moyens d'action en son pouvoir, afin de briser la résistance de Méhémet Ali.

C'est sur cette nécessité que j'ai appelé l'attention du Principal Secrétaire d'Etat pour les Affaires Etrangères dans un second entretien que j'ai eu avec lui dans la journée du 3 Octobre.

Je lui ai fait sentir que le tems qui s'écoulerait pour écrire d'ici à Lord Clanricarde et pour en recevoir des réponses à la suite de notre entretien de la veille, pourrait devenir mortel pour la Porte; que dans l'état où elle se trouve, chaque heure semble la rapprocher de sa ruine; et qu'il n'y a qu'une action prompte et énergique de la part de l'Angleterre qui puisse la préserver d'une catastrophe imminente.

A l'appui de cette vérité, j'ai placé sous les yeux de Lord Palmerston une carte de l'Asie Mineure, et lui indiquant les deux points de Ténédos et d'Alexandrie, je lui ai dit, "Voilà où votre escadre se trouve aujourd'hui, et voilà où elle devrait être pour sauver l'Empire Ottoman."

Pour préciser davantage les réflexions que j'avais à cœur de soumettre dans cette grave conjoncture à l'examen approfondi de Lord Palmerston, je lui ai demandé la permission de lui donner lecture d'un aperçu rapide que j'avais tracé dans le but de rendre clairement compte au Ministère Anglais lui-même de la situation actuelle des choses en Orient, et des mesures qu'il me semblait urgent de prendre pour abattre l'audace de Méhémet Ali.

Cet aperçu, entièrement dégagé de toute considération liée à notre propre politique, est rédigé avec une parfaite impartialité, comme s'il avait été conçu dans l'intérêt seul de l'honneur et de la dignité de la Grande Bretagne.

En traçant ce travail, je n'ai pas hésité un seul instant à croire que notre Auguste Maître daignerait approuver les intentions dans lesquelles je l'ai rédigé, persuadé comme je le suis, que je serai assez heureux de mériter toujours son approbation, lorsque, mettant de côté toute considération personnelle d'intérêt et d'amour-propre, je consacrerai mes efforts à la cause commune du maintien de la paix générale, et de la bonne intelligence entre la Russie et l'Angleterre. C'est dans cette persuasion que j'ose soumettre à votre Excellence le travail ci-joint, tel que je l'ai communiqué à Lord Palmerston.

Ce Ministre, sans me dissimuler l'impossibilité où se trouverait l'Angleterre de se charger à elle seule d'une action décisive à l'égard de l'Egypte, est convenu pourtant envers moi, qu'il ne serait guère possible non plus de rester dans une inaction absolue, et qu'il fallait faire quelque chose pour venir au secours de la Porte, afin de ne pas exposer les Cours Européennes au blâme d'avoir promis au Sultan une assistance qu'elles n'ont pas le moyen de lui prêter,—aveu de faiblesse et d'impuissance qui serait aux yeux du monde une véritable atteinte portée à la dignité des Grandes Cours.

Quel que soit le résultat que puisse produire cet essai, il aura du moins l'avantage d'avoir constaté positivement aux yeux du Ministère Anglais, d'abord, que nous désirons sincèrement une action destinée à sauver l'Empire Ottoman; en second lieu, que nous ne serions nullement jaloux du rôle que l'Angleterre jouerait pour exercer une influence salutaire sur la Question d'Egypte; de plus, que ce n'est point la Russie qui tient à s'attribuer dans cette crise une part prépondérante; enfin, que ce n'est pas notre Cabinet non plus qui veut gêner ni embarrasser le moins du monde la position du Gouvernement Britannique; et que si ce dernier peut décider la France à se joindre aux mesures coercitives qu'il prendrait contre Méhémet Ali, une pareille action collective, sans être pour nous un motif de jalousie et de méfiance, rencontrerait au contraire notre entier assentiment, de même qu'elle a obtenu l'adhésion la plus franche de notre Auguste Maître, à l'époque où Sa Majesté a daigné se prononcer à ce même sujet, il y a un an, lors de son séjour à Tœplitz.

Je dirai plus, si l'Angleterre peut réussir à écarter l'opposition que la France a élevée jusqu' ici contre l'emploi des mesures coercitives envers l'Egypte, en ce cas, l'Empereur verrait avec satisfaction que la mission dont il m'a chargé ait pu concourir à influer moralement sur les déterminations du Gouvernment Français, et à vaincre la résistance opiniâtre qu'il avait opposée jusqu'ici aux démarches conçues à Londres dans l'intérêt Européen de la pacification du Levant.

Au moment de terminer ce rapport, il m'est permis d'espérer encore, que le résultat que je viens de signaler ici pourra être obtenu, et que le Ministère Anglais parviendra à surmonter les difficultés que la France n'a cessé de faire naître depuis si longtems, de manière à compliquer tous les jours davantage la Question d'Egypte.

Si je pouvais quitter Londres avec la certitude que ces difficultés ont été heureusement vaincues, et que le Cabinet Britannique a réussi d'amener la France à se joindre à une action efficace dirigée contre Méhémet Ali, je me féliciterais de pouvoir annoncer à votre Excellence un résultat qui répondrait si utilement à la sollicitude que notre Auguste Maître ne cesse de vouer à l'affermissement du repos de l'Orient.

(Translation.)

Baron Brunnow to Count Nesselrode.—(Communicated confidentially by Baron Brunnow.)

(Extract.) *London*, $\frac{\text{September 26}}{\text{October 8}}$, 1839.

THE very day that the Cabinet Council assembled at Windsor to deliberate upon the affair of Egypt, I received the despatch of the 9th of September, in which your Excellency enjoined me to make you, as soon as possible, acquainted with the decision which the British Government was about to take with respect to that important question.

I immediately requested an interview of Lord Palmerston. The Note which I wrote to him on this point crossed the invitation which he on his

part addressed to me, to call upon him in town, where he would arrive the following day, the 2nd of October.

I will endeavour to lay before your Excellency a summary of this conversation, which we resumed the following day, the 3rd of October; and which, taken together, will enable you, M. le Comte, to form for yourself an exact opinion of the nature of the views which the Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was pleased to communicate to me with a degree of sincerity to which I cannot sufficiently render justice.

He began by telling me, that the Council had taken into serious consideration the overtures with which I had been entrusted.

That it had not hesitated to admit and strongly to appreciate the sincerity of the intention by which those overtures had been dictated.

That on this point the opinion of all the Members of the Cabinet was unanimous, so as to pay the tribute which is due to the rectitude of the intentions of our august Master.

That the desire manifested by the Emperor to come to an amicable understanding with England, with respect to the Affairs of the East, was in entire conformity with the wishes of the British Cabinet; but that the latter is under the necessity of not losing sight of many considerations which make it expedient for it to observe great caution in its proceedings, in order not to run directly counter to opinions which it is important to it that it should have regard for.

Lord Palmerston, on this point, entered into very detailed explanations, which I will endeavour, M. le Comte, to repeat in this place, while I report to you, as faithfully as possible, the very words employed by this Minister.

"The opinion of my Colleagues," said he, "is loudly expressed in favour of the same principles as those which you have set forth on the part of your Cabinet, for the maintenance of the independence and the preservation of the Ottoman Empire. Like you, we desire to act for this purpose in concert with you, and to dedicate thereto a common action. We should be determined to act in this manner *with all the Cabinets* who might be willing to concur with us for the attainment of this object. We should be ready to proceed in this course *with France*, and even *without her*, if she refused to join therein. We persist in thinking that our efforts should be directed to reinstate the Sultan in the possession of Syria. We do not conceal from ourselves that this result cannot be obtained without a display of force designed to overcome the resistance of the Pasha.

"Still, neither can we overlook that the employment of these measures might lead Mehemet Ali to adopt an extreme resolution, and to march his Army on Constantinople.

"If this contingency should occur, we are the first to admit the necessity of seeing Russia interpose her material force to ensure the safety of the capital of the Ottoman Empire. But in that case, my Colleagues are of opinion that it would be desirable and necessary that the military intervention of Russia in the Bosphorus, should not have the appearance of excluding our co-operation.

"According to the unanimous opinion of the Council, the military intervention of Russia, if it should become necessary for the protection and defence of Constantinople, ought to take place in such a manner as that it might be combined with a certain degree of co-operation and assistance on the part of the naval forces of England.

"This co-operation might be settled so as not to blend and not to bring in contact the forces of one Power with those of the other. This distinction would even be the result of a principle on which we are already agreed. As a general proposition, we look upon the two Straits of Constantinople as closed to the flag of war of foreign nations. Consequently, if as an exception to this rule, and for the common interests of the defence of the Ottoman Empire, one of those Straits should be opened to your naval forces, it would be just and natural, that in pursuance of the same exception, the other of those Straits should equally admit our naval forces. They would appear there by no means with the intention of confining or controuling your action. Each of the two Straits would be placed under the protection of the respective Powers, whose forces would in this manner remain separated, and would not find themselves in presence of each other. You on one side, we on the other, would be there to prevent the Egyptian Army from crossing the canal of Constantinople. Placed at a distance from each other, the respective forces would run no risk of coming in contact. Besides, the numerical disproportion which would exist between them, would evidently show that our co-operation could have no hostile tendency with respect to you; for the presence of three or four ships of the line which we should send there, would assuredly not be calculated to compete with your land and sea forces concentrated in the Bosphorus. All that would be necessary for us, would be to prove to the nation, that we have not consented to allow ourselves to be excluded from a common operation, having for its object to preserve the Capital of the Ottoman Empire; that we have not formally agreed to a principle by which Russia would be empowered to exercise that protectorate alone.

"It is not therefore from mistrust as to the intentions of the Emperor, whom we respect, nor from jealousy of Russia, with whom we are sincerely desirous of proceeding together, but only from the considerations above-mentioned that it is impossible for us to accede to an arrangement by which we should ourselves pronounce the absolute exclusion of our flag from a quarter where we should in principle establish the isolated presence of yours."

It is in these terms that Lord Palmerston communicated to me the decision of the Council. He did so in a manner which proved to me that the British Cabinet at the present time entertained no mistrust as to the intentions of our August Master with regard to Turkey. But that in expressing the opinion above set forth, it had merely guarded itself against the attacks which it is easy for it to anticipate, in the event of its lending itself to concessions which might be represented as an injury done to the honour of the British Nation.

After having listened with serious attention to the communication of which I have just given an account, I immediately replied to Lord Palmerston, that in one of our previous conversations, I had already acquainted him with the formal orders which I was furnished with relative to the question of foreign flags in the Sea of Marmora.

That my instructions in this respect were too precise to admit of my deviating from them.

That it certainly was no business of mine to make myself a judge of the considerations on which the opinion of the Members of the Council rested.

That if their determination was taken on this matter, mine must be so likewise.

That the will of the Emperor being for me the sole rule of my conduct, I must stop at the point at which we had arrived; faithfully report to my Court the observations which he had just imparted to me; and wholly reserve to the Emperor to pronounce upon them a decision which rested with himself alone.

That for my part, I was satisfied that our August Master would never, in any case, and even if the views of the two Cabinets could not be reconciled, regret that he had given to England in this serious matter a spontaneous proof of friendship and of confidence.

That I considered that I had sufficiently fulfilled his intentions, if I had succeeded in convincing the British Cabinet of the sincerity of the intentions of His Imperial Majesty, as well as of the friendly dispositions which he has constantly entertained towards Great Britain.

That if those dispositions were appreciated here as they deserve to be, I should consider myself happy in not having unprofitably employed my care and my efforts.

But that I conceived, that I had now reached the extreme limits of the duty which had been assigned to me, and that if the decision of the Council, such as he had just announced it to me, was definitively taken, it only remained for me to suspend our discussions, and to refer the matter to the Emperor, explaining to him the difficulty which had opposed to my proceedings an obstacle which it did not rest with me to remove, unless I deviated from the strict sense of my instruction, which I could in no case allow myself to do without the express sanction of the Emperor.

Lord Palmerston fully admitted the weight and justice of the motives which hindered me from going further. He stated to me, that he would immediately acquaint the Marquess of Clanricarde with what had passed between us, and also with the difficulties which had not permitted us to come to a definitive arrangement on the question of Egypt. On my part, I informed him, that I will submit to my Court a faithful narrative of our conversation. And to assure myself the more of the exactness with which I shall have caught his ideas, I told him that I shall place before him the report which I was about to address to your Excellency, before sending it off. He promised me on his part that he would beforehand communicate to me the despatches he was about to address to Lord Clanricarde.

After having explained to you, M. le Comte, the obstacle which has prevented the continuance of my negotiation, I will abstain from entering here into more ample details respecting the explanations which passed between us on the theoretical and practical question of a naval co-operation.

Moreover, the observations on either side upon this combination offered no novelty. In my view of the case, this question is altogether exhausted. Each party remained of his own opinion, without convincing, and without inducing the other to give way. It certainly did not depend upon me to solve this difficulty to the mutual satisfaction of the two Cabinets. All that I could do was, to prevent it from becoming a subject of controversy between them, and thereby to secure my mission, which was planned by our August Master in a spirit of sincere goodwill, from ending in provoking a disagreeable discussion between Russia and Great Britain.

This rock I conceive I have fortunately avoided: I will say more; I have every reason to hope that my mission has produced the good effect which it was designed to accomplish, and that it has advantageously contributed to satisfy the British Cabinet of the exalted sentiments by which our August Master is animated, as well as of his friendly dispositions towards the Government of Great Britain.

I would fain think, that this impression will continue to operate favourably upon the further communications between the two Courts.

For the moment, that which appears to me most important is, to contrive that the suspension of the definitive arrangement between England and our Cabinet, with respect to the affairs of the East, should not be the occasion of delay, so as to retard and to impede the measures of salvation which the precarious situation of the Ottoman Empire imperatively calls for.

On this point, I have derived great advantage from the observations which His Majesty the Emperor addressed personally to the Marquess of Clanricarde, as well as from those which your Excellency was so good as to impart to me in your despatch of the 9th of September.

The particulars which you communicated to me, as to the state of uncertainty and of moral disorganisation in which the Porte is situated, enabled me to urge upon Lord Palmerston the necessity of taking at length some energetic measures to repress the daring projects of the Pasha of Egypt, and to dispose him to submit to an arrangement based upon equitable conditions.

The urgency which exists for adopting, for this purpose, a more decided attitude is sufficiently admitted by the English Ministry itself. But if it hesitates to take an energetic determination in this respect, it is because it has to struggle against a twofold difficulty.

The first is, that it would not wish to run the risk of driving Mehemet Ali into marching upon Constantinople, so long as England has not come to a previous understanding with us as to the mode of a common action, having for its object to place Constantinople in security against an hostile attack.

The second is, that it would prefer that France should not remain aloof from the measures which might be employed against Mehemet Ali, whilst that Power resists for the last two months all the proposals which have been made to it from hence to induce it to lend itself to the employment of menace and of force against the Viceroy.

Placed thus in the twofold uncertainty of being unable to reckon, on the one hand, upon an understanding with us, since it does not yet exist; on the other, upon a co-operation with the French Government, since it has hitherto been obstinately refused, the British Cabinet feels a degree of hesitation which neutralises the measures which it would desire to take, to support and defend the interests of the Porte.

The reasons of this hesitation explain, M. le Comte, why England has abstained, up to this time, from adopting a decisive attitude with regard to Egypt.

Nevertheless, it has appeared to me, as if the moment had arrived when this hesitation must give way to more weighty considerations. In fact, at a time when every day lost in unprofitable discussions contributes to aggravate the situation of the Turkish Empire, and may bring it to destruction, I have considered it my duty to make a direct appeal to the wisdom of the English Government, to induce it no longer to delay the interposition of the means of action at its disposal, in order to crush the resistance of Mehemet Ali.

It is to this necessity that I called the attention of the Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in a second interview which I had with him on the 3rd of October.

I impressed upon him, that the time which must elapse in writing from hence to Lord Clanricarde, and in receiving his reply, in consequence of our conversation of the preceding day, might be fatal to the Porte; that in its present state, every hour seemed to bring it nearer to its destruction; and that nothing but a prompt and energetic action, on the part of England, could preserve it from an imminent catastrophe.

In support of this truth, I placed before Lord Palmerston a map of Asia Minor; and, pointing out to him the two spots of Tenedos and Alexandria, I said to him, "See where your squadron now is, and see where it ought to be to preserve the Ottoman Empire."

To explain more precisely the considerations which I was desirous at this momentous crisis to submit to the serious examination of Lord Palmerston, I requested his permission to read to him a hasty minute which I had sketched out, in order clearly to explain to the English Ministry itself the actual state of affairs in the East, and the measures which it appeared to me to be urgent to adopt, with a view to humble the audacity of Mehemet Ali.

This minute, wholly divested of every consideration connected with our own policy, is drawn up with perfect impartiality, just as if it were composed with a view only to promote the honour and dignity of Great Britain.

In sketching out this paper, I have not hesitated a single moment to suppose, that our August Master would be pleased to approve the intentions with which I have drawn it up, being sure, that I shall be happy enough always to merit his approbation, when, laying aside every personal consideration of interest and self-love, I shall employ my efforts for the common cause of the maintenance of the general peace, and of the good understanding between Russia and England. It is under this persuasion, that I venture to lay before your Excelleney the annexed document such as I communicated it to Lord Palmerston.

That Minister, without concealing from me the impossibility of England undertaking alone to act decidedly with respect to Egypt, nevertheless agreed with me that it still was scarcely possible to remain in a state of absolute inaction, and that something must be done to succour the Porte, in order not expose the Courts of Europe to the reproach of having promised to the Sultan assistance which they have not the means of affording,—an admission of feebleness and weakness, which in the eyes of the world would be a real affront to the dignity of the Great Courts.

Whatever result may be produced by this attempt, it will at least have the advantage of having positively proved to the English Ministry, first, that we sincerely desire a course of action, having for its object to preserve the Ottoman Empire; secondly, that we should be in nowise jealous of the part which England might play in order to exercise a salutary influence on the question of Egypt; further, that it is not Russia who clings to assigning to herself a preponderating part in the present crisis; lastly, that neither is it our Cabinet which would in the least constrain or embarrass the position of the British Government; and that if the latter can induce France to join in the coercive measures which it might have recourse to against Mehemet Ali, such conjoint action, instead of being to us a motive for jealousy and distrust, would on the contrary meet with our entire concurrence, in the same manner as it received the most frank adhesion of our August Master, at the time when His Majesty was pleased to declare himself on this same matter, a year ago, when he was staying at Töplitz.

I will say further, that if England can succeed in setting aside the opposition which, up to this time, France has offered to the employment of measures of coercion against Egypt, in that case, the Emperor would see with satisfaction that the mission which he entrusted me with, may have contributed to produce a moral influence on the determination of the French Government, and to overcome the obstinate resistance which up to this time it had offered to the measures devised in London for the advancement of the European interest of the pacification of the Levant.

While closing this report, I have still reason to hope, that the result which I have just indicated, will be obtained, and that the English Ministry will surmount the difficulties which France for so long a time has not ceased to originate, so as to render the Question of Egypt every day more complicated.

If I could leave London with the certainty that these difficulties have happily been surmounted, and that the British Cabinet has succeeded in inducing France to unite in an effective system of action against Mehemet Ali, I should congratulate myself on being able to announce to your Excellency a result which would so advantageously respond to the solicitude which our August Master does not cease to devote to the establishment of the repose of the East.

Inclosure in No. 353.

Baron Brunnow's Memorandum on Eastern Affairs.

(Extrait.) *Octobre*, 1839.

DANS la crise actuelle de l'Orient, il est un fait qui enhardit Méhémet Ali et décourage la Porte: c'est l'inaction de l'Angleterre. Car ce fait prouve d'une part, qu'il y a désaccord entre les Grandes Puissances; de l'autre, indécision de la part de l'Angleterre elle-même.

Le jour où celle-ci se décidera à agir, la Porte reprendra courage et les espérances de Méhémet Ali s'évanouiront.

Tout le secret de résoudre la crise du moment d'une manière prompte et pacifique, consistera donc à faire croire aux Musulmans que l'accord entre les Puissances Européennes existe.

Pour cela il ne faut pas un grand déployement de forces; il faut seulement une résolution prompte et énergique, calculée de manière à produire une forte sensation sur la Turquie aussi bien que sur l'Egypte.

C'est sur cette conviction que se fonde le plan d'opération exposé ci-après.

Il a pour but:—

1°. De rassurer la Porte et d'empêcher au sein de la capitale de cet Empire cette désorganisation politique et morale qui y fait tous les jours de plus alarmans progrès.

2°. D'empêcher Ibrahim de mettre à exécution la menace qu'il a faite de se porter en avant, si dans un certain espace de tems donné le Sultan ne souscrivait point aux termes de l'arrangement proposé par le Pacha d'Egypte.

3°. D'influer fortement sur les déterminations de ce dernier, pour le porter à modérer ses prétentions et à transiger avec la Turquie à des conditions équitables.

Le plan qu'il s'agirait d'adopter, serait donc destiné à agir simultanément sur Constantinople, sur la Syrie, et sur Alexandrie.

Selon le plus ou moins de vigueur que l'on voudra employer à l'exécution de ce plan, on peut y procéder de trois manières différentes.

Maximum du Plan d'Opération.

CONSTANTINOPLE.

Déclarer à la Porte qu'elle peut compter sur la ferme résolution du Gouvernement Britannique d'appuyer efficacement ses vrais intérêts; qu'elle ne doit ni se livrer à un fatal découragement, ni se prêter à des concessions humiliantes pour le Sultan; mais attendre avec confiance le résultat des efforts que l'Angleterre fera dans un parfait accord avec ses Alliés; lui annoncer que dans ce but, l'Amiral Stopford vient de recevoir des ordres positifs qui attesteront hautement à la face de l'Europe l'attitude que le Gouvernement Britannique est résolu de prendre pour réprimer les projets ambitieux de Méhémet Ali.

SYRIE.

Donner à l'Amiral Stopford l'ordre:—1°. De se porter avec son escadre sur les côtes de la Syrie, en établissant sa station selon que la saison et les circonstances locales le lui conseilleront, dans la baie de Iskendéroon, ou sur tel autre point qui lui présentera le plus de sécurité.

2°. De détacher un nombre de vaisseaux qu'il jugera suffisant pour aller occuper, soit par surprise, soit de vive force, les ports sur la côte qui servent de principaux dépôts militaires et de communication entre l'Egypte et l'armée d'Ibrahim; à cet effet, la situation de Lattakié et de Bayrouth semblerait d'autant plus importante que leur voisinage des villes d'Alep et de Damas est fait pour agir sur les populations de ces villes, ainsi que sur les tribus Druzes, où règne le plus de mécontentement contre l'administration oppressive du Vice-Roi.

3°. D'envoyer un officier supérieur au quartier-général d'Ibrahim, pour lui déclarer, que s'il fait un seul pas en avant, au mépris des promesses formelles que Méhémet Ali a données aux Puissances Européennes, l'Angleterre se verra obligée de regarder le Pacha d'Egypte comme traître à sa parole et comme déchu de son pouvoir; que dès-lors elle armera au nom de la Porte les populations de la Syrie toute entière, et frappera Méhémet Ali de toute la rigueur que réclamera l'infraction qu'il aurait faite aux engagemens qu'il avait pris de respecter le repos de l'Orient, que toutes les Grandes Puissance ont également à cœur de maintenir et de défendre.

4°. De capturer tous les vaisseaux sous pavillon Egyptien qui auront à bord des munitions de guerre destinées à l'Armée d'Egypte.

EGYPTE.

Envoyer simultanément un officier supérieur à Alexandrie pour faire exactement la même déclaration à Méhémet Ali, en y ajoutant de plus, que si Ibrahim marche, l'Angleterre, sans jalousie et sans méfiance aucune, sera la première à appeler la Russie au secours de la Porte.

Ces mesures si elles sont promptement exécutées, permettent de croire avec une entière certitude: d'abord, qu'Ibrahim, menacé de voir couper ses communications avec l'Egypte, n'osera point s'avancer au centre de l'Asie Mineure; en second lieu, que l'éventualité d'une intervention militaire Russe dans le Bosphore cessera par conséquent de se réaliser; troisièmement, que la position prise par l'Angleterre sur les côtes de la Syrie, ébranlera fortement dans cette contrée l'autorité de Méhémet Ali et y amènera peut-être un état de choses qui, sans coup férir, pourra faire rentrer cette province sous la domination de la Porte, si les populations désirent réellement un pareil retour; enfin, que dans tout état de cause, la Porte négociera une transaction définitive avec l'Egypte, sous des auspices bien plus favorables, lorsque l'Amiral Stopford aura pris pied sur les côtes de la Syrie, que lorsqu'il est à l'ancre devant Ténédos.

Médium du Plan d'Opération.

Déclaration rassurante à Constantinople conçue dans les mêmes termes ci-dessus indiqués;—Ordre à l'Amiral Stopford de se porter sur les côtes de la Syrie pour intercepter les communications entre ce pays et l'Egypte;—capturer les vaisseaux sous pavillon Egyptien;—envoyer un officier à Ibrahim chargé d'un message comminatoire dans le même esprit que nous avons ci-dessus indiqué;—faire une déclaration analogue à Méhémet Ali.

Minimum.

Déclaration rassurante à Constantinople;—Ordre à l'Amiral Stopford d'établir sa station à l'Ile de Rhodes ou à celle de Chypre;—d'envoyer un détachement pour croiser sur les côtes de la Syrie et renvoyer les bâtimens qui portent des munitions de guerre à l'Armée d'Egypte;—expédier un officier à Ibrahim pour lui déclarer que s'il avance, l'Angleterre rendra Méhémet Ali et toute sa famille responsable des conséquences que pourra entraîner la reprise des hostilités. Même déclaration à Alexandrie.

Observations générales.

1°. Exécuter toutes ces mesures avec la plus grande promptitude et le plus grand secret. Promptitude,—parceque c'est le seul moyen d'en assurer le succès; secret, parcequ'il faut frapper d'abord le coup avant de l'annoncer.

2°. En déclarant à Méhémet Ali que si Ibrahim marche, l'Angleterre sera la première à inviter la Russie à venir au secours de la Porte, le Gouvernement Britannique produit l'effet qu'il importe essentiellement d'obtenir, car il fait voir à Méhémet Ali que l'accord entre l'Angleterre et la Russie existe.

3°. Si le Gouvernement Britannique le juge indispensable, l'Amiral Stopford pourra laisser un détachement de 3 à 4 vaisseaux à Ténédos, bien qu'il soit préférable qu'il ait à sa disposition toutes ses forces réunies, que de les diviser.

4°. En ce qui concerne la France, l'Angleterre en adoptant la marche ci-dessus indiquée, n'empêcherait en rien que le Cabinet des Tuileries vînt s'y associer, s'il le jugeait à propos. Le Gouvernement Britannique commencerait seulement par agir d'abord sans se laisser retenir davantage par la résistance que le Ministère Français a opposée depuis trois mois à toutes les propositions qui lui ont été successivement adressées par le Cabinet de Londres. La France serait libre de suivre le mouvement de l'Angleterre, mais celle-ci serait assurément dans son plein droit en usant de la liberté qu'elle a à son tour de marcher en avant sans se laisser paralyser par une opposition qui, en dernière analyse, finirait par assurer, sous la protection de la France, le triomphe de l'Egypte et la ruine de la Porte.

Conclusion.

D'après un mûr examen, le plan tel qu'il vient d'être exposé ci-dessus, semblerait réunir de grands avantages sans présenter le moindre inconvénient. L'Angleterre en l'adoptant agirait avec la dignité et l'énergie qui appartient à une Grande Puissance; elle employerait le seul moyen qui reste, selon tous les calculs de la prudence humaine, pour préserver l'Empire Ottoman d'une catastrophe qui deviendra inévitable, si les Cabinets de l'Europe continuent encore à discuter comme ils l'ont fait jusqu'ici, sans probabilité aucune d'en venir à une conclusion positive; et s'ils hésitent encore plus longtems à prendre une attitude forte pour imposer un frein aux projets ambitieux du Pacha d'Egypte.

En dernière analyse, l'Angleterre, si elle se décide à agir, a une grande chance de sauver l'Empire Ottoman; tandisque si elle n'agit point, elle a la certitude que cet Empire croulera, ou du moins que le Sultan pour retarder cette chûte, sera contraint de subir toutes les conditions que Méhémet Ali voudra lui imposer;—transaction désastreuse pour la Porte et humiliante pour tous les Cabinets qui, après avoir promis leur assistance et leur médiation à la Turquie, auront fini par l'abandonner sans défense.

(Translation.)

Baron Brunnow's Memorandum on Eastern Affairs.

October, 1839.

IN the existing crisis of affairs in the East, there is one circumstance which encourages Mehemet Ali, and discourages the Porte; this is, the inaction of England. For this circumstance proves, on the one hand, that there is disunion among the Great Powers; on the other, the existence of indecision on the part of England herself.

The day that England shall determine to act, the Porte will recover courage, and the hopes of Mehemet Ali will vanish away.

The whole secret for bringing the present crisis to a solution, in a prompt and peaceable manner, will consist therefore in inspiring the Mussulmans with the belief that the European Powers are united.

For this purpose no great display of force is requisite: a prompt and energetic resolution, so devised as to produce a strong sensation in Turkey as well as in Egypt, is all that is required.

It is on this persuasion that the plan of operations hereafter explained rests.

Its object is:

1st. To reassure the Porte, and to put a stop in the very capital of that Empire to that political and moral disorganization which is there daily making the most alarming progress.

2ndly. To prevent Ibrahim from carrying into execution the threat which he has uttered of advancing, if within a given space of time the Sultan should not consent to the terms of the arrangement proposed by the Pasha.

3rdly. To exert a strong influence over the determinations of the latter, in order to induce him to moderate his pretensions, and to come to a settlement with Turkey on equitable conditions.

The plan to be adopted then should be designed to operate at the same time upon Constantinople, upon Syria, and upon Alexandria.

Three different courses may be adopted, according as it may be desired to employ more or less vigour in the execution of this plan.

Maximum of the Plan of Operations.

CONSTANTINOPLE.

To declare to the Porte that it can rely upon the firm resolution of the British Government effectually to support its real interests: that it must not give way to fatal despondency, nor lend itself to concessions humiliating to the Sultan; but wait with confidence the result of the effort which England will make in perfect concert with her Allies; to announce to it that, for this end, Admiral Stopford has received positive orders which will plainly manifest, in the face of Europe, the attitude which the British Government is determined to take, in order to repress the ambitious projects of Mehemet Ali.

SYRIA.

To order Admiral Stopford: 1st. To proceed with his squadron to the Coast of Syria, and there station himself according as the season and local circumstances shall render advisable, in the Bay of Scanderoon, or at such other point as shall offer the greatest security.

2ndly. To detach what he may consider a sufficient number of ships, to occupy, either by surprise or by force, the ports on the coasts which serve as the principal military depôts, and as points of communication between Egypt and the Army of Ibrahim; for this purpose the situation of Latakia and of Beyrout would appear so much the more important, as their vicinity to the cities of Aleppo and of Damascus is calculated to produce an influence on the people of those cities, as well as upon the Druse tribes, among whom the greatest discontent against the oppressive administration of the Viceroy is prevalent.

3rdly. To send a superior officer to Ibrahim's head-quarters, to declare to him, that if he advances a single step in disregard of the formal promises given by Mehemet Ali to the European Powers, England will feel under the necessity of considering the Pasha as a traitor to his word, and as having forfeited his power; that thereupon she will arm, in the name of the Porte, the people of the whole of Syria, and will strike Mehemet Ali with all the force which shall be called for by his infringement of the engagements taken by him to respect the repose of the East, which all the Great Powers have equally at heart to maintain and to defend.

4thly. To capture all the vessels under the Egyptian flag which shall have on board munitions of war destined for the Army of Egypt.

EGYPT.

To send at the same time a superior officer to Alexandria, to make precisely the same declaration to Mehemet Ali; adding, moreover, that if Ibrahim should march, England, without any jealousy and distrust, will be the first to summon Russia to the assistance of the Porte.

These measures, if executed with promptitude, warrant us in believing with certainty,—first, that Ibrahim, menaced with having his communications with Egypt cut off, will not dare to advance into the centre of Asia Minor; secondly, that the contingency of a military intervention of Russia in the Bosphorus, will, consequently, not be realized; thirdly, that the position assumed by England on the coasts of Syria will greatly shake in that country the authority of Mehemet Ali, and will, perhaps, bring on there a state of things which, without a blow, will cause that province to return under the sway of the Porte, if the people really desire so to return; lastly, that in every state of the case, the Porte will negotiate a definitive arrangement with Egypt under much more favourable circumstances, when Admiral Stopford shall have taken up a position on the coasts of Syria, than when he is at anchor before Tenedos.

Medium of the Plan of Operation.

An encouraging declaration at Constantinople, couched in the terms indicated above; orders to Admiral Stopford to proceed to the coasts of Syria for the purpose of cutting off the communications between that country and Egypt; to capture vessels under the Egyptian flag; to send an officer to Ibrahim to convey to him a threatening message in the same sense as that which we have suggested above; to make a corresponding declaration to Mehemet Ali.

Minimum.

An encouraging declaration at Constantinople; orders to Admiral Stopford to take up a position at Rhodes or at Cyprus; to send a detachment to cruize on the coasts of Syria, and to turn away the vessels which may convey warlike stores to the army of Egypt; to despatch an officer to Ibrahim to declare to him, that if he advances, England will make Mehemet Ali and all his family responsible for the consequences which the resumption of hostilities may bring on. The same declaration to be made at Alexandria.

General Observations.

1st. To execute all these measures with the greatest promptitude and with the greatest secrecy. Promptitude,—because it is the only means of ensuring their success; secrecy,—because the blow must first be struck before it is announced.

2ndly. By declaring to Mehemet Ali, that if Ibrahim marches, England will be the first to invite Russia to come to the assistance of the Prte, the British Government produces the effect which it is of essential importance to obtain, for it lets Mehemet Ali see, that union exists between England and Russia.

3rdly. If the British Government considers it indispensable, Admiral

Stopford can leave at Tenedos a detachment of three or four sail of the line, although it were better that he should have at his disposal his whole forces united, than that he should divide them.

4thly. As for France, England by adopting the course above pointed out, would in no wise prevent the Cabinet of the Tuileries co-operating in it, if it thought fit to do so. The British Government would merely commence by acting in the first instance, without allowing itself to be any longer restrained by the resistance which the French Ministry for the last three months has offered to all the proposals which have successively been made to it by the Cabinet of London. France would be free to follow the motions of England, but the latter would surely be fully entitled to make use of the liberty which on her part she possesses, of proceeding without suffering herself to be paralyzed by opposition, which, in the last instance, would end by ensuring, under the protection of France, the triumph of Egypt and the ruin of the Porte.

Conclusion.

After an attentive examination, the plan above sketched out would appear to unite great advantages without offering the slightest inconvenience. England, by adopting it, would act with the dignity and with the energy appertaining to a Great Power; she would employ the only means which remain, according to all calculations of human wisdom, for the preservation of the Ottoman Empire from a catastrophe which will be inevitable, if the Cabinets of Europe still continue to discuss, as they have hitherto done, without any probability of arriving at a positive conclusion; and if they still hesitate any longer to assume a strong attitude in order to controul the ambitious projects of the Pasha of Egypt.

Finally, England, if she decides upon acting, has a great chance of saving the Ottoman Empire; whereas, if she does not act, she has the certainty that that Empire will crumble to pieces, or, at least, that the Sultan, to delay its fall, will be compelled to submit to all the conditions which Mehemet Ali shall be willing to impose upon him; an occurrence disastrous for the Porte, and humiliating for all the Cabinets, which, after having promised their assistance and their mediation to Turkey, will have ended by abandoning her without defence.

No. 354.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received October* 28.)

(Extract.) *Paris, October* 25, 1839.

I HAVE received your Lordship's despatches to the 22nd of October. Marshal Soult this morning read to me despatches dated the 7th, which he had just received from Alexandria and from Constantinople. They first mention rumours of Ibrahim Pasha having withdrawn his head-quarters from Marash to Aleppo, and of insurrections having broken out in parts of Syria, but add, that the truth of these rumours was very doubtful. Mehemet Ali had removed to Cairo, as he says, for the benefit of his health by the change of air, and as said by others, to be out of the way of further discussions with the European Consuls.

The French Ambassador in one of his despatches transmits a copy of a letter addressed by Mehemet Ali to Hosrew Pasha, written with the intention of inducing the latter to enter into negotiations for peace without the intervention of the European Powers; and the Ambassador also reports the substance of a despatch received by the Internuncio from Count Fiquelmont, recommending that a peace should be concluded upon the basis of the Sultan conceding to Mehemet Ali the hereditary government of Egypt, and the government of Syria, and of Candia, during the life of Mehemet Ali, holding out the hope, that at his death these Pashalics may be divided among his children.

A courier arrived this morning at the Austrian Embassy from Prince Metternich; he is also charged with despatches to Prince Esterhazy, and will proceed immediately to London. Count Appony read to me a despatch from Prince Metternich, in which his Highness writes, that although his wishes are always for the least possible concession being made by the Sultan to the demands of Mehemet Ali, yet that the Austrian Government can now only wait until the French and English Governments arrive at an agreement as to the conditions of peace which the Great Powers shall propose to the respective parties.

No. 355.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 28.)

(Extract.) *Paris, October* 25, 1839.

THE French Government states, that if it were supposed that it has any desire to aggrandize the Pasha of Egypt, such supposition is utterly groundless. It would be well content not only to accede to an arrangement which should deprive the Pasha of all the dominions he governed, excepting Egypt, but also to one which should restore to the Sultan the possession of Egypt itself. The question, however, is not what is desirable, but what is feasible; and it sees not the means of driving Mehemet Ali out of Syria by force, or of so embarrassing him by naval operations as to induce him to make the sacrifice of such extensive and important dominions. France, whatever might be the intention of its Government, could not furnish a military force for this purpose. England is not prepared to send an army to Syria, nor are the Austrian and Prussian Governments willing to employ their troops in such an enterprise. The execution of it, therefore, could only be undertaken by Russia; and considering the difficulties which a Russian army would have to encounter, and the force which Ibrahim Pasha could bring into the field, there may be doubts of the success of its operations, but none as to the remedy being worse than the disease.

The moral power of the Sultan would be far more seriously impaired by having his empire and his capital protected by the arms of Russia, than by the undue aggrandizement of his vassal; and the French Government never had been more surprised than at the favourable consideration your Lordship had given to the Baron Brunnow's proposition, that the troops of the Emperor Nicholas should occupy Asia Minor, and the defence of Constantinople be confided to a Russian force.

I have not failed to point out, that the proposal made by Baron Brunnow implied the virtual abandonment of the principle hitherto asserted and acted upon by the Russian Government, of not considering the affairs of Turkey an European Question, and of excluding from all discussion with other Powers the relations of the Ottoman Empire with Russia; and that it was only under a Convention specially binding the Russian Government to withdraw its troops from the territories of the Sultan when called upon to do so by the other Great European Powers, that the protection of the Sultan from the Egyptian army would have been confided to Russia.

The reply has been, that whatever confidence the English Government may be disposed to place in the proposed Convention, such Convention would not be an abrogation of the Unkiar Skelessi Treaty, but a sanction given by the other Powers to the carrying that Treaty into execution, against which both England and France had protested. In the present state of things, the French Government says, it has only to wait the progress of events. It has communicated to the other Powers its views in regard to bringing about a peace between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali. The conditions proposed are such as the Pasha may be expected to accept, and which the Sultan might concede with far less danger to the Turkish Empire than might result to it from an attempt to enforce greater sacrifices from Mehemet Ali.

No. 356.

Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

My Lords, *Foreign Office, October* 29, 1839.

AS it appears that Ibrahim Pasha has retired from Marash, and as he does not seem to indicate any intention of advancing upon Constantinople, Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that it would be expedient that Admiral

Sir Robert Stopford should be directed to proceed, with the squadron under his command, to Smyrna, or to any other convenient anchorage on the coast of Asia Minor, if the weather should compel him to leave Besika Bay.

This course would be better than that he should proceed to the White Cliffs, unless some reason with which Her Majesty's Government is at present unacquainted, should render it preferable for the squadron to go to the White Cliffs.

I have, therefore, to signify to your Lordships the Queen's commands, that instructions to the above effect may be given to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford.

If, however, when those instructions reach Sir Robert Stopford, the squadron should already have anchored at the White Cliffs, and should find itself safe in that anchorage, it may remain there until further instructions, or until Sir Robert Stopford, with a view to his own arrangements, may find it more convenient to go to Smyrna.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 357.

The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 29.)

(Extract.) *St. Petersburgh, October* 18, 1839.

THE proposition of the French Cabinet, to which I referred in my last despatch, is the same that has been made through M. de St. Aulaire to the Austrian Government, and has been communicated to your Lordship.

M. de Barante tells me, that no answer has been given to it by Count Nesselrode.

I cannot learn that there is any truth in the reports lately circulated in English and French newspapers, that the army in the south of Russia and on the Turkish frontier has been augmented. But I am informed, that the number of troops usually withdrawn during the winter months from the neighbourhood of Odessa and Sevastopol, will be continued in their present station during the winter: so that there will always be 20,000 men ready for embarkation at a short notice.

No. 358.

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, October* 29, 1839.

YOUR Excellency will find in my despatches to Mr. Bulwer, an account of the communications which have passed between Count Sébastiani and myself, upon Turkish affairs up to a certain point of the negotiation. Subsequently to the period to which those despatches relate, I had a conversation with Count Sébastiani, in which I stated that Her Majesty's Government regretted extremely that it was quite impossible for them to concur in the final arrangement between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, which the Government of France recommended, and which was to consist in granting to Mehemet Ali an hereditary tenure in the government of all the territories and places which he now occupies, except the small district of Adana, which the French Government proposed should be immediately restored to the direct authority of the Sultan, and except also the Island of Candia, which the French Government thought might, at the death of Mehemet Ali, be given to one of his younger sons.

I said that such an arrangement would be a virtual dismemberment of the Turkish Empire, the integrity of which France had spontaneously declared her full determination to maintain; for such an arrangement would give to Mehemet Ali independence in all but the name; it would leave him stronger than the Sultan, and in the uncontrolled possession of the resources, financial and military, of the best part of the Sultan's dominions. Mehemet Ali, therefore, would require nothing in order to make himself independent, but the will to do so; for the Sultan would be entirely unable to prevent him from so doing. But Mehemet Ali announced to the Powers of Europe very frankly last year, that his object was independent sovereignty; that he would never give up his determination to attain that object; and that he was firmly resolved to accomplish it. If, therefore, the Five Powers were to help him half way on his road, by advising the Sultan to grant him hereditary tenure of what he now occupies, they could have no just reason to be surprised if, in the course of a very short period afterwards, he were to withhold his tribute, alter his title, call himself King of the Arabs instead of Pasha of Egypt, and thus dismember the Ottoman Empire in word as well as in fact.

I said that Her Majesty's Government, therefore, could not concur with the Government of France, in pursuing a course which must demonstrably lead to results so diametrically opposite to those which both Governments have pledged themselves to obtain, and which are necessary for the best interests of Europe.

But I said that, as the French Government seem so anxious to procure better terms for Mehemet Ali, we would endeavour to see if it were not possible to render the proposed arrangement somewhat more favourable to him, without injury to the fundamental principle upon which the arrangement ought to rest.

I then pointed out upon the map a line which would extend the hereditary Pashalic of Mehemet Ali without any material danger to the Sultan; and I suggested, that instead of placing the eastern limit of the Pasha's Government at El Arish, which is the proper boundary of Egypt, his Pashalic might be made to continue along the sea-coast, as far north as the cape formed by Mount Carmel; that the boundary might from thence run in a straight line to the southern extremity of the Lake Tiberias; thence down the River Jordan to the Dead Sea; thence along the whole of the western shore of the Dead Sea to its southern extremity; and from thence to the head of the Gulf of Akaba, and along the western coast of that gulf to Cape Ras Mahommed; and so round by the eastern shore of the Gulf of Suez to Suez. Thus excluding from the hereditary Pashalic the Fortress of St. John of Acre and the caravan road from Damascus to the Holy Cities. The Fortress of Acre, I observed, is the key of Syria, and on that account ought to be held by the Sultan: and the possession of the Holy Cities, as was very justly pointed out by the French Government in the early part of the negotiation, is essential for the Sultan; and therefore it is necessary that the authority of Mehemet Ali should not extend over the road which leads to those cities.

I said that the arrangement which I had thus suggested would certainly be objectionable, because it would bring the territory administered by the Pasha too closely in contact with that administered by the direct authority of the Sultan, and because it would not interpose any adequate barrier between those territories; but, nevertheless, it might be recommended to the Sultan, if all the Five Powers were prepared to employ whatever means might in any case be necessary to carry it into execution.

I said that if such a modification of our original plan would obtain for Her Majesty's Government the concurrence and co-operation of the Government of France, we should be willing to agree to it; but I begged Count Sébastiani to understand that this was the utmost extent of modification to which Her Majesty's Government could be a party; and that it appeared to me that it would be far better for the Sultan to let things remain as they are, and to take the chance of future events, than to consent to grant to Mehemet Ali an hereditary tenure in the government of any greater extent of the territory of the Ottoman Empire.

I observed, that Her Majesty's Government had afforded repeated proofs of its willingness to modify its own opinions for the purpose of obtaining the co-operation of France.

First, Her Majesty's Government had given up one part of the instructions which it had proposed should be sent to the admirals, for obtaining the restoration of the Turkish fleet; next, Her Majesty's Government had waved the proposal which it had made, that the restoration of the Turkish fleet should be demanded and enforced, without waiting for a general agreement among the Five Powers as to the final arrangement to be made between the Sultan and the Pasha; and now Her Majesty's Government is willing, if, by so doing, it can obtain the co-operation of France, considerably to enlarge the boundary which we had proposed for the hereditary Pashalic of Mehemet Ali. I expressed a hope that the spirit of conciliation thus shown by Her Majesty's Government would be duly appreciated, and that the French Government would accede to the suggestion now made, and would consent to join with the other Powers in such measures as might be necessary for carrying the arrangement, so modified, into effect.

Count Sébastiani said he would report to his Government what I had proposed, and the statements I had made; and that he would let me know as soon as he should have received a reply.

After the proper time had elapsed for the arrival of an answer from Paris, Count Sébastiani came to me and showed me a despatch from Marshal Soult, which stated that the French Government could not agree to the suggestion which Her Majesty's Government had made, but still adhered to its own proposal,—namely, that Mehemet Ali should have hereditary tenure in the government of everything which he now occupies, except Candia and the district of Adana; Candia to be retained by him during his life, with reversion to one of his younger sons; Adana to be immediately evacuated by him and to be restored to the Sultan. Such an arrangement the French Government thought would probably be agreed to by Mehemet Ali; but as the despatch did not distinctly say that France would be a party to coercive measures to enforce even this arrangement if it were rejected by Mehemet Ali, and as, on the contrary, the French Government appeared to labour under the greatest dread of employing in any case coercion against the Pasha, the natural inference to be drawn was, that even these conditions, inadmissible as they were, were not to be proposed to Mehemet Ali as an ultimatum, but were to be considered liable to extension if he should not consent to accept them. In fact, the despatch seemed very plainly to imply, that France would not be a party to any arrangement to which Mehemet Ali should not spontaneously and without coercion agree.

As this reply rendered all further negotiation or discussion useless, I contented myself with expressing to Count Sébastiani the regret which Her Majesty's Government must feel at thus losing all prospect of arriving at a common understanding with France upon these urgent and important matters; and I said that as the last proposal of Her Majesty's Government had been declined by France, that proposal must be considered as withdrawn, and as not having been made; and Her Majesty's Government must again take its stand upon the plan which it originally proposed, and which goes to limit the hereditary Pashalic of Mehemet Ali to Egypt, ending to the eastward at El Arish.

It is needless for me in writing to your Excellency, to dwell upon the regret with which Her Majesty's Government have learnt the present views and opinions of the French Government upon these matters; because your Excellency has, by your personal communications with Her Majesty's Government during your late visit to England, become fully acquainted with its sentiments upon all these affairs. But as your Excellency is hereby instructed to give to Marshal Soult a copy of this despatch as the least formal way of conveying to the French Government in an official manner, and of thus placing on record the sentiments of the British Government, I cannot refrain from stating, that the views and intentions expressed by the French Government in the outset of these negotiations were not calculated to prepare Her Majesty's Government for the course which the French Cabinet has subsequently adopted and seems to intend to pursue. A short recital of facts will suffice to show how natural the disappointment is which Her Majesty's Government feel upon this occasion.

When first it became certain that hostilities were going to break out between Mehemet Ali and the Sultan, the French Government came forward generously and spontaneously, as the champion and protector of the Sultan. It not only concurred with the British Government in giving instructions to the combined squadrons in the Mediterranean to use coercive measures to compel Mehemet Ali to stop his army and to cease hostilities, but it made of its own accord a formal declaration to the other Four Powers, announcing its determination to maintain "the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire under its present dynasty, and to employ all *its influence and means of action* in order to maintain the security of this essential element of the balance of power," and "to oppose any combination which should be hostile to that independence and integrity;" and it invited the other Powers to make to it similar declarations in reply.

Great Britain complied with this invitation, and immediately responded in similar terms.

The French Government then proposed, that the measures to be taken with respect to Turkish affairs should be decided by a conference of the Five Powers at Vienna. This proposition was entirely in accordance with the spirit of the preceding declaration, and, when coupled with that declaration, it naturally led Her Majesty's Government to suppose that the object intended to be attained by the deliberations of such a conference, was to be, to secure for the future, upon a firm and stable foundation, the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

But, in order that the assembled Plenipotentiaries should be able to accomplish that end, it was obviously necessary that they should all come with full powers to concur in any measures of execution which might be found requisite for that purpose; and therefore it is evident that the French Government could not at that time have considered unconditional submission to the Pasha, as the only course that could be recommended to the Sultan.

Nor was this all, the French Ambassador at Constantinople, acting in accordance with what he must have supposed to be the intentions of his Government, signed a Collective Note, by which the Five Powers requested the Porte not to make any terms with the Pasha by a separate negotiation, but to be guided in its arrangements with Mehemet Ali by the advice of the Five Powers,—a recommendation which would have been unsuitable towards an Ally in distress, unless the parties who gave it were determined to obtain for the Sultan, by their interference, better terms than in his present state he was likely to get by direct negotiation with the Pasha; for it is evident that if they intended merely to advise the Sultan to submit to whatever terms the Pasha might be willing to impose, the Collective Note was only calculated to excite in the mind of the Sultan delusive expectations of support.

These acts of the French Government and of its Agent certainly led Her Majesty's Government to think, that France was resolved to afford her steady co-operation in effecting such a final arrangement between Mehemet Ali and his Sovereign as might, by relieving the Sultan from future danger on the part of the Pasha, tend to secure the "independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire under its present dynasty;" and it has been with deep regret that Her Majesty's Government have observed the appearance of a sudden change in the feelings and policy of the French Government on these matters. For the Cabinet of Paris soon declined to be a party to any effectual measures, in order to compel Mehemet Ali to restore to the Sultan that fleet, the possession of which, as a means of naval defence for Constantinople, is obviously necessary in order to enable him to maintain the shadow of that independence which Her Majesty's Government had been led to believe the Government of France was resolved to uphold. The Collective Note which, not having been disavowed, still constitutes an undeniable pledge of support from France to the Sultan, has lost, nevertheless, some part of its moral weight, by the subsequent recall of the Ambassador who signed it; and the effect of the assurance that France would employ all her influence and means of action, in order to maintain the Ottoman Empire under its present dynasty, has been unfortunately neutralized by the intimations since given by the French Government, that it had no influence or means of action which it could usefully or successfully employ, in order to reduce the pretensions of the Pasha within any limits which Her Majesty's Government can think compatible with the integrity and independence of Turkey.

The British Government proposed to the other Four Powers a plan of arrangement between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, which, in principle, was approved by all, not excepting even France herself; but the French Government, after admitting that the arrangement so proposed would, if carried into effect, best tend to secure the future peace of the Levant, and to consolidate the resources of the Turkish Empire, declined to be a party to any measures for carrying that arrangement into execution, and proposed a plan of its own which amounts virtually to an immediate dismemberment of that empire.

So obvious, indeed, is the tendency of that plan, that the partisans of Mehemet Ali, upon becoming acquainted with that scheme, hailed it as a declaration of the French Government in favour of the Pasha, and loudly proclaimed it as a proof that France would not join in any measures of coercion against him.

Her Majesty's Government need scarcely say, that they attach no weight or value to the interpretations of the policy of the French Government thus made by the partisans of Mehemet Ali, except inasmuch as they show to what an extent circumstances have combined to deprive the Sultan of the benefit of that influence which the original declaration of the French Government must have led him to count upon.

It appears, then, from the foregoing recital, that the French Government, which began by declaring itself the protector of the Sultan, has now become in appearance, and for practical purposes in the negotiation, the protector of the Pasha; and Her Majesty's Government finding at the present time a state of things so different from that which existed when these negotiations commenced, cannot refrain from expressing its very sincere and deep regret, that the opinions and views of the two Cabinets should appear to be so widely different upon a matter of such great European importance, and upon which it would have been so desirable that Great Britain and France could have acted in concert.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 359.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 2.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October* 8, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of an instruction addressed by his Excellency the Internuncio to the Austrian Consul-General at Alexandria, and also copy of a letter from myself to Her Majesty's Agent and Consul-General in Egypt.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 359.

Baron Stürmer to M. de Laurin.

Monsieur, *Constantinople, le* 5 *Octobre*, 1839.

S. A. LE GRAND VIZIR m'a fait communiquer la dernière lettre que lui a adressée le Pacha d'Egypte. Le ton qu'y règne est à la vérité un peu plus modéré que celui qu'il avait pris jusqu'ici dans ses ouvertures envers le Divan de Sa Hautesse. Mais ce que m'y a frappé, c'est que Méhémet Ali parait se flatter toujours d'amener la Porte à un arrangement auquel les Grandes Puissances de l'Europe, sous l'égide desquelles elle se trouve placée, resteraient étrangères. Est-il possible qu'un homme qui dans sa longue carrière a fait preuve d'une sagacité peu ordinaire, puisse s'aveugler à ce point, lorsqu'il s'agit de ses propres intérêts? Je ne doute pas, Monsieur, qu'en en appelant à cette même sagacité, vous ne parveniez à lui faire comprendre l'erreur où il se trouve, et à l'éclairer sur sa véritable situation. Voici les réflexions qui vous aurez à lui remettre.

Les malheurs de la Porte et l'abilité qu'il a su mettre à en profiter, lui ont donné des forces supérieures. Il peut en abuser: il peut dans le moment actuel enlever encore à la Porte des plus grands territoires; personne n'est là pour s'y opposer. Il peut garder la flotte Ottomane; les Alliés du Sultan n'emploieront pas la force pour la reprendre, car sa destruction serait la suite probable du conflit. Méhémet Ali peut donc, s'il le veut, se complaire dans la conviction et dans l'abus de sa puissance matérielle. Mais où tout cela le ménera-t-il si l'Europe lui est hostile? En supposant même qu'elle ne fit rien pour le combattre, elle possède contre lui une arme redoutable: c'est celle de son avenir.

Que veut-il en effet? Il ne cesse de répéter que tout ce qu'il fait n'a d'autre but que celui de fonder l'avenir de sa famille. Croit-il, par exemple, que la haine personnelle qui l'a animé jusqu'ici contre Hosreff Pacha, soit une bonne base à donner à l'établissement de sa famille? A-t-il jamais vu un sentiment de cette nature fonder quelque chose de durable? Plus il a fait d'efforts pour rapprocher l'Egypte de l'Europe par son administration, par les arts et par le commerce, plus il a dû apprendre et mieux il comprendra que la sanction de

l'Europe est nécessaire à l'existence régulière et à la durée d'une position politique quelconque. Qu'il ne se trompe donc pas sur la nature de la supériorité de ses forces: elles ne suffisent pas pour lui donner l'avenir qu'il veut fonder. Si même le Sultan lui accordait toutes les concessions qu'il demande, elles ne suffiraient pas pour consolider sa position, car l'Europe ne les sanctionnerait pas. Voilà ce dont il doit se pénétrer surtout, et ce que je vous autorise, Monsieur, à lui dire au nom de la Cour Impériale.

Il y a un siècle que Méhémet Ali, Chef des Musulmans révoltés, aurait pu fonder un nouvel Empire: il aurait existé dans cet état de séparation et d'isolement qui rendait alors l'Europe peu attentive à des évènemens de cette nature. Mais Méhémet Ali a lui-même voué sa vie à l'établissement d'un autre ordre de choses: il a besoin, sous peine de passer comme un météore, de la sanction de l'Europe, et l'Europe ne sanctionnera que ce qui laissera intact le principe de la souveraineté du Sultan.

Si Méhémet Ali fonde l'espoir du succès de sa résistance sur la conviction qu'il parait avoir de la difficulté qu'auraient les Puissances d'adopter en concert des mesures actives contre lui, il doit sentir qu'elles se mettraient facilement d'accord pour refuser leur sanction à un ordre de choses qu'elles trouveraient trop onéreux pour la Porte: une mesure négative n'est jamais difficile à prendre.

En mettant tous vos soins, Monsieur, à rendre cette position intelligible à Méhémet Ali, vous servirez ses intérêts aussi bien que ceux de la Porte. Je vais donner connaissance de cette dépêche aux Ambassadeurs de France et d'Angleterre, ainsi qu'aux Envoyés de Russie et de Prusse, et je ne doute pas que MM. vos Collègues ne reçoivent l'ordre de tenir au Pacha le même langage.

Recevez, &c.,
(Signé) STURMER.

(Translation.)

Baron Stürmer to M. de Laurin.

Sir, *Constantinople, October* 5, 1839.

HIS Highness the Grand Vizier has caused the last letter which the Pasha of Egypt has addressed to him to be communicated to me. The tone which pervades it is in truth a little more moderate than that which he had hitherto assumed in his overtures to the Divan of His Highness. But that which struck me in it is, that Mehemet appears to continue to flatter himself that he will bring the Porte to an arrangement, to which the Great Powers of Europe, under whose ægis the Porte is placed, shall be strangers. Is it possible that a man who has given proof during his long career of no common sagacity, can be so blind when his own interests are concerned? I do not doubt, Sir, that by appealing to that sagacity you will be enabled to make him understand his error, and to enlighten him as to his real position. These are the reflections which you should lay before him.

The misfortunes of the Porte, and the skill which he has shown in taking advantage of them, have given him a superiority of force. He can abuse it; he can wrest still larger territories from the Porte at the present moment; nobody is there to oppose him. He may keep the Ottoman fleet; the Allies of the Sultan will not employ force to retake it, for its destruction would probably be the result of a combat. Mehemet Ali may then, if he chooses, revel in the conviction and in the abuse of his material power. But where would this lead him, if Europe is hostile to him? Even supposing she were to do nothing to combat him, she possesses a formidable weapon against him, that of his future position.

In fact, what does he want? He ceases not to repeat that all that he has done has no other object than that of founding the future position of his family. Does he imagine, for example, that the personal hatred by which he has hitherto been animated against Hosrew Pasha is a good basis for the establishment of his family? Did he ever see a feeling of this nature serve as a foundation for anything lasting? The more efforts he has made to approximate Egypt to Europe by his administration, by commerce and the arts, the more he must have learnt and the better he will understand, that the sanction of Europe is necessary to the regular existence and to the continuance of every political position.

Let him not therefore deceive himself as to the superiority of his forces. They are not sufficient to give him the future position which he wishes to found. Even if the Sultan were to make all the concessions which he asks for, they would not suffice to consolidate his position, for Europe would not give its sanction to them. He should be convinced of this above all things, and this is what I authorize you, Sir, to tell him in the name of the Imperial Court.

A century back Mehemet Ali, chief of the revolted Mussulmans, might have founded a new empire: it would have existed in that state of separation and isolation which at that period rendered Europe but little attentive to events of this kind. But Mehemet has himself devoted his life to the establishment of a new order of things; he requires the sanction of Europe, at the risk of passing away like a meteor, and Europe will only sanction that which leaves the principle of the sovereignty of the Sultan untouched.

If Mehemet Ali rests the hope of his successful resistance upon the conviction which he appears to entertain of the difficulty which the Powers would have in adopting in concert active measures against him, he must feel that they would easily come to an agreement to refuse their sanction to a state of things which they should find too burdensome for the Porte; it is never difficult to take a negative step.

You will promote the interests of Mehemet Ali, as well as those of the Porte, by using all your endeavours to make him understand this position.

I shall communicate this despatch to the Ambassadors of France and England, as well as to the Envoys of Russia and Prussia, and I have no doubt that your Colleagues will be directed to hold similar language to the Pasha.

Accept, &c.,
(Signed) STURMER.

Inclosure 2 in No. 359.

Viscount Ponsonby to Colonel Campbell.

Sir, *Therapia, October* 5, 1839.

YOUR Colleague, the Austrian Consul-General, will have received an instruction from his Excellency the Internuncio, dated Constantinople, 5th of October, 1839, which he is desired to communicate to you, and to request your co-operation with him in his efforts to expose to the Pasha of Egypt the impolicy and the inutility of all the attempts the Pasha may make to resist measures which it shall be the interest and the duty of some of the Great Powers, and perhaps of Europe as a whole, to carry into execution; and I have to beg that you will do what is proper for that end, making use of such arguments as Her Majesty's Government would use, founded upon the opinions they entertain of the comparative resources and power of the Pasha, and upon their views of political exigencies and interests, of which you are well-apprised.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 360.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 2.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October* 8, 1839.

HIS Excellency the Internuncio has been so good as to give me a copy of the information he received by the last French steamer, on the 4th instant, from Alexandria, and which he sent in to Rechid Pasha for the Porte. I have not received any communication by this last, nor by the preceding steamer, from Her Majesty's Consul-General at Alexandria, and it is from other sources I have learned the malady of Mehemet Ali, and such other matters as ought to be known by the Ambassador here.

I yesterday received from Mr. Consul Werry, at Damascus, a despatch of September 25, and one from Mr. Vice-Consul Werry, at Aleppo, of September 20, and a private letter from Mr. Consul Moore, at Beyrout, dated 28th September;

and I gathered from these reports very important information, tending to show the correctness of the accounts given by the Austrian Consul-General to the Internuncio (inclosed), of the impediments that prevent Ibrahim Pasha from marching this way.

I gather from the examination of the reports of these Consuls, that it will not be possible for Ibrahim to arrive in this neighbourhood before the end of December, and that probably it will not be in his power to come then; and that were he to come, he could not well have a larger force than about 15,000 men.

If this be correct, it will be apparent, that what I have so much insisted upon, is true; namely, that the real force of Mehemet Ali is insignificant, instead of being of a magnitude before which the Great Powers of Europe are obliged by prudence to bow down with submission.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 360.

Extract of Reports from Alexandria, of September 26, 1839.

MEHEMET ALI va mieux, mais dès qu'il se met à parler d'affaires, son pouls bat avec violence et devient fièvreux.

On lui a conseillé de changer d'air, ce qui l'a déterminé à s'absenter pendant une huitaine de jours pour faire un voyage sur le Nil.

Les troubles en Syrie continuent, surtout dans le Haouran.

A Adana, où est le gros de l'Armée du Taurus, on manquait de vivres, de fourrages, &c., et des fièvres malignes faisaient de grands ravages parmi les troupes. Nonobstant, Ibrahim Pacha s'occupait à déplacer la moitié de cette armée, et à lui faire reprendre les cantonnemens d'Antioche et de Killis.

Méhémet Ali a envoyé 120,000 ardebs de blé aux trois quartiers-généraux de Damas, de Alep, et de Marache, pour prévenir la famine dont ils sont menacés. Ces dispositions pourraient bien faire penser qu'il veut se préparer aux évènemens que l'avenir pourrait amener; mais elles prouvent en même temps qu'il n'est plus question, comme on l'avait annoncé avec emphase, de marcher en avant, si, au bout d'un mois, la Sublime Porte ne se prête à un arrangement. Partout les soldats demandent leur solde arrièrée, et partout les caisses sont vides.

Quant à la flotte Ottomane, le Pacha dit toujours qu'il veut la garder jusqu'à la paix. Mais tout faisait croire qu'il pourrait modifier incessamment son langage. Achmet Pacha ne le voit plus si souvent. Il a quitté sa maison de campagne pour s'installer sur son Vaisseau Amiral; Méhémet Ali commence à le traiter avec froideur.

Méhémet Ali, interpellé sur les projets de faire avancer son armée, et de marcher sur Constantinople, dit bien qu'il n'a pas abandonné celui d'envahir l'Asie Mineure; mais qu'il n'a jamais songé à vouloir occuper Constantinople. La vérité est qu'il avait effectivement ordonné à Ibrahim de se porter en avant, mais que celui-ci lui a représenté que l'armée manque de vêtemens et de vivres; que les maladies en ont enlevé une partie considérable; que les Vizirs de l'Anatolie, auxquels il s'était adressé, avaient tout d'un coup manifesté des intentions peu amicales envers les Egyptiens; que des troubles avaient éclaté en même temps sur plusieurs points de la Syrie qui ne pouvaient être réprimés avec succès par des troupes irrégulières; enfin, qu'il se voyait obligé d'opérer une dislocation de l'armée, et même d'évacuer les endroits situés autour de Marache.

(Translation.)

Extract of Reports from Alexandria of September 26, 1839.

MEHEMET ALI is better, but the moment he begins to talk upon business, his pulse beats with violence, and becomes feverish.

A change of air has been recommended to him, which has determined him to absent himself for a week to make a voyage on the Nile.

The troubles in Syria continue, particularly in the Haouran.

A want of provisions and forage was felt at Adana, where the main body of the Army of the Taurus is, and malignant fevers were making great havoc among the troops. Notwithstanding this, Ibrahim Pasha was busy in removing one half of this army, and making it re-occupy the cantonments of Antioch and Killis.

Mehemet Ali has sent 120,000 ardebs of wheat to the three head-quarters of Damascus, Aleppo, and Marash, to provide against the famine which threatens them. These proceedings would seem to indicate, that he wishes to prepare for the events which the future may produce. But they also prove that there is no longer an idea of advancing, as had been emphatically given out, if at the end of a month the Sublime Porte does not come into an arrangement. The soldiers every where demand their arrears, and the military chests are empty everywhere.

As to the Ottoman Fleet, the Pasha always says that he will keep it until peace is established. But everything gave reason to imagine that he might shortly alter his language. Achmet Pasha does not see him so frequently as formerly. He has left his country house, to establish himself on board his flag-ship; Mehemet Ali begins to treat him with coolness.

Mehemet Ali, when interrogated respecting his plans of making his army advance and march on Constantinople, says, that he has not abandoned the plan of invading Asia Minor; but that he never dreamt of occupying Constantinople. The truth is, that he had in fact ordered Ibrahim to move forward, but that the latter represented to him that the army was in want of clothing and provisions; that sickness had carried off a considerable number; that the Viziers of Anatolia, to whom he had addressed himself, had all of a sudden evinced intentions but little friendly to the Egyptians; that disorders had broken out at the same time in different parts of Syria, which could not be successfully put down by irregular troops. Finally, that he found himself obliged to change the quarters of the army, and even to evacuate the places situated around Marash.

No. 361.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received November* 2.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, October* 8, 1839.

I INCLOSE copy of an Official Note sent in this day to the Sublime Porte, as a reply to the Note of the 28th of September, from the Porte to the Representatives of the Five Powers. I had previously answered in the usual way through the Dragoman; and I have taken this additional step, because it seemed necessary to come forward in support of the policy we have pursued here, and of the policy of the Porte.

I inclose copy of a Note, dated October 2, 1839, from the French Ambassador to the Porte.

Inclosure 1 in No. 361.

Note from Viscount Ponsonby to the Sublime Porte.

Therapia, October 8, 1839.

THE Undersigned directed the Chief Dragoman of the British Embassy to express to his Excellency Rechid Pasha, Minister for Foreign Affairs, the great satisfaction with which the Undersigned received the Note, dated 28th September, which his Excellency, by order of the Sublime Porte, had addressed to the Ministers of the Five Powers; and further, to assure his Excellency that the Note should be forwarded without delay to Her Britannic Majesty's Government.

The Undersigned is of opinion, that in treating an affair of such high importance, it is right to make a more formal official reply, particularly on account of the increased interest that events attach to the transaction; and, therefore, the Undersigned has the honour to assure his Excellency, in this official form, that the Undersigned is confident Her Majesty's Government will have learnt, with the highest satisfaction, the wise and generous views and sentiments of the Sublime Porte, as described in that Note, in exact conformity with the early declarations of the Ottoman Ministers to the Representatives of the Great Powers, and received with entire satisfaction.

The Undersigned must be permitted to add, that late and present events increase in a very high degree the respect due for the magnanimity of the Sublime Porte, exemplified in the continued adherence to the resolution to extend to the Pasha of Egypt the same indulgence and favour as was then offered to him, notwithstanding the multiplied acts of aggression and offence that have been committed or countenanced by that Pasha since the communication was made to him of the beneficent intentions of his August Sovereign and Master, Sultan Abdul Medjid. The Undersigned cannot have a doubt of the complete triumph of a policy so wise, and just, and benevolent, if it shall be persevered in by the Sublime Porte without alteration, because its base is the maintenance of the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire, and resistance to the attempts that are made to partition it, under the disguise and cloak of a desire to re-establish peace. Enlightened men know, that by granting to the Pasha of Egypt the demands he continues to make, the Sublime Porte would give a fatal blow to the sacred royal prerogatives and power of the Sultan; and they cannot fail to applaud the wisdom and courage exerted to uphold the national welfare and unity.

The Undersigned avails himself, &c.,

(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 361.

Note from Baron Roussin to the Sublime Porte.

Thérapia, le 2 *Octobre*, 1839.

LE Soussigné, Ambassadeur de France près la Sublime Porte, a reçu la Note que Son Excellence Réchid Pacha, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, lui a fait l'honneur de lui adresser le 28 Septembre, à l'appui de la Note en date du 22 Août dernier, qui avait été également adressée aux Représentans des Grandes Cours par le Ministère de Sa Hautesse.

Ces deux communications sont une preuve trop manifeste des justes sentimens de confiance dont s'est montré animée la Sublime Porte envers le Gouvernement du Roi et ceux de ses augustes Alliés, pour que le Soussigné ne s'empresse pas de les transmettre à Paris. Il n'ajoutera rien aux considérations qui y sont développées avec autant de prudence que de vérité, et il croirait même inutile de rappeler que les dispositions de la France à l'égard de l'Empire Ottoman sont toujours aussi amicales, s'il n'était heureux lui-même d'en renouveler aussi souvent que possible, les assurances. Le Soussigné ne doute pas que d'après la nouvelle démarche de la Sublime Porte, le Gouvernement du Roi ne cherche, d'accord avec ses Alliés, à régler les affaires d'Orient de manière à affermir l'Empire Ottoman en consolidant la paix du monde, et il s'empressera de transmettre à la Sublime Porte, aussitôt qu'il les aura reçues de sa Cour, les décisions qu'elle aura prises à cet égard.

Son Excellence Réchid Pacha, en adressant aux Représentans des Grandes Cours sa Note du 28 Septembre, avait également chargé les Premiers Drogmans des Ambassades de France et d'Angleterre, de représenter à ces Ambassadeurs, que la présence de leurs flottes au mouillage qu'elles occupent maintenant, pouvait faire naître des complications que la Sublime Porte a intérêt à éviter; que les mauvais tems qui vont régner pendant plusieurs mois ne permettraient que très-difficilement à ces flottes de conserver leur mouillage actuel, et pourraient, par nécessité, les obliger à entrer dans les Dardanelles.

Le Soussigné reconnait combien ces réflexions sont fondées, et que la Porte est parfaitement dans son droit en adressant aux Représentans des Cours amies, cette demande officieuse d'explication que des susceptibilités étrangères ont pu, d'ailleurs, lui rendre nécessaire. Mais le Soussigné doit, de son côté, rappeler à la Sublime Porte, que les deux Gouvernemens, en faisant rapprocher leurs escadres jusque dans la Baie de Ténédos, ont voulu donner au Gouvernement de Sa Hautesse, au milieu des circonstances de la plus haute gravité, un appui

moral qui paraissait nécessaire pour éviter les plus fâcheuses complications, que la sagesse de la Sublime Porte a su, du reste, empêcher. Le Soussigné ajoutera, qu'il appartient seulement aux Gouvernemens qui ont décidé cette mesure, de reconnaître si elle est encore maintenant utile, et qu'eux seuls pourront prescrire aux Amiraux de s'éloigner lorsqu'ils jugeront que cette détermination ne serait plus à regretter pour personne, et surtout pour la Sublime Porte.

En transmettant au Gouvernement du Roi les réflexions inspirées à la Sublime Porte par la présence des Escadres Française et Anglaise, le Soussigné ne doute pas qu'après les avoir examinées avec tout l'intérêt qu'il accorde aux Affaires d'Orient, il ne s'empresse de prendre la détermination la plus prudente, et, en même tems, la plus utile à l'affermissement de l'Empire Ottoman.

Le Soussigné saisit, &c.,

(Signé) BARON ROUSSIN.

(Translation.)

Note from Baron Roussin to the Sublime Porte.

Therapia, October 2, 1839.

THE Undersigned, Ambassador of France at the Sublime Porte, has received the Note which his Excellency Rechid Pasha, Minister for Foreign Affairs, did him the honour to address to him on the 28th of September, in support of the Note dated 22nd of August last, which had also been addressed by the Ministers of His Highness to the Representatives of the Great Courts.

These two communications are too evident a proof of the just feelings of confidence by which the Sublime Porte has shown itself to be animated towards the Government of the King, and those of its august Allies, for the Undersigned not to hasten to forward them to Paris. He will add nothing to the considerations which are developed therein, with as much prudence as truth, and he should think it useless to recal to mind that the disposition of France towards the Ottoman Empire is as friendly as ever, if he himself did not take pleasure in renewing this assurance as often as possible. The Undersigned does not doubt that, after the fresh step taken by the Porte, the Government of the King will seek, in concert with its Allies, to settle the affairs of the East in such a manner as to strengthen the Ottoman Empire by consolidating the peace of the world, and he will hasten to lay before the Sublime Porte the decision which his Court may come to on this matter, as soon as he shall have received it.

His Excellency Rechid Pasha, in addressing the Note of the 28th of September to the Representatives of the Great Courts, had also desired the First Dragomans of the French and English Embassies to represent to those Ambassadors, that the presence of their fleets, at the anchorage which they now occupy, might give rise to complications which it is for the interest of the Porte to avoid; that the bad weather which was about to set in for some months would with difficulty allow of the fleets remaining at their present anchorage, and might perforce compel them to enter the Dardanelles.

The Undersigned acknowledges that there is ground for these reflections, and that the Porte is perfectly justified in addressing this informal demand for explanation to the Representatives of the friendly Powers, which moreover the susceptibility of others may have rendered necessary. But the Undersigned, on his side, must recall to the recollection of the Sublime Porte, that the two Governments, in causing their squadrons to approach even as near as the Bay of Tenedos, wished to afford to His Highness's Government, under circumstances of the greatest moment, a moral support that seemed necessary to avoid the most disastrous complications, which, however, the wisdom of the Sublime Porte has been able to avert. The Undersigned will add, that it is for those Governments alone who decided upon this measure to judge whether it is still useful, and that they alone can order the Admirals to depart whenever they shall be of opinion that this determination will not be a source of regret to anybody, and particularly to the Sublime Porte.

In transmitting to the Government of the King, the observations which the presence of the French and English squadrons have suggested to the Porte, The Undersigned does not doubt that, after examining them with all the

interest which it feels in the affairs of the East, it will lose no time in taking the most prudent determination, and at the same time the one most useful to the support of the Ottoman Empire.

The Undersigned, &c.,

(Signed) BARON ROUSSIN.

No. 362.

Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

(Extract.) *Foreign Office, November* 3, 1839.

HER Majesty's Government are of opinion, that it is expedient that Admiral Sir Robert Stopford should be authorized to attend to any requisition which he may receive from the Porte, through Her Majesty's Ambassador, for the presence of the British squadron at Constantinople, in order to support the Sultan's Government against an insurrection: and I am accordingly to signify to your Lordships the Queen's commands, that an instruction to the above effect should forthwith be addressed to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford.

No. 363.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 4.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October* 13, 1839.

I HAVE this morning received from the Sublime Porte the inclosed communication.

I believe Ibrahim Pasha is driven by the necessities of his army, to commit the aggressions mentioned, and that those necessities will multiply greatly every day.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 363.

Substance of Despatches received by the Sublime Porte.—(Communicated to the Representatives of the Five Powers, October 12, 1839.)

TOPGI OGLOU, commandant un corps de troupes Egyptiennes qui fait partie des troupes cantonnées à Ourfa, se porta, il y a peu de temps, dans le voisinage de Souirik; s'empara des provisions de bouche qui s'y trouvaient; prit possession des districts de Tzermik et de Erghana, et après y avoir séjourné quelque tems, il en sortit, emmenant avec lui quelques familles de ces districts, et retourna à Ourfa.

On avisait aux moyens d'établir des autorités, au nom de Sa Hautesse, dans les deux districts ci-dessus mentionnés, pour assurer par là la tranquillité des habitans et des pauvres; mais Shukri Bey, Général de division dans l'Armée Egyptienne, se présenta tout récemment dans les environs, à la tête de trois régimens d'Infanterie, d'un régiment de Cavalerie, et d'un corps de troupes irrégulières composé de mille hommes; il somma le Gouverneur de Souirik, Omer Bey, d'en sortir, et fit ses dispositions pour se rendre maître, en employant la force, et de ce district, et de celui de Tzermik.

Omer Bey, considérant qu'il n'était pas autorisé par la Sublime Porte à opposer de la résistance, sortit de la place, bon gré mal gré, et se porta à Malatia.

Ces mouvemens des troupes Egyptiennes non seulement troublent la tranquillité de ces pays là et feront cesser les travaux aux Mines Impériales, mais peu après ils agiront dans une sphère plus grande: ils feront que les

tribus Curdes s'attacheront à leur parti, et ils feront naître une foule d'autres inconvéniens.

Voulant rétablir la sûreté du pays et des routes, et protéger les habitans et les pauvres, on expédia à Erghana, Rustem Bey, Colonel de la Garde Impériale, et l'on écrivit en conséquence au Caïmacam de Diarbékir.

L'Inspecteur des Mines Impériales, Son Excellence Saadem Pacha, vient d'adresser deux dépêches à la Sublime Porte, pour qu'on lui fasse savoir sans délai comment il faut agir dans ces circonstances, et dans le cas que cet état de choses empirait.

Le Pacha a envoyé en même temps à la Porte une lettre de Shukri Bey, accompagnée de plusieurs pièces.

Ibrahim Pacha, établi aujourd'hui à Marache, sême le trouble et la division dans les environs. Il a même expédié un corps de plus de 500 hommes contre Solyman Pacha, Ex-Mouhassil de Marache, sous le commandement de Carà Mursal Oglou, Ahmed Bey, et Durzi Bey Chébib, et Carà Baïractar, Hassan Jazigè. Solyman Pacha évitant de combattre avec les siens, se retira à Caïssar.

Depuis le jour de son entrée à Marache, Ibrahim Pacha livre à ses soldats tous les produits des fermes et des terres, &c., que Solyman Pacha possède, soit dans la ville, soit dans les villages de Marache, ce qui cause à ce dernier beaucoup de préjudice.

(Translation.)

Substance of Despatches received from the Sublime Porte.—(Communicated to the Representatives of the Five Powers, October 12, 1839.

TOPGI OGLOU, commanding a corps of Egyptian troops, which forms part of the troops stationed at Orfa, went a short time ago to the neighbourhood of Souirik; made himself master of the provisions which were there; took possession of the districts of Tzermik and of Erghana, and having stayed there some time, went away, carrying with him some families of those districts, and returned to Orfa.

Measures were under consideration for establishing, in the two districts above-mentioned, authorities in the name of the Sultan, in order thereby to secure the tranquillity of the inhabitants and of the poor. But Shukri Bey, General of Division in the Egyptian Army, appeared very recently in the neighbourhood at the head of three regiments of infantry, one of cavalry, and one of irregular troops consisting of 1000 men; he summoned the Governor of Souirik, Omer Bey, to go out of it, and made his arrangements to render himself master by force, as well of that district as of the district of Tzermik.

Omer Bey, considering that he was not authorized by the Sublime Porte to offer resistance, left the place whether or no, and proceeded to Malatia.

These movements of the Egyptian troops not only disturb the tranquillity of those countries, and will put a stop to the working of the Imperial Mines, but will shortly have a more extensive action: they will cause the Koords to attach themselves to their party, and will give rise to a multitude of other inconveniences.

As it was desired to restore security in the country and on the roads, and to protect the inhabitants and the poor, Rustem Bey, Colonel of the Imperial Guards, was despatched to Erghana, and the Caimacam of Diarbekir was written to accordingly.

The Inspector of the Imperial Mines, his Excellency Saadem Pasha, has just addressed two despatches to the Sublime Porte for immediate information how he is to act under these circumstances, and in case the state of affairs should become worse.

The Pasha sent at the same time to the Porte a letter from Shukri Bey, accompanied by many documents.

Ibrahim Pasha, at present stationed at Marash, disseminates trouble and disturbance in that neighbourhood. He has even sent a corps of more than 500 men against Solyman Pasha, Ex-Mouhassil of Marash, under the

orders of Cara Mursal Oglou, Ahmed Bey, and Durzi Bey Chebib, and Cara Bairactar, Hassan Jazige. Solyman Pasha, avoiding to engage with the force under him, retired to Caissar.

Since the day of his entry into Marash, Ibrahim Pasha makes over to his soldiers all the produce of the farms and lands, &c., the property of Solyman Pasha, either in the city or in the villages of Marash, which occasions much injury to the latter.

No. 364.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received November* 4.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, October* 14, 1839.

IN reply to Admiral Stopford's communication to me, that he thought of going to Vourla, I said, that I thought Ibrahim Pasha in too great difficulties to make an attempt at present upon this place; but that I thought it would be highly imprudent to leave unexecuted any measures calculated to defeat an attempt, if made by him.

No. 365.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received November* 4.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October* 14, 1839.

I AM assured by Rechid Pasha, that the copy* of the instructions to Hafiz Pasha transmitted to me in your Lordship's despatch of September 9, and which I communicated to his Excellency for the purpose of ascertaining their authenticity, is very incorrect.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 366.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

(Extract.) *Foreign Office, November* 4, 1839.

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, a copy of an instruction † which I have been commanded by the Queen, to address to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

No. 367.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November* 4, 1839.

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency, that Her Majesty's Government approve the instruction which it appears by your despatch of October 8, you addressed to Colonel Campbell, on the 5th of October, directing him to co-operate with the Austrian Consul-General in pointing out to Mehemet Ali the impolicy and inutility of any attempts on his part to resist the measures which the Great Powers may determine to adopt.

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* See Inclosure in No. 305.

† See No. 363.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 368.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

(Extract.) *Foreign Office, November* 4, 1839.

I HAVE received and laid before the Queen, your Excellency's despatches to the 8th of October.

Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the Note, of which a copy is inclosed in your despatch of the 8th of October, and which your Excellency addressed to the Porte on that day, in reply to the Note communicated by the Porte, on the 28th of September, to the Representatives of the Five Powers.

No. 369.

The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 5.)

(Extract.) *St. Petersburgh, October* 25, 1839.

COUNT NESSELRODE communicated to me a long despatch from Baron Brunnow, in which the Baron minutely detailed the substance of his communications with your Lordship.

Count Nesselrode informed me of the suggestion made by your Lordship to Baron Brunnow, and by him referred to his Government, that if it were found expedient for a Russian force to defend the Bosphorus, a British force should appear simultaneously within the Dardanelles.

Copies of the reply of the Imperial Cabinet to the last proposition of the French Government are sent to London by this messenger, and will be communicated to your Lordship by M. de Kisseleff.

No. 370.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 7.)

My Lord, *Paris, November* 4, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt, by yesterday's messenger, of your despatches of the 1st of November.

I this day communicated to Marshal Soult the instructions sent by Her Majesty's Government to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, relative to the anchoring the fleet under his command near Smyrna. The Marshal expressed his obligation to me for the communication; he told me that similar instructions had been given by the French Government to Admiral Lalande, of which he would send me a copy.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 371.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 8.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, October* 16, 1839.

I HAD yesterday the honour of presenting Her Majesty's letter to the Sultan, and my credentials also.

His Imperial Majesty expressed his great satisfaction with Her Majesty's letter, and the high value he attaches to Her Majesty's friendship.

His Imperial Majesty was pleased to honour me with a very gracious reception.

I presented the Secretary of Her Majesty's Embassy, and the other members of it, to His Majesty.

The Grand Vizier and the Seraskier, and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, received me on my arrival within the Palace, (the old Seraglio,) where Sultan Abdul Medjid resides. All the usual forms demonstrative of respect to Her Majesty's Ambassador were observed.

I had a conversation with the Grand Vizier and the Secretary of State. The Grand Vizier said, that were the army of Ibrahim on the opposite coast, the Porte would not yield; that the Porte relied upon the friendship of England. I replied, that the Porte might depend upon the friendship of England. The conversation was of some length. I afterwards conversed with Rechid Pasha. He said that they were convinced that ruin would follow submission to the Pasha of Egypt's demands. The Grand Vizier rejoined us, and the subject was continued. I said, that resistance at present to the demands of the Pasha produced no evil to the Sultan; that the Porte was able to reduce its expences, whilst Mehemet Ali must continue to incur greater than he had any means to support; that the information from Syria showed the bad and disordered state of the army and country under Ibrahim; that on the side of the Porte there did not appear any danger from an open attack from the Pasha; and that if it were attempted, it would be resisted by all the Powers, if reliance could be placed upon their formal and reiterated declarations; that therefore the Porte should remain in the position it had taken, until the views and opinions of its friends should be known; that if at last those friends should not do what the Porte thought consistent with its interest, it would then be time enough to make to Mehemet Ali those concessions which necessity might demand to be made, instead of now laying the Government of the country at that Pasha's feet, and risking, if not giving up, the best interests of the Sultan, without necessity.

The Grand Vizier concurred.

The reports from the Consuls in Syria, which go home, and other information I have received, all show how little solid power the Egyptians have; and a report from the Austrian Consul-General at Alexandria to the Internuncio, which I have read, and which I believe will be shown to Lord Beauvale, gives an account from Alexandria of a similar state of things.

No. 372.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 11.)

(Extract.) *Paris, November* 8, 1839.

COUNT MEDEM has called upon me this morning, and made me acquainted with the contents of a despatch from Count Nesselrode, which he has communicated to Marshal Soult, and which is in answer to the proposition made by the French Government, with respect to an arrangement between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali.

No. 373.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 15.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October 22, 1839.*

I INCLOSE copy of a Note from the Sublime Porte, dated 21st instant.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 373.

Note from the Sublime Porte to the Representatives of the Five Powers.

Constantinople, le 13 Chaban, 1259.
(Traduction.) (21 *Octobre*, 1839.)

ON sait qu'aussitôt après l'avènement au trône du Sultan Abdoul Medjid, le pardon que Sa Hautesse daignait accorder à Méhémet Ali, Pacha d'Egypte, à condition que les hostilités cesseraient par terre et par mer, fut publié, et annoncé à tous les hauts fonctionnaires de l'Empire; et que, bientôt après, les Cinq Puissances Alliées se chargèrent de l'arrangement et de la conclusion de la Question Egyptienne.

On sait aussi qu'en attendant la décision des Cinq Puissances, et pour laisser les choses dans l'état où elles étaient, la Sublime Porte fit savoir à ses généraux, dans leurs campemens respectifs, qu'il fallait éviter absolument, la circonstance arrivant, tout conflit avec les troupes Egyptiennes, et qu'elle ne cesse encore de faire les mêmes recommandations.

Il était donc nécessaire, qu'en attendant l'heureuse issue de la médiation des Puissances, Méhémet Ali Pacha s'abstînt aussi de tout mouvement hostile. On voit cependant par les dépêches successives communiquées aux Représentans des Cinq Puissances, que les troupes du Pacha, sous prétexte, tantôt de prendre des quartiers d'hiver, tantôt de poursuivre leurs déserteurs, se sont peu à peu portées en avant des lieux qu'elles occupaient et se sont établies dans diverses villes, bourgs et villages. Les commandans de l'Armée Ottomane, se conformant aux instructions de la Sublime Porte, ne se sont pas opposés à ces envahissemens de territoire; ils se sont contentés d'en informer le Gouvernement de Sa Hautesse, et de demander à cet égard l'expression de la volonté Impériale.

Or, il serait contraire à la déclaration officielle de la Sublime Porte qu'elle autorisât ses sujets à repousser par la force l'agression Egyptienne. D'un autre côté, il est impossible d'envoyer aux habitans des lieux dont les Egyptiens veulent s'emparer des instructions pour qu'ils les y reçoivent.

En conséquence, outre la difficulté qui résulte pour la Sublime Porte de ce fait en lui-même, il ne lui parait pas convenable, après l'acceptation de l'intervention des Cinq Puissances, de pourvoir, sans les consulter, aux mesures qu'exige une affaire aussi délicate.

La Sublime Porte se regarde donc comme obligée par la nature de l'affaire aussi bien que par celle de ses rapports d'amitié avec les Cinq Puissances, d'en faire part à leurs Représentans et de s'en référer à eux quant à la marche qu'elle doit adopter.

La présente Note est adressée à M. l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre, de même qu'elle l'est à M. l'Internonce d'Autriche, à MM. les Ministres de Russie et de Prusse, et à M. le Chargé d'Affaires de France, et c'est pour nous une occasion de lui renouveler l'assurance de notre haute considération.

(Signé) RECHID.

(Translation.)

Note from the Sublime Porte to the Representatives of the Five Powers.

Constantinople, 13*th Chaban*, 1259.
(*October* 21, 1839.)

IT is known that immediately after the accession of Sultan Abdul Medjid to the throne, the pardon which His Highness was pleased to grant to Mehemet Ali, Pasha of Egypt, on condition that hostilities should cease by land and by sea, was published and notified to all the high functionaries of the Empire; and that presently afterwards the Five Allied Powers undertook to settle and conclude the Egyptian Question.

It is also known, that while waiting for the decision of the Five Powers, and in order to leave matters in the state in which they were, the Sublime Porte acquainted its Generals in their several positions, that it was absolutely necessary to avoid, the case occurring, any conflict with the Egyptian troops, and that the Porte does not even now cease to issue the same injunctions.

It was necessary, therefore, that while waiting for the happy issue of the mediation of the Powers, Mehemet Ali should also abstain from all hostile movements. It appears, however, by the successive despatches communicated to the Representatives of the Five Powers, that the troops of the Pasha, under pretext, at one time of taking up winter quarters, at another of following deserters, have by degrees advanced from the positions which they occupied, and have established themselves in different cities, towns, and villages. The Commanders of the Ottoman Army, in obedience to the instructions of the Sublime Porte, have not opposed these encroachments; they have confined themselves to reporting them to the Government of His Highness, and to demanding the enunciation of the Imperial pleasure in respect to this matter.

Now, it would be at variance with the official declaration of the Sublime Porte, if it were to authorize its subjects to repel by force the Egyptian aggression. On the other hand it is impossible to direct the inhabitants of the places which the Egyptians wish to make themselves masters of, to receive them.

Consequently, besides the difficulty which the Sublime Porte experiences from this circumstance alone, it does not consider it proper, after having accepted the intervention of the Five Powers, to have recourse, without consulting them, to the measures which so delicate an affair requires.

The Sublime Porte then considers itself obliged by the nature of the affair, as well as by the nature of its friendly relations with the Five Powers, to communicate thereupon with the Representatives, and to refer to them as to the course which it should adopt.

The present note is addressed to the Ambassador of England, in the same manner as it is addressed to the Internuncio of Austria, the Ministers of Russia and of Prussia, and the Chargé d'Affaires of France; and the doing so affords me an opportunity of repeating to him the assurance of our high consideration.

(Signed) RECHID.

No. 374.

Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received November* 16.)

(Extract.) *Aleppo, September* 23, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for your Lordship's information, a copy of my despatch of the 20th instant, to Viscount Ponsonby, which I hope will meet with your Lordship's approbation.

Since the date of my inclosed despatch to his Excellency the Ambassador, nothing of any interest has transpired on this frontier, or within the jurisdiction of this Consulate, which merits your Lordship's attention.

Inclosure in No. 374.

Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Ponsonby.

(Extract.) *Aleppo, September* 20, 1839.

I HAVE further to inform your Lordship, that during my stay at Biregick, I had occasion to see a very respectable Christian, from whom I elicited that the whole country round is perfectly quiet, and that the only Egyptian troops that had crossed the river were two regiments of Infantry under Selim Pasha, who continue to remain at Orfa, as also some Bedouin Cavalry and Turkish Irregulars (Bachi-Bozuks) under Colonel Maggiun Bey. He added, that this latter, with the Bedouins and Turkish Irregulars, had only just returned to Orfa, for he had heard they had gone on a reconnoitring tour along the Desert, in which they had advanced to a place called Ambra, the object of which, he says, is not known, though generally rumoured and believed to find Souffook Bey and that tribe of Arabs.

I have the honour to acquaint your Lordship, that the Egyptian forces continue to occupy on the frontiers between Aintab and Marash, the same position as when I last had the honour of addressing your Lordship, with the exception of several regiments, which have been ordered as here under.

Towards the south, for Hamah, Homs, and Damascus, two regiments of Infantry, two idem of Cavalry, and one of Artillery.

To Antioch, two regiments of Infantry; and there are at present forming the garrison of Aleppo, two regiments of Infantry, and one idem of Cavalry, the Dragoons.

His Excellency the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha continues to occupy Marash, and has with him about five regiments, four of which are Infantry, and one Cavalry, with a few batteries of Artillery.

At Aintab there are four regiments of Infantry, and two of Artillery.

I have not received lately any advices from the Adana district, but I am assured that Achmet Menekli Pasha continues to be there with a corps of Cavalry.

From the latest advices I have from the Alexandretta district, I am able to inform your Lordship, that the whole of those mountains and of Byass along that range to Adana, are now perfectly quiet and secure; and I may add, that at present, the whole of this Consular district enjoys the greatest tranquillity.

I have further to inform your Lordship, that on my way back to Aleppo, I passed through Aintab, and I there learnt that his Excellency the Seraskier had ordered the Cuirassier Regiment to proceed forthwith to Albistan, said to be about eighteen hours from Marash; and upon my enquiring for what reason, I was told that one of those mountains, called "Giugik Dagh," had risen, and was completely revolted, in consequence, they added, of his Excellency having demanded their arms and conscripts.

I was further informed, that the inhabitants of this mountain were the same who had some short time back advanced on the Giaour Dagh mountains, and who committed the late many depredations on the caravans, &c., towards Byass, and all that neighbourhood, and who had also, some time back, taken the Government oxen employed in the mountains for the timber cutting in the same direction.

I was also told by many, whilst at Aintab, that the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha had still the intention of bringing the River Sedjour to Aleppo, and that he had sent for all the colonels of the regiments there, to combine measures for this undertaking. Since my arrival here I learn that the Government has sent a large quantity of baskets, spades, &c., to Aintab, by order of his Excellency the Seraskier, said to be for the purpose of working the canal which is to conduct the River Sedjour to this place.

In consequence of there having been no arrivals from Malatia and that direction, I possess no correct information to lay before your Lordship with regard to the movements of the Sultan's Seraskier Sadullah Pasha, who I am assured is at Malatia.

It has been reported, to me that Sadullah Pasha has collected in the direction of Malatia, Diarbekir, &c., a force of 20,000 Regulars, and that 10,000 have reached Malatia from Constantinople, which, together with Solyman Pasha's force of Irregulars, form a body of 35,000 to 40,000 men. But this report requires further confirmation, as it does not appear to be at all authentic, nor is it mentioned from any other quarter.

His Excellency Solyman Pasha (Colonel Sèves) is still here, though hourly expecting, he says, to obtain leave from his Excellency the Seraskier to repair to Sidon.

His Excellency Ismael Bey, our Governor, is still in the Damascus district, and is employed with his Excellency Sheriff Pasha in the settlement of the Haouran affair.

No. 375.

Mr. Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 16.)

My Lord, *Damascus, September* 28, 1839.

I HAD the honour of addressing your Lordship on the 30th ultimo.

The insurrection in the Agloun district has been pacified by his Excellency Ismael Bey and the forces under his command, not however without first destroying two villages. The tribe of Saffer Arabs who, it was apprehended, would have made common cause with the Agloun population, were previously defeated by Ismael Bey's forces; one Chief Sheik, and twenty-five Arabs, were taken and decapitated; they lost also, it is said, 25,000 sheep and 2,000 camels, which became booty to the Egyptian soldiers. Ismael Bey and the Caftan Bey, with their forces, have since proceeded to the Haouran district, the Fellah population of which have hitherto refused to pay taxes, furnish supplies, and recognize the Government. I hear the chief Sheiks of Haouran, with the major part of the population, carrying with them their effects, provisions, &c., have fled to Boussre, and have once more entered the Ledgea. His Excellency Sheriff Pasha left Damascus on the 15th instant, with his suite, taking with him one battery of field-pieces, a regiment of light regular cavalry, and 500 irregular foot, which arrived here the day previous from Aleppo, and is to be joined with 500 foot from the Emir Bechir's, under his son, the Emir Halil, at the Ledgea, to form a junction with Ismael Bey's forces. Nine redoubts, to cover the springs, are to be erected, in order to render the position of the Ledgea untenable to the insurgents. All the masons, builders, and carpenters have been put into requisition for this undertaking, and sent off to the Ledgea. Not only the subjugation of the Haouran population may be a protracted affair, but the chief object of rendering the Ledgea a refuge and bulwark for the disaffected and insurgents of the south of Syria, may be of doubtful issue; still it is the only plan which promises success to the Egyptian Government.

Your Lordship will receive from the Aleppo Pro-Consul, advices on the measures taking by his Highness Ibrahim Pasha, either to advance, or to maintain his forces in the positions he occupies, until the solution of the pending question between the Sultan and the Viceroy. But from general advices, there is not an appearance that the Egyptian forces are intended to return immediately to their old cantonments. The only indications which I have observed from hence to maintain the Egyptian forces in the north, are the sums of money which have been sent to Aleppo; and the medical men which have arrived from hence, have received orders to rejoin the forces, even at Orfa. Ibrahim Pasha has also sent orders, that the depôt of clothing at Acre should furnish the supplies to the army on the northern frontier. These, with the operations going on at the Ledgea, denote that the Government is intent on keeping the army on that frontier, and, at the same time, is taking measures here to prevent, in case of an advance of his Highness Ibrahim Pasha, a reaction in the south of Syria.

In the Palestine jurisdiction, I hear there has been, in the neighbourhood of Jerusalem, great uneasiness at the disaffection of a Sheik, having at his command a large population who can find arms. In other parts of Syria tranquillity exists, but the commercial interests are in a languid state.

The Government here is taking measures to keep down and regulate the incessant rise and variation of specie, which is a grievance of long standing, which seems likely still to frustrate the intentions of Government.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) N. W. WERRY.

No. 376.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 16.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, October* 20, 1839.

ON the 13th instant I received a despatch, (inclosure No. 1,) from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, informing me, that the Internuncio had sent instructions to the Austrian Consul-General here, to make a communication to the Pasha, and which I was directed to support.

As the Pasha was still absent, I merely informed Viscount Ponsonby of the receipt of his despatch (inclosure No. 2).

M. de Laurin gave to me a copy of the communication received by him from the Internuncio, and which forms the inclosure No. 3; and he, at the same time, received a Turkish translation of it, which he was instructed to give to Mehemet Ali.

The Pasha arrived here on the evening of the 16th, and on the following morning, M. de Laurin saw him, and gave to him the paper, in Turkish, alluded to.

On the morning of the 18th, I waited on the Pasha, and my despatch to Viscount Ponsonby, (inclosure No. 4,) will inform your Lordship of the details of my interview.

Inclosure No. 5 is copy of a letter from Hosrew Pasha to Mehemet Ali, and inclosure No. 6 is the reply thereto.

Your Lordship will see by those two documents, that Hosrew Pasha did not, as Mehemet Ali says, offer to negotiate directly with him without the knowledge or sanction of the Great Powers, but that the proposition to that effect proceeded from Mehemet Ali; and that Hosrew Pasha, so far from listening to it, immediately addressed to the Representatives of the Great Powers at Constantinople a Note, dated September 28, translation of which forms inclosure No. 7.

I have further the honour to inclose copy of a Note (No. 8) from Baron Stürmer to M. de Laurin, transmitting another Note (inclosure No. 9) from the Porte to the Representatives of the Five Powers, and which M. de Laurin was authorized to communicate confidentially to the Pasha.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Inclosure 1 in No. 376.

Viscount Ponsonby to Colonel Campbell.

[See Inclosure 2 in No. 359.]

Inclosure 2 in No. 376.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Alexandria, October* 16, 1839.

I HAD the honour to receive, on the 13th instant, your Excellency's despatch of 5th instant, directing me to co-operate with the Austrian Consul-General, in the representation to the Pasha, which he is instructed by the Internuncio to make.

M. de Laurin has fully communicated to me the instructions which he has received, and I have assured him of my most zealous and cordial co-operation in such manner or form as he may deem best calculated to obtain the desired end.

As the Pasha is still absent, although daily expected here, no steps have yet been able to be taken in the affair.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Inclosure 3 in No. 376.

Baron Stürmer to M. de Laurin.

[See Inclosure 1 in No. 359.]

Inclosure 4 in No. 376.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Alexandria, October* 19, 1839.

IN my despatch of the 16th instant, I had the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's letter of 5th instant, and to inform your Excellency that I should conform to the contents of it, on the return of the Pasha to this place.

The Pasha returned on the evening of the 16th instant, and on the morning of yesterday I waited on him, and found him alone.

I mentioned to the Pasha, that I was charged by your Excellency to support the demands which the Internuncio had directed M. de Laurin to state to him, and which that Consul-General had mentioned to me having already submitted to him on the previous day. And I said, that I hoped and expected that his Highness would conform to them, not only as being the wish of the Great Powers, but also that it was only just, and also of his own interest to make to his Sovereign the concessions required.

The Pasha said that he could not consent to give up Adana, which was "the door to his house;" but that he was ready to pay for Adana any extra tribute beyond what he already paid.

I replied, that such a transaction could merely be considered as a bargain and not as any concession to his Sovereign, and which he was bound to make; and, moreover, that he ought to consider that he had been informed in the note given to him by M. de Laurin, that the Great Powers would not regard as valid, any agreement made between the Porte and Mehemet Ali without their sanction.

He again said, that he could not give up Adana, but that he would not object to give up Candia to the Porte, but nothing more.

I then entered on the subject of his sending back the Turkish fleet, to which he replied, that it was well known that it was not his intention to keep it, and that he always considered it as the property of the Sultan, and that he would restore it so soon as the question between the Porte and himself should be settled, but that if he gave it up now, it would only be a motive for demands for further concessions. And I could not bring him to change his opinion either on this point, or upon that of further concessions to the Porte.

He mentioned, however, that he did not longer desire the removal of Hosrew Pasha; but in regard to the Note of 28th of September, sent by the Divan to the Ambassadors of the Great Powers at the Porte, to desire that no arrangement might be permitted except by the medium of the Great Powers, the Pasha expressed some surprise, as he had, he said, a letter from Hosrew Pasha, of the 3rd of September, implying, that a direct amicable arrangement might be made between the Porte and Mehemet Ali, without the intervention of the Great Powers, and to which letter Mehemet Ali replied on the 15th of September.

The Pasha promised me copies of those letters, which I have now the honour to transmit to your Excellency (inclosures No. 1 and 2), by which you Excellency will be able to judge how far Hosrew Pasha's letter bears the interpretation of a desire to treat directly with Mehemet Ali, without the knowledge or interference of the Great Powers; but it appears to me that the letter of Hosrew Pasha does not admit of the interpretation which Mehemet Ali pretends to give to it.

Copies of those letters have also been given to M. de Laurin and to Count Medem.

I learn from those two gentlemen, that the substance of their interviews with the Pasha was to the same effect as my interview; and in regard to the Consul-General of France, he has not interfered in this affair.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Inclosure 5 in No. 376.

Hosrew Pasha to Mehemet Ali.

(Traduction.) 3 *Septembre*, 1839.

J'AI eu l'honneur de recevoir la dépêche de votre Altesse et d'en comprendre le contenu. Elle est remplie de reproches, et Votre Altesse nous invite de nous éloigner des affaires et à lui donner avis de cela. J'écris la présente à votre Altesse pour lui témoigner que notre amitié est sincère envers elle, et de cela Dieu en est témoin, et que nous ne nourrissons aucun sentiment d'animosité envers elle. L'opinion qu'elle a de moi n'est pas juste, et malgré que les reproches et les plaintes de votre Altesse contre moi ayent rempli la terre entière, moi je ne me suis pas fâché contre elle et cela regarde plutôt à l'Empereur. Toutes ces paroles ont causé entre les Musulmans et les Sages d'Europe du tort au nom de Méhémet Ali Pacha, et puisque " chaque individu doit se dévouer à la cause des siens," cela m'a beaucoup surpris en votre Altesse, et m'a même fâché. Parce que le Capitan Pacha est coupable, vouloir retenir la flotte n'est pas une chose raisonnable, et nous ne le croyions pas. Vous avez écouté les paroles du Capitan Pacha, et si vous auriez envoyé la Flotte Impériale, cela aurait été une chose convenable et douce. Ce qui peut regarder mon éloignement des affaires, Votre Altesse le sait, que depuis plusieurs années j'ai resté retiré dans ma maison. La Providence, malgré mon désir contraire, a voulu que je devins Grand Vizir, et cela est l'effet de la Grâce Divine, et s'opposer, aurait été s'opposer à la volonté de Dieu: je craignais, et j'acceptais le Vizirat avec la persuasion que Dieu m'aidera. Maintenant, Monseigneur, je vous prie beaucoup de vouloir me pardonner cette faute du Grand Vizirat, puisque cela pour moi était un destin de Dieu, par la raison même que je me trouvais un des premiers dans l'Islam; et je remercie le Tout-Puissant qu'au dernier soupir je me trouve dans la grâce du Prophète et au service de notre bienfaiteur, l'Empereur, que je servirai avec zèle. Votre Altesse connait tout cela minutieusement, et en le répétant elle pourrait se fâcher. Que Dieu donne à chacun de nous selon son cœur; en attendant, tâchons avec zèle et dévouement à remplir nos devoirs.

(Translation.)

Hosrew Pasha to Mehemet Ali.

September 3, 1839.

I HAVE had the honour to receive the despatch from Your Highness, and to understand its contents. It is full of reproaches, and Your Highness calls upon me to give up office, and to inform you of my doing so. I write this letter to Your Highness to prove to you that my friendship for you is sincere, and of that God is witness, and that I entertain no sentiments of animosity against you. The opinion which you have of me is not just, and notwithstanding that the reproaches and complaints of Your Highness against me have filled the whole earth, I myself am not angry with you, and that matter rather concerns the Emperor. All these words have injured the name of Mehemet Ali Pasha among the Mussulmans and the wise men of Europe, and since "each person ought to devote himself to the cause of his countrymen," your Highness has much surprised me, and has even vexed me. Because the Capudan Pasha is blameable, it is not reasonable that you should wish to retain the fleet, and I did not believe that you would. You have heard the words of the Capudan Pasha, and if you had sent the Imperial fleet, it would have been right and proper. As regards my retirement from office, your Highness knows, that for some years past I have remained secluded in my house. Providence, notwithstanding my desire to the contrary, would that I should become Grand Vizier, and that is the effect of the Divine favour, and to resist, would have been to resist the will of God; I feared to do so, and I accepted the office of Vizier with the persuasion that God will aid me. Now, my Lord, I entreat you to be so good as to pardon me this fault of being Grand Vizier, since that in my case was agreeable to the destiny of God, because I was one of the first men in Islam; and I thank the Almighty that up to my last breath I am in the favour of the Prophet, and in the service of our benefactor, the Emperor, whom I will serve with zeal. Your Highness knows all this minutely, and in consequence of my repeating it you may be angry. May God give to each after his heart; in the meanwhile, let us endeavour with zeal and with devotion to fulfil our duties.

Inclosure 6 in No. 376.

Mehemet Ali to Hosrew Pasha.

[See Inclosure in No. 345.]

Inclosure 7 in No. 376.

Note from the Sublime Porte to the Representatives of the Five Powers.

[See Inclosure in No. 343.]

Inclosure 8 in No. 376.

Baron Stürmer to M. de Laurin.

Monsieur, *Bouyoukdère, le 7 Octobre*, 1839.

VOUS recevez ci-incluse une copie de la dernière Note de la Porte aux Représentans des Cinq Grandes Puissances, que faute de tems je n'ai pas pu joindre à ma lettre d'avant-hier expédiée par l'Archiduc Lodovico. Vous pouvez la communiquer au Pacha, si vous le jugez convenable, mais ce ne devrait être que d'une manière confidentielle.

(Signé) STURMER.

(Translation.)

Baron Stürmer to M. de Laurin.

Sir, *Buyukdéré, October* 7, 1839.

YOU receive inclosed herein a copy of the last Note of the Porte to the Representatives of the Five Great Powers, which, from want of time, I was unable to add to my letter of the day before yesterday, sent by the "Archiduc Lodovico." You may communicate it to the Pasha if you think fit; but you should only do so confidentially.

(Signed) STURMER.

Inclosure 9 in No. 376.

Note from the Sublime Porte to the Representatives of the Five Powers.

[See Inclosure in No. 343.]

No. 377.

The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 17.)

(Extract.) *St. Petersburgh, November 5, 1839.*

COUNT NESSELRODE called upon me yesterday. He is very anxious to receive from your Lordship the definitive opinion of Her Majesty's Government, as to the best settlement to be effected between Mehemet Ali and the Porte, and as to the measures to be adopted to effect that settlement. But his Excellency is reconciled to the longer delay than he had anticipated in the arrival of such a communication, by the hope that your Lordship will have ascertained the views of the French Cabinet, and obtained, if possible, its assent to the line of conduct which Her Majesty's Government may desire to adopt.

Count Nesselrode has always shown himself sensible of the advantages which would be gained by securing the assent of France to the settlement desired by the other Powers. His Excellency repeated, what he had frequently remarked to me before, that the French journals were entirely wrong in asserting that M. de Brunnow's mission was intended to exclude France from acting in concert with Russia and England upon this subject, and he seems sincerely to hope that your Lordship will succeed in conciliating the spirit of the French Government towards the policy of the British Cabinet. He laid much stress upon the opinion, that Candia was the portion of Mehemet Ali's possessions which it was most desirable for the Sultan to regain, with a view to his own security. His Excellency expressed a decided opinion, that if a fleet should intercept the communications between Syria and Egypt, and act offensively against Mehemet Ali, Ibrahim Pasha would not dare to attempt a march upon Constantinople, and that he would even have great difficulties in maintaining his army in its present position; because a hostile army can make no progress, and can have no security in Syria, without support and communications from without by sea. But this last reflection did not lessen Count Nesselrode's desire that the French Government should prove, at least, not hostile to the arrangement which the other Powers may desire to effect.

No. 378.

Sir George Hamilton to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 18.)

(Extract.) *Berlin, November 13, 1839.*

I READ to Baron Werther the copy of your Lordship's despatch, dated the 25th of October, to the Marquess of Clanricarde, relative to the mission of Baron Brunnow in England, and his Excellency expressed his entire approbation of it, more particularly of the view taken by Her Majesty's Government with respect to the Straits of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles; and that the best arrangement would be, that while Turkey is at peace, both of those straits should be shut against ships of war of all Powers; and he considered that this arrangement would be more conducive to the maintenance of peace, than an understanding that the Straits in question should be open at all times to the ships of war of all countries.

With regard to the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, that if for a particular emergency, one of those Straits should be opened for one party, the other ought at the same time to be opened for other parties, and for instance, if it should become necessary that a Russian force should enter the

Bosphorus, a British force should at the same time enter the Dardanelles, (and for which case it appears that M. de Brunnow's instructions did not provide,) his Excellency observed, that however right and necessary it would be at a future period to come to some distinct understanding on this point, he regretted that any time should at present be lost in the negotiation of this question, as he considered that no such emergency as that contemplated by the advance of Ibrahim Pasha on Constantinople could possibly arise; that all the accounts he had received from Asia Minor, confirmed him in the opinion of the impossibility of Ibrahim's advance, from the present state of Syria and of his own army; but that Her Majesty's Government must be even better informed on this head than he could be. Convinced, however, as he was, of the impossibility of Ibrahim's advance, he begged me to convey to your Lordship his opinion, that it would be more advantageous to leave the question of the Straits of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles for a matter of future negotiation; (more particularly as happily at this moment, the British and Russian Governments seemed to have abandoned all distrust of each other on Turkish Affairs;) and that all the energies of Her Majesty's Government should be turned to the settlement of the Syrian Question.

No. 379.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 18.)

My Lord, *Paris, November* 15, 1839.

I HAVE received your Lordship's despatches to the 12th of November.

I have communicated to Marshal Soult your Lordship's despatch of October 29, in which are recapitulated the proceedings which have taken place between the two Governments on the Affairs of the East, and in obedience to your instructions, I left a copy of it in his hands.

His Excellency this morning informed me that the French Consul at Alexandria writes, that the language of Mehemet Ali is pacific; and although the Pasha said, that in the case of his giving up Adana, it ought to be held by one of his sons under the Porte, still he believed that the Viceroy would conclude a treaty of peace with the Sultan on the conditions stated in the project of the French Government. On my asking the Marshal whether he had any reason to suppose that the Turkish Government were disposed to accede to those conditions, his Excellency replied, that the despatches of M. Pontois merely announced his arrival at Therapia, and at the time of their date, M. Pontois had not had any conversation with the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The Marshal, at the same time that he expressed his hope, that a peace would be concluded between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, seemed desirous that I should not imagine that the French Government felt any anxiety on the subject. He told me, that the reports he had received from the French Consuls at Beyrout, at Damascus, and at Aleppo, contradicted the rumours of any insurrections being apprehended in Syria, of a nature to give uneasiness to Ibrahim Pasha.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 380.

Viscount Palmerston to the Marquess of Clanricarde.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November* 19, 1839.

I HAVE received and laid before the Queen your Excellency's despatches to the 5th of November.

With reference to your conversation with Count Nesselrode on Turkish Affairs, reported in your despatch of that day, I have to state to your

Excellency, that Her Majesty's Government are waiting for a reply from the Russian Government to the proposition made by them to that Government, through Baron Brunnow, and explained in my despatch to your Excellency, of the 25th ultimo; and Her Majesty's Government anxiously hope, that so reasonable an arrangement will meet with the concurrence of the Imperial Cabinet.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 381.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 21.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, October* 26, 1839.

BY the last post I forwarded copy of an Official Note from the Porte, dated October 21st. I now inclose copy of my answer.

Inclosure in No. 381.

Note from Viscount Ponsonby to Rechid Pasha.

THE Note, dated the 21st of October, addressed by his Excellency Rechid Pasha to the Undersigned, affords a new proof of the fidelity with which the Sublime Porte adheres to engagements. The High Allies and friends of the Porte must find in such conduct, additional incitement to devote their uninterrupted attention to the early and stable settlement of the great affairs they have taken upon themselves to arrange; and the result will prove that the delicacy with which the Ottoman Government has acted, is in intimate accordance with prudence. The interest of the Pasha is to provoke the Porte or its Generals to act, so as to enable him to strike some blow that will give him advantages in the final arrangement; and his is a position in which it is politic to risk. His strength is not solid, but rests upon ephemeral bases; and his army is not good, is not numerous, is not paid, is not well affected. The domination of the Egyptians in Syria is opposed by all who dare act, and is detested by the whole population of the country. The Pasha has the greatest need of some success against the Ottoman troops, that may give his partizans occasion to make, anew, pompous reports of his power, to deceive the uninformed world, and to give force to his extravagant claims, which amount to the partition of the empire under the disguise of vassalage. Time has already operated beneficially for the State, for it has proved the fidelity of the subjects of all ranks to their Sovereign, and belied the assertions of the Pasha of Egypt, that the Pashas and the people were the supporters of his pretensions. Time has shown that the authority of the Sublime Porte is obeyed throughout the empire, and that the enemies of the Porte have spoken falsehood when they asserted that anarchy prevailed everywhere, and that there remained no empire to be the object of the friendly solicitude of the Allies of the Sultan.

It is easy to point out many more advantages that have been produced by the operation of time in making truth known; and the Sublime Porte will not fail to see the wisdom of the counsel given in the Collective Note of the 28th of July, by the Representatives of the Great Powers, which prevented a hasty submission on the part of the Porte to the imperious demands of a rebel subject, and saved the empire from partition, and the most sacred prerogatives of the Sultan from the danger to which they must be exposed, by leaving the government of the Holy Cities in the possession of a man raised to a power much too great to be controuled by the Porte. It would be wrong, therefore, if the Sublime Porte were impatient; it would be a great error to act under the influence of such a feeling, for its only consequence would be to make the Sultan abandon a third part of his empire to the family of Mehemet Ali, and to raise up rivals to dispute the most sacred of His Imperial Majesty's rights.

The Sublime Porte cannot have anything to apprehend, if it will continue to act with the prudence and firmness that have hitherto distinguished its conduct.

The Allies of the Porte are interested in maintaining the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire; and it is not to be imagined that they want the power to do so against a petty Chief, if it should be necessary for them to exert their strength. The Ottoman Ministers are too well acquainted with facts to be deceived by the vain boasts of the Pasha of Egypt, and the absurd exaggerations of his partizans; but there are ignorant men in this country who entertain the most foolish ideas, and think, that to grant Mehemet Ali all he demands, would be to unite the whole Mussulman force, and to create the means of preserving the country from all danger. It requires little penetration, however, to see, that if what Mehemet Ali demands were granted, the effect would not be to unite Mussulmans, but to disunite them; for it is impossible that a Sultan could be safe on his throne, when such possessions as Syria, Arabia, Egypt, &c., were placed irrevocably in the hands of a Pasha; and it is equally impossible for a Pasha, holding such possessions, to be safe in the enjoyment of them, as long as there is a Sultan on the throne interested to wrest them from him; and the consequence must be, that jealousy, fear, and hate, must predominate in the bosoms of the Sultan and Pasha, and that union (even for an hour) cannot exist between them: and thus it is manifest that the ideas above-mentioned, of strengthening the Mussulman power by granting the demands of Mehemet Ali, are false, and that the measure is ridiculous, if proposed as a security for the empire, because it is in fact the partition of it, creating a necessity for one portion of it to be always in opposition to the other,—a strange way of making the whole strong against external enemies.

The difficulty stated as arising from the alternative, that the Sublime Porte may be obliged either to disregard its acceptance of the intervention of the Five Powers, and order the Ottoman Generals to resist the advances of Ibrahim Pasha, or to instruct the inhabitants of those parts into which that Pasha may enter, to receive him, is one that, on all accounts, requires attention, but it must be resolved by the consideration of what is best for the interest of all, including those inhabitants in question.

If the Generals and Armies of the Sublime Porte were sure of making a successful resistance to the advances of the Pasha, there might be no doubt of the propriety of making it; and the Five Powers might not interpret the act to be an infringement of the engagement of the Sublime Porte, and the inhabitants would thereby be protected; but if there be danger that the Ottoman forces should be found not sufficiently prepared nor numerous enough to insure success for their efforts, it must be the duty of the Porte not to throw away that power in the defence of a small portion of the country which, if kept unbroken, may suffice to restore the whole monarchy to peace and order, and amply compensate the inhabitants of those districts for any temporary evils they may sustain by submission to the temporary power of an invader. It is not necessary that the Porte should give any instructions to the inhabitants upon the subject, and prudence requires that nothing should be said upon the matter to them, and, whenever it is in its power, the Porte will apply the remedy to the evils they are exposed to.

The Undersigned, &c.,

(Signed) PONSONBY.

Therapia, October 25, 1839.

No. 382.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received November* 21.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October* 27, 1839.

I INCLOSE copy of a report from the Austrian Consul-General at Alexandria to the Internuncio. It contains interesting information upon several subjects, illustrative of the means possessed by the Egyptians. I

have since heard that Ibrahim has made some arrangement with his adversaries in the Ledgea, by which he grants them large privileges. I believe this arrangement, if it be made, will prove to be of the nature of more than one or two previously made between the same parties. A mere expedient to gain time.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 382.

M. de Laurin to Baron Stürmer.

(Traduction.)
(Extrait.) *Alexandrie, le* 15 *Octobre,* 1839.

DEPUIS mes rapports du 24 du mois passé et du 6 du courant, les affaires de la Syrie semblent avoir considérablement empiré.

Dans la nuit du 25 au 26 Septembre, les insurgés du Haouran attaquèrent les troupes de Chérif Pacha et les repoussèrent jusqu'au-delà des Puits de Barack sur la route de Damas. Le chef des troupes irrégulières, Hassan Agha-el-Yazdji, fut porté blessé à Damas, et l'on décida dans un Conseil des autorités militaires de cette ville, de renforcer sur le champ les troupes du Haouran et de leur envoyer des munitions de bouche et de guerre.

Ce succès des insurgés, quelque petit qu'il fût, parait cependant inquiéter beaucoup Méhémet Ali. Il appréhende que les mécontens ne l'exagèrent et ne soulèvent par là d'autres peuplades. Cette appréhension du Pacha est parfaitement fondée. La défaite de Hassan Agha fait le sujet de toutes les conversations, et depuis lors plusieurs districts de la montagne ont refusé l'impôt, et se trouvent actuellement en révolte ouverte contre le Gouvernement.

Pour ce qui regarde la dislocation des troupes d'Ibrahim Pacha, elle a eu lieu avant que Kiamil Bey eût apporté au Séraskier les contre-ordres dont fait mention mon rapport du 6 de ce mois. Ibrahim Pacha se trouve maintenant avec peu de troupes à Marache, et néanmoins (d'après un rapport d'Alep du 19 Septembre) il doit avoir l'intention d'occuper Besana et Diarbékir.

Méhémet Ali semble à présent approuver la première de ces mesures de son fils, mais il nie d'avoir donné l'ordre d'occuper Besana et Diarbékir. Les travaux des fortifications de St. Jean d'Acre et aux passes d'Alexandrie se continuent avec assiduité.

La flotte Ottomane a reçu une grande quantité de biscuit et d'autres munitions de bouche. On en infère qu'elle pourra bientôt partir d'ici. Les équipages le désirent si ardemment, qu'il faudra à la fin adhérer à leur demande pour ne pas les pousser à la révolte. Même le paiement de la solde arriérée qui eut lieu il y a quatre jours, n'a pu apaiser cette demande énoncée d'une manière presqu'impétueuse.

P.S.—16 *Octobre*, 1839. J'expédie ce rapport par le pyroscaphe de guerre Anglais "Rhadamanthus."

Le Pacha est attendu d'une heure à l'autre. Mr. Campbell et le Comte Médem se sont déclarés prêts à appuyer de leur mieux le Message que je dois faire au Pacha d'après la dépêche de votre Excellence du 5 de ce mois. M. Cochelet n'a reçu, à ce sujet, aucune instruction positive.]

(Translation.)

M. de Laurin to Baron Stürmer.

Alexandria, October 15, 1839.

SINCE my reports of the 24th ultimo, and 6th instant, affairs in Syria appear to have grown much worse.

In the night between the 25th and 26th of September, the insurgents of

the Haouran attacked the troops of Cherif Pasha and drove them back beyond the wells of Barack on the road to Damascus. The Commander of the irregular troops, Hassan Agha el Yazdji, was carried wounded to Damascus, and it was decided in a council of the military authorities of that city, forthwith to reinforce the troops of the Haouran, and to send them provisions and military stores.

This success of the insurgents, trifling as it has been, appears, nevertheless, to disturb Mehemet Ali much. He is apprehensive lest the malcontents should exaggerate it, and thereby raise up other tribes. This apprehension on the part of the Pasha is perfectly well founded. The defeat of Hassan Agha is the subject of every conversation, and subsequently several districts of the mountain have refused to pay taxes, and are actually in open revolt against the Government.

As regards the breaking up of the troops of Ibrahim Pasha, it took place before Kiamil Bey had brought to the Seraskier the counter-orders mentioned in my report of the 6th instant. Ibrahim Pasha is now with a few troops at Marash, and nevertheless, (according to a report from Aleppo of the 19th of September,) he intends to occupy Besana and Diarbekir.

Mehemet Ali appears at present to approve of the first of these measures of his son, but he denies having given orders for the occupation of Besana and Diarbekir. The works on the fortifications of St. Jean d'Acre, and at the passages of Alexandria, continue with activity.

The Turkish fleet has embarked a great quantity of biscuit and other provisions. It is inferred from thence, that it will possibly soon depart from this. The crews long for it so intensely, that it will be necessary at last to yield to their demand, in order not to drive them to revolt. Even the payment of their arrears, which took place four days ago, has not had the effect of pacifying this demand, which has been expressed almost with impetuosity.

P. S.—*October* 16, 1839. I send this report by the British steamer of war "Rhadamanthus."

The Pasha is hourly expected. Colonel Campbell and Count Medem have declared themselves ready to support to the best of their ability the message which I am to deliver to the Pasha according to your Excellency's despatch of the 5th of this month. M. Cochelet has not received any positive instruction on this point.

No. 383.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received November* 21.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October* 28, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of Baron Stürmer's reply to the official Note of the Porte, dated October 21, which was forwarded to your Lordship in my despatch of October 22.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

P.S.—The reply of the French Chargé d'Affaires, Count de Lurde, was much to the same purport.

P.

Inclosure in No. 383.

Note from Baron Stürmer to the Sublime Porte.

24 *Octobre*, 1839.

LE Soussigné a pris connaissance de la Note que son Excellence M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères lui a fait l'honneur de lui adresser, en date du 21 de ce mois.

Il regrette plus vivement que personne les pénibles embarras que suscitent à la Sublime Porte les envahissemens des troupes Egyptiennes dans l'Asie Mineure; mais il croirait superflu de faire observer au Divan, que ces embarras sont inhérens à la situation du moment, et que, les circonstances ne permettant point d'y remédier promptement, il est d'une sage politique de s'appliquer du moins à ne pas les aggraver.

Laisser fraterniser les troupes Ottomanes avec celles d'Ibrahim Pacha entraînerait, sans contredit, de graves inconvéniens; de l'autre côté, une lutte entre ces deux forces armées pourrait amener les complications les plus fâcheuses, car on ne saurait se dissimuler que tout nouveau succès des Egyptiens produirait en leur faveur un effet moral incalculable, et pourrait soulever des peuplades dont leurs émissaires n'ont pas réussi jusqu'ici à ébranler l'attachement à leur souverain légitime.

Le Soussigné est donc sûr de remplir les intentions de son Auguste Cour en conseillant à la Sublime Porte d'enjoindre itérativement à ses Généraux et Commandans dans l'Asie Mineure, d'éviter soigneusement tout contact avec les troupes Egyptiennes, et de se retirer chaque fois que celles-ci feraient mine de vouloir se rapprocher des positions qu'ils occupent. En agissant ainsi, la Sublime Porte prendra l'attitude la plus propre à manifester la confiance qu'elle place dans l'appui des Cinq Puissances coalisées. Le moment d'ailleurs n'est pas loin, j'espère, où elle sentira toute la valeur de cet appui, et le Gouvernement de Sa Hautesse n'aura pas à regretter de l'avoir attendu avec patience.

La Sublime Porte n'ignore pas que le gros de l'Armée Egyptienne n'est nullement en mesure de se porter en avant; mais quand même il le pourrait, Mehemet Ali est trop bien avisé pour ordonner un mouvement qui deviendrait pour les Grandes Puissances de l'Europe le signal de leur réunion instantanée contre lui.

La perte temporaire de quelques portions de terrain dans l'Anatolie n'a pas assez d'importance dans la conjoncture actuelle pour balancer les grands intérêts qui sont en jeu, et faire dévier le Ministère Ottoman du systême de temporisation et de calme qu'il a suivi jusqu'ici avec tant de sagesse. Le Soussigné est d'avis que les empiètemens mêmes des Egyptiens peuvent tourner au profit de la Sublime Porte en achevant d'irriter l'opinion publique contre Méhémet Ali, et en accélérant les effets de l'union qui existe entre les Cinq Puissances.

En soumettant ces réflexions au jugement éclairé du Divan de Sa Hautesse, le Soussigné saisit cette occasion de renouveler à son Excellence M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères l'assurance de sa haute considération.

(Signé) STURMER.

(Translation.)

Note from Baron Stürmer to the Sublime Porte.

October 24, 1839.

THE Undersigned has taken cognizance of the Note which his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs did him the honour to address to him on the 21st instant.

He regrets more deeply than any one the painful embarrassments which the encroachments of the Egyptian troops in Asia Minor occasion to the Sublime Porte; but he would consider it superfluous to state to the Divan, that these embarrassments necessarily attach to the present state of affairs; and that as circumstances do not admit of a remedy being speedily applied, it is a prudent policy to endeavour at least not to aggravate them.

To allow the Ottoman troops to fraternize with those of Ibrahim Pasha, would unquestionably give occasion to serious inconvenience: on the other hand, a conflict between these two armed forces might bring on the most lamentable complications; for it is impossible to conceal, that every fresh success on the part of the Egyptians would produce an incalculable moral effect in their favour, and might stir up the tribes whose attachment to their lawful Sovereign, the Egyptian emissaries have not yet succeeded in shaking.

The Undersigned, therefore, feels certain that he shall fulfil the intentions

of his august Court, by counselling the Sublime Porte again to enjoin its Generals and Commanders in Asia Minor, carefully to avoid coming in contact with the Egyptian troops, and to retire on all occasions when the latter should evince an intention to approach the positions occupied by them. By acting thus, the Porte will assume the attitude best calculated to manifest the reliance which it places on the support of the Five United Powers. The moment besides, is not, I trust, far distant, when it will experience the whole value of this support, and the Government of His Highness will not have occasion to regret having waited for it with patience.

The Sublime Porte is not ignorant that the main body of the Egyptian Army is by no means in a state to advance; but even if it could do so, Mehemet Ali is too prudent to order a movement which would be the signal for the immediate coalition of the Great Powers of Europe against him.

The temporary loss of some portions of territory in Anatolia is not of sufficient importance in the present state of affairs, to weigh against the great interests which are at stake, and to cause the Ottoman Ministry to deviate from the temporizing and passive system which up to this time it has so prudently observed. The Undersigned is of opinion that even the encroachments of the Egyptians may turn to the advantage of the Sublime Porte, by eventually irritating the public mind against Mehemet Ali, and by hastening the effects of the union existing between the Five Powers.

In submitting these considerations to the enlightened judgment of the Divan of His Highness, the Undersigned takes this opportunity to repeat to his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs the assurance of his high consideration.

(Signed) STURMER.

No. 384.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November* 22, 1839.

I HAVE received and laid before the Queen your Excellency's despatches to the 28th of October.

I have to acquaint your Excellency, that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the Note which you addressed to the Porte on the 25th of October, of which a copy is inclosed in your despatch of October 26, in reply to the official Note of the Porte, of October 21, respecting the continued encroachments of the Egyptian Army upon the Turkish territory.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 385.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston—(*Received November* 21.)

(Extract.) *Paris, November* 18, 1839.

THE French Government felt hurt at having been taxed in your Lordship's despatch, (which I had communicated on Friday last to Marshal Soult,) with having, at the commencement of the communications between the two Governments, professed a determination to preserve the independence and integrity of the Turkish Empire, and with having subsequently, and on a sudden, changed its policy, and become, to all practical purposes, the protector of Mehemet Ali. It avers, that it is as desirous as ever to maintain the independence of the Turkish Empire, and makes the following statement of its conduct: When accounts arrived here of hostilities being imminent between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, the French Government, being strongly impressed with the great danger which might result to the independence of Turkey from the breaking out of war, was anxious to concert with the British Government, the best means of preventing a collision of the Turkish and Egyptian Armies, or, if hostilities had actually commenced, of concluding an armistice between them. As long as both parties were in the field, and as long as no decisive advantage had been gained by either army, when the Turkish and Egyptian fleets were nearly of equal force, and when the slightest naval assistance given to one might ensure victory over the other, it was not unreasonable to expect, that the warning voice of the British and French Governments would be listened to, and that their intervention might be effectual; but after the total rout and dispersion of the Turkish Army, and after the treacherous surrender by the Capudan Pasha, of the fleet under his command, into the hands of Mehemet Ali, the position of affairs was entirely changed, and we had to consider what it was possible to do, as well as what arrangement it was desirable to effect. The French Government is not disposed to deny, that the arrangement proposed by the British Government, if it could be carried into effect, affords a better security to the Turkish Empire than the arrangement proposed by France; but we have not the means of compelling Mehemet Ali to evacuate Syria, and we must not *vouloir l'impossible.* A naval blockade could not effect that object. They have had enough of blockades, and of their inefficacy at Vera Cruz, and at Buenos Ayres, and how could the two Governments undertake a blockade, which, if the information received from Admiral Lalande be correct, those who would have to execute it, the officers of the two fleets, agree, could not be maintained upon the coast of Egypt and of Syria without great risk, and which would not turn out to be effectual? If these naval means are inadequate to compel Mehemet Ali to accept the limits traced out in the Plan of the British Government, where is to be found the military force to drive the Egyptians out of Syria? It cannot, or will not, be furnished by England, by France, or by Austria; there remains then only Russia; and if that task be assigned to Russian troops, the French Government has no hesitation in asserting, that a far more irrecoverable blow would be inflicted upon the independence of the Sultan and of the Turkish Empire, by the Russian occupation of Constantinople and of Asia Minor, than by the conceding to the administration of Mehemet Ali even all the territory which the Egyptians now occupy.

This, my Lord, is, I think, the substance of the grounds on which the French Government defends itself from the imputation of inconsistency of conduct in the Eastern Question.

No. 386.

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November* 22, 1839.

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch of the 18th instant, I have to observe to your Excellency, that the upshot of the statement of the French Government appears to be, that in proportion as the course of events has rendered the active assistance of the Powers of Europe necessary for maintaining the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire, exactly in that proportion, and precisely for that reason, the French Government has become unwilling to afford to the Sultan any assistance at all.

With respect to the notion, that the Five Powers acting in union with the Sultan, have not the means of compelling the Pasha of Egypt to evacuate Syria, that opinion is one which it can scarcely be worth while seriously to argue; the disparity of forces between the two parties in such a contest being so infinitely great, that resistance on the part of the Pasha must necessarily be vain.

The French Government, however, seems to be of opinion, that the Sultan would be more seriously injured in his independence by receiving assistance from Russia, than by having his Empire practically dismembered, and by being deprived permanently of the resources of a large portion of his own territories. In this opinion Her Majesty's Government cannot concur. It is undoubtedly a misfortune for a Sovereign to be under the necessity of receiving military or naval aid from another Sovereign to defend him against hostile attack. The receiving of such aid is a public and undeniable proof of great weakness on the part of him who receives it; and real independence is not compatible with great weakness. Such aid also, if given by the single act of the Sovereign who affords it, entitles that Sovereign to ask in return favours and influence which must trench upon the future independence of the Sovereign who has been protected. But if Russia were to give assistance to the Sultan, not as acting upon her own single decision, but as acting in pursuance of a concert between the Five Allied Powers, such assistance would of course not bring after it any favours or concessions from Turkey to Russia that would be injurious to the independence of Turkey; and then the only question would be, whether the independence of the Turkish Empire would, permanently and for the future, be most affected by the temporary occupation of some part of the Turkish territory by a friendly Russian force, which would come in to restore that territory to the Sultan, and which would go out again when that purpose was accomplished, or by the permanent occupation of such territory by a hostile Egyptian force, which, having come in to conquer, would stay in to retain; and would by retaining, practically sever such territory from the Turkish Empire. Surely there can be no doubt how that question must be answered.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 387.

Baron Werther to Viscount Palmerston.

3, *Lower Berkeley Street,*
ce 22 *Novembre*, 1839.

My Lord,

JE viens de recevoir la copie d'un rapport de notre Légation à Constantinople. Comme les données qu'il renferme vous offriront peut-être quelque intérêt, je m'empresse de vous transmettre cette copie. Ce rapport du Comte Kœnigsmarck confirme ce que vous avez eu la bonté de me communiquer hier, que Méhémet Ali ne veut pas même se contenter des territoires que le Cabinet Français propose de lui abandonner héréditairement, et que le Vice-Roi insiste à obtenir le district d'Adana et les défilés du Taurus.

Veuillez agréer, &c.,
(Signé) WERTHER.

(Translation.)

Baron Werther to Viscount Palmerston.

3, *Lower Berkeley Street,*
November 22, 1839.

My Lord,

I HAVE just received the copy of a report from our Mission at Constantinople. As the particulars which it contains will perhaps be of interest to you, I hasten to send you this copy. This report from Count Königsmarck confirms what you had the goodness to communicate to me yesterday, that Mehemet Ali is not disposed even to be satisfied with the territories which the French Cabinet proposes to abandon to him hereditarily, and that the Viceroy insists upon obtaining the district of Adana and the defiles of the Taurus.

Receive, &c.,
(Signed) WERTHER.

Inclosure in No. 387.

Count Kœnigsmarck to His Majesty the King of Prussia.

Sire, *Bouyoukdéré, ce 30 Octobre,* 1839.

PAR mon très-humble rapport, No. 65, j'ai eu l'honneur de rendre compte à votre Majesté de la démarche que M. l'Internonce d'Autriche, d'ordre de sa Cour, avait prescrite, en date du 5 de ce mois, à M. de Laurin, pour déclarer au Pacha d'Egypte qu'il ne parviendrait pas d'amener la Porte à un arrangement auquel les Grandes Puissances, sous l'égide desquelles elle s'était placée, resteraient étrangères, et pour faire comprendre à Méhémet Ali, qu'une supériorité de forces matérielles ne suffirait pas pour lui donner l'avenir qu'il veut fonder dans l'intérêt de sa famille, puisque, quand même le Sultan accorderait toutes les concessions qu'il demande, elles ne consolideraient pas sa position, si l'Europe ne les sanctionnait pas. Je me suis permis de joindre au dit très-humble rapport l'office que j'avais adressé à M. le Comte de Médem, chargé, durant l'absence de M. Roquerbe, de la gestion du Consulat de Prusse à Alexandrie, pour l'inviter à appuyer, au nom de mon Auguste Cour, le langage de M. le Consul-Général d'Autriche, et à éclairer le Vice-Roi sur sa véritable position.

M. le Comte de Médem vient de m'informer de la manière dont il s'est acquitté de cette commission, et comment le Pacha l'a reçue, par un rapport qu'il m'a adressé en date du 20 du courant, et que j'ai l'honneur d'annexer ici en copie. Votre Majesté daignera voir entre autre par cette pièce, que Méhémet Ali a déclaré aux Consuls-Généraux, qu'il n'avait jamais cherché à établir des négociations avec la Porte dans le but de terminer ses différends avec elle, sans le concours des Grandes Puissances; qu'il avait pris ample connaissance de la dépêche de M. le Baron de Stürmer, et qu'il appréciait beaucoup les considérations qu'elle renfermait, mais qu'il n'avait rien à y répondre, sinon qu'il se tenait à sa dernière déclaration, et que ce ne serait que lorsqu'il connaîtrait les résolutions définitives des Grandes Cours sur la Question Orientale, qu'il pourrait émettre une réplique positive, l'issue de la question réposant sur des faits et non sur des raisonnemens.

Il résulte en outre de ce rapport, que M. le Consul-Général de France, au lieu de s'associer à cette démarche, est allé jusqu'à faire sentir au Pacha, que si dans la dépêche de M. l'Internonce d'Autriche il n'était pas question de moyens répressifs, ce changement de langage était dû à l'influence de la France seule, qui s'était opposée à toute mesure coërcitive; qu'à la suite de cette communication, M. le Consul-Général de Russie avait cru devoir faire part au Vice-Roi du projet d'accommodement présenté par le Cabinet des Tuileries, en lui observant qu'il devait être préparé plutôt à obtenir moins que plus; que l'idée des mesures comminatoires n'était nullement abandonnée, et que ses prétentions relativement à la destitution de Hosreff Pacha avaient été jugées complètement inadmissibles; observations auxquelles Méhémet Ali a répondu, que la Question Orientale ayant changé de face par le fait de l'intervention des Grandes Puissances, il renonçait à la demande du renvoi de Hosreff Pacha; que quant à l'Ile de Candie, il se déciderait aussi à s'en désister, mais que, pour Adana, il ne consentirait jamais à la restituer à la Porte, les défilés du Mont Taurus (Koulek Boghas) fermant la porte de sa maison et le mettant à l'abri d'un coup de main de la part des Turcs.

Le rapport que M. de Laurin a adressé à M. le Baron de Stürmer sur ce sujet, renferme à peu près les mêmes détails, mais le rapport ci-joint du Comte de Médem étant plus précis, M. l'Internonce en a fait un extrait pour sa Cour. Je n'ai pas encore appris ce que M. le Colonel Campbell a écrit à Lord Ponsonby, ni lu ce que M. le Consul-Général de Russie a mandé à M. de Bouténeff sur leurs entretiens avec Méhémet Ali à l'occasion de la démarche Autrichienne; mais d'après ce que MM. de Médem et de Laurin en rapportent à M. de Stürmer et à moi, on ne saurait cependant douter qu'elle n'ait fourni une nouvelle preuve que le Pacha d'Egypte, aussi longtems qu'il se croira soutenu par la France et à l'abri de moyens coërcitifs, ne se désistera pas de ses prétentions.

Je suis, &c.,
(Signé) KŒNIGSMARCK.

(Translation.)

Count Königsmarck to His Majesty the King of Prussia.

Sire, *Buyukdéré, October* 30, 1839.

BY my most humble report, No. 65, I had the honour to give Your Majesty an account of the step which the Internuncio of Austria, by orders from his Court, had, on the 5th instant, enjoined M. de Laurin to take, in order to declare to the Pasha of Egypt that he would not succeed in bringing the Porte to an arrangement with which the Great Powers, under whose protection it had placed itself, should have nothing to do, and to make Mehemet Ali understand, that a superiority of material forces would not suffice to confer upon him that future position of which, for the interest of his family, he is desirous of laying the foundation, since, even if the Sultan should grant all the concessions which he demands, they would not consolidate his position, if Europe did not sanction it. I ventured to annex to the above-mentioned most humble report the despatch which I had addressed to Count Medem, who, during the absence of M. Roquerbe, has the management of the Prussian Consulate at Alexandria, to request him to support, in the name of my August Court, the language of the Consul-General of Austria, and to enlighten the Viceroy on his real position.

Count Medem has just acquainted me with the manner in which he executed this commission, and how the Pasha received it, by a despatch which he has written to me, dated the 20th instant, and of which I have the honour to inclose a copy. Your Majesty will be pleased to observe among other things by this document, that Mehemet Ali has declared to the Consuls-General, that he had never sought to enter into negotiations with the Porte with the view of bringing his differences with it to an end, without the concurrence of the Great Powers; that he had made himself fully acquainted with the despatch of Baron de Stürmer, and that he greatly appreciated the considerations which it contained; but that he had no answer to make to it, except that he abided by his last declaration; and that it was only after he should be aware of the definitive resolutions of the Great Courts on the Eastern Question, that he could give a positive answer, as the solution of the Question depended on facts and not on reasonings.

It further appears from this report, that the Consul-General of France, instead of joining in this proceeding, went so far as to give the Pasha to understand, that if in the despatch of the Internuncio of Austria there was no mention of measures of coercion, this alteration of language was owing to the influence of France alone, who had opposed all such measures; that in consequence of this communication the Consul-General of Russia had thought it right to communicate to the Viceroy the plan of arrangement proposed by the Cabinet of the Tuileries, remarking, that he should be prepared rather to obtain less than more; that the notion of threatening measures was by no means abandoned; and that his pretension, relative to the dismissal of Hosrew Pasha, had been considered altogether inadmissible, to which observations Mehemet Ali replied, that the Eastern Question having changed its aspect from the circumstance of the intervention of the Great Powers, he abandoned his demand for the removal of Hosrew Pasha; that, as for the Island of Candia, he would decide upon giving that up also; but that as to Adana he would never consent to restore it to the Porte, as the defiles of Mount Taurus (Kulek Boghas) closed the door of his house, and secured it from a sudden attack on the part of the Turks.

The report which M. Laurin has addressed to the Baron de Stürmer contains pretty nearly the same details; but the annexed report of Count Medem being more precise, the Internuncio has made an extract of it for his Court. I have not yet learnt, what Colonel Campbell has written to Lord Ponsonby, nor read what the Consul-General of Russia has detailed to M. de Bouténeff respecting their interviews with Mehemet Ali on the subject of the

Austrian proceedings; but, according to what MM. Medem and Laurin report to M. de Stürmer and myself respecting it, it is altogether impossible to doubt, that it has furnished a fresh proof, that the Pasha of Egypt, so long as he shall imagine himself supported by France, and secure from coercive measures, will not desist from his pretensions.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) KŒNIGSMARCK.

No. 388.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 25.)

(Extract.) *Vienna, November* 11, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship, that his Excellency Lord Beauvale informed me on the evening of the 9th instant, that Prince Metternich would see me on the following morning at 12 o'clock. I called on the Prince at the hour appointed, and his Highness immediately entered on the subject of the Eastern Question; he assured me emphatically, that the opinions of Austria were completely identified with those of England, whatever might be the difficulties that obstructed the realization of their joint views. He stated it as his confident opinion, that Russia and Prussia were in perfect unanimity with England and Austria in their determination to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and that the professions of France were of the same tenour, although a disposition to give countenance to the pretensions of Mehemet Ali was manifestly evinced.

"It would probably," said Prince Metternich, "be of some advantage to you to tell Mehemet Ali that I have, *vivâ voce,* acquainted you with the views of Austria, and that you can bear your own personal testimony to their complete accordance with those of your own Government. Endeavour to point out to the Pasha the magnitude of the risk he is incurring, and that at his advanced period of life, it would be the height of impolicy to sacrifice the prospects of the future to the assumed exigencies of the present. That no unreasonable conditions, such as the surrender of Egypt, will be imposed on him; that if he professes himself to be the faithful and obedient subject of the Sultan, deeds and not words must prove his sincerity; and that he would undoubtedly consult his own interests in supporting the Ottoman Empire, as any further encroachment would be contrary to the resolution of the Great Powers of Europe, and could have no other result than the aggravation of his embarrassments."

Prince Metternich then passed to the consideration of those difficulties which would seriously engage the attention of the Great Powers. Although fully alive to, and by no means undervaluing questions of territorial boundary, he gave the pre-eminence to those which involved the final settlement of rights and duties.

The Prince then read to me the despatch most recently received from the Austrian Consul-General at Alexandria, the purport of which was the continued obstinacy of the Pasha in his territorial pretensions, as well as the detail of a conversation held with him on the subject of the surrender of the Turkish fleet.

I forward this despatch to your Lordship under flying seal, through his Excellency Lord Beauvale.

No. 389.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 21.)

My Lord, *Vienna, November* 10, 1839.

BEING uncertain whether a copy of Lord Ponsonby's despatch to me of the 28th ultimo has been sent to your Lordship. I have the honour to transmit one with its inclosure.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 389.

Viscount Ponsonby to Lord Beauvale.

My Lord, *Therapia, October* 28, 1839.

I INCLOSE a despatch I received this day from Colonel Campbell. It reports a conversation between the Pasha and him. I do not understand what is said about Adana. I know of no propositions having been made to the Pasha; there was a demand made that he should give up the fleet.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 389.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Ponsonby.

[See Inclosure 4 in No. 376.]

No. 390.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 25.)

My Lord, *Vienna, November* 16, 1839.

IN reference to my despatch, of the 10th instant, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship the copy of a despatch which I have received from Viscount Ponsonby, together with its inclosures.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 390.

Viscount Ponsonby to Lord Beauvale.

My Lord, *Therapia, October* 30, 1839.

WITH reference to the despatch of October 19, from Colonel Campbell, which I had the honour to transmit to your Excellency on the 28th instant, I now inclose translations of the two letters which form the annexes to that despatch.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 390.

Hosrew Pasha to Mehemet Ali Pasha.

[See Inclosure 5 in No. 376.]

Inclosure 3 in No. 390.

Mehemet Ali to Hosrew Pasha.

[See Inclosure in No. 345.]

No. 391.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 25.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, October* 30, 1839.

RECHID PASHA has acquainted me with what passed between him and M. de Pontois yesterday, as follows:—"After some preliminary discourse, I said to the Envoy, 'I am much mortified by seeing, as I do, in the French journals, that France shows partiality for Mehemet Ali, which contradicts the assurances I have given to my Government, and to His Highness, of the friendly feelings of the French Government for the Sublime Porte, and of its will to maintain the integrity and independence of the Ottoman dominions.'"

The Envoy replied: "There is no attention to be given to what the journals say. The Government has at heart the interests of the Sublime Porte, and is strongly disposed to do what may be useful to it.

The Pasha.—The interests of the Sublime Porte demand that nothing should be granted to Mehemet Ali, except the hereditary government of Egypt alone; but France has proposed to the Great Powers an arrangement by which Adana should be given up now to the Porte, and Candia restored to it after the death of Mehemet Ali, and Syria be divided amongst his children at the same period, and that the hereditary government of Egypt should be given to him. To give Syria to the children of Mehemet Ali as an hereditary possession after the death of that Pasha, is the same thing as to cede the hereditary possession of it to him now.

The Envoy.—The French Government is of opinion that the Sublime Porte should grant to Mehemet Ali, independently of the hereditary government of Egypt, some other favours for life. France disagrees with England only on one point, namely, as to the means to be employed. France, in communicating her ideas to the other Governments, has not given them as her ultimatum; it is only a project. The employment of force against Mehemet Ali is considered by the Government of France as the signal for his march to Constantinople, and therefore of the march of the Russians, which might bring on an European war. If the combined fleets go to Alexandria to burn the Egyptian fleet, the Ottoman fleet will be burnt also.

The Pasha.—The combined fleets by going to Egypt might do other things than burn the fleet.

The Envoy.—The season is too far advanced for the fleets to go to Egypt. We have not the advantages that Russia has; the Russians are at the door of Constantinople, they have the winds for them and the currents, and our fleets are at a distance from Constantinople, and they might find many obstacles in approaching it.

The Pasha.—The two fleets together consist of a large number of ships, and one-half would suffice for Egypt, and the other half for these parts (parages). The Egyptian Army is not in a state to march forward, for money is wanting, and there are troubles to be quieted in different parts of Syria; besides, if the season is bad for the English and French ships to act on the coast, it is too far advanced also for the Egyptian Army to march forward; but, to conclude, I wish to know if you are already informed of the resolutions of the French Government?

The Envoy.—The Baron Brunnow, sent by the Emperor of Russia to London, was the bearer of propositions that have been rejected by England; it is therefore very probable that after that having happened, and particularly as Prince Metternich is on the point of returning to Vienna, the Governments will not long delay coming to an understanding and sending me and my colleagues instructions on the Egyptian Question, and the Russians will fail in all their efforts to disunite France and England.

I had a long conversation with M. de Pontois two days before his visit to Rechid Pasha, when he said to me nearly what he said to the Pasha as reported above. He was anxious to disclaim all partiality for Mehemet Ali and all jealousy of England, and to attribute the wishes of the French Government, as expressed in its propositions, to the opinion entertained that Mehemet Ali would bring on a war, &c. I discussed with him, one by one, the reasons assigned for that opinion.

No. 392.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received November* 25.)

My Lord, *Vienna, November* 16, 1839.

COLONEL HODGES has left this town for Alexandria. During his stay here I communicated to him, according to your Lordship's orders, the correspondence upon Turkish and Egyptian affairs, and before his departure I addressed to him an instruction of which I have the honour to inclose a copy. It has been communicated to Prince Metternich, who fully concurs in its contents.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

Inclosure in No. 392.

Instructions from Lord Beauvale to Colonel Hodges.

Sir,

YOUR arrival at Alexandria from Vienna,—the supposed centre of the negotiation upon the affairs of Turkey and Egypt,—will probably excite expectation of a result, the want of which may lead to a doubt as to the existence of understanding between the Powers.

You have seen by the correspondence which has been placed in your hands, that for some time past the affairs in question have been treated in London, and you will not conceal the fact.

From Vienna, therefore, nothing is at present to be expected upon them; but it is to be remarked, that upon all the leading points—upon the preservation of the integrity of the Turkish Empire under the reigning dynasty; upon the defence of Constantinople; upon the conditions on which the right of hereditary succession may be recognized in the family of the Pasha; the Five Powers are already agreed. Nothing remains to be established between them but the line of demarcation and some other points of detail, upon which there is every prospect of their coming to a sufficient agreement.

If, therefore, Mehemet Ali were to build upon your arrival without definitive instructions, a hope of security to himself from dissensions among the Powers, he would be deceived. A rash step taken by him would at once lead to consequences which would make him sensible of his error.

It is probable that England will have been represented to the Pasha as his enemy, as exciting and leading the opposition to him, and as aiming at his destruction.

If these opinions have gained credit with him, he will be little accessible to the truth, nor will it be desirable to attempt to force it upon him; but as occasion may offer, it will be well that you should state, that the British Government has no feeling of enmity or hostility towards him; that the order and security which he has established in Egypt are more valuable to England, by opening a short communication with India, than to any other nation; that the commercial prosperity of Egypt reacts upon us; and that for these reasons the continuance of the system which Mehemet Ali has created in that country, is of high value and importance to us.

In Africa we are friendly to his power, and to its permanence: if we are less so in Asia, it proceeds not from any hostility to his person, but because in Asia his presence acts as a solvent to the empire of the Sultan,—an empire which his conquests in that quarter of the globe can neither support nor replace; which they can only weaken and destroy; and which we are determined to sustain.

If the object of Mehemet Ali be really the establishment of his family, it is only in Africa that that establishment can be fixed. There he will have Europe friendly to him; and, reconciled to the Porte, he may pursue the consolidation of the structure he has raised, with every facility for success, and with the certainty of transmitting it to his descendants.

In Asia, on the contrary, there can never exist between him and the Sultan but an armed truce. He must either overthrow or be overthrown. But the chances are not equal: the loss of a battle expels Mehemet Ali from Asia, the gain of one opens at most to him the road to Constantinople, which is too strongly guarded, for him to make an impression upon it. Full and final success is therefore impossible to him; the utmost he can gain in Asia is the temporary occupation of some additional districts; the utmost he can lose may be read in the history of all conquerors when checked in their career. And let him not deceive himself by supposing that the defence of Constantinople is but temporary, that the Powers will slacken in their efforts, or separate in their views. He will not find it so: their defence of it results from no personal feelings, from no transient motives. It is founded on their interests. Aiming at the preservation of peace, they cannot risk that so great a spoil should become an object of contention, and to avoid this, they unite their efforts to secure it to its present possessor. Mehemet Ali can never occupy it, and his power can take no root in Asia unless he does occupy it. If, then, he is willing to pass away, as he has seen Buonaparte pass before him, let him continue his present career.

If he aims at bequeathing his power and station to his family, let him accept what has been offered. In Africa these objects can be secured to him, while in Asia his reign is but for a day.

By all accounts of Mehemet Ali, he will be but little accessible to these or similar reasonings; nor is the time yet come when they can with propriety be made to him, unless he should of himself give occasion for it.

You will, therefore, abstain from all official communications whatever upon these subjects, awaiting the orders of our Government: but from the ascendancy which Mehemet Ali appears to exercise upon all who approach him, it is possible that these truths may as yet have been unheard, and even uncontemplated, in Egypt; and it is for this reason that I explain them to you, leaving it to your tact and discretion to make use of them, in case opportunities of doing so with advantage should present themselves, without however pledging your Government to any particular measures or course of conduct, beyond the engagements which it has already taken. These are public; but the mode of rendering them available, must be left to the Government itself.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

No. 393.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received November* 25.)

(Extract.) *Vienna, November* 16, 1839.

I COMMUNICATED to Prince Metternich your Lordship's despatch, of October 29, to Earl Granville, in which his Highness expressed his entire concurrence, requesting me to assure you, that there is no difference between England and Austria upon this question.

Prince Metternich expects that the difficulty about the joint defence of Constantinople will be got over, and that England, Austria, and Russia, will thereby be enabled to act together.

He will accede to the plan of settlement, be it what it may, which shall be agreed upon between England and Russia. The more favourable it is to the Porte, the more he will be pleased with it. He considers the delay which has taken place to have been favourable to the Porte. He is in no hurry to terminate it, and looks to ultimately uniting the Five Powers upon one line, and to carrying through their common determinations, without a blow being struck.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

No. 394.

Sir George Hamilton to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received November* 26.)

(Extract.) *Berlin, November* 20, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch of November 12, inclosing despatches under flying seal to the Marquess of Clanricarde.

Baron Werther read to me yesterday a despatch he had received from Count Königsmarck, dated Constantinople, October 30th; and as I considered that some of its contents might be interesting to your Lordship, I requested his Excellency to give me a short abstract; a copy of which I have the honour herewith to inclose.

Inclosure in No. 394.

Abstract of Despatch from Count Königsmarck to Baron Werther.

Constantinople, le 30 *Octobre*, 1839.

LE Consul-Général de France à Alexandrie a fait sentir à Méhémet Ali que, si dans la dépêche de l'Internonce d'Autriche, il n'était pas question de moyens répressifs, ce changement de langage était dû à l'influence de la France qui s'était opposée à toute mesure répressive.

Méhémet Ali a dit aux Consuls, qu'il consentirait à la cession de Candie, mais que pour Adana et les défilés du Taurus, il ne consentirait jamais à les restituer au Grand Seigneur.

(Translation.)

Abstract of Despatch from Count Königsmarck to Baron Werther.

Constantinople, October 30, 1839.

THE Consul-General of France at Alexandria has given Mehemet Ali to understand that, if in the despatch of the Austrian Internuncio there was no question of coercive measures, this change of language was owing to the influence of France, who had opposed herself to all such measures.

Mehemet Ali has told the Consuls, that he would consent to give up Candia, but that as for Adana and the defiles of the Taurus, he would never consent to restore them to the Grand Signor.

No. 395.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 27.)

My Lord, *Paris, November 25, 1839.*

I HAVE received your Lordship's despatches to the 22d of November.

In reference to your despatch of that day, in which your Lordship incloses, for my information, and for communication to the French Government, a copy of Viscount Ponsonby's reply to an Official Note addressed by the Porte, on the 21st of October, to the Representatives of the Five Powers, on the subject of the continued encroachments of the Egyptian Army upon the Turkish territory, I have to state that, upon my mentioning Lord Ponsonby's Note to Marshal Soult, this morning, his Excellency said, that a copy of it, which he had just read, was at that moment on his table; and he was sorry to observe that the language of Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople was calculated to excite hopes in the Divan, which the real state of things could scarcely justify. I replied, that the statements made by Lord Ponsonby in his Note, of the advantages which the Porte had derived from its compliance with the request of the Representatives of the Five Powers, not hastily to submit to the conditions of peace imperiously prescribed by Mehemet Ali, appeared to be well founded. The discontent existing in Syria is stated by the Austrian Consul at Alexandria to give considerable uneasiness to the Pasha of Egypt, and the report seems to be true, that Ibrahim Pasha has represented to Mehemet Ali, that in consequence of that discontent, it would be imprudent to march his army into Asia Minor. The Marshal answered, that from the last accounts received by him of the state of Syria, it appeared that the country was perfectly tranquil. Captain Caillier, his Aide-de-camp, who had traversed a great part of it, and the French Consuls at Beyrout and Damascus, all testify to its tranquillity, as well as private letters of a very late date from those countries. But with respect to the Eastern Question, he hoped to transmit in a day or two to Count Sébastiani, a despatch which he had addressed to him, and which would to-morrow be submitted to the Cabinet Council, containing observations on your Lordship's despatch to me upon the same subject, as well as full explanations of the opinions of the French Government on the present state of affairs in the East.

The Marshal said he was in momentary expectation of the despatches which were brought to Marseilles by the steam-boat, of which the arrival had been notified by telegraph; and his Excellency seemed very desirous to receive the confirmation of the report which prevailed on board the packet, that the Turkish fleet had been restored to the Sultan, considering it as a prelude to the conclusion of peace; but I observed to him, that the dissatisfaction which had manifested itself among the officers and crews of the Turkish ships, and the difficulty the Pasha had in satisfying their demands for pay, might account for his restoration of the fleet, even though no progress had been made towards a peace with the Porte.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 396.

Viscount Palmerston to Colonel Hodges.

(Extract.) *Foreign Office, November 28, 1839.*

I HAVE received from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna, a copy of the the instructions which he gave to you on your departure from Vienna, for the guidance of your language and conduct at Alexandria. Her Majesty's Government approve the tenour of those instructions.

No. 397.

Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale.

(Extract.) *Foreign Office, November* 28, 1839.

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch of the 16th instant, transmitting a copy of the instructions which you have addressed to Colonel Hodges, I have to inform your Excellency, that Her Majesty's Government approve of the tenour of those instructions.

No. 398.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

(Extract.) *Foreign Office, December* 2, 1839.

I HAVE to instruct your Excellency to continue to urge the Turkish Government to remain firm; to make no concession to Mehemet Ali; but to trust to the support of its Allies. The British Government has taken its line; and the course of the negotiation during the last few months ought to inspire the Turkish Government with confidence in Great Britain.

No. 399.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 2.)

My Lord, *Paris, November* 29, 1839.

MARSHAL SOULT this morning read to me his despatch to Count Sébastiani, in reply to that which your Lordship addressed to me on the 29th of October, respecting the conduct of the French Government on the Turco-Egyptian Question.

As your Lordship must by this time have received from the French Ambassador a copy of Marshal Soult's despatch, it is unnecessary for me to report its contents. The despatch appeared to me to contain little that has not been before adduced and already answered, and I did not feel myself called upon to enter into any extensive argument upon the subject. I contented myself with pointing out several inaccurate statements that occur in the course of the despatch; and in regard to the insinuation that Her Majesty's Government in their anxiety to restore to the Sultan the territories now in possession of Mehemet Ali, had lost sight of the more important European Question, I observed, that the putting an end to the exclusive Protectorate of Turkey by the Russian Government, which must be the European Question referred to, would be best accomplished by the course which England had proposed; and that a combined operation concerted by all the Five Powers for the defence of the Turkish Empire, would be, in fact, to annul the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. Marshal Soult, after he had finished reading his despatch, entered into the question of the conditions of peace, to which Mehemet Ali might be brought to accede. The Pasha, he said, was willing to give up Adana which he had possessed ever since the arrangement of Kutaya; he was willing also to withdraw from Diarbekir and Orfa, in short, from the eastern side of the Euphrates; he was ready to accept only a life interest in the occupation of Candia, and perhaps might be induced to cede it at the present time. With regard to the Holy Cities, the possession of which by Mehemet Ali, your Lordship seemed to think would destroy the prestige of the Sultan's sovereignty, he observed that those cities had been occupied by Mehemet Ali's troops for twenty-five years, at the express request of the Sultan himself, the Turkish Government not having the means of defending them against the Wahabites; and that these Holy Cities would be again exposed to the same danger, if the Egyptian troops were to be withdrawn from them.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 400.

The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received December* 5.

(Extract.) *St. Petersburgh, November* 18, 1839.

IN consequence of a delay in the arrival of the post at Berlin, the messenger Fenessy was detained nearly four days in that capital, and only brought me your Lordship's despatches of the 25th and the 29th of October, on Wednesday night, the 13th instant.

Count Nesselrode promised me to despatch a messenger, at the end of this week, with the formal answer of the Imperial Government, which I presume will be contained in a despatch to M. de Kisseleff.

Count Nesselrode says, the reports he has received from Constantinople, convince him that the Sultan will not come to a settlement of his differences with Mehemet Ali without the advice or interference of his Allies. The Russian Consul at Alexandria, however, has written, that the Pasha would give up Candia, if the Sultan would accede to his other demands.

P.S.—I have omitted to state above, that the Pasha of Egypt declared positively to Count Medem, that he would on no account give up Adana and the passages of the Taurus;—a declaration that shows the justice of the objection made by your Lordship to the proposition of the French Government, without any offer of carrying it into effect by force, if necessary, when agreed to by the Allied Powers. I now inclose a copy of an extract of the despatch of the Russian Consul-General in Egypt, which Count Nesselrode has given me.

Inclosure in No. 400.

Count Medem to Count Nesselrode.

(Extrait.) *Alexandrie, le* $\frac{8}{20}$ *Octobre,* 1839.

J'AI dit au Pacha : "il n'entre dans la pensée d'aucune des Grandes Cours de vous écraser, toutes veulent au contraire vous assurer un avenir. Elles ont toutes le même désir et le même intérêt—une pacification honorable, équitable pour l'Egypte et sans être désavantageuse pour la Porte ; en d'autres termes, une solution compatible avec la sécurité future et l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman. Aucune d'elles n'a considéré vos prétentions relatives à la destitution de Hosreff Pacha admissibles ; ce serait vous accorder une ingérence dans les affaires intérieures du pays et intervertir les rôles de Souverain et de vassal."

Méhémet Ali me répondit :—"Si j'ai insisté dans le tems sur le renvoi de Hosreff, c'est lui qui m'y a contraint par ses intrigues et sa duplicité ; c'était là le seul moyen pour moi d'en venir à un arrangement définitif et stable. Depuis que les Grandes Cours d'Europe se sont chargées du rôle de Médiatrices, les affaires ont changé de face, et cette question est aujourd'hui pour moi d'un intérêt secondaire. Ce n'est plus sur le renvoi de Hosreff que j'insisterai, et je renonce entièrement à cette prétention. Pour ce qui est de l'île de Candie, j'y souscrirai encore, si elle peut suffire pour amener la paix désirée ; cette possession, quoique importante pour moi comme position maritime, loin de m'avoir rapporté le moindre revenu, m'a toujours suscité des dépenses ; mais quant à la restitution d'Adana, qui forme la porte de ma maison, qu'on ne me la demande pas, car je n'y adhérerai point. En m'ôtant les défilés du Mont Taurus (Goulek Boghas), que j'ai fait fortifier à si grands frais, ce serait vouloir me mettre à la merci d'une attaque de la part de la Turquie."

Moi.—Ce district, ayant été donné à ferme à Ibrahim et non concédé à vous, vous ne pouvez le réclamer comme propriété. Si vous y avez fait des fortifications et dépensé des sommes immenses, personne ne vous y obligeait ; c'est à vous-même qu'il faut vous en prendre et non à la Porte, et cette considération ne saurait influencer les décisions des Grandes Cours.

Méhémet Ali.—Je ne me déciderai jamais à remettre la clef de ma maison ; que la Porte augmente son tribut, j'y consentirai, mais on ne me persuadera point de restituer Adana.

(Translation.)

Count Medem to Count Nesselrode.

(Extract.) *Alexadria, October* $\frac{8}{20}$, 1839.

I SAID to the Pasha, "None of the Great Courts think of crushing you; they all, on the contrary, wish to secure you a future position. They have all the same desire for, and the same interest in, an honourable peace,—fair towards Egypt, without being disadvantageous to the Porte; in other terms, a settlement compatible with the future security and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. None of them have considered your pretensions relative to the dismissal of Hosrew Pasha as admissible; that would be to grant to you a right of interference in the internal affairs of the country, and invert the positions of Sovereign and vassal."

Mehemet Ali replied to me, "If I insisted at the time upon the dismissal of Hosrew, it was he that forced me to do so by his intrigues and duplicity; it was the only way by which I could arrive at a definitive and durable arrangement. Since the Great European Courts have taken upon themselves the character of Mediators, the appearance of affairs has changed, and I consider that question at present as one of secondary interest. I will no longer insist upon the dismissal of Hosrew, and I abandon that pretension altogether. As to what is desired respecting the island of Candia, I will also consent to it, if that would suffice to bring about the wished-for peace; that possession, although of importance to me as a maritime station, so far from producing me any revenue, has always been a source of expence; but with regard to the restitution of Adana, which is the gate of my house, do not ask me for it; for I will never consent to it. To deprive me of the passes of Mount Taurus (Kulek Boghas) which I have caused to be fortified at so great an expence, would be to wish to place me at the mercy of an attack on the part of Turkey."

Myself.—That district having been given to Ibrahim to farm, and not given up to you, you cannot claim it as your property. If you have constructed fortifications and expended large sums of money there, no one forced you to do so; it is yourself and not the Porte whom you should blame, and that consideration can have no influence on the decisions of the Great Courts.

Mehemet Ali.—I will never consent to give up the key of my house. Let the Porte increase the tribute, I will consent to it; but they will never persuade me to restore Adana.

No. 401.

The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received December* 5.)

(Extract.) *St. Petersburgh, November* 22, 1839.

I HAVE the satisfaction to inform your Lordship that, by the messenger who bears this despatch, Count Nesselrode sends to M. de Kisseleff a communication which will convey to your Lordship the consent of the Imperial Cabinet to the modifications of Baron Brunnow's propositions, desired by Her Majesty's Government.

Baron Brunnow will be directed to repair immediately to London, to continue the negotiations he so sucessfully opened with your Lordship.

No. 402.

Count Nesselrode to M. de Kisseleff.—(Communicated by M. de Kisseleff, December 5.)

Monsieur, *St. Pétersbourg, ce $\frac{10}{22}$ Novembre,* 1839.

LE Marquis de Clanricarde vient de me remettre la copie d'une dépêche dans laquelle le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat a consigné un exposé circonstancié des entretiens qu'il a eus avec le Baron de Brunnow, exposé qui est entièrement d'accord avec les informations que ce Ministre nous avait transmises au moment de quitter Londres.

Il résulte des communications que l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre était chargé de nous faire, que le Cabinet Britannique est disposé à adopter l'ensemble de nos propositions, à l'exception d'un seul point à l'égard duquel il croyait devoir demander une modification qui, si elle était acceptée par notre Cour, amènerait une entente immédiate entre la Russie et l'Angleterre sur les affaires de la Turquie.

Le Baron de Brunnow nous avait déjà fait connaître les considérations majeures qui obligeaient le Ministère Anglais à insister sur cette modification : la franchise et la confiance avec lesquelles Lord Palmerston s'était énoncé à cet égard vis-à-vis de lui, ont été vivement appréciées par l'Empereur. Sa Majesté Impériale ne saurait ne pas reconnaître la gravité des difficultés contre lesquelles le Ministère Anglais aurait à lutter pour faire réussir une pareille combinaison ; et si par une preuve de déférence, notre Auguste Maître peut contribuer à les lui éviter, il éprouvera une sincère satisfaction de répondre à l'appel que le Gouvernement de la Reine vient de faire à son amitié.

D'ailleurs, les ouvertures spontanées que l'Empereur avait fait adresser par le Baron de Brunnow au Cabinet de Londres, et qui ont été accueillies avec ce sentiment de confiance qu'un exposé aussi sincère des intentions pacifiques de la Russie était fait pour inspirer, ont suffisamment indiqué le but que Sa Majesté Impériale n'a cessé de poursuivre dès l'origine des fâcheuses complications qui ont surgi en Orient. De son côté, le Cabinet de Londres y a répondu avec la même franchise et avec un égal désir de faciliter entre toutes les Puissances une entente qui mettrait un terme à ces complications, et assurerait ainsi le salut et l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman. C'est là en effet la seule pensée qui a servi constamment de base à la politique de l'Empereur, et c'est là encore la règle invariable qui déterminera sa conduite à l'avenir ; guidé par ces principes, étrangers à toute vue d'influence ou de prépondérance exclusive, désireux de faire cesser un conflit qui pourrait entraîner la chûte du trône du Sultan, notre Auguste Maître n'hésitera jamais à mettre de côté toute considération d'amour-propre, pour atteindre le but élevé que les Puissances ont en vue, et pour écarter, autant qu'il pourra dépendre de lui, les obstacles qui seuls semblent aujourd'hui s'opposer à la solution de la Question d'Orient.

Je me félicite en conséquence de pouvoir vous annoncer, Monsieur, que l'Empereur, appréciant toute la gravité des considérations que Lord Palmerston a fait valoir, dans la vue de nous démontrer la nécessité où était l'Angleterre d'insister sur la co-opération d'une partie de ses forces navales, dans le cas où un péril imminent forcerait la Porte Ottomane à avoir recours à l'intervention militaire de la Russie, Sa Majesté Impériale est disposée à adhérer sous ce rapport au vœu que le Cabinet de Londres lui a fait manifester, et à admettre, si l'hypothèse dont nous avons fait mention, venait à se réaliser, que le pavillon de chacune des Puissances qui voudront participer à l'action commune, soit représenté par l'envoi de quelques bâtimens, afin de constater par là, qu'elles ont toutes concouru à la défense et à la protection de la Capitale de l'Empire Ottoman. Un arrangement spécial devra fixer le nombre de ces vaisseaux, et indiquer les parages où ils devront croiser dans la Mer de Marmora près du Détroit des Dardanelles, de manière à prévenir tout contact avec les forces Russes destinées à mettre Constantinople à l'abri de toute attaque du côté du Bosphore.

L'Empereur, en adoptant cette résolution, a pensé que personne n'était plus à même de régler les détails de l'arrangement dont il s'agira de convenir, et d'assurer par là le succès de la négociation générale, que celui qui l'a conduite dès son origine à l'entière satisfaction de notre Auguste Maître. Je viens par conséquent d'inviter le Baron de Brunnow à retourner sans délai à Londres pour mettre la dernière main à un arrangement dont les points les plus essentiels se

trouvent déjà arrêtés, et qui, en déterminant les moyens d'action que les Puissances Contractantes seraient appelées à employer pour faire adopter leur plan à Méhémet Ali, contribuerait à assurer sur des bases solides la pacification du Levant.

Vous voudrez bien, Monsieur, annoncer sans retard à Lord Palmerston les déterminations que l'Empereur vient de prendre, dont je crois de mon devoir de vous prévenir par le courrier que je vous expédie aujourd'hui.

La manière distinguée avec laquelle le Baron de Brunnow s'est acquitté de la mission que l'Empereur avait daigné lui confier, l'accueil bienveillant dont Sa Majesté la Reine l'a honoré, et la justice éclatante que le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat s'est plû à rendre à l'esprit de conciliation et au sentiment de modération dont il a été constamment animé, nous sont garans que le choix de ce Plénipotentiaire ne pourra qu'être agréable au Cabinet de Londres.

Veuillez donner lecture de la présente dépêche à Lord Palmerston et lui en aisser copie, s'il vous en témoignait le désir.

Recevez, &c.,
(Signé) NESSELRODE.

(Translation.)

Count Nesselrode to M. de Kisseleff.—(Communicated by M. de Kisseleff, December 5.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, November* $\frac{10}{22}$, 1839.

THE Marquess of Clanricarde has just transmitted to me a copy of a despatch, in which the Principal Secretary of State has set forth a detailed statement of the conversations which he had held with Baron de Brunnow, a statement entirely in accordance with the intelligence which that Minister transmitted to us on leaving London.

It appears, from the communications which the English Ambassador was instructed to make to us, that the British Cabinet is disposed to adopt all our proposals, with the exception of one single point upon which they thought proper to request a modification, which, if accepted by our Court, would bring about an immediate understanding between Russia and England on the affairs of Turkey.

Baron de Brunnow had already brought to our knowledge the more important considerations which obliged the English Ministry to insist on that modification: the frankness and confidence with which Lord Palmerston expressed himself to him on this matter, have been highly appreciated by the Emperor. His Imperial Majesty cannot but acknowledge the serious nature of the difficulties against which the English Ministry would have to contend, in order to render such a combination successful; and if, by a proof of deference, our August Master could contribute to relieve them therefrom, he would feel sincere satisfaction in responding to the appeal which the Government of the Queen has just made to his friendship.

Moreover, the spontaneous overtures which the Emperor has caused Baron de Brunnow to address to the Cabinet of London, and which have been received with the feeling of confidence which so sincere a declaration of the pacific intentions of Russia was calculated to inspire, have sufficiently indicated the object which His Imperial Majesty has never ceased to pursue, since the commencement of the grievous complications which have arisen in the East. The Cabinet of London on its side has responded to them with the same frankness, and with an equal desire to facilitate an understanding among all the Powers, which would put an end to these complications, and would thus secure the safety and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. That is, in fact, the only feeling which has constantly been the basis of the Emperor's policy, and it is the invariable rule which will decide his conduct for the future: guided by these principles, free from every desire for influence or exclusive preponderance, anxious to put an end to a conflict which might bring about the fall of the Sultan's throne, our August Master will never hesitate to put aside every selfish consideration, in order to attain the high object which the Powers have in view, and to remove, as far as is in his power, the obstacles which alone at present seem to prevent a solution of the Eastern Question.

I congratulate myself, consequently, on having to state to you, Sir, that the Emperor, fully appreciating the importance of the considerations set forth by Lord Palmerston, with the view of explaining the necessity under which England found herself of insisting, that a part of her naval force should co-operate, in the event of imminent danger obliging the Ottoman Porte to have recourse to the military intervention of Russia, His Imperial Majesty is disposed in this respect to accede to the wish which the Cabinet of London has manifested, and to consent, if the contingency above mentioned should arise, that the flag of each of the Powers who may wish to participate in the common operation, should be represented by sending some vessels, in order to prove thereby that they have all united for the defence and protection of the capital of the Ottoman Empire. A special arrangement should fix the number of these vessels, and the spaces within which they should cruize in the Sea of Marmora, near the Straits of the Dardanelles, in order to avoid any contact with the Russian forces destined to place Constantinople in security against any attack from the side of the Bosphorus.

The Emperor, in adopting this resolution, has judged that no one was better able to regulate the details of the desired arrangement, and to insure thereby the success of the general negotiation, than he who has conducted that negotiation from its commencment to the entire satisfaction of our August Master. I have, therefore, requested Baron Brunnow to return to London without delay to complete an arrangement, the principal points of which are already settled, and which, by defining the means of action which the Contracting Powers should be called upon to employ in order to force Mehemet Ali to adopt their plan, would contribute to establish the pacification of the Levant on a solid basis.

You will have the goodness, Sir, to state without delay to Lord Palmerston the determination which the Emperor has just taken, of which I think it right to inform you by the messenger whom I despatch this day.

The able manner in which Baron de Brunnow has discharged the mission which the Emperor deigned to entrust to him, the favourable reception with which Her Majesty the Queen honoured him, and the eminent justice which the Principal Secretary of State has rendered to the spirit of conciliation, and to the feeling of moderation with which he has been always animated, assure us, that the choice of that Plenipotentiary cannot but be agreeable to the Cabinet of London.

Be so good as to read this despatch to Lord Palmerston, and to give him a copy of it if he desires to have one.

Receive, &c.,
(Signed) NESSELRODE.

No. 403.

Count Sébastiani to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 6.)

Londres, ce 4 *Décembre*, 1839.

LE Comte Sébastiani a l'honneur d'adresser ci-jointe à son Excellence M. le Vicomte Palmerston, Ministre Secrétaire d'Etat au Département des Affaires Etrangères de Sa Majesté Britannique, la dépêche dont le Gouvernement du Roi lui a donné l'ordre de transmettre copie à son Excellence, et de lui renvoyer, en même temps, avec tous ses remercîmens, la minute de lettre écrite à Lord Granville, qu'elle avait bien voulu lui confier.

Le Comte Sébastiani saisit, &c.

(Translation.)

Count Sebastiani to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 6.)

London, December 4, 1839.

COUNT SEBASTIANI has the honour to communicate to his Excellency Viscount Palmerston, Her Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the annexed despatch of which the Government of the

King has directed him to transmit a copy to his Excellency; and at the same time to return to him, with his best thanks, the draft of letter written to Lord Granville, which he had been so good as to communicate to him.

The Count Sébastiani avails himself, &c.

Inclosure in No. 403.

The Duc de Dalmatie to Count Sébastiani.

Monsieur le Comte, *Paris, le* 25 *Novembre*, 1839.

AINSI que vous me l'avez annoncé, Lord Granville m'a communiqué une longue dépêche de Lord Palmerston, relative à la Question d'Orient, dont l'objet est de justifier la résolution qu'a prise le Gouvernement de Londres de rejeter le plan d'accommodement proposé par la France. Sans reprendre, un à un, des détails bien souvent reproduits dans ma correspondance, je crois devoir repousser les accusations élevées dans cette dépêche contre la marche suivie par le Gouvernement du Roi, et répondre à quelques assertions erronées qu'elle me parait contenir.

Je commence par protester, de la manière la plus formelle, contre l'idée qui y est exprimée, que la France s'est constituée la protectrice de Méhémet Ali. Cette idée a été trop souvent mise en avant pour qu'il me soit possible de la passer sous silence. Non, la France n'éprouve pour Méhémet Ali aucune prédilection partielle. L'unique but qu'elle poursuit est l'arrangement des affaires d'Orient sur des bases solides et durables. Quant aux conditions de cet arrangement, les plus avantageuses qu'il soit possible de ménager à la Porte sans exposer la paix générale à de funestes perturbations, sont celles que nous préférons; mais convaincus, comme nous l'avons toujours été, que le plan de l'Angleterre ne serait pas accepté par le Vice-Roi, et que pour le lui imposer il faudrait recourir à des mesures extrêmes, impraticables peut-être, et en tous cas bien dangereuses, nous n'avons pu l'accepter, et nous avons dit hautement quel était celui qui nous paraissait le plus propre à assurer tout à la fois l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman et le maintien de la paix.

Lord Palmerston prétend, il est vrai, que nous avions commencé par approuver les propositions du Cabinet de Londres. J'ignore absolument sur quoi peut reposer une pareille affirmation, qui se produit pour la première fois, et que je ne puis rattacher à aucune des communications échangées sur la question entre les deux Gouvernemens. Je désire que vous me fassiez savoir d'où peut provenir un pareil malentendu.

Ce n'est pas d'ailleurs sur ce seul incident que Lord Palmerston appuie le reproche de contradiction qu'il adresse à notre politique. Rappelant l'empressement avec lequel, au commencement de la crise actuelle, nous avons pris l'initiative de l'appui à accorder à la Porte, il prétend démontrer que notre attitude a complètement changé, et qu'en proclamant le principe de l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman, en engageant les autres Puissances à le proclamer avec nous, nous avions d'avance condamné les bases que maintenant nous voulons donner à la réconciliation de la Porte avec son vassal.

Il m'est impossible, M. le Comte, d'admettre cette manière de poser la question. Il est parfaitement vrai, et le Gouvernement du Roi ne peut que se plaire à le voir rappeler, qu'il a le premier invité les Puissances à se concerter pour sauver la Porte de l'orage qu'elle avait imprudemment provoqué. Il est également certain que tandisque tous les autres Cabinets délibéraient encore sur la position qu'ils prendraient, le Gouvernement du Roi était déjà parvenu à arrêter la marche d'Ibrahim Pacha victorieux, et que par ses représentations énergiques et incessantes, trop faiblement appuyées par ses Alliés, il avait indiqué à l'ambition de Méhémet Ali les limites au-delà desquelles il rencontrerait l'opposition unanime des Puissances. L'invitation faite à la Porte par l'Ambassadeur de France, de concert avec ses Collègues, de ne conclure rien avec le Vice-Roi sans avoir consulté les Cours Européennes, l'engagement échangé, sur notre demande, entre les Cours de Londres, de Vienne, de Berlin, et de Paris, pour la protection de l'indépendance et de l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman, sont des faits également constans et que je n'entends certes ni désavouer ni révoquer en doute; mais pour que l'on fût autorisé à en tirer les conséquences que veut en tirer Lord

Palmerston, il faudrait commencer par établir que les stipulations de notre projet sont contraires à cette intégrité, à cette indépendance; et c'est ce que nous n'admettons en aucune façon.

Sans doute, c'est une situation fâcheuse pour un souverain que la nécessité d'accorder à un sujet trop puissant l'investiture héréditaire des territoires qu'il gouverne; mais cette nécessité, dont on ne prétendra pas apparemment nous rendre responsables, Lord Palmerston la reconnaît lui-même, puisqu'il propose aussi en faveur de Méhémet Ali, cette investiture héréditaire, appliquée seulement dans de moindres proportions. Le différend existant entre la France et l'Angleterre ne roule donc pas, cela est évident, sur une question de principes, mais bien sur le mode d'application, sur des appréciations de détail. Lord Palmerston admet que l'Empire Ottoman ne serait pas démembré si la seule Egypte était concédée, comme Pachalic héréditaire, à Méhémet Ali et à sa postérité. Nous croyons que le démembrement n'aurait pas lieu davantage si à l'Egypte on ajoutait la Syrie, en consacrant d'ailleurs la souveraineté de la Porte et la vassalité du Vice-Roi par la stipulation formelle du tribut en argent et des secours en hommes et en vaisseaux qu'il serait tenu de lui fournir. Encore un coup, il y a là, entre les deux Cabinets, non pas diversité de principes, mais dissentiment sur leur application; et aucun des deux n'est autorisé à puiser dans ce dissentiment le droit d'accuser l'autre d'inconséquence et de contradiction.

Lord Palmerston dit, il est vrai, que pour en arriver à accorder à Méhémet Ali la totalité de ses demandes il n'était pas nécessaire d'annoncer d'abord l'intention de donner secours à la Porte contre ses exigences. Pour répondre à cette objection, il suffit d'établir quelles étaient d'abord ces exigences, et à quel point nous sommes parvenus à les réduire. Méhémet Ali, dans le principe, non seulement repoussait avec emportement l'idée d'acheter l'hérédité par les moindres concessions territoriales, mais déclarait qu'il entendait garder aussi les districts nouveaux occupés par son fils après la bataille de Nézib. Il reclamait de plus, comme condition absolue d'une pacification, le renvoi du Grand Vizir. Aujourd'hui, non seulement il renonce à ces deux clauses exorbitantes, mais il consent, sauf des restrictions qui ne sont probablement pas son dernier mot, à abandonner l'Ile de Candie, le district d'Adana, et il offre encore d'élever la somme du tribut qu'il paie à la Porte. Pourrait-on soutenir que des modifications de cette importance ne méritent pas d'être prises en considération?

Une autre objection élevée par le Cabinet de Londres c'est que nous aurions rendu nos propositions plus inacceptables encore en repoussant opiniâtrement, et de la façon la plus péremptoire, la pensée d'en venir jamais à les appuyer par des moyens coërcitifs dans le cas où elles ne seraient pas accueillies par le Vice-Roi. En fait, cette objection n'a plus de portée aujourd'hui que Méhémet Ali a adhéré à notre plan, mais je dois ajouter qu'elle est fondée sur une allégation inexacte. La France n'a pas écarté, d'une manière absolue, la prévision des mesures coërcitives; elle n'a pas refusé d'en délibérer avec les autres Cours; seulement elle a demandé qu'avant de s'occuper des moyens d'exécution, on commençât par se mettre d'accord sur le but à atteindre, et aussi, ce qui était bien autrement urgent, ce qui touchait à des questions bien autrement délicates et difficiles, sur le mode d'action par lequel les Puissances concourraient à la défense de Constantinople dans le cas où Ibrahim Pacha poursuivrait sa course victorieuse. Les motifs qui nous faisaient préférer une semblable marche sont évidens. D'une part, l'intérêt vraiment important pour l'Europe est celui de la défense de Constantinople, et on peut même dire que tous les autres intérêts, sous le point de vue Européen, sont subordonnés à celui-là. D'un autre côté, tant qu'on n'était pas certain de s'accorder sur les conditions à présenter à Méhémet Ali, il eut été plus qu'inutile de se livrer prématurément à la discussion des voies de contrainte auxquelles il pourrait devenir nécessaire de recourir pour forcer son consentement. Nous avions, d'ailleurs, la conviction que cette pénible nécessité ne se présenterait pas si les conditions proposées étaient raisonnables, et l'évènement a justifié notre manière de voir.

Lord Palmerston, parmi les argumens qu'il emploie pour démontrer l'impossibilité prétendue d'accéder à notre projet, fait valoir une considération dont il prétend que le Gouvernement Français a reconnu la force au commencement de la négociation actuelle. C'est que la possession des Villes Saintes de l'Arabie est nécessaire au Sultan. Si, par la possession, il entend le droit de souveraineté, il a parfaitement raison de soutenir que le Sultan, dépouillé de ces sanctuaires de l'Islâmisme, perdrait une portion du prestige religieux sur lequel s'appuie en partie sa puissance. Nous en sommes convaincus, et nous mettons un si grand prix à la conservation de tous les élémens de cette puissance, que lorsqu'il y a quelques mois on répandit le bruit que les agens entretenus par le Sultan en qualité de chef de la religion, à la Mecque et à Médine, avaient été expulsés par le Vice-Roi, je chargeai le Consul-Général de France de lui faire à ce sujet de vives représentations; c'est probablement le fait auquel Lord Palmerston veut faire allusion. Je remarquerai en passant, que ce bruit, aussi bien que tant d'autres répandus à Constantinople contre Méhémet Ali, était complètement faux. Quoiqu'il en soit, aujourd'hui comme alors, je reconnais que la Porte doit garder son droit de souveraineté sur les Villes Saintes et sur l'Arabie tout comme sur la totalité des autres territoires gouvernés par le Vice-Roi et sa famille, mais je ne vois pas et je n'ai jamais dit qu'aucun intérêt moral ou matériel fût compromis par ce que l'Arabie continuerait à être placée sous l'administration du Vice-Roi; et j'ajouterai, que l'idée de changer cet état de choses établi sans contestation depuis vingt ans, se présente à moi comme une combinaison toute nouvelle qui ne pourrait que compliquer au détriment même de la Porte, une question si difficile déjà. Le fait est que jusqu'ici cette idée n'avait pas été mise en avant, et que l'Arabie était universellement considérée comme une dépendance de l'Egypte, comme liée au sort de ce dernier pays.

J'ai parcouru en quelque sorte le cercle des objections élevées par Lord Palmerston contre notre politique. Je crois avoir prouvé qu'elles reposent en général sur des malentendus ou des erreurs de fait. Il en est encore une dont j'hésite presque à parler. Dans l'opinion du Cabinet Britannique, le rappel de M. l'Amiral Roussin a eu pour effet d'atténuer la force morale de l'acte qu'il avait signé pour promettre à la Porte l'appui de la France. Je ne comprends pas, je l'avoue, comment le changement d'un agent diplomatique pourrait amener ce résultat en présence de la déclaration sans cesse renouvelée par le Gouvernement du Roi qu'il persiste dans sa politique bienveillante pour le Sultan. Je n'en dirai pas davantage, et le Cabinet de Londres comprendra que je n'entre pas dans des explications qui prendraient un caractère personnel.

Lord Palmerston, dans la dépêche à laquelle je réponds, exprime le regret qu'il éprouve du désaccord survenu entre la France et l'Angleterre. Il énumère tout ce que son Gouvernement a fait pour le prévenir. Au nombre des témoignages de condescendance qu'il nous a donnés, il compte l'abandon des mesures de rigueur auxquelles il avait proposé de recourir pour forcer Méhémet Ali à restituer préalablement la flotte Ottomane. Peut-être, M. le Comte, peut-être serais-je en droit de remarquer que ces mesures n'ont pas été seulement repoussées par la France; que toutes les autres Cours les ont jugées dangereuses, impraticables, et d'un succès à-peu-près impossible; et que, suivant toute apparence, le Gouvernement Britannique même, livré à sa seule impulsion, les eût écartées après y avoir mieux réfléchi. Au reste, il est loin de ma pensée de contester les sentimens concilians que le Cabinet de Londres a portés dans cette grande affaire. Ils ne se sont arrêtés, j'en suis bien convaincu, que devant une conviction erronée à mon avis, mais sincère et profonde. Une conviction non moins énergique, quoique contraire, a dû également surmonter, dans notre esprit, l'impulsion de sentimens tout aussi bienveillans pour nos Alliés; elle nous a réduits à la nécessité de persister dans un fâcheux dissentiment; mais on nous rendra cette justice que nous avons fait aussi longtems que possible, tout ce qu'a dépendu de nous pour l'atténuer, pour le dissimuler aux yeux des autres Cours.

Je me suis souvent demandé, M. le Comte, comment il se faisait que les deux Cabinets en fussent venus à ne pas s'entendre sur la question qui semblait la mieux faite pour les mettre d'accord. Je vais vous dire toute ma pensée. Cela tient surtout à ce que la France a principalement eu en vue le côté Européen de la Question, tandis que l'Angleterre s'est trop préoccupée des considérations relatives à la position respective de la Porte et du Vice-Roi. Nous nous sommes proposé, avant tout, de faire sortir de la crise actuelle l'annulation du protectorat exclusif et dominant que la Russie commençait à faire peser sur la Porte, ou, du moins, d'empêcher que ce protectorat n'y trouvât une nouvelle occasion de s'exercer et de se légitimer en quelque sorte, sans négliger le soin de préserver, en Egypte et en Syrie, l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman; nous avons eu constamment présent à l'esprit qu'il n'était pas moins important de sauver à Constantinople l'indépendance de cet empire, cette indépendance sans laquelle l'intégrité n'est plus qu'un vain mot. L'Angleterre avait paru d'abord se diriger vers le même but que nous, et obéir à la même pensée.

Ne l'a-t-elle pas, depuis, un peu perdu de vue? Je serais tenté de le croire, lorsque je remarque dans la dépêche à laquelle je réponds, il ne se trouve pas un mot dont on puisse induire que le Cabinet de Londres voie autre chose dans la solution à donner à la Question d'Orient qu'un règlement territorial plus ou moins à la convenance du Sultan et du Vice-Roi.

Veuillez, M. le Comte, donner lecture de la présente dépêche à Lord Palmerston et lui en laisser copie.

Agréez, &c.,
(Signé) MARECHAL DUC DE DALMATIE.

(Translation.)

The Duc de Dalmatie to Count Sébastiani.

Monsieur le Comte, *Paris, November* 25, 1839.

IN accordance with what you announced to me, Lord Granville has communicated to me a long despatch from Lord Palmerston, relative to the Eastern Question, the object of which is to justify the resolution which the British Government has taken to reject the plan of arrangement proposed by France. Without reverting, point by point, to the details so often reproduced in my correspondence, I think it right to repel the accusations brought forward in that despatch, against the course pursued by the Government of the King, and to reply to some erroneous statements which it appears to me to contain.

I begin by protesting in the most formal manner against the idea expressed therein, that France has constituted herself the protectress of Mehemet Ali. This idea has been too often brought forward, to make it possible for me to pass it over in silence. No, France entertains no partial predilection for Mehemet Ali. The only end which she pursues is the arrangement of the Affairs of the East, upon solid and durable bases. With respect to the conditions of this arrangement, the most advantageous which it may be possible to secure to the Porte without exposing the general peace to disastrous derangements, are those which we prefer; but convinced, as we have always been, that the plan of England would not be accepted by the Viceroy, and that in order to impose it upon him, it would be necessary to have recourse to measures, extreme, perhaps impracticable, and in any case very dangerous, we have not been able to accede to it, and we have distinctly stated the one which appeared to us the most proper for securing at the same time the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and the maintenance of peace.

Lord Palmerston, it is true, asserts that we had set out by approving the propositions of the Cabinet of London. I am totally ignorant upon what ground such an assertion can rest, which is produced for the first time, and which I cannot connect with any of the communications which have passed upon this question between the two Governments. I wish that you will let me know whence such a misunderstanding can have arisen.

But it is not upon this circumstance alone, that Lord Palmerston founds the reproach of inconsistency which he ascribes to our policy. Calling to mind the eagerness with which, at the commencement of the present crisis, we took the initiative in the support to be afforded to the Porte, he endeavours to demonstrate that our attitude is completely changed, and that by proclaiming the principle of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and by engaging the other Powers to proclaim it with us, we had by anticipation condemned the bases upon which we now seek to found the reconciliation of the Porte with its Vassal.

It is impossible for me, M. le Comte, to admit this mode of putting the question. It is quite true, and the Government of the King cannot be otherwise than pleased to see it recalled to mind, that it was the first to invite the Powers to concert together in order to save the Porte from the storm which it had imprudently raised. It is equally certain, that while all the other Cabinets were still deliberating upon the position in which they should place themselves, the Government of the King had already succeeded in arresting the victorious progress of Ibrahim Pasha, and that by its energetical and incessant representations, too feebly supported by its Allies, it had indicated to Mehemet Ali the limits beyond which his ambitious views would encounter the unanimous opposition of the Powers. The advice given to the Porte by the Ambassador of France in concert with his colleagues, to conclude nothing with the Viceroy without having consulted the European Courts; the engagements interchanged at our request between the Courts of London, Vienna, Berlin, and Paris, for the protection of the independence and the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, are facts equally certain, and which I do not mean to deny or to call in question; but to be justified in drawing the conclusions which Lord Palmerston wishes to deduce from them, it would be necessary to begin by establishing, that the stipulations of our plan are opposed to this integrity and to this independence, and this is what we do not in any manner admit.

No doubt, it is a distressing situation for a Sovereign to be placed under the necessity of yielding to a too powerful subject the hereditary investiture of the territories which he governs; but this necessity, for which apparently it will not be pretended that we are to be made responsible, has been acknowledged by Lord Palmerston himself, since he also proposes this hereditary investiture in favour of Mehemet Ali, but applied within more confined limits. The difference existing between France and England does not therefore turn, as it is evident, upon a question of principle, but rather upon the mode of application, upon considerations of detail. Lord Palmerston admits, that the Ottoman Empire would not be dismembered if Egypt alone were granted as an hereditary Pashalic to Mehemet Ali and his posterity. We think, that the dismemberment would not any more take place if Syria were added to Egypt, provided the sovereignty of the Porte and the vassalage of the Viceroy were recorded by a formal stipulation for tribute in money, and contingents of men and of vessels which he would be considered liable to furnish. Furthermore, there is between the two Cabinets not a diversity of principles, but a difference of opinion as to their application; and neither of the two is justified in deducing from this difference of opinion a right to accuse the other of inconsistency and of contradiction.

Lord Palmerston, it is true, says that, in order to decide upon granting to Mehemet Ali the whole of his demands, it was unnecessary to announce beforehand the intention of giving assistance to the Porte against them. In order to answer this objection, it will be sufficient to establish what were in fact his demands, and to what point we have succeeded in reducing them. Mehemet Ali at the outset not only repelled with warmth the idea of purchasing the hereditary tenure, by the smallest territorial concessions, but declared that he intended to keep also the districts newly occupied by his son after the battle of Nezib. He required, furthermore, as a necessary condition to a pacification, the dismissal of the Grand Vizier. At the present time, he not only renounces these two exorbitant conditions, but he consents, under restrictions which are probably not his ultimatum, to give up the Island of Candia and the district of Adana, and he offers, further, to raise the amount of tribute which he pays to the Porte. Can it be maintained, that modifications of this importance do not deserve to be taken into consideration?

Another objection brought forward by the Cabinet of London is, that we have rendered our propositions still more unacceptable by obstinately and in the most peremptory manner repelling the idea of ever enforcing those propositions by coercive measures, in case they should not be accepted by the Viceroy. This objection, in point of fact, has no longer any application, since Mehemet Ali has acceded to our plan; but I must add that it is founded upon an incorrect statement. France has not absolutely rejected the contemplation of coercive measures; she has not refused to deliberate upon them with the other Courts; she has only demanded that, before considering the means of execution, an agreement should be previously come to with respect to the object to be attained, and also as regarded a much more urgent affair, and one which related to questions much more delicate and difficult,—with respect to the mode of action by which the Powers should join in the defence of Constantinople in case Ibrahim Pasha should continue his victorious progress. The motives which induced us to prefer such a course are evident. On the one hand, the really important interest of Europe is that involved in the defence of Constantinople; and it may even be said, that every other interest in an European point of view is subordinate to that one. On the other hand, as long as there was no certainty of an agreement upon the conditions to be offered to Mehemet Ali, it would have been worse than useless prematurely to discuss the means of pressure to which it might be necessary to recur in order to extort his consent. We felt besides a conviction, that this painful necessity would not occur if the conditions proposed were reasonable; and the event has justified our view of the matter.

Lord Palmerston, among the arguments which he employs to demonstrate the alleged impossibility of agreeing to our demands, adduces a consideration of which he asserts the French Government acknowledged the force at the commencement of the present negotiation. This is, that the possession of the Holy Cities of Arabia is necessary to the Sultan. If, by possession, he means the right of Sovereignty, he is quite right in maintaining that the Sultan, deprived of these sanctuaries of Mahomedanism, would lose a portion of the religious veneration upon which his power in some measure is founded. We are convinced of this, and we regard so highly the preservation of all the elements of this power, that when, some months since, a report was spread, that the agents maintained by the Sultan at Mecca and Medina in his capacity of Chief of the religion, had been expelled by the Viceroy, I directed the Consul-General of France to make to him strong representations upon this subject; it is probably to this circumstance that Lord Palmerston alludes. I will observe, by the way, that this report, as well as so many others current at Constantinople against Mehemet Ali, was entirely false. Whatever the case may be, now, as formerly, I acknowledge that the Porte should retain its right of Sovereignty over the Holy Cities and over Arabia, as well as over the whole of the other territories governed by the Viceroy and by his family; but I do not see, and I have never said, that any interest, either moral or physical, would be compromised by Arabia continuing to be placed under the administration of the Viceroy; and I will add, that the idea of changing this state of things, established without question for twenty years, appears to me as quite a new arrangement which can only tend to complicate, to the injury of the Porte, a question already so difficult. The fact is, that until now, this idea had never been brought forward, and that Arabia was universally considered as a dependency of Egypt, and as linked to the destiny of the latter country.

I have in some measure gone the round of the objections raised by Lord Palmerston to our policy. I think I have proved that they are founded in general upon misunderstandings or upon errors of fact. There is still one upon which I almost hesitate to speak. In the opinion of the British Cabinet, the recall of Admiral Roussin has had the effect of weakening the moral weight of the Act which he had signed, promising to the Porte the support of France. I do not comprehend, I confess, how the change of a diplomatic agent could produce this result in the face of the declaration continually renewed by the government of the King, that it persisted in its friendly policy towards the Sultan. I will say no more on this subject, and the Cabinet of London will perceive that I do not enter into explanations which might assume a personal character.

Lord Palmerston, in the despatch to which I am replying, expresses the regret which he feels at the disagreement which has arisen between France and England. He specifies all that his Government has done to prevent it. He reckons in the list of proofs of deference which he has given to us, the abandonment of the rigorous measures to which he had proposed to have recourse, in order to force Mehemet Ali to restore, in the first instance, the Ottoman fleet. Perhaps, M. le Comte, I might be justified in observing, that these measures were not repudiated by France alone; that all the other Courts considered them dangerous, impracticable, and almost impossible of success; and that, according to all appearances, the British Government itself, left to its own impulse, would have rejected them upon more mature reflection. However, it is far from my intention to call in question the conciliatory sentiments with which the Cabinet of London has been actuated in this important affair. These, I am well convinced, have been checked only by a conviction, erroneous, in my opinion, but sincere and deep. A conviction not less forcible, although of a contrary nature, could not but overpower in like manner in our minds the impulse of sentiments no less friendly towards our Allies; it has reduced us to the necessity of persisting in an unfortunate difference of opinion; but this justice will be rendered to us, that we have, as long as possible, done everything in our power to lessen it, and to conceal it from the observation of other Courts.

I have often asked myself the question, M. le Comte, how it has happened that the two Cabinets should not have come to an understanding upon a question, which appeared the best adapted to bring them to an agreement. I will frankly state to you my opinion. It arises from the circumstance, that France has principally had in view the European side of the question, while England has been too much engrossed with considerations relative to the respective positions of the Porte and of the Viceroy. Without neglecting the care of preserving in Egypt and in Syria the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, we have proposed to ourselves above all to make the present crisis terminate in the abolition of the exclusive and predominant protectorship which Russia was beginning to impose upon the Porte, or at least to prevent this protectorship from finding in this crisis a new occasion for its exercise, and in some measure for its legalisation; we have borne constantly in mind, that it was not less important to preserve at Constantinople the independence of this Empire; that independence without which integrity is but an idle word. England appeared at first to pursue the same object, and to act upon the same intention as ourselves. Has she not since somewhat lost sight of these views? I am almost induced to think so, when I observe that there is not, in the despatch to which I am now replying, a single word from which it can be inferred, that the Cabinet of London sees anything else, in the solution of the Eastern Question, but a territorial arrangement, more or less favourable to the Sultan and to the Viceroy.

Have the goodness, M. le Comte, to read this despatch to Lord Palmerston, and to give him a copy of it.

Receive, &c.,
(Signed) MARECHAL DUC DE DALMATIE.

No. 404.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received December* 6.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, November* 13, 1839.

I HAVE heard that the French Minister stated to an acquaintance of mine, that the French Government disagreed with the English upon the question of Mehemet Ali, because the time was not propitious for settling the great question with Russia; and was of opinion that the Porte ought to patch up (*plâtrer*) affairs with Mehemet Ali; that there should be then established a protectorship for the security of Constantinople by the Great Powers.

I told Rechid Pasha, that I doubted M. de Pontois acted under instructions from his Government, when he advised the direct arrangement should be made with Mehemet Ali; because I doubt if the French Government would give such instructions at the present time, without the concurrence of the British Government; and I had no knowledge that any such concurrence had been given by the latter. I said the Sublime Porte could not suffer any loss by delaying to act, until after the Porte should have correct information of what the Governments of England and Austria have decided to do. That, were it the fact that the Egyptian had the power necessary to attack the Porte, he could not exert it at this season of the year. That it would always be time enough for the Porte to consent to the partition of the Empire; and that no present danger existed to hurry on the adoption of such a measure.

No. 405.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, December* 6, 1839.

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the language which you held to Rechid Pasha, as reported in your despatch of November 13, with reference to the advice which M. de Pontois is stated to have given to the Turkish Government, to come to a direct arrangement with Mehemet Ali.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 406.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 9.)

(Extract.) *Paris, December* 6, 1839.

I HAVE received your Lordship's despatches to the 3rd of December. Marshal Soult, this morning, told me that he had received despatches yesterday from Constantinople and from Alexandria, but that they contained no very interesting information; nothing, in short, which could lead him to form any opinion whether peace was likely to be soon concluded between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali by a direct negotiation between the two parties.

The French Consul at Alexandria writes, that the attempt at insurrection in the Haouran has been entirely put down; that the whole of Syria is in a state of tranquillity, and that Ibrahim Pasha is employed in collecting tribute from the country; that the Egyptian Army had been paid a considerable portion of the arrears which were due to it, and that the officers and crews of the Ottoman fleet had received a month's pay from Mehemet Ali.

No. 407.

Mr. Consul Young to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 10.)

My Lord, *Jerusalem, October* 16, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to apprize your Lordship that active steps are being taken by the Egyptian Government to place Acre in a state of defence. Three vessels, loaded with guns and other warlike stores, have been discharged there, and all the artisans that could be found here have been sent down to work there.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) W. T. YOUNG.

No. 408.

Mr. Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 10.)

(Extract.) *Damascus, October* 25, 1839.

IT is stated by the Government here, that the insurgents in the Ledgea have made their submission and returned to their avocations in the Haouran. Only four redoubts, in lieu of nine, have been erected by the Egyptians, on the border of the Ledgea, said to be a condition stipulated with the insurgents; but I have heard that the chief cause of the pacification are orders from his Highness Ibrahim Pasha, to settle this affair as speedily and in the best manner possible. Neither his Excellency Sheriff Pasha nor Ismael Bey have yet returned here with their forces; I am informed that the former will proceed to the southern Druse Haouran mountains, to organize affairs there, and regulate the agricultural preparations for the season, which have met with interruption; and his Excellency will afterwards join Ismael Bey with the forces who are to proceed to the Agloun district, which was suddenly, and but partially, pacified when the Haouran insurrection was renewed, to regulate affairs there and forward the agricultural preparations, which have been, in a great measure, abandoned.

The Caftan Bey has been recently employed with his irregular Annadi Cavalry to defeat the Arab tribe Zein of the Desert, bordering the Ledgea and Haouran district, from whom very considerable captures of flocks and animals have taken place, which cannot fail to tend, with the former captures, to diminish the supplies of this city.

The Mutuali Chief, Sheik Hussein Shebib, in the neighbourhood of Soor, who is at the head of 500 horsemen, which numbers have collected from the remnant of the late Emir Gewad, continues to interrupt the roads and disturb that part of the country.

Such is the state of this part of Syria; what is going on further south I am not perfectly informed on; and the measures of the Government and the complexion of affairs generally, confirm the observations I had the honour of making to your Lordship in my last despatch, that his Highness Ibrahim Pasha is anxious to put the south of Syria in a state to enable him to be at liberty to act with his army on the northern frontier, as circumstances may require.

No. 409.

Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 10.)

(Extract.) *Aleppo, October* 31, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith, for your Lordship's information, copies of two despatches I addressed to Viscount Ponsonby, on the 11th and 29th of this month.

Inclosure 1 in No. 409.

Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Alep, le* 11 *Octobre*, 1839.

ME trouvant indisposé à ne pouvoir pas écrire moi-même pour le moment, je dicte en Français ces lignes au Pro-Chancelier de ce Consulat, afin de ne pas laisser partir le steamer pour chez vous, sans donner à votre Excellence connaissance de ce qui s'est passé dans nos contrées depuis la dernière dépêche que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous adresser en date du 20 Septembre passé.

J'ai l'honneur maintenant de vous soumettre, que les forces Egyptiennes sont toujours dans les mêmes positions à vous marquées précédemment, à l'exception qu'à cause des grandes maladies qui ont régné parmi les troupes qui étaient à Adana, l'ordre a été donné de disperser ce corps dans les environs d'Antioche, et l'on dit que Achmet Ménekli Pacha a reçu l'ordre de Sa Hautesse le Séraskier de se rendre ici.

Nous avons appris aussi depuis quelques jours, que le Séraskier Ibrahim Pacha réunit à Marache un nombre considérable d'ouvriers en maçonnerie et menuiserie, et la voix court que c'est pour y construire des redoutes et d'autres fortifications; cependant il y a des personnes qui assurent que ce n'est que pour y bâtir des hôpitaux et des casernes; dans peu de jours nous pourrons savoir au juste ce qui en est. J'ai appris par une bonne source, que Son Altesse le Séraskier compte faire son quartier d'hiver à Marache avec le corps de troupes qu'il a avec lui.

L'esprit de sédition qui s'était manifesté dans une des montagnes d'Albestan dont j'ai eu l'honneur de vous parler par ma dernière dépêche, se trouve, à ce que l'on dit, presque calmée, à cause des forces que Son Altesse le Séraskier a dirigées contre les habitans de cette montagne.

Aussi une espèce de révolte s'est manifestée de nouveau dans les montagnes de Payass, près d'Alexandrette, mais d'après les derniers avis que j'ai reçus de la dite échelle, des forces suffisantes ont été mises en marche contre les rebelles, et tout fait croire que cela n'aura aucune suite: de même dans les montagnes de Lattaquié il s'était déclaré un esprit de révolte parmi les Ensaris; mais par les mesures immédiates et énergiques qui ont été également prises par le Gouvernement, le peuple est rentré dans l'obéissance et commence à payer les impôts qu'on leur demandait. A l'exception de ces petits évènemens, tout le reste du district de ce Consulat est assez tranquille.

J'ai aussi l'honneur de vous dire, que depuis que les mesures de guerre ont cessé dans nos contrées, le commerce a repris un peu de faveur, et si cela dure, je pense que les intérêts de nos nationaux iront de mieux en mieux.

Son Excellence Solyman Pacha se trouve encore ici, mais ayant demandé à Sa Hautesse un congé pour aller voir sa famille, cette permission lui a été accordée sous la condition de retourner ici sous peu de jours.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.,
(Signé) F. H. S. WERRY.

(Translation.)

Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Aleppo, October* 11, 1839.

BEING too unwell at this moment to write myself, I dictate these lines in French to the Pro-Chancellor of this Consulate, in order not to let the steamer depart without acquainting your Excellency with what has passed in our district since my last despatch to you of the 20th of September last.

I have now the honour to acquaint you that the Egyptian troops continue in the positions already stated to you, with the exception that, in consequence of the severe illness which has prevailed among the troops at Adana, orders have been given to distribute that corps in the neighbourhood of Antioch, and it is said that Achmet Menekli Pasha has been ordered by His Highness to repair hither.

We have also learnt during the last few days that the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha is assembling a considerable number of masons and carpenters at Marash, and it is reported that this is with the view of constructing redoubts and other fortifications; however, there are some persons who say, that it is only to build hospitals and barracks; in a few days we shall known the truth. I learn from good authority, that His Highness the Seraskier intends to take up his winter quarters at Marash, with the corps of troops which he has with him.

The seditious feeling which had shown itself in one of the mountains of Albestan, which I had the honour to mention to you in my last despatch, is said to be nearly quelled, in consequence of the force which His Highness the Seraskier directed to be sent against the inhabitants of that mountain.

A kind of revolt has also broken out afresh, in the mountains of Payass near Alexandretta, but according to my last advices from thence, a sufficient force had been marched against the rebels, and there is every reason to believe that nothing will result from it; a spirit of rebellion had in like manner manifested itself among the Ensaris, in the mountains of Latakia; but in consequence of the energetic measures taken by the Government, the people had returned to their obedience, and were beginning to pay the taxes required of them. With the exception of these slight events, the remainder of the district of this Consulate is tolerably quiet.

I have also the honour to state to you, that since warlike operations have ceased in our district, commerce has somewhat revived, and if this lasts, I think that the interests of our countrymen will go on improving.

His Excellency Solyman Pasha is still here, but having asked His Highness for leave of absence to go and see his family, permission has been given him on condition of returning hither in a few days.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) F. H. S. WERRY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 409.

Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Aleppo, October* 29, 1839.

I HAD the honour to address your Lordship under the 11th instant, which communication, in consequence of indisposition, I was obliged to dictate in French, to the Pro-Cancellier of this Consulate.

I now do myself the honour of transmitting to your Excellency the little that has further taken place since that period, on events in this district meriting your Lordship's attention.

His Excellency the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha continues to occupy Marash with the same force; and the Egyptian troops on that northern frontier, and within this district, continue to hold with little or no change the same positions as I had the honour of noting to your Lordship in my last communication. But it is generally supposed that his Excellency the Seraskier will, on the approaching severe winter months, make Aleppo his head-quarters, leaving, however, the troops in the same positions they now hold.

His Excellency has caused a second "Salyan" to be taken from the inhabitants of Marash.

I had the honour of stating to your Lordship, in my last communication, that his Excellency the Seraskier had ordered to Marash all the principal masons, carpenters, and workmen, supposed to be either for the erection of fortifications, or for that of barracks and hospitals for the forces.

About five days ago the chief Government architect of this Pashalic, M. Vincent Germain, received an order from his Excellency to repair immediately in that direction, for which district he has left.

I learn from persons coming from that frontier, that some redoubts and other fortifications have already been erected at Marash, and that the chief architect's presence in that quarter has for its object to superintend the erection of barracks and hospitals at Aintab; and it is said, that probably the same buildings will be required at Marash, as the forces there are to hold, during the winter months, that position, which contains at present no suitable quarters for that season; from which it appears that his Excellency the Seraskier has the intention of keeping during the winter season, the whole of the forces concentrated in the same positions they now hold, all along the northern frontier of Syria.

I beg also to observe to your Lordship, that the Government here and throughout this district have laid, and continue to lay in depôt, a considerable quantity of grain of all sorts, as also of ammunition, much greater than has ever been practised in former years by this Government, and ever since its occupation of this country.

The Egyptian force at Orfa has not been increased in any way; but it is reported in town, and it appears correct and authentic, that the inhabitants of Mardin, in consequence of the demand on that part of the country by the Sultan's authority, to furnish conscripts for the army, rose and destroyed the Governor of the town, Cadi, and other officers of the place, and then sent a deputation to the Egyptian commanding officer at Orfa, inviting him to advance with a force, and that on their approach, they, the malcontents, would deliver up that place and the surrounding country to the Egyptian authority.

I have made very strict inquiry respecting this circumstance, and find it confirmed through other channels. The Dragoman has also had some conversation with a Christian who has just arrived here from Diarbekir, of the Gadban family, whose account of the affair corroborates with the above report which I have had the honour of noting to your Lordship; and further adds, that he met Colonel Maggiun Bey, with some Bedouin Cavalry, Turk Irregular Cavalry (Bashi Bozuks), and about a regiment of regulars, at Chermook, which place they had just reached from Orfa, and that it was reported they were on their way to Mardin.

Chermook, as your Lordship is aware, has, ever since the occupation of Orfa by the Egyptian forces, a Mussellim named there under that Government, and is distant about three days from Mardin, and two from Diarbekir.

The information that I have been able to elicit from this person, who has reached from Diarbekir, respecting the movements of the Sultan's troops and officers is, that the force at Malatia, under Sadullah Pasha, said to be of about 10,000 men, has been withdrawn from that place, and marched to Carpoot.

I have no late advices from the Adana district, but I believe everything there remains without any further change since the last time I addressed your Lordship.

I informed your Lordship, in my last, that resistance to the Government had taken place in the mountains near Byass, on the continuity of the range of the Taurus, refusing to pay the taxes, and that a force had been directed against the malcontents. I have no fresh advices from the Alexandretta district respecting the issue of that undertaking; but I learn from different good sources here, that the malcontents of those mountains had begun to give in their submission, and to pay the taxes in the same manner as the Ensaries in the Latakia district, who had also some time back evinced symptoms of discontent, in consequence of the demand made for the taxes, but who, I learn from our agent there, have returned to their duty; and altogether, I may say that the whole of this consular district is at present pretty tranquil.

Although the malcontents in Syria against the Egyptian Government are general among the population, it may be said that the whole of the population of this country is inimical to this Government; arising from the forcible conscription, and at present from the heavy taxation everywhere exercised and exacted with such great rigour, and a train of circumstances growing out of the wants of a too grasping Government inconsistent with the means of the people.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) F. H. S. WERRY.

No. 410.

Mr. Consul Moore to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 10.)

My Lord, *Beyrout, November* 7, 1839.

THE information I have the honour to transmit by this month's packet, *viâ* Alexandria, is but limited.

During the last fifteen or twenty days, the communication between Tyre and Acre has been interrupted by a party of insurgent Mutualis (an heretical sect of Mahommedans) to the number of about 400. These lay in wait for travellers whom they rob and murder, as well as plunder the caravans which pass that way. They lately seized upon a Christian, and, after robbing him, spared his life on condition of his conveying a message, on their part, to the Governor of Tyre, demanding 50,000 piastres, and a supply of ammunition and provisions from that town. In the event of a refusal, they threatened an incursion into the town. The inhabitants of Tyre are without the means of defence, and have applied in great alarm to the Mudir of Acre for protection. It is doubted, however, whether he has a sufficient force at his disposal to keep the Mutualis in check; meanwhile our communication with the south is interrupted.

Trade is almost entirely suspended at this place, which may be principally attributed to the anxiety and suspense which exist generally in respect to the present state of the relations betwixt Mehemet Ali and the Porte.

Accounts have reached Beyrout, that Ibrahim Pasha has directed troops to march towards Malatia, Diarbekir, and Mardin.

Solyman Pasha arrived at Sidon from Aleppo on the 24th ultimo, and has since visited Acre, at which place considerable military stores have lately arrived from Egypt.

On the 22nd instant, Mahmoud Bey, the Governor, communicated to the European Consuls here an order from his Excellency Sheriff Pasha, prohibiting the introduction of arms into Syria as an article of commerce.

On the 31st ultimo, an Egyptian brig-of-war touched here, bearing treasure for the payment of the troops in Syria; and on the 1st instant, a steamer, supposed to be the Egyptian frigate "Nile," passed within sight of this port steering northward.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) N. MOORE.

No. 411.

Sir George Hamilton to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received December* 10.)

My Lord, *Berlin, December* 4, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatches to the 26th of November together with their inclosures.

The French Chargé d'Affaires at this Court has read to me part of a despatch addressed to him by Marshal Soult, in which was inclosed a copy of your Lordship's despatch to Lord Granville of the 29th of October.

The Marshal began by stating, that although the language held by your Lordship to the French Ambassador in London had become less strong (moins tranchant) than formerly on the Turkish and Egyptian Question, yet the views taken by Her Majesty's Government of the state of affairs in the East, and of the means to be employed for bringing about an arrangement between the Porte and Mehemet Ali, were still too exaggerated and too inadmissible to coincide with those of the French Government.

The Marshal commented in rather severe terms on some of the passages in your Lordship's despatch to Lord Granville, saying, that some of the sentiments were exaggerated and others unfounded, and that he was preparing to answer them in the most peremptory terms (dans les termes les plus péremptoires). I merely observed to M. Humann, that a considerable time had elapsed since the despatch in question had been received and no answer had as yet been returned.

M. Humann then read to me extracts of a despatch from Marshal Soult to the French Consul-General at Alexandria.

I was much struck with the language of this despatch, for whilst it reprimanded in gentle terms the conduct of the Consul-General in having gone too far at different times, in his conversations with the Pasha of Egypt, in his assurances of the protection of France, and of the interest she took in Mehemet Ali's welfare, thereby perhaps contributing to the Pasha's obstinacy in making him believe that France was more disposed to the aggrandizement of Egypt than to the maintenance of the Porte, yet this slight expression of disapprobation at his conduct was much interwoven with flattery for the Pasha personally, and with assurances to the Pasha of the admiration with which his "genius and glory" inspired the French nation. The despatch however terminated with orders to M. Cochelet to state to Mehemet Ali, that if the French Government had to choose between the preservation of the integrity of the Turkish Empire and the aggrandizement of the Pasha, their choice must inevitably be the former; and that the Pasha would best insure the continued protection of France by the moderation of his demands.

Although evidence was not before wanting to prove that the complaints which had been received at Vienna and Constantinople of M. Cochelet's language at Alexandria were well founded, yet the existence of the despatch I have had the honour of quoting to your Lordship, proves that the French Government have even thought it necessary to take notice of it.

Baron Werther informed me yesterday, that he had received news direct from Alexandria, containing renewed complaints of M. Cochelet's language.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GEORGE B. HAMILTON.

No. 412.

Sir George Hamilton to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received December* 10.)

(Extract.) *Berlin, December* 4, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship, that the Russian Minister has this moment informed me that a Russian Cabinet messenger has arrived at Berlin on his way to Stutgardt, bearing instructions to Baron Brunnow to proceed to London without delay, to negotiate with Her Majesty's Government the final arrangements consequent upon the acceptation by Russia of the propositions lately made by your Lordship, for the entry of the English and French fleets into the Straits of the Dardanelles, in the event of a Russian force being required for the protection of the Porte.

The messenger has not been detained a moment, but has been desired to proceed to Stutgardt without delay.

No. 413.

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.

(Extract.) *Foreign Office, December* 10, 1839.

IN a conversation which I had with Count Sébastiani on Thursday last, I took occasion to remark, but in a friendly manner, upon the considerable naval preparations which the French Government is making at Toulon. I observed, that there is now in the Levant a French squadron of nine sail of the line, all heavy and powerful ships, and that we learn that an additional squadron of eight sail of the line is fitting out at Toulon, which, when complete, will give France a fleet of seventeen sail of the line in the Mediterranean. I said that this great armament cannot fail to attract attention and to produce remarks in this country; that it will inevitably become the subject of discussion; and that people will naturally ask whom is it that so large a force is intended to act against?

It will be said, that such a fleet is not wanted against the Russians, who have only twelve sail of the line shut up in the Black Sea; that it cannot be meant against the Turks, because they have no fleet left; that it is obviously not directed against Mehemet Ali, because France not only declares that she will not coerce him, but of late has in her negotiations openly protected him; that, consequently, there remains only England and the English fleet, against which these great preparations can be made. I said also, that persons who wish to embroil the two Governments may allege that the tone and language of the French press is calculated to countenance the notion, that in France, at least, these naval preparations are believed to be destined to support some system of policy adverse to Great Britain; and I instanced an article which appeared lately in the "Journal de Paris," and which openly boasted, not only that England would be forced by France to submit to, and even to sign and guarantee the independence of Mehemet Ali, but that Gibraltar was to be wrested from us, and to be transferred to the Spaniards. I said, that I myself attached no importance whatever to such newspaper articles, but they were at least indications serving to show which way public opinion and public feeling in France are travelling.

Count Sébastiani seeming to entertain some doubts of the accuracy of the report which had reached Her Majesty's Government as to the naval preparations at Toulon, I gave him the details, and stated that the French force now in the Levant consists of—

The Montébello	120 Guns.	The Diadème	86 Guns.
Hercule	100 ,,	Généreux	80 ,,
Jéna	90 ,,	Triton	80 ,,
Jupiter	86 ,,	—Trident	80 ,,
Santi Petri	86 ,,	9	

that the squadron which is equipping at Toulon is to consist of—

The Souverain	-	100 Guns.	
Alger	-	80 ,,	
Marengo	-	80 ,,	
Scipion	-	80 ,,	
Ville de Marseille		80 ,,	recently brought from Brest.
Neptune	-	86 ,,	ditto.
Océan	-	120 ,,	expected from Brest.
—Suffren	-	90 ,,	ditto.
8			

I said that we are going to put three line-of-battle ships into commission, in order to relieve three others now in the Mediterranean, and whose time of service is out; but that if the French should make so large a naval armament, it is obvious, that we may be obliged to convert this relief into a reinforcement, and perhaps even to make a still further addition to our ships in commission.

Count Sébastiani said he would certainly report to his Government what I had said to him, and would not fail to mention the friendly spirit in which my remarks had been made; but he assured me, in the most positive manner, that the main wish and guiding principle of his Government, in regard to its foreign relations, was to maintain unimpaired its alliance with England, and to render that alliance as close and intimate as possible; and that, consequently, he could undertake at once to declare, that not a shadow of hostile feeling towards England could by possibility have entered into the motives which may have induced his Government to order the equipment of this squadron of reserve.

I think it will be desirable that your Excellency should take an opportunity of adverting to this matter, in conversation with Marshal Soult, in the same manner in which I touched upon it in my interview with Count Sébastiani. For, notwithstanding the friendly professions and declarations of the French Government, it is impossible for Her Majesty's Government, not to apprehend that the Cabinet of the Tuileries bears in mind, with respect to Mediterranean affairs, the views and policy which have in past periods actuated the Monarchical, the Republican, and the Imperial Governments of France.

The desire of possessing Egypt is not a recent ambition on the part of France; and the French Government seems to be labouring to establish an Independent State, consisting of Egypt, Syria, and Arabia, to be placed under the protection, and to be subject to the influence, of France.

Undoubtedly, the full execution of such a plan would be attended with difficulties hardly to be surmounted; and when once its nature and extent came to be generally seen and understood in England, any British Government would be compelled by public opinion, to resist the further progress of such a scheme. But in matters of this kind, prevention is better than remedy, and the earliest steps are always the wisest and the most effectual; and therefore it is, that Her Majesty's Government have deemed it expedient to lose no time in noticing this apparently uncalled-for augmentation of the French fleet.

Her Majesty's Government do not believe that the Cabinet of the Tuileries can seriously contemplate a rupture with England, for the purpose of supporting the aggressive pretensions of Mehemet Ali; but that Cabinet probably thinks, that if the French naval force in the Mediterranean were very much superior to that of Great Britain, such a circumstance would tend to give great weight to the opinions and wishes of France in favour of Mehemet Ali; and that France would be able to negotiate in favour of the Pasha with much better effect, if, while England had only twelve sail of the line in the Mediterranean, France were to have seventeen, besides the whole of the Turkish and Egyptian fleets, which now, by a train of circumstances of which the history yet remains to be fully explained, are in the possession of Mehemet Ali.

No. 414.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 12.)

My Lord, *Paris, December* 9, 1839.

I HAD an interview this morning with Marshal Soult, and was immediately, on my entrance into his room, greeted with a congratulation upon the communication he received yesterday from General Sébastiani, of the Russian Government having notified to your Lordship its acquiescence in the proposal of Her Majesty's Government, and expressed its willingness that if a Russian force should enter the Bosphorus, ships of war of all the other co-operating Powers shall enter the Dardanelles. Nothing, said the Marshal, could be more satisfactory than this communication; he considered it as the removal of the great obstacle to the satisfactory conclusion of the Eastern Question; and when I observed that Mehemet Ali, being aware that the forces of all the Great Powers would be united in defence of Constantinople, could no longer indulge the hope of sowing dissension among them by the advance of the Egyptian Army towards the capital of Turkey, and would be therefore disposed to accede to more reasonable conditions of peace than those on which he now insisted, his Excellency fully concurred in the justice of this observation; the Marshal told me he should write by a courier this day to Count Sébastiani, instructing him to express the satisfaction with which the King and the French Government had received this communication.

His Excellency mentioned to me, that the French Minister at Stutgardt had written to him, that the Baron de Brunnow had received, on the 6th of this month, instructions to proceed directly to London, and that on the 8th he purposed setting off for that destination.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 415.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 12.)

(Extract.) *Paris, December* 9, 1839.

THE Marshal Soult told me this morning, that in the same despatch in which General Sébastiani had apprized him of the communication received by Her Majesty's Government from that of Russia, relative to the union of the forces of all the Allies of the Porte in the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, his Excellency had stated, that your Lordship had mentioned to him the accounts which had been received in England of the equipment of a reserve squadron at Toulon, to be commanded by Admiral Rosamel. The Marshal said, that he thought he had, at the time of the appointment of Admiral Rosamel to this command, explained to me the circumstances of that appointment, but upon my assuring him that he had never in his conversations with me alluded to the subject, he expressed his regret at the omission; he purposed replying to this part of General Sébastiani's despatch, in a way that he had no doubt would be perfectly satisfactory to your Lordship; he then entered into an explanation of the reasons which necessitated the French Government to have reserve ships in commission at home, in order to supply the place of others on a foreign station, which, from the discharge of the sailors after a certain period of service, and from other causes, might be obliged to return to France.

No. 416.

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, December* 12, 1839.

WITH reference to your despatch, of the 9th instant, I have to acquaint your Excellency, that Count Sébastiani read to me yesterday a despatch from Marshal Soult, in which the Marshal expressed the great satisfaction with which the French Government had learnt that the Russian Cabinet was disposed to agree to the arrangement proposed by Her Majesty's Government on the subject of the Dardanelles, and that Baron Brunnow was expected to return to London for the purpose of resuming the negotiation; and the Marshal stated, that if, when Baron Brunnow arrived, it should appear that the Russian proposals were such as have been announced, and were not accompanied by any conditions or reserves tending to counteract their ostensible effect, the French Government would, in such an altered state of things, be prepared to reconsider the whole of the Turco-Egyptian Question, not even excepting those points upon which different Governments have hitherto taken views so different as to render further negotiation upon them apparently useless.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 417.

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, December* 13, 1839.

IN your despatch, of the 9th instant, your Excellency reports, that Marshal Soult had stated to you on the morning of that day, that, in the same despatch in which General Sébastiani had apprized him of the communication which has been received by Her Majesty's Government from that of Russia, about the return of Baron Brunnow to London, Count Sébastiani had stated that I had mentioned to him the accounts which had been received in England of the intended equipment of a reserve squadron at Toulon, to be commanded by Admiral Rosamel; and your Excellency further reports the explanations given to you by Marshal Soult, respecting the appointment of that Admiral.

I have to state to your Excellency in reply, that in the despatch relative to the Affairs of the Levant, which Count Sébastiani showed me a few days ago, and which I mentioned in my despatch of the 12th instant, there was a passage relating to what I had said to Count Sébastiani the other day upon the subject of the intended equipment of a fleet of reserve at Toulon, and that passage contained very nearly the same statement which Marshal Soult made verbally to your Excellency as above referred to.

But this explanation leaves the matter much as it was before, and entirely evades the real point. Your Excellency should, therefore, ascertain from Marshal Soult, whether it is, or is not, the intention of the French Government to equip a squadron of reserve of eight sail of the line at Toulon, in addition to the nine sail of the line already in the Levant; for it is the equipment of such a squadron, and not the appointment of any particular Admiral to command it, to which the observation of Her Majesty's Government has been directed; and if it should be the intention of the French Government to carry its active naval force in the Mediterranean to the amount supposed, Her Majesty's Government would be glad to know that fact.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 418.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 16.)

My Lord, *Paris, December* 13, 1839.

IN obedience to the instructions contained in your despatch of the 10th instant, I adverted in an interview I had this morning with Marshal Soult to the report which had reached Her Majesty's Government of the fitting out of a squadron of eight sail of the line, at Toulon, in addition to the nine sail of the line now stationed in the Levant under the command of Admiral Lalande. I expressed my hopes that the report which I had made to your Lordship of my conversation with his Excellency on Monday last, and more especially the despatch which he told me he had written to Count Sébastiani upon this subject, had already satisfied Her Majesty's Government that the account of the force of this squadron of reserve had been exaggerated, and that the equipment of it had been ordered with no view the least unfriendly to England; but I could not omit however to mention to him, that I had received yesterday a despatch containing observations similar to those addressed by your Lordship to the French Ambassador, relative to the report of the naval preparations which had been made at Toulon; and which you thought it desirable that I should take an opportunity of adverting to in my conversation with his Excellency. This instruction showed, I said, how very anxious Her Majesty's Ministers are, to be enabled to answer satisfactorily any remarks or questions which might be put to them on the subject of this armament in either House, when Parliament meets. Marshal Soult replied, that he had no doubt of your Lordship having been satisfied with the answers he had given to Count Sébastiani upon this matter, and he added, that the number of French ships of the line fit to go to sea, did not amount to more, he believed, than thirteen, and that two of them were employed to transport troops to Algiers.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 419.

The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 17.)

(Extract.) *St. Petersburgh, November* 30, 1839.

COUNT NESSELRODE assures me, that he feels confident that the Sultan will rely upon the efforts of his Allies, and will not settle his disputes with the Pasha without their intervention: and his Excellency considers that, after all that has passed, it will be infinitely better that the final arrangement should be determined by the Great Powers: as thereby the dignity of the parties who signed the Collective Note presented to the Sultan, and whose conduct has been consistent with that Note, will be maintained; the Ottoman Empire will gain better terms; and the settlement will be more probably permanent.

No. 420.

M. Wagner, Prussian Consul at Alexandria, to Count Kœnigsmarck.

(Extrait.) *Alexandrie, le* 26 *Novembre, N. S.*, 1839.

C'EST un fait digne d'attention, que la première nouvelle des démarches collectives que les Représentans des Cinq Grandes Puissances à Constantinople ont faites pour assurer la Porte de l'intérêt de leurs Cours et pour l'engager à renoncer à tout arrangement direct, a produit sur Méhémet Ali la plus grande impression: il en fut consterné et parut sentir l'inutilité et les dangers d'une résistance à la volonté unanime des Cinq Puissances.

Autant que les ouvertures faites isolément et qui ne reposent point sur une base solide, restent stériles, autant d'effet peut-on se promettre d'une démarche collective que les Consuls-Généraux pourraient être appelés à faire auprès de Méhémet Ali pour lui intimer, comme une décision définitive et irrévocable, la résolution de leurs Cours à l'égard de ses différends avec la Porte; et je partage l'opinion de plusieurs de mes Collègues, que Méhémet Ali se soumettrait à cette décision, fût-elle même beaucoup moins avantageuse pour lui que les conditions qu'il pourrait attendre d'un arrangement direct avec la Porte.

Méhémet Ali sent tous les jours davantage les difficultés de sa position; il s'est aliéné l'esprit des Cabinets qui sont intervenus dans ses différends avec la Porte, en se refusant à accepter leur médiation et en fesant par ses ouvertures directes à la Porte des tentatives de s'y soustraire. L'essai d'exciter à la révolte

les populations des provinces restées fidèles à Sa Hautesse, a complètement échoué; l'armée d'Ibrahim Pacha se trouve paralysée par les rigueurs d'un climat auquel elle n'est point accoutumée, ainsi que par le manque de vivres et la difficulté de ses communications avec la Syrie. La présence de la flotte Turque à Alexandrie, qui avait été regardée au premier moment comme un incident heureux pour Méhémet Ali, ne manque pas d'offrir de grands inconvéniens; le Pacha s'est vu obligé, pour calmer le mécontentement toujours croissant des équipages, à leur faire payer un mois de solde, ce qui augmente ses embarras pécuniaires.

Tandis que la position de Méhémet Ali devient de jour en jour plus difficile, celle de la Porte parait s'améliorer; et la marche sage et correcte qu'elle a suivie en acceptant l'intervention des Grandes Puissances, ne manquera pas de lui en faire éprouver les effets salutaires.

Nous voyons les provinces rester tranquilles; le jeune Sultan qui, dès son avènement au trône, avait en sa faveur les sympathies des Cinq Puissances, gagne de jour en jour de popularité, et le Hatti Chérif, publié dernièrement, exercera probablement une influence salutaire sur l'opinion publique en Turquie et en Europe. Mais un incident imprévu, la manifestation d'un mécontentement populaire à Constantinople, un soulèvement dans les provinces, un changement du Ministère Turc, une incendie ou une disette, pourraient facilement changer cet état de choses et amener d'un jour à l'autre de graves complications. Méhémet Ali insisterait alors avec plus d'opiniâtreté que jamais sur ses prétentions outrées, et le Sultan, pour sortir d'embarras, se verrait obligé de souscrire à un arrangement direct moins favorable que les conditions que lui aurait procurées une prompte intervention des Cinq Puissances,—intervention qui aujourd'hui aurait probablement pû se borner à faire simplement connaître leur décision unanime et irrévocable au Pacha d'Egypte.

(Translation.)

Mr. Wagner, Prussian Consul at Alexandria, to Count Königsmarck.

(Extract.) *Alexandria, November* 26, *N.S.*, 1839.

IT is a fact worthy of attention, that the first news of the collective steps which the Representatives of the Five Great Powers at Constantinople have taken to assure the Porte of the interest of their Courts, and to prevail upon it to give up any direct arrangement, has produced the greatest impression on Mehemet Ali: he was thrown into consternation by it, and appeared to feel the uselessness and the dangers of resisting the unanimous will of the Five Powers.

In proportion as the overtures made singly and without any basis to rest upon are fruitless, so much the more effect may be anticipated from a collective step which the Consuls-General might be called upon to take, to intimate to Mehemet Ali, as a final and irrevocable decision, the determination of their Courts with regard to his differences with the Porte; and I agree in opinion with several of my colleagues, that Mehemet Ali would submit to this decision, even if it were much less advantageous for him than the conditions which he might expect from a direct arrangement with the Porte.

Mehemet Ali feels more and more every day the difficulties of his position; he has alienated from himself the good-will of the Cabinets which interposed in his differences with the Porte, by refusing their mediation, and by endeavouring to escape from it by making direct overtures to the Porte. The attempt to excite to revolt the population of the Provinces, which remained faithful to His Highness, has completely failed; the Army of Ibrahim Pasha is paralyzed by the rigour of a climate to which it is unaccustomed, as well as by the want of provisions, and by the difficulty of its communications with Syria. The presence of the Turkish fleet at Alexandria, which at the first moment was looked upon as a fortunate event for Mehemet Ali, does not fail to produce much inconvenience. The Pasha has been compelled, in order to appease the increasing discontent of the crews, to furnish them with a month's pay, which augments his pecuniary difficulties.

While the position of Mehemet Ali becomes daily more difficult, that of the Porte seems to improve; and the wise and prudent line which it has adopted in

accepting the intervention of the Great Powers cannot fail to make it feel the salutary effects thereof.

We see the other provinces remain quiet; the young Sultan, who had the sympathy of the Five Powers in his favour, from the time of his accession to the throne, gains popularity daily; and the recently published Hatti Sheriff will probably exercise a salutary influence over public opinion in Turkey and in Europe. But one unforeseen accident, the manifestation of popular discontent at Constantinople, a rising in the provinces, a change of the Turkish Ministry, a fire, or a famine, might easily alter this state of things, and produce at any moment serious complications. Mehemet Ali would in that case insist, with more obstinacy than ever, upon his exaggerated pretensions, and the Sultan, to escape from embarrassment, would find himself obliged to consent to a direct arrangement less favourable than the conditions which a prompt intervention of the Five Powers would have procured for him,—an intervention which now might probably have been confined to simply making known to the Pasha of Egypt their unanimous and irrevocable decision.

No. 421.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received December* 22.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, November* 24, 1839.

THIS country seems to be in its usual state. The Government is obeyed, and the revenue collected as heretofore. I am told, that the Hatti Sheriff published at the Gulhané, on the 3rd of November last, is universally approved of, and that Ottoman and Rayah subjects desire, with equal anxiety, to see it carried into execution.

The accounts received by the Internuncio and others from Alexandria, speak of the state of Syria as being very embarrassing to Ibrahim Pasha, and say, that country is with difficulty kept in subjection by the military force.

No. 422.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received December* 22.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, November* 27, 1839.

THE Internuncio has been so good as to communicate to me the latest intelligence he has received from Alexandria, which I inclose for your Lordship. I have seen a very intelligent gentleman, lately arrived from that place; and he says, the Ottoman sailors are in utter despondency; that they had received only one month's pay; that Ahmed Pasha is held in contempt; that the Egyptian troops have seventeen months' pay due to them; that Mehemet Ali is detested by all, but is feared; that Ibrahim is extremely feared; that in his opinion, any disaster befalling the Pasha would produce his certain fall at once; that Mehemet Ali is extremely alarmed at his position,—and this last fact he has gathered from authority that cannot be doubted. He thinks the Pasha will offer to send the fleet back. It is said the French have recommended that step.

Inclosure in No. 422.

M. de Laurin to the Baron de Stürmer.

(Extrait.) *Alexandrie, le* 17 *Novembre,* 1839.

MEHEMET ALI se résigne de plus en plus. Il ne gâtera rien aux affaires pour l'Ile de Candie, soit qu'on veuille la lui prendre avant ou après sa mort. La Flotte Ottomane lui est à charge et demande à haute voix à être renvoyée. Depuis le premier Ramazan elle est payée du Trésor Egyptien.

Ahmed Pacha a appris que Méhémet Ali désire se concilier avec Hosreff Pacha. Dans ce cas, il resterait ici ou bien il se retirerait à la Mecque. Méhémet Ali continue à lui jurer amitié, mais il le voit plus rarement que par le passé; il ne lui communique plus ni des nouvelles importantes, ni des plans, &c. &c., de sorte qu'il s'adresse souvent aux Consulats étrangers pour avoir les nouvelles de Constantinople et d'Europe.

Le pyroscaphe "Peiki Chewket," a apporté ici, cinq exemplaires du Hatti Chérif du 3 de ce mois. Il fit une impression difficile à décrire. Malgré la défense la plus sévère, des officiers de tout grade se pressent autour du bateau pour en prendre les détails, et sont doublement impatiens de leur captivité.

(Translation.)

M. de Laurin to the Baron de Stürmer.

(Extract.) *Alexandria, November* 17, 1839.

MEHEMET ALI becomes more and more resigned; he will not mar matters on account of the Island of Candia, whether it is intended to take it from him before or after his death. The Ottoman fleet is a burthen to him, and demands loudly to be sent back. Since the first of Ramazan it has been paid out of the Egyptian treasury.

Ahmed Pasha has learnt that Mehemet Ali wishes to become reconciled with Hosrew Pasha. In that case, he would remain here, or rather, he would retire to Mecca. Mehemet Ali continues to swear friendship to him, but he sees him less frequently than formerly; he no longer communicates to him important news, or plans, &c., &c.; so that he often applies to the foreign consulates for news from Constantinople and Europe.

The steamer, "Peiki Chewket," has brought here five copies of the Hatti Sheriff of the 3rd of this month. It made an impression difficult to be described. In spite of the strictest prohibition, officers of every rank crowded round the boat in order to get the details of it, and are doubly impatient of their captivity.

No. 423.

Sir George Hamilton to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 25.)

(Extract.) *Berlin, December* 18, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatches to the 10th of December, together with their inclosures.

I have had frequent conversations with Baron Werther on the affairs of the East; and he informed me yesterday, that he was happy to hear from Paris that when the French Government heard of Baron Brunnow's renewed mission to London, it received the intelligence with satisfaction, and expressed its hopes that it might lead to a termination of the Eastern Question.

No. 424.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 25.)

My Lord, *Paris, December* 23, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship a copy of the speech which His Majesty the King of the French delivered this day upon opening the Session of the Chambers.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

Inclosure in No. 424.

Speech of His Majesty the King of the French at the opening of the Chambers, December 23, 1839.

(Extrait.)

MES rapports avec les Puissances étrangères ont conservé ce caractère pacifique et bienveillant que prescrit l'intérêt commun de l'Europe. Notre pavillon, de concert avec celui de la Grande Bretagne, et fidèle à l'esprit de cette union, toujours si avantageuse aux intérêts des deux pays, a veillé sur l'indépendance et la sûreté immédiate de l'Empire Ottoman. Notre politique est toujours d'assurer la conservation et l'intégrité de cet Empire, dont l'existence est si essentielle au maintien de la paix générale. Nos efforts ont au moins réussi à arrêter dans l'Orient le cours des hostilités que nous avions voulu prévenir; et, quelles que soient les complications qui résultent de la diversité des intérêts, j'ai l'espérance que l'accord des Grandes Puissances amènera bientôt une solution équitable et pacifique.

(Translation.)

Speech of His Majesty the King of the French, at the opening of the Chambers, December 23, 1839.

(Extract.)

MY relations with Foreign Powers have preserved that pacific and friendly character prescribed by the common interests of Europe. Our flag, in concert with that of Great Britain, and faithful to the spirit of that union, always so advantageous to the interests of the two countries, has watched over the independence and the immediate safety of the Ottoman Empire. Our policy is ever to assure the preservation and the integrity of that Empire, the existence of which is so essential to the maintenance of the general peace. Our efforts have at least succeeded in arresting in the East the course of those hostilities which we had desired to prevent; and, whatever may be the complications which result from diversity of interests, I have the hope that the agreement of the Great Powers will soon bring about an equitable and pacific solution.

No. 425.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 26.)

My Lord, *Paris, December* 23, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to inclose an extract from the "Eclaireur de la Méditerranée," which confirms the answer I received from Marshal Soult, in reply to the question I put to him, by your Lordship's directions, respecting the number of French ships of the line in commission in the Mediterranean.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

Inclosure in No. 425.

Extract from the "Eclaireur de la Méditerranée."

L'ESCADRE de l'Amiral Lalande ne se composera plus que de six vaisseaux. Le trois ponts "le Montébello," était du nombre de ceux qui devaient opérer leur etour en France; mais on apprend aujourd'hui même que ce vaisseau reste rans le Levant. Au moment où le Gouvernement Anglais augmente son escadre de trois vaisseaux de plus, et donne ordre à l'Amiral Stopford de se maintenir en Orient, nous faisons rentrer une partie des nôtres.

M. le Vice-Amiral Ducampe de Rosamel, Commandant supérieur de l'escadre de réserve, n'est attendu à Toulon que dans la première quinzaine de janvier prochain. A cette époque, huit vaisseaux doivent être réunis au port, savoir: les trois vaisseaux attendus du Levant, les deux de Brest, ensuite "le Neptune," "l'Alger" et "le Marengo," plus les deux frégates "la Belle-Poule" et "l'Amazone."

(Translation.)

Extract from the "Eclaireur de la Mediterranée."

THE squadron of Admiral Lalande will no longer consist of more than six ships of the line. The three-decker "Montebello" was one of those which was to return to France; but we learn this very day that this ship remains in the Levant. At the time when the English Government increases its squadron by three more ships of the line, and orders Admiral Stopford to remain in the East, we bring home part of ours.

Vice-Admiral Ducampe de Rosamel, Commander-in-Chief of the Squadron of Reserve, is not expected at Toulon before the first fortnight of next January. At that time eight ships of the line are to be assembled in port, namely, the three ships of the line expected from the Levant; the two from Brest; and then the "Neptune," "Alger," and "Marengo;" besides the two frigates the "Belle Poule," and the "Amazon."

No. 426.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 26.)

My Lord, *Therapia, November* 30, 1839.

I HEARD, yesterday, from Her Majesty's Consul at the Dardanelles, of the arrival of three British line-of-battle ships in Besika Bay, where they cast anchor. The news had reached town early, and inquiries were made by some of my colleagues. I replied, that orders had been given some time ago, that measures of precaution should be taken against the threatened attack by Ibrahim Pasha, and any possible attempt that might be made from that quarter against the Porte. I said the same thing to Rechid Pasha.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 427.

Measures suggested by Baron Brunnow for the Settlement of the Turco-Egyptian Question. January, 1840.

1°. DE déclarer que les Cabinets Alliés, considérant que la situation actuelle des affaires entre la Sublime Porte Ottomane et Méhémet Ali, Pacha d'Egypte, menace de troubler la paix de l'Orient, et peut finir par faire naître des évènemens qui entraîneraient de graves complications pour l'Europe entière; et considérant en outre qu'ils ont formellement promis à la Porte Ottomane une assistance que celle-ci a acceptée; ont résolu d'arrêter entre eux les bases d'une pacification par laquelle cette assistance serait efficacement prêtée et l'indépendance ainsi que la sécurité de l'Empire Ottoman complètement mises à couvert du danger d'une agression à laquelle le Pacha d'Egypte pourrait se livrer de nouveau.

2°. Etablir que les Cabinets Alliés, en se fondant sur les déterminations et les vues déjà spontanément manifestées de la part du Sultan, dans le but de faire cesser à l'avenir tout sujet de dissension et de mésintelligence, admettent en

principe que la Sublime Porte accorde à Méhémet Ali Pacha la possession de l'Egypte toute entière, avec le droit de transmettre à ses descendans l'administration de cette province, dont la Sublime Porte donnera l'investiture à ses successeurs en maintenant ainsi dans sa famille les titres et les prérogatives dont il a joui jusqu'ici en qualité de Pacha d'Egypte, vassal de la Porte.

3°. Les limites du Pachalic d'Egypte seront déterminées.

4°. Méhémet Ali et ses successeurs continueront à reconnaître la Souveraineté du Sultan et à lui payer le tribut que la Porte percevait jusqu'ici du Pachalic d'Egypte.

5°. Les Pachalics de la Syrie, Damas, Alep, et autres, ainsi que le district d'Adana, de même que l'Ile de Candie, seront évacués par les troupes Egyptiennes, et immédiatement restitués à la Porte, qui continuera à les posséder en toute propriété comme de tout tems.

6°. La flotte Ottomane, actuellement dans le port d'Alexandrie, sera immédiatement replacée sous l'autorité des préposés Turcs que le Sultan chargera de la recevoir et de la ramener à Constantinople avec ses équipages et tout le matériel y appartenant.

7°. Les dispositions ci-dessus, après avoir été préalablement communiquées à la Porte comme résultat de l'appui qui lui a été formellement promis par les Représentans des Cinq Cours, et après avoir obtenu l'adhésion du Sultan, seront mises à exécution par les Cabinets Alliés, lesquels se chargeront de notifier ces conditions à Méhémet Ali Pacha, en le sommant d'y souscrire.

8°. Si contre toute attente, Méhémet Ali refusait d'accepter les termes de cet arrangement, et annonçait l'intention de soutenir des prétentions plus étendues, les Cours Alliées sont résolues de procéder à une série de mesures coërcitives graduellement destinées à vaincre l'opposition du Pacha d'Egypte et à lui imposer l'arrangement pacifique qui aura obtenu la sanction préalable du Sultan et que toutes les Puissances de l'Europe auront reconnu comme juste et comme irrévocable.

9°. En conséquence, les Cabinets Alliés procéderaient à l'emploi des mesures ci-après: (ici suivrait l'indication des moyens d'action dont le Ministère Britannique a été le premier à nous suggérer le plan). En adoptant ces mesures on mettrait d'abord à exécution celles qui gêneraient le moins le commerce, tout en agissant moralement sur les déterminations de Méhémet Ali en détériorant sa position sous le rapport politique et militaire.

A cet effet, on commencerait par diriger les Escadres Anglaise et Française dans la Baie d'Iskendéroon pour y prendre une position et une attitude qui menaceraient Ibrahim Pacha dans son flanc, intercepteraient toutes ses communications par mer, et l'exposeraient au danger de voir éclater des troubles sérieux parmi les populations mécontentes qu'il retient à peine dans l'obéissance aujourd' hui, et qui se soustrairaient à son pouvoir dès qu'elles auraient une chance de le faire impunément en se fondant sur l'appui des forces militaires de l'Alliance.

Si cette première démonstration était insuffisante, on procéderait à rétablir l'autorité du Sultan dans l'Ile de Candie, mesure qui ne manquerait point de réagir sur toutes les provinces soumises à Méhémet Ali et y ébranlerait fortement son pouvoir.

Dans le cas où cette mesure ne parviendrait pas encore à vaincre la résistance de Méhémet Ali, il faudrait en venir au blocus des côtes de la Syrie et de l'Egypte,—démonstration qui imposerait assurément au commerce Européen une certaine gêne, mais ne serait aussi que momentanée, parceque le Pacha d'Egypte ne résisterait pas longtems à l'emploi de moyens coërcitifs qui paralyseraient toutes ses ressources financières.

Je m'abstiens de ranger ici le rappel des Consuls au nombre des mesures dont je me permettrais de suggérer l'adoption, d'une part, parceque l'absence de nos agens diminuerait les moyens d'action morale que nous avons sur Méhémet Ali; de l'autre, parceque les espérances de ce dernier pourraient se fortifier de nouveau si les Consuls de toutes les Puissances Européennes ne se trouveraient pas rappelés simultanément de leurs postes.

10°. Après avoir précisé dans leur ordre graduel les mesures coërcitives qu'ils ont résolu de prendre, les Cabinets Alliés établiraient comme une éventualité possible la chance que Méhémet Ali, venant de rejeter le plan de pacification ci-dessus, recommencât les hostilités contre l'Empire Ottoman, en faisant marcher ses troupes par l'Asie Mineure pour menacer Constantinople.

Dans ce cas, la Cour Impériale de Russie, invariablement résolue comme elle l'est d'aller au secours de son voisin et de ne point permettre que le trône du Sultan fût mis en péril par son vassal, s'engagerait à agir dans un but de conservation et au nom de l'Alliance Européenne, en consentant à la demande du Sultan, à envoyer sa flotte de la Mer Noire avec des troupes de débarquement pour défendre la capitale de l'Empire Ottoman contre l'agression de l'armée d'Egypte, pendant que de l'autre côté les flottes combinées des autres Puissances opéreraient sur les côtes d'Egypte et de Syrie, afin de forcer Méhémet Ali d'arrêter la marche de ses troupes. De plus, afin de mieux constater aux yeux de l'Europe entière l'intime et franche union qui s'est établie entre les Cours Alliées dans la poursuite du plan salutaire qu'elles ont adopté, il serait expressément entendu, que pendant que la flotte et les troupes Russes seraient appelées dans le Bosphore, afin de pourvoir à la défense de Constantinople, l'Autriche, la Grande Bretagne, et la France, sur l'invitation qui leur en serait également adressée par la Porte, feraient entrer de leur côté chacune deux ou trois bâtimens de guerre dans la Mer de Marmora, où ces vaisseaux établiraient une croisière entre Gallipoli et le Golfe de Moudania pour empêcher toute entreprise des troupes Egyptiennes de ce côté-là.

11°. Il serait convenu que la présence des forces Russes dans le Bosphore, de même que celle des vaisseaux de guerre des autres Puissances dans la Mer de Marmora, cesserait aussitôt que le but de sûreté qu'ils avaient momentanément été appelés à atteindre, auraient été obtenu, et que le danger dont Constantinople aurait été menacé n'existerait plus.

12°. Il serait expressément entendu en outre, que l'admission des pavillons étrangers dans le Bosphore ainsi que dans la Mer de Marmora ne serait considérée que comme une mesure exceptionnelle, adoptée à la demande seule de la Porte elle-même et uniquement dans le but de sa défense ; mais que cette mesure ne porterait pas la moindre atteinte au principe existant, en vertu duquel la Sublime Porte a toujours considéré le détroit des Dardanelles et celui du Bosphore comme devant rester fermés en tems de paix comme en tems de guerre aux vaisseaux de guerre de toutes les Puissances étrangères. Ce principe ayant invariablement servi de règle à l'Empire Ottoman de tout tems comme un droit inhérent à la souveraineté du Sultan, comme maître et gardien des deux détroits, les Cours Alliées, pour manifester le respect qu'elles portent unanimement à l'indépendance et au repos de l'Empire Ottoman, s'accorderaient à reconnaître aujourd'hui formellement la fermeture des détroits des Dardanelles et du Bosphore, et s'engageraient à considérer désormais la Mer de Marmora et la Mer Noire comme mers closes, en consacrant à jamais ce principe comme faisant partie du droit public Européen.

(Translation.)

Measures suggested by Baron Brunnow for the Settlement of the Turco-Egyptian Question, January 1840.

1. TO declare that the Allied Cabinets considering that the actual state of affairs between the Sublime Ottoman Porte and Mehemet Ali, Pasha of Egypt, threatens to disturb the peace of the East, and may end by producing events which would lead to serious complications for the whole of Europe; and considering moreover that they have formally promised the Ottoman Porte assistance, which the latter has accepted; they have determined to settle among themselves the basis of a pacification, by means of which that assistance may be effectually afforded, and the independence as well as the security of the Ottoman Empire entirely protected from the danger of an aggression which the Pasha of Egypt might again attempt.

2. To lay down that the Allied Cabinets, acting upon the determinations and the views already spontaneously evinced on the part of the Sultan, with the view of causing every subject of dissension and misunderstanding to cease for the future, admit as a principle that the Sublime Porte should grant to Mehemet Ali Pasha the possession of the whole of Egypt, with the right of transmitting to his descendants the administration of that province; the

investiture of which the Sublime Porte shall grant to his successors, thu maintaining in his family the titles and prerogatives which he has hitherto enjoyed in his capacity of Pasha of Egypt, vassal of the Porte.

3. The limits of the Pashalic of Egypt shall be fixed.

4. Mehemet Ali and his successors shall continue to recognize the Sovereignty of the Sultan, and to pay to him the tribute which the Porte hitherto received from the Pashalic of Egypt.

5. The Pashalics of Syria, Damascus, Aleppo, and others, as well as the District of Adana, and also the Island of Candia, shall be evacuated by the Egyptian troops, and immediately restored to the Porte, who shall continue at all times to hold them in full possession.

6. The Ottoman Fleet, at present in the Port of Alexandria, shall immediately be replaced under the authority of the Turkish officers whom the Sultan shall direct to receive it, and to bring it back to Constantinople with its crews and all the furniture thereunto belonging.

7. The above arrangements, after having been in the first instance communicated to the Porte as the result of the support which has been formally promised to it by the Representatives of the two Courts, and after having obtained the concurrence of the Sultan, shall be carried into execution by the Allied Cabinets, who will undertake to notify these conditions to Mehemet Ali Pasha, and to call upon him to acquiesce in them.

8. If, contrary to all expectation, Mehemet Ali should refuse to accept the terms of this arrangement, and should announce his intention to support more extensive pretensions, the Allied Courts are resolved to proceed to a series of coercive measures destined by degrees to overcome the opposition of the Pasha of Egypt, and to impose upon him the pacific arrangement which will have received the previous sanction of the Sultan, and which all the Powers of Europe will have considered just and irrevocable.

9. In consequence, the Allied Cabinets would proceed to the following measures; (here would follow an explanation of the means of action of which the British Ministry has been the first to suggest to us the plan.) In adopting these measures, those would be first carried into execution which would least annoy commerce, at the same time that they would have a moral action upon the determinations of Mehemet Ali by rendering his position worse, politically and militarily.

For this purpose the Allied Cabinets would commence by despatching the English and French Squadrons to the Bay of Scanderoon, in order to take up a position and an attitude which should menace Ibrahim Pasha on his flank, should cut off all his communications by sea, and should expose him to the danger of seeing serious troubles break out among the discontented populations, whom he scarcely keeps under obedience at the present time, and who would withdraw themselves from his sway, as soon as they should have a chance of doing so with impunity, relying upon the support of the military forces of the Alliance.

If this first demonstration should be insufficient, the Allied Cabinets would proceed to re-establish the authority of the Sultan in the Island of Candia, a measure which would not fail to react upon all the provinces subject to Mehemet Ali, and strongly to shake his power therein.

In case this measure should not yet have the effect of overcoming the resistance of Mehemet Ali, it would be necessary to proceed to the blockade of the coasts of Syria and of Egypt,—a demonstration which certainly would expose European commerce to some degree of annoyance, but which would also be only of short duration, since the Pasha of Egypt would not long resist the employment of coercive measures which would paralyse all his financial resources.

I abstain from including the recall of the Consuls among the number of the measures of which I would allow myself to suggest the adoption, on the one hand, because the absence of our agents would diminish the means of moral action on Mehemet Ali which we possess; on the other, because the hopes of the latter might be again strengthened if the Consuls of all the European Powers should not be simultaneously recalled from their posts.

10. After enumerating in their order the coercive measures which they have determined to adopt, the Allied Cabinets would lay down as a possible contingency the chance that Mehemet Ali, rejecting the above plan of pacifi-

cation, should recommence hostilities against the Ottoman Empire, by marching his troops through Asia Minor in order to menace Constantinople.

In this case, the Imperial Court of Russia, invariably determined as it is to assist its neighbour, and not to allow the throne of the Sultan to be put in peril by his vassal, would pledge himself to act for its preservation and in the name of the European Alliance, by consenting, on the demand of the Sultan, to send its Black Sea fleet with a body of troops to be disembarked for the defence of the capital of the Ottoman Empire against the aggression of the Egyptian Army; whilst, on the other hand, the combined fleets of the other Powers should act on the coasts of Egypt and Syria, in order to compel Mehemet Ali to stop the advance of his troops. Moreover, in order better to prove to the whole of Europe the intimate and frank union which exists among the Allied Powers in pursuit of the salutary plan which they have adopted, it would be expressly understood that, while the Russian fleet and troops should be called into the Bosphorus in order to provide for the defence of Constantinople, Austria, Great Britain, and France, on the invitation which would be addressed to them by the Porte in the same manner, would on their part each of them cause two or three vessels of war to enter into the sea of Marmora, where those vessels would cruize between Gallipoli and the Gulf of Moudania in order to prevent any attempt of the Egyptian troops in that direction.

11. It should be agreed that the presence of the Russian forces in the Bosphorus, as also that of the vessels of war of the other Powers in the Sea of Marmora, should cease as soon as the object of security which they had for a time been called upon to effect, should have been attained, and the danger with which Constantinople should have been menaced should no longer exist.

12. It should, moreover, be expressly understood that the admission of foreign flags into the Bosphorus, as well as into the Sea of Marmora, should be considered only as a measure of exception, adopted at the sole demand of the Porte itself, and merely with a view to its defence; but that this measure should not at all prejudice the existing principle, in virtue whereof the Sublime Porte has always considered the Strait of the Dardanelles and that of the Bosphorus as necessarily closed in time of peace, as well as in time of war, to the vessels of war of all foreign Powers. This principle having invariably been the rule of the Ottoman Empire from all time, as a right inherent in the Sovereignty of the Sultan as the master and guardian of the two Straits, the Allied Courts, in order to manifest the respect which they unanimously entertain for the independence and for the repose of the Ottoman Empire, should agree formally to recognise at the present time the closing of the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus, and should undertake to consider henceforward the Sea of Marmora, and the Black Sea, as closed seas, by recording for ever this principle, as forming part of the public law of Europe.

No. 428.

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January* 3, 1840.

IN reply to your despatch, of the 23rd December, 1839, inclosing an extract from the newspaper the "Eclaireur de la Méditerranée," relative to the amount of the French naval force in the Mediterranean, I have to observe to your Excellency, that the statement contained in that extract is vague, and can scarcely be taken as a contradiction to the enumeration of ships which I sent to you in my despatch, of the 10th ultimo.

If the ships named in the list which I sent to your Excellency are not all to be commissioned, it would be very easy for the French Government to specify which of them are to continue to be laid up in ordinary.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 429.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received January* 5, 1840.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, December* 11, 1839.

I HAVE this day received a report from the Dragoman, which is as follows:—

"His Excellency Rechid Pasha has charged me to thank your Lordship for the instructions of the 8th instant; and he has desired to have a translation of them. The Pasha also charges me to assure you, that the Sublime Porte is firm in the system it has adopted, and that there is no question of an accommodation with Mehemet Ali, direct or indirect, under the auspices of any Power.

No. 430.

Viscount Palmerston to Count Sebastiani.

Mon cher Comte, *Holland House, le* 5 *Janvier*, 1840.

EN réfléchissant sur notre conversation d'hier, je pense que je n'ai vraiment pas le droit de donner au Gouvernement Français copies ou extraits de dépêches écrites par un Ministre d'une autre Puissance à un de ses Collègues, et qui ne m'ont été communiquées que confidentiellement. Mais puisque ce que vous désirez est d'être à même de faire connaître à votre Gouvernement le but de la seconde mission du Baron de Brunnow à Londres, je crois que je pourrai en peu de mots vous donner les renseignemens que vous me demandez, et je crois même que de cette manière je vous fournirai les moyens d'expliquer l'affaire à votre Gouvernement mieux et plus clairement qu'en vous envoyant les extraits dont il a été question hier.

En effet, la chose est de la plus grande simplicité: vous savez parfaitement déjà tout ce qui s'est passé entre le Gouvernement Anglais et le Baron de Brunnow au mois d'Octobre passé. Vous savez que l'Angleterre et la Russie se sont trouvées d'accord sur toutes les questions qui ont été discutées par rapport à l'Affaire Turco-Egyptienne, excepté seulement la distribution de rôles entre les Puissances Alliées pour la défense de Constantinople, dans le cas où Ibrahim Pacha pourrait marcher sur Broussa pour menacer Constantinople.

Le Baron de Brunnow nous a proposé un certain arrangement pour ce cas, nous lui en avons proposé un autre; ses instructions n'avaient pas prévu notre proposition, et il ne s'est pas cru autorisé à y accéder sans en référer à sa Cour.

Il écrivit par conséquent à Pétersbourg, et par suite d'instructions qu'il a reçues de sa Cour, il est maintenant revenu à Londres pour nous annoncer l'adhésion de l'Empereur à l'arrangement que nous lui avions proposé; et le Baron est aussi chargé de négocier dans le but d'amener une solution définitive et permanente de la Question Turco-Egyptienne, afin d'assurer l'indépendance et l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman, et de mettre un terme aux dangers dont l'état existant des relations entre le Sultan et le Pacha, et la position militaire de ce dernier, menacent la paix de l'Europe.

Je n'ai pas pu encore communiquer au Cabinet la réponse du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg; mais le Conseil se réunira demain et je leur ferai cette communication. Le Baron de Neumann est arrivé de Vienne, chargé, comme sans doute il vous l'aura dit, de nous annoncer que l'Autriche est entièrement d'accord avec l'Angleterre et la Russie sur ces questions importantes; et je crois pouvoir affirmer que la Prusse envisage ces affaires sous le même point de vue. Il ne nous reste donc maintenant que le concours de la France pour établir un accord Européen sur une affaire qui est sans contredit la plus grave et la plus importante de toutes celles que nous avons eu à traiter pendant ces dernières années; nous espérons vivement que ce concours ne nous sera pas refusé, et que les Cinq Puissances, marchant d'accord et sur une même ligne vers un but d'un intérêt commun et général, parviendront par leur fermeté, leur vigueur, leur

unanimité, et leur désintéressement, à écarter pour bien des années les dangers graves dont l'état actuel des choses dans le Levant menacent sans cesse la paix et le repos de l'Europe.

Agréez, &c.,
(Signé) PALMERSTON.

(Translation.)

Viscount Palmerston to Count Sébastiani.

My dear Count, *Holland House, January* 5, 1840.

UPON reflecting on our conversation of yesterday, it occurs to me that I have, in fact, no right to give to the French Government copies or extracts of despatches written by a Minister of another Power to one of his Colleagues, and which have been communicated to me confidentially only. But since what you desire is to be enabled to inform your Government of the object of the second mission of the Baron de Brunnow to London, I think I can, in a few words, give you the information you require; and I think, moreover, that by this mode I shall furnish you with the means of explaining the affair to your Government better and more clearly than I should were I to send you the extracts referred to yesterday.

The thing is, in fact, extremely simple; you already know perfectly well what passed between the English Government and the Baron de Brunnow in the month of October last. You know that England and Russia were agreed upon all the questions which came under discussion with respect to the Turco-Egyptian Affair, excepting only as to the parts to be assigned to each of the Allied Powers for the defence of Constantinople, in case Ibrahim Pasha should march on Brussa for the purpose of menacing Constantinople.

The Baron de Brunnow proposed to us a certain arrangement for this contingency; we proposed to him another. His instructions did not provide for our proposition, and he did not consider himself authorized to accede to it without referring it to his Court.

He wrote consequently to Petersburgh, and in consequence of instructions which he has received from his Court, he has now returned to London, to announce to us the Emperor's acquiescence in the arrangement which we had proposed to him; and the Baron is also instructed to negotiate with the view of bringing about a definitive and permanent solution of the Turco-Egyptian Question, in order to secure the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and to put an end to the dangers with which the existing state of relations between the Sultan and the Pasha, and the military position of the latter, threaten the peace of Europe.

I have not yet had an opportunity of communicating to the Cabinet the answer of the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh; but the Council will meet to-morrow, and I will then make the communication to them. The Baron de Neumann has arrived from Vienna, having instructions, as no doubt he will have informed you, to announce to us that Austria entirely agrees with England and Russia on these important questions; and I think I can undertake to say that Prussia takes the same view of these affairs. Nothing more, then, is now wanting to us but the concurrence of France to come to an European agreement respecting an affair which is undeniably the most serious and important of any which we have had to treat upon of late years; we ardently hope that that concurrence will not be withheld from us, and that the Five Powers, advancing together on the same line towards an object of common and general interest, will, by their firmness, their vigour, their unanimity, and their disinterestedness, succeed in removing, for many years to come, the serious dangers with which the actual state of affairs in the Levant continually threatens the peace and repose of Europe.

Accept, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 431.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 6, 1840.)

(Extract.) *Alexandria, December* 16, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's duplicate despatches, with inclosures, of the 3rd and the 14th of October.

Having left Trieste on the 1st of this month, I reached here on the evening of the 14th instant in the French steamer "Mentor." I landed in the barge of the Egyptian Admiral, which Her Majesty's Consul had procured for that purpose, and immediately proceeded to the residence of Colonel Campbell, who received me with great kindness and cordiality. Colonel Campbell immediately reported my arrival to his Excellency Boghos Bey, as well as to the Agents and Consuls-General of the different Foreign Powers resident at Alexandria; and I have been this day informed through Boghos Bey, that his Highness Mehemet Ali has fixed Saturday next, the 21st instant, as the day for my official reception.

I yesterday afternoon had the honour of waiting upon Boghos Bey, and experienced from him a warm and courteous reception. He assured me of Mehemet Ali's anxious desire to maintain the best understanding and the most friendly relations with Her Majesty's Government, and at the same time expressed his own readiness to be of any utility in furthering this end. In reply, I assured Boghos Bey, that nothing should be wanting on my part to promote so desirable an object, and that it was the sincere desire of Her Majesty's Government to bring to a favourable and equitable termination those differences that have unhappily existed between Mehemet Ali and his Sovereign the Sultan.

No. 432.

Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 9, 1840.)

My Lord, *Aleppo, November* 20, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, for your Lordship's information, copy of my despatch of this day's date to Viscount Ponsonby, together with extract of a letter from Mr. French Consul Gillet of Tarsous, under date October 21, as also extract of Mr. Vice-Consul Elias's journal of Latakia, October 31, the whole of which will put your Lordship in full possession of every thing of interest that has transpired within this Consular district up to this period, and meriting your Lordship's notice.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) F. H. S. WERRY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 432.

Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Ponsonby.

(Extract.) *Aleppo, November* 20, 1839.

I HAD the honour of addressing your Excellency under the 29th ultimo, per Austrian steamer, *viâ* Beyrout.

I now avail myself of the same channel to do myself the honour of communicating to your Lordship the little information since circulating within the jurisdiction of this Consulate, and worthy of your Lordship's notice.

M. Vincent Germain, the chief government architect of this Pashalic, who, I stated to your Lordship, had received orders from his Excellency the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha to proceed to Aintab, for which place he immediately left, andgenerally supposed to be for the purpose of superintending the erection of barracks and a hospital, both of which that place does not contain, has, since my last communication to your Lordship, returned back here. I have seen

M. Germain, who assures me that the sole object of his visit to Aintab and that district, was to superintend, from the knowledge he has of the localities of that part of the country, the work his Excellency the Seraskier has undertaken of turning some six or seven small sources of the River Sedjour into the Aleppo River, which he tells me has been successfully accomplished, and which in a few days will be very visible in the Aleppo River, which will in consequence rise considerably. This statement as to the object of M. Germain's visit to Aintab, I hear confirmed through other channels, and from persons coming from that direction.

The Egyptian forces within this district, and stationed on the northern frontier of Syria, have undergone but little change since my last communication to your Lordship.

The two Infantry Regiments that have been in garrison here, the 11th and 17th of the Line, left this on the 11th instant, said to be for Orfa, to change quarters with the 9th and 14th stationed there; the cause given for this movement is, that as the two regiments of this place have their depôts here, and consequently their clothing for the winter suited for the severe season of Orfa, which the regiments there have not, their depôt being at a distance, at Taffa, which place they left in the summer season. Consequently, to avoid expence, and also loss of time, the Orfa regiments will, it is said, come here to perform garrison duty, where they may easier receive their clothing.

This sudden change of garrison of these troops has, however, given rise to a great many conjectures with the public, and various reports are afloat respecting the same. Some say that they proceed to Orfa, and from thence are to be sent forward to Diarbekir, where, it is said, Maggiun Bey, commanding officer at Orfa, has orders to advance to; others have the idea that these troops are sent to reinforce the force at Orfa, it being the intention of the Egyptian authority on that line to advance in the direction of Bagdad.

I shall watch all these movements and see if any of these reports get confirmed, and immediately report to your Lordship accordingly.

The Egyptian force at Orfa is composed of two regiments of Infantry, one of Cavalry, and a few batteries of Artillery, which will, with the two regiments that left this on the 11th instant, make five in all, besides Bashi Bozuks and Annadis.

From what I can learn, the Egyptian authority on that line does not, for the present, and up to the last departures from thence, extend beyond Swerik and Chermook; at both of which places there are irregular troops exacting taxes from the inhabitants of those places.

His Excellency the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha continues to remain at Marash with about the same force as I have before noted to your Lordship.

Although his Excellency does not himself advance in any way, still, I learn that he has sent the Cuirassier Regiment to Albestan, which is sixteen miles beyond Marash, north.

A native merchant, who has reached this from Malatia, states, that at Bisneh, although the authority is a Mussellim appointed by the Sultan's Seraskier, still the Egyptian irregulars, Bashi Bozuks and Annadis, frequently advance to that place, and obtain from the inhabitants what they require. Bisneh is two days beyond Marash, situated east.

This merchant further states, that while he was at Bisneh, he heard that his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha had ordered the Cuirassier Regiment to advance from Albestan to a place called Smantia, about twenty-four hours from Roustant, and attacked a tribe of Turcomans, say of 4,000 tents, whom they compelled to pay a Salyan of 200,000 piastres. I am told that these same Turcomans reside in the winter in the Adana district, and in the summer generally occupy the place above mentioned. The forces concentrated at Aintab are, without material change, composed of four regiments of Infantry and two of Artillery.

The French Consul, M. Gillet, has, been kind enough, under the 21st of October, to give me some advices on the position of the Egyptian troops in the Tarsus district; extract of which I have the honour to inclose herewith for your Lordship's information.

The last advices I have received from Alexandretta are under the 16th instant, at which period everything was stated to be quiet there and throughout that district.

The Governor of that place, Rashouan Effendi, had received orders from his Excellency the Seraskier, to get brought down immediately from the mountains, the following quantity of timber, 1,700 trees, part of which had already arrived on the beach, and had begun to be shipped, to be conveyed from thence to Acre, for the Artillery service there.

The disaffected in the direction of Byass had not of late, and since the force sent against them, evinced any further symptoms against the Government, which was rigorously exacting from all classes of the population the taxes; and I am told in many instances, particularly the lower order, taken in two-fold.

This measure, my Lord, is being in a similar manner exercised both here, at Aleppo, and throughout this district generally; which, in consequence of the rigorous steps pursued, and in many instances with force, has of late caused general discontent among all the population; among the lower classes of the inhabitants this measure is greatly felt, and causes great oppression. Many are said not to be able to stand against it.

I beg to inclose, for your Lordship's information, extract of Mr. Vice-Consul Elias's journal, under date Latakia, 31st October, which will fully acquaint your Lordship with the measures pursued by this Government, in exacting the taxes, and the consequences arising therefrom.

I am sorry I have no correct or interesting advices to offer to your Lordship respecting the Sultan's Seraskier Sadullah Pasha's movements, beyond that his Excellency was a short time back at Malatia, with about 20,000 men and sixty pieces of Artillery; but by advices received here in town, I learn he had marched with that force to Karpoot.

From a late arrival from Koniah, I also learn that Hadji Ali Pasha of that place was still there, but expected soon to be replaced by a person whose name was not known. It was reported that the new Pasha of that district was to bring with him a force of about 20,000 to 22,000 men, to be composed of four regiments of Infantry, two of Cavalry, and about thirty pieces of Artillery.

Inclosure 2 in No. 432.

Mr. French Consul Gillet to Mr. Pro-Consul Werry.

(Extrait.) *Tarsous, le* 21 *Octobre,* 1839.

C'EST avec bien de plaisir, Monsieur, que je viens satisfaire à votre demande pour avoir des nouvelles politiques sur cette province; mais elles sont bien insignifiantes.

Il y a deux mois que le corps d'armée qui était dans cette province pouvait s'élever en totalité à 30,000 hommes de toute arme; à présent il n'est que de 20,000; plusieurs régimens formant cette différence ont été envoyés à Antioche, Alep, Homs, et Lataké, parceque cette province ne pouvait réellement pas nourrir autant de monde, ni près de 10,000 chevaux de cavalerie qui s'y trouvaient.

Maintenant voici l'énumération des régimens qui s'y trouvent sous les ordres directs d'Achmet Méneckli Pacha.

Trois régimens d'Infanterie avec un Général de Brigade, quatre régimens de Cavalerie avec deux Généraux de Brigade, un régiment d'Artillerie à cheval avec son Colonel, et deux batteries d'Artillerie à pied.

Toutes ces troupes sont encore campées aux environs de Adana, à l'exception d'un régiment de Cavalerie qui est ici.

En outre, il y a aussi 1,500 Artilleurs réguliers aux batteries be Kouluk Boghaz, et 700 à 800 d'Ingénieurs.

Un bataillon de Baltagi dans ce même lieu et aussi des troupes de Génie, et enfin des troupes irrégulières, Cavalerie et Infanterie, réparties sur toutes les provinces, qui, avec les troupes ci-dessus, forment le total général de 20,000 hommes.

Il n'y a nul doute que tout ce corps d'armée ne passe son quartier d'hiver dans la province.

(Translation.)

Mr. French Consul Gillet to Mr. Pro-Consul Werry.

(Extract.) *Tarsus, October* 21, 1839.

IT is with much pleasure, Sir, that I proceed to comply with your request to be furnished with the political news of this Province; but they are very unimportant.

Two months ago the *corps d'armée* which was in this Province might have amounted in all to 30,000 men of all arms; it now only amounts to 20,000; several regiments constituting the difference between these amounts have been sent to Antioch, Aleppo, Homs, and Latakia, because this province could in fact, neither maintain so many people, nor nearly 10,000 cavalry horses which were here.

Now the following is an enumeration of the regiments at present under the direct command of Achmet Méneckli Pasha.

Three regiments of infantry, with a Brigadier-General, four regiments of cavalry, with two Brigadier-Generals, a regiment of Horse Artillery, with its Colonel, and two batteries of Foot Artillery.

All these troops are still encamped in the neighbourhood of Adana, with the exception of a regiment of cavalry, which is here.

Moreover, there are also 1,500 regular artillerymen in the batteries of Kulek Boghaz, and from 700 to 800 engineers, a battalion of Baltagi in the same place, and also engineers; and finally irregular troops, cavalry and infantry, divided among all the provinces, which, with the above troops, form a sum total of 20,000 men.

There is no doubt that the whole of this *corps d'armeé* will be quartered for the winter in the province.

Inclosure 3 in No. 432.

Extract of Mr. Vice-Consul Elias's Journal, dated Latakia, October 31, 1839.

L'ORDINE è l'istesso per la riscuozione dei danari del territorio di Latakia, e continuase a fare tutti i sforsi; e di più, il Generale Selim Bey ebbe l'ordine d'andare in persona con l'occorente delle trupe del regimento, e mandare degli Uffiziali per altri luoghi, e cosi sono sparsi in tutti i cantoni.

Il Campo del Mudir è sempre trasportato d'una provincia all'altra, facendo pagare tutto a forza di bastone; ma gli abitanti sono già scarsi di moneta e non possono soddisfare i loro debiti, avendo venduto i loro grani, orzo, bovi, mortoni, butirro, &c. &c., a vil prezzo; ed anche s'imprestano sempre della moneta a 4. 5. p. c. al mese; ed altri hanno preso a 35. 40. p. c. per otto mesi, o sia alla racolta del tabacco, per prendere questo genere al prezzo che sarà fissato dai negozianti; e non si vede altro che gente girare in città, cercando che gli da moneta col cambio, e molti del paese hanno guadagnato bene in questa circostanza.

(Translation.)

Extract of Mr. Vice-Consul Elias's Journal, dated Latakia, October 31, 1839.

THE same order for the collection of money from the territory of Latakia continues to be put in execution with every effort; and moreover, the General, Selim Bey, was commanded to go in person with the troops of the regiment which were at hand, and to send officers to the other places, so that they are dispersed throughout the whole country.

The Mudir's camp has been constantly moved from one Province to another, making every one pay under pain of the bastinado; the inhabitants, however, are already in want of money, and cannot pay their debts, having sold their grain, barley, oxen, sheep, butter, &c., under their value; money also is borrowed at 4 and 5 per cent. for one month; some have taken it up at from 35 to 40 per cent. for eight months, or till the tobacco crop is got in, in order to take it in kind at a price to be fixed by the merchants; nothing is seen but persons traversing the town, endeavouring to obtain money at interest, and many of the natives have been considerable gainers under these circumstances.

No. 433.

Mr. Consul Young to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received January* 9, 1840.)

My Lord, *Jerusalem, November* 25, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship, that the state of this part of the country is daily becoming more unsettled. The Fellah are assuming a very determined position against the Government, and their attitude towards the authorities is materially changed. The severe measures that have lately been pursued to obtain money, have caused whole villages to be abandoned; and many of the Sheiks have sent word to the Governors in my district, that they consider themselves no longer responsible to the Pasha. Unless some steps are taken by the Government, the whole of this part of the country will be in a state of open revolt. Hebron has formally declared itself independent; and a messenger sent last week by the Governor of Jerusalem on some business there, was ordered to return without delivering his message.

Sheik Abdrachman Aamar continues to increase the number of his followers.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) W. T. YOUNG.

No. 434.

Mr. Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received January* 9, 1840.)

(Extract.) *Damascus, November* 28, 1839.

THE affairs in the Haouran and Agloun districts have been settled since the date of my last despatch. His Excellency Sheriff Pasha and Ismael Bey are returned here, with the regular forces employed on that service.

All the taxes and imposts due in those districts have been rigorously collected, and the same is being carried into execution throughout the Damascus district, and I hear also in every part of Syria. His Highness Ibrahim Pasha's orders to his Excellency Sheriff Pasha and to Ismael Bey, are said to be very severe, menacing that, in case the taxes are not collected by the end of Ramadan, in their respective districts, they will be charged with the deficiency, and have to pay it up from their private purses. It is stated that these funds are destined chiefly for the payment of the army. There is at present about 6,000 purses in the treasury here; but I believe a great part of the total amount being collected in Syria, will be required for Egypt, as I understand the income collected along the coast is chiefly sent to the seat of the Government in that country, though the wants for the expenditure in Syria, are not of a less important and urgent nature; and it may be also, that these funds will not be employed, until the Egyptian Government decides whether, or not, they may be required to forward offensive operations on the northern frontier. The 18th Regiment Infantry has been paid within these three days; it is said the irregulars are also to be paid in a few days. 2,000 purses have been sent the last week to his Highness Ibrahim Pasha. 1,000 purses are reserved for the Pilgrim Mecca Caravan. Orders have been issued to collect the Haratch due three months hence, in Moharem, for the year 1256. Many of the Chiefs in the different quarters of this city, appointed and charged by the Government to collect the Ferdeh tax, fail and become bankrupts; the deficit is again charged to and collected from the inhabitants to the Christians, it amounts to an additional charge of thirty per cent. It seems to be the object of the Government that, whatever may be decided on, as regards the future possession of this country, or any other eventual circumstance occurring, no taxes shall remain to be collected.

I hear that the French Solyman Pasha, who has been on an inspection at Acre, is expected here on his way to Aleppo. Part of a regiment, Cavalry, employed on the Ledgea service, has been sent to Acre. The Infantry and Artillery employed on the same service, remain here for the present. But, as yet, nothing denotes that the army on the northern frontier at Marash and Orfa, will fall back. His Highness Ibrahim Pasha, by recent advices from him to Sheriff Pasha, was still at Marash. I hear that the same rigours practised in this district and in Syria, have been employed also to collect taxes on the newly occupied frontier, including Albistan and Antemarah, also from Orfa, Swerik and Chermook, taking in a large radius of country on the ranges of mountains on the former country in a north-westerly direction, exacting taxes as due several years, on the plea that they have never been subject to or paid taxes to the Sultan's Government.

The Emir Bechir has sent one of his grandsons, the Emir Meggid, with a force to reduce the Mutuali Chief, Sheik Shebib, who, with about 500 horsemen, continues to infest the roads between Acre, Soor, Tyre and Sidon. This Sheik has been joined with other Mutualis from the remains of the force of the late Emir Gewad, some of which have shown themselves on the Balbec line, against which a force has also been sent by the Emir Bechir; but I believe the whole of that affair will very soon terminate in the pacification, or in the destruction, of these brigands.

The new French Consul, the Count de Rattimenton, is arrived at his post here. I find he visited Solyman Pasha at Sidon, he says, to ascertain from Solyman Pasha the position in which the French relations are. His visit also to the Emir Bechir, denotes the desire of the French Government, that their Damascus Consul should be on the most advantageous footing with the *quasi* Independent Prince of Lebanon. The Count de Rattimenton was previously employed at Tiflis. I also hear that the Prince de Joinville is expected to visit Damascus, and that the French Consul-General at Alexandria may make a tour of Syria next spring.

No. 435.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received January* 9, 1840.)

(Extract.) *Alexandria, December* 19, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship, that Mehemet Ali intimated to me his desire that my public audience should take place on the 18th instant, at 11 o'clock, A. M.

At an early hour of the day appointed, a detachment of Infantry commanded by a field-officer with a military band, accompanied by a numerous body of the Viceroy's Janissaries, and a number of horses for the use of those British residents who had intimated their intention of escorting me to the Viceroy's Palace, made their appearance at the residence of Colonel Campbell. The cortège was numerous and respectable; and having been received at the grand entrance with the ceremony usual on such occasions, I was ushered into the Hall of Audience at the hour appointed, and presented to the Viceroy by Colonel Campbell. I then addressed the Pasha in the following terms:—

"The letter which I have the honour to present to your Highness from Her Majesty's Government, accrediting me as Her Majesty's Agent and Consul-General in Egypt, will make known to your Highness the earnest desire of the Government of Great Britain, to consolidate and maintain the interest of that part of the Ottoman Empire which has been entrusted to the government of your Highness. Nothing shall be wanting on my part to maintain a continuance of that good understanding and those friendly relations, which it is the desire of my Government to see mutually established and upheld. I shall use my best efforts to follow the judicious example that has been set me by my predecessor Colonel Campbell, and the best and only reward I shall seek on the termination of my labours, will be my Sovereign's approbation of my political conduct in carrying with me the good will and approval of your Highness."

Mutual assurances of regard were then presented, and I ventured to compliment the Pasha on the magnificent new edifices and improvements of Alexandria, to which he replied, that " he was doing his best to regenerate his country and merit the esteem of Europe." I then assured his Highness that his labours in this respect were fully appreciated by Europeans, which Artin Bey, the Pasha's Dragoman, interpreted, raising his voice, "My Lord's power is well known in Europe." The Pasha replied emphatically, "I know not whether it has been appreciated hitherto, but please God it shall be so henceforward." Leave was shortly after taken.

Having returned to the house of Colonel Campbell, I read to the British merchants Her Majesty's Commission as Agent and Consul-General for Egypt. "I assured them of my anxious desire to merit their confidence and esteem; that I should be thankful for their counsel and assistance in all matters connected with British interests, and indulged in the expectation, that on their part, I should experience sympathy and good will in enabling me to carry into effect the views and intentions of Her Majesty's Government, as I could never conceive the possibility of a body of British merchants drawing a line of separation between their local interests as private individuals, and the policy of that Government which directed the affairs of our common country." I have the satisfaction of assuring your Lordship, that I received from this highly respectable assemblage of British merchants the most cordial assurances of their support, and I hope and trust that nothing shall be wanting on my part to merit a continuance of their confidence and regard.

No. 436.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received January* 9, 1840.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, December* 20, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship, that Kiamil Pasha, late Envoy to the Court of Berlin, who arrived here on the morning of the 18th instant, in a Turkish Government steamer with the Hatti Sheriff lately published at Constantinople, and the Firman for its execution in Egypt, is to leave to-morrow for Cairo, accompanied by Habib Effendi, who was the bearer of Mehemet Ali's presents to the late Sultan Mahmoud, on the occasion of the marriage of his eldest daughter with Halil Pasha. The object of this journey to Cairo is to publish the Hatti Sheriff and Firman, and to cause their registration in the Mehkemeh of that Capital.

No. 437.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received January* 9, 1840.)

(Extract.) *Alexandria, December* 21, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship, that I yesterday paid a visit of ceremony to Hussein Pasha, one of the Viceroy's Officers and Directors of Finance, and on taking leave, was pressed by Artin Bey to wait upon Mehemet Ali, who happened to be in an adjoining room. I yielded to his solicitation, and on going to his Highness, found him surrounded by several individuals, including two of the Resident Consuls, but a significant glance from the Pasha soon induced them to withdraw; and from this circumstance, coupled with Artin Bey's desiring me to remain, I was led to conclude that the interview was preconcerted.

The conversation soon turned to the Oriental Question, which gave the Pasha an opportunity of complaining of the treatment he had experienced from the Porte during the whole of his career, of which he gave a brief relation. He touched cursorily on the events of the Greek war, and the humble position which the Porte assumed towards him in the affair of Mustapha Pasha of Scutari, as well as its treachery in that of Abdullah Pasha of Acre; and then characterised in most unequivocal terms, the policy of England, as highly pernicious to her own interests not less than those of Egypt.

In answer to this, I expressed my confidence of being able to convince his Highness in our future interviews, of the friendly intentions of that Government towards Egypt, always, however, with a due regard to the interests of the Ottoman Porte. His Highness then emphatically exclaimed, "I am the pillar and support of Turkey; if they wish to support her, let it be done through me. I have been mistrusted by the English on the groundless supposition of being capable of uniting with the enemies of my country against my country. But should a war break out with Russia, as I am a Mussulman, I would make up my differences with the Porte, and prove to the world that I am the staunchest friend of the Ottoman Empire. I appeal to Colonel Campbell (who was seated on the left of the Pasha) for his opinion on my devotion to Turkey, and what I have done for her resources; ask Mr. Briggs and other British merchants for their candid opinion of me and my measures."

In reply to this, I said I had no doubt whatever of the genius and force of his Highness' character having acquired for him the admiration of the individuals alluded to, but that his Highness was too generous not to admit that the late Sultan Mahmoud was also possessed of numerous attractive qualities, which had ensured to him the profound respect and esteem, not only of the British Ambassador, but of every British resident within the precincts of Constantinople.

The Pasha, during the whole of this interview, flitted from topic to topic, evidently with the view of drawing me out, but while replying directly to what could not be passed over, I allowed his Highness to perceive that I had no desire to enter on any premature discussion, desiring him to repose confidently on the assurance of the just and friendly intentions of Great Britain, whose policy was as equitable as it was decided; his Highness ended the conversation by repeating with great energy, "I am a soldier, but love peace; I am firm, but God is my last refuge; if they pull me I will not come; if they push me I will not go, no, not a step; I will wait events."

No. 438.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 9, 1840.)

(Extract.) *Alexandria, December* 21, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship, that two frigates, two corvettes, and one transport, are in readiness to sail from this port for St. Jean d'Acre, for the purpose of bringing from thence from 3,000 to 4,000 irregular troops, as a reinforcement of the garrison of Alexandria. The two corvettes have left the port, and are now cruising outside, and it is expected that the frigates will leave to-morrow forenoon.

Three transports laden with corn have also sailed; two for the port of Alexandretta, and one for the Island of Candia.

December 23.

P. S.—I have this moment been acquainted by M. de Laurin, that the transports and frigates dispatched by Mehemet Ali, as within alluded to, are sent for the purpose of bringing invalids from Ibrahim Pasha's Army, and a reinforcement of no more than from 600 to 800 regular troops.

No. 439.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 9.)

My Lord, *Paris, January* 6, 1840.

I INCLOSE the "Moniteur Parisien" of this evening, which contains the address of the King, proposed by the Commission of the Chamber of Peers, and which was this day read to the Chamber. Your Lordship will observe, that in the paragraph relative to the affairs of Turkey and Egypt, the phraseology of the King's speech has not been followed. The word *intégrité* of the Ottoman Empire is omitted, and the word *indépendance* substituted in lieu of it. I heard some days ago that an opinion prevailed in the Commission, and indeed generally in the Chamber of Peers, that the expression in His Majesty's speech conveyed a meaning too unfavourable to the pretensions of the Pasha of Egypt, and that they wished to mark that opinion by making the alteration to which I have drawn your Lordship's attention.

The debate on the address, I was told this evening, was remarkable only for the attack made by the Legitimist Peers, the Duc de Noailles and the Marquis de Dreux Brézé, upon the French Alliance with England, and upon the general policy of the English Government. M. Villemain, the Minister of Instruction, spoke in defence of both.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 440.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 9.)

My Lord, *Paris, January* 6, 1840.

MARSHAL SOULT informed me last night, that he had yesterday received despatches from M. de Pontois, but that the steam-boat which conveyed them had not brought any despatches to him from Alexandria. The intelligence from Constantinople, he said, was uninteresting; but he had learnt, by an indirect channel, that Mehemet Ali had held a conversation with M. Cochelet, in which the Pasha had declared that it was not his wish to occupy the Holy Cities; that the maintaining a considerable body of troops for the defence of them was a great burden on his finances; but that whether the Holy Cities were occupied or not by Egyptian troops, he had always considered every appointment in them connected with religion to be under the controul of the Sultan, as Caliph, or successor of Mahomet.

The Marshal said he waited with impatience for the confirmation of the account, in the expected official despatches from the French Consul, because he thought it most important with reference to the restoration of peace between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 441.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 12, 1840.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, December* 13, 1839.

THERE has been a good deal said here of the mission of a person of distinction to Alexandria, and erroneous reports may reach England. The fact is, that the Ottoman Ministers have thought it expedient to send Kiamil Pasha to deliver to Mehemet Ali a Firman issued by the Porte in furtherance of the Hatti Sheriff of the 3rd of November last, promulgated at the Gulhané.

No. 442.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 12, 1840.)

My Lord, *Therapia, December* 17, 1839.

THE Berat for Colonel Hodges has been received at the Embassy, and forwarded to Alexandria.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 443.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 14.)

My Lord, *Vienna, January* 5, 1840.

PRINCE METTERNICH has written to Berlin, to urge the Prussian Government to take part in the arrangement about to be concluded in London, for the settlement of the Turco-Egyptian Question. I need give your Lordship no account of the contents of the Prince's despatches, as they are sent to London to be communicated.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

No. 444.

Viscount Palmerston to Sir George Hamilton.

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 14, 1840.

I HAVE to instruct you to invite the Prussian Government to give full powers to Baron Werther, the Prussian Chargé d'Affaires, to negotiate with the Representatives of the British, Austrian, Russian, and French Governments at London, or with the Representatives of such of those Governments as may be willing to negotiate, and to conclude a Convention between the negotiating Powers, or between them and the Porte, for the purpose of arriving at a final and satisfactory settlement of the affairs of the Levant. Her Majesty's Government intend to prepare a Draft of a Convention for this purpose, to be submitted for the consideration of the other Four Powers.

I inclose, for your information, a copy of a despatch which I have received this morning from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna, stating that Prince Metternich has urged the Prussian Government to take part in the proposed negotiation.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 445.

Count Nesselrode to Baron Brunnow.—(Communicated by Baron Brunnow.)

Monsieur le Baron, *St. Pétersbourg, le* $\frac{\text{20 Décembre, 1839.}}{\text{1 Janvier, 1840.}}$

NOUS venons d'avoir indirectement connaissance de la dépêche adressée par le Maréchal Soult, le 25 Novembre, au Comte Sébastiani, et dans laquelle le Cabinet des Tuileries justifie l'attitude qu'il a prise en opposition au point de vue adopté par l'Angleterre dans les discussions qui ont eu lieu entre les deux Gouvernemens, au sujet du plan de pacification à effectuer entre la Porte et le Pacha d'Egypte.

Comme ce n'est point à nous, M. le Baron, que cette dépêche a été adressée, et que nous n'en avons eu connaissance que par une voie indirecte, nous

ne nous sentirions point appelés à nous expliquer sur des divergences d'opinions qui concernent plus particulièrement les Cabinets de Paris et de Londres, si le Gouvernement Français n'avait jugé à propos de nous mêler dans la discussion, en ajoutant à sa réponse un passage dont la tendance est évidemment dirigée contre nous.

Il ne nous appartient donc pas de nous prononcer ici sur la manière dont la France entend concilier ses vues concernant l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman, avec celles de l'Angleterre. Nous ne nous arrêterons pas non plus sur la prétention qu'elle met en avant, d'avoir pris l'initiative de l'appui offert à la Porte Ottomane. Si elle croit avoir contribué plus qu'aucun autre des Cabinets Alliés à appeler sur le Sultan la sollicitude de l'Europe, et par ses représentations énergiques, indiqué la première à Méhémet Ali, les limites au-delà desquelles il rencontrerait l'opposition des Puissances, nous ne sommes nullement disposés à lui contester cette satisfaction. Il nous suffit que le bien ait été opéré, les hostilités suspendues, le Pacha contenu jusqu'ici dans les bornes qu'il ne devait pas franchir. Nous nous félicitons de ce résultat, sans demander qui des autres ou de nous s'est présenté pour l'obtenir en première ligne. Mais ce qui nous a surpris, ce qui devait en effet nous surprendre, c'est le doute jeté sur nos intentions à l'égard de l'indépendance du Sultan ; c'est l'accusation portée contre nous de faire, suivant l'expression du Cabinet Français, peser sur la Porte Ottomane un protectorat exclusif et dominant. Est-il besoin de rappeler que loin de vouloir protéger exclusivement le Sultan, loin de nous prévaloir de notre Traité d'Alliance avec la Porte, nous avons au contraire été les premiers à en prévenir l'application, et à réclamer pour elle l'assistance des Cours Maritimes, en les engageant, à plusieurs reprises, et de la manière la plus pressante, à faire usage de tous leurs moyens d'action auprès du Pacha rebelle ? Si dès l'origine des complications, nos avertissemens avaient été suivis, si l'on avait agi à Alexandrie sans tourner les yeux à Constantinople, si l'on s'était préoccupé un peu moins exclusivement de ce que la France appelle le côté Européen de la question, dès longtems la paix eut été rétablie en Orient, et nous n'aurions pas à chercher si laborieusement le dénouement de la crise actuelle. Mais toutes récriminations sont aussi loin de notre pensée qu'elles seraient présentement inutiles.

Pour répondre victorieusement aux allégations du Gouvernement Français, il nous suffira d'un seul fait, et ce fait, M. le Baron, c'est celui de votre présence à Londres. Quant au Cabinet Britannique, nous aimons à lui rendre la justice, qu'il n'avait pas attendu votre second envoi en Angleterre, pour apprécier et reconnaître la loyauté de la politique de l'Empereur. Nous n'avons donc pas un seul instant admis la pensée que les insinuations de la France aient pu faire sur lui la moindre impression. Nous devons néanmoins lui faire remarquer, que dans les circonstances du moment un langage pareil à celui de la France pouvait entraîner des conséquences infiniment regrettables. Avec un Cabinet moins conciliant que le nôtre, et plus susceptible de céder à un premier mouvement, la négociation qui va s'entamer pouvait en souffrir gravement. Que Lord Palmerston veuille bien y faire attention. Avouer aussi hautement que vient de le faire le Maréchal Soult, que dans la pacification du Levant, son but principal a été moins cette pacification elle-même que l'annulation de notre prétendue prépondérance en Orient ; déclarer en termes si peu couverts, qu'à ses yeux il est encore plus important de protéger contre nous l'indépendance de la Porte, que d'assurer son intégrité de la part du Pacha ; insinuer enfin que dans l'opinion de la France, la cause du dissentiment qui s'est récemment manifesté entre elle et la Grande Bretagne, vient surtout de ce que celle-ci a cessé de suivre le même but, d'obéir à la même pensée, c'est-à-dire aux mêmes défiances ; est-ce là, nous le demandons au Principal Secrétaire d'Etat, un moyen bien efficace de nous rattacher à l'œuvre commune ? Ne serions-nous pas quelque peu fondés à nous prévaloir de pareilles dispositions pour nous refuser d'associer la France à un arrangement qui, pour être mené à bonne fin, a besoin de reposer sur une coincidence de vues, et sur une confiance réciproque ? Telle n'est pourtant point, M. le Baron, l'intention de l'Empereur. La politique de notre Auguste Maître est trop élevée, trop au-dessus des susceptibilités et des petitesses de l'amour-propre, pour qu'il soit tenté de leur sacrifier l'intérêt majeur du moment, et pour qu'il n'apporte pas à ses déterminations, le degré de mesure qu'il sait toujours mettre dans ses paroles. Ce n'est pas dans l'instant même, ou par les concessions qu'il a faites au maintien de la paix

Européenne, il vient de donner au monde la preuve la plus éclatante de son abnégation, qu'il se laissera détourner par un semblable incident du noble but qu'il se propose. Sa Majesté fait d'ailleurs la part des circonstances dans lesquelles a été écrite la dépêche du Gouvernement Français. Sous les impressions erronées auxquelles votre mission en Angleterre avait donné naissance, il est concevable à la rigueur, que le Cabinet des Tuileries ait cru pouvoir adopter à notre égard un langage si peu conforme à nos intentions véritables. Il ignorait d'ailleurs encore les modifications que nous avons consenti à apporter à la teneur de nos premières propositions.

Aujourd'hui qu'il en est instruit, il nous parait impossible d'admettre qu'il se refuse plus longtems à reconnaître combien dans la Question d'Orient les vues de notre Cabinet sont pures. Nous avons dès-lors tout lieu d'espérer qu'il apportera d'autres dispositions à la conclusion d'un arrangement dont nous ne prétendons pas plus l'écarter en ce moment, que nous n'avons voulu le faire lors de votre premier voyage à Londres. Veuillez donc, M. le Baron, en communiquant la présente dépêche au Principal Secrétaire d'Etat, l'assurer de notre part, que le langage du Cabinet Français ne change rien à notre attitude. En relevant les allégations si gratuitement articulées par ce Cabinet, nous n'avons fait qu'obéir à la nécessité où il nous avait lui-même placés de ne point les passer sous silence.

Recevez &c.,
(Signé) NESSELRODE.

(Translation.)

Count Nesselrode to Baron Brunnow.—(Communicated by Baron Brunnow.)

Monsieur le Baron, *St. Petersburgh,* December 20, 1839 / January 1, 1840.

WE have just been made acquainted, in an indirect manner, with the despatch addressed by Marshal Soult, on the 25th of November, to Count Sébastiani, and in which the Cabinet of the Tuileries justifies the attitude which it has assumed in opposition to the view taken by England in the discussions which have taken place between the two Governments, upon the subject of the plan of pacification to be carried into effect between the Porte and the Pasha of Egypt.

As this despatch has not been addressed to us, M. le Baron, and as we have only been made acquainted with it through an indirect channel, we should not feel ourselves called upon to enter into the divergences of opinion which concern more particularly the Cabinets of Paris and of London, if the French Government had not thought fit to mix us up in the discussion, by introducing into its answer a passage, the tendency of which is evidently directed against us.

It is not our business, then, to give our opinion here on the manner in which France pretends to reconcile her views respecting the integrity of the Ottoman Empire with those of England. Neither shall we dwell upon the pretension which she has advanced, that she took the initiative in offering assistance to the Ottoman Porte. If she thinks that she has contributed more than any other of the Allied Cabinets to call forth the anxiety of Europe with respect to the Sultan, and that she has been the first, by her energetic representations, to point out to Mehemet Ali the bounds in passing which he would meet with the opposition of the Powers, we are by no means disposed to deny her this gratification. It is sufficient for us that good has been effected, hostilities suspended, and the Pasha kept within the bounds which he ought not to pass. We congratulate ourselves upon this result, without inquiring which of us was the first to come forward to produce it. But we were surprised, and we really had reason to be surprised, at the doubt thrown upon our intentions with regard to the independence of the Sultan; and at the charge brought against us, of having, according to the expression used by the French Cabinet, imposed upon the Ottoman Porte an exclusive and predominant protectorship. Is it necessary to call to mind that, so far from wishing exclusively to protect the Sultan, so far from taking advantage of our Treaty of Alliance with the Porte, we were on the contrary the first to guard against its application, and to claim for the Porte the assistance of the Maritime Courts, by calling upon them repeatedly, and in the

most urgent manner, to make use of all their means of action against the rebellious Pasha? If, from the commencement of the difficulties, our warnings had been attended to; if, without turning to Constantinople, measures had been taken at Alexandria; if what France calls the European side of the question, had been less exclusively attended to; peace would long ago have been re-established in the East, and we should not have had so much trouble in finding a solution of the present crisis. But all recrimination is as far from our intention, as it would now be useless.

In order to give a triumphant answer to the allegations of the French Government, one circumstance is sufficient, and that circumstance is, M. le Baron, your presence in London. As to the British Cabinet, we are glad to do it the justice to say, that it did not wait for your second mission to England to appreciate and acknowledge the good faith of the Emperor's policy. We have not, therefore, for one moment, entertained the idea that the insinuations of France could have made the least impression upon it. We must, however, observe to it, that under existing circumstances, language similar to that held by France, might lead to very lamentable consequences. With a Cabinet less conciliatory than ours, and more disposed to yield to a first impulse, the negotiation which is about to commence might suffer seriously therefrom. Let Lord Palmerston well consider this. To avow so openly as Marshal Soult has just done, that, in the pacification of the Levant, his principal object has been not so much the pacification itself, as the annihilation of our alleged preponderance in the East; to declare in terms so little reserved, that according to his view it is still more important to protect the independence of the Porte against us, than to secure the maintenance of its integrity as regards the Pasha; finally, to insinuate that, in the opinion of France, the disagreement which has recently arisen between herself and Great Britain, has been caused by the circumstance, that the latter has ceased to pursue the same object, and to entertain the same opinion, that is to say, the same suspicions; is this, we ask the principal Secretary of State, an effectual way of attaching us to the common work? Should we not be somewhat justified in taking advantage of such a disposition, to refuse our consent to the association of France in an arrangement, which, in order to be brought to a satisfactory conclusion, must be based upon a coincidence of views, and upon mutual confidence? Such, however, M. le Baron, is not at all the intention of the Emperor. The policy of our August Master is too exalted, and too far above the susceptibility and meanness of selfishness, to allow him to sacrifice thereto the more important interests of the moment, and to prevent his exercising, in his decision, that degree of moderation which he always employs in his language. It is not at the very moment, when, by the concessions which he has made in order to maintain peace in Europe, he has given to the world the most brilliant proof of his self-denial, that he will allow himself to be diverted by such an incident from the noble object which he has in view. Moreover, His Majesty makes allowances for the circumstances under which the despatch of the French Government was written. Under the erroneous impressions to which your mission to England had given rise, it may just be imagined, that the Cabinet of the Tuileries might have thought itself entitled to use, with respect to us, language so little in accordance with our real intentions. It was, besides, still in ignorance of the modifications which we have consented to make in the tenour of our original proposals.

Now that it is aware thereof, it appears to us to be impossible that it can refuse any longer to acknowledge how pure the intentions of our Cabinet are upon the Eastern Question. We have, henceforth, every reason to hope that it will proceed with a different disposition to the conclusion of an arrangement, from which we are as far from intending now to separate it, as we were at the time of your first journey to London. Have the goodness, then, M. le Baron, in communicating the present despatch to the principal Secretary of State, to assure him, from us, that the language of the French Cabinet makes no change in our position. In answering the allegations so gratuitously made by that Cabinet, we have only yielded to the necessity under which we were placed of not passing them over in silence.

Accept, &c.,
(Signed) NESSELRODE.

No. 446.

Count Nesselrode to Count Medem at Paris—(*Communicated by Baron Brunnow.*)

M. le Comte, *St. Pétersbourg, le* 26 *Décembre*, 1839.

J'AI reçu la dépêche que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'adresser, pour m'accuser la réception de mon expédition du 22 Novembre, et dans laquelle vous rendez compte au Ministère Impérial des plaintes que vous avait faites le Chef du Cabinet Français, relativement à la nature incomplète et tardive de nos dernières communications au sujet du retour de M. le Baron de Brunnow en Angleterre. Bien qu'il ne nous soit pas absolument démontré qu'en cette occasion, nos communications aux Cours de Vienne et de Berlin aient été plus détaillées, puisqu'il ne s'agissait que de leur annoncer un seul fait, l'adoption de la modification demandée par l'Angleterre à nos premières ouvertures ; bien qu'également, le retard de peu de jours qu'a subi la dépêche qui vous était adressée, tienne purement à des combinaisons insignifiantes dans l'arrangement du départ de nos courriers ; néanmoins, M. le Comte, nous admettrons la réclamation comme fondée, et nous allons y répondre avec une entière franchise.

Nous conviendrons donc que dans les derniers tems nos explications avec la France ont été empreintes d'une certaine réserve, et que celles que nous avons données à nos autres Alliés, portaient, peut-être, un caractère plus marqué d'empressement et d'abandon. Cette réserve avait ses motifs, et nous ne prétendons point les dissimuler. C'est que depuis longtems, M. le Comte, nous avions cru nous apercevoir que la France apportait dans ses jugemens sur notre politique en Orient, des dispositions moins favorables que les autres Puissances ; c'est que celles-ci nous témoignaient plus de confiance et d'équité ; qu'à l'égard de l'Egypte, leurs vues s'identifiaient davantage avec les nôtres ; et que, comme nous, elles pensaient trouver dans la conduite du Gouvernement Français, plus de penchant pour le vassal que pour le souverain légitime. C'est que dans la question du différend à régler entre le Sultan et Méhémet Ali, la France ne semblait voir qu'une question purement secondaire. Elle mettait à la représenter comme Européenne avant tout,—une affectation dont le but nous était palpable. C'est qu'en un mot le langage qu'elle adressait à nos Alliés, et celui que tenaient les feuilles plus particulièrement destinés à soutenir à l'intérieur la popularité de son Ministère, portaient ouvertement l'empreinte d'un sentiment peu juste, peu amical, envers la Russie.

Ce qui n'était qu'une présomption, vient de se convertir en fait, par la dépêche que le Maréchal Soult a récemment adressée au Gouvernement Anglais, pour défendre contre les objections de celui-ci, son opinion sur le plan de pacification à effectuer entre l'Egypte et la Porte. Dans cette pièce, qui se rapporte exclusivement aux divergences qui se sont manifestées entre les deux Cabinets, celui des Tuileries a cru devoir gratuitement nous faire entrer dans l'arène de la discussion, en appelant sur nous particulièrement la vigilance et l'attention de l'Angleterre. Il y avoue explicitement que l'indépendance de l'Empire Ottoman le préoccupe pour le moins autant que son intégrité même ; et qu'à ses yeux il est peut-être plus important de protéger l'une contre nous, que d'assurer l'autre contre l'Egypte. Il y reproche à l'Angleterre de perdre de vue ce qu'il appelle le côté Européen de la question, pour ne s'occuper que de la partie Egyptienne ; il y insinue enfin, que s'il existe aujourd'hui entre la Grande Bretagne et la France un dissentiment fâcheux, ce dissentiment vient uniquement de ce que, dans la pacification du Levant, la Grande Bretagne ne voit autre chose qu'un arrangement territorial, plus ou moins avantageux, à obtenir en faveur du Sultan, tandis qu'au contraire la France s'est constamment proposée d'en faire avant tout sortir *l'annulation* du *protectorat exclusif* et *dominant* que nous faisons, suivant son expression, *peser* sur la Porte Ottomane !

Voilà, certes, des aveux nettement articulés ; et si nous pouvons reprocher au Cabinet Français de méconnaître nos vraies intentions, il ne nous accusera sûrement pas de nous méprendre sur les siennes.

Comme la dépêche qui renferme les allégations que je viens de citer, ne nous est point adressée, nous ne nous sentirions point autorisés à y répondre directement. Mais puisque, d'un autre côté, le Maréchal Soult a pris vis-à-vis de vous l'initiative des réclamations, il ne nous sera pas défendu de lui faire entendre les nôtres.

Le protectorat exclusif de la Russie! Nous l'avouons, après toutes les preuves de désintéressement qu'a données l'Empereur dans ces derniers temps, nous avons été surpris de voir se reproduire un pareil fantôme. Le Gouvernement Français perdrait-il de vue, qu'au moment où nous parlons, l'Empereur n'a mis encore en mouvement ni un soldat, ni un vaisseau, tandisque les bâtimens Français sillonnent les eaux de la Méditerranée, et ancraient encore, il y a peu, dans le voisinage des Dardanelles? Etait-ce donc ce protectorat exclusif que nous cherchions lorsqu'en 1833, avant que le désespoir du Sultan l'eût porté à appeler notre assistance, nous avons adjuré les Puissances Maritimes de le secourir contre le Pacha? Etait-ce celui que nous voulions conserver, lorsque dès le commencement de la crise actuelle, nous avons été les premiers à éveiller sur la situation de l'Orient la commune sollicitude de ces mêmes Puissances; à les engager à contenir Méhémet Ali dans des limites infranchissables; à les presser, et la France en particulier, d'employer au besoin contre lui des mesures coërcitives? Si comme on l'a tant de fois soutenu, le Traité d'Unkiar Skélessi avait eu pour but de nous assurer cette protection exclusive, aurions-nous, comme nous l'avons fait, employé nos conseils et nos efforts à prévenir l'application de ses clauses? La France ne sait-elle pas, que loin de nous prévaloir de cet acte, nous nous sommes spontanément déclarés prêts à en faire l'abandon, si nous obtenions en échange la reconnaissance d'un principe de droit public Européen, qui, à la vérité, fermerait bien aux pavillons étrangers l'accès de l'un des deux détroits de Constantinople, mais qui, à nos propres bâtimens, interdirait l'entrée de l'autre? Faut-il enfin rappeler au Gouvernement Français que même antérieurement aux dernières concessions que nous venons de faire, nous avions, spontanément encore, proposé, que s'il devenait nécessaire de faire avancer notre flotte et nos troupes au secours de la capitale du Sultan, cette mesure serait dépouillée de tout caractère isolé, qu'elle ne serait point Russe exclusivement, mais proclamée solennellement comme une mesure Européenne?

Ces faits devant être pour la France aussi patens qu'ils le sont pour les autres Cabinets, on serait presque tenté de se demander, M. le Comte, si c'est bien sérieusement qu'elle a pu élever contre nous des allégations pareilles à celles que renferme la dépêche du Maréchal Soult, ou si elle a voulu les employer en faveur de son plan de pacification, comme un moyen de négociation dans ses discussions avec l'Angleterre, en réveillant sur notre compte d'anciennes appréhensions que nous avons si heureusement réussi à effacer?

Si (ce que nous sommes assurément loin de penser) telle avait été effectivement l'intention du Cabinet des Tuileries, sa conduite en cette occasion présenterait avec la nôtre un contraste bien remarquable. Lorsque se sont manifestés les premiers symptômes d'un dissentiment entre les deux Puissances Maritimes sur les moyens de concilier la sécurité du Sultan avec les prétentions du Pacha d'Egypte, qu'aurions-nous fait, nous le demandons à la France, si, comme elle le suppose si gratuitement, notre intention avait été de l'isoler en la séparant de l'Angleterre? Evidemment, nous aurions cherché à envénimer ce dissentiment, à l'exploiter, à le convertir, s'il eut été possible, en mésintelligence. Nous nous serions efforcés d'exagérer encore aux yeux du Cabinet Anglais la partialité qu'il reproche à la France en faveur du Pacha d'Egypte.

Nous eussions abondé avec empressement dans le sens de ses idées, et soutenu énergiquement son plan de pacification contre celui mis en avant par la France. Bien loin de là, nous avons parlé aux deux Puissances le langage de la conciliation. Quoique à la vérité le Plan de Lord Palmerston nous semblât plus favorable que celui du Gouvernement Français, à la sécurité future de la Porte Ottomane, bien qu'il fût certainement aussi plus conforme à la dignité des Cinq Cours intervenantes, après les offres de médiation qu'elles avaient, de leur propre mouvement, adressées au Grand Seigneur, nous nous sommes bornés à engager les deux Cabinets à chercher à rapprocher leurs idées. Nous leur avons déclaré, que si elles parvenaient par des concessions réciproques à se rencontrer à mi-chemin, et à convenir d'un moyen-terme, nous étions prêts à adopter le plan dont ils pourraient tomber d'accord, pourvu seulement que ce plan fût accepté par la Porte, et précédé d'une entente commune sur ses moyens d'exécution.

Ce n'est pas plus pour isoler la France, et pour nous passer de son concours, qu'à l'époque des propositions dont nous avons chargé le Baron de

Brunnow, nous nous sommes en premier lieu adressés à l'Angleterre. C'est parceque comme nous l'avons dit et le répétons au Gouvernement Français, l'Angleterre nous avait témoigné des dispositions plus confiantes; c'est parceque les vues de cette Puissance à l'égard du Vice-Roi d'Egypte coincidaient davantage avec les nôtres, et qu'au besoin, elle était d'avance déterminée à les appuyer pas des moyens d'action.

Mais de ce que nous avons pris vis-à-vis d'elle l'initiative d'ouvertures préalables sur un arrangement à discuter plus tard avec les autres Cabinets, s'ensuit-il donc nécessairement que notre dessein fut d'en exclure la France? Si une pareille initiative devait impliquer cette exclusion, pourquoi l'Autriche, pourquoi la Prusse, ne l'ont-elles pas ainsi interprétée pour elles-mêmes? D'où vient qu'aucune de ces deux Puissances n'avait songé à s'en formaliser? Leur amour-propre est-il moins exigeant, ou nous ont-elles rendu plus de justice?

Il est tems, M. le Comte, que les méfiances et les récriminations fassent place enfin à une plus saine appréciation de nos vues politiques. L'Empereur a fait assez de sacrifices d'amour-propre au désir de l'union et de la paix, pour avoir droit d'en obtenir quelques uns en échange. Sa Majesté ne s'est pas bornée à de purs sacrifices d'opinion, elle a offert au bien commun des concessions de fait, autrement importantes. C'est bien le moins que l'on renonce d'un autre côté, à des préventions qui n'ont plus de fondement. Si malgré tant de preuves de désintéressement et d'abnégation, l'Empereur continuait à voir ses intentions méconnues; si, tout en acceptant ses concessions on essayait de les exploiter dans un but de popularité, en les représentant comme dérivant d'une autre source que de sa spontanéité libre et entière; si dans l'arrangement qu'il s'agit de conclure, on s'efforçait de compliquer la négociation par de nouvelles exigences, en agitant des questions, en soulevant des éventualités étrangères à la crise actuelle; si, enfin, sous prétexte de faire entrer la Turquie dans le système Européen, on tentait de nous enlever, non cette prépondérance exclusive, à laquelle nous n'avons jamais prétendu, mais cette part légitime d'influence à laquelle la Russie ne renoncera point; alors, M. le Comte, ayant épuisé la mesure de la modération et de la condescendance, notre Auguste Maître pourrait se voir forcé de se replacer sur le terrain qu'il occupait avant ses premières propositions, et il ne resterait plus à Sa Majesté qu'à attendre avec calme les évènemens, ne prenant conseil, pour les régler, que du soin de sa dignité et des intérêts de son Empire.

Tel ne sera point le cas, nous aimons à l'espérer. Quand le Cabinet Français s'exprimait comme il a fait dans la dépêche précitée, il était encore dans l'ignorance de l'importante modification que nous avons consenti à apporter à la teneur originelle de nos ouvertures. Il pouvait donc à la rigueur lui rester un doute sur nos intentions définitives. Mais après le gage éclatant que l'Empereur vient de donner de sa loyauté, Sa Majesté n'admet pas la possbilité qu'il en puisse exister encore. Que la France apporte donc à la négociation qui va s'ouvrir des dispositions conformes à cet acte de conciliation, et nous nous féliciterons sincèrement de la voir y prendre la part que son rôle et sa position lui assignent. L'Empereur vous a déjà chargé, et il vous charge itérativement, d'assurer le Cabinet des Tuileries de tout le prix qu'il attache à une co-opération qui, aux yeux de la majorité, ne peut que contribuer à asseoir la pacification du Levant sur des fondemens plus solides.

Veuillez, M. le Comte, exprimer cet espoir et cette opinion au chef du Cabinet Français, en lui donnant communication et copie de la présente dépêche.

Recevez, &c.,
(Signé) NESSELRODE.

(Translation.)

Count Nesselrode to Count Medem at Paris.—(Communicated by Baron Brunnow.)

M. le Comte *St. Petersburgh, December* 26, 1839.

I HAVE received the despatch which you have done me the honour to address to me, acknowledging the receipt of my despatch of the 22nd of

November, and in which you give an account to the Imperial Ministry of the complaints which the Chief of the French Cabinet had made to you, relative to the incomplete and tardy nature of our last communication on the subject of the return of Baron Brunnow to England. Notwithstanding it has not been absolutely demonstrated to us, that on this occasion our communications to the Courts of Vienna and of Berlin have been more detailed, since all that was to be done was to announce to them a single fact—the adoption of the modification required by England in our first overtures; although, besides, the delay of a few days, which has been the case with the despatch addressed to you, originated solely in the trifling matters relating to the arrangement for the departure of our messengers; nevertheless, M. le Comte, we will admit the remonstrance to have some foundation, and proceed to answer it with entire candour.

We will admit, then, that our explanations with France have latterly been characterised with a degree of reserve, and that those which we have given to our other Allies have borne, perhaps, a character of greater cordiality and frankness. This reserve had its motives, and we do not pretend to disguise them. It is, M. le Comte, because we have for some time considered that France, in her opinion of our policy in the East, was less favourably disposed than the other Powers; it is because the latter evinced towards us a greater degree of confidence and equity; because, with respect to Egypt, their views were more identified with our own; and because, like us, they thought they found in the French Government more inclination for the Vassal than for the lawful Sovereign. It is because France appeared to consider the Question of difference to be settled between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali as purely secondary. She set herself about representing the matter as essentially an European question —an insinuation, the object of which was evident to us. In a word, it is because the language which she addressed to our Allies, and that held by the papers more peculiarly designed to uphold in the interior the popularity of her Ministry, manifestly bore the character of sentiments little just, little friendly to Russia.

That which was merely a presumption has now been changed into a fact, by the despatch which Marshal Soult has recently addressed to the English Government, in order to defend, against the objections offered by the latter, his opinion upon the plan of pacification to be effected between Egypt and the Porte. In this document, which relates exclusively to the differences which have manifested themselves between the two Cabinets, that of the Tuileries has thought fit to bring us gratuitously into the discussion, by especially directing against us the vigilance and the attention of England. It plainly avows therein, that the independence of the Ottoman Empire interests it, at least as much as even the integrity of it; and that in its estimation it is, perhaps, more important to protect the one against us than to secure the other against Egypt. It reproaches England for losing sight of what it calls the European side of the Question, in order to busy herself with the Egyptian portion of it alone. Lastly, it insinuates that if, at the present time, an unpleasant difference of opinions exists between Great Britain and France, that difference is solely occasioned by Great Britain looking to nothing in the pacification of the Levant, beyond obtaining for the Sultan a territorial arrangement more or less advantageous; whereas, on the other hand, France has always proposed to herself above everything to extract from that pacification, the annihilation of the exclusive and domineering protectorate which we, according to his expression, cause to weigh upon the Ottoman Porte.

Thus, we have in truth two avowals clearly expressed; and if we can reproach the French Cabinet with mistaking our real intentions, it will surely not charge us with being under any misapprehension with respect to its own.

As the despatch in which the allegations which I have cited, is contained, is not addressed to us, we should not feel ourselves warranted in replying to it directly. But since, on the other hand, Marshal Soult has been the first to address to you demands for explanations, we will not be restrained from causing him to hear our own.

The exclusive protectorate of Russia! We confess, after all the proofs of disinterestedness which the Emperor in these last times has offered, we have been astonished to see such a bugbear reappear. Could the French Government forget, that, at the moment I am speaking, the Emperor has not yet moved either a single soldier or a single vessel, while the ships of France plough the waters of the Mediterranean, and, moreover, cast anchor a short time ago in the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles? Was it, then, this exclusive protectorate at which we aimed when, in 1833, before the despair of the Sultan had led him to invoke our assistance, we implored the Maritime Powers to succour him against the Pasha? Was it what we desired to retain when, at the very beginning of the existing crisis, we were the first to rouse up, with reference to the state of the East, the common solicitude of these same Powers; to urge them to restrain Mehemet Ali within bounds which he could not pass; to press them, and especially France, to employ, if necessary, measures of coercion against him? If, as has so often been maintained, the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi had had for its object to secure to us this exclusive protection, would we have employed, as we have done, our advice and efforts to prevent the application of its stipulations? Is not France aware, that, far from taking advantage of that instrument, we have spontaneously declared ourselves ready to forego it, if we could obtain in exchange for it the recognition of a principle of public European law, which, in truth, would indeed close to foreign flags the entrance into one of the two Straits of Constantinople, but which would prohibit to our own vessels the entrance into the other? Finally, must we remind the French Government that, even before the last concessions which we have made, we had still spontaneously proposed, that, if it should become necessary to advance our fleet and our troops to the succour of the Sultan's capital, that measure should be deprived of all appearance of isolation, that it should not be exclusively Russian, but solemnly announced as an European measure?

As these facts must be as notorious to France as they are to the other Cabinets, one would almost be tempted to ask, M. le Comte, if she has really seriously been able to advance against us such allegations as those contained in Marshal Soult's despatch, as a means of negotiation in her discussions with England, reviving with respect to us apprehensions of old date, which we have so happily succeeded in effacing?

If (what we are assuredly far from supposing) such had really been the intention of the Cabinet of the Tuileries, its conduct on this occasion would offer a very remarkable contrast with ours. When the first symptoms of a difference of opinion between the two Maritime Powers as to the means of reconciling the security of the Sultan with the pretensions of the Pasha of Egypt manifested themselves, what should we have done, we ask France, if, as she so gratuitously supposes, our intention had been to isolate her by separating her from England? Clearly we should have sought to exasperate this difference, to increase it, and to convert it, if it were possible, into a misunderstanding. We should have exerted ourselves to exaggerate still more, in the view of the British Cabinet, the partiality which it reproaches France with entertaining in favour of the Pasha of Egypt.

We should have eagerly coincided with its notions, and energetically supported its plan of pacification against that put forward by France. Very far from that, we have held to the Two Powers the language of conciliation. Although in truth Lord Palmerston's plan appeared to us more favourable than that of the French Government to the future security of the Ottoman Porte, although it was certainly also more conformable to the dignity of the Five intervening Powers, after the offers of mediation which they had, of their own accord, addressed to the Grand Signor, we confined ourselves to exhorting the two Cabinets to endeavour to make their notions coincide. We declared to them that if by reciprocal concessions they contrived to meet each other halfway, and to agree to a middle term, we were ready to adopt the plan on which they might agree, provided only that that plan was accepted by the Porte, and preceded by a common understanding as to the means of carrying it into execution.

It was no more in order to isolate France, and to dispense with her co-operation, that at the time of making the proposals which we had entrusted to Baron Brunnow, we in the first instance addressed ourselves to England. It is because, as we have said and repeat to the French Government, England had evinced towards us dispositions of greater confidence; it is because the views of that Power, with regard to the Viceroy of Egypt, coincided more with our own, and that, in case of need, it was determined beforehand to support them by action.

But does it necessarily follow because we have made to England in the first instance preliminary overtures as to an arrangement to be hereafter discussed with the other Cabinets, that we designed to exclude France? If such a course necessarily implied an exclusion of this kind, why has not Austria, why has not Prussia, so interpreted it for themselves? Whence comes it that neither of these Two Powers thought of taking exception to it? Is their self-esteem less exacting, or have they rendered us more justice?

It is time, M. le Comte, that this distrust and these recriminations should give place at length to a sounder appreciatiation of our political views. The Emperor has made sufficient sacrifices of personal feeling to the desire for union and peace, to be entitled to obtain some in return. His Majesty has not confined himself to mere sacrifices of opinion; he has made for the common advantage actual concessions, far more important. It is the least that can be done in other quarters, to give up prejudices which have no longer any foundation. If, notwithstanding so many proofs of disinterestedness and self-denial, the Emperor should continue to see his intentions misunderstood; if, at the same time that his concessions are accepted, endeavours are made to turn them to account with the view of acquiring popularity, by representing them as proceeding from another source than his free and entire volition; if, in the arrangement which is to be concluded, endeavours are made to complicate the negotiations by new demands, by discussing questions, by raising contingencies unconnected with the existing crisis; if, in short, under the pretext of bringing Turkey into the European system, attempts should be made to deprive us, not of that exclusive preponderance to which we have never pretended, but that fair share of influence which Russia will not forego; then, M. le Comte, having exhausted the measure of moderation and compliance, our August Master might see himself compelled to replace himself in the position which he occupied before he made his first propositions, and nothing would remain for His Majesty but calmly to wait for events, taking no counsel, for the ordering of them, but of attention to his own dignity and to the interests of his Empire.

We flatter ourselves that such will not be the case. When the French Cabinet expressed itself as it has done in the despatch above-mentioned, it was still ignorant of the important modification which we have consented to admit in the original purport of our overtures. It might therefore in strictness still retain a doubt as to our definitive intentions. But after the striking pledge which the Emperor has just given of his sincerity, His Majesty does not admit the possibility of such a doubt still existing. Let then France bring to the negotiation about to be entered upon, dispositions consistent with this act of conciliation, and we shall sincerely congratulate ourselves on seeing her resume in it the station which her part and her character assign to her. The Emperor has already instructed you, and he instructs you again, to assure the Cabinet of the Tuileries of the great value which he attaches to a co-operation which, in the opinion of the greater part, cannot but contribute to settle the pacification of the East on the most solid foundations.

Have the goodness, M. le Comte, to express this hope and this opinion to the Chief of the French Cabinet, on communicating to him the present despatch, and giving him a copy of it.

Receive, &c.,
(Signed) NESSELRODE.

No. 447.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 16.)

(Extract.) *Paris, January* 13, 1840.

MARSHAL SOULT told me this morning, that he had heard I had expressed the hope, that the French Government would communicate to that of Her Majesty the exact number of the French ships of the line now in commission, in order that Her Majesty's Ministers may be enabled to reply with confidence and certainty to any questions which might be put to them regarding the reports of considerable naval armaments being prepared in the ports of France.

The Marshal said, that he had also received from Count Sébastiani the copy of a letter addressed to him by your Lordship, inclosing a list of French ships, which it had been reported to your Lordship were now in commission, and which were to constitute the Fleet of France in the Mediterranean.

The Marshal read to me your Lordship's letter, and then went over with me the inclosed list of ships. His Excellency said that, by a courier of this evening, he proposed answering Count Sébastiani's despatch; and that the French Ambassador would be furnished with such information as would enable him to answer satisfactorily your Lordship's inquiries, and show that the French Naval Force in the Mediterranean did not exceed the number of ships, (namely, fifteen,) which, at the time that the communication took place between the two Governments relative to the junction of their fleets in the Levant, it had professed its intention to equip; and that, independent of the two British ships of the line now in the Tagus, which might be considered as part of the British Mediterranean fleet, that fleet was now superior to that of France. His Excellency spoke of the ship of the line at Rochefort having been launched, because the ship was ready for launching, and not as intended for immediate service.

This is the substance of Marshal Soult's conversation with me relative to the subject of your Lordship's letter to Count Sébastiani; but the answer to your inquiries will be given, I hope, more explicitly and in detail by the French Ambassador.

No. 448.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received January* 16.)

(Extract.) *Paris, January* 13, 1840.

MARSHAL SOULT this morning, after questioning me relative to the progress made in the negotiation between your Lordship and Baron Brunnow, informed me that he had received from the French Ambassador a report of a conversation he had had with your Lordship; from which it appeared that you were preparing propositions (in consequence of Baron Brunnow's communications respecting the Turco-Egyptian Affairs) for the consideration of the other Powers interested in the settlement of that question.

The proposals of the Russian Government, he understood, were to the effect that two or three British, and two or three French ships of the line, should enter the Dardanelles, but not proceed beyond Gallipoli; that the Russian fleet, having troops on board, and unlimited in number, were to be stationed in the Bosphorus, and opposite to Constantinople.

The Marshal gave no positive opinion as to the acceptance by France of the arrangement proposed by Russia for the defence of the Straits of Constantinople; but from the manner in which he spoke of the superiority in numbers as well as in position, assigned to Russia in Baron Brunnow's propositions, I am led to conclude that the French Government will not be a party to that arrangement.

No. 449.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received January* 17, 1840.)

My Lord, *Therapia, December* 24, 1839.

RECHID PASHA, after expressing the pleasure the communication of your Lordship's Instructions of December 2, gave him, says, that it has augmented the confidence of the Sublime Porte in the goodwill of Great Britain; and that the Sublime Porte will remain firm, and will not make any concession to Mehemet Ali without the concurrence of its Allies.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 450.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 20.)

My Lord, *Paris, January* 17, 1840.

I HAD an interview this morning with Marshal Soult. His Excellency had received, yesterday, despatches from the French Consul at Alexandria, stating that Mehemet Ali manifested no impatience regarding the delay that has taken place in concluding a peace with the Sultan,—a delay which the Pasha asserted was more detrimental to the Porte, than to himself,—that Mehemet Ali had lately issued pay to his army, and to the Turkish as well as to the Egyptian fleet.

Marshal Soult mentioned that Albania was in a disturbed state.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 451.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 21, 1840.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, December* 28, 1839.

I FORWARD copy of the letter from the Grand Vizier to the Pasha of Egypt, which was carried to Alexandria by Kiamil Pasha, of whose mission I advised your Lordship.

The sovereignty of the Sultan is asserted and exercised in the firman of which Kiamil Pasha is the bearer. This may bring on the discussion of the question, what are to be the prerogatives of the Sultan when the Pasha is made hereditary Governor of Egypt?

Inclosure in No. 451.

The Grand Vizier to Mehemet Ali.

AINSI qu'il est connu à votre Altesse, on ne peut jamais établir une bonne administration dans un Etat, ni assurer la tranquillité des peuples que par un régime stable et sage, et sous le règne des lois équitables.

Mais on n'a pu s'occuper d'institutions en Turquie, malgré le besoin extrême qu'elle en a, à cause d'une foule d'affaires embarrassantes dont elle a été depuis quelque tems successivement accablée.

Sa Majesté Impériale, animée de sentimens pleins de clémence et d'intentions les plus salutaires, veut faire prospérer l'Empire et la nation, et assurer le repos et le bien-être de ses sujets; et un Hatti Chériff ayant été émanée dernièrement de Sa Hautesse à cet égard, des firmans analogues ont été publiés dans toutes les parties de l'Empire. Il est par conséquent devenu nécessaire que la Sublime Porte adresse aussi des firmans de la même teneur à votre Altesse, ainsi qu'à votre fils, son Excellence Ibrahim Pacha; et voilà pourquoi deux firmans ornés en haut d'un Hatti Chériff vous sont envoyés avec le très-illustre Kiamil Pacha, Général de Brigade dans l'Armée Impériale.

Votre Altesse verra par la teneur de ces firmans, quelle est la volonté souveraine; et comme les lois dont on s'occupe, et qu'on va établir, devront donner une nouvelle vie à la religion, au Gouvernement, à l'Empire, et à la nation, et que cela est précisément ce que votre Altesse a toujours désiré, d'après la sagesse et le zèle qui la distinguent, et à quoi elle a constamment appliqué ses soins, tout le monde a la conviction qu'elle agira conformément aux ordres souverains.

J'espère donc que votre Altesse s'empressera de publier les firmans qui vous sont envoyés dans les lieux qui se trouvent dans votre Gouvernement, et dans celui de votre fils sus-mentionné, et qu'elle mettra en pratique les principes salutaires qu'ils renferment.

7 *Chewal,* 1255 (13 *Décembre,* 1839.)

(Translation.)

The Grand Vizier to Mehemet Ali.

AS Your Highness is aware, a good administration can never be established in a State, nor can the tranquillity of the people be assured, except by a firm and wise rule, and by the exercise of equitable laws.

But it has not been possible in Turkey to take such institutions under consideration, notwithstanding the extreme want of them, on account of the number of embarrassing affairs with which she has been for some time continually overwhelmed.

His Imperial Majesty, animated by feelings full of clemency, and by the most salutary intentions, desires to make the Empire and the nation prosper, and to ensure the repose and the welfare of his subjects; and a Hatti Sheriff having lately been issued by His Highness for this purpose, firmans of a similar kind have been published in all parts of the Empire. It has therefore become necessary that the Sublime Porte should address firmans to the same effect to Your Highness, as well as to your son, his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha; and this is the reason that two firmans, adorned at the top with a Hatti Sheriff, are sent to you by the hands of the illustrious Kiamil Pasha, a Brigadier-General in the Imperial Army.

Your Highness will perceive, from these firmans, what the Sovereign will is; and as the laws under consideration, and which are about to be established, are intended to give new life to religion, to the Government, to the Empire, and to the nation, and as this is precisely what Your Highness has always desired, in conformity with the wisdom and zeal which distinguish you, and to which your care has constantly been devoted, every one is convinced that you will act in accordance with the Sovereign orders.

I hope, therefore, that Your Highness will hasten to publish the firmans sent to you in the places under your government, and in that of your son abovementioned, and that you will put the wholesome principles which they contain, into practice.

Chewal 7, 1255 (*December* 13, 1839).

No. 452.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received January* 21, 1840.)

My Lord, *Therapia, December* 29, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a report from M. de Laurin to the Internuncio, which his Excellency has had the goodness to communicate to me.

Rechid Pasha was made acquainted with the contents of that report, and I took occasion to recommend to him the perfection of the means most proper for defence against any enterprise that might be attempted by Mehemet Ali. Mehemet Ali is as likely as any man to mistake the nature of his own position; and he may risk attempts that cannot have success against the power opposed to them, and which failing, will, at last, put in danger those advantages he can secure by a prudent submission. He may march his troops towards the capital, and make a great effort to raise confusion there, and give rise to serious inconvenience, though his ultimate defeat be inevitable. I have long believed that a British maritime force, acting in conjunction with the Sultan's flag on the coast of Syria, cutting off the communication with Alexandria, and closing that port, would paralyze the whole body of Mehemet Ali's power.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 452.

M. de Laurin to the Baron de Stürmer.

(Traduction.)

M. le Baron, *Alexandrie, le* 16 *Décembre,* 1839.

LES nouvelles sur les menées des mécontens dans l'Asie Mineure, que j'ai eu l'honneur de mander à votre Excellence en date du 6 de ce mois, ont été communiquées le lendemain à mes Collègues par Méhémet Ali. Il a déclaré à mes Collègues et à moi, qu'aucun de ses commandans de troupes ne s'était approché des insurgés, et qu'il avait même fait dire à ceux de Diarbékir d'être tranquilles, vu qu'il ne voulait et ne pouvait rien faire pour eux. Mais sous main on ne néglige rien pour entretenir la fermentation et même pour préparer une révolte qui viendrait à éclater par la suite dans un moment favorable.

Méhémet Ali m'a dit dernièrement qu'il n'était pas inactif, qu'il travaillait journellement et se préparait à toutes les éventualités. En effet, on remarque une activité extraordinaire dans le Divan des Muavin. Mercredi dernier on expédia à Ibrahim Pacha des ordres relatifs à la concentration de l'armée. Ces mouvemens doivent commencer au mois de Février et être exécutés avant la Lune de Safer.

Les confidens du Pacha prétendent savoir qu'il a le projet d'occuper Diarbékir, d'organiser les masses, et ainsi renforcé, de s'emparer du reste de l'Asie Mineure. D'autres, au contraire, pensent qu'il ne s'agit que de faire prendre à Ibrahim une forte position défensive à Marache, afin de mettre à couvert Tarsous et Adana. D'autres encore, partisans du Pacha, et Français pour la plupart, le poussent à prendre l'offensive et garantissent le succès le plus brillant pour le cas où il attaquerait Constantinople par mer et par terre. Les masses, disent-ils, sont contre le Sultan et le Grand Vizir, et sympathisent tellement avec Méhémet Ali, qu'elles sont prêtes à l'accueillir comme le plus fort et le plus heureux. Une fois Constantinople prise, les Puissances Européennes cesseront aussi de défendre un trône qui n'a aucun soutien dans les sentimens de la nation.

Méhémet Ali loue beaucoup ce langage, qui convient parfaitement à ses plans et à ceux de son fils. Tous deux seraient disposés à commencer la lutte dès à présent.

Le parti modéré pense que le Pacha causera à la Porte un dommage plus sensible en se tenant sur la défensive qu'en se portant à l'attaque. C'est pourquoi ce parti cherche à le dissuader d'avancer. Il dit au Pacha qu'il se trouve maintenant dans une position inattaquable, et que pourvu qu'il puisse s'y maintenir durant l'hiver, il ne rencontrera plus aucun obstacle à devenir le maître de la Turquie Asiatique.

Par le dernier bateau à vapeur on lui écrit de Constantinople de se tenir tranquille et d'attendre les évènemens, bien persuadé que les Puissances n'oseront pas l'attaquer s'il ne fait point d'invasion en Europe.

On ignore encore quel parti prendra le Pacha. Mais dans tous les cas il est positif qu'il s'occupe très-sérieusement à faire de grands préparatifs de guerre. Il menace d'armer au pis aller les corps de métier et les ouvriers des fabriques (17,000 hommes), et de les réunir à l'armée de Syrie.

Mr. Hodges vient d'arriver ici. Il m'a remis aussitôt une lettre de Son Altesse le Prince de Metternich, et m'a dit avoir l'ordre d'agir dans l'accord le plus intime avec moi et de donner toute son attention à mes conseils.

Agréez, &c.,
(Signé) LAURIN.

(Translation.)

M. de Laurin to the Baron de Stürmer.

M. le Baron, *Alexandria, December* 16, 1839.

THE intelligence respecting the proceedings of the malcontents in Asia Minor, which I had the honour to report to your Excellency in my letter of the 6th instant, was communicated to my Colleagues on the following day by Mehemet

Ali. He declared to my Colleagues and to me that none of the Commanders of his troops had gone near the insurgents, and that he had even sent word to those of Diarbekir to be quiet, as he neither would nor could do anything for them. But nothing is neglected in secret to keep up the ferment, and even to prepare a revolt which should break out afterwards at a favourable moment.

Mehemet Ali told me lately that he was not idle, that he worked daily, and prepared for all chances. In fact, an extraordinay activity is observed in the Divan of the Muavin. Orders were sent off on Wednesday last to Ibrahim Pasha, relative to the concentration of the Army. These movements are to commence in the month of February, and to be completed before the moon of Safer.

Those in the confidence of the Pasha pretend to know that he has the plan of occupying Diarbekir, of organizing the population, and thus reinforced, of taking possession of the rest of Asia Minor. Others think, on the contrary, that it is only intended that Ibrahim should take up a strong defensive position at Marash, in order to cover Tarsus and Adana. Others, again, partisans of the Pasha, and chiefly Frenchmen, urge him to act on the offensive, and promise the most brilliant success in the event of his attacking Constantinople by sea and by land. The population, say they, are opposed to the Sultan and the Grand Vizier, and sympathize so strongly with Mehemet Ali, that they are ready to welcome him as the strongest and the most fortunate. Constantinople once taken, the Powers of Europe will also cease to defend a throne which has no support in the feelings of the nation.

Mehemet Ali praises this language very much, which tallies perfectly with his own and his son's plans. Both are disposed to begin the struggle immediately.

The moderate party are of opinion that the Pasha will do more hurt to the Porte by keeping on the defensive than by making an attack. Therefore it is that this party seek to dissuade him from advancing. They tell the Pasha that he is now in a position that cannot be attacked, and that if he can only maintain himself in it during the winter, he will meet no further obstacle to his becoming master of Turkey in Asia.

The last steamer from Constantinople brings him advice to remain quiet and wait for events, fully persuaded that the Powers will not attack him if he makes no invasion into Europe.

It is still unknown what line the Pasha will take; but at all events, it is certain that he is very seriously occupied in making great preparations for war. He threatens, if the worst comes to the worst, to arm the corps of artizans, and the workmen of the manufactories (17,000 men), and to unite them to the Army of Syria.

Mr. Hodges is just arrived here; he immediately delivered to me a letter from His Highness Prince Metternich, and told me that he had orders to act in the most perfect concert with me, and to pay every attention to my counsels.

Accept, &c.,
(Signed) LAURIN.

No. 453.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 21.)

My Lord, *Vienna, January* 12, 1840.

I COMMUNICATED to Prince Metternich the inclosure in Lord Ponsonby's despatch of December 29, and he has requested me to delay the messenger, so as to give him time to write his sentiments upon its contents to Baron Neumann, for communication to your Lordship. In the mean time I can state, that his ideas revert to his proposition of November last, and that he considers it advisable that no time should be lost in declaring to the Porte and to Mehemet Ali, that an attack made by the latter would encounter the opposition of the Powers. If no arrangement has yet been signed in London, the necessity of this is, in the Prince's opinion, self-evident; if one has been signed, still there will be delay in obtaining the accession of the Porte; whereas the proposed notification should be made without the loss of a moment, whereby no prejudice will be caused to the plans for the final settlement of the question.

I asked the Prince, if he was prepared to make the declaration in the name of the Four Powers only without France, to which he answered, that if France did not accede to this proposition, neither would she do so to the more extended one; and that the real question therefore was, whether, in case she should refuse to go along with us, we should proceed without her. This, he said, is a matter for the consideration of the Four Powers, and Austria is for doing so.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

No. 454.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January* 24, 1840.

WITH reference to the observations in your Excellency's despatch of the 28th December, on the relative positions of the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, when the latter should be made hereditary Governor of Egypt, I have to state to your Excellency, that it never has been contemplated by Her Majesty's Government that Mehemet Ali should have, as hereditary Pasha of Egypt, any other, or different, powers and authorities than those which he now possesses. All that has been proposed is, that the Sultan shall engage to appoint Mehemet Ali's lineal descendants as successors to Mehemet Ali, in the post of Pasha of Egypt; but that Egypt should remain, as it now is, an integral part of the Ottoman Empire; that all treaties and laws made by the Sultan, should apply to Egypt as much as to any other province; and that the troops and ships of the Pasha of Egypt should be as much at the disposal of the Sultan, for attack or defence in time of war, as those kept by any other Pasha of the Ottoman Empire.

Your Excellency will find a statement to this effect in my despatch to the Marquess of Clanricarde, of the 9th of July, 1839, of which a copy was transmitted to your Excellency in my despatch, of the 13th of that month.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 455.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January* 25, 1840.

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that the negotiations on Turco-Egyptian Affairs, in which I have for some time been engaged with the Plenipotentiaries of Austria and Russia, are making such progress as to give reason to expect that they may end in an agreement between the Powers of Europe to assist the Sultan in confining the authority of Mehemet Ali to Egypt. The Austrian and Russian Plenipotentiaries have received full powers to sign a Convention for that purpose, and the Plenipotentiary of Prussia expects shortly to receive the like authority from his Government. I cannot speak with equal certainty as to the course which the French Government may pursue in this matter; but in any case, the presence of a Turkish Plenipotentiary will be required, and I have therefore to instruct your Excellency to urge Rechid Pasha to send off immediately to Nouri Effendi, the Ambassador of the Porte at Paris, powers and authority to sign in London any Convention that may be proposed to him by the Plenipotentiaries of the Five Powers, or by those of Four out of the Five, provided it be a Convention securing advantages to the Sultan in the shape of support and assistance from the Powers of Europe.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 456.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received January* 23.)

(Extract.) *Paris, January* 20, 1840.

COUNT MEDEM this morning gave to Marshal Soult a copy of a despatch he received yesterday from Count Nesselrode relative to the Oriental Question, and the negotiation upon that subject with which Baron Brunnow has been charged by the Russian Government.

The Marshal read to me this despatch, commenting upon parts of it as he read them. The despatch does not state what are the propositions of which the Russian Envoy to London is the bearer, and Count Nesselrode accounts for his communications with the British Government being more unreserved than those with France, on the ground that the Court of St. Petersburgh, in respect to the conditions of a pacific arrangement between Turkey and Mehemet Ali, and the means of enforcing them, coincides more with the Court of St. James than with the Court of the Tuileries.

No. 457.

The Duc de Dalmatie to the Baron de Barante—(*Communicated by Count Sébastiani.*)

M. le Baron, *Paris, le* 24 *Janvier*, 1840.

J'AI l'honneur de vous envoyer le texte d'une * dépêche écrite par M. de Nesselrode à M. de Médem, qui, ainsi qu'il en avait l'ordre, m'en a remis copie, après m'en avoir donné lecture. La forme et le fond de cette dépêche m'ont, je dois vous le dire, également surpris. Dans les observations que je vais vous présenter à ce sujet je ne tiendrai compte que du fond.

La marche suivie par le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg dans l'incident de la Mission de M. de Brunnow, n'avait pas causé une telle surprise au Gouvernement du Roi, que j'eusse cru devoir en faire l'objet d'une réclamation. Aussi n'était-ce nullement à titre de plainte que j'en avais parlé à M. de Médem. J'avais voulu seulement bien établir que ce qu'il y avait dans cette marche de peu conforme aux protestations générales d'intentions conciliantes et de désir d'arriver à un accord Européen ne m'avait pas échappé. Dois-je supposer que M. de Médem avait mal compris ma pensée, et, en la transmettant à son Gouvernement, en avait assez exagéré la portée pour qu'on ait jugé nécessaire d'y répondre d'une manière aussi solennelle? Ou bien dois-je croire que le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg, sans s'abuser lui-même sur le véritable sens de mes paroles, a saisi le premier prétexte qui s'est offert à lui de nous faire parvenir, sous forme de récrimination, l'expression d'un mécontentement d'ailleurs bien peu fondé? Je serais porté à admettre plutôt cette dernière supposition, en voyant combien peu cette prétendue réponse se réfère à ce qu'elle semble avoir pour but de réfuter.

Quoiqu'il en soit, sans entrer dans une polémique dont le moindre inconvénient serait de ne pouvoir conduire à aucun résultat, je vais m'expliquer en peu de mots sur quelques uns des points principaux traités dans la dépêche de M. de Nesselrode.

Le Gouvernement du Roi n'a jamais songé à enlever à la Russie sa part légitime d'influence dans les affaires de l'Orient; il sait qu'elle doit être grande pour être en accord avec la nature des choses; ce que nous avons voulu, ce que nous voulons encore, c'est que les autres Puissances ne soient pas déshéritées de celle qui leur appartient également, c'est qu'elles en trouvent la garantie non pas uniquement dans la modération personnelle du Souverain de la Russie, mais bien dans un ensemble de mesures politiques combinées pour la protection efficace de tous les droits et de tous les intérêts.

Demander que ces droits et ces intérêts ne soient pas à la merci d'une

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* See No. 446.

Puissance à laquelle il ne manquerait pour abuser de sa prépondérance que la volonté de le faire, exiger d'autres sûretés que la générosité et la sagesse d'une des parties, ce n'est certes pas, quoiqu'on en dise, lui témoigner une injurieuse défiance, c'est tout simplement faire acte de prudence et de dignité. Je ne puis donc reconnaître que dans la surveillance attentive, inquiète si l'on veut, que nous portons sur la situation de Constantinople, il y ait rien dont le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg ait le droit de s'offenser.

Le Gouvernement du Roi serait bien autrement fondé à réclamer contre les assertions sans cesse renouvelées, qui le présentent comme se préoccupant exclusivement, dans la Question d'Orient, des intérêts du Pacha d'Egypte, et y sacrifiant ceux de la Porte. Après les dénégations appuyées d'argumens si convaincans, qu'il a tant de fois opposées à ces imputations malveillantes, il devait peu s'attendre, peut-être, à les voir reproduites dans la dépêche de M. de Nesselrode. Ce n'est pas d'ailleurs sans une satisfaction réelle qu'il y trouve l'assurance que M. de Brunnow a la mission de travailler à faire cesser sur le point délicat du règlement territorial de la Question d'Orient, les dissentimens partiels de l'Angleterre et de la France,—dissentimens qui ne sauraient être que temporaires entre deux Cabinets unis par des liens si étroits. Les informations que j'avais recueillies au sujet des instructions données à cet Envoyé m'avaient fait craindre au contraire que la Russie, en adhérant purement et simplement au plan le plus défavorable au Vice-Roi, ne tendît à rendre plus difficile un rapprochement entre les idées des Cabinets de Londres et de Paris. Nous en avions été d'autant plus surpris, que le Gouvernement Impérial, en manifestant à plusieurs reprises son regret de ce qu'on n'avait pas laissé au mois de Juillet dernier la Porte et le Pacha s'arranger directement, avait autorisé à penser qu'il eût adhéré sans peine même à des conditions beaucoup plus avantageuses pour le Pacha que celles que nous proposons aujourd'hui. Certes, un changement aussi complet dans sa manière de voir n'eut pas trouvé à beaucoup près, une justification suffisante dans le simple fait de la médiation offerte le 27 Juillet à la Porte, puisque cette offre n'impliquait en aucune façon, de la part des Puissances, la promesse d'une intervention matérielle dirigée dans le but de faire obtenir au Sultan des stipulations déterminées.

Voilà, M. le Baron, ce que j'avais à vous dire sur la lettre de M. de Nesselrode. Vous voudrez bien lire à ce Ministre la présente dépêche et lui en laisser copie.

Agréez, &c.,
(Signé) MARECHAL DUC DE DALMATIE.

(Translation.)

The Duc de Dalmatie to the Baron de Barante.—(Communicated by Count Sebastiani.)

Monsieur le Baron, *Paris, January* 24, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to send to you the copy of a despatch written by M. de Nesselrode to M. de Medem, who, agreeably to his instructions, delivered to me a copy, after having read it to me. The form and the substance of this despatch have both, I must confess to you, equally surprised me. In the observations which I am about to make to you on the subject of this despatch, I shall touch merely upon the substance.

The course pursued by the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh in the case of the Mission of M. de Brunnow, did not create such surprise in the King's Government, as to make it appear to me to call for remonstrance. Neither was it by any means in the style of complaint that I spoke of it to M. de Medem. I merely wished clearly to establish, that the inconsistency of this step with the general protestations of conciliatory intentions, and of a desire to produce harmony throughout Europe, had not escaped me. Am I to suppose that M. de Medem had misunderstood my meaning, and that, in communicating it to his Government, he had so exaggerated its tendency, as to cause it to be deemed necessary to answer it in so formal a manner? Or rather, am I to think that the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, without mistaking the true sense of my words, has seized on the first pretext which presented itself for conveying to us, in the

form of recrimination, the expression of dissatisfaction for which, moreover, there is very little ground? I am rather inclined to admit this latter supposition, on observing how little this pretended answer bears upon what it appears designed to refute.

Be that as it may, without entering into a discussion, the least inconvenience of which is that it does not tend to any result, I will in a few words explain myself upon some of the principal points treated in the despatch of M. de Nesselrode.

The King's Government has never thought of depriving Russia of her legitimate share of influence in the affairs of the East,—it knows that that influence must be great according to the nature of things: what we have wished, what we still wish, is that the other Powers should not be excluded from that to which they are all equally entitled; that they should have it ensured to them not only by the personal moderation of the Sovereign of Russia, but also by a system of combined political measures for the effectual protection of all rights and interests.

To require that those rights and interests should not be at the mercy of a Power which would need, for the purpose of abusing its own preponderance, only the will to do so,—to exact other securities than the generosity and wisdom of one of the parties,—is assuredly not, whatever may be said of it, to evince an offensive distrust; it is merely to act the part of prudence and of dignity. I cannot, then, admit, that there is anything in the attentive vigilance, restless if you will, which we exercise over the situation of Constantinople, at which the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh can have any right to take offence.

The King's Government would be much more entitled to remonstrate against the constantly repeated assertions, which represent it as employing itself exclusively, in the Eastern Question, with the interests of the Pasha of Egypt, and sacrificing to them those of the Porte. After positive denials supported by such convincing arguments, which it has so repeatedly made to those malevolent imputations, it had, it might have been supposed, little reason to expect to see them again brought forward in the despatch of M. de Nesselrode. It is not, however, without real satisfaction that it finds therein, the assurance that M. de Brunnow is commissioned to endeavour to bring to an end, with respect to the delicate point of the territorial settlement of the Eastern Question, the partial differences which exist between England and France,—differences which cannot but be temporary between two Cabinets united by such close ties. The information which I had obtained on the subject of the instructions given to that Envoy had, on the contrary, made me fear that Russia, in adhering wholely and simply to the proposition the most unfavourable to the Viceroy, might tend to increase the difficulty of an approximation between the views of the Cabinets of London and of Paris. We were the more surprized at this, because the Imperial Government, while repeatedly manifesting its regret that the Porte and the Pasha had not been left to settle their differences directly in the month of July last, had given reason for thinking that it would, without hesitation, have consented to conditions much more advantageous to the Pasha than those which we now propose. Assuredly, so complete a change in its manner of viewing the question would have been far from obtaining a sufficient justification in the simple fact of the offer of mediation made on the 27th of July to the Porte, since that offer did not by any means imply, on the part of the Powers, the promise of an active intervention, having for its object to obtain for the Sultan any given stipulations.

Such, M. le Baron, are the observations which I had to make to you on the letter of M. de Nesselrode. You will be pleased to read this despatch to that Minister and to give him a copy of it.

Accept, &c.,

(Signed) MARECHAL DUC DE DALMATIE.

No. 458.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 27.)

(Extract.) *Paris, January* 24, 1840.

I THIS day, at an interview I had with Marshal Soult at the Foreign Office, inquired from him what was the view taken by the French Government of the communication received from the French Ambassador in London.

The Marshal immediately sent for Count Sébastiani's despatch, which begins by saying that the communication made to the Ambassador by your Lordship was merely a sketch (*une ébauche*) of a project of Convention, on which you were desirous to have the opinion of the French Ambassador before you submitted it, in a more finished shape, to the consideration of the Cabinet. Count Sébastiani then states the propositions made by your Lordship in this sketch, for bringing about the settlement of the Turco-Egyptian Question.

I did not enter into any discussion with the Marshal regarding these propositions, but I observed to his Excellency, that the mode of proceeding adopted by your Lordship afforded a strong demonstration of your wish not to act separately from France upon the Affairs of the East, and that I had no doubt this early and frank communication of your Lordship's present views of this question, under the alteration of circumstances caused by the Court of St. Petersburgh's admission of the principle of the defence of the Straits of Constantinople being confided to other Allies of the Porte as well as to Russia, would be duly appreciated by the French Government.

The Marshal unhesitatingly expressed his obligation to your Lordship for this mark of confidence, but he appeared to be in expectation of receiving an official communication from the English Government to the same effect. I observed to him that your Lordship must naturally look for a confidential reply to your confidential communication, before you proceeded to make any proposition officially to the French Government, and that I was surprised none had been sent. His Excellency then told me that the Council were to assemble at the Tuileries this evening to deliberate upon the contents of Count Sébastiani's despatch.

The Marshal did not specify any particular objection to any one of the Articles of the proposed sketch of Convention; he approved of the plan of the Five Powers concluding, in the first instance, the Convention with the Porte, but doubted much the acquiescence of Russia in that plan, inasmuch as it would annul the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, and make Turkey a component part of the European system, from which it had hitherto been the policy and endeavour of the Russian Cabinet to exclude it.

His Excellency did not believe that the interception of supplies by sea from Egypt into Syria, would occasion any serious embarrassment to the Egyptian Army under Ibrahim Pasha, and he considered that the result of the proposed arrangement would be only to prolong the actual relative position of the two parties.

No. 459.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 30.)

My Lord, *Paris, January* 27, 1840.

I HAVE received your Lordship's despatches to the 24th of January. Marshal Soult informed me this morning, that a despatch would be sent by a courier this evening to Count Sébastiani, in reply to your Lordship's communication to the French Ambassador. The Marshal said to me, that by the acquiescence of Russia in a Treaty between the Five Powers and the Porte, a point of great importance would be gained, but he had no expectation of the Emperor authorizing his Plenipotentiary to enter into such a Convention.

His Excellency did not communicate to me what answer his despatch would contain relative to the other points of your Lordship's Proposition.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 460.

The Duc de Dalmatie to Count Sébastiani.—(Communicated by Count Sébastiani, February 4.)

Monsieur le Comte, *Paris, le* 26 *Janvier,* 1840.

J'AI reçu la dépêche que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire sous le No. 9. L'importance des informations qu'elle contient a fixé la plus sérieuse attention du Gouvernement du Roi. Vous comprendrez que je ne m'explique pas encore d'une manière complète sur la communication de Lord Palmerston. Le caractère tout confidentiel de cette communication, dont les bases mêmes et à plus forte raison la rédaction n'étaient pas encore définitivement arrêtées par le Cabinet Britannique, appelle d'autant moins de notre part une réponse immédiate et officielle que, dans une pareille matière, le fond ne peut guère être apprécié indépendamment de la forme. Quoiqu'il en soit, et sans m'arrêter à des points de détail qui pourraient demander des éclaircissemens, je n'hésite pas à dire qu'en ce qui concerne le mode de la protection à accorder à la Porte contre un mouvement éventuel d'Ibrahim Pacha sur Constantinople, les modifications proposées par Lord Palmerston au plan du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg, me paraissent constituer une amélioration considérable. L'idée de faire intervenir la Porte dans le traité qui réglerait ce mode de protection, est surtout une conception très-heureuse et d'une grande portée.

Je regrette de ne pouvoir approuver également dans le projet de Lord Palmerston, ce qui se rapporte aux arrangemens territoriaux à conclure entre le Sultan et le Vice-Roi. Nous persistons à croire que ce Ministre ne tient pas suffisamment compte des ressources de Méhémet Ali, de l'énergie de son caractère, et de l'impossibilité morale qu'un homme de cette trempe accepte, sans résistance, des conditions qui lui ôteraient avec une si grande partie de sa puissance matérielle, toute la force d'opinion dans laquelle réside son principal appui. Plutôt que de les subir, je suis convaincu qu'il s'exposerait aux plus grandes extrémités, et que, tout en s'abstenant peut-être de marcher sur Constantinople, il n'hésiterait pas à envahir la Mésopotamie, à enlever à la Porte des provinces dont les ressources lui permettraient d'opposer aux résolutions des Puissances la résistance la plus énergique.

Contre de telles entreprises que pourraient les moyens de coaction indiqués par le nouveau projet Anglais? Que pourraient même l'intervention Russe dans les limites où il tend à la contenir? n'est-il pas évident qu'une fois entrées dans cette voie, les Puissances n'auraient d'autre alternative que de reculer devant l'audacieuse attitude de Méhémet Ali ou de recourir au seul moyen réel de protéger la Porte en autorisant l'intervention Russe dans le sens le plus étendu? A moins d'abandonner le Sultan à sa faiblesse, ne seraient-elles pas forcées de souffrir qu'une armée Impériale traversât l'Asie Mineure et la Syrie, pour refouler jusqu'en Egypte les soldats du Vice-Roi? Je ne pense pas que cette extrémité pût convenir à l'Angleterre, plus qu'elle ne nous conviendrait à nous-mêmes.

En vous signalant l'insuffisance des voies coërcitives proposées par le Cabinet de Londres, j'ai voulu surtout vous faire remarquer ce qu'il y a de contradictoire entre la grandeur des concessions demandées à Méhémet Ali et la faiblesse des moyens par lesquels on se propose de les lui arracher. Sans doute le Cabinet de Londres se persuade que ce Pacha cédera à la première démonstration des Puissances, et que hors d'état de suffire longtems aux charges d'un *statu quo* rendu plus gênant et plus onéreux pour lui par l'espèce de blocus qu'on établirait sur la côte de Syrie, il s'empressera de s'y soustraire en acceptant l'arrangement qui lui sera offert. Je crois fermement que c'est une erreur, et que même en admettant, ce qui n'est guère probable, que Méhémet Ali ne se fit pas un jeu de jeter l'Europe dans les complications les plus effrayantes plutôt que de se soumettre aux injonctions des Puissances, la prolongation du *statu quo* actuel avec ses incertitudes et ses dangers, serait tout au moins la conséquence de sa résistance passive. Il faudrait étrangement méconnaître la situation respective des deux parties pour croire que cette prolongation fût plus désavantageuse au Vice-Roi qu'au Sultan.

Dans l'état où la Porte est aujourd'hui réduite, elle a particulièrement besoin pour se remettre, pour reprendre le degré de consistance et de solidité exigé par l'intérêt général, de repos, de sécurité, d'un sentiment de confiance dans l'avenir. De tels avantages sont bien autrement importans pour elle que celui de recouvrer immédiatement la possession de quelques provinces qu'elle serait peut-être fort embarrassée d'avoir à gouverner, et dont, en tout cas, la souveraineté lui serait conservée. Mais la Porte ne peut recueillir ces avantages que par une prompte réconciliation avec Méhémet Ali; et pour que cette réconciliation ait quelque chance de durée, il faut qu'elle repose sur des bases qui soient dans une juste proportion avec la force et la puissance des Parties Contractantes.

Telles sont, M. le Comte, les raisons qui nous font considérer comme dangereuse et impraticable la tentative d'imposer à Méhémet Ali les conditions énoncées dans la communication de Lord Palmerston. Il n'y a de notre part ni obstination, ni prédilection aveugle, ni engagement d'aucune sorte. Nos motifs sont tous puisés dans l'intérêt général, dans la force des choses, et dans des convictions profondes. Que Lord Palmerston les considère surtout comme inspirés par le plus vif désir de nous entendre, et d'établir entre nos deux Gouvernemens cette identité de vues et de tendances qui serait la meilleure garantie de la paix du monde comme des intérêts des deux pays.

Je n'ai pas besoin de vous dire que le Gouvernement du Roi s'en rapporte entièrement à vous quant au choix du moment et de la forme qui vous paraîtront les plus propres à produire avec avantage les argumens que je viens de vous suggérer.

Agréez, &c.,
(Signé) MARECHAL DUC DE DALMATIE.

(Translation.)

The Duc de Dalmatie to Count Sébastiani.—(Communicated by Count Sébastiani, February 4.)

Monsieur le Comte, *Paris, January* 26, 1840.

I HAVE received the despatch marked No. 9, which you have done me the honour to write to me. The importance of the information which it contains has fixed the most serious attention of the Government of the King. You will understand, that I do not as yet explain myself fully upon the subject of Lord Palmerston's communication. The strictly confidential character of this communication, of which even the bases, and still less therefore the form, had not yet been definitively arranged by the British Cabinet, requires so much the less an immediate and official answer on our part, as in such a matter the substance can hardly be taken into consideration independently of the form. Be that as it may, and without stopping at points of detail which might require explanations, I do not hesitate to say, that in what relates to the mode of protection to be afforded to the Porte against any eventual movement of Ibrahim Pasha upon Constantinople, the modifications proposed by Lord Palmerston to the plan of the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, appear to me to constitute a considerable improvement. The idea of bringing in the Porte as a party to the treaty for regulating this mode of protection, is above all a happy conception and one of great scope.

I regret that I cannot equally approve of that part of the project of Lord Palmerston, which refers to the territorial arrangements to be concluded between the Sultan and the Viceroy. We persist in thinking that this Minister does not sufficiently take into account the resources of Mehemet Ali, the energy of his character, and the moral impossibility that a man of that stamp should accept without resistance, conditions which would deprive him, with so large a portion of his physical power, of all the force of opinion in which his principal strength consists. Rather than submit to them, I am convinced that he would expose himself to the greatest extremities, and that, although perhaps refraining from marching upon Constantinople, he would not hesitate to invade Mesopotamia, and deprive the Porte of provinces the resources of which would enable him to oppose the most energetic resistance to the resolutions of the Powers.

Against such enterprises, what could the means of coercion indicated in the new English plan avail? What could even the Russian intervention avail, in the limits within which that plan professes to restrict it? Is it not evident, that having once entered upon this course, the Powers would have no other alternative but either to retire before the bold attitude of Mehemet Ali, or to have recourse to the only real means of protecting the Porte, by authorising a Russian intervention in its most extended sense? Unless they abandon the Sultan to his weakness, would they not be obliged to allow an Imperial army to traverse Asia Minor and Syria, in order to drive back the soldiers of the Viceroy into Egypt? I do not think that this extreme measure would suit England any more than it would suit us.

In pointing out to you the insufficiency of the coercive measures proposed by the Cabinet of London, I have been especially desirous of directing your attention to the disproportion between the magnitude of the concessions demanded of Mehemet Ali, and the weakness of the means by which it is proposed to extort them from him. No doubt the Cabinet of London persuades itself that the Pasha will yield to the first demonstration of the Powers, and that, incapable of sustaining for any time the charges of a *status quo*, rendered more galling and onerous to him by the sort of blockade which would be established on the coast of Syria, he would hasten to extricate himself from them by accepting the arrangement which would be offered to him. I firmly believe that this is an error, and that even admitting, which is scarcely probable, that Mehemet Ali would not play the game of involving Europe in the most alarming complications rather than submit to the injunctions of the Powers, the prolongation of the present *status quo*, with its uncertainties and its dangers, would at the least be the consequence of his passive resistance. It would be a strange misconception of the respective position of the two parties, to think that this prolongation would be more disadvantageous to the Viceroy than to the Sultan.

The Porte, in the state to which it is now reduced, especially requires for its recovery, for its restoration to the degree of strength and solidity demanded by the general interest, repose, and security, and a feeling of confidence in the future. Such advantages are of much more importance to the Porte than that of immediately recovering the possession of some provinces which it would perhaps be very much embarrassed to have to govern, and the sovereignty of which would in any case be preserved to it. But the Porte can only obtain these advantages by a prompt reconciliation with Mehemet Ali; and in order that this reconciliation may have any chance of duration, it should be founded upon bases which are in due proportion to the force and to the power of the Contracting Parties.

Such, M. le Comte, are the reasons which lead us to consider as dangerous and impracticable, the attempt to impose upon Mehemet Ali the conditions announced in the communication from Lord Palmerston. There is on our part neither obstinacy nor blind predilection, nor engagement of any kind. Our motives have all their source in the general interests, in the force of circumstances, and in deep convictions. Let Lord Palmerston consider them, above all, as inspired by the most earnest desire to come to an understanding, and to establish between the two Governments that identity of views and motives, which will be the best guarantee for the peace of the world as well as for the interests of the two countries.

I need not say to you, that the Government of the King leaves entirely to your discretion the choice of the moment and the mode which may appear to you most proper to bring forward with advantage the arguments which I have just suggested to you.

Accept, &c.
(Signed) MARECHAL DUC DE DALMATIE.

No. 461.

Sir George Hamilton to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 30.)

(Extract.) *Berlin, January* 20, 1840.

THE French Chargé d'Affaires at this Court has communicated to Baron Werther, the Russian Minister, and myself, part of a despatch which he received on the 18th instant, from Marshal Soult, informing him that Her Majesty's Government had rejected M. de Brunnow's propositions, as they were found to be inadmissible both in form and substance; and that your Lordship was about to bring forward counter-propositions. This information astonished both Baron Werther and myself, more particularly as his letters from London made no mention of such a fact.

I am informed that it was likewise stated in Marshal Soult's despatch, that the territorial arrangements proposed by M. de Brunnow did not meet with the approbation of Her Majesty's Government, as they were more favourable to Mehemet Ali than those contemplated by your Lordship.

No. 462.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 31.)

My Lord, *Therapia, January* 8, 1840.

I INCLOSE reports from Alexandria, for which I am indebted to the Internuncio. They may be interesting to your Lordship as confirmatory of other information.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 462.

M. de Laurin to the Baron de Stürmer.

(Extrait.) *Alexandrie, le* 23 *Décembre*, 1839.

LE bateau à vapeur du Grand Seigneur, le "Peiki Chewket," arriva ici dans la matinée du 18 Décembre. Il nous amena Kiamil Pacha, ci-devant Ministre à Berlin. La curiosité que l'apparition de ce dignitaire excita à Alexandrie était telle qu'on sût le motif de sa mission avant qu'il n'eût mis pied à terre.

Tandis que le bateau jetait l'ancre, Kiamil Pacha fut questionné par les amis de Méhémet Ali s'il était porteur de la nouvelle de la destitution de Hosrew Pacha, ou bien de celle de sa mort, et d'un arrangement définitif de l'Affaire Egyptienne.

Aussi des bruits dans ce sens coururent incessamment en ville. Mais dès que Kiamil Pacha eut déclaré franchement qu'il n'avait rien de semblable à mander par rapport à Hosrew Pacha, et que sa mission n'avait pas trait à la Question Egyptienne, l'émotion causée d'abord par son arrivée se calma, d'autant plus qu'il se répandit bientôt la nouvelle qu'il n'apportait que le Hatti Chérif de Goulhané, et qu'il se rendrait, après l'avoir transmis au Vice-Roi, au Caire, pour y faire proclamer solemnellement le contenu de ce document.

Le Président du Conseil des Muavin, Houssein Pacha, eut l'ordre d'aller au-devant de Kiamil jusqu'en bas de l'escalier du Palais, et de l'introduire à Méhémet Ali. La cérémonie se passa tout simplement. Le Vice-Roi reçut le Hatti Chérif de la main de Kiamil Pacha, le porta à son front et à sa bouche, et après un entretien confidentiel d'une demie-heure dans lequel il fut arrêté que Kiamil Pacha partirait le 21 Décembre pour le Caire, accompagné de Habib Effendi, ancien Chiaja de cette ville, que le Hatti Chérif y serait proclamé, registré et communiqué en copie à toutes les autorités provinciales, le Ministre de la Porte se rendit dans la maison du Divan Effendi où on lui avait préparé des appartemens.

Méhémet Ali ne parut ni se réjouir ni s'embarrasser de la mission de Kiamil Pacha. Il fit accréditer l'opinion parmi le peuple, que ce Hatti Chérif n'était autre chose que l'Ibka ordinaire par lequel on le confirmait dans sa dignité.

Le départ de Kiamil Pacha et de Habib Effendi pour le Caire eut effectivement lieu le 21 Décembre à 9 heures.

(Translation.)

M. de Laurin to the Baron de Stürmer.

Alexandria, December 23, 1839.

THE Grand Signor's steam-boat, "Peiki Chewket," arrived here on the morning of the 18th of December. It brought us Kiamil Pasha, formerly Minister at Berlin. The curiosity excited at Alexandria by the appearance of this dignitary was so great, that the motive of his mission was known before he landed.

While the steamer was casting anchor, Kiamil Pasha was questioned by the friends of Mehemet Ali, whether he was the bearer of the news of the dismissal of Hosrew Pasha, or of that of his death and of a definitive settlement of the Egyptian Question.

Rumours of this nature spread immediately through the town; but the moment that Kiamil Pasha declared frankly that he had nothing of that nature to communicate respecting Hosrew Pasha, and that his mission did not relate to the Egyptian Question, the emotion caused by his arrival subsided, more especially when he soon after announced that he was merely the bearer of the Hatti Sheriff of Gulhane, and that he was proceeding, after having delivered it to the Viceroy, to Cairo, in order to cause the contents of the document to be solemnly proclaimed there.

The President of the Council of the Muavin, Houssein Pasha, was ordered to go and meet Kiamil at the foot of the staircase of the palace, and to introduce him to Mehemet Ali. The ceremony was of the ordinary kind. The Viceroy received the Hatti Sheriff from the hands of Kiamil Pasha, carried it to his forehead and to his mouth, and after a confidential interview of half an hour, during which it was settled that Kiamil Pasha should set out on the 21st of December for Cairo, accompanied by Habib Effendi, formerly Chiaja of that city, and that the Hatti Sheriff should there be proclaimed, registered, and copies communicated to all the provincial Authorities, the Minister of the Porte repaired to the house of the Divan Effendi, where apartments had been prepared for him.

Mehemet Ali did not seem either to rejoice at, or to be embarrassed by, the mission of Kiamil Pasha. He caused the opinion to be spread among the people that this Hatti Sheriff was nothing more than the customary Ibka, by which he was confirmed in his dignity.

The departure of Kiamil Pasha and Habib Effendi for Cairo did, in fact, take place at 9 o'clock, on the 21st of December.

Inclosure 2 in No. 462.

M. de Laurin to the Baron de Stürmer.

M. le Baron, *Alexandrie, le* 28 *Décembre*, 1839.

LE changement d'uniforme de la Marine de Sa Hautesse est en rapport avec une autre disposition que Méhémet Ali vient de faire. Ce changement n'a rien moins pour but que la fusion de tous les équipages du Sultan avec ceux de Méhémet Ali. L'autre prescrit que, pour le moment, la moitié des officiers et charges subalternes de la Flotte Egyptienne doit passer à bord des vaisseaux Ottomans, et *vice versâ*. Mais il est à prévoir que cette mesure, qu'on met déjà à exécution, sera suivie d'une fusion générale des équipages dès que les habillemens commandés seront prêts.

Le but avoué de cette disposition est d'apporter plus d'unité dans les manœuvres et dans l'action. Cette mesure doit avoir été provoquée par Ahmed Fevzi Pacha, qui pense, dit-on, que la flotte du Sultan gagnera beaucoup sur le rapport de l'instruction et du service matériel, en observant attentivement les Arabes, qui sont plus adroits et plus agiles.

Mais ce n'est pas ce but que s'est proposé Méhémet Ali. Il parait avoir remarqué que la flotte Ottomane n'est pas animée à son égard des sentimens les plus pûrs. Il sait même qu'il y aurait probablement une émeute dans le cas où le paiement de la solde éprouverait les délais qui ne sont ici que trop d'usage. C'est pourquoi il cherche à prévenir, à temps, un semblable évènement, et il se voit d'autant plus sûr à ce sujet que, par toute sorte d'artifices, il a fait accroire aux équipages que sa cause est identique avec celle du Sultan. Pour mieux encore remplir ce but, il a sévèrement ordonné qu'à bord les deux flottes on ne parlera du Sultan qu'avec la soumission et le respect qui lui sont dûs en sa qualité de Père commun de la Patrie et de Chef de l'Etat.

Aujourd'hui, Ahmed Fevzi Pacha donne à dîner à Méhémet Ali et aux Etat-Majors des Flottes Turque et Egyptienne. Les officiers et les matelots y prendront part, de sorte qu'il y aura en tout 1000 couverts. Ce dîner aura lieu à bord du vaisseau "Mahmoudié," de 130 pièces de canon. L'effet que ces nouvelles ont produit sur les Francs et les Turcs de cette ville est que Méhémet Ali a enfin levé le masque et s'est formellement approprié la flotte du Grand Seigneur.

Agréez, &c.,
(Signé) LAURIN.

(Translation.)

M. de Laurin to the Baron de Stürmer.

Sir, *Alexandria, December* 28, 1839.

THE change in the uniform of His Highness's Navy is connected with another proceeding of Mehemet Ali. This change has no less an object in view than the amalgamation of the crews of the Sultan with those of Mehemet Ali. The other directs that for the present one-half of the officers and subalterns of the Egyptian fleet shall remove on board the Turkish ships, and *vice versâ*. But it is to be anticipated that this measure, which is already being carried into execution, will be followed by a general amalgamation of the crews, the moment that the clothes, which have been ordered, shall be ready.

The avowed object of this proceeding is, to produce a greater unity of action in the manœuvres. This measure would seem to have been brought about by Ahmed Fevzi Pasha, who, it is said, thinks that the Sultan's fleet will gain a great deal of instruction in practical service, by observing with attention the Arabs, who are more active and expert.

But this is not the object of Mehemet Ali. He appears to have remarked, that the Ottoman fleet is not animated by the purest feelings towards himself. He is even aware that there would probably be a disturbance in case any delays, such as are only too common here, were to take place in furnishing the pay. It is with this view that he seeks to guard against such an event in time; and he thinks himself the more secure on this head, because he has used all kinds of artifice to make the crews believe that his cause is identical with that of the Sultan. In order the better to attain this end, he has strictly enjoined that no one on board the two fleets shall speak of the Sultan without the submission and the respect due to him, in his capacity of common Father of the Country and Chief of the State.

To-day Ahmed Fevzi Pasha gives a dinner to Mehemet Ali and to the Staff of the Turkish and Egyptian Fleets. The officers and the sailors are to take part, so that there will be 1000 guests in all. This dinner will take place on board the "Mahmoudie," of 130 guns. The effect produced by these tidings upon the Franks and Turks of the City is, that Mehemet Ali has at length thrown off the mask, and formally appropriated to himself the Fleet of the Grand Signor.

Accept, &c.,
(Signed) LAURIN.

No. 463.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 31.)

My Lord, *Paris, January* 29, 1840.

MARSHAL SOULT last night informed me that the Baron de Bourqueney would be despatched this day to London, for the purpose of apprizing Count Sébastiani that the King had determined to relieve his Excellency from the duties with which he was now charged at the Court of Her Majesty, and that it was the King's intention to mark his sense of the services of Count Sébastiani, by advancing him to the dignity of Marshal of France.

Marshal Soult at the same time told me that M. Guizot would be named Ambassador to England.

In reply to this communication, I said that Her Majesty's Government would much regret the departure of Count Sébastiani, who has been animated with the most sincere desire to maintain the best understanding between France and England, during the whole period that he has occupied the important post from which he was about to be relieved, and had by his honourable and straightforward conduct conciliated the good opinion and respect of those with whom he had to do; but that they would learn with pleasure His Majesty's gracious intention to confer the high dignity of Marshal of France upon Count Sébastiani.

That with respect to the appointment of M. Guizot to the vacant Embassy, his high reputation could not fail to secure to him a most favourable reception by Her Majesty and by Her Majesty's Government.

M. Guizot has just called upon me, and said he was glad to have the opportunity of assuring me that Count Sébastiani could not have been more anxious than he will be, to maintain the most intimate alliance between the British and French Governments.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 464.

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January* 31, 1840.

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch, of the 24th instant, reporting a conversation which your Excellency had held with Marshal Soult on the subject of a confidential despatch which the Marshal had received from Count Sébastiani, relative to the negotiations now carrying on in London upon the affairs of Turkey and Egypt, I have to state to your Excellency, that I showed Count Sébastiani, confidentially, on paper, a sketch of the plan which had suggested itself to me, as one to which all the Five Powers might agree. But I have not as yet been able to mature that plan sufficiently to be able to submit it for the consideration of the Cabinet; and of course, therefore, I have not yet made any formal proposition to any of the Plenipotentiaries of the Four Powers.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 465.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 31, 1840.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, December* 27, 1839.

IT has been for some time known at this place, that great discontent exists amongst the crews of the ships belonging to the Turkish squadron, and that this circumstance has caused considerable anxiety to Mehemet Ali, and led him to the determination of amalgamating the crews of the Turkish and Egyptian squadrons.

M. de Laurin, the Austrian Consul-General, called upon me this day, and confirmed what I have stated to your Lordship, adding that Mehemet Ali had ordered 15,000 Egyptian uniforms to be made for the Turkish sailors, who are all well disposed to exchange their present Frank costume for that of the Ottomans. M. de Laurin further informed me that Mehemet Ali is assigning an equal number of Egyptian and Turkish officers on board the Sultan's squadron, expecting thereby to avert the dangers that are already impending.

The Viceroy gives this day a dinner on board the "Mahmoudié," the Capudan Pasha's flag-ship, to the officers of all ranks of the combined Turkish and Egyptian fleets.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 466.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 31, 1840.)

(Extract.) *Alexandria, December* 27, 1839.

I HAVE just learnt that a considerable military movement has taken place in Syria. The garrison of Marash, which is now 9,000 strong, is to be increased to 12,000, and the works of St. Jean d'Acre, which are already formidable, are to be put into a perfect state of defence.

No. 467.

The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 1.)

(Extract.) *St. Petersburgh, January* 14, 1840.

THE Russian Government are anxiously awaiting the determination of Her Majesty's Government, as to the course of action to be adopted independently of France, if France should refuse to concur in the settlement which may be determined upon by the other Powers of Europe. I expressed to Count Nesselrode my personal conviction, that Her Majesty's Government would proceed with the vigour and consistency with which they had hitherto acted, and which the conduct of the Emperor was so well calculated to inspire, and deserved to meet with.

No. 468.

Viscount Palmerston to the Marquess of Clanricarde.

(Extract.) *Foreign Office, February* 3, 1840.

HER Majesty's Government approve the language which your Excellency held to Count Nesselrode, as reported in your despatch of January 14, respecting the course which Her Majesty's Government would pursue in the Turco-Egyptian Question.

No. 469.

Mr. Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 3, 1840.)

My Lord, *Damascus, December* 23, 1839.

I HAD the honour of addressing your Lordship, my last despatch, on the 28th ultimo, per Beyrout sailing packet.

His Excellency Ismael Bey proceeded from hence on the 17th instant, to the Naplouse district, with rather a considerable irregular force of foot and cavalry, ostensibly to collect taxes due to the Government.

A regiment of Cavalry and one of Horse Artillery have arrived here from the north, and remain in garrison. One regiment of Infantry is also arrived at Hamah. The 18th Infantry has marched from hence to Acre; the Government here says it is to garrison that fortress, but I am told it is destined for Egypt. The cause stated for these troops having been marched from the north, principally from Antioch, is that, having suffered from sickness, their removal from thence became indispensable, and that they are merely to winter in the Damascus district and the south; whether the stations they now occupy may have been decided on from any political motive connected with the future state of this country, your Lordship can best judge. Nothing at present denotes that the troops on the Marash frontier and at Orfa will fall back, or that those in the environs of Aleppo will retire to the south.

I hear that the Emir Bechir has succeeded in re-establishing order on the roads between Acre, Tyre, and this place, infested by the Mutualis under Sheik Hussein Shebib, but he with his partizans, now reduced to about twenty persons, have not been apprehended; the Government has threatened to destroy the houses of all those who are found absent, or suspected of being so, to join this Chief, which strong measure has produced, for the present, the effect of reducing these insurgents.

The country, in other respects, is quiet, and as winter is setting in, it may be hoped that it will remain so, as the country is not adapted for marauding or insurrectionary movements during the inclement season.

The Pilgrim Mecca Caravan is on its departure. The number of Turks is very small, not above 600. The Persians are about 800. A combination of circumstances seems to tend to deter yearly the Islams from undertaking this religious journey.

Commerce of all kinds is in a very languid and depressed state, arising chiefly from the limited extent of operations with Bagdad, whose markets are influenced by the state of Persia, and the great influx of goods to them. The uncertain political position of this country materially increases the paralysis which pervades the whole system in Syria; and the late rigorous exaction of taxes, by the Government, on the agricultural classes, has tended to prevent, in many parts, the cultivation of lands.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) N. W. WERRY.

No. 470.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received February* 3.)

(Extract.) *Paris, January* 31, 1840.

I HAVE received your Lordship's despatches to the 28th instant.

Marshal Soult this morning read to me a despatch received yesterday from Count Sébastiani, stating that your Lordship had submitted to the Cabinet Council the proposition that the Turco-Egyptian Question should be settled by a Convention to be concluded between the Sultan and the Five Great Powers, and not, as had been intended, by a Convention to which the Sultan was not previously invited to be a Contracting Party, and that Her Majesty's Council had unanimously approved of this proposal.

The Marshal said, that his own opinion entirely coincided upon this point with that of Her Majesty's Government, and that this communication from the French Ambassador gave him great satisfaction. He doubted, however, very much, that the Court of St. Petersburgh would agree to this proposition.

The Marshal calculated the time that must necessarily elapse before a Plenipotentiary from Turkey could arrive in London from Constantinople, and seemed to rejoice that during the next two months the French Government would not be under the necessity of refusing or assenting to be a party to a Convention of the Five Powers regarding the Affairs of the East.

I sounded Nouri Effendi, the Turkish Ambassador at Paris, whether he would go to England and sign a Convention, in case he should be invited so to do, for the purpose of expediting an arrangement which must otherwise be delayed for a length of time. His Excellency said that he had no orders from his Government which would justify his taking such a step, and he could not quit his post, and enter into a negotiation in London upon his own responsibility.

No. 471.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 11.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, December* 30, 1839.

IN reference to my despatch of the 27th instant, I have been given to understand, both by M. de Laurin and others, that nothing of any particular importance took place on the occasion of the dinner given by Mehemet Ali on the 27th, on board the "Mahmoudié." Mehemet Ali made great professions of loyalty and devotion to the Sultan before the Turkish officers, saying, that it would afford him great satisfaction to renew similar occasions of cementing those sentiments which were happily now in common amongst them all for the good of their country.

The Austrian and Russian Consuls-General called upon the Pasha yesterday: the former questioned him as to his object in placing an equal number of Egyptian and Turkish officers on board the Turkish squadron. Mehemet Ali replied, "that he had done so at the request of Ahmed Capudan Pasha and the two other Admirals, who seeing the superiority in the discipline and manœuvring of the Egyptian squadron, thought it advisable to adopt this system for placing the crews of both the fleets on an equal footing of efficiency." The Austrian Consul-General inquired his object in changing the uniforms of the Turkish sailors. "This measure I have also resorted to at the suggestion of the Capudan Pasha," replied Mehemet Ali, "and I know it will be popular among the sailors themselves, who are anxious and willing to change the Muscovite costume for that of the Turkish." "But all this," replied M. de Laurin, "coincides badly with your assurances that you only detained the Turkish squadron for a time, without considering them at all as forming part of your own forces." "What I am doing," replied Mehemet Ali, "is but natural and just: I shall give up the Turkish squadron as soon as the differences between the Porte and myself are arranged; and if, in the interim, I am attacked by any Foreign Power, I will use it as a means of defence; which my present position would fully justify." Count Medem informs me that his conversation with the Pasha was of a similar nature.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 472.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 11.)

(Extract.) *Alexandria, January* 4, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship, that I waited upon His Highness Mehemet Ali yesterday, at 10 o'clock, A.M., and presented to him my exequatur from the Porte. I found with his Highness, Ahmed Capudan Pasha, Boghos Bey, and the first Dragoman, Artin Bey. The Pasha said, that he had always received with pleasure the firmans of the late Sultan announcing the appointment of British Agents, and that the circumstance of his present youthful Sovereign being a particular friend of the British Government enhanced it greatly on this occasion. The Capudan Pasha then retired; although I had met him at Constantinople on two occasions, I as pointedly as I could avoided recognizing him.

The Pasha opened the conversation by saying, in reply to a desire which I expressed of seizing the opportunity of accompanying him to see Cairo, that that depended not on him, but upon the English Government, in whose hands now rested the option of good or evil in the settlement of his question with the Porte. I begged to assure his Highness of the friendly intentions of Her Majesty's Government; and assured him, that whatever his own opinions might be, no Power could be more interested in his prosperity; but at the same time announced to him the positive determination of Her Majesty's Government to adhere to the line of policy which it had definitively adopted on this subject, and of which an additional proof was afforded to his Highness, by the nomination of a new Agent to enforce it. His Highness might rely upon my faithfully expressing the intention of Her Majesty's Government, unbiassed and uncontrolled by any consideration. I then proceeded to acquaint His Highness impressively, that it was England's firm determination to maintain the integrity of Turkey under its present dynasty; and that any opposition offered by His Highness could only entail upon him the most ruinous consequences; for that Her Majesty's Government were determined to carry out their policy by measures which could leave no doubt as to the spirit of it, even if they acted alone. The Pasha was evidently much agitated, and I awaited his reply, when Boghos Bey, who stood by him, requested him to be composed, and to allow me to proceed. Finding that his Highness was not disposed to continue the subject, I remarked that Prince Metternich, with whom I had a short time ago an opportunity of conversing upon the Oriental Question at Vienna, had authorized me to state to his Highness, that the Austrian Government were determined to back the policy of England to its fullest extent; and that he believed the other Powers were equally agreed upon the subject; and for the correctness of which statement I referred his Highness to M. de Laurin, the Austrian Consul-General. Mehemet Ali here burst forth violently, that "much words were useless. I don't deny the power of England, nor can I tie her hands; but if they pretend to confine me within the limits," meaning, I presume, of Egypt, "I swear that I will do anything before I submit to be thus sacrificed; as for supporting the Turkish dynasty, who can be more zealous than I am? the very people about me would rise against me, were I to attempt its overthrow." I said, that the occupation of the Turkish provinces in Asia Minor was incompatible with such an assertion; to which the Vizier replied, that before the battle of Nezib it was not concealed at Constantinople that unless he had a predominant share in the administration of the Empire, it could never be restored to any degree of quiet or order, owing to the obstinacy of Hosrew Pasha; even the affections of that man (the Capudan Pasha, who had retired,) were alienated. "I now hold firm possession of those provinces, and still they are not submissive. I am an old man, upwards of seventy-one, but I will never consent to the cession of them during my life-time." The Pasha confirmed this determination with a solemn oath, and evinced a desire to cease the conversation. He had much reliance on the justice and humanity of England, and was sure she would hesitate ere she caused the effusion of blood which might spring from her present policy. "Write," said he, "and I will answer all." I remarked in conclusion to his Highness, that the nature of my communication to him was perfectly confidential, and by no means official, and actuated by the best motives; and that I should feel very happy to renew the theme whenever he felt disposed to do so.

Although my personal knowledge of the Pasha is of a very short duration, it was evident to me, from his manner and gesture, that he was labouring under great anxiety of mind, and incertitude of action; and I believe that I may, even after so short a residence in this country, assure your Lordship that Mehemet Ali will submit, as soon as he sees a force able to compel him to do so at hand, but not until then.

No. 473.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 11.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, January* 4, 1840.

AFTER my interview with Mehemet Ali yesterday, a Council was summoned at an unusual hour, where the withdrawal of the troops from the Hedjaz, for the reinforcement of the garrison of Alexandria, was taken into consideration. This force, I am told, does not exceed 4,000 men; and it has been decided to hold them in readiness to march upon this point. Instructions have been given to the squadrons and telegraphs, to bring into use and familiarize themselves with the French Code of Signals.

These circumstances may be deemed worthy of notice, and I therefore beg leave to report them for your Lordship's information.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 474.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received February* 11.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, January* 6, 1840

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship, that a few hours after the arrival here of the French steamer from Marseilles, M. Cochelet, Consul-General for France, waited upon the Pasha, and made to him the following communication:—"That Russia had made many concessions to the other Powers, and was about to identify her policy with that of England and Austria by uniting her force to theirs for the termination of the Egyptian Question; that to such an union France could not object, and that it was even one to which she herself might possibly become a party; that it was necessary for the Pasha to be convinced, that the arrangement of the Egyptian Question, upon the basis proposed by France, was no longer attainable. M. Cochelet went on to warn the Pasha of the dangers to which he would expose himself by a perseverance in his present course. To this the Pasha replied, that having exercised moderation in preventing his army from advancing upon Constantinople after the battle of Nezib, he relied upon the Great Powers taking this circumstance into consideration; that even the oppressed were entitled to justice; that he would await events, and place his confidence in Divine Providence.

Count Medem, Russian Consul-General, called upon the Pasha soon after, and made a similar declaration on the part of his Government; adding, "If you should attempt to move on Constantinople, you may expect to have a Russian force opposed to you." The Pasha answered, "I have no thoughts of moving upon Constantinople, for I am not able to contend with one Power, much less with all."

I have since learnt, from a source on which I can place reliance, that the Pasha has declared to the people about him, that he will surrender his just rights only with his life; using the words, "They must first trample on my body."

In addition, I have only to state that, from everything I can hear and learn, Mehemet Ali will only submit when he sees the danger near at hand.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 475.

Sir George Hamilton to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received February* 11.)

My Lord, *Berlin, February* 5, 1840.

I HAVE learnt from an authority upon which full reliance may be placed, that a letter has within a few days been received at Berlin from a Prussian Artillery officer at Constantinople, in the service of the Porte, who was present at the battle of Nezib, in which the writer states his opinion, that notwithstanding the completion of the fortifications at the passes of Boghas Kulek, near Koniah, the Turkish Army in Syria would not be able to prevent the advance of Ibrahim Pasha on Constantinople, of which fears were entertained.

This officer, however, adds his impression, that Ibrahim would not have it in his power to muster on the Asiatic coast of the Bosphorus, a larger force than

15,000 men, and that the Turkish garrison of Constantinople, together with 2,000 Artillerymen withdrawn from the Dardanelles, would be sufficiently strong to resist the passage of the Bosphorus, and an attack upon Constantinople by the Pasha, whose failure in the object of his attempt would, probably, lead to the total destruction of his army.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GEORGE B. HAMILTON.

No. 476.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received February* 11.)

My Lord, *Therapia, January* 15, 1840.

I INCLOSE a letter from Mehemet Ali to the Grand Vizier.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 476.

Mehemet Ali to the Grand Vizier.

(Traduction.)

J'AI eu l'honneur de recevoir des mains de Kiamil Pacha, Général de Brigade dans l'Armée Impériale régulière, deux nobles firmans ornés d'un Hatti Chériff, et adressés l'un à votre serviteur, et l'autre à mon fils, son Excellence Ibrahim Pacha, dont la substance est: que Sa Majesté Impériale, animée de la pensée du bien public, a exprimé dans un Hatti Chériff qui vient d'être publié, sa volonté souveraine d'établir de nouvelles institutions tendant à l'amélioration de l'état des provinces, et du sort des peuples ; que les bases fondamentales du Hatti Chériff, dont les conséquences nécessaires ont été développées, sont :—la garantie de la vie et de l'honneur ; le mode d'asseoir les impôts ; et la règle à observer dans la levée des soldats et dans la durée de leur service ; qu'attendu la difficulté qu'il y a à exécuter tout de suite les mesures relatives à la perception des impôts et à la durée du service militaire, on doit continuer de percevoir les impôts et d'employer les soldats comme à l'ordinaire, jusqu'à ce que des dispositions calculées à faciliter ces deux objets aient été arrêtées dans les Conseils ; et que quant aux autres points déjà développés, on doit commencer à les mettre à exécution dès-à-présent.

J'ai reçu les firmans avec tous les honneurs qui leur étaient dûs, en les portant sur mes lèvres et sur mon front, et afin de remplir à cette occasion toutes les formalités requises, j'ai envoyé au Caire avec Kiamil Pacha celui qui m'était adressé, pour y convoquer une grande assemblée et l'y faire lire ; j'en ai expédié des copies dans les chefs-lieux des provinces et des sandjacks de la Syrie, et j'ai expédié à mon fils, Ibrahim Pacha, le firman qui était à son adresse, pour qu'il eût à le faire lire publiquement à Adana, et qu'il en envoyât une copie à Djidda.

Effectivement, une assemblée a été tenue au Divan du Caire, à laquelle ont assisté le Cadi, les Mouftis des quatre Rits Orthodoxes, tous les Oulémas, Imaums, Hatibs, les principaux des habitans, tous les serviteurs de Sa Hautesse, les Vice-Consuls des Puissances Amies, et les Patriarches et les notables des autres Nations Chrétiennes. Là le Firman a été ouvert et lu avec toutes les démonstrations de la vénération et du respect, et aussitôt la lecture terminée, tous les assistans ont béni le Sultan et fait des vœux pour la conservation de ses jours précieux et pour la prospérité de son Empire.

Dieu soit loué! C'est dans le tems du très-grand, très-puissant, et très-Auguste Sultan régnant que vont revivre les Lois Divines et la Législation qui, à cause des circonstances, se trouvent depuis nombre d'années tombées dans l'inobservation. Cette sollicitude Souveraine fait voir que la Providence Divine veille sur la conservation de l'Empire, et sur le bonheur et la prospérité de Sa Hautesse. Mais tant que les réglemens de justice dont il s'agit n'auront pas été établis, c'est en vain que les Ministres de la Sublime Porte, hommes doués de loyauté, de dévouement, de zèle, et de piété, s'efforceront et prendront mille peines pour faire le bien, chacun dans la partie qui le concerne, durant l'exercice de ses fonctions; car il est clair que là où un bon principe n'existe pas, il n'y a aucun bon effet à attendre.

Le pays où je me trouve est à l'extrémité de l'Empire, et c'est avec de grands efforts que j'ai réussi, il y a déjà plusieurs années, à y établir la garantie de la vie, de l'honneur et de la fortune. Ici nul n'est mis à mort qu'il n'y ait été légalement condamné. Les puissans ne molestent en aucune manière les faibles, ni dans leur honneur ni dans leurs biens. La confiscation, la condamnation à l'amende, et les payemens à faire aux Moubashirs (officiers chargés du recouvrement des monnaies) ont été supprimés et remplacés de tems à autre par d'autres réglemens. Nul n'est condamné à subir par la loi du talion une peine encourue par un autre. On fait toucher exactement aux héritiers, quelle que soit la nation à laquelle ils appartiennent, la part qui leur est échue, et l'on a de tems en tems, et lorsque l'occasion se présentait, rédigé des Codes de peu d'étendue et à la portée de chacun, qui sont, sous les auspices du Sultan, maintenus en vigueur.

Il existe surtout des codes militaires pour l'armée et la marine lesquels ont été sanctionnés par la signature des Oulémas, et doivent, ainsi que la résolution en a été prise, avoir toujours force de loi.

Tels sont les réglemens qui ont été établis et dont on ne s'est jusqu'ici jamais écarté. Après cela, on avait fixé à cinq ans, à compter du jour de l'enrôlement, le terme du service militaire. Mais plus tard, en considération de l'exigence des tems, et par des raisons locales, le service a été fixé à quinze ans. D'autres excellentes dispositions de ce genre ont aussi été faites avec succès. Mais attendu la difficulté qu'il y a à faire ces sortes de réglemens, aucune branche de ces institutions n'a pu être portée à sa perfection.

Que Dieu daigne conserver la prospérité de l'Empire de Sa Hautesse jusqu'à la consommation des siècles. Fort de la volonté que Sa Majesté Impériale vient de manifester, je mettrai désormais tous mes soins à exécuter, avec l'assistance divine, toutes les dispositions que renferme le susdit noble firman; et sous les auspices de Sa Majesté Impériale, toutes auront sous peu de tems été mises à exécution.

Et c'est pour exprimer toute ma reconnaissance ainsi que pour renouveler mes hommages, que j'écris à votre Altesse la présente lettre, que je lui envoie par Kiamil Pacha qui s'en retourne à Constantinople.

(Translation.)

Mehemet Ali to the Grand Vizier.

I HAVE had the honour to receive from the hands of Kiamil Pasha, General of Brigade in the regular Imperial Army, two noble firmans adorned with a Hatti Sheriff, and addressed, one to your servant, and the other to my son his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha, the substance of which is, that His Imperial Majesty, animated with a desire for the public welfare, has signified, in a Hatti Sheriff just published, his sovereign will to establish new institutions tending to ameliorate the state of the Provinces and the condition of the people: that the principal bases of the Hatti Sheriff, the necessary consequences of which have been explained, are: security of life and honour; the manner of assessing the taxes; the regulations to be observed in the conscription of soldiers and in the duration of their service; but inasmuch as it is difficult to put into immediate execution the measures relating to the collection of the taxes and to the duration of military service, the taxes are to be collected, and the soldiers to be employed in the usual manner, until arrangements calculated to facilitate these two objects have been determined upon in the Councils; and with regard to the other points already mentioned, they are to be carried into execution from the present time.

I have received the firmans with all due honours, raising them to my lips and to my forehead, and in order to discharge on this occasion all the necessary formalities, I have sent the one addressed to myself to Cairo, by Kiamil Pasha to convoke a great assembly, and cause it to be read therein; I have sent copies of it to the chief places of the Provinces and Sandjacks of Syria, and I have sent to my son

Ibrahim Pasha the firman which was addressed to him, that he may cause it to be read publicly at Adana, and send a copy of it to Djidda.

In effect, an Assembly has been held at the Divan of Cairo, at which were present the Cadi, the Muftis of the four orthodox rites, all the Ulemas, Imaums, Hatibs, the principal inhabitants, all the servants of His Highness, the Vice-Consuls of the friendly Powers, and the patriarchs and chief men of the other Christian nations. There the firman was opened and read with every demonstration of veneration and respect, and at the conclusion, all present blessed the Sultan, and prayed for the preservation of his precious life, and for the prosperity of his Empire.

God be praised! It is in the time of the most great, most powerful, and most august reigning Sultan, that the divine laws and legislation which, from circumstances have for a number of years past fallen into neglect, are about to revive. This sovereign care shows that Divine Providence watches over the preservation of the Empire and over the happiness and prosperity of His Highness. But so long as the rules of justice in question are not established, it is in vain that the Ministers of the Sublime Porte, men endowed with loyalty, devotion, zeal, and piety, labour and take a thousand pains to do good, each in the matter which concerns him, during the exercise of his functions; for it is evident that where no good principle exists, no good result can be attained.

The country where I am, is at the extremity of the Empire, and it is now some years since I succeeded in establishing in it security for life, honour, and property. Here no person is put to death who has not been legally condemned. The powerful do not, in any manner, injure the weak, either in their honour or in their property; confiscation, condemnation to fines, and payments made to the Moubashirs (officers employed in the recovery of money), have been suppressed, and other regulations substituted for them from time to time. No person is made answerable for a crime committed by another. Heirs, to whatever nation they may belong, are put duly in possession of the inheritance to which they may succeed, and from time to time, and as opportunites presented themselves, codes of moderate length and within the capacity of every one, have been drawn up, and are maintained in vigour under the auspices of the Sultan.

There are also military codes for the army and navy, which have been sanctioned by the signature of the Ulemas, and which are always to have, as was determined, the force of law.

Such are the regulations which have been established and which have hitherto never been departed from. After that, the term of military service was fixed at five years, to date from the day of enlistment. But, latterly, in consequence of the exigencies of the times, and for local reasons, the term of service has been fixed at fifteen years. Other excellent arrangements of this sort have been made with success. But the difficulty of making these regulations, has prevented any branch of these institutions from being brought to its perfection.

May God deign to preserve the prosperity of His Highness's Empire to the end of time. Strong in the pleasure which His Imperial Majesty has manifested, I shall henceforth employ all my diligence to execute, with the divine assistance, all the regulations which the before said noble Firman contains; and under the auspices of His Imperial Majesty they shall all be put in execution in a short time,

And it is to assure you of all my acknowledgments, and to renew my compliments, that I write to Your Highness the present letter, which I send by Kiamil Pasha, who is about to return to Constantinople.

No. 477.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received February* 11.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, January* 15, 1840.

I INCLOSE two reports from Syria.

Inclosure 1 in No. 477.

Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Ponsonby.

(Extract.) *Aleppo, December* 24, 1839.

HIS Highness the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha continues to occupy Marash, and, from all appearances, has not the intention for the present of abandoning that point, or retiring the force he has with him from that position.

The forces at Orfa remain without any further change than that noted in my last despatch to your Lordship, that the 11th and 17th Regiments of the Line in garrison here left this for Orfa; and since then the 9th and 14th Regiments of the same, who were at Orfa, have replaced them here, where they continue to remain.

The 13th Regiment of Cavalry stationed here has also received orders to proceed south to Acre, for which place it has left; and the 2nd Regiment of Artillery has returned to its post here, from Aintab.

It is rumoured, that some of the other regiments that are at present at Aintab are soon to come to this place to winter; and the Government here, I understand, has already prepared and emptied several khans for their reception.

I learn from several quarters, that some of the regiments from the Adana district, and some of those that have occupied the north-eastern frontier, have also been sent to the south, to their respective garrisons. This measure, and the disposition of the forces returning south, is generally supposed to be for the purpose of placing all the troops into quarters suited for the severe months of the winter season which has approached.

By the latest advices from the Alexandretta district, I learn from Mr. Vice-Consul Hays, that for the present everything continues quiet; and that the inhabitants of the neighbouring mountains have not evinced any further symptoms of discontent against the Government, which continues to exact the taxes.

Inclosure 2 in No. 477.

Mr. Consul Werry to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Damascus, December* 28, 1839.

I HAD the honour of addressing your Lordship, per Austrian steamer, on the 4th instant.

The 16th Regiment of Infantry, which arrived here from the north, has proceeded to Acre. A regiment of Horse Artillery, and one of Cavalry, has been stationed here; and one regiment of Infantry has arrived at Hamah.

I hear the Mutuali Sheik, Hussein Shebib, who infested the environs of Tyre, has, with a few followers, entered the Ledgea. The Government here expects that the Snutt Arab, Sheik Antash, will cause them to be seized and delivered up to this Government. Twenty-two Mutualis have been brought here and delivered to the Government, by the Emir Bechir's grandson, forming part of Hussein Shebib's followers. Two of them killed a Catholic Greek priest at Korsheya, and have committed various depredations and robberies. They are to suffer death, and the rest are to be sent to Acre. In other respects the country is for the present quiet.

I hear that the Egyptians are as active as they were previously represented to be, in Arabia.

I do not observe any fresh measure of Government which is indicative of its future policy. Affairs remain in the same state which I had the honour of noticing to your Lordship in my last despatch.

Your Lordship will be informed by the Aleppo Pro-Consul of the expected arrival of troops there, from the northern frontier. Ibrahim Pasha was still at Marash. The troops are said to be expected at Aleppo from that point, and no mention is made of those at Orfa retiring, though, I hear, quarters are preparing at Aleppo for ten regiments. Whether this retrogade movement is owing to the bad quarters to the frontiers, ill adapted to winter, to the sickly state of the troops, or is a prelude to the settlement of the question between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, your Lordship can best determine.

The Pilgrim Mecca Caravan has left this city. The number of pilgrims is very small, being about 800 Persians and 600 Turks. The fervour of the Mahommedans seems to diminish annually for this pious journey.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) N. W. WERRY.

P.S.—Ismael Bey has proceeded with a considerable force of Irregular Cavalry and of Foot, to collect Miri due in the Naplouse district.

No. 478.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received February* 12.)

My Lord, *Paris, February* 10, 1840.

I RECEIVED, yesterday, your Lordship's despatch of the 7th instant, with its inclosures.

The appointment of M. Guizot to be Ambassador at the Court of London is notified in the "Moniteur" of this day.

I, yesterday, stated to M. Guizot, as well as to Marshal Soult, that your Lordship thought it essential in the present state of things, when the negotiation of an arrangement with the Three Powers about the affairs of Turkey was in progress, that a French Ambassador should be on the spot with whom you might communicate on that subject; and I learnt from them that, twenty-four hours after the arrival of Count Sébastiani, with whom M. Guizot was desirous of having some conversation, he would be prepared to leave Paris. Count Sébastiani is expected here on Saturday; M. Guizot will, therefore, set off probably for London the beginning of next week.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 479.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received February* 12.)

My Lord, *Paris, February* 10, 1840.

THE despatches lately received from M. Cochelet state, that since the last interview which took place between Colonel Hodges and Mehemet Ali, the Pasha has expressed his determination to decline all verbal communications with the Consuls of the Great European Powers, and that he is occupied in preparing naval and military means of defence. To a certain degree this account is confirmed by letters which have been received here from the Russian Consul at Alexandria, who, however, subsequently to the audience of Colonel Hodges, had a conversation with Mehemet Ali, in which the Pasha observed to him, that if the Egyptian garrison quitted Candia, the island would not fall under the dominion of the Turks, but be under the government of the native Greeks; and that with regard to the Holy Cities in Arabia, if they should be evacuated by the Egyptians, they will fall an easy prey to the tribes of the Wahabites.

Count Medem, the Russian Consul, is of opinion that the arming of the workmen at Alexandria and in the adjacent cities, will not give to Mehemet Ali an efficient military force; but he agrees in opinion with the French Consul, that the Pasha will not be induced, by any fear of the hostility of the European Powers, to abandon the possession of Syria; and that from the crops in Egypt having been last year abundant, he has still considerable pecuniary resources.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 480.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 13.)

My Lord, *Therapia, January* 18, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith an abstract of Kiamil Pasha's report of his mission to Egypt, which has been communicated to me by the Porte; and also a copy of a letter from Mehemet Ali to the Consul-General of France, relative to his Arabian possessions.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

P.S.—It is striking that Mehemet Ali, in his letter to M. Cochelet, relating to his affairs in Arabia, treats this matter as if all his exertions were to be considered to have been made by an independent Sovereign, and not by a subject and officer of the Sultan, and as if the means, military and civil, employed, belonged to Mehemet Ali by right, and not to the Porte.

Inclosure 1 in No. 480.

Report of Kiamil Pasha.

(Traduction.)

KIAMIL PACHA a été chargé de porter à Méhémet Ali et à son fils Ibrahim Pacha, les Firmans Impériaux qui leur avaient été adressés relativement aux institutions salutaires qu'on est maintenant occupé à établir et à exécuter dans les Etats de la Sublime Porte.

A son arrivée à Alexandrie, lui-même ainsi que le Firman dont il était porteur ont été parfaitement bien accueillis par le Gouverneur qui leur rendit tous les honneurs d'usage. Ensuite Méhémet Ali envoya le dit Pacha au Caire, où il fit lire publiquement le Firman en présence des Oulémas, des principaux habitans et des Vice-Consuls des Puissances amies. Cette déclaration du Sultan, si marquée au coin de la justice, a été pour tous les habitans de l'Egypte le sujet de la joie la plus vive et la plus parfaite. Le Firman adressé à Ibrahim Pacha lui a été expédié par son père, qui a annoncé qu'il en enverrait aussi des copies dans les divers districts de la Syrie.

Voici, en substance, ce qu'a dit Méhémet Ali dans les entretiens qui ont eu naturellement lieu sur la question du jour. Parlant de ce qu'on avait laissé les Puissances Européennes se mêler de l'arrangement de l'affaire, il indiqua, par voie d'allusion, qu'elles ne pouvaient pas, sans raison, s'imposer tant de dépenses et d'embarras; qu'elles devaient avoir des vues particulières et agir en cela selon leurs intérêts politiques*. Cela l'amena à entamer de nouveau la question d'un arrangement direct. Il dit que pourvu qu'on lui laissât l'Egypte et la Syrie, ses intérêts à lui ne seraient pas compromis si on donnait à un autre les contrées situées plus en arrière, ainsi que le Hédjadj; que, par conséquent, il consentait à ce qu'on disposât de la province de Djidda en faveur d'un autre, mais qu'il ne se désisterait pas de la Syrie. Mais Kiamil Pacha n'ayant point de mission relative à des objets politiques, n'est entré dans aucune espèce d'explications qui auraient eu l'air d'une réponse.

Le ci-devant Grand-Amiral Ahmed Pacha que Kiamil Pacha eut mission de voir, affecta de ne témoigner aucun repentir de sa conduite, qu'il voulait expliquer par quelques interprétations futiles. Néanmoins le seul aspect d'Ahmed Pacha trahit les remords qui lui déchirent le cœur. Les généraux et officiers de la Flotte Impériale déplorent unanimement d'avoir été trompés, et ils cherchent par leurs instances à hâter le moment de leur retour à Constantinople.

Voici ce que contient le Rapport de Kiamil Pacha.

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* Mehemet Ali said, "Russia seeks to obtain Constantinople, and England Egypt."

(Translation.)

Report of Kiamil Pasha.

KIAMIL PASHA was instructed to convey to Mehemet Ali and to his son Ibrahim Pasha, the Imperial firmans which were addressed to them respecting the salutary institutions which are about to be established and carried out in the dominions of the Sublime Porte.

On his arrival at Alexandria, he, as well as the firman of which he was the bearer, were perfectly well received by the Governor, who paid them all the usual honours. Afterwards Mehemet Ali sent the Pasha in question to Cairo, where he caused the firman to be publicly read in the presence of the Ulemas, of the principal inhabitants, and of the Vice-Consuls of the friendly Powers. This declaration of the Sultan, so marked with the stamp of justice, has formed the subject of the most lively and most sincere joy to all the inhabitants of Egypt. The firman addressed to Ibrahim Pasha was despatched to him by his father, who announced that he would also send copies of it to the different districts of Syria.

The following is the substance of what Mehemet Ali said in the interviews which have naturally taken place upon the question of the day. Speaking of the circumstance that the European Powers had been allowed to interfere in the arrangement of the matter, he remarked, incidentally, that they could not, without a motive, take upon themselves so much expence and embarrassment; that they must have some particular objects and act thereupon according to their political interests*. This led to his entering afresh upon the question of a direct arrangement. He said that, provided they would leave him Egypt and Syria, his own interests would not suffer if the countries situated further in their rear, as well as the Hedjaz, were given to another; that, consequently, he consented that the province of Djidda should be placed at the disposal of another, but that he would not give up Syria. But Kiamil Pasha having no commission with regard to political objects, he entered into no sort of explanation which could have the appearance of an answer.

The late Grand Admiral, Ahmed Pasha, whom Kiamil Pasha was instructed to see, pretended to show no feeling of repentance for his conduct, which he tried to account for by some futile explanations. Nevertheless, the countenance alone of Ahmed Pasha betrays the feelings of remorse which agitate his mind. The generals and officers of the Imperial fleet unanimously lament having been deceived, and they seek by their importunity to hasten the moment of their return to Constantinople.

The above are the contents of the Report of Kiamil Pasha.

Inclosure 2 in No. 480.

Mehemet Ali to M. Cochelet.

(Traduction.)

CHACUN sait que la Porte sous les trois derniers règnes se voyant dans la nécessité de chasser du Hédjadj les Wéhabites qui l'avaient envahi, avait chargé les Gouverneurs de Bagdad, de Damas, et d'Egypte, de cette entreprise. Mais le dernier surtout avait été plus particulièrement encouragé par les faveurs les plus flatteuses. Sorti des rangs de l'armée, jaloux d'être compté parmi les défenseurs de l'Etat, je me chargeai seul de la conduite de l'expédition. A force de peines et de sacrifices je délivrai les lieux saints de la présence de l'ennemi. C'était servir à la fois la religion Musulmane et l'Empire Ottoman. Aussi rien ne fut-il épargné pour la défense des pays reconquis.

Cependant la garde des lieux saints coûtant beaucoup et exigeant une armée considérable, je pensai que le moyen de diminuer la dépense et d'assurer à l'avenir la tranquillité, serait d'aller subjuguer chez eux-mêmes les habitans de l'Assir (les Wéhabites), lorsque j'appris que ceux-ci, suivant l'exemple de leurs

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* Mehemet Ali said, "Russia seeks to obtain Constantinople, and England Egypt."

ayeux, voulaient, dans des vues hostiles, s'emparer de divers points sur la côte du Yémen. Persuadé que s'ils n'étaient prévenus, ils recommenceraient à troubler la paix de l'Empire, je songeai à prendre les mesures nécessaires pour amener leur soumission complète. C'est pour parvenir à les chasser du Yémen qu'il fallait y envoyer une armée et y ordonner des dispositions capables de les soumettre. L'éloignement de l'Assir, sa situation dans un désert, nécessitaient de vastes moyens de transport pour une armée avec ses munitions et ses bagages. Le Nédjid pouvant seul fournir les chameaux dont on avait besoin, il fallait encore envoyer des troupes dans cette province pour se les procurer. Le Nédjid n'a été évidemment occupé que pour parvenir à la soumission de l'Assir et pour garantir par ce moyen la religion et l'Etat des dangers qui les menaçaient. Je le répète, mes guerres dans l'Hédjadj, toutes les dépenses que j'ai faites, n'ont eu absolument d'autre but que de servir ma nation et mon souverain.

A la fin du dernier règne, Edhem Effendi, Dignitaire de la Porte, étant venu en mission en Egypte, la conversation vint à rouler sur le rebelle Turktchebilmez. A quoi pensiez-vous, lui di-je, en le nommant Gouverneur de Djidda? C'était agir plutôt dans mon intérêt que dans le vôtre. La Porte en se chargeant de gouverner elle-même l'Arabie, m'épargnerait une dépense annuelle de 135,000 à 140,000 bourses qui pourront servir à me fortifier de ce côté-ci. Ce n'est par là, répondit-il, l'unique erreur que nous ayons commis.

En définitive, si par suite de mon dévouement à ma nation et à mon Souverain, l'Arabie m'est accordée temporairement, je continuerai à faire mes efforts pour la défendre; mais j'aime trop mon pays et mon Gouvernement pour proposer d'abandonner de moi-même cette province. Seulement si l'on désire qu'elle soit gouvernée par la Porte, que l'ordre me vienne de me retirer, et je rappellerai aussitôt mes troupes sans faire la moindre difficulté pour l'évacuer.

(Translation.)

Mehemet Ali to M. Cochelet.

EVERYBODY knows that the Porte, under the three last reigns, finding itself under the necessity of driving out of the Hedjaz the Wahabees, who had invaded that territory, charged the Governors of Bagdad, Damascus, and Egypt with this undertaking. But the last of these was, above all, more particularly encouraged by the most flattering marks of favour. Sprung from the ranks of the Army, eager to be reckoned among the defenders of the State, I undertook alone the conduct of the expedition. By dint of labour and of sacrifices, I delivered the Holy Places from the presence of the enemy. Service was thus rendered at once to the Mahomedan religion and to the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, nothing was spared for the defence of the reconquered countries.

However, the keeping of the Holy Places costing a great deal and requiring a considerable Army, I thought that the way to diminish the expence and to secure tranquillity for the future, would be to proceed to subdue in their own country the inhabitants of Assir (the Wahabees), when I learnt that, following the example of their ancestors, they wished, with hostile intentions, to seize upon different points on the coast of the Yemen. Being persuaded that if they were not prevented, they would begin again to disturb the peace of the Empire, I determined to take the measures necessary for bringing about their complete submission. In order to succeed in driving them out of the Yemen, it was necessary to send thither an Army, and to make such arrangements there as would be likely to bring them under subjection. The distance of Assir, and its situation in a desert, required great means of conveyance for an Army with its ammunition and baggage. The Nedjid being alone able to furnish the camels which were required, it was also necessary to send troops into that province to procure them. The Nedjid was evidently only occupied in order to bring about the subjection of Assir, and to secure by that means the Religion and the State from the dangers which threatened them. I repeat, that my campaigns in the Hedjaz, and all the expence which I have incurred, have positively had alone for their object the service of my nation and my Sovereign.

At the end of the last reign, Edhem Effendi, a dignitary of the Porte, having come upon a mission to Egypt, the conversation turned upon the rebel-

lious Turktche-bilmez. What were you thinking of, I said to him, when you appointed him Governor of Djidda? You were thus consulting my interests more than your own. The Porte, by undertaking itself to govern Arabia, would save me an annual expence of from 135,000 to 140,000 purses, which will serve to strengthen me on this side. That, he answered, is not the only mistake which we have committed.

Finally, if in consequence of my devotion to my nation and to my Sovereign, Arabia is temporarily granted to me, I will continue to endeavour to defend it; but I love my country and my Government too much to propose of my own accord to abandon that province. But if it is desired that it should be governed by the Porte, let me receive orders to withdraw, and I will recall my troops without making the least difficulty as to evacuating it.

No. 481.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 13.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, January* 12, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship, that the two frigates and two corvettes which I mentioned in my despatch, of the 21st December, having sailed from this port for St. Jean d'Acre, returned here yesterday, and have brought with them 1,930 irregular troops. It is reported that 2,000 more are expected here from the same quarter, and that 3,000 Irregular Cavalry had left Syria by land for Cairo, where it is said Mehemet Ali is now about concentrating a formidable force. The above 1,930 men have already left Alexandria for Cairo, to join the garrison of that place.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 482.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 13.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, January* 12, 1840.

I HAVE just been informed, that on Mehemet Ali's taking leave of Kiamil Pasha, on his return to Constantinople on the 3rd instant, he requested the latter to tell Halil Pasha, that it was his intention to accompany the Turkish fleet to the Bosphorus early in the spring, in order to have the satisfaction of showing to his youthful Sovereign, the alterations he had made in the discipline of the squadron; and the consequent superior precision they had attained in their evolutions.

This intention on the part of the Viceroy is here considered as unlikely to be realized, but I am not disposed to treat it as undeserving of notice, when I take into account his fertility in expedients, and the serious dilemma to which he is verging.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 483.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 13.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, January* 13, 1840.

MEHEMET ALI has ordered the immediate formation of two regiments of National Guards, to be formed from the inhabitants of Alexandria, to consist of 4,000 men. Ahmed El Garbi, an influential and popular Chieftain, has this day been raised to the rank of Bey, and is entrusted with the command of this force.

A National Guard is also to be formed of the inhabitants of Cairo, Damietta, and Rosetta, and it is, I believe, decided to carry into execution this system throughout all parts of the Ottoman Empire over which Mehemet Ali holds controul.

I have, &c.,
Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 484.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 13.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, January* 14, 1840.

INTELLIGENCE has come to me from a source on which I can rely, that Mehemet Ali has been for the last week addressing the crews and officers of the Turkish squadron, telling them their faith and liberties were menaced, he having reason to apprehend an attack from the Allied Powers of Europe. That Great Britain was foremost in the measures towards him, but that he warned all true Mussulmans not to be blinded by professions of support from Powers who only sought their own aggrandisement. That as for the Sultan he was in the hands of designing men; but, that as God was great, he, Mehemet Ali, would try to rescue him from his danger, and maintain him upon his throne; that he would await the Allies patiently and repel them in case of attack; that should he be successful in his repulse of the enemy, he would unite both fleets and give battle to the invading squadrons, and if he were victorious, would carry war into the very heart of those countries that had tried to disturb the peace of Egypt: that he looked for the union of all true Mussulmans, and as his cause was just, he had no doubt of success.

In fact, my Lord, Mehemet Ali has been very successful in demoralizing the crews of the Turkish squadron, and he has, no doubt, become much more popular than before, with both officers and men. The whole of the Turkish officers now appear in the Egyptian uniforms, and the crews will be dressed in the same costume in a few days; they are regularly drilled with muskets once or twice a-week, and the Pasha is careful to make a display of this force by marching it through the crowded streets of Alexandria from the Arsenal to the exercising ground outside the walls.

I waited on the Pasha this morning, and he was not long in expressing his determination to maintain his rights at all risks and hazards; on which I told him of the regret I felt at the tone he had assumed in his harangues to the officers and crews of the Sultan's squadron, and pointed out how much it was at variance with his former professions, not only to the Sublime Porte, but to the Agents of the Great Powers here. To this the Pasha replied, "I have not as yet held the language you impute to me, but if I am driven to it, I shall hold such language, and resort to any means for my defence; for I tell you, if I am attacked, I will resist, and cause much blood to be shed." I then said I was glad he denied using such language, and that as for all his preparations of defence, he was master of his actions, and might do what he thought proper; but that he must well know such preparations would have no effect whatever in thwarting the views of Great Britain and her Allies, or of turning them from their unalterable determination of supporting the Sublime Porte, and restricting him within his due limits. I told him that England had in no way changed her old habits of never coming to a rash decision, but the decision once made, of striking boldly, and with such a force as must command success. I entreated Mehemet Ali to be assured that England would only resort to such a measure when he had proved to us that all means of persuasion were unavailing, and recalled to his memory a circumstance of no remote date, which unhappily might bear a strong analogy to his own case, should he persist in his present course, which was, that Napoleon Buonaparte refused the offer of the Allied Sovereigns that he should be the ruler of France, with the Alps and the Rhine as a boundary, but at a latter period, having sent Caulaincourt to treat with the Allied Powers, his tardy offers of acceptance were rejected.

The Pasha, with some impatience of manner, replied, "There is no use in all this talking. I am determined; you may write to your Government and tell them so."

Notwithstanding all this threat of resistance, I still continue to believe that the Pasha will give in as soon as he sees at hand a force capable of compelling him to submit.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 485.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 13.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, January* 16, 1840.

MEHEMET ALI has loosely spoken of his intention to send to Leeza, under the orders of Deli Mustapha, Vice-Admiral of the Turkish squadron, a regiment of the regular troops of the line on board the Turkish squadron, amounting to 3,000 men, and to augment this force by a corps of 2,000 men, chiefly gunners, belonging to that squadron. This circumstance is as yet only talked of, but I have reason to believe that the Pasha is determined to carry it into execution, which has induced me to call upon the Austrian Consul-General, to consult with him on the measures he proposed to adopt on the occasion. M. de Laurin not appearing to come to a decision, I requested him in his character of Senior of the Foreign Agents, to ascertain from our Colleagues, what their line of conduct would be under the circumstances, stating, at the same time, my fixed determination of officially protesting against such a measure on the part of the Pasha, even alone, should my Colleagues refuse to co-operate with me; M. de Laurin approved of my suggestion, and decided upon consulting with my Colleagues on the subject.

I trust your Lordship will approve of the decision I have come to.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 486.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 13.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, January* 16, 1840.

MEHEMET ALI has addressed a letter of the 3rd instant to Abbas Pasha, Governor of Cairo, desiring him to consult with the Minister of War on the immediate organization of ten regiments, to consist of 3,200 men each, six of which are to be armed and equipped as the regular Turkish regiments of the line, and four as the Bedouin Arabs. These are destined to replace the army of the Hedjaz under Ahmed Pasha. Two regiments of that army, and several squadrons of Cavalry, are ordered to defend the Egyptian frontier from El-Arish to Alexandria. The reasons given by the Viceroy for this movement are, that the Franks pretend to have a right to demand of him the provinces he now possesses, and he has decided upon defending himself at all hazards, and has no doubt that the Franks will pause well ere they dare to attack him.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 487.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 13.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, January* 17, 1840.

THIS morning I had interviews with Count Medem and M. Wagner, the Agents of Russia and Prussia. Count Medem informed me that he had seen the Pasha the day before yesterday, and asked him his reasons for the extensive warlike preparations now going on in Alexandria; to which Mehemet Ali replied, that having been informed by me that it was the intention of Her Majesty's Government to restrict his territorial possessions to Egypt alone, he was determined to resist; and with the exception of Candia, which he could not well defend, he would never cede one inch of the country he now held in his possession. Count Medem replied, that he had better pause and think well on the effect that all this arming might produce on the Great Powers, the majority of which, he was convinced, would never require Mehemet Ali to make unjust sacrifices.

M. Wagner has informed me that, having on a recent occasion had an interview with the Pasha, he expressed himself in the same terms, but with redoubled wrath and anger against Great Britain, which Power he declared to be menacing him for her own selfish ends. That she had been before driven from Egypt, and that if she ventured to trouble the repose of this country again, he would repel her, pursue her squadrons, and carry war into her own islands.

Your Lordship will perceive that the Pasha states to Count Medem that I had told him that he must content himself with Egypt alone, whereas the whole substance and tendency of my communications resolve themselves into two distinct propositions,—that Great Britain entertains the most friendly feelings to Mehemet Ali, and that "no Power could be more interested in his prosperity,"—but that if this question could not be settled consistently with the vital interests of the Ottoman Empire, Great Britain was unalterably determined, with or without her Allies, to strike with such a force as must command success. But your Lordship will perceive, on reference to my correspondence, that I gave no positive or geographical interpretation of what I expressed as the Pasha's "due limits."

Your Lordship will clearly see that words make no impression whatever on the Pasha, and that nothing short of an actual array of military or naval strength will bring him to terms. He may even go the length of allowing himself to be attacked, under the impression that, should he be worsted, the least that the Allied Powers would offer him would be Egypt alone. However, the more diligently and accurately he informs himself of the strength of the squadrons of England, the greater will be his apprehensions for himself, and the greater his readiness to treat with us, if even at the eleventh hour.

Among other symptoms of things taking the turn I have alluded to, I cannot omit mentioning the partial failure of some of his plans of defence; for instance, of the imposing array of National Guards, the formation of which has been so loudly trumpeted, only 300 had been up to yesterday enrolled; nor can he place such implicit reliance upon the Turkish fleet as he would fain have believed. Deli Mustapha Pasha has declared that he will never give up alive that ship which was entrusted to him by the Sultan. In spite of this, my Lord, I believe nothing will bring the Pasha to reason but the appearance of an imposing force off this city to demand and enforce compliance with the terms that may be offered to him.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 488.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 13.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, January* 21, 1840.

I AM not aware that your Lordship has been made acquainted that, about a month previous to my arrival in this country, the Consul-General for France was instructed by his Government to demand of Mehemet Ali an explanation in writing as to the intentions regarding the occupation of the Hedjaz.

I have herewith the honour to inclose to your Lordship a copy of the reply* sent by the Viceroy to M. Cochelet.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

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* See Inclosure 2 in No. 480.

No. 489.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 13.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, January* 23, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship, that Mehemet Ali has received serious interruption in the progress of his warlike preparations. The levée en masse that he had attempted to raise under the name of a National Guard, has dwindled into a force hardly worth naming; he is evidently much depressed and disappointed, and has assumed a tone very different from that which he held a few days ago.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 490.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 13.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, January* 24, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship, that Omer Bey, Rear-Admiral of the Turkish fleet, has refused to accept or wear the new uniform which Mehemet Ali has desired to be prepared for the officers and men of the Turkish squadron.

I this morning had a conversation with M. d'Anastasy, the Swedish Consul-General, who is one of the Pasha's confidential friends and advisers, and on remonstrating on the recent acts and intentions of the Pasha, as regards the officers and men of the Turkish fleet, M. d'Anastasy replied, "Why, what will you have the Viceroy do, when he fears that discontent may manifest itself amongst them?"

I beg leave to acquaint your Lordship, that Mehemet Ali has been forced to abandon his plans for a general armament, finding the impossibility of carrying them into effect. The excuse he gives is, that he is just now reluctant to disturb the Fellahs in their agricultural occupations, and that he defers his project to a more favourable moment.

Mehemet Ali persists, however, in obtaining as many men as he can at Alexandria. He was led to expect that a force would be raised of 12,000, whereas he has been able to embody, up to this date, only 1,600 men.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 491.

The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 15.)

(Extract.) *St. Petersburgh, January* 29, 1840.

YOUR Lordship's despatches to the 6th instant, were delivered to me on the 20th instant.

The Imperial Cabinet are highly pleased by the reports Baron Brunnow has sent home of his reception in London, and of the commencement of his negotiations with your Lordship.

The extent of the powers granted to Baron Neumann have been made known to this Court, and the Russian Government rely confidently upon the firmness and wisdom of the British Cabinet, to bring the Question of Syria to a satisfactory settlement: there does not exist here any apprehension of war, although the recent debates in the French Chambers have put an end to any expectation that France will unite herself in this matter to the other Great Powers.

The French Ambassador received, two days since, a letter from Marshal Soult, in the postscript of which the President of the Council says, that he had just received from Count Sébastiani, information that Her Majesty's Ministers had determined upon the rejection of Baron Brunnow's overtures, or propositions.

No. 492.

Sir George Hamilton to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received February* 17.)

My Lord, *Berlin, February* 12, 1840.

THE Prussian Government have lately made a communication to the Cabinet of the Tuileries, on the subject of the negotiations going on in London on the Oriental Question, which has not met with much success.

Baron Arnim had been instructed to present a Note to the French Government, strongly advising France not to separate herself from the rest of Europe, as the union of the Four Powers was too compact to be resisted, and that it would be for the interest of France to join with them with as little delay as possible. Baron Arnim writes to his Government, that the French Cabinet received the communication with great coldness, and have not yet returned any answer to it.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GEORGE B. HAMILTON.

No. 493.

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February* 18, 1840.

COLONEL HODGES informs me, in his despatch, of the 4th of January, that instructions have been given to the Egyptian squadrons and telegraphs, to bring into use and to familiarize themselves with the French Code of Signals, from whence it might be inferred that the Pasha expected that his ships would have to act in concert with the French squadron. The packet from Marseilles to Alexandria of the 21st of December, if it kept its time, would have arrived at Alexandria early in the morning of the 3rd of January. Colonel Hodges' despatches do not afford means of judging when the packet in question actually arrived at Alexandria; but in his despatch of the 6th of January he mentions that a few hours after the arrival of the packet, M. Cochelet saw Mehemet Ali, and that Count Medem saw the Pasha soon after. Some time, therefore, must have elapsed between the arrival of the packet and the date of Colonel Hodges' despatch of the 6th of January.

In the "Times" newspaper of the 13th instant, accounts are quoted from Toulon of the 6th of this month, stating that a telegraphic despatch had been received on the preceding day, directing the Maritime Prefect to hold a steamer in readiness to sail with pressing orders for M. de Pontois and Admiral Lalande; and that Admiral Rosamel had also been directed to send off three ships of the line to the Archipelago, with various articles indispensable for the fleet, which articles were to be embarked on board the "Neptune," "Suffren," and "Alger."

Your Excellency will see that up to the 4th of February, no extraordinary movement had taken place at Toulon, of the nature referred to in the newspaper which I have quoted. The letters from Alexandria of the 16th of January, appear to have reached London on the morning of the 7th of February, being quoted in the newspapers of that day; and therefore the French Government must have received their despatches from Alexandria of the 16th of January, at the latest, on the morning of the 5th of February.

I mention these coincidences to your Excellency, in order that you may endeavour to ascertain whether the order for the reinforcement to be sent to the French squadron in the Levant has originated in any intelligence received from Egypt.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 494.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received February* 23.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, January* 26, 1840.

MEHEMET ALI, as your Lordship knows, has threatened resistance. He has been busy in endeavouring to seduce the Ottoman officers and sailors. He might risk an expedition against Constantinople with his fleets. He perhaps might bribe the garrison at the Dardanelles, and his presence at the head of a large naval force at Constantinople, would produce more mischief than any other event that can well be supposed possible under existing circumstances. The British fleet alone can give security against the execution of such a project. I presume Her Majesty's Government would not suffer it to be executed.

Mehemet Ali has had time to take his measures to strike such a blow as a desperate man might risk. I would not say that he will not do it, but I am sure it can be prevented with ease. I believe Mehemet Ali knows his own intrinsic feebleness, yet his pride and ambition may be strong enough to make him refuse the possession of Egypt as the price of his submission to the loss of Syria, &c., which it is necessary for the preservation of the European peace should be taken from him.

No. 495.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received February* 23.)

My Lord, *Therapia, January* 28, 1840.

IN consequence of the renewal of Mehemet Ali's threats, I have renewed my endeavours to engage the Sublime Porte to take measures for resisting any attack by sea or land that might be made; and I requested Captain Walker to speak, in my name, to the Capudan Pasha upon the subject, and to suggest such means for his adoption, as appeared calculated to prevent the passage of the Bosphorus or the Dardanelles by Ibrahim's Army, should he ever reach the coast.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 496.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received February* 23.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, January* 28, 1840.

I HAVE heard from his Excellency Rechid Pasha very strong expressions of the impatience the Ottoman Ministers feel for the termination of affairs. He adds, the Porte has entirely confided in the Great Powers, and it will never believe they will abandon the interests of the Sultan.

No. 497.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received February* 23.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, January* 29, 1840.

I LEARN that M. de Pontois has powers to call the French Admiral to the assistance of the Porte, if Mehemet Ali should make an attack.

No. 498.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 23.)

(Extract.) *Paris, February* 21, 1840.

WITH reference to your directions given me on the 18th instant, to take an opportunity of endeavouring to ascertain whether the order for the reinforcement to be sent to the French squadron in the Levant has originated in any intelligence received from Egypt, I have to state, that Marshal Soult, in reply to an observation I made this morning upon the "Alger" and the "Suffren" ships of the line having sailed from Toulon for that destination, said, that these two ships had orders to go, in the first instance, off the coast of Greece near Athens, and would afterwards proceed to join Admiral Lalande, whose squadron had, by the return to Toulon of vessels wanting repair, been reduced to only four ships of the line.

No. 499.

Viscount Palmerston to Colonel Hodges.

Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 25, 1840.

I HAVE received and laid before the Queen your despatches to the 24th of January.

You state in your despatch of the 14th of January, that Mehemet Ali, in a conversation which you had with him on that day, expressed to you his determination to maintain his rights at all risks and hazards.

I have to instruct you, on the next occasion on which Mehemet Ali shall speak to you of his rights, to say to his Highness, that you are instructed by your Government to remind him that he has no rights except such as the Sultan has conferred upon him; that the only legitimate authority which he possesses is the authority which has been delegated to him by the Sultan, over a portion of the Sultan's dominions, and which has been entrusted to him for the sole purpose of being used for the interest of, and in obedience to the orders of the Sultan; that the Sultan is entitled to take away that which he has given; that the Sultan may probably do so, if his own safety should require it; and that if, in such case, the Sultan should not have the means of self-defence, the Sultan has Allies who may possibly lend him those means.

You should also take an occasion of suggesting to the mind of Mehemet Ali, that if it should become necessary to use force in order to coerce him, and if that force should be successful, he might possibly not obtain from the Sultan the terms which had been first proposed to him; that to a garrison which capitulates in time, honourable conditions are granted; but that a garrison which insists upon being stormed, must take the chance of war.

I have further to instruct you to take every proper opportunity and means of endeavouring to explain to the officers of the Turkish fleet, that it is the intention and determination of Great Britain, and of the other Powers in alliance with Turkey, to maintain the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire under its present Dynasty, and not to infringe in any way upon the dignity of the Sultan, nor to trench upon the territory of the Ottoman Empire. That, consequently, those officers have been led into error in imagining that they were serving the interests of the Sultan, or of their country and faith, by going with their ships to Alexandria; and that on the contrary, they have thereby done a serious injury to the very cause which they wished to support; and that the best course which, as good Mussulmans and faithful subjects of the Porte, they could pursue, would be to avail themselves of the first opportunity to return with their ships to Constantinople in order to rally round their Sultan and Caliph, and to defend his person and throne.

I have to add, that you will act in this matter openly, and will make no secret either towards Mehemet Ali or towards your Colleagues, as to the nature of the instructions which you have received with regard to the officers of the Turkish fleet.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 500.

Mr. Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received February* 27.)

(Extract.) *Damascus, January* 18, 1840.

I HAD the honour of addressing your Lordship my last despatch, under the 23rd ultimo.

The Mutuali chief insurgent, Sheik Hussein Shebib, who with his partisans took refuge in the Ledgea, were not suffered to remain there by the Snutt Arabs of that district, headed by Sheik Antash, and on their quitting that stronghold, he with his followers were seized by the Druses of Haouran, and delivered up to the Government here. Hussein Shebib and another Mutuali have been beheaded, and nine sent to Acre; a body of other Mutualis have been also seized by the Emir Bechir's troops, and sent here. The Mutuali insurrection, or rather disorders, may be considered terminated.

The Firman emanated to Mehemet Ali, in consequence of the Sultan's Hatti Sheriff of Gulhané was promulgated here on the 6th instant; it has produced considerable sensation among the population, though very imperfectly understood, as this document was published in Turkish instead of Arabic. I hear a translation is being made in Arabic. The chief authorities of the city were invited, and were present at this ceremony, but the European Consuls received no intimation or information thereon. The impression made on the minds of the majority of the population is, that it is a prelude to the Sultan resuming the Government of Syria, the abolition of Ferdeh, Conscription, Statute labour and requisitions, and the restoration of the old order of Government, all which is congenial to the desire and feelings of the people.

The country is generally in a tranquil state, but dulness and inaction pervade the whole system, and no alteration has taken place in this respect since I had the honour of addressing your Lordship my last despatch.

Mehemet Ali is reported to be daily pushing his influence in the Persian Gulf, and Kourschid Pasha is fortifying himself on the Arabian Coast, but all is quiet for the moment. He will not move until events in the north authorize such a step, as the consolidation of his authority is his primary object. He is reported to be master of a line from the Red Sea to the Gulf; it is presumed he will strengthen himself in both seas, and then will have little left to fight for, if let alone.

I hear from Bagdad, that Ibrahim Pasha's irregular troops have been from Orfa, and attacked and plundered the Arabs under the Sultan's jurisdiction at Khaboor, and induced some to join them, while the Egyptians are still encamped on that river. It is also reported that the Pasha has been tampering with the Chiefs and citizens of Merdin. I hear that these Chiefs sent an invitation to Ibrahim Pasha to occupy that city, of which Inger Mehemet Pasha of Moussoul got information, and proceeded there and decapitated a great many of the Chiefs and a Catholic bishop.

No. 501.

Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received February* 28.)

My Lord, *Aleppo, January* 20, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith, for your Lordship's information, copy of my despatch[*] of the 24th December of last year, which I addressed to Viscount Ponsonby, and which I hope will meet your Lordship's approval.

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[*] See Inclosure 1 in No. 477.

I have nothing fresh or interesting to offer to your Lordship's notice on the state of affairs, coming within the cognizance of this consular district, since the date of the above despatch.

His Highness the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha, who still continues to remain at Marash, has, I learn, been of late a little indisposed, but with nothing serious.

All the Egyptian forces are now cantoned into winter quarters throughout this district, many of them along the north and north-eastern frontier; and others have gone southward for the same purpose.

The whole of this consular district enjoys tranquillity for the present.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) F. H. S. WERRY.

No. 501.

Mr. Consul Werry to John Bidwell, Esq.

(Extract.) *Damascus, January* 23, 1840.

I INCLOSE you a list of the distribution of the Egyptian regular forces in Syria. At Acre very great preparations are making to repair, and put in a state of defence, that important fortress, by rebuilding part of the walls, particularly that towards the sea, and erecting towers and redoubts on the land side. I hear 500 pieces of artillery have arrived there from Egypt, of which 250 are already placed in battery. Every measure is being taken in every part of Syria to resist either effective operations to dislodge the Egyptians, or demonstrations made against them; and however much Mehemet Ali may feign to come into the views of the Sultan's Government, either for internal ameliorations of Government, or for a cession of territory, be assured he is taking every measure to secure at least what he holds, if not to occupy the Pashalic of Bagdad, from both the routes from Bassorah to Bagdad, and from the north by way of Merdin and Moussoul. He still hopes to establish an Arab Empire, to execute which, he must count on the disunion of the Great Powers, and be tacitly understood with one or more of them, as it is not reasonable to suppose he would attempt the execution of this project, unless some European Power countenanced his measures. My advices, both from Bagdad and Moghill, near Bassorah, confirm the Pasha's intentions of occupying the Bagdad Pashalic, which the operations of Kourschid Pasha, holding a line from the Red Sea to the Persian Gulf, and Ibrahim Pasha's troops, from Orfa to the Kaboor, fully indicate, if not to be immediately performed, will henceforward be done without much fighting, if left alone.

Inclosure in No. 502.

Note of the Distribution of the Egyptian Forces.

Aleppo.

9th Infantry.
10th ditto.
14th ditto.
31st ditto.

Killis.

6th Infantry.
34th ditto.
11th Cavalry.

Aintab.

1st Infantry (Guard).
1st Artillery ditto.
2nd ditto, (Foot).
2nd Infantry.
12th ditto.

Orfa.

11th Infantry.
17th ditto.
22nd ditto.

Marash.

2nd Infantry (Guard).
3rd ditto ditto.
4th Infantry.
2nd Cuirassiers (Guard).

Adana.

5th Infantry.

Tarsus.

7th Cavalry.

Maara.

8th Cavalry.

Hamah.

30th Infantry.
1st Artillery (Horse).

Latakia.

2nd Horse Artillery (Guards).

Tripoli.

2 Battalions Sappers.

Idlip.

1st Battalion, Sappers.

Acre.

10th Cavalry.
18th Infantry.

Gaza.

2nd Cavalry.

Jerusalem.

25th Infantry.

Antioch.

29th Infantry.
4th Cavalry.

Damascus.

2nd Horse Artillery (Guards).

Homs.

1st Horse Artillery (Guards).

Taken from the Board of Health at Aleppo, this 6th January, 1840.

(Signed) F. H. S. WERRY.

No. 503.

Mr. Consul Moore to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 28.)

My Lord, *Beyrout, January* 29, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship that the Hatti Sheriff of Gulhané was publicly read at the Seraï at this place, by the Moufti, on the 20th instant, previous notice having been given the same morning in the bazaars of the city.

No notification on the subject was made to Her Majesty's Consulate, nor to any other European authority here. The feeling produced in the country generally, by the publication of the Hatti Sheriff, is one of sincere and undissembled satisfaction.

Such cannot be said to be the case in respect to information which reached this place two days ago from Egypt, relative to the organization in that country by the Viceroy, of a Militia or National Guard. A feeling amounting to consternation has been caused here amongst both Christians and Mahommedans, by this intelligence, and already numbers of persons have concealed themselves, and others contemplate emigrating, from a fear lest a similar regulation should be extended to Syria. If such be the case, it will be received with the utmost dissatisfaction; but I am not prepared to say at present whether any open resistance would or could be offered by the natives.

In other respects, the public tranquillity is undisturbed; but all classes are in a state of deep anxiety as respects the future, with reference to the existing position of affairs between the Porte and Mehemet Ali, and both commerce and public confidence are greatly affected thereby.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) N. MOORE.

P.S.—The effect produced by the information received from Egypt, alluded to, has produced so great and general alarm amongst all classes, that with a view of ascertaining whether there were any positive grounds for supposing the measure would be extended to Syria, I made inquiry last night of Mahmoud Bey, the Governor, on the subject. His Excellency replied, that he was without any information from Egypt relative thereto.

N. M.

I have just learnt that the Governor has issued orders prohibiting the departure from this place of all persons under his jurisdiction, without previous examination into the motives of such departure.

N. M.

No. 504.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 27.)

(Extract.) *Alexandria, February* 6, 1840.

I HAVE not been able to discover any intention on the part of Mehemet Ali to cause his army, under the orders of Ibrahim Pasha, to advance or move from their present position.

No. 505.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 27.)

My Lord, *Therapia, February* 6, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to inclose the translation, which I have only just received, of an article that appeared in the "Moniteur Ottoman."

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 505.

Article from the "Moniteur Ottoman" of February, 1840.

(Traduction.)

PAR suite du changement du Capitan Pacha, annoncé dans le précédent numéro de cette gazette, la Flotte Impériale, qui se trouve à Alexandrie, étant restée sans chef, il était devenu nécessaire de charger quelqu'un parmi les employés du Gouvernement, pour qu'il prît soin de la flotte, et qu'il maintînt une bonne administration parmi les officiers et les équipages.

Or, Moustapha Pacha étant un homme capable et intelligent, et ayant de grandes connaissances dans toutes les parties du service de la flotte, il a plu à Sa Hautesse de le nommer Caïmacam, pour qu'en cette qualité il ait à expédier les affaires qui regardent la flotte, et avoir soin des bâtimens qui la composent.

En conséquence, le Firman qui confère à Moustapha Pacha le poste de Caïmacam, lui a été expédié, et Son Altesse le Grand Vizir a écrit à Son Altesse Méhémet Ali, Pacha d'Egypte, pour l'inviter à faire lire publiquement le Firman ci-dessus mentionné, afin de porter par-là son contenu à la connaissance des officiers et des équipages de la flotte, et à mettre à exécution la volonté de Sa Hautesse.

(Translation.)

Article from the "Moniteur Ottoman" of February, 1840.

IN consequence of the change of the Capudan Pasha, announced in the preceding number of this paper, the Imperial fleet which is at Alexandria being without a chief, it became necessary to employ some one among the servants of the Government to take care of the fleet, and to maintain good government among the officers and crews.

Now, Mustapha Pasha being a man of capacity and intelligence, and having great knowledge in all that relates to the service of the fleet, His Highness has been pleased to appoint him Caimacam, in order that, in that quality, he may despatch the business which concerns the fleet, and may take care of the vessels which compose it.

In consequence, the firman which confers the post of Caimacam upon Mustapha Pasha has been transmitted to him, and His Highness the Grand Vizier has written to His Highness Mehemet Ali, Pasha of Egypt, to request him to cause the above-mentioned firman to be read publicly, in order thereby to make it known to the officers and crews of the fleet, and to carry the will of His Highness into execution.

No. 506.

The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received March* 3.)

(Extract.) *St. Petersburgh, February* 11, 1840.

COUNT NESSELRODE sent me, a few days ago, a copy of the sketch of a Convention which Baron Brunnow submitted to your Lordship, and I had a conversation upon it with his Excellency this morning.

No. 507.

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, March* 5, 1840.

WITH reference to my former instructions to your Excellency, of the 10th and 13th of December of last year, and of the 3rd of January last, upon the subject of the naval armaments now making in the ports of France, I have to state to your Excellency, that Her Majesty's Government have been informed that, in addition to the seventeen sail of the line, of which I sent your Excellency a list in my despatch of the 10th of December and which are either already equipped, or in progress of equipment, for service in the Mediterranean, the "Inflexible," of ninety guns, is getting ready for sea at Rochefort; and that thus the French will soon have eighteen sail of the line, and most of them heavy ships, afloat in the Mediterranean.

If this information be true, this is a matter which must necessarily engage the serious attention of the British Government, and the more especially, because the explanations hitherto given upon this subject by the French Government have been anything but satisfactory.

Her Majesty's Government are not aware that any Naval Power meditates an attack upon France; and Her Majesty's Government do not know of any operations which France can be called upon to undertake in conjunction with other Powers, for which so large a force can be necessary.

But if the French naval force afloat shall be raised to so large an amount it will be impossible for Her Majesty's Government not to make a corresponding augmentation of the British fleet in commission; because neither public opinion in England, nor a due sense of official responsibility, would permit any Administration in this country to leave the British fleet in commission inferior to the fleet of France, so as to give to France the command of the sea; and Her Majesty's Government is persuaded, that whatever exertions may at any time be required on the part of the nation to maintain the position of Great Britain as a Naval Power, those exertions will be cheerfully, promptly, and effectually made.

But it cannot escape the sagacity of the French Government, that such armaments and counter-armanents on the part of France and England, originating in no political necessity, cannot take place without producing effects extremely unfavourable to the maintenance of friendly relations between the two countries.

It is possible, indeed, that some of the ships now ready, or getting ready, at Toulon, may be intended to take the place of some of those now in the Levant, and which, in consequence of the term of service of their crews being over, are to come home, and to be laid up again in ordinary; but though this was intimated by Count Sébastiani, it has never yet been distinctly stated by the French Government.

Your Excellency is instructed to take an opportunity of communicating these remarks to M. Thiers, as I shall do to M. Guizot.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) **PALMERSTON.**

No. 508.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received March* 9.)

My Lord, *Paris, March* 6, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatches to the 3rd instant.

I this morning went to the Foreign Office, intending to communicate with M. Thiers upon several points which I had delayed bringing under the consideration of the French Government, in consequence of the Ministerial interregnum. Our interview was, however, interrupted by the arrival of the Members of the Conseil d'Etat, who came to pay a visit of ceremony to the new President of the Council.

In the short conversation, however, that passed between us, M. Thiers said, that he had read over all the correspondence in his office that had any bearing upon the Turco-Egyptian Question, but that he must consult with his Colleagues upon a question so important as that of the East, before he could explain to me his views, or give instructions to the King's Ambassador in England upon the subject. He considered, however, that until a Turkish Plenipotentiary arrived in London, the question was suspended, and that therefore no inconvenience would arise from this short delay.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) **GRANVILLE.**

No. 509.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received March* 11.)

My Lord, *Paris, March* 9, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge your Lordship's despatches to the 6th instant.

I had this morning a conversation with M. Thiers, upon the subject of the naval armaments in the ports of France. I told him that I had yesterday received a despatch from you, stating that the information which had reached your Lordship regarding the amount of the French naval force actually afloat in the Mediterranean, or getting ready for sea, was such as must necessarily engage the serious attention of Her Majesty's Government; that from this information it appeared, that in addition to a list of seventeen sail of the line which your Lordship had communicated some time ago to Count Sébastiani as being already equipped, or in progress of equipment, the "Inflexible," of ninety guns, was preparing for sea at Rochefort, and that France would, therefore, soon have eighteen sail of the line, and most of them heavy ships, afloat in the Mediterranean; and I observed, that if this information were true, Her Majesty's Government would be compelled to augment proportionally the British fleet, for that neither public opinion in England, nor a due sense of official responsibility, would allow the Ministry to leave to any other nation the command of the sea. I also represented that such armaments and counter-armaments were calculated to have an unfavourable effect upon the friendly relations between the two countries, which it was the acknowledged interest of both to maintain, and which I knew M. Thiers was desirous to cultivate. M. Thiers assured me that the information on which was founded my representation, was erroneous; that the French Government neither had equipped, nor purposed to equip, more than fifteen sail of the line, of which it was intended that nine should be stationed in the Levant, and that six should remain at Toulon. I answered, that fifteen sail of the line appeared a larger force than was necessary for any operations which France could be called upon to undertake in the Mediterranean. To this, the French Minister replied, that for the service of transporting troops to Algiers, and between Algiers and other points on the coast, these large ships were very serviceable; and that, besides, a state of things might occur in the Dardanelles, in which it would not be prudent that the naval force of France and England united, should be less than thirty sail of the line.

M. Thiers then proceeded to say, that whatever turn affairs might take in the East, there was no danger of firing of cannon between our fleets; he hoped that the two Governments might arrive at a concordance of opinion in the Turco-Egyptian Question, but even should they not agree upon the measures to be pursued, such disagreement would not affect the friendly relations between the two countries. I then observed to M. Thiers, that although Count Sébastiani had intimated to your Lordship, that some of the ships mentioned in the list you had shown to his Excellency were to be replaced by others in the list and laid up in ordinary, no distinct statement on this subject had been given by the French Government, and that it would be satisfactory to receive such a document. His Excellency answered, that he had no objection to giving such a statement, but that in these matters there ought to be reciprocity, and that a corresponding statement of the British naval force ought to be offered to the French Government.

Our conversation on this subject ended by M. Thiers saying, that the French Government did not seek to maintain a naval force as large as that of England, but it desired that its Navy should be upon a footing to make it respected, and that its vessels individually should be able to cope with those of America and England.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 510.

The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received March* 11.)

(Extract.) *St. Petersburgh, February* 24, 1840.

COUNT NESSELRODE observed to me in conversation, that it would be very difficult to insist upon the restitution of the Fort of Acre to the Sultan; and I said, my personal opinion was, that your Lordship might be induced to concede it to Mehemet Ali, if thereby the cordial co-operation of France could be secured.

The Russian Ministers seem confident that no foreign force will be required for the defence of Constantinople, and this is their sincere desire.

No. 511.

The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received March* 11.)

(Extract.) *St. Petersburgh, February* 24, 1840.

YOUR Lordship's despatches to the 4th instant, were delivered to me on the 17th inst.

Since writing my preceding despatch, a messenger has arrived from London to Count Nesselrode.

His Excellency says, that he did not anticipate this long delay in negotiating the Convention for the settlement of Syria, which he fears may produce bad consequences, and which he says cannot produce any good result.

Count Nesselrode assured me, that no one could desire more sincerely than did the Russian Government, that France should accede to the proposed Convention; but he said, that he saw no probability, and barely the possibility of such an event; because the basis on which the French Government had desired to open a negotiation, differed so widely from that upon which your Lordship and Baron Brunnow were agreed, that the Cabinet of Paris would have to abandon all the propositions and opinions they had published: besides, the French Government had evinced a determination not to coerce, by hostilities, the Viceroy of Egypt; but coercive measures must undoubtedly now be resorted to.

I repeated to his Excellency my hope, that the delay, and the presence of M. Guizot in London, and of Count Sébastiani in Paris, might lead to a result different from that which he anticipated; but that I should not fail to communicate to my Government, the views entertained by the Imperial Cabinet.

No. 512.

Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale.

(Extract.) *Foreign Office, March* 12, 1840.

I HAVE to inform your Excellency, that owing to the changes which have lately taken place in the French Ministry, and in consequence of its being uncertain whether the Ministry which has been formed at Paris will be able to maintain itself, no further progress has lately been made in the Turco-Egyptian Negotiation. Baron Brunnow and M. de Neumann are naturally very anxious that some definitive determination should be taken by Her Majesty's Government; but it is obviously impossible for Her Majesty's Government to know what to propose to the Governments of Austria, Russia, and Prussia, until Her Majesty's Government shall have been able to ascertain what France may be inclined to accede to, and what she would decline, so that we might know whether it will be possible for the Five Powers to keep together, or whether the Four will be obliged to conduct these matters to a settlement without the co-operation of France. This, however, cannot be ascertained until M. Guizot shall have received his definitive instructions from the new French Ministry. Her Majesty's Government do not at present despair of finding that the opinions of the present French Ministers may approximate more nearly than those of their predecessors, to the views of the Four Powers.

Although M. Guizot has not yet been furnished with instructions calculated to give to what passes between him and me, an official character, or to enable us to arrive at any practical result, yet I have had some conversation with his Excellency, in order to ascertain from him his own views and, as far as he may know them, the views of his Government, and in order also to put him in possession of the views of Her Majesty's Government. The substance of what passed between us is as follows:—

In the opinion of M. Guizot, the Government of France intirely agrees with the Government of Great Britain, in wishing to maintain the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and coincides with us in opinion, that the best arrangement of the pending dispute would be to confine Mehemet Ali to Egypt. But the Government of France, according to M. Guizot, feels convinced that Mehemet Ali would not consent to such an arrangement without compulsion; and the French Government thinks that the means of compulsion which have been suggested by Great Britain would be insufficient. M. Guizot said, that to cut off the communication by sea between Egypt and Syria would have no decisive effect upon Ibrahim's military position in Syria; it would only compel Mehemet Ali to send by land the supplies which his Syrian Army would require, and those supplies would, by means of camels, arrive by land as surely as by sea, though at a greater expence of time and money; that a commercial blockade of Alexandria would annoy France and England more than Mehemet Ali; that any attempt to restore Candia to the Sultan by force, would create a new Greek revolution in that island; and thus, he said, nothing in the opinion of France would be effectual for the accomplishment of the object in view, but the entrance of a Russian Army into Asia Minor. And such a step would, according to M. Guizot, more seriously shake the independence of the Ottoman Empire than anything which could result from the present state of things.

In support of these opinions, M. Guizot argued that the restoration of Syria would not give any real increase of strength to the Sultan; that the Sultan would be unable to govern it with advantage, and that he would not draw from it a revenue larger than the tribute which the Pasha now pays to him for it. He said that it is good organization and not extent of territory that gives strength to States, and that the Sultan would be stronger if he were to govern well and efficiently the territory which is now subject to his direct authority, than if he were to regain what Mehemet Ali actually occupies, and to administer it ill.

M. Guizot further argued, that if Mehemet Ali were contented, he would become the best friend and firmest defender of the Porte, while, on the other hand, if his pretensions were overruled he would continue to be the most dangerous enemy of the Ottoman Empire.

Everything like an event in the Levant, according to M. Guizot, must turn to the profit of Russia, who is on the spot and ready to take advantage of whatever happens. It is, therefore, the interest of the other Powers to prevent the occurrence of events, and this, M. Guizot thinks, would be best accomplished by letting the two parties make peace on their own terms. M. Guizot positively denies that France is actuated in these matters by any selfish views of influence or aggrandizement. He did not indeed deny, that some very extravagant schemes and notions upon these affairs have been broached by some parties and by some newspapers in France; but he assured me that those views were by no means shared by the ten or twelve leading men from among whom any possible French Cabinet must necessarily be chosen; and he said, that the Government of Great Britain ought not to give more credit to such imputations upon the policy of France, than the Government of France gives to the assertions made in the French papers, that the course pursued by Great Britain is dictated by a desire to obtain possession of Egypt.

In reply to M. Guizot's arguments I stated it to be the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, that the means of coercion which have been proposed, are sufficient to induce Mehemet to comply with the arrangement which has been proposed to him; but that, even supposing this not to be the case, and that the advance of a Russian force into Asia Minor should become necessary, I could not see how such an advance, sanctioned, as it would be, by a Treaty between the Five Powers and the Ottoman Porte, in which should be recorded the objects of the advance of that force, the duration of its stay, and the time of its retirement, could materially affect the independence of the Porte, except as it would be a public proof of the present weakness of the Sultan, and of his inability to defend himself without external aid. But this fact, I remarked to M. Guizot, is unfortunately too well known, and would not be made more real by the entrance of Russian troops into Turkey; while, on other hand, if the advance of those troops were to place the Sultan in possession of the resources of Syria, and to take those resources away from his enemy, Mehemet Ali, such an entrance of Russian troops would in the end strengthen the independence of the Sultan, by increasing his financial and military means. But very different, I observed, would be the result, if the Russian forces were to enter Turkey by the single will of the Russian Government, and were to act, when in Turkey, as the single and uncontrouled discretion of that Government might suggest; to stay as long as that Government pleased; and to make their departure depend on such conditions as that Government might choose to impose. That would indeed shake the independence, if it did not even impair the integrity of the Ottoman Empire; and yet this, I told M. Guizot, would infallibly be the consequence of acting as France wishes to do, that is, of allowing things to remain as they are, or of granting to Mehemet Ali all the conditions he demands. For in either case new collisions must infallibly arise between the Sultan and the Pasha, by the aggressions either of the one or of the other; and such collisions would certainly lead to events which would bring the Russians into Turkey, unfettered by any engagement with the other Powers. I pointed out to M. Guizot, that in such case neither England nor France could prevent the Russians from entering, as neither of those Powers would be on the spot. France and England might, in such case, indeed, make war upon Russia, to punish that Power for what it had done; but is it the object of the Powers of Europe to lay the ground for a future war, or are we not striving to make arrangements by which a future war may be prevented?

I further observed to M. Guizot, that even if the naval means of the Allies should fail to coerce Mehemet Ali, there is a plan much better than the advance of a Russian force into Asia Minor; and that is an expedition to Alexandria, to strike at the heart of Mehemet Ali's power.

This suggestion appeared new to M. Guizot, and it seemed to make a considerable impression upon him; but he represented it as difficult of accomplishment, from the great amount of force which Mehemet Ali could concentrate to oppose it.

I reminded him, that about 13,000 English had made good their landing in Egypt in face of a good Army of between 20,000 and 30,000 men; and I said, that a combined Austrian and Turkish expedition of sufficient amount would drive like dust before the wind, the artizans of the dockyard of Alexandria, and the wretched conscripts whom Mehemet Ali has assembled in Egypt; and that, if Mehemet Ali were to bring back Ibrahim Pasha's Army from Syria for the defence of Egypt, we should then only have to change the direction of the expedition, and to send it to take possession of Syria, thus left defenceless.

I observed, that if, as M. Guizot contended, extent of territory does not give power, mankind had from the earliest ages been in a considerable error; and that this error had been equally shared by those who sought to obtain power themselves, and by those who have striven to prevent others from becoming dangerously powerful. But that it is obvious that extent of territory does give to the party possessing it, men, money, and military positions; and these are the elements which constitute the strength of States.

With respect to organization, I remarked that the Porte has been making rapid advances to a system of organization and of rational government, infinitely better than anything which exists under the tyrannical and grinding sway of Mehemet Ali; and that there is no reason, moral or physical, why the Sultan should not be able to govern Syria, as well as the remoter province of Bagdad; and that neither of the two are so far from Constantinople as many provinces of other States are from the seat of government, or as some portions of the territory which Mehemet Ali has invaded in Africa and Arabia, are from Alexandria. That as to the advantage which the Sultan would derive from regaining possession of Syria, I had to observe, that the Sultan would in that case not only have at his disposal the amount of tribute now paid for Syria by Mehemet Ali, but the additional revenue drawn from that province by Mehemet Ali for his own purposes, and which is employed by him to make war against the Sultan.

I admitted that the occurrence of any great events in the Levant ought, if possible, to be prevented; but I said that the only way of averting events of a very disastrous nature, would be to reduce Mehemet Ali to a state of occupation compatible with his condition of a subject; that as to contenting Mehemet Ali, I had yet to learn how it is possible to content ambition; and that I was convinced that neither Mehemet Ali nor his successor could, as things now stood, be a real friend or defender of the Porte; because their interest and that of the Sultan must be in opposition, as long as there should be anything left for the one to acquire or for the other to lose.

With respect to the views and intentions attributed to France, I observed, that those intentions had been openly avowed by many of the French papers which are the organs of that party to whose opinion and influence the French Government say they are obliged to defer: that those papers plainly state, that the Mediterranean ought to be a French lake; that Mehemet Ali should be made the Sovereign of Egypt, Syria, and Arabia, and should become the protected Ally of France; and that thus, with Algiers, Egypt, and Syria, and with Tunis and Tripoli, which would of course be swallowed up by France and her Egyptian Ally, France would virtually command the whole shore of the Mediterranean, from Tangier to Adana; and that the ports and ships of Egypt would be at the disposal and at the service of France.

I said that I did not certainly believe that any reflecting French statesman could seriously think of schemes, the accomplishment of which he must see would be impossible. That in the first place, if, for the time present, the French Government were disposed, as their newspapers are, to count up the amount of their own maritime force, and to add to that force, the Egyptian and Turkish fleets now in the harbour of Alexandria, the French Government must still feel conscious that the naval forces which Great Britain would be able to muster, added to the naval forces of those Allies whom the course pursued by

France must give to Great Britain, would infallibly turn the balance against France.

It would, however, be much better, I observed, that neither party should begin this kind of arithmetic; that as to the above-mentioned scheme for the future, it was needless for me to say, that Great Britain would endeavour, by every means at her disposal, to prevent its accomplishment, because such a scheme would be greatly against the interests of Great Britain. France would, therefore, not be able to realise such a plan without a war, of which the result might not be success.

With respect to the notion inculcated by some of the French papers, that the policy of Great Britain, with regard to the affairs of the East, is grounded on a wish to obtain possession of Egypt, I observed to M. Guizot, that Great Britain would not accept the possession of Egypt, even if it were offered to her, because that possession would be a burthen and not an advantage; and I remarked, that it is not very apparent how Great Britain is likely to secure Egypt for herself, by endeavouring, as she does, to make it continue to be a province of the Ottoman Empire.

M. Guizot promised to report all that passed between us to his Government. In the mean time, that Government cannot furnish M. Guizot with instructions with respect to this question, until it has ascertained whether it will be able to stand.

Her Majesty's Government do not, however, despair of inducing France to agree to the general principles laid down by the other Four Powers, provided those other Four Powers remain firm and steady to their purpose.

No. 513.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received March* 13.)

My Lord, *Therapia, February* 18, 1840.

M. DE BOUTENEFF communicated to me this evening a despatch from Count Nesselrode, dated January $\frac{16}{28}$, 1840, containing directions to M. de Bouténeff, "de s'associer à toutes les démarches que Lord Ponsonby croirait nécessaire de faire pour inspirer au Divan une juste confiance dans les intentions des Cabinets."—[To co-operate in all the steps which Lord Ponsonby might deem it necessary to take in order to inspire the Divan with just confidence in the intentions of the Cabinets.]

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 514.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received March* 16.)

My Lord, *Paris, March* 13, 1840.

M. THIERS this morning began a conversation with me on the Turco-Egyptian Question, by assuring me of his most anxious desire to cultivate and maintain an intimate Union and Alliance between France and England; and that he very much regretted that upon a question so important as that which now occupied the attention of all the Great European Powers, the French and British Governments, having the same objects in view, should differ as to the means best calculated to arrive at a satisfactory result. His Excellency said it was from no partiality to Mehemet Ali, that the French Government refused to be a party to coercive measures against the Pasha, to compel him to abandon the possession of Syria; that it was to the French Government a matter of indifference whether the Pasha retained or did not retain it; but that he was persuaded, that the measures which it was proposed to adopt would fail of success, and that the attempt would entail evils of far greater magnitude than any that could be apprehended from the Egyptian occupation of Syria.

M. Thiers then went into a detail of the naval and military means of

Mehemet Ali, and thought it very doubtful whether the operations of any army that Russia could bring into Asia Minor, would be successful in the defiles of the Taurus against the Egyptian Army in its present efficient state, and commanded by Generals as able as Ibrahim Pasha and Solyman Bey. The Russians, he said, have had some experience of wars of this nature, in their battles with the Caucasians; we have had the same experience in the Algerine Territory with Abdel Kader; and the Egyptians are more formidable enemies than Caucasians or Arabs; but, added M. Thiers, will even the success of the Russians in Syria, be favourable to the independence of the Sultan? Is a Russian Army to remain stationary in Syria, to keep in subjection the Turkish population of those Pashalics, or is it to be left to be the theatre of civil war between feeble detachments of Turkish troops and the Druses, and other warlike tribes of those countries, and the Porte thus rendered more unequal to the defence of its European dominions than if it were in the possession of Mehemet Ali?

I said to M. Thiers, that I would not now discuss with him whether the accounts he had received of the military resources of Mehemet Ali were exaggerated, or whether the Pasha was in a condition to refuse acceding to any arrangement proposed to him by the European Powers; but I would ask him (not however speaking in the name of my Government, for I had received no instructions to make any communication to the French Government on this subject, since the Portfolio of Foreign Affairs had been placed in his hands), whether he had any proposition other than what had been made by his predecessor in office, for settling the difference between the Porte and Mehemet Ali. M. Thiers answered, that any proposition from Her Majesty's Government would be considered by him and by his Colleagues with the most earnest desire to come to an understanding with it upon this question. I said, supposing (but I had not the slightest reason for imagining that such a proposition would be made), that it was proposed to the French Government to join with the other Powers in calling upon Mehemet Ali to give up a certain part of Syria, leaving to him the remainder, would the French Government agree to that proposition, and what would be the position taken up by France, if refused by the Pasha? To this question, M. Thiers replied, that no hope could be entertained that Mehemet Ali would give up Syria; that he had found by the correspondence in his office, that the French Government had pressed with the utmost earnestness some concession from the Pasha on this point, but that the Pasha's language on this head had been invariable and most decided; that he might be induced to give up Adana besides Candia, and the Arabian Pashalic. M. Thiers then said, that I must be as well aware as he was of the impossibility of any Ministry in France, however composed, acting hostilely against Egypt for the purpose of restoring to the Porte the Pashalic of Egypt. There was but one opinion in the country upon that question.

M. Thiers terminated our conversation by saying, that it would be his most earnest desire that a difference of opinion upon this question should not affect the good understanding between the two Governments; but that he could not be blind to the possible effects of the mutual recriminations of the press of the two countries, arising on this divergence in the policy of their respective Governments, upon the feeling of both nations.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 515.

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, March* 17, 1840.

WITH reference to the assertion which Marshal Soult recently made, that in July last he told your Excellency that the French would have fifteen sail of the line in the Mediterranean, I must observe to your Excellency, that no mention of such an intention is made in any of your despatches of that period. But in your despatch of June 17, of last year, your Excellency reported, that Marshal Soult stated to your Excellency, that the French fleet on the Levant station would consist of ten sail of the line, besides frigates and sloops of war; and that thus if the British squadron should be augmented to an equal amount, the combined force would consist of twenty sail of the line.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 516.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received March* 20.)

My Lord, *Therapia, February* 26, 1840.

IN obedience to your Lordship's directions, I requested that full powers might be sent to Nouri Effendi to concur in a Treaty to be negotiated at London, &c., &c. I had the honour, by last post, to acquaint you, that the Porte had consented and had desired that I should forward the full powers by a messenger. The full powers have not yet been sent to be forwarded.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 517.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received March* 20.)

My Lord, *Therapia, February* 26, 1840.

M. DE BOUTENEFF communicated to me a despatch he had received from Count Nesselrode, stating that your Lordship had desired that M. de Bouténeff and I should act together for persuading the Sublime Porte to abstain from committing itself with the Pasha of Egypt, &c.

In reply, I assured M. de Bouténeff of my readiness to take any steps he should think proper, adding, that at the present moment I was not aware that any were necessary. His Excellency was of the same opinion upon this head, as so much had been lately done, and with entire success, to obtain the desired end.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 518.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received March* 20.)

My Lord, *Therapia, February* 26, 1840.

COUNT KŒNIGSMARCK read to me a despatch from Baron Werther to the Prussian Chargé d'Affaires in London, giving full powers to that Minister to concur in the arrangement of the Egyptian Affair upon the basis of Prince Metternich's Note, &c., &c.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 519.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received March* 22.)

My Lord, *Paris, March* 20, 1840.

IN my interview with M. Thiers this morning, he again reverted to the Turco-Egyptian Question. His Excellency re-stated the opinions and the arguments on this subject which I had heard from him a week ago, and which, having been detailed in a despatch addressed by him to M. Guizot, and read to your Lordship by the French Ambassador, I need not report.

His Excellency expressed great regret that the discussions which had taken place had not led to an approximation in the line of conduct of the two Governments on this question. He said that the accounts which he had received from the French Consuls and Agents since our last conversation, strongly confirmed his impression, that neither menace nor force would wrest from Mehemet Ali the possession of Syria. He said that if any reasonable proposition were made to the Pasha, the French Government would use its best efforts with him to induce him to accept it. I asked him whether he considered every proposition short of leaving to Mehemet Ali the possession of all Syria as unreasonable; he answered that perhaps there might be modifications in regard to the hereditary tenure of the whole, or part of it. He stated, that the restoration of Adana to the Porte was an important object, and that the French Government "pesera de tout son poids" to obtain it. I asked whether by the menace of the hostility of France against the Pasha, if he refused to make this concession? To this he replied by an allusion to the acknowledged public feeling of France against a war with the Pasha of Egypt; but again repeated the words "il pesera de tout son poids."

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 520.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received March* 22.)

My Lord, *Paris, March* 20, 1840.

I THIS morning called upon my Turkish Colleague, and learnt from him that he had as yet received no instructions to proceed to England. He had heard from Constantinople that such instructions would be sent to him, but no official communication had been made to him to that effect.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 521.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received March* 23.)

(Extract.) *Alexandria, February* 12, 1840.

THE next subject touched upon was the attack upon the tribe inhabiting the banks of the river Khaboor (under the jurisdiction of the Sultan) by Ibrahim Pasha's irregular Cavalry from Orfa, which the Viceroy attempted to explain by saying, that Ibrahim Pasha had been compelled to use compulsory measures by the refusal of that tribe to furnish recruits. Mehemet Ali was evidently embarrassed on this subject, and declined answering further, unless I addressed him officially in writing.

I then mentioned a report of his Highness having been tampering with the chiefs and citizens of Merdin, and that they had sent an invitation to Ibrahim Pasha to occupy that city, and that a Catholic bishop and some of the opposing chiefs had been decapitated. Mehemet Ali explained this by saying, that it was only a deputation from Maggiun Bey to his son, and that he knew nothing of the murder of the Catholic bishop.

Noticing the recent destitution of Ahmed Pasha, Mehemet Ali characterized it as a direct insult towards him on the part of the Sublime Porte, who having sought, six months after his defection, to arrange matters amicably with the Pasha, now testified its disappointment by that insulting measure. He added, that were he not sure of the sentiments of Mustapha Pasha, he would not have allowed him to accept the appointment. From this I entirely dissented, by declaring, that I considered that the Sublime Porte was perfectly entitled to dismiss at pleasure an officer who had proved himself unfaithful.

No. 522.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston—(*Received March* 23.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, February* 21, 1840.

VARIOUS rumours have been afloat here for the last fifteen days. The Austrian Consul-General received a communication from the Internuncio, dated the 7th instant, stating that the preliminaries of a Treaty had been agreed upon between England, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, for the settlement of the Eastern Question, and that he was in hourly expectation of receiving the announcement of its conclusion.

This intelligence, coupled with the news that Mehemet Ali had received from his agents at Paris and Constantinople, filled him with alarm, and he awaited with much anxiety the arrival of Her Majesty's steamer from Malta, which took place on the 20th instant. This vessel, however, brought no confirmation of the above circumstance; notwithstanding which, I believe that the French Consul-General has made such representations to the Pasha, that he sees a crisis at hand, and no longer to be averted.

M. Cochelet seems much perplexed and disappointed, and the numerous French residents of this place evince their alarm in various ways.

All those circumstances have roused the Pasha's energies, and he is now making efforts to place himself in a formidable posture of defence. He has just given the most pressing orders regarding the three following extraordinary measures:—

1st. To disarm the two squadrons in the Port of Alexandria, and form six regiments from the ships' crews and marines, to defend the coast from Rosetta to Alexandria, and thence to the Arab's Tower. To bring on shore all the guns of the Turkish and Egyptian squadrons, and place them in battery to strengthen the positions of Aboukir, the Catacombs, Marabout, and the entrance of the Port of Alexandria. To dispose the ships in line at such a distance, that in case of fire, one could easily be removed without endangering the others.

2nd. To form a camp of 36,000 men at Damanhour, chief town of Béhéré, thirty-four miles from this city. This corps will be composed of two regiments formed from the crews of the Egyptian squadron, two regiments of regular Infantry, eight squadrons of regular Cavalry, and 25,000 Bedouins, who, the Pasha says, have been engaged for a considerable time back.

3rd. To arm forthwith the National Guards of Alexandria, Cairo, and other towns of Egypt, in the manner described to your Lordship in my former despatches.

Thus the fusion of the two squadrons which the Pasha contemplated, and hastened or suspended according to circumstances, is now definitively decided upon. The Egyptian squadron furnishing three regiments, and that of the Sultan the same.

The selection of Damanhour as the place of encampment, is judicious, being central, and commanding a ready communication with most of the points on the coast open to attack.

Boghos Bey has assured me, that Kourschid Pasha has retired from the Hedjaz, and Ibrahim Pasha from Yemen, and that both are on their march for this country. This circumstance Boghos Bey wished to impress upon me as a proof of the Pasha's willingness to surrender these provinces; but it is manifestly the intention of the Pasha to concentrate the whole of his disposable troops in Egypt.

Advices from Cairo represent all civil and military departments of the Government to be in full activity. A considerable quantity of bombs, powder, and other military stores were sent to Alexandria on the 19th instant. A regiment of Guards stationed at the Citadel has received orders to march, together with the Artillery of Toura, and a portion of the invalids with which the town is garrisoned; 260 decorations were sent down for the National Guard of Alexandria. The foundery of Boulac is in full activity casting cannon shot.

It is positively stated that the Minister of War has orders to pay seven months arrears; and that, in addition to the money which the war department has lately received, 500 purses are to be furnished by the Divan Iradat.

I have been informed that Ibrahim Pasha has written for Artillery, and that elm wood has been sent for to Alexandria to construct the carriages. The number of cannon required is estimated at 120. The gates of Cairo have been repaired; the palace of Ibrahim Pasha at Quasr-el-Ain is in readiness for Ahmed, late Capudan Pasha.

Acre is in all the bustle of being fortified and provisioned, so as to withstand a siege, and its garrison is to be considerably augmented.

The Viceroy is in a state of great agitation, and treats as an act of insanity the declaration made by the officers of the Sultan's squadron, on the 14th instant, when paying their respects to him on the occasion of the Bairam, "that they were ready to make common cause with him against the Infidels, but that they would never take arms against their Sultan."

He illtreats and dismisses the Mudirs and Mamurs who tell him that the Fellahs would leave their lands *en masse* to escape the military conscription. All the Mudirs of Lower Egypt have received orders to exact exorbitant sums; but even with the bastonade it will be impossible to raise the sums demanded.

The National Guard of Alexandria is now drilled for four hours twice a week, but of the number contemplated, the Government is obliged to content itself with 3,700, of whom 1,100 are picked out, the greater part of the rest being boys incapable of bearing arms.

The financial resources of the country have been nearly exhausted, and the maintenance of the troops now embodied is a matter of wonder to the mercantile community here. But it is evident that vast as are the natural resources of Egypt, they are unequal to any continuance of the pressure which is now upon them. Alarm is spreading among the foreign merchants, who are reluctantly closing their purse strings, determined rather to sacrifice previous advances, than incur the risk of total ruin, and this despite the ascendancy that the Pasha has acquired over their minds, by the manner in which he has sought to identify their interests with his own.

I have reason, in some degree, to alter my opinions as to Mehemet Ali's intention of resisting to the last extremity, should his territorial possessions be restricted to Egypt alone. In such a case his self-love might possibly lead him to risk a struggle. He counts much on his chances of successfully exciting insurrections not only in Asia Minor, but also in Constantinople and Turkey in Europe; and I perceive a certain method and arrangement in preparing his means of resistance, which I had not expected. I still, however, rather incline to the opinion that his good sense will prevent him from risking a collision with the Powers of Europe.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 523.

Viscount Palmerston to Colonel Hodges.

Sir,

Foreign Office, March 25, 1840.

I HAVE received and laid before the Queen your despatches to the 22nd of February.

I have to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government approve the language which you held to Mehemet Ali, as reported in your despatch of the 12th of February, in reply to his observations on the dismissal of Achmet Pasha by the Sultan, from his office of Capudan Pasha. It seems, indeed, to be a most extraordinary perversion of language on the part of Mehemet Ali, to assert that the Sultan, by dismissing a traitorous Admiral from his post, has offered an insult to Mehemet Ali. It may, indeed, be natural that a Pasha who has turned against the Sultan, the power and the arms which the Sultan had entrusted to him for very different purposes, should dislike to see the Sultan dismiss from his service, an Admiral who has likewise betrayed his trust; but if there has been any insult offered in this case, it may justly be affirmed, that the Pasha is offering an insult to the Sultan by continuing forcibly to retain the Sultan's fleet in the harbour of Alexandria.

You are at liberty to show this despatch to Boghos Bey.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 524.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received March* 25.)

(Extract.) *Paris, March* 23, 1840.

COUNT APPONY this day called upon the Ambassador of the Porte, for the purpose of inquiring from him whether he had received instructions from his Government to proceed to England to take a part in the negotiations on the Affairs of the East, and found that no orders to that effect had as yet reached him.

No. 525.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received March* 26.)

My Lord, *Therapia, February* 27, 1840.

I HAVE received from his Excellency Rechid Pasha, a packet containing full powers for Nouri Effendi, and instructions for that Ambassador, which, at the request of the Sublime Porte, I send by a messenger to Vienna, to be forwarded to Earl Granville at Paris.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 526.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received March* 26.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, March* 3, 1840.

I INCLOSE a despatch from Mr. Consul Moore, dated 21st of February, because I am not sure that your Lordship has received the intelligence it contains, and to part of which I wish to draw your attention for reasons that will appear when your Lordship receives a despatch that will be forwarded by the first messenger.

Mr. Moore says, "Secret meetings amongst the Christians and some Sheiks of the Druses have been held in Mount Lebanon, and a resolution adopted to resist all attempts either to disarm them or to levy conscripts." This is a strong symptom of the state of Syria.

The late accounts from Alexandria show the efforts making by Mehemet Ali to increase his force, and Colonel Hodges seems to think it possible he may risk some desperate measure. I have ventured in a former communication, to state an opinion that he will not make an attempt which is easy to be foiled, and which, if foiled, must be the cause of his total ruin; but still it may be made early in April, and in twenty or a few more days, the sea might be reached by the army of Ibrahim, who would then be able to raise by means of money, disturbances that would produce the worst consequences. This danger may be completely guarded against by the naval means at hand: a few frigates and steamers are enough to prevent the possibility of the attempt to pass the water and also to prevent all sedition, and to give confidence and power to the Sultan's Government.

Inclosure in No. 526.

Mr. Consul Moore to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Beyrout, February* 21, 1840.

SINCE I had the honour to address your Excellency under date of the 1st —3rd instant, all the masons and builders at Beyrout have been called for by the Governor, and sent to Acre to be employed in the fortifications at that place; the bakers have likewise received orders to prepare a supply of biscuit for that fortress: similar orders have been given at Sidon.

Two battalions of Infantry have passed through this place for the same destination, and others are to follow.

The trenches are to be deepened and enlarged at Acre, whither a large quantity of lime for making mortar has also been transported. A mound on the east, raised by the Egyptian army when that place was besieged and taken, is to be levelled; and permission has been granted to such persons as may be desirous of quitting the city, to depart, and several have already availed of the permission, and are arrived at Sidon.

The present force at Acre consists of a regiment of Cavalry and one of Infantry, and about 600 artillerymen, but this force is to be increased.

Secret meetings amongst the Christians and some Sheiks of the Druses have been held in Mount Lebanon, and a resolution adopted by them to resist all attempts either to disarm them, or to levy conscripts.

Solyman Pasha has left Beyrout for Sidon and Acre.

In this neighbourhood public tranquillity is maintained.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) N. MOORE.

No. 527.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received March 26.)

My Lord, *Paris, March* 24, 1840.

I TRANSMITTED to Nouri Effendi a despatch from his Government which was forwarded to me by Lord Ponsonby, containing official instructions to his Excellency to proceed to England to take part in the conferences at London on the Affairs of the East.

I have this evening received a note from Nouri Effendi, apprizing me of his intention to quit Paris in two days to proceed to his destination.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 528.

Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, March* 28, 1840.

I HAVE to inform your Excellency, that a very bad effect has been produced upon the pending negotiations upon the Turkish Question, by an opinion which has gone forth, that Austria would not choose, in any case, to take any active part in any measures which the Allies might find themselves obliged to resort to in support of the Sultan's rights.

This opinion passes current at Paris, and is entertained by many persons in London. Her Majesty's Government know very well that this opinion is entirely unfounded, and that Austria would be perfectly ready and willing to take any part which might properly belong to her in any measures which might become necessary; but it would be desirable that your Excellency should point out to Prince Metternich, how much the successful issue of the pending negotiations may be prevented, and how much the political weight, which properly belongs to Austria, is diminished, by the prevalent misconception which has arisen upon this matter.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 529.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received March* 29.)

(Extract.) *Paris, March* 27, 1840.

NOURI EFFENDI took leave of me yesterday, stating it to be his intention to quit Paris this day for London.

No. 530.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received April* 3.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, March* 7, 1840.

I INCLOSE a translated copy of a letter written by Mehemet Ali to the Grand Vizier, which was sent in original from Rechid Pasha, and translated by M. Frederic Pisani.

Inclosure in No. 530.

Mehemet Ali to the Grand Vizier.

(Traduction.)

J'AI l'honneur de représenter ce qui suit: ainsi qu'il est connu à votre Altesse, tous mes efforts, dès le début de ma carrière, n'ont eu qu'une seule tendance,—celle de rendre à la religion, à la Sublime Porte, à l'Empire, et à la Nation Musulmane, des services importans.

Si, par la grâce de Dieu, et sous les auspices de la Sublime Porte, j'ai pû parvenir à la position dans laquelle je me trouve aujourd'hui, votre Altesse n'ignore pas que les décrêts de la Providence avaient permis qu'il fut tenu à mon égard, sous le règne précédent, des procédés qui, étant tout-à-fait opposés à mes véritables sentimens, ne pouvaient manquer de m'affliger profondément.

Sensiblement peiné de ce que les temps passés n'ont pas été justement appréciés, songeant aux maux et aux dangers imminens de toutes espèces dont le tems présent est gros; et persuadé qu'un homme aussi éclairé que votre Altesse pensait aux conséquences d'un pareil état de choses, si l'on manquait d'y remédier à temps, j'ai cru de mon devoir,—devoir que m'imposaient et la religion et mon dévouement sincère,—de vous donner quelques explications sur certains points; et c'est ce que j'avais fait dans une lettre que j'ai envoyée à ma fille, Zuhra Khanum, afin qu'elle la remit à votre Altesse. J'attendais, à la vérité, de la part d'un homme animé de tant de zèle, d'un homme d'une si grande expérience dans les affaires, une réponse conciliante. Mais, quelque temps après, votre Altesse envoya à ma fille un billet qui renfermait vos ordres, et qu'elle me fit parvenir.

J'ai plusieurs fois médité sur le billet en question, et l'ayant trouvé conçu, contre mon attente, dans un style plein d'allusions et d'allégories, les décrêts du ciel l'ordonnent ainsi, me suis-je dit, en mordant mes doigts, tant j'étais stupéfait.

Ne voulant plus rien dire ni rien écrire, j'ai demeuré quelque temps comme hors de moi-même. Mais, à la fin, sachant ce qui se passe actuellement, et considérant la position dans laquelle je me trouve sous les

auspices de la Sublime Porte, garder le silence parceque je suis fâché, m'a paru un grand crime, une chose capable de m'attirer les plus mauvaises conséquences et dans cette vie et dans l'autre. Et comme, d'ailleurs, je connais votre Altesse pour l'homme le plus sage de notre siècle, pour un homme qui veut le bien de la religion et de l'état, j'ai été induit, par les impulsions de la saine raison et de mon zèle, à vous écrire encore une fois, sans aucune étiquette, pour vous exposer la vérité toute nue.

Votre Altesse parle dans le billet qui renferme ses ordres, de la nécessité pour moi que je donne des témoignages évidens, utiles, &c. Bien que cela ne soit pas clair, je crois, cependant, en avoir saisi l'allusion. Si je ne me trompe, votre Altesse veut parler de la restitution de la flotte Impériale. S'il en est ainsi, je lui ferai observer, que la flotte Impériale a toujours été la propriété héréditaire du Sultan notre Seigneur et Maître; qu'elle est venue tout naturellement à Alexandrie; et que Sa Hautesse sait fort bien qu'un aussi humble serviteur que Méhémet Ali ne vise pas à la lui ravir.

Au reste, il y a déjà longtems que j'aurais renvoyé la flotte à Constantinople; mais puisqu'on n'insiste que sur la restitution de cette flotte, tandis que l'on rejette l'offre que j'ai tant de fois faite, non seulement de rendre la flotte, mais de réunir toutes les forces de terre et de mer de l'Egypte à celles de la Sublime Porte, n'ai-je pas raison de croire que, continuant d'avoir de moi l'opinion qu'on en avait sous le règne précédent, on veut faire une scission? Or, tandisque la même opinion à mon égard existe, si j'avais renvoyé la flotte, quelques uns de mes collègues se livreraient à des illusions; et en disant,—voici que nous avons pris la flotte, ils mettraient obstacle à l'amitié de la nation; et à la longue, le peuple Mahométan ne tomberait-il pas dans un plus grand abîme?

Voilà, Monseigneur, que je vous ai exposé tels qu'ils sont réellement et en apparence et au fond, les motifs qui me guident à l'égard de la flotte. Expliquons maintenant les motifs que j'ai pour persister à demander la Syrie jusque et compris Adana et les gorges du Mont Taurus avec leurs confins.

J'ai déjà passé ma soixante-dixième année; il ne faut point d'autres preuves que je ne travaille pas pour moi-même. Mais il y a tant d'années que je sers; j'ai créé une famille, et mon désir le plus ardent est que ma famille, toujours sous les auspices de Sa Hautesse, ne soit pas dispersée après moi, et que fils, petit-fils, et arrière-petit-fils, sincèrement dévoués à la Sublime Porte, et ayant dans l'Arabie des forces imposantes, et toujours prêtes à agir au besoin, ils puissent ainsi rendre des services à la religion et au Gouvernement, et faire que ma mémoire soit pour longtemps bénie dans l'histoire. Or, on persiste obstinément à me refuser Adana et les gorges du Mont Taurus, d'où je conclus qu'on veut me frustrer de l'objet que je désire obtenir, et qu'on a peut-être même d'autres intentions encore; et de là naquit la nécessité pour moi de persister dans mes demandes résolument.

L'idée de ne pas s'arrêter au refus, et de vouloir commettre la faute si préjudiciable de recourir, à la fin, à quelques Grandes Puissances, confirme de plus en plus mon premier soupçon.

J'ai rejeté tout net les propositions qui m'avaient été faites de concert par les Grandes Puissances, en leur faisant une réponse tout-à-fait négative, et en voici les raisons:

Rien de plus favorable à la politique des Grandes Puissances que le recours à elles: en effet, leur politique exige que la Sublime Porte soit toujours en proie à des malheurs, afin qu'affaiblie par là, sa faiblesse facilite l'exécution du projet qui, depuis nombre d'années, fait l'objet de leurs méditations,—le partage de la Turquie, lorsque le temps en sera venu. Les Puissances se sont coalisées pour détruire les sources d'où la Sublime Porte peut tirer des forces. Elles disent, l'Egypte fait la principale force de la Sublime Porte; diminuons donc la puissance de l'Egypte; car, comme après cela la discorde et les dissentions entre les deux parties ne cesseront jamais, à la longue les deux parties s'affaibliront également, et nos vœux seront accomplis. Cela étant, il vaut mille fois mieux périr à présent d'une manière digne de l'Islâmisme, et en montrant une vive foi, que périr avec déshonneur dans cinq ans d'ici.

Quoiqu'il en soit, votre Altesse saura qu'on a commencé ici à faire des préparatifs de guerre qui ne sont interrompus ni de jour ni de nuit. Pour l'amour de Dieu, que votre Altesse ne permette pas que le peuple Mahométan soit plongé dans les malheurs dont il est menacé; qu'elle daigne m'accorder la faveur que je désire si ardemment obtenir, la faveur d'être admis comme un serviteur fidèle et dévoué. Non, un homme aussi judicieux, aussi éclairé que votre Altesse ne saurait ignorer qu'en me traitant avec cette clémence que j'implore, il verra ses vœux accomplis dans l'un et l'autre monde; et c'est ce qui m'encourage à prendre la liberté de vous faire de nouvelles représentations; ce que je fais, comme je l'ai dit plus haut, d'une manière dénuée de toute étiquette.

Je prends Dieu à témoin que ces représentations sont franches et sincères. Plein de confiance dans la sagacité, dans l'esprit de religion et de modération qui vous anime, et dans votre qualité de mon ancien Maître et Protecteur, je vous ai ouvert tout mon cœur. J'espère en Dieu, que daignant prêter une oreille favorable à mes prières, votre Altesse voudra bien mettre toute sa sollicitude à faire prendre un nouvel essor à la nation Musulmane, et renouveler votre ancienne protection à mon égard. Moi, de mon côté, qui ai recours à la clémence de votre Altesse, je me montrerai pour le reste de ma vie assidument et constamment occupé à servir, avec l'assistance divine, et avec un dévouement sans bornes, la religion et notre Gouvernement; et j'assurerai ainsi ma félicité dans cette vie et dans l'autre. Mais si votre Altesse fait à mes représentations, qui portent le sceau de la franchise et de la vérité, une réponse semblable à celles qui l'ont précédée, et cherche à gagner du tems, moi aussi, mettant en chaque circonstance toute ma confiance dans l'assistance et la faveur divines, je ne changerai pas de résolution; et votre Altesse, informée de cela, donnera les ordres qu'il lui appartient de donner.

19 *Zilhadge*, 1255. (23 *Février*, 1840.)

(L. S.) MEHEMET ALI.

(Translation.)

Mehemet Ali to the Grand Vizier.

I HAVE the honour to represent as follows:—As Your Highness is aware, all my efforts from the commencement of my career have only had one object,—that of doing important service to religion, to the Sublime Porte, to the Empire, and to the Mussulman nation.

If I have been enabled by the grace of God, and under the auspices of the Porte, to attain the position which I now hold, Your Highness is not ignorant that in the preceding reign the decrees of Providence permitted measures to be adopted with regard to me, which, being perfectly opposed to my true feelings, could not fail deeply to afflict me.

Sensibly grieved that past times have not been justly appreciated, contemplating the evils and imminent dangers of all kinds with which the present time is pregnant, and persuaded that so enlightened a man as Your Highness would think of the consequences of such a state of things, if a remedy was not produced in time, I have thought it my duty—a duty imposed upon me by religion and my sincere devotion—to make some explanations to you upon certain points; and this is what I did in a letter which I sent to my daughter, Zuhra Khanum, to be delivered by her to Your Highness. I certainly expected a conciliatory reply from a man actuated by so much zeal, and from one so well versed in affairs. But, some time afterwards, Your Highness sent a Note to my daughter, containing your orders, which she caused to be delivered to me.

I have repeatedly meditated over the Note in question, and having, against my expectation, found it couched in a style full of allusions and allegories, I said to myself,—biting my fingers, so much was I astounded,—Heaven has thus decreed it.

Not being willing to say or to write anything more, I remained for a time

as if beside myself. But at last, knowing what is now going on, and considering the position in which I am placed under the auspices of the Sublime Porte, I thought that to keep silence because I am angry, was a great crime, a thing capable of drawing down the worst consequences upon me both in this and in the other world. And since, moreover, I know Your Highness to be the wisest man of our age,—a man who desires the good of religion and of the State,—I have been induced, under the impulse of sound reason and of my zeal, to write to you once more without any ceremony, to lay the naked truth before you.

In the Note which contains your orders, Your Highness speaks of the necessity of my giving evident and useful proofs, &c. Although that is not clear, I believe, nevertheless, I have found out to what it alludes. Unless I am deceived, Your Highness would speak of the restitution of the Imperial fleet. If this be so, I will observe to you, that the Imperial fleet has always been the hereditary property of the Sultan, our Lord and Master; that it came quite naturally to Alexandria; and that His Highness well knows that so humble a servant as Mehemet Ali does not aim at wresting it from him.

Moreover, it is now some time since I would have sent back the fleet to Constantinople; but since the restitution of this fleet is alone insisted upon, whilst the offer which I have so often made, not only to restore the fleet, but to unite all the land and sea forces of Egypt to those of the Sublime Porte, is rejected, have I not reason to believe that, in continuing to have the same opinion of me, as was the case under the preceding reign, it is wished to effect a schism? Now, as long as the same opinion exists with respect to me, if I had sent back the fleet, some of my Colleagues would have given themselves up to illusions; and saying, Now we have taken the fleet,—they would place obstacles in the way of the friendship of the nation; and in the long run, would not the Mahomedan people fall into a greater abyss?

I have now, my Lord, laid before you the motives which guide me with respect to the fleet, such as they really are in appearance and in substance. Let us now explain the motives which I have in persisting to demand Syria, as far as, and including, Adana, and the passes of Mount Taurus and their borders.

I have already passed my seventieth year; no other proofs are required that I do not labour for myself. But I have served for so many years; I have created a family, and my most ardent desire is, that my family, always under the auspices of His Highness, may not be dispersed after my death, and that sons, grandsons, and great grandsons, sincerely devoted to the Sublime Porte, and possessing an imposing force in Arabia, and always ready to act in case of need, may also render services to religion and to the government, and cause my memory to be long revered in history. Now, the refusal to give me Adana and the passes of the Taurus, is obstinately persisted in, whence I conclude that it is desired to frustrate the object I have in view, and that perhaps something further is intended; and hence the necessity which I feel for resolutely persisting in my demands.

The notion of not being content with a refusal, and of being willing to commit so prejudicial an error, as to have recourse at last to some great Powers, more and more confirms my first suspicion.

I have at once rejected the proposals which had been made to me in concert by the Great Powers, by making a reply to them quite in the negative, and these are my reasons.

Nothing is more favourable to the policy of the Great Powers, than that recourse should be had to them: in fact, their policy requires that the Sublime Porte should always be a prey to misfortunes, in order that, weakened thereby, its weakness may facilitate the execution of the plan which for a number of years has formed the object of their meditations—the partition of Turkey, when the time shall have arrived. The Powers have coalesced to destroy the sources from whence the Sublime Porte can derive its forces. They say, Egypt constitutes the principal power of the Sublime Porte; let us diminish then the power of Egypt; for, since after that, the discord and dissensions between the two parties will never cease, the two parties will be equally reduced in the long run, and our wishes will be accomplished. This being the case, it is much better to perish at once in a manner worthy of Islamism, and by showing a lively faith, than to perish five years hence with dishonour.

However this may be, Your Highness will be aware that warlike preparations, which cease neither day nor night, have been begun here. For the love of

God, Your Highness, do not allow the Mahometan people to be plunged into the misery which threatens them. Grant me the favour which I so ardently desire, that of being admitted as a faithful and devoted servant. No, so enlightened, so judicious a man as Your Highness is, cannot be ignorant that you will see your desires accomplished in this world and in the next, by treating me with the clemency which I implore; and this it is which encourages me to take the liberty of making fresh representations to you; which, as I have said above, I do without any ceremony.

I call God to witness, that these representations are frank and sincere. Full of confidence in the wisdom, in the spirit of religion and of moderation which animates you, and in your quality of my old master and protector, I have opened my whole heart to you. I trust in God that, vouchsafing a favourable ear to my prayers, your Highness will use all your care to give a fresh impulse to the Mussulman Nation, and renew your former protection with regard to me. I, for my part, who have always had recourse to the clemency of your Highness, I shall, by divine assistance, show myself assiduously and constantly occupied for the rest of my life in serving religion and our Government, with a boundless devotion; and I shall thus ensure my happiness in this world and in the next. But if your Highness answers my representations which bear the stamp of frankness and truth, in a like manner as before, and seeks to gain time, I shall not alter my resolution, putting my entire confidence, under every circumstance, in divine favour and assistance; and your Highness being informed of this, will give the orders which it is your duty to give.

19*th Zilhadge*, 1255. (*February* 23, 1840). (LS.) MEHEMET ALI.

No. 531.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 3.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, March* 11, 1840.

I INCLOSE a communication I have just received from the Sublime Porte, being the substance of despatches from Bagdad, Diarbekir, and Moussoul.

Inclosure in No. 531.

Substance of despatches from Moussoul, Bagdad, and Diarbekir.

(Traduction.)

LE Gouverneur de Bagdad, Ali Pacha, écrit sous la date du 19 Février dernier, "le Général Egyptien Kourchid Pacha qui était il y a quelque tems dans le Yémen, vient d'arriver maintenant à un endroit distant de trente heures de Bassora. Il y lève des troupes, et fait des approvisionnemens. Il fait aussi venir du Yémen sur des bâtimens, de l'artillerie, des munitions de guerre et autre matériel nécessaire, voulant, sans doute, mettre à exécution quelque projet qu'il médite."

Une dépêche de Méhémed Pacha de Moussoul, porte en substance ce qui suit: "l'Egyptien connu sous la dénomination de Maadjoun Agassi, est venu ces jours-ci avec un corps de Cavalerie considérable à un endroit appelé Sabour vers Moussoul, où il a commis des excès en pillant quelques tribus. De là il s'est dirigé vers Bassora, et par ses marches et contre-marches dans ces environs là, il trouble la tranquillité des habitans. A juger de sa manière d'agir, son intention est de frapper un coup quelque part. En cas donc, que ce Maadjoun Agassi ne se retire pas avec ses cavaliers du côté d'Ourfa, et de là vers l'Egypte, son pays, des troubles éclateront dans la province de Moussoul ainsi que dans les environs de Bagdad, et sur la grande route qui y mène."

Le Moushir de Diarbékir, Saadoullah Pacha, écrit: "le Général de Brigade, Ferhad Bey, qui est à Antab, exige, en employant même quelques moyens coërcitifs, du blé et de l'orge du district de Hazahzour.

Un Colonel Egyptien est venu d'Ourfa sous prétexte d'acheter des mulets, et un Major s'est rendu par la grande route de Balou à Erzroum: ils y font des approvisionnemens de vivres, et s'y procurent d'autres objets, et ils veulent faire la même chose en avançant plus encore dans le pays."

Les Pachas susmentionnés ajoutent: "indépendamment de ces procédés de la part des Egyptiens, qui font jouer des ressorts patens et cachés, on voit bien qu'ils ont beaucoup d'autres objets en vue, et une pareille conduite est tout-à-fait opposée à la politique suivie aujourd'hui." Agissant, disent-ils, avec prudence, ils, cherchent toujours à éviter de provoquer les Egyptiens en la moindre chose; mais ils demandent des instructions de la Sublime Porte, pour savoir ce qu'ils doivent faire en cas que les Egyptiens vinssent à commettre de nouveaux actes d'agression.

(Translation.)

Substance of despatches from Moussoul, Bagdad, and Diarbekir.

THE Governor of Bagdad, Ali Pasha, writes under date of the 19th of February last, "The Egyptian General Kourchid Pasha, who some time since was in Yemen, has arrived at a place about thirty hours from Bassora. He is there levying troops and laying in provisions. He is likewise bringing artillery, warlike stores, and other necessary stores from Yemen by boats, intending without doubt to put into execution some plan which he meditates.

A despatch from Mehemet Pasha of Moussoul, contains in substance what follows:—"The Egyptian known under the name of Maadjoun Agassi, arrived within the last few days with a considerable body of cavalry at a place near Moussoul, called Sabour, where he committed excesses in pillaging several tribes. From thence he went to Bassora, and by his marches and counter-marches in that vicinity, he disturbed the tranquillity of the inhabitants. To judge of his movements, his intention appears to be to strike a blow somewhere. If this Maadjoun Agassi does not retire with his horsemen towards Orfa, and from thence to his country, Egypt, disturbances will take place in the province of Moussoul, as well as in the environs of Bagdad, aud on the high road leading thither."

The Moushie of Diarbekir, Saadoullah Pasha, writes:—"The General of Brigade, Ferhade Bey, who is at Aintab, has made requisitions of corn and barley in the district of Hazahzour, to enforce which he even employs coercive measures. An Egyptian Colonel has arrived from Orfa on the pretext of buying mules, and a Major has proceeded to Erzeroum by the great road of Balou; they are there collecting provisions, and other matters, and they intend doing the same while proceeding further up the country."

The above-named Pashas add:—"Independently of these measures on the part of the Egyptians who are intriguing openly and secretly, it is clearly to be seen, that they have many other objects in view, and such conduct is entirely opposed to the policy at present followed." They say, that acting always with prudence, they seek to avoid provoking the Egyptians in the least matter; but they ask instructions from the Sublime Porte, in order to know what they are to do in case the Egyptians should commit fresh acts of aggression.

No. 532.

Lord William Russell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 6.)

(Extract.) *Berlin, April* 1, 1840.

I HAVE had a general conversation with Baron Werther since I arrived here, from which I infer that the policy of Prussia remains unchanged; that is, that the same desire prevails to act as much as possible in concert with Austria and Russia, the results of which should be the continuance of peace. At the same time there is a very friendly feeling in this Cabinet towards England and France.

Baron Werther has given such instructions on the Eastern Question to Baron Bülow, as he thinks will be satisfactory to your Lordship, but he fears that a speedy settlement of that question is not to be expected. At the same time, the *status quo* gives him no apprehension of war. He rejoiced at Baron Brunnow's appointment to London, as he thought him more able than any one to explain all pending questions; his long service in the Foreign Office of St. Petersburgh, making him master of every subject, and his views being conciliatory.

No. 533.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 6.)

My Lord, *Paris, April* 3, 1840.

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your despatches to the 31st of March, and I have to thank your Lordship for transmitting to me a copy of your despatch of the 12th of March to Lord Beauvale, containing an account of a long and interesting conversation you held with M. Guizot upon the Turco-Egyptian Question.

The arguments adduced by the French Ambassador in support of the views of the present Ministers and of their predecessors in this matter, are those which I have heard from the mouth of Marshal Soult, and of M. Thiers, and which I reported in various despatches to your Lordship; I am glad to be put in possession of the statement made by your Lordship in reply to those arguments, and shall avail myself of it in any future discussion that may arise upon this question with the French Minister; but I should deceive your Lordship, if I led you to expect that any change in the views or conduct of the French Government could thereby be effected, or that Her Majesty's Government need not despair of inducing the French Government to agree to the general principles laid down by the other Four Powers, provided those Four Powers remain firm and steady in their purpose.

I am every day more and more convinced (a conviction, I believe, shared by every one of my Diplomatic Colleagues), that France will not join in hostile measures to compel the evacuation of Syria by the Egyptians, whatever may be the party who form the Government.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 534.

Mr. Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 7.)

(Extract.) *Damascus, February* 20, 1840.

UNDER the 18th ultimo, per Austrian steamer from Beyrout, I had the honour of addressing your Lordship my last despatch.

The environs of this city and the Damascus district are in a quiescent state. I have only heard that, on an order being sent by the Government here to the Mussellim of Balbec, to seize one of the Mutuali Emirs implicated in the late insurrection, that Emir proceeded to the house of the brother of the Governor of Balbec, residing in one of the adjacent villages, and killed him; but it appears the affair terminated there, and has produced no further consequences for the present.

I hear that a spirit of resistance has manifested itself to the measures supposed to be contemplated by the Egyptian Government in the Emir Bechir's jurisdiction in Mount Lebanon. It is stated that the Emir required those who had been furnished with arms by order of Ibrahim Pasha, subsequently to the quelling of the Druse insurrection, in which the Emir Bechir's Christian population was employed,—when 16,000 stand of arms were distributed to them,—to deliver their arms up to the Emir Bechir. It appears they have refused to accede to this demand, and have declared that the population are, with the Druses, determined that they shall retain their arms, which were placed in their hands, under a promise from the Egyptian Government, that they should be for the defence of themselves and their children; that this determination has arisen chiefly from the apprehension of the population, that it is the intention of the Egyptian Government to exact from them conscripts for the Egyptian army, or to raise a militia to serve beyond the limits of the Emir Bechir's jurisdiction.

I hear that orders have been received here from the Government in Egypt, to send the six Chiefs commanding the Irregular Syrian Cavalry with their force to Egypt; this force may amount to about 1,200 men, but is ordered to be completed to 2,000. Some difficulty has presented itself in executing the orders of the Egyptian Government in the immediate marching of these troops; they state that they were recruited for the Syrian service, and have no means either for themselves or their families, which must remain in Syria, to extend their service to a distant part of the territories of this Government. The Chiefs have required a delay of sixty days to combine arrangements on this subject. It would appear that it is the object of the Government to remove them from Syria, as both the chiefs and men are the most turbulent spirits in the country, whom the Government cannot trust, while they can be employed in Egypt or Arabia, with a better chance of success.

My freshest advices from Aleppo, state the destination of two regiments of Infantry from thence for the South, and I hear some Artillery is to augment that force for the same object; here, it is stated, that this force is for the district of Acre. No change had taken place in retiring any part of the force either from Marash or Orfa, and Ibrahim Pasha was still at the former place.

No. 535.

Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

(Extract.) *Foreign Office, April* 7, 1840.

I AM commanded by the Queen to signify to your Lordships Her Majesty's pleasure, that Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, or the officer commanding Her Majesty's Naval Forces in the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles, should be instructed, on receiving an application from the Porte for the presence of the British Squadron in the Bosphorus to protect Constantinople against any attack on the part of Ibrahim Pasha, to repair to the Bosphorus with his squadron, or with such portion thereof as he may think sufficient, and there to adopt, in concert with Her Majesty's Ambassador, and with the Turkish Government, the most effectual measures for the protection of the Turkish capital against an attack by the Egyptian forces.

No. 536.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

(Extract.) *Foreign Office, April* 7, 1840.

IN order to guard against the possibility of any misunderstanding, a precise instruction will now be given to the British Admiral in the terms of my letter to the Admiralty of this day, of which I inclose a copy, and by which the Admiral will be directed, on receiving through your Excellency an application from the Porte for the presence of the British squadron in the Bosphorus to protect Constantinople against any attack on the part of Ibrahim Pasha, to repair to the Bosphorus with his squadron, or with such portion thereof as he may think sufficient, and there to adopt, in concert with your Excellency and with the Turkish Government, the most effectual measures for the protection of the Turkish capital against an attack by the Egyptian forces.

No. 537.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 10.)

My Lord, *Therapia, March* 18, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to forward translated copies of a letter from the Grand Vizier to the Pasha of Egypt, and of the latter's reply, on the subject of the new appointment of a Capudan Pasha, both of which documents were communicated to me this day by his Excellency Rechid Pasha.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 537.

The Grand Vizier to Mehemet Ali.

January 19, 1840.

CONFORMEMENT aux ordres émanés de Sa Hautesse, le poste de Capitan Pacha vient d'être conféré au Ministre du Commerce, son Excellence Saïd Pacha.

Quoique le prédécesseur de Saïd Pacha doive conserver sa décoration personnelle, il faut cependant d'après notre système, que la décoration affectée à la dignité de Capitan Pacha, soit donnée à son successeur.

Par suite de ce changement, il a fallu, suivant les règles de la marine, nommer un personnage convenable Commandant Supérieur de la flotte Impériale. Le Général de Division, Moustapha Pacha, étant un serviteur actif et intelligent de la Sublime Porte, et se trouvant là, Sa Majesté Impériale a daigné le nommer Caïmakam de la flotte, pour qu'il ait, en cette qualité, à soigner toutes les affaires qui regardent les bâtimens, et avoir l'inspection sur les équipages; et j'expédie à Votre Altesse le firman contenant la double commission de Moustapha Pacha à qui Saïd Pacha écrit lui-même.

Je vous écris donc cette lettre pour vous recommander de mettre à exécution la volonté de Sa Majesté Impériale, en faisant lire publiquement le Firman susdit, afin que la commission de Moustapha Pacha soit connue des officiers et des matelots de la flotte; Votre Altesse prendra aussi la décoration affectée au poste de Capitan Pacha et elle l'enverra ici.

(Translation.)

The Grand Vizier to Mehemet Ali.

January 19, 1840.

IN obedience to the orders of His Highness the post of Capudan Pasha has been conferred on the Minister of Commerce, his Excellency Said Pasha.

Although the predecessor of Said Pasha is allowed to retain his personal decoration, the decoration attached to the dignity of Capudan Pasha must, according to our system, be given to his successor.

In consequence of this change it has become necessary, according to the regulations of the Navy, to name a proper person superior Commandant of the Imperial fleet. The General of Division, Mustapha Pasha, being an active and intelligent servant of the Sublime Porte, and being on the spot, His Imperial Majesty has been pleased to name him Caimacam of the fleet, in order that he may in that capacity have a care of all things relating to the vessels, and have

the superintendence over the crews: and I forward to your Highness the firman containing the twofold commission of Mustapha Pasha, to whom Said Pasha writes himself.

I write this letter therefore to enjoin you to execute the will of His Imperial Majesty by causing the said firman to be publicly read, in order that the commission of Mustapha Pasha may be known to the officers and the sailors of the fleet. Your Highness will likewise take the decoration attached to the post of Capudan Pasha, and forward the same to this place.

Inclosure 2 in No. 537.

Mehemet Ali to the Grand Vizier.

February 29, 1840.

J'AI eu l'honneur de recevoir le Firman qui annonce, qu'en vertu des ordres émanés du Trône, la dignité de Capitan Pacha a été conférée à son Excellence Saïd Pacha, et que, comme par suite de ce changement il a fallu, d'après la règle suivie dans la marine, nommer un personnage convenable Commandant Supérieur de la flotte Impériale, Sa Hautesse a daigné nommer son Excellence Moustapha Pacha, qui se trouve ici, Caïmakam de la flotte Impériale. J'ai aussi reçu la lettre par laquelle Votre Altesse me recommande de mettre à exécution la volonté de Sa Hautesse, en faisant lire le Firman susdit en présence des officiers de la flotte. Comme il est de mon devoir d'exécuter la volonté de Sa Majesté Impériale, j'ai fait remettre le Firman susdit à Moustapha Pacha par le Capitaine qui en avait été le porteur, et je l'ai fait lire ensuite publiquement à bord du vaisseau le "Mahmoudié," en présence de tous les officiers et capitaines qui s'y étaient réunis.

J'ai aussi donné les ordres nécessaires à Moustapha Pacha de remplir avec soin les devoirs de sa charge.

Je voulais vous faire savoir que nous ne cessons tous de former des vœux pour la conservation des jours précieux et de la prospérité de Sa Majesté Impériale, lorsque le Capitaine dont j'ai parlé plus haut, ayant exprimé le désir de retourner à Constantinople, j'ai profité de cette occasion d'écrire à Votre Altesse.

(Translation.)

Mehemet Ali to the Grand Vizier.

February 29, 1840.

I HAVE had the honour to receive the firman announcing that in obedience to the orders of the throne, the dignity of Capudan Pasha has been conferred on his Excellency Said Pasha, and that, as in consequence of this change it had become necessary, according to the rule followed in the maritime service, to name a proper person superior Commandant of the Imperial fleet, His Highness had been pleased to name his Excellency Mustapha Pasha, who is here, Caimacam of the Imperial fleet. I have likewise received the letter by which your Highness enjoins me to carry the will of His Highness into execution, by causing the abovenamed firman to be read in presence of the officers of the fleet. As it is my duty to execute the will of His Imperial Majesty, I have caused the said firman to be delivered to Mustapha Pasha by the Captain who brought it, and I have subsequently caused it to be publicly read on board the ship of the line, the "Mahmoudié," in presence of all the officers and captains who had there assembled.

I have likewise given the necessary directions to Mustapha Pasha to execute with care the duties of his situation.

I wished to inform you that we do not cease to pray for the preservation of the precious days, and for the prosperity, of His Imperial Majesty, when the captain, of whom I have spoken above, having expressed a wish to return to Constantinople, I availed myself of this opportunity to write to your Highness.

No. 538.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston—(*Received April* 10.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, February* 26, 1840.

BY accounts I have this day received from Kaiffa, I am informed that the fortification of St. Jean d'Acre is carried on with the greatest activity, and Ibrahim Pasha, it is said, has allowed the Governor only thirty days to render it effective. Workmen are brought from all quarters, consisting of condemned criminals, soldiers, &c., to the amount of about 6,000. The 30th Regiment of Infantry is on its way from Damascus to reinforce the place. Solyman Pasha is expected from Saida, and 100 pieces of Artillery are to be brought from Alexandria. The extensive stores of the hospital have been filled with powder; and provisions sufficient to maintain 16,000 men, for six months, are said to be in store. Ten thousand baskets have been ordered for the object, it is said, of levelling a mound near Acre.

The inhabitants of Acre are in the greatest alarm about an expected blockade of that place.

The Mudir returned to Acre to-day, after an absence of three months, spent in collecting the contribution. His instructions were most peremptory; and it is said that he has succeeded in settling accounts with the peasants, as well as obtaining payment of the sums advanced them by Ibrahim Pasha, at an interest of 25 per cent. But this has occasioned extreme misery and desolation among the country people, many of whom were obliged to sell their oxen to escape the threatened punishment; others to abandon their homes with their families.

It is said, that the Government despairing of payment from some of the villages, has applied to the merchants who traffic with them.

The Local Government does not pay the least attention to the claims of British merchants trading with this country, a subject on which I shall do myself the honour of reporting to your Lordship shortly.

Mehemet Ali talks openly of dismantling and sinking the ships of both squadrons, arming the shores from Marabout to Rosetta, with the guns from the ships, and employing the crews and officers in defending this line of coast.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 539.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received April* 7.)

(Extract.) *Alexandria, March* 6, 1840.

THE reports I receive from Mr. Consuls Werry, Moore, and others, represent Syria as in a great state of excitement, caused by Mehemet Ali's recent arbitrary measures for the increase of his military forces. Mr. Werry writes to me to say, that he has addressed your Lordship on this subject, as well as his Excellency Viscount Ponsonby.

From what I learn from other sources of information, I am led to believe, that the Pasha's fears have been seriously excited in consequence of those circumstances; and that he has decided upon sending two influential and confidential individuals of his suite to the head-quarters of Ibrahim Pasha, for the purpose of arranging with him such measures as may prove most likely to allay the alarms that have now risen to such a height.

Large reinforcements of troops, of all arms, have arrived at Alexandria since I last had the honour of addressing your Lordship. A number of cannon of different calibres, with a large supply of shot and shell, have also been sent down here, from the arsenal of Cairo, which has been in full activity for some time past.

Your Lordship is, doubtless, informed of what even the public prints make known, that important military preparations have lately been made at St. Jean d'Acre; and that Solyman Pasha has been to that place, in order to superintend and accelerate these works of defence.

Mehemet Ali assumes a tranquil and determined demeanour; and continues to declare that he will resist to the last. He is certainly most indefatigable and methodical in his efforts for defence; but I perceive nothing to lead me to change my opinion, that he will submit to the decision of the Great European Powers, so soon as he sees them united in their purpose, and a sufficient force at hand to carry their intentions into effect.

Mehemet Ali left Alexandria this afternoon for Cairo, and I have conceived it my duty to follow him. I, therefore, propose proceeding to Cairo to-morrow morning. I purpose returning to Alexandria before the English packet shall depart on the 19th instant.

We have had several deaths here lately, said to proceed from plague. They average daily from three or four to seven. But I have been credibly informed, that no such disease actually has existed here since my arrival; and that such a report is propagated for the sole purpose of gaining time for defensive preparations, by working on the fears of Great Britain in particular, or indeed any other European Power that may prove disposed to attack the possessions of the Pasha.

No. 540.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received April 7.*)

(Extract.) *Alexandria, March* 20, 1840.

IN reference to my despatch of the 6th instant, I have the honour to inform your Lordship, that I returned to Alexandria yesterday, having left Cairo on the morning of the 15th instant, the Viceroy preceding me by a few hours.

From all I could learn and perceive, the object of Mehemet Ali's visit to Cairo was to expedite the works now going on in the arsenal; to ascertain the precise numbers of men and horses that the Cavalry establishment at Ghizeh could furnish; and to inspire confidence in the minds of the people of the neighbourhood, whose fears have been excited to an extraordinary degree by the late levies, and other arbitrary acts of the Pasha.

Mehemet Ali does not appear to have been by any means satisfied with the condition of the public mind in Cairo. He warmly reproved Abbas Pasha, Governor of that place, for not having repressed certain manifestations of popular feeling.

The arsenal in general is well furnished, and the greatest activity prevailing in some departments; as, for example, in the manufactory of muskets, which is directed by an artisan from Birmingham. Within a few weeks the Pasha will possess a supply of arms fully sufficient to equip any force he can possibly assemble.

Extraordinary exertions are making in the manufactory of powder, where steam-engines are employed, and where men, women, and children are at work, day and night. On the 14th instant, 200 camel loads of gunpowder were sent off to Alexandria. The Pasha besides is amply provided with shot and shell.

Great efforts are making to furnish a large number of gun-carriages and extra wheels, as well as in making tumbrils, and repairing old ones. I was particularly struck, in examining these pieces, by the perfection of the iron work; but the wood-work appeared to me to be so rudely fashioned and imperfect, that I should greatly question its durability.

The manufactory of swords and small arms, of which there is a large supply, is by no means inferior to the workmanship of France.

Considerable quantities of boots and shoes, of European make, are in store; as well as much cloth and linen stuff for summer clothing.

The cavalry establishment at Ghizeh, is under the superintendence of a French officer of considerable experience. Most of the horses were at grass.

The appearance and bearing of the soldiers evinced an economy and discipline which would be highly creditable to any European troops. With the exception of the Fez, and the full Egyptian breeches, with which, however, the Cavalry wear boots and spurs, there is not much difference from the usual costume and equipments of a French dragoon.

The garrison of Cairo is composed at present of the following force:—two regiments of Regular Infantry, each of about 4,000 men; one regiment of Baltagi, or Invalids; and in the neighbourhood of the city there are stationed,—one regiment of Regular Cavalry, about 4,800 Arnaouts and Turks, and about 2,000 Cavalry from Syria.

In Toura, there are also from 1,500 to 1,800 of the 35th Regiment of Infantry.

In Upper Egypt, there are three regiments of Cavalry; one at Benisouef, one at Minieh, and one at Manfalut.

On the 16th instant, about 800 Cavalry arrived at Cairo, from Syria; reporting that the whole number expected from that quarter amount to 5,000.

The 32nd Regiment of Infantry, from Essiout, which was to have proceeded to Alexandria, has received counter orders.

I hear that some Artillery has been expedited to Cosseir and Suez; but I have not as yet been able to ascertain the numbers.

Amongst the other defensive preparations of the Pasha, a considerable force of Artillery has been brought to this point. A regiment of that arm is at present encamped outside the town. It consists of 10 batteries, 60 brass field-pieces, and 3,200 men; the remaining 800 who complete its complement of 4,000, being now, for the most part, with the horses, which are at grass. Yesterday the Pasha reviewed this regiment: it did not perform any evolutions, but the guns were placed in position. Of these, four batteries executed target practice with round shot, and acquitted themselves in a manner highly creditable. The other six batteries opened and sustained for some time a rolling fire, and the guns were served actively and with efficiency. The men afterwards went through the sword exercise Two additional batteries of the same regiment are daily expected to arrive from Cairo.

Having said thus much of the force, arms, and matériel possessed by Mehemet Ali, your Lordship will perhaps permit me to add, that the wealth and resources of Egypt cannot be unknown to you; they are such as enable Mehemet Ali to form, in various parts of the country, ample depôts of corn, rice, and pulse,—the usual food of the inhabitants.

Some of my Colleagues talk much of the resources at the disposal of Mehemet Ali, and the means he still has in reserve for procuring money. His credit with the capitalists of Europe can be better estimated by your Lordship than by myself; and I therefore shall only review his financial position in this country. He has no doubt at present produce in his stores to the value of half a million sterling; but this being set off against his debts, would leave a very small balance in his favour. Upon the breaking out of a war with any of the European Powers, the chief outlets being closed, the produce of Egypt would be no longer available as a source of wealth; commerce would, consequently, be paralyzed; and it is obvious that Mehemet Ali must support hostilities by means of his credit alone.

It is my duty to remark to your Lordship, that the bearing of Mehemet Ali is full of defiance. In his public conversations respecting both his own legitimate Sovereign, the Sultan, and the Allied Powers, he expresses himself in the haughtiest terms.

No. 541.

Nouri Effendi to Viscount Palmerston.

Londres, le 7 *Avril,* 1840.

LE Soussigné, Ambassadeur Plénipotentiaire de la Sublime Porte, ayant été spécialement chargé par son Auguste Maître le Sultan, de se rendre à Londres pour y reclamer l'effet de l'intérêt manifesté à Sa Hautesse par la Note Collective que les Représentans des Cours de la Grande Bretagne, d'Autriche, de France, de Prusse, et de Russie, accrédités auprès du Grand Seigneur, ont présentée au Divan, le 27 Juillet, 1839, s'adresse en toute confiance à MM. les Représentans des dites Cours réunis à Londres, pour concerter avec eux les moyens d'effectuer la pacification de l'Empire Ottoman dont le repos a été troublé par les projets ambitieux de Méhémet Ali, Pacha d'Egypte.

Il est généralement connu, que depuis l'année 1827, l'Empire Ottoman a éprouvé une série de malheurs et de désastres par terre et par mer, à la suite desquels ses moyens défensifs ont éprouvé pour le moment un grand affaiblissement. Méhémet Ali, au lieu d'aider son Souverain à se relever de ces pertes, a, au contraire, profité de l'état d'affaiblissement où se trouvait l'Empire Ottoman, pour donner suite aux desseins ambitieux et hostiles que depuis longtemps il méditait contre son Souverain. En effet, il ne craignit pas de l'attaquer en 1832: et il lui enleva une partie de ses plus belles provinces. Les sacrifices que fit alors le Sultan, devaient lui faire espérer que la paix ne serait plus troublée dans ses Etats, et que le Pacha d'Egypte, en reconnaissance de la générosité avec laquelle Sa Hautesse lui avait conféré le gouvernement de tant de belles provinces, les administrerait dans l'intérêt de son maître. Mais, au contraire, l'épuisement où se trouvait l'Empire Ottoman à la suite de tant de malheurs, et l'affaiblissement momentané dans lequel il languissait, furent pour Méhémet Ali un motif de donner un nouvel essor à son ambition. C'est ainsi qu'il essaya, il y a deux ans, de se déclarer indépendant et d'obtenir à cet effet le consentement des Puissances étrangères. Mais celles-ci, faisant preuve de loyauté et de bonne foi envers la Porte, repoussèrent spontanément une prétention si incompatible avec les droits de souveraineté du Sultan. Mais cette injuste prétention ne fit que changer de forme: et bientôt après, Méhémet Ali demanda avec hauteur pour lui et ses enfans, l'hérédité de toutes les provinces qu'il administrait au nom de Sa Hautesse. Il appuya sa demande de préparatifs hostiles, indiquant suffisamment son dessein d'imposer par la force à son Souverain.

Feu le Sultan Mahmoud se vit en conséquence obligé de se mettre en garde contre les nouveaux projets de son ambitieux vassal. Il réunit une armée pour sa défense. Cependant les deux armées une fois en présence, en vinrent aux prises; il en résulta pour l'Empire Ottoman de nouveaux désastres qui brisèrent le cœur du Sultan Mahmoud, et contribuèrent à accélérer sa fin.

Malgré tant de malheurs qui vinrent fondre à la fois sur la Porte, un des premiers actes du Sultan Abdoul Medjid, à son avènement au trône, fut d'offrir à son vassal rebelle l'oubli du passé et l'hérédité de l'Egypte pour lui et ses enfans, à condition que le Pacha restituerait la flotte Impériale et toutes les provinces ne faisant pas partie du Pachalic d'Egypte. Au lieu de reconnaître la magnanimité de son Souverain, Méhémet Ali y répondit par des prétentions dures et hautaines. Néanmoins, le Sultan allait envoyer un fonctionnaire à Alexandrie pour y faire un nouvel effort afin de régler un arrangement avec son vassal, lorsque les Cours de la Grande Bretagne, d'Autriche, de France, de Prusse, et de Russie, voyant la position désastreuse dans laquelle se trouvait le Grand Seigneur, et mûes par des sentimens d'amitié, de bienveillance, et de générosité, qu'il ne saurait assez reconnaître, firent signifier par le moyen de leurs Représentans accrédités auprès de la Sublime Porte, que "l'accord sur la Question d'Orient était assuré entre les Cinq Grandes Puissances, en engageant le Sultan à suspendre toute détermination définitive sans leur concours, en attendant l'effet de l'intérêt qu'elles lui portaient."

Le Soussigné prend la liberté de reproduire ci-jointe la copie de cette Note Collective.

Sa Hautesse a attendu jusqu'à présent avec confiance l'effet de l'intérêt si généreusement exprimé par cette même Note. Mais placé sous le fardeau des charges extraordinaires qui pesent sur l'Empire Ottoman, et obligé de se prémunir contre l'attitude hostile et les préparatifs de guerre toujours continués de Méhémet Ali, le Sultan se voit empêché de donner tous ses soins à la réforme des abus dans l'administration de son empire; tandisque les ressources de tout genre qui devraient contribuer à opérer cette réforme, s'épuisent tous les jours de plus en plus, et font désirer ardemment de voir bientôt un résultat aux intentions bienveillantes des Cinq Cours Alliées de la Porte.

Le Soussigné est en conséquence chargé d'appeler la sérieuse attention de MM. les Représentans des Cours de la Grande Bretagne, d'Autriche, de France, de Prusse, et de Russie, sur un état de choses aussi pénible que dangereux pour l'existence politique de l'Empire Ottoman, dont elles ont déclaré vouloir maintenir l'intégrité et l'indépendance, et de réclamer leur co-opération et leur sollicitude pour faire cesser au plus tôt des maux d'une nature aussi grave.

Pour mieux atteindre à ce but, le Soussigné Plénipotentiaire est chargé par ordre du Sultan son Auguste Maître, d'annoncer qu'il est muni de l'autorisation nécessaire pour conclure et signer une Convention avec MM. les Représentans des dites Cours, laquelle aurait pour but d'aider le Sultan à faire exécuter l'arrangement d'après lequel Sa Hautesse avait annoncé l'intention de conférer à Méhémet Ali et à ses enfans, l'hérédité du Gouvernement de l'Egypte, à condition que le Pacha restituerait la flotte Ottomane et toutes les autres provinces ou gouvernemens situés en-dehors du Pachalic d'Egypte.

Le Soussigné, en vertu de l'intérêt que les dites Puissances ont manifesté au Sultan, et vû la position critique où se trouve aujourd'hui placé l'Empire Ottoman, a l'honneur d'inviter, au nom de Sa Hautesse, MM. les Représentans de la Grande Bretagne, d'Autriche, de France, de Prusse, et de Russie, à vouloir bien se joindre à lui pour conclure une Convention dans le but ci-dessus énoncé, et pour convenir en même temps des moyens nécessaires pour y donner effet.

Le Soussigné se flatte que MM. les Représentans des dites Cours voudraient bien lui prêter leur assistance pour accomplir un œuvre qui devrait essentiellement contribuer à rendre la paix au Levant, et servir en même temps à prévenir les complications fâcheuses qui, sans cela, pourraient en résulter pour l'Europe entière.

Le Soussigné, Plénipotentiaire de la Sublime Porte, prie MM. les Représentans des Cinq Grandes Puissances, d'agréer l'assurance de sa plus haute considération.

(Signé) NOURI.

(Translation.)

Nouri Effendi to Viscount Palmerston.

London, April 7, 1840.

THE Undersigned, Ambassador Plenipotentiary of the Sublime Porte, having been especially instructed by his august Master the Sultan, to proceed to London, there to solicit the effect of the interest manifested to His Highness by the Collective Note which the Representatives of the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, accredited to the Grand Signor, presented to the Divan on the 27th of July, 1839, addresses himself with full confidence to the Representatives of the said Courts assembled in London, in order to concert with them the means of effecting the pacification of the Ottoman Empire, the repose of which has been disturbed by the ambitious projects of Mehemet Ali, Pasha of Egypt.

It is generally known that since the year 1827, the Ottoman Empire has experienced a series of misfortunes and disasters by land and by sea, in consequence whereof its defensive means have for the time been much weakened. Mehemet Ali, instead of assisting his Sovereign to recover himself from these losses, has, on the contrary, availed himself of the state of weakness in which

the Ottoman Empire was placed, to pursue the ambitious and hostile designs which for a long while he meditated against his Sovereign. Infact, he did not fear to attack him in 1832; and he deprived him of a portion of his fairest provinces. The sacrifices which the Sultan at that time made, entitled him to expect that peace would be no further disturbed in his dominions, and that the Pasha of Egypt, out of gratitude for the generosity with which His Highness had conferred upon him the Government of so many fair provinces, would administer them for the interest of his Master. But, on the contrary, the state of exhaustion in which the Ottoman Empire was placed in consequence of so many misfortunes, and the temporary weakness under which it languished, induced Mehemet Ali to give a fresh impulse to his ambition. Thus he attempted two years ago to declare himself independent, and to obtain for that object the assent of foreign Powers. But these proving their sincerity and good faith towards the Porte, spontaneously repelled a pretension so incompatible with the Sultan's rights of sovereignty. But this unjust pretension only changed its shape; and soon afterwards Mehemet Ali haughtily demanded for himself and his children, the inheritance of all the provinces which he administered in the name of the Sultan. He supported his demand by hostile preparations, indicating sufficiently his design of imposing by force upon his Sovereign.

The late Sultan Mahmoud accordingly found himself obliged to guard against the new projects of his ambitious vassal. He collected an army for his defence. However, the two armies, once in presence, came to an engagement; the result whereof was new calamities to the Ottoman Empire, which broke the heart of Sultan Mahmoud, and contributed to hasten his end.

Notwithstanding so many calamities which befell the Porte at one time, one of the first acts of the Sultan Abdul Medjid, on his accession to the throne, was to offer to his rebellious vassal oblivion of the past, and the inheritance of Egypt for himself and his children, on condition that the Pasha restored the Imperial fleet, and all the provinces which do not form a part of the Pashalic of Egypt. Instead of acknowledging the magnanimity of his Sovereign, Mehemet Ali replied to it by harsh and haughty pretensions. Nevertheless, the Sultan was about to send a functionary to Alexandria, to make there a fresh attempt to settle an arrangement with his vassal, when the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, seeing the disastrous situation in which the Grand Signor was placed, and influenced by sentiments of friendship, goodwill, and generosity, which cannot be sufficiently acknowledged, signified through their Representatives, accredited to the Sublime Porte, "that the agreement on the Eastern Question was ensured among the Five Great Powers; whereupon the Sultan was invited to suspend any definitive determination without their concurrence, and to wait for the effect of the interest which they felt for him."

The Undersigned takes the liberty to inclose a copy of this Collective Note.

His Highness has waited up to the present time with confidence for the effect of the interest so generously expressed in this same note. But placed beneath the burthen of the extraordinary charges which weigh down upon the Ottoman Empire, and obliged to take measures of precaution against the hostile attitude and the incessant warlike preparations of Mehemet Ali, the Sultan finds himself prevented from devoting all his care to the reform of abuses in the administration of his Empire; while the resources of all kinds which should contribute to effect that reform, are day by day exhausted more and more, and occasion a vehement desire of witnessing speedily the result of the friendly intentions of the Five Courts, Allies of the Porte.

The Undersigned is in consequence directed to call the serious attention of the Representatives of the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, to a state of things as painful as it is dangerous to the political existence of the Ottoman Empire, the integrity and independence of which they have declared their desire to maintain; and to claim their co-operation and their solicitude in order to put a stop, at the earliest possible period, to evils of so serious a nature.

In order better to attain that object, the Undersigned Plenipotentiary is directed, by order of the Sultan his August Master, to announce that he is provided with the necessary authority for concluding and signing a Convention with the Representatives of the said Courts, which should have for its object, to aid the Sultan in carrying into effect the arrangement according to which His Highness had announced his intention of conferring upon Mehemet Ali and his children the inheritance of the Government of Egypt, on condition that the Pasha should restore the Ottoman Fleet, and all the other Provinces and Governments situated without the Pashalic of Egypt.

The Undersigned, in virtue of the interest which the said Powers have manifested towards the Sultan, and considering the critical situation in which the Ottoman Empire is at present placed, has the honour to invite, in the name of His Highness, the Representatives of Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, to be pleased to unite with him in the conclusion of a Convention with the object above-mentioned, and to come to an agreement at the same time as to the means necessary for carrying it into effect.

The Undersigned flatters himself, that the Representatives of the said Courts would be good enough to lend him their assistance for the accomplishment of a work which must essentially contribute to restore peace to the Levant, and tend at the same time to prevent the grievous complications, which otherwise might result for the whole of Europe.

The Undersigned, Plenipotentiary of the Sublime Porte, requests the Representatives of the Five Great Powers to accept the assurance of his highest consideration.

(Signed) NOURI.

No 542.

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, April* 10, 1840.

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, a copy of an official Note which I have received from Nouri Effendi, announcing that he is authorized to conclude and sign with the Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, a Convention, having for its object to assist the Sultan to carry into effect an arrangement with Mehemet Ali, which shall confer upon that Pasha and upon his children the hereditary government of Egypt, in return for the restoration by him to the Sultan of the Turkish fleet, and of all the provinces and governments lying beyond the limits of the Pashalic of Egypt.

Nouri Effendi further requests, that the Representatives of the Five Powers will conclude with him such a Convention, and will at the same time agree with him as to the means necessary for carrying the same into effect.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 543.

Viscount Palmerston to Nouri Effendi.

Foreign Office, April 11, 1840.

THE Undersigned, &c., has had the honour to receive the Note of the 7th instant, by which his Excellency Nouri Effendi, &c., has announced that he is provided with the necessary powers and instructions to conclude with the Plenipotentiaries of the Courts of Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, a Convention for the purpose of giving effect to the Collective Note which was presented to the Porte on the 27th of July, 1839, by the Representatives of the Five Powers at Constantinople.

In reply to this communication, the Undersigned has the honour to inform his Excellency Nouri Effendi, that the Undersigned is ready, on the part of Her Majesty's Government, to concert immediately with his Excellency, together with the Representatives of Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, the best means of realizing the friendly intentions which the Representatives of the Five Powers manifested in the name of their respective Courts towards the Porte by the above-mentioned Collective Note of the 27th July, 1839.

The Undersigned, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 544.

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, April* 11, 1840.

I INCLOSE to your Excellency a copy of a note which I have addressed to Nouri Effendi in reply to His Excellency's note of the 7th instant, of which a copy was inclosed in my despatch of yesterday's date, and I have to instruct your Excellency to show this reply to M. Thiers.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 545.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 16.)

(Extract.) *Paris, April* 13,1840.

IN obedience to your instructions of the 11th instant, which I received by the post this day, I have shown to M. Thiers the copy of the Note addressed by your Lordship to Nouri Effendi, in reply to his Excellency's Note of the 7th.

M. Thiers made scarcely any observation upon the Note, but requested me to allow him to keep it for twenty-four hours. I asked him whether any, or what answer had been given to Nouri Effendi's Note by the French Ambassador in London? M. Thiers said, none, except the acknowledgment of its receipt, and that with respect to the matter it contained, he preferred entering into the discussion of it with your Lordship rather than with Nouri Effendi.

No. 546.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 17.)

My Lord, *Paris, April* 15, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship the "Moniteur" of this day, containing a speech delivered yesterday by the President of the Council in the Chamber of Peers. I was present at the debate, and the general approbation manifested of the sentiments of M. Thiers on the Question of Egypt, confirmed the opinion I have always entertained and expressed in my despatches to your Lordship, that no Ministry which could be formed in this country, would agree to the adoption by France of measures of coercion against Mehemet Ali.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 547.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 20.)

My Lord, *Paris, April* 17, 1840.

IN my interview this morning with M. Thiers, I asked him whether he had instructed the French Ambassador in London, to give any reply to the Note which Nouri Effendi had addressed to the Representatives in London, other than the mere acknowledgment of its receipt. M. Thiers said, that the French Government having no expectation that the settlement of peace between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, would be advanced by any communication with Nouri Effendi regarding the contents of his Note, had not instructed M. Guizot to answer it. With respect to the question itself, he was ready and desirous to discuss with your Lordship the means of effecting a reconciliation between the Porte and the Pasha of Egypt; but he had his doubts as to the policy of establishing a conference of the Five Powers for the attainment of that object, being of opinion that if four of the Five Powers decided upon having recourse to coercive measures to compel the restoration of Syria to the Turkish Government, the refusal of France to join in those measures, after having been a party in the conference, would be a more marked separation from the other Powers than if no such conference had taken place.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 548.

Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 20.)

(Extract.) *Aleppo, February* 20, 1840.

I NOW do myself the honour to wait on your Lordship with a copy of another despatch I addressed to Viscount Ponsonby under the 21st of last month.

Since the date of the above communication, nothing whatever of any interest has transpired in this district, and in any way meriting your Lordship's notice.

His Excellency the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha continues to be at Marash, and all the Egyptian forces within this district, and on the north and north-east frontiers, remain without any further change, but are all cantoned on various points in suitable quarters, to meet the severe weather of the season.

Inclosure in No. 548.

Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Ponsonby.

(Extract.) *Aleppo, January* 21, 1840.

HIS Highness Ibrahim Pasha continues to remain at Marash, and where, from all appearances, he will most likely pass the winter.

All the Egyptian forces are now cantoned into winter quarters; some along the north and north-east frontier, others in some of the principal towns, besides many of the regiments that have gone southwards for the same object.

The Egyptian force at Orfa remains, from all accounts, without any further change; nor have I been able to learn that their authority on that line has advanced further, but continues to occupy the points I have already noted to your Lordship.

The Alexandretta district and the neighbouring mountains of the Giaour Dagh, who had several months back evinced symptoms of discontent against this Government, are, by the latest advices from our authority in that district, perfectly quiet; and, I may add, that not only that, but also the Latakia, Tripoli, and indeed every part of this Consular district, enjoys for the present every quietness.

No. 549.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, April* 21, 1840.

I HAVE to instruct your Excellency to endeavour at the proper time to persuade the Porte to give to the Druses such privileges and exemptions as may satisfy their reasonable desires.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 550.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 22.)

My Lord, *Paris, April* 20, 1840.

I HAVE received your Lordship's despatches to the 17th instant.

M. Thiers told me to-day, that although the French Government would not consent to their Ambassador in London being member of a Conference of the Five Powers, solemnly assembled to deliberate upon the propositions contained in the Note of Nouri Effendi, M. Guizot was authorized to discuss with your Lordship, and also with the Representatives of the other Powers, the means of effecting peace between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali; and that the French Government were ready to urge upon the Pasha of Egypt, and to use their utmost influence to obtain, his acquiescence in any arrangement which, considering his position and means of resistance, there is the least chance of his accepting.

M. Thiers said, that he had written a long despatch to M. Cochelet to be read to Mehemet Ali, cautioning him not to be led by the speeches made in the Tribunes of the Chambers of France, to indulge in exaggerated expectations in regard to the conditions of peace between him and the Sultan.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 551.

Mr. Consul Werry to J. Bidwell, Esq.—(Received April 21.)

(Extract.) *Damascus, February* 20, 1840.

ALL the measures and operations of the Egyptian Government seem at present intended to protect Egypt and Syria from the Western Powers, though Ibrahim with his chief forces remain at Marash, and are extended into Orfa Swerik, and Chermook, north and south, to the Khaboor river; in fact, ready to proceed further in either direction, according to circumstances, next spring.

No. 552.

Mr. Consul Moore to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 20.)

My Lord, *Beyrout, February* 27, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to state, for your Lordship's information, that Solyman Pasha visited Beyrout on the 31st ultimo. His Excellency has since left for Sidon. His appearance at this place added greatly to the alarm which previously existed amongst both Christians and Mahommedans, lest it should have for its object the enrolment in Syria of a Militia, as in Egypt. Solyman Pasha assured me that for the present no such intention existed; and he has since left this place for Sidon and Acre.

At the latter place, the most extensive preparations are making for defence; the trenches are to be enlarged and deepened; a mound to the east of that fortress, raised by the Egyptian army on its investment, is to be levelled; large supplies of biscuit and other provisions have been ordered; a stock of lime, for making mortar, has also been transported there; and the works are pushed on with such vigour, that the labour is carried on by torchlight.

It is reckoned that, betwixt labourers and troops, not fewer than 13,000 men are employed at Acre. All the builders and artizans from this and the neighbouring places, have been sent to that place.

Several families have also quitted the city, it is said by permission, and are arrived at Sidon.

The military force at Acre, according to last accounts, consists of three regiments,—one of Cavalry and two of Infantry, with about 600 Artillerymen. About 300 guns on the batteries were counted about two years ago by an individual through whom I have received this information, but it is said, that since then they have been increased, though I have not been able to ascertain the precise number.

Secret meetings have been held in Mount Lebanon amongst the Christians and Sheiks of the Druses, and a resolution taken by them to resist all attempts either to enrol or disarm them.

The Government is everywhere collecting its outstanding revenue, and much rigour is used to compel payment. The usual advances made by Government to cultivators has this year been discontinued; the land must therefore, in many cases, lie fallow for want of the means of sowing it.

Though public tranquillity is maintained, much anxiety is felt by all classes as to the future.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) N. MOORE.

No. 553.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received April* 26.)

My Lord, *Therapia, April* 1, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to inclose a translated copy of the Grand Vizier's reply to the Pasha of Egypt's last communication, of which a copy was transmitted to your Lordship in my despatch of the 7th of March.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 553.

The Grand Vizier to Mehemet Ali.

(Traduction.)

L'EXPERIENCE du passé semble, d'après Sa Hautesse, notre Auguste Maître et Bienfaiteur, et la Sublime Porte, rendre, pour ainsi dire, nécessaire de ne pas revenir sur ce qui a été dit touchant la position dans laquelle Votre Altesse s'est mise de son propre gré, tout ce qui a été dit n'ayant jusqu'ici produit aucun effet.

Dans le seul but, cependant, de nous prémunir contre toutes les insinuations qui pourraient, ce qui est à présumer, être faites plus tard, savoir, que nous n'avons fait aucun cas de la confiance que Votre Altesse vient de montrer, ni des ouvertures qu'elle vient de faire pour un accommodement, je vous parlerai succintement, conformément à la résolution qui en a été prise, des principaux points de la lettre confidentielle que vous venez de m'adresser, en vous faisant connaître avec franchise mes sentimens là-dessus.

Personne n'est plus vivement affecté que moi des différends qui existent depuis de longues années entre la Sublime Porte et Votre Altesse, des maux de toutes espèces qui en résultent pour notre Patrie, et de la commotion que produisent dans tous les esprits cette désunion et cette scission qui règnent parmi les Musulmans. Sans la réserve que je me suis imposée en fait d'imputations qui sont aussi désagréables pour celui qui les fait que pour celui à qui il les fait, il me serait certes extrêmement facile de démontrer que les torts ne sont pas de notre côté. Mais ces choses là étant laissées au tribunal du Très-Haut, nous espérons en Dieu que ceux qui en sont la cause n'échapperont point à la colère céleste.

Quoiqu'il en soit, j'ai jugé à propos, jetant un voile sur le passé, et gardant le silence sur l'avenir, fixer toute mon attention sur le présent. Je

dis donc, d'abord, au sujet de notre dernière correspondance qui fait le fond de nos présentes discussions, que vous vous plaignez que j'ai employé certaines expressions fortes; c'est-à-dire, que je me suis servi d'un langage faisant voir la nécessité que vous prouviez votre fidélité et votre dévouement à la Sublime Porte, par des faits et à la face de tout le monde; et vous ajoutez, que mes expressions renferment indubitablement une allusion à la restitution de la flotte Impériale. Tandis qu'il fallait, en effet, que Votre Altesse commençât par rendre la flotte, ce qui serait tout-à-fait dans l'ordre des choses, vous en faites à présent une affaire secondaire; et il est devenu clair et évident, que les désirs de la Sublime Porte ne seront pas accomplis même à cet égard, si la question administrative n'est pas simultanément résolue d'une manière satisfaisante.

Vous dites qu'il a fallu retenir la flotte parcequ'elle était allée à Alexandrie spontanément. Je crois devoir répondre que votre justification n'est pas solidement établie. L'arrivée de la flotte à Alexandrie n'a pas été la conséquence d'une victoire, mais l'effet d'une trahison qui a été réprouvée par l'opinion publique de tous les Pays, et qui a couvert le nom de son auteur d'une éternelle infamie. La détention de la flotte, parcequ'elle est allée à Alexandrie, est donc, comme tout le monde sait, aussi inconvenante qu'elle est injuste. Vous avouez vous-même, que la flotte est un bien héréditaire de Sa Majesté Impériale, et vous dites que vous n'avez jamais eu la pensée de vous en emparer. Il est pourtant clair et évident que, retenir la flotte contre la volonté de Sa Hautesse, sans être aucunement arrêté par la considération de ce qu'en dira la Nation Musulmane entière, qui regardera cet acte tout simplement comme un mépris pour elle, c'est la même chose que s'en emparer.

Dans un tems, le feu Sultan se plaignait aussi; mais n'en parlons pas à présent, car ce serait une longue histoire à raconter. Je dirai seulement que lors de l'avènement au trône de Sa Majesté Impériale, dont toutes les pensées sont tournées vers le pardon du passé et le rétablissement de la paix et de la concorde parmi tous ses sujets, et qui n'emploie tous ses momens qu'à assurer leur prospérité et à leur faire jouir des bienfaits d'une administration équitable et paternelle, et des avantages de la civilisation, Sa Hautesse a manifesté à votre égard des sentimens que vous ne devez pas oublier.

Si vous dites: comme le Sultan ne fait que commencer à régner, il ne s'opposera pas à ce que ses Ministres lui proposeront, je vous ferai observer que vous êtes dans une erreur complète. Les excellentes intentions qui animent le Sultan, comme on l'a vu plus haut, sont tellement enracinées dans son cœur plein de bonté, que si quelqu'un de ses serviteurs osait tenir une conduite opposée à ses sentimens souverains, il encourrait sur le champ sa colère et sa disgrâce; ce qu'à Dieu ne plaise! Vous pouvez juger de là aussi combien Sa Hautesse doit être peinée de voir un de ses plus illustres Vizirs, un personnage tel que Votre Altesse, correspondre d'une manière si inconvenante aux bontés et à la faveur dont elle l'a comblée dès le début de son règne.

La lettre de Votre Altesse nous apprend, que non seulement vous êtes disposé à rendre la flotte Impériale, mais que vous avez même montré plusieurs fois des dispositions à réunir toutes les forces de terre et de mer de l'Egypte à l'armée et à la flotte de la Sublime Porte, qui les a refusés; ce qui vous a fait de la peine. Eh, quoi! voulez-vous dire que Sa Hautesse doit abandonner la moitié de son empire à un de ses sujets, seule condition à laquelle le sujet promet toutes les forces dont il peut disposer? qu'entendez-vous dire? J'avoue que je n'ai pas pu comprendre votre idée. On voit qu'en parlant des pays qui ne font point partie de l'Egypte, vous vous croyez obligé d'insister dans vos prétentions que Adana et les gorges du Mont Taurus vous soient abandonnés, parceque vous les considérez comme nécessaires pour assurer l'avenir de votre famille; et que vous pensez que tant que ces positions seront soumises à votre autorité, vous êtes à l'abri de toute attaque de la part de la Sublime Porte.

Les motifs de Votre Altesse pour donner tant d'importance à l'occupation de ces lieux, ne doivent-ils pas aussi engager la Sublime Porte à ne les abandonner ni les céder jamais? et ces positions étant les clefs des pays situés au-delà de l'Asie Mineure, ne sont-ils pas considérées comme les fortifications naturelles de l'Anatolie? est-il possible que nous en venions à un accommodement tant que Votre Altesse persiste dans de pareilles prétentions? Je ne doute pas que Votre Altesse ne m'attribue, à moi, cette fermeté et cette constance dans les principes qui nous guident. Mais supposons pour un moment, que Votre Altesse soit à ma place; je vous demande: oseriez-vous essayer de persuader Sa Majesté Impériale de faire des concessions telles que celles dont il s'agit; concessions de nature à détruire de fond en comble son influence et sa puissance, à blesser la dignité souveraine, et à froisser si considérablement les intérêts de ses sujets? Je vous prie d'une manière toute particulière de me répondre franchement.

Mais que Votre Altesse sache aussi, que supposé même, par impossible, que préférant notre ancienne amitié à la fidélité et au dévouement que je dois au Padishah, notre Bienfaiteur et Maître, je veuille favoriser vos demandes bien connues, est-il à présumer qu'un Souverain si sage et doué de tant de sagacité (Dieu veuille nous le conserver!) condescende au sacrifice de ses droits sacrés? Est-il d'ailleurs possible que tous les Ministres, tous les fidèles et dévoués serviteurs de la Sublime Porte, et même les particuliers, donnent leur consentement à un état de choses si nuisible?

Il est possible que quelques hommes, mûs uniquement par leurs propres intérêts, vous aient flatté dans les lettres qu'ils vous ont écrites, en vous disant que le Sultan a de bonnes dispositions, ou que vous avez beaucoup de partisans, et qu'ils aient voulu vous induire ainsi en erreur. Mais si ces choses étaient vraies, l'opposition d'un Ministre et même de plusieurs Ministres, pourrait-elle les empêcher?

Plus encore, n'est-il pas bien connu que dans la Note Collective qu'ils ont présentée à la Sublime Porte, en date du 27 Juillet dernier, les Représentans des Grandes Puissances ont formellement et catégoriquement déclaré leur ferme résolution est de s'opposer à tout arrangement qui ne serait pas conforme aux intérêts de tout le monde?

Votre Altesse a voulu nous faire concevoir des soupçons sur les intentions des Puissances. Mais quel est donc leur but? Leur but est aujourd'hui ce qu'il était au commencement de la question; c'est-à-dire, que comme elles considèrent la force de cet empire comme étant nécessaire à la conservation de la balance politique de l'Europe, elles veulent que les arrangemens à faire soient conformes à ce principe. Or, le partage de l'Empire Ottoman en deux parties égales soumises à deux différens Gouvernemens, serait un obstacle à l'obtention de la fin qu'elles se proposent, et voilà pourquoi les Puissances ne veulent pas que l'on y consente. Si dans cet état de choses, oubliant les devoirs que nous imposent et la fidélité que nous devons à notre Souverain, et la place que nous occupons, nous aurions osé supplier Sa Majesté Impériale d'accorder les demandes de Votre Altesse, nous nous mettrions en opposition, non avec quelques Puissances seulement, mais avec l'Europe entière, et c'est ce que l'on ne saurait nier. Tandis donc que la raison était de notre côté, et que telles étaient les intentions que les Puissances de l'Europe ne cessaient de nous manifester d'une manière positive, nous était-il possible de suivre une autre ligne de conduite que celle que nous avons adoptée jusqu'ici? Voilà encore une chose que je vous prie de prendre en considération.

Si les Puissances de l'Europe n'ont pas pu jusqu'à présent faire naître un résultat conforme à nos vœux, nous ne devons pas pour cela prendre soupçon de leurs intentions; et bien que certaines circonstances aient retardé le résultat espéré, leurs sentimens à notre égard n'ont pas subi par là la moindre altération: et nous avons la certitude que les exigences impérieuses de leur politique se combineront à la fin, d'une manière favorable à nos droits clairs et patens. Tel étant le pied sur lequel nous sommes avec les Grandes Puissances, nous attendons les évènemens avec la plus grande sécurité.

Vous annoncez des préparatifs de guerre, sur le ton de la menace; ce qui ne s'accorde guère avec votre prétendue fidélité et votre dévouement à Sa Hautesse, qui en est surprise. Quant à Sa Hautesse, forte de ses droits, qui sont assis sur des bases solides, et de la protection du Ciel, elle agira en conséquence, et fera ce qu'exigent ses relations avec les Grandes Puissances.

En un mot, vous voudrez bien me faire savoir catégoriquement si vous avez, ou non, l'intention d'accepter les concessions et les faveurs que le Sultan notre Auguste Maître, en montant sur le trône, a daigné vous offrir. Comme vous connaitrez les principes et les intentions de la Sublime Porte par les

réponses qu'elle fera par écrit à vos demandes, et que vous faites profession de fidélité et de dévouement, si, indépendamment de ces demandes, vous avez quelques idées et quelques observations à nous communiquer, vous voudrez bien le faire d'une manière claire et très-détaillée.

Je prends, en attendant, la liberté de vous donner, ainsi que notre ancienne amitié l'exige, quelques conseils analogues à notre sujet. Après le rang élevé auquel votre Altesse est parvenue, il ne lui reste plus rien à désirer; et elle-même avoue que le principal objet de ses vœux à présent est d'assurer un avenir à ses fils et petit-fils. Or, pour y parvenir, il ne faut employer que les moyens sages qui seuls y conduisent. Pour combler donc vos vœux, il faut profiter du moment actuel, car il n'est pas improbable qu'un peu plus tard vous ayez perdu l'occasion de le faire. Que votre Altesse ne prète pas l'oreille dans des affaires semblables, à des insinuations perfides d'un tas d'adulateurs; mais qu'elle écoute plutôt les représentations bienveillantes d'un ami sincère qui se fait un devoir, à son âge avancé et avec la grande expérience qu'il a acquise, de dire la vérité.

(Translation.)

The Grand Vizier to Mehemet Ali.

IN the opinion of His Highness Our August Master and Benefactor, and of the Sublime Porte, the experience of the past appears, as it were, to make it necessary not to revert to what has been said relative to the position in which Your Highness has voluntarily placed yourself, since everything which has been said has hitherto produced no effect.

Nevertheless, with the sole object of securing ourselves against all the insinuations which might, as it is to be presumed, be made at a later period, namely, that we have had no regard for the confidence which Your Highness has shown towards us, nor for the overtures which you have made for an accommodation, I will address you briefly, in conformity with the resolution which has been taken on that matter, with respect to the principal topics of the confidential letter which you have just written to me, and communicate to you with sincerity my opinion thereupon.

No one is more deeply affected than myself by the differences which for many years existed between the Sublime Porte and Your Highness, by the evils of all kinds which have resulted to our country from those differences, and from the troubles which this disunion and schism among Mussulmans produce in the minds of all people. Without the reserve which I have imposed upon myself with respect to imputations which are as disagreeable for him who makes them, as for him against whom they are made, it would assuredly be extremely easy to demonstrate that the wrongs are not on our side. But those matters being left to the tribunal of the Most High, we trust in God, that those persons who are the cause of them, will not escape the anger of heaven.

Be that as it may, I have thought fit, throwing a veil over the past, and preserving silence as to the future, to fix my entire attention on the present. I say then, in the first place, on the subject of our recent correspondence which is the matter of our present discussions, that you complain that I have made use of certain strong expressions, that is to say, that I have employed language proving the necessity of your evincing your fidelity and devotion to the Sublime Porte, by acts and in the face of the world; and you add, that my expressions indubitably contain an illusion to the restoration of the Imperial Fleet. Whereas, in fact, Your Excellency ought to begin by restoring the fleet, which would be altogether in the order of things you now treat that matter as an affair of secondary importance; and it has become clear and evident, that the desires of the Sublime Porte will not be accomplished even in this respect, if the administrative question is not at the same time settled in a satisfactory manner.

You say that it was necessary to retain the fleet, because it went to Alexandria spontaneously. I deem it my duty to reply, that your justification rests on no solid foundation. The arrival of the fleet at Alexandria was not the consequence of a victory, but of a treason which has been reprobated by the public opinion of all countries, and which has covered the name of its author with eternal infamy. The detention of the fleet, because it went to Alexandria, is then, as all the world knows, as improper as it is unjust. You admit yourself, that the fleet is an hereditary property of His Imperial Majesty, and you say that you have never had any idea of making yourself master of it. It is, however, clear and evident that to retain the fleet against the will of His Highness, without being at all deterred by the consideration of what the whole Mussulman nation will say of the transaction, who will regard that act simply as a contempt for His Highness, is the same thing as to make yourself master of it.

At one time the late Sultan also complained; but let us talk no more about it now, for it would be a long story to tell. I will merely say, that at the time of His Imperial Majesty's accession to the throne,—all whose thoughts are turned towards the pardon of the past, and the re-establishment of peace and of concord among all his subjects, and who employs all his time merely to ensure their prosperity, and to make them enjoy the benefits of an equitable and paternal administration, and the advantages of civilization,—His Highness manifested, with respect to you, sentiments which you ought not to forget.

If you say, As the Sultan has only just begun his reign, he will not oppose what his Ministers shall suggest to him,—I will observe to you that you are altogether mistaken. The excellent intentions by which the Sultan is animated, as has been seen above, are so deeply rooted in his heart full of goodness, that if any one of his servants should dare to act contrary to his Sovereign sentiments, he would forthwith incur his anger and his disgrace, which God forbid! You can judge from thence also how much His Highness must be grieved at seeing one of his most illustrious Viziers, such a personage as Your Highness, make so unseemly a return to the goodness and to the favour which he has heaped upon him from the very commencement of his reign.

Your Highness's letter informs us that not only are you disposed to restore the Imperial fleet, but that you have also at various times manifested your disposition to join the sea and land forces of Egypt to the army and fleet of the Sublime Porte, which has refused them—a circumstance which has occasioned you sorrow. What! would you say that His Highness should abandon the moiety of his Empire to one of his subjects, the only condition on which that subject promises all the forces of which he can dispose? What do you mean to say? I confess that I have been unable to comprehend your meaning. It is evident that when you speak of the countries which do not form part of Egypt, you think yourself obliged to insist upon your pretensions that Adana and the passes of Mount Taurus should be made over to you, because you consider them necessary to secure the future condition of your family; and think, that so long as these positions shall be subject to your authority, you are safe from all attack on the part of the Sublime Porte.

The motives which induce Your Highness to attach so much importance to the occupation of these places, must not they also influence the Sublime Porte not to abandon them, or ever to yield to them? and these positions being the keys of the countries situated beyond Asia Minor, are they not considered as the natural fortifications of Anatolia? Is it possible that we should come to an agreement so long as Your Highness persists in such pretensions? I have no doubt that Your Highness attributes to me, firmness and constancy in the principles by which we are guided. But let us suppose for a moment that Your Highness was in my place: I ask you, Would you venture to endeavour to persuade His Imperial Majesty to make such concessions as those under consideration—concessions calculated to destroy altogether his influence and his power, to wound his sovereign dignity, and to prejudice so considerably the interests of his subjects? I request you most earnestly to answer me frankly.

But Your Highness should also consider, that even supposing—what is impossible—that, preferring our ancient friendship to the fidelity and devotion which I owe to the Padishah, our benefactor and master, I should be willing to favour your well-known demands, is it to be presumed that a Sovereign so wise, and endowed with so much sagacity (may God please to preserve him to us!) would consent to sacrifice his sacred rights? Is it besides possible that all the Ministers, all the faithful and devoted servants of the Sublime Porte, and even private persons, should consent to such a hurtful state of things?

It is possible that some persons, influenced solely by their own interest, may have flattered you in the letters which they have written to you, saying that the Sultan is well disposed, or that you have many partisans, and may have thus wished to deceive you. But if these things were true, could the opposition of a single Minister, or even of many Ministers, prevent them?

Moreover, is it not well known that in the Collective Note which the Representatives of the Great Powers presented to the Porte on the 27th of July last, they formally and categorically declared that their fixed resolution is to oppose every arrangement which should not be consistent with the general interest?

Your Highness has desired to inspire us with suspicions as to the intentions of the Powers. But what then is their object? Their object is now what it was at the commencement of the question; that is to say, that as they consider the force of this Empire to be necessary for the preservation of the political balance of Europe, they desire that the arrangements which are to be made should be in conformity with that principle. Now, the division of the Ottoman Empire into two equal portions, subject to two different Governments, would be an obstacle to the attainment of the end which they propose to themselves; and that is why the Powers are unwilling that we should agree to it. If in this state of things, forgetful of the duties imposed upon us by the fidelity which we owe to our Sovereign, and to the place which we hold, we should have ventured to beseech His Imperial Majesty to grant the demands of Your Highness, we should place ourselves in opposition, not only to some Powers, but to the whole of Europe; and that is what cannot be denied. Whilst, then, reason was on our side, and such were the intentions which the Powers of Europe did not cease to manifest to us in a positive manner, was it possible for us to follow any other line of conduct than that which we have adopted up to this time. This is also a point which I request you to take into consideration.

If the Powers of Europe have not hitherto been able to bring about a result in conformity with our wishes, we ought not therefore to entertain any suspicion of their intentions; and although certain circumstances may have retarded the looked-for result, their sentiments with respect to us have not therefore undergone the slightest alteration; and we possess the certainty that the imperious necessities of their policy will at last effect a combination in a manner favourable to our clear and manifest rights. Such being the footing on which we stand with the Great Powers, we wait for events with the greatest security.

You announce warlike preparations in a menacing tone, which is scarcely consistent with your pretended fidelity and devotion to His Highness, who is surprised at it. As for His Highness, strong in his rights, which rest on solid foundations, and in the protection of Heaven, he will act accordingly, and will do what is required by his relations with the Great Powers.

In a word, you will have the goodness to let me know categorically whether you intend or not to accept the concessions and the favours which the Sultan, our August Master, on ascending the throne, was pleased to offer to you. As you will learn the principles and intentions of the Sublime Porte by the answers which it will return in writing to your demands, and as you profess fidelity and devotion, if, independently of those demands, you have certain notions and observations to communicate to us, you will have the goodness to do so in a clear and very explicit manner.

Meanwhile, I take the liberty of giving you, as is required by an ancient friendship, some advice corresponding with the subject of which we are treating. After the exalted rank at which Your Highness has arrived, nothing further remains for you to desire; and you yourself admit that the principal object of your wishes at present is to ensure a future position to your children and grandchildren. Therefore, to attain to this, you should only make use of the means which alone can enable you to do so. To effect, then, your wishes, you must take advantage of the present moment; for it is not improbable that somewhat later you may have lost the opportunity of doing so. Let not Your Highness, in matters of this kind, lend an ear to the perfidious suggestions of a multitude of flatterers; but listen rather to the benevolent representations of a sincere friend, who makes it his duty, at his advanced age, and with the experience which he has acquired, to tell the truth.

No. 554.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 1.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, March* 27, 1840.

COUNT MEDEM acquaints me of the details of an interview he had with Mehemet Ali a day or two since. In allusion to his present position, the Pasha inquired, with some appearance of irritation, "When will this business end?" and he continued by saying, "There is now more disunion than ever amongst you; and though a change has taken place in the French Ministry, there is as little probability as before of any alteration in the policy of that country, as far as regards my interests." Count Medem replied, "Your Highness is mistaken; for I believe that the question must now be brought to a final conclusion. England seems determined to act."

The Pasha rejoined, "Let England act; if she is alone, I am not afraid, and may even contend with her. I am invulnerable in Egypt." Count Medem then said, "Hear me, Pasha: your Highness is vulnerable everywhere. Do not depreciate in your own mind the means of England. The thing most easy for her to effect, would be precisely the measure most dangerous to you. She would blockade your coasts. You know what would then be your lot in Syria. The blockade would be your ruin: you would be destroyed little by little. It would be a thousand times better for you to die in the field. The foreign merchants resident in Egypt would quit the country, your commerce would be paralyzed, and your end would be wretched."

I have, &c.,
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 555.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 1.)

(Extract.) *Alexandria, March* 31, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship, that, accompanied by Mr. Alison, I waited upon Mehemet Ali yesterday.

I informed Mehemet Ali of the capture*, near Corfu, of the Greek merchant brig, "Achille," and an Ionian trabacolo, employed for recruiting and transporting Albanian troops for the service of his Highness. At first, the Pasha denied all knowledge of this affair, but upon my insisting, and showing him the charter of the brig, he said, that the fact as I stated it was very possible,—as ever since his possessing the supreme authority in Egypt, he had always recruited his Albanian corps from their native country. As to the vessels, he said that the English might do with them whatever they pleased, but that he expected numbers of Albanians would yet reach him.

I replied, that whatever his practice may have been formerly, it but ill accorded with his actual political relations, and his professions of devotion to the Sultan, and desire for the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire, to now seduce and enrol Turkish subjects, for the purpose of acting against their legitimate Sovereign; I added, that it was perfectly known to me who were the agents of his Highness in this business. The Pasha rejoined, that he had taken no measure for seducing the subjects of the Porte, he only wanted recruits for his army; and starting up, he exclaimed with great warmth, "I could, if I would, make the whole nation revolt against the Sultan, and possibly I may do so, if driven to extremities."

I next entered upon the topic of my instructions contained in your

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* See page 639.

Lordship's despatch of the 25th ultimo, and had not proceeded far in my communication, the matter of which I had some time since conveyed to him in a private conversation, when the Pasha manifested much impatience, and exclaimed abruptly, "You speak as if you were a novice in this question. I am weary of these representations. Let us drop the subject. These matters have been repeated to me over and over again. It is useless again to refer to them." Here, Boghos Bey, seeing the Pasha much excited, and fearing that he might commit himself, requested me to write to his Highness, to which I only replied, that my communications with the Pasha must be personal, but that if I had occasion to apply to the Minister, it would be in writing; and I added, that I expected of his Highness a patient hearing. I said that I regretted extremely, that my communication was not of a more agreeable character, but that I really thought the blame to rest, rather with his Highness than with my Government; and that he might rest satisfied, that any representations it might become my duty to make, would always be couched in terms of due respect to the Pasha.

Resuming then the conversation, I asked Mehemet Ali, "Pray, what does your Highness purpose doing with the Turkish fleet;" to which he replied, "I shall keep it as a weapon taken from the hand of my enemies, until my differences are settled with the Porte, and then I shall send it back to the Sultan." To this I rejoined, "If the officers of the Turkish fleet knew their duty to their religion and to the Sultan, they would return with their ships to Constantinople; and I do not conceal from your Highness, that I am instructed by my Government to advise their adoption of such a course." On this, the Pasha, in a state of the greatest excitement, jumped up from his Divan, and cried, "Now you place me in a state of war. I warn you, that the first defection I perceive, I will shoot the offender." I contented myself with answering, "Your Highness may rely on it, that threats will not prevent the performance of my duty. I view with regret, the measures your Highness is adopting, and the preparations you are making; they cannot avail, and only prove the eagerness with which your Highness is rushing towards certain destruction."

I begged Mehemet Ali to inform me, whether he had not recently written to Hosrew Pasha, respecting some arrangement of his differences with the Sublime Porte. He replied, that he had written such a letter about a month since, to which he expected a reply by the next steamer: and that he believed that Hosrew Pasha had communicated it to the Representatives of the Five Powers at Constantinople. I said that I had been informed, that a copy had been, by his orders, furnished to M. Cochelet; and I expressed a hope, that his Highness would have sufficient confidence in me to intrust me with the same document. To this the Pasha made no objection, but ordered Boghos Bey to furnish me with a transcript, which, however, I have not as yet received.

It is proper that I should inform your Lordship, that the demeanour and tone of Mehemet Ali, during the whole of the political portion of this interview, manifested defiance and haughtiness.

I observed towards him a calm, respectful, but firm, deportment.

It is not possible to believe that Mehemet Ali, confiding in his own feeble resources, could assume such a bearing, or use such language, to the Agent of a Power like Great Britain.

As respects that portion of your Lordship's instructions relating to the officers of the Turkish fleet, the performance would be so replete with danger for those individuals, that it is my intention to take no active measures as regards it until I receive your Lordship's further orders. Should I, however, find that there is peril to the lives of any persons who may have been compromised through a confidence in the sympathy and assistance of Her Majesty's Government, I shall certainly receive such persons into my house, or furnish them with an asylum on board one or other of the two vessels of war stationed here.

Under the circumstances before set forth, I cannot but be of opinion, that further intercourse between myself and the Pasha's Government should be avoided at present as much as possible. It is useless, and worse than useless. It can only expose me gratuitously to much that is painful. Threats I cannot employ, until I am certain that menaces will be immediately followed by effects: I, therefore, have determined to remain for the present entirely passive, until the resolutions of Her Majesty's Government are made known to me.

I shall await with anxiety the reception of your Lordship's next despatches; and I trust the mode in which I have executed your Lordship's late commands may merit your approval.

Papers relating to the case of the Greek Merchant Brig "Achille," and an Ionian Trabacolo, referred to in the preceding Despatch.

James Stephen, Esq. to John Backhouse, Esq.

(Extract.) *Downing Street, April* 10, 1840.

I AM directed by Lord John Russell to transmit to you, for the information of Viscount Palmerston, copies of a despatch, and of its two inclosures, which have been received from Her Majesty's Lord High Commissioner to the Ionian States, reporting the measures which he has taken for defeating the scheme of an agent of Mehemet Ali, to convey a party of Albanian recruits to Candia.

Inclosure.

Sir Howard Douglas to Lord John Russell.

(Extract.) *Corfu, March* 12, 1840.

FOR some time past, this island, and Paxo, have been kept in constant alarm by hordes of Albanians being assembled, who, it was apprehended, meditated a descent upon one or both of these Islands; and on the 2d instant, it was stated to me that an Egyptian Agent, named Ibrahim Muzzo, a Colonel in the service of Mehemet Ali, had arrived here and had taken up a Greek Brig and an Ionian trabacolo, for the purpose of embarking as many Albanian recruits as they could contain out of those which had been engaged, and to convey them to Candia.

Having ascertained that Ibrahim Muzzo was an agent so employed, and having become possessed of an authentic copy of the Charter Party under which those vessels had been taken up, I determined to take the strongest measures, at the proper time, to defeat the present attempt, and effectually to prevent all attempts of this kind for the future. The Turkish Consul, who suspected what was going on, wished me to prevent the enterprise before it was undertaken; but I thought it much better to let the agent proceed to such an extent as might make the case strong, evident, and ripe.

I accordingly requested Captain Codrington, of Her Majesty's Ship "Talbot," to keep a look out upon the vessels thus engaged, to follow them to any point of Albania, and watching them there, to endeavour to catch them in the act of embarking men, and to bring them both into this port. This service, Captain Codrington executed to my perfect satisfaction, and I beg leave to refer your Lordship to the copy of his report herewith put up.

I have not failed to communicate also these details to Her Majesty's Minister at Vienna, in reference to his despatch of the 30th August last I have likewise reported the circumstances to Lord Ponsonby.

Sub-Inclosure 1.

Charter Party.

(Traduzione.)

PER mezzo del presente privata carta, la quale avra la stessa forza come se fosse anche pubblica, di comune consenso, cioè, dall' una il Capitan Demetrio Polemi del brigantino mercantile Greco "Achille" di ton 147, attrovantosi in questo porto di Corfu, e dall' altra Imbraim Bey Ottomano da Belichi, Colonello di Maemet Ali, ritrovantosi in questi recenti di contumacia, si convennero come segue:

1. Il suddetto Capitano Demetrio noleggia all' Imbraim Bey il suo naviglio, ed Imbraim Bey accettandolo, si obbliga di caricarlo con persone per Candia nel seguente accordo.
2. Il veniente Mercardi 21 corrente, Stylo Vecchio, tempo permettendo, si obliga il detto Capitano di ricevere nel suo naviglio il Imbraim Bey, e di recarsi nell' opposto Continente nel porto Tre Scoglietti pertinenza di Butrinto, ove le persone deggiono imbarcarsi.
3. Arrivando quello, nel periodo di cinque giorni si obbliga l' Imbraim Bey d' imbarcare li detti Ottomani Albanesi tanti quanti il naviglio del suddetto Capitano Demetrio potra contenere.
4. Il Capitan Demetrio tosto che saranno imbarcate le persone si obbliga, con primo buon vento, di partire per Candia, portando seco lui anche l'Imbraim Bey, il quali si obbliga di andarvi.
5. Arrivando in Candia nel porto di Canea o Suda, nel periodo di cinque giorni dovra l' Imbraim Bey sbarcare le persone suddette senza difficoltà o pretesti, si da però l' autorità al detto Capitano Demetrio di non sbarcarli se prima non riceve dal suo noleggiatore Imbraim Bey il nolo di detto viaggio, consistente in talleri colonati 900, come si obbliga di contarli, senza verun ostacolo, come si convennero ambe le parte per quante persone s' imbarcheranno.
6. Il suddetto Capitano Demetrio si obbliga di aver la cura per la giornaliera sussistenza delle suddette persone, e giornalmente consegnare al suo noleggiatore per distribuirle a loro a suo piacere; tutte le spese, però, che incontrerebbe il Capitan Demetrio, saranno pagate dall' Imbraim Bey come lo sara di ogni altra spesa che potrebbe seguire per esse.

Tanto si convennero ambo le parti, e si obbligano di tenerlo firme, sicuro, ed irrevocabile, ed in riscontro si fanno due simili firmate da entrambe per tenere una per caduno per riciproca loro cautela.

(Firmato) DEMETRIO POLEMI.
IMBRAIM BEY.

Corfu, li 19 *Febraio*, 1840.

(Translation.)

BY this private writing, which shall have the same effect and force as if it were published with mutual consnet, that is to say between Captain Demetrio Polemi of the Greek merchant-brig "Achille," of 147 tons, in the port of Corfu, on the one part, and Ibraim Bey, an Ottoman of Belichi, a Colonel of Mehemet Ali, and now in quarantine here, on the other, it is agreed as follows:

1. The above Captain Demetrio charters to Ibraim Bey his said vessel, obliging himself to convey people to Candia under the following agreement.
2. On Wednesday next the 21st inst., weather permitting, the said Captain Demetrio obliges himself to receive on board his vessel Ibraim Bey, and to proceed to the port of Tre Scoglietti, belonging to Butrinto on the opposite coast, where these persons are to be embarked.
3. Three days after her arrival, Ibraim Bey obliges himself to embark as many of the said Albanian Ottomans as the vessel can take.

4. Captain Demetrio, as soon as these persons are embarked, obliges himself to proceed to Candia with the first fair wind, taking with him also the said Ibraim Bey, who obliges himself to accompany him.
5. On arrival in Candia in the port of Canea or Suda, Ibraim Bey shall disembark in the period of five days the above-mentioned persons without any hindrance or pretext. Authority, however, is given to the said Captain Demetrio not to disembark them till he first receives from Ibraim Bey the freight for the voyage, being 900 dollars, which he obliges himself to pay without any obstacle, according to the agreement made by both parties for such persons as shall be embarked.
6. The said Captain Demetrio obliges himself to take care of the daily subsistence of these persons and to deliver it daily to the freighter, to be distributed to them at his pleasure. All the expences, however, to which the said Demetrio may be exposed, shall be paid by Ibraim Bey, as well as any other expence that may occur.

It is so agreed between the Contracting Parties, who oblige themselves to hold it secure and irrevocable, in proof of which they subscribe two similar instruments, one to be retained by each for mutual security.

(Signed) DEMETRIO POLEMI.
IBRAIM BEY.

Corfu, February 19, 1840.

Sub-Inclosure 2.

Captain Codrington to Major Fraser.

Her Majesty's Ship "Talbot,"
Corfu, March 9, 1840.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acquaint you, for the information of his Excellency, the Lord High Commissioner, that on the 7th I proceeded with the "Talbot" and "Weazle" in search of the Greek merchant brig "Achilles," and the Ionian trabacolo, mentioned in your letter of the 4th instant, as going to Tre Scoglietti, with the intention of embarking Albanian recruits for the service of the Pasha of Egypt.

On anchoring at Butrinto, for the purpose of making enquiries, and reconnoitering the neighbouring anchorage of Tre Scoglietti, to see what progress the brig had made in the embarkation, I found, that after staying there only a few hours, she had sailed to the north, with a fair wind, early on that very morning. On making further enquiries from the Turkish trabacolos then lying at Tre Scoglietti, I was informed, that the brig had only taken in a little ballast, but had not embarked any men there, since the Albanians, who had been assembled to the number of four hundred, and had been waiting there for her for some time past, had been obliged, for want of provisions, to disperse themselves, in consequence of the brig not having arrived at the time appointed. Whether this were true or not, it seemed probable that the brig, after calling to receive recruits at one or two places on the Albanian coast, more to the north, would stand out to sea, and proceed to Alexandria, along the western side of Corfu. The "Weazle" was therefore detached for a few days, to the southward, to endeavour to cut her off to the west of Cape Bianco, while the "Talbot" continued the examination of the Albanian coast to the north.

No vessel was lying at Santa Quaranta, nor could any be distinguished that evening to the southward of Cape Kephali. On the next day, the 8th, at Port Palermo, I was informed that in that neighbourhood there had also been collected about four hundred men, ostensibly for Greece, or for Candia, but in reality as recruits for the Pasha of Egypt.

These men having been reduced, by the delay, to great distress for provisions, had also dispersed themselves in the neighbouring villages, but could be again collected in twenty-four hours, or a little more, for embarkation.

Nothing having been seen on board of the brig on this part of the coast, I returned close along shore to the southward, intending to seek information at Santa Quaranta, but on rounding Cape Kephali, the same afternoon, I observed the brig and Ionian trabacolo at anchor together, in a small bay to the south of the Cape,—a place where there is no house, nor Dogana, nor any Turkish authority in the neighbourhood, to interfere with them.

The captain and crew of the brig made no mystery of their business there, avowing at once that it was to convey recruits for the Pasha of Egypt; adding, that the Agent whom they had brought, was then up the country, for the purpose of collecting them for embarkation. The crew of the trabacolo added to this, that they had accompanied the brig, for the purpose of showing them the anchorage. Both vessels were ordered at once to return to Corfu, in company with this ship, and on being assured that the command would be enforced, they obeyed, though with reluctance. A strong attempt at escape from on board the trabacolo was made by a person in a Turkish dress, who, I understand, is a brother of the Agent. Finding himself pursued by our boat, he plunged overboard, out of his, and swam for the shore, but was captured, and sent on board the trabacolo again.

All further attempts at escape during the night, while on the passage from thence to Corfu, were prevented by the precautions taken, and the strict look out kept on them; and I had the satisfaction of delivering them into the charge of the captain of the port in this anchorage, at three this morning.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) H. E. CODRINGTON.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received September* 10.)

My Lord, *Vienna, August* 30, 1839.

LORD PONSONBY, with reference to the arrival of an Egyptian brig at Salonica, having on board emissaries from Mehemet Ali, expressed to me his opinion that it would be desirable that the Austrian Agents should be instructed to hold a language to the Pashas near whom they reside, calculated to confirm them in their allegiance to the Sultan. I transmitted this suggestion to Prince Metternich, coupled with another for having the coast of Albania watched by the Austrian naval force in the Adriatic, to prevent the landing of Agents from Egyptian ships of war. Both suggestions have been complied with, and in return Prince Metternich has requested me to make a similar application to the Officer commanding Her Majesty's naval forces in the Adriatic.

As I am not aware whether any naval force is stationed there, I have written upon the matter to Sir Howard Douglas, and have the honour to inclose copy of my letter

I have, &c.,
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

Inclosure.

Lord Beauvale to Sir Howard Douglas.

Sir, *Vienna, August* 30, 1839.

IT is not improbable that attempts may be made by the Pasha of Egypt to excite revolt in Albania. Should any Egyptian vessel appear upon the coast having Agents on board charged with such a commission, it would be highly desirable, and no more than consistent with the relations existing between Her Majesty's Government and the Great Powers and the Porte, that such vessel should be taken possession of.

The Austrian Government have sent orders to that effect to their naval force in the Adriatic, and have requested me to apply in the same sense to the Officer commanding Her Majesty's vessels in that sea.

As I am doubtful whether we have a naval force there, I beg to put the affair into your hands, requesting you, if such a force exists in the Adriatic, to transmit this application to the Officer commanding it.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 24.)

My Lord, *Therapia, March* 31, 1840.

I ACQUAINTED the Minister for Foreign Affairs, for the information of the Sublime Porte, with the friendly conduct of Sir Howard Douglas, with respect to the emissaries sent by the Pasha of Egypt into Albania, &c. &c., which has been reported by his Excellency the Lord High Commissioner to Her Majesty's Government; and I have this day received from his Excellency Rechid Pasha a message, saying that my communication had been heard by His Imperial Majesty the Sultan with the greatest pleasure and satisfaction.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

James Stephen, Esq., to John Backhouse, Esq.

Sir, *Downing Street, May* 7, 1840.

REFERRING to my letter of the 10th instant, I am directed by Lord John Russell to transmit to you, for the information of Viscount Palmerston, a copy of a despatch which has been received from Her Majesty's Lord High Commissioner at Corfu, covering a translation of a communication from the Vizier Nouri Pasha, in which His Highness expresses his gratitude for the measures recently taken by the Lord High Commissioner to defeat the scheme of an Agent of Mehemet Ali to carry off a party of Albanian recruits.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) JAMES STEPHEN.

Inclosure.

Sir Howard Douglas to Lord John Russell.

(Extract.) *Corfu, March* 25, 1840.

IN reference to my despatch of the 12th instant, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship translated copy of a communication addressed to me by His Highness the Vizier Nouri Pasha, Governor of the adjoining Ottoman Provinces, expressive of his gratitude for the measures which, under your Lordship's instructions, I took to prevent the transport of troops from the ports of Albania to join the Pasha of Egypt.

The Agent of the Viceroy of Egypt taken by Her Majesty's ship "Talbot" and brought hither, I shall detain under surveillance until I hear from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

Sub-Inclosure.

The Vizier Mustafa Nouri Pasha to Sir Howard Douglas.

(Translation.)
Excellency,

OUR Consul in the Ionian Islands has informed us that a certain Albanian named Ibraim Muzoz, who came from Alexandria to Corfu, manifested an intent to disturb the tranquillity of these countries by levying soldiers, hiring ships, and preparing to transport Albanian troops to other countries.

On this becoming known to your Excellency, our said Consul was duly informed of the same, and your Excellency on this, as well as on a former occasion, made manifest your wish to scrupulously maintain that ancient and sincere friendship and harmony which exist between the Ottoman Porte and Great Britain.

Last year, when we received manifest proofs of this true friendship from your Excellency, who incurred both danger and trouble in driving away the suspected vessel which arrived from Egypt, we expressed our sentiments of profound gratitude for the conduct pursued by a friendly and neighbouring Power, under the circumstances of the case.

These we now again express to your Excellency in consequence of the information communicated to us relative to the measures taken by your Excellency to impede the departure of the vessels engaged for the transport of troops levied with a view to disturb the tranquillity of these countries. Your Excellency has foreseen every possible disturbance. These acts on the part of your Excellency we cannot but consider as proofs of the cordial feeling which exists between Great Britain and the Ottoman Porte, and the conduct of the English calls forth the expression of our gratitude. We trust that in reply to this we may receive such manifestations of a friendly disposition as may tend to strengthen the feelings which now unite us, and to prevent those disorders which attempts similar to those that have lately occurred, might occasion. We also avail ourselves of this opportunity to express the profound esteem and consideration with which, &c.,

(Signed) VIZIER MUSTAFA NOURI PASHA.

Yanina, March 11, 1840.

No. 556.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 4.)

(Extract.) *Paris, May* 1, 1840.

I HAVE received your Lordship's despatches to the 28th of April.

M. Thiers, yesterday, read to me extracts of a despatch addressed by him to M. Cochelet, for the purpose of showing that the Pasha of Egypt was not encouraged by the French Government to refuse his acquiescence in reasonable conditions of peace with the Sultan. In one of the extracts which he read to me, M. Thiers enjoins the French Consul to make it clearly understood by Mehemet Ali, that France will not sacrifice its alliance with England to the interests of the Pasha.

No. 557.

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, May* 5, 1840.

A FEW days before the adjournment of the House of Commons for the Easter recess, I requested M. Guizot again to draw the attention of his Government to the question of the Naval Armaments of France, with respect to which, so many communications have taken place between the two Governments since December last.

I said, that when the Navy Estimates were discussed in the House of Commons, some members remarked, that the number of ships which we then had in commission would require, in order to man them, a larger number of seamen than that which we had proposed to Parliament, as the permanent establishment for the service of the year; and the Government was asked how it reconciled the number of ships in commission, and the crews which those ships must necessarily contain, with the number of men proposed to be voted: I said, that in reply it had been stated, that we hoped to be able to lay up in ordinary some of the ships of the line then in commission, and thus to reduce the number of seamen employed, so as to bring it down to the number proposed to be voted; and that if circumstances should arise to prevent this reduction, and if the state of affairs should require the continuance of the same amount of naval force which was then employed, the Government would come down to Parliament later in the session, would state that fact, and would apply for a supplementary vote. I said, that the Chancellor of the Exchequer would be obliged after Easter to make his financial statement of the income and expenditure of the country, for the year ending April, 1841; and that the Government must, before that statement is made, determine finally what amount of naval force we may be obliged to keep up: that our decision on this point must mainly depend upon the course pursued by France. That if France should reduce her naval force, England would do the same; but that if France should resolve to maintain her present large amount of ships in commission, England could not reduce hers; and the Government would be obliged to apply to Parliament for a supplementary vote: that, in applying for this vote, we might be compelled to state the reasons which rendered it necessary, and that, if it should be occasioned by the extensive armament of France, a statement of that fact in Parliament would not produce a good effect upon the public mind of Europe, or upon the mutual relations of the two countries. I showed M. Guizot the list, of which I inclose a copy, by which it appears, that the French have in the Mediterranean seventeen sail of the line now afloat, and equipped or equipping for service, and another ship of the line at Rochefort; while we have in the Mediterranean ten, at Lisbon two, at home two preparing for the Mediterranean, two getting ready for general service, and the three guardships: that thus, the French have eighteen sail of the line afloat, while we have, exclusive of the guardships, which have not their full complement of men, and which cannot leave their respective ports, and exclusive of the three line-of-battle ships in the East Indies, which cannot be reckoned in this comparison, only sixteen. I said, that it is impossible for England to remain inferior to France in naval means, either permanently, and upon a comparison of the whole number of ships belonging to each country, or for a time, and upon a comparison of the number of ships which each country may have in commission: that it appeared however to Her Majesty's Government, that it would be much better to restore the balance by mutual reduction than by rivalship in augmentation; and that, accordingly, I had, on the part of Her Majesty's Government, to propose through him to the French Government, that if France would reduce the number of her line-of-battle ships in commission to twelve, England would fix her Mediterranean fleet at the same amount, and would, in addition to that fleet, keep in commission in the seas of Europe only the two sail of the line at Lisbon, and the three guardships; the latter of which are rather head-quarter stations for the Port Admirals than an available naval force, and the former of which are a necessary reserve for a country which, like England, has numerous and widely scattered Colonial possessions, and many distant interests to guard. I, at the same time, showed M. Guizot your Excellency's despatch of the 17th of June of last year, in which you report, that Marshal Soult had talked not of fifteen sail of the line, but of ten, as the French naval force; saying, that France had then seven in the Levant; that the French Government intended to send thither three more, which were getting ready at Toulon, and that they would then have ten in the Levant; and that if the English Government would augment the British squadron in the Mediterranean to the same amount, there would then be a combined force of twenty sail of the line ready to act for the protection of the Turkish Empire.

M. Guizot promised to report to his Government what I had said, and to let me know as soon as possible their decision on this proposition. Accordingly, a few days ago, M. Guizot read to me a part of a letter which he had received from M. Thiers, conveying the French answer to the above-mentioned proposal of Her Majesty's Government. M. Thiers said in that letter, that the French Government has now nine sail of the line in the Levant, and six at Toulon; not, however, it is to be observed, noticing in this enumeration the two others which are under repair at Toulon, and the "Inflexible," which is getting ready for sea at Rochefort. He said, that in order to obviate any jealousy on the part of England, he was willing to agree that under present circumstances, the French force should be distributed in the following manner: that ten sail of the line should be stationed to the eastward of Malta, and between that Island and the Dardanelles and Alexandria; and that six should be stationed to the westward of Toulon, and between that port and Algiers and Cadiz; the French naval force in commission being thus maintained at seventeen; namely, sixteen in the Mediterranean and one at Rochefort. But M. Thiers added, that whenever France should acquire the certainty that she would not be left alone (*isolée*) on the Turco-Egyptian Question, the French Government would immediately lay up in ordinary five out of these seventeen sail, and turn over their crews to frigates and smaller vessels, and send them to Buenos Ayres.

Your Excellency will see that there was nothing in this communication which could lead Her Majesty's Government to think, that it would be expedient or proper to abstain from proposing to Parliament a fresh grant for the purpose of keeping up the present amount of our naval force; because the proposal that the existing naval force of France should be divided into two portions, of which, one should be stationed to the east of Malta, and the other to the west of Toulon, could hardly be dealt with by any serious observation; and the measure which was announced as intended to be adopted whenever such an arrangement of the Turco-Egyptian Question as would be satisfactory to France shall be arrived at, would produce no diminution in the effective and active naval force of France, (because the real naval force of a country must be measured by the number of seamen employed,) but would only be a transfer of a part of that force from one description of ships to another, and its application to a purpose which would not be by any means calculated to allay national jealousy in this country.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON

Inclosure in No. 557.

List of French Ships in the Mediterranean, April 1840.

In Toulon Roads fit for Sea.

Ocean 120 Hercule 100 Généreux 80
Triton 80 Marengo 80

In Toulon fitting for Sea.

Souverain 110 Ville de Marseilles 80 Scipion 80

Friedland . .	120,	launched at Cherburgh.
Jemappe . .	100,	launched at L'Orient.
Inflexible . .	90,	fitting at Rochefort

Nine in the Levant, of which two are coming to Toulon for Repair.

Montebello	120	Jena	90	Jupiter	86
Santi Petri	86	Diadême	86	Trident	80
Neptune	86	Alger	80	Suffrein	90

No. 558.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received May* 8.)

(Extract.) *Alexandria, April* 6, 1840.

THE morning after my interview with his Highness the Viceroy, on the 31st ultimo, he nominated Ahmed Pasha to the command of the Turkish and Egyptian squadrons, and restored to him the insignia of rank as Capudan Pasha, of which he had been, only a few weeks since, deprived by the Sultan.

This step on the part of Mehemet Ali, has created much surprise in the minds of my Colleagues; and I confess that it strikes me as one of the most important and significant indications of his determination to resist, should force be resorted to against him by the Allied Powers; nay, more, that he is now determined, by some overt act, to bring the question to a crisis.

I am informed by M. Cochelet, that when he remonstrated with him on the late nomination, he answered, "What would you have me do? I sent lately to Constantinople, proposals for an arrangement with the Porte: these were confided to my daughter-in-law. Twice she went with them to Hosrew Pasha, who found some excuse for not receiving her. I am laughed at by the Court of Constantinople. I will show these people that they cannot insult me with impunity. As to Ahmed Pasha, he shall always have asylum in Egypt; and the Turkish fleet will be sent home as soon as my differences with the Sultan are terminated. If Mustapha Pasha deems his staying in this country inconsistent with his honour, he may go to his friend Colonel Hodges, who will probably send him to Constantinople; but if he does not, I will."

Indeed, my Lord, it would in no way astonish me, were Mehemet Ali, on being driven to extremities, to order the advance of Ibrahim Pasha's Army on Constantinople. Such an act would be only in keeping with the tone and manner he has lately assumed, especially towards the Austrian Consul-General and myself. The Pasha's deportment towards M. de Laurin, in an interview he had with him on the 4th instant, was both insulting and defying. I may here remark to your Lordship, that M. Cochelet assures me, that on some points, such for instance as the restoring liberty to the officers of the Turkish squadron, he backed my representations made to the Pasha.

No. 559.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received May* 8.)

(Extract.) *Alexandria, April* 8, 1840.

A LETTER has been received from Sheriff Pasha on the subject of the quarantine in Syria, which it was stated had increased the popular ferment. Sheriff Pasha referred to the opinion which had been already expressed, that if the power and jurisdiction of his Highness in Syria were not speedily confirmed and consolidated, the public feeling, exasperated by the present and other measures, might evince itself in a manner highly dangerous to the existing authority.

What I can communicate as more positive, since the facts, after coming to my knowledge, were confirmed by M. Cochelet himself, is, that this gentleman, on the evening of the 4th instant, had an audience of Mehemet Ali, in the course of which he informed the Pasha that he had received despatches from M. Thiers, from which he gathered that France was inclining in her foreign policy towards a Northern Power.

Count Medem tells me, that on remonstrating with the Pasha on his late nomination of Ahmed Pasha to the command of both fleets, Mehemet Ali replied, "that he had been urged to that course by the insulting conduct of the Porte; and that, independent of such a cause, he had long wished to grant repose to the declining years of his old servant, Mustapha Pasha, recently Admiral of the Egyptian squadron, for which purpose he had named Ahmed Pasha Inspector-General of both fleets." Your Lordship will, no doubt, observe the discrepancy contained in the titles given by the Pasha to his new Admiral, in his two conversations with M. Cochelet and Count Medem.

No. 560.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received May* 8.)

(Extract.) *Alexandria, April* 18, 1840.

SINCE I last had the honour of addressing your Lordship, in my despatch of the 8th instant, the affairs of this country have not assumed any novel or remarkable character.

The warlike preparations of the Pasha continue, on all sides, with extreme activity; and his air of perfect confidence in the fortunate results of his policy, seems undiminished. Every day confirms and augments my former suspicions, that Mehemet Ali is backed by the secret support and assurances of a first-rate European Power; and that he is fully prepared and resolved for any contingency.

At Alexandria, there has not recently occurred anything more worthy of note than the collection of forces at Damanhour, and the diligent drilling of the troops belonging to the fleets and the city; both circumstances to which I have adverted in former despatches.

About a fortnight back, 105,000 round-shot and shell arrived from Cairo.

A frigate, called the "Cafarshir," is loading with military stores, amongst which, are 1,100 shell; and three or four transports are also taking in munitions. These, it is thought, are destined for St. Jean d'Acre.

The fine corvette commanded by Said Bey, son of the Pasha, is preparing for sea.

On the 16th instant, Her Majesty's steam-ship "Gorgon," and the "Daphne" corvette, sailed from this port, in consequence of orders from Admiral Sir John Louis, and proceeded to Malta.

The 26th and 35th Regiments of Infantry have left Cairo, and, I believe, have descended to the coast. Fifteen or twenty new field-pieces had also been despatched in the same direction. Several influential Sheiks, for the purpose of elevating the public spirit, have assumed the Nizam costume; but the late forcible conscriptions have spread terror and dissatisfaction throughout Egypt.

The information I receive from Syria, represents that country as being in a very agitated and unsettled condition. Discontent prevails to the highest extent. It is said, that the Emir Bechir, Prince of Mount Lebanon, has refused to furnish 20,000 men demanded of him by the Egyptian Government. All accounts concur in declaring that the

Syrians look with confidence and hope to being speedily liberated by an European army.

The fortification and victualling of St. Jean d'Acre, continue without intermission.

The garrison of Acre, on the 9th ultimo, was as follows:—

1 Regiment (18th) Infantry.
1 Regiment (30th) Infantry, formed of invalids.
600 Sappers and Miners. (Baltadgi.)
300 Regular Artillery.
1,000 Irregular Artillery.

Another regiment of Infantry is expected to arrive from Damascus.

No. 561.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 8.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, April* 20, 1840.

SINCE I had the honour of writing to your Lordship in my despatch of the 18th instant, I have ascertained that the Pasha is about to undertake a short tour up the Delta.

I am informed by a letter received this day from our Consular Agent at Atfe, on the Mahmoudié Canal, that four regiments of Regular Infantry, recently arrived from Cairo, are now encamped at Damanhour, at which place there are also 800 men of Irregular Cavalry. In addition, several regiments from Upper Egypt and from the Hedjaz, are expected there. It is believed that two regiments will be quartered in the village of Darout-a-Halgh-el Ghiamal, about an hour distant from Atfe.

The recruiting of the National Guard continues everywhere with the utmost activity. At Cairo, Osman Bey Sennari, late Ulema of the Mosque Ashar, has undertaken to raise four regiments; and Mehemet Ali has promised, that should he succeed, he will make him Pasha of two tails. Ibrahim Aref Bey, late a merchant in Cairo, is named Brigadier-General, and has engaged to raise two regiments. Mahomed Bey, late Ulema, is to assemble other two regiments, and to be decorated with the same rank. These eight regiments are to be recruited in the city of Cairo.

Hussein Bey Surur is to be made Colonel, and is to recruit one regiment in Old Cairo.

Ali Djezzar will have the same rank, and is to form another regiment in the neighbouring suburb of Boulac.

My correspondence from Syria of the 31st ultimo, represents Ibrahim Pasha as still at Marash. It is worthy of remark, that something more than two months back, he had distributed various regiments in Hamah, Homs, Damascus, Acre, &c.; but that the whole of these troops, with reinforcements, have been recalled and concentrated about Marash. Three regiments of Infantry are also on the point of leaving Aleppo with the same destination.

It is reported in Aleppo, that the Egyptian Infantry is to be divided into two columns of operation: one to be stationed near Acre, and the other at Marash.

The entire force of Cavalry is concentrating in and about Killis.

In the vicinity of Aleppo, all the beasts of burden have been put in requisition to transport the matériel of the army deposited there in the magazines.

The utmost activity prevails in perfecting the fortifications of Acre. Workmen of all kinds are impressed for this service from the adjacent cities. Requisitions for provisions and other stores, are also exacted over great part of the country, for the supply both of Acre and Alexandria.

The Government is exerting itself to disarm the mountaineers. An inconsiderable revolt had taken place. The misery of the masses is extreme. The disaffection of the Syrians is universal.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 562.

Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

My Lords, *Foreign Office, May* 8, 1840.

WITH reference to my letter to your Lordships of the 7th of April, conveying to your Lordships the Queen's pleasure as to the instructions to be addressed to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, with reference to the contingency of an application being made by the Porte, for the presence of the British squadron in the Bosphorus to protect Constantinople against any attack on the part of Ibrahim Pasha; I am commanded by the Queen to acquaint your Lordships, that accounts recently received show, that it is not improbable that Ibrahim Pasha may suddenly march on Constantinople; and I am to signify to your Lordships Her Majesty's pleasure, that Admiral Sir Robert Stopford should be instructed to station two or three sail of the line in the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles, to be ready to pass up to Constantinople, if invited by the Turkish Government to do so.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 563.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, May* 8, 1840.

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a letter which, I have addressed to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, conveying to their Lordships the Queen's pleasure that Admiral Sir Robert Stopford should be instructed to station two or three sail of the line in the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles, to be ready to pass up to Constantinople, if invited by the Turkish Government to do so.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 564.

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, May* 12, 1840.

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, a copy of an instruction which, by Her Majesty's commands, I have addressed to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, to provide for the possible contingency of Admiral Sir Robert Stopford being invited by the Turkish Government to pass up to Constantinople.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 565.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 14.)

My Lord, *Paris, May* 12, 1840.

THE Turkish Ambassador, Chekib Effendi, accredited to Her Majesty, is arrived in Paris. He purposes to remain in Paris about a week, and will then proceed to London.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 566.

Mr. Consul Young to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received May* 18.)

My Lord, *Jerusalem, February* 17, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to apprise your Lordship that I have received a letter from the Consular-Agent at Acre, advising me that the greatest possible activity is displayed there in repairing and strengthening the fortifications.

Here there is another seizure of all the artisans: they are treated in every respect like convicts. It is reported that they are taken to the north.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) W. G. YOUNG.

No. 567.

Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received May* 17.)

(Extract.) *Aleppo, March* 19, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith for your Lordship's information, copy of a despatch I addressed, under the 12th instant, to Viscount Ponsonby.

Inclosure in No. 567.

Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Ponsonby.

(Extract.) *Aleppo, March* 12, 1840.

HIS Highness the Seraskier Pasha continues to remain at Marash with the same force. The Cuirassier Regiment still occupies Albestan; and I learn that a detachment of Egyptian Irregular Cavalry (Bachi Bozuks) have advanced in the direction of Kaisserieh, it is said to about four to five hours' distance on this side of that town, and are busily occupied in exacting and collecting the Salyan Tax from all the inhabitants throughout the line of country from Marash to that point, besides an immense quantity of plunder and spoil, which, I am told, they have and continue to take from all classes.

I have not heard of any change or movement in the disposition of the Egyptian forces throughout this district

I beg leave further to inform your Lordship, that his Excellency Maggiun Bey, with the Annadis and some Irregular Cavalry (Bachi Bozuks), have lately been advancing on the Orfa line towards Bagdad. I am told that the principal object of Maggiun Bey in these incursions into the country, which he often makes, is to exact the Salyan Tax, and to seize as much plunder as possible from the inhabitants. The last advices from Orfa state that Maggiun Bey had just reached that place from an expedition he had made, first against the Arabs, along the River Khaboor, from whom he obtained large sums of money and a great quantity of pillage, consisting of grain and cattle of all sorts, which had reached Orfa; and that he afterwards had advanced in a similar manner towards the Sindjar, from whence he came. From inquiry I have made, I learn that Maggiun Bey has under him at Orfa about 1,000 Annadis; the remainder are with the Caftan Agha, in the direction of Hamah; and the total Bachi Bozuks that are between Aintab, Marash, and those in the direction of Orfa, amount to about 1700 men.

The regular force at Orfa remains without any change; but on that line towards Diarbekir, the Egyptian authority extends at present even beyond Swerik and Chermook, and within ten hours from Diarbekir; there are at present at Diarbekir about 700 of the Sultan's regular troops, with two Viziers; and if Maggiun Bey chose, he might, with 500 men, take possession of that town. His Excellency the Sultan's Seraskier Sadullah Pasha had gone to Karpoot, according to report, in order to superintend and raise animals, which are sent to convey the ammunition and military stores that are being landed by the Turkish Government on the coast of the Black Sea, at Trebizond and Samsoon.

By the last advices from Mr. Vice-Consul Hays at Alexandretta, and from our different agents on the coast, every thing appears to be tranquil within their respective districts; and the whole of this consular district is tranquil, and enjoys perfect health. I have no recent advices from the Adana district; there does not appear to be any movement of any interest, except that the works and fortifications in the defile of the Taurus have, I understand, all been entirely finished. About a fortnight ago, 120 pieces of Artillery of those taken at Nezib were sent to Alexandretta, and then shipped on board vessels of war to be conveyed to Acre.

No. 568.

Mr. Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 17.)

(Extract.) *Damascus, March* 23, 1840.

I HAD the honour of addressing your Lordship, on the 20th ultimo.

I therein mentioned an aggressive act, indicative of the beginning of an insurrectionary feeling of some of the Mutualis in the Balbec district. I have since learnt that from 150 to 200 horsemen infest the roads from Balbec, Hosneh, to Homs. The Government is employed in taking measures to repress them, but the absence of sufficient numbers of irregular Syrian Cavalry, renders the entire success thereof problematical. In the present juncture of affairs, it is not impossible that the Emir Bechir looks on the Mutualis, extending on the whole line of country from Soor to Balbec, Hosneh, and Homs, as strong outposts, if not auxiliaries, in case any sudden change should take place of a warlike contest between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, for the possession of Syria; in which case, the Emir Bechir might look to them as a relief from being brought into immediate collision with either of the contending Powers on the eastern desert line of his territories, and thereby permitting him to maintain a neutral position.

The measures and preparations taking for the victualling and defence of Acre continue, throughout this district, to be pursued with great activity; this fortress seems to exclusively occupy the attention and energies of the Government in the south; the country, extending from the coast, north and south, and the east, will be guarded by two regiments of regular Cavalry, and a regiment of Horse Artillery; and a hill, commanding part of the fortifications, is being reduced by the troops now in garrison there.

My last advices from Aleppo state, that the Egyptian regular forces, in lieu of retiring, still occupied the country to the north, as far as Albestan, and that the Irregular Cavalry were even making incursions within a short distance of Kaisserieh, and that the forces from Orfa to the river Khaboor, south, extending Egyptian influence to the Sindjar and Merdin; and northerly, assuming an influence, if not an absolute jurisdiction and authority, beyond Swerik and Chermook, to within a few hours of Diarbekir; that in every direction the Egyptian irregular forces were occupied in obtaining spoil and pillage, and reducing the country to the Egyptian rule.

Your Lordship will observe that these measures have a tendency to render the advance of any force from the north, either Ottoman or European, of a difficult nature, while the Egyptians commanding the Sindjar and the Arab tribes on the desert line south, bring their authority in immediate contact with the Koords from the mountains of

Koordistan, independent of the same fierce tribes, widely and numerously scattered on all the mountains along the ranges of the Taurus, extending from Marash in a north-east direction.

No. 569.

Mr. Consul Moore to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received May* 18.)

(Extract.) *Beyrout, March* 27, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that since my despatch of the 27th February, 135 pieces of cannon, taken at the battle of Nezib, have been transported to Acre, and 15,000 trees, for palisades, have been ordered for the same place.

Two days ago, the Governor visited the castles which defend Beyrout, with a view, I presume, of impressing the people with the intention of Mehemet Ali of offering resistance at every point, if necessary. They are not of a nature to be strongly defended under any circumstances.

Although the public tranquillity is undisturbed in this neighbourhood, complaints are loud from all parts of Syria of the rigour used to enforce the payment of taxes and imposts, and there exists a feeling of strong discontent in consequence.

Accounts have to-day reached this place from Damascus, that the plague is rapidly spreading in that city; it has infected the garrison. I regret to add, that it has likewise declared itself in the lazaretto here.

No. 570.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received May* 17.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, April* 25, 1840.

IF Ibrahim advances, it will be easy to raise all the Syrians against his government. I might answer for the inhabitants of Lebanon, the Emir Bechir, and all, provided England will act, and will support them; and I think the mere appearance of a British squadron (no matter how small), being accompanied by an Ottoman frigate carrying the Sultan's flag, will suffice for raising all those countries. The Sultan will send the frigate, and give every aid in his power.

No. 571.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received May* 17.)

(Extract. *Therapia, April* 26, 1840.

IN a former despatch, I acquainted your Lordship with the intention of the Porte to collect a military force to guard against any attack from the Egyptian Army, having for its end to menace the capital, &c.

It appears that about 23,000 men can be employed for the above mentioned purpose. The Porte has appointed Riza Pasha to be General in Asia, so as to have under his command Scutari and the country above Mondania, where it is proposed to establish a camp for protection against an attempt by Ibrahim, a measure which, I believe, will fully and completely answer that purpose.

No. 572.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received May* 17.)

(Extract.) *Therapia April* 26, 1840.

I INCLOSE copy of a report from the Austrian Consul-General at Alexandria to the Internuncio, which his Excellency was so good as to give me.

Inclosure in No. 572.

M. de Laurin to the Baron de Stürmer.

Monsieur le Baron, *Alexandrie, le* 16 *Avril*, 1840.

LA réponse à la lettre de Méhémet Ali Pacha, du 23 Février dernier, dont fait mention la dépêche de votre Excellence du 28 Mars dernier, vient d'être remise au Pacha.

L'ayant vu cet après-dîner, il me dit que ce n'est pas une réponse à sa lettre: que tout y est vague; que le Sadrazam fait connaître son embarras; qu'il sent sa faiblesse et l'impuissance de la Sublime Porte, quoique soutenue par les Puissances; que c'est absurde de dire que tout dépend du Sultan, puisque Hosrew Pacha a destitué dernièrement plusieurs grands dignitaires sans et même contre la volonté de Sa Hautesse; que le style de la lettre n'est pas bon; que la rédaction en est Franque; qu'on ne sait plus écrire à Constantinople; qu'au lieu de réfuter ses propositions, on met en avant d'autres qui n'ont pas le sens commun; que puisqu'on ne veut pas écouter la voix de la raison, il est juste de se méfier du Divan et de continuer les armemens; que cependant il lui écrira dans deux ou trois semaines sur le même ton que précédemment.

La conclusion de la lettre, disait Méhémet Ali, est la chose la plus curieuse qu'on lui aît jamais écrite. "On me presse," disait-il, "d'en finir, de ne pas perdre cette bonne occasion parcequ'elle ne se présentera pas de sitôt, une fois perdue; mais finir quoi et comment? rendre tout hors l'Egypte? Cela ne peut pas être; je garderai malgré ces Messieurs là ce qui m'appartient; s'ils veulent, qu'ils viennent m'attaquer; l'Egypte est gardée par la mer et par les déserts, et j'aurai bientôt 80,000 hommes réunis à Alexandrie pour repousser une attaque. Je payerai en blés les traitemens, si l'argent viendra à me manquer. J'en ai parlé aux officiers des deux escadres, il y a soixante jours; ils ont accueilli avec transport cette proposition, et je compte sur eux."

Agréez, &c.,

(Signé) **LAURIN.**

(Translation.)

M. de Laurin to the Baron de Stürmer.

Monsieur le Baron, *Alexandria, April* 16, 1840.

THE answer to Mehemet Ali Pasha's letter of the 23rd of February last, mentioned in your Excellency's despatch of the 28th of March last, has just been delivered to the Pasha.

Having seen him this afternoon, he told me that it was no answer to his letter; that everything in it was vague; that the Sadrazam evinces his embarrassment; that he is conscious of his weakness, and of the want of power of the Sublime Porte, although supported by the Powers; that it is absurd to say that everything depends on the Sultan, seeing that Hosrew Pasha has lately displaced several great dignitaries without, and indeed against, the consent of His Highness; that the style of the letter is not good; that its composition is Frank; that at Constantinople no one can any longer write; that instead of refuting his propositions, others have been advanced devoid of common sense; that as the voice of reason is not listened to, he is justified in distrusting the Divan, and in continuing to arm; but that, nevertheless, he should write to him in two or three weeks in the same sense as before.

The conclusion of the letter, said Mehemet Ali, is the most curious thing that has ever been written to him. "I am urged," said he, "to finish; not to lose this favourable opportunity, because once lost, it will not so soon recur: but, what am I to finish, and how? To give up everything except Egypt? That cannot be; I shall retain, in spite of these gentlemen, that which belongs to me; if they wish it, let them come and attack me: Egypt is defended by the sea and by the desert, and I shall soon have 80,000 men assembled at Alexandria to repel an

attack. I shall issue their pay in corn, if money should grow scarce. I have spoken to the officers of the two squadrons of this, sixty days ago: they were delighted with the proposition, and I rely upon them.

Receive, &c.,
(Signed) LAURIN.

No. 573.

The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 18.)

(Extract.) *St. Petersburgh, May* 4, 1840.

COUNT NESSELRODE appears to think it possible that your Lordship's observations to M. Guizot on the engagement contracted by France by the Collective Note to the Porte of last July, may produce a good effect; and his Excellency is confident that if France joins the other Great Powers, Mehemet Ali will at once give way.

No. 574.

Nouri Effendi to Viscount Palmerston.

My Lord, *Londres, le* 18 *Mai*, 1840.

PAR la réponse en date du 11 Avril que votre Excellence a daigné faire à la Note du 7 du même mois que j'ai eu l'honneur de lui adresser, elle a annoncé qu'elle était prête à concerter immédiatement avec les Plénipotentiaires des Quatre Grandes Puissances et avec mo , les moyens les plus propres à réaliser les intentions bienveillantes que les Représentans des Cinq Cours ont manifestées à la Porte Ottomane par la Note Collective du 27 Juillet, 1839.

Permettez-moi, My Lord, de vous rappeler qu'il y a déjà cinq semaines passées, et l'Affaire de l'Orient reste encore dans l'état où elle était.

Ce délai non seulement rend ma responsabilité grave vis-à-vis de mon Souverain, mais aussi contribue à alimenter et propager de plus en plus en Turquie l'inquiétude qui y règne. Les dernières nouvelles que je viens de recevoir de Constantinople, me mandent qu'il y a eu des troubles à Sophia, à Adrianople, et sur quelques autres points en Roumélie. Mon Gouvernement a des raisons de soupçonner Méhémet Ali d'être l'instigateur de ces troubles, et je laisse à imaginer l'effet de ces troubles, si le Pacha, encouragé par l'inaction des Cinq Puissances, se permet de susciter à la Porte de nouveaux embarras bien plus graves encore.

Il est donc de l'intérêt des Cinq Puissances Médiatrices de prévenir les malheurs qui menacent la Turquie, comme il est de leur dignité de remplir au plus tôt l'engagement qu'elles ont contracté envers le Sultan mon Maître.

J'ai déjà eu l'honneur de prévenir votre Excellence par ma Note du 7 Avril dernier, que je suis muni de l'autorisation nécessaire pour conclure avec les Plénipotentiaires d'Angleterre, d'Autriche, de France, de Prusse, et de Russie, une Convention de nature à terminer définitivement l'Affaire de l'Orient; et pour arriver à ce but, j'ai prié MM. les Représentans des dites Cours de me prêter leur assistance; et comme je vois que l'accomplissement de cette œuvre dépend essentiellement des bons offices du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique, je viens les réclamer instamment, et prie votre Excellence de vouloir bien donner effet le plus tôt possible aux bonnes intentions d'une entente immédiate qu'elle a manifestées par la Note responsive du 11 Avril de cette année.

Cela seul pourrait tirer la Porte de la position critique où elle se trouve, et fera cesser un état de choses si préjudiciable à ses intérêts aussi bien qu'à ceux de l'Europe entière.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.,
(Signé) NOURI.

(Translation.)

Nouri Effendi to Viscount Palmerston.

My Lord, *London, May* 18, 1840.

IN the reply dated 11th of April, which your Excellency was pleased to make to the Note which I had the honour to address to you on the 7th of the same month, you stated that you were ready immediately to concert together with the Plenipotentiaries of the Four Great Powers, and with me, as to the most suitable means for realizing the kind intentions which the Representatives of the Five Courts have manifested to the Ottoman Porte by the Collective Note of the 27th of July, 1839.

Allow me, my Lord, to remind you that five weeks have now elapsed, and the Eastern Question remains in the state that it was.

This delay not only makes my responsibility to my Sovereign very serious, but it also contributes to keep up and excite the restlessness which becomes more and more prevalent in Turkey. The last accounts which I have received from Constantinople, bring me intelligence of troubles at Sophia, Adrianople, and some other places in Roumelia. My Government has reason to suspect Mehemet Ali to be the instigator of these disorders, and I leave the effect of these troubles to be imagined, if the Pasha, encouraged by the inactivity of the Five Powers, allows himself to cause still more serious embarrassment to the Porte.

It is, therefore, for the interest of the Five Mediating Powers to ward off the misfortunes which threaten Turkey, as it is also for their dignity to fulfil the engagements which they have contracted with the Sultan my Master, as soon as possible.

I have already had the honour to acquaint your Excellency in my Note of the 7th of April last, that I am provided with the necessary authority to conclude a Convention with the Plenipotentiaries of England, Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, of a nature to settle definitively the Eastern Question; and in order to attain this end, I have requested the Representatives of the abovementioned Courts to afford me their assistance; and as I perceive that the accomplishment of this work depends essentially upon the good offices of the Government of His Britannic Majesty, I now earnestly solicit them, and I beg your Excellency to give effect as soon as possible to the good intentions of coming to an immediate understanding, which you manifested in your Note of the 11th April of this year.

This alone could extricate the Porte from the critical position in which it is placed, and would put an end to a state of things so hurtful to its interests, as well as to those of the whole of Europe.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) NOURI.

No. 575.

Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale.

(Extract.) *Foreign Office, May* 20, 1840.

WITH reference to the plan which has been suggested for separating the Pashalics of Syria from that of Egypt, I have to observe to your Excellency, that such a separation would in reality be merely nominal and illusory, because the whole would, according to that plan, remain in the power of Mehemet Ali till his death, and at his death, the whole would fall into the hands of Ibrahim Pasha; and it would be the merest delusion to fancy, that, at that time, the powerless younger brothers of Ibrahim would have any possible means of compelling Ibrahim to give them up their Pashalics, or that they would have any chance of obtaining those Pashalics.

Such a prospective arrangement never would or could be carried into effect.

No. 576.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, May* 20, 1840.

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch of April 26, reporting that you had advised the Turkish Government to exert itself, and to adopt such measures as are within its power for the defence of Constantinople; and I have to acquaint you, that Her Majesty's Government approve the course which you have pursued in this respect.

I have also to instruct your Excellency to omit no opportunity of impressing upon the Ottoman Ministers, that one great difficulty which has hitherto prevented Her Majesty's Government from carrying fully into effect their anxious desire to assist the Sultan, is the general opinion, exaggerated no doubt, but nevertheless too prevalent, that the Sultan has by the events of last year been entirely stripped of all means of self-defence; and that the whole task of protecting him, or of enforcing his rights, must fall upon His Highness' Allies. In proportion, however, as the Sultan shows that he has been successful in reorganizing means of self-defence, in the same proportion will it become less difficult for Her Majesty's Government to give effect to their good wishes in the Sultan's favour.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 577.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 20.)

(Extract.) *Paris, May* 18, 1840.

CHEKIB EFFENDI, the Turkish Ambassador accredited to Her Majesty, arrived here about a week ago.

He purposes leaving Paris towards the end of the week.

No. 578.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 29.)

My Lord, *Therapia, May* 5, 1840.

NOT being certain that your Lordship will receive from Her Majesty's Acting-Consul at Aleppo a despatch dated April 13, 1840, I have the honour to inclose it for your perusal.

It indicates a design on the part of Ibrahim to move; and what is stated respecting the establishment of a mortar-battery to command the town, may be the means intended to enable the Egyptians to leave that place under the guard of a feeble garrison, without abandoning it to the inhabitants, who are extremely averse to the Egyptian Government. I have brought the matter before the Ottoman Ministers with the view of hastening their defensive measures.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 578.

Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Ponsonby.

(Extract.) *Aleppo, April* 13, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that this Government has, within these two or three days, received orders from his Highness the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha at Marash, to get ready to start, at the first orders, the six batteries of artillery that are stationed here; which orders, I am told, are being executed with haste and great activity, but its destination is not yet known.

At the barracks of Sheik Yabrak, the Government is hastily erecting a platform in the centre of that building, upon which mortars are to be placed, so as to bear upon and command this town.

The 12th Regiment of the line that was here, has left this for Hamah, to replace the one there which has been ordered to Acre: and, I am told that the 2nd of the line (Guards), which is here, is also to leave for the south, to Damascus. With this exception, I have not heard of any further movement among any of the different corps of the Egyptian Army, who, I have every reason to believe, occupy the same positions as I have previously had the honour of noting to your Lordship.

The expedition of Maggiun Bey from Orfa, in the direction of the river Khaboor, has, I hear, been successful; for it is stated, that his Excellency repulsed an attack made on him by Suffook, of the Gherba Arab tribes, and that several Chiefs of the Annazee tribe have given in their submission to Maggiun Bey and to the Egyptian authority: but I hear from another quarter, that, on the contrary, Maggiun Bey, in an attack he made against the Gherba Arabs, got repulsed, and was obliged to retire. The first letters from Orfa will, however, bring us some authentic account with regard to this affair, which I will not fail to immediately communicate to your Lordship.

No. 579.

Chekib Effendi to Viscount Palmerston.

My Lord, *Londres, le* 31 *Mai,* 1840.

LA responsabilité qui pèse sur moi dès mon début à Londres, m'impose le devoir d'adresser une Note Officielle aux Représentans des Cinq Grandes Cours qui ont pris à cœur les intérêts du Sultan mon Auguste Maître, afin de les prier de ne pas tarder à prendre avec moi en considération l'Affaire Orientale, dont la solution est attendue avec une vive impatience par Sa Hautesse le Sultan.

Les Représentans des Grandes Puissances, par un mouvement généreux et spontané, ont arrêté le Sultan dans la voie des sacrifices que le malheureux état des affaires de l'Orient, à son avènement au trône, allait lui imposer. Quelque pénible qu'eût été l'arrangement qu'il ait fait alors avec Méhémet Ali, il le serait cependant encore davantage aujourd'hui, si les intentions bienveillantes des Puissances sollennellement manifestées par la Note Collective du 27 Juillet, 1839, restaient sans effet.

L'intérêt constant que votre Excellence a témoigné au Sultan, doit me faire espérer qu'elle voudra bien prendre en considération cet état de choses, et s'occuper sans délai d'une affaire qui, par les retards qu'elle éprouve, donne tout l'avantage à Méhémet Ali, tandis qu'il affaiblit de plus en plus l'Empire Ottoman.

C'est avec une anxieuse impatience que j'attendrai une réponse satisfaisante à ma Note de ce jour, et je répète ici ce que j'y ai consigné, savoir que, de mon côté, j'apporterai toutes les facilités qui dépendraient de moi pour aider à lever les obstacles qui, jusqu'à présent, ont arrêté la conclusion d'un arrangement entre le Sultan et son ambitieux vassal sous les auspices des Cinq Grandes Puissances.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.,
(Signé) CHEKIB.

(Translation.)

Chekib Effendi to Visconnt Palmerston.

My Lord, *London, May* 31, 1840.

THE responsibility which devolves upon me on my arrival in London, imposes upon me the duty of addressing an official Note to the Representatives of the Five Great Courts, who have taken up the interests of the Sultan, my August Master, in order to entreat them no longer to delay to take into consideration with me the Eastern Question, the solution of which His Highness the Sultan awaits with great impatience.

The Representatives of the Great Powers, by a generous and spontaneous movement, arrested the Sultan in the sacrifices which the unhappy state of affairs in the East was about to impose upon him, at his accession to the throne. However painful the arrangement would have been which he then would have made with Mehemet Ali, it would be still more painful now, if the benevolent intentions of the Powers solemnly manifested by the Collective Note of July 27, 1839, remained without effect.

The constant interest which your Excellency has shown for the Sultan, causes me to hope, that you will be pleased to take this state of things into consideration, and occupy yourself forthwith with an affair which, in consequence of the delays which it has experienced, gives all the advantage to Mehemet Ali, while it enfeebles the Ottoman Empire more and more.

It is with anxious impatience that I shall await a satisfactory answer to my Note of this day, and I here repeat what I have therein stated; namely, that I, on my part, will afford all the facilities which depend upon me in assisting to remove the obstacles which have hitherto impeded the conclusion of an arrangement, under the auspices of the Five Great Powers, between the Sultan and his ambitious vassal.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) CHEKIB.

No. 580.

Chekib Effendi to Viscount Palmerston.

Londres, le 31 *Mai,* 1840.

LE Soussigné, l'Ambassadeur de la Sublime Porte près Sa Majesté Britannique, avait espéré, à la suite de la Note présentée le 7 Avril de cette année par son prédécesseur, Nouri Effendi, aux Représentans des Cours d'Angleterre, d'Autriche, de France, de Prusse, et de Russie, et de leurs réponses à la dite Note, trouver, en arrivant à Londres, l'Affaire Turco-Egyptienne terminée, ou à la veille de l'être.

C'est donc avec le plus vif regret qu'il a appris que les soins que les Représentans avaient promis de vouer à un objet aussi important pour le repos de l'Orient, étaient jusqu'à présent restés infructueux.

Le Soussigné, depuis son départ de Constantinople, a reçu de nouveaux ordres qui lui enjoignent de presser la solution de cette affaire. Si, par conséquent, les délais apportés dans l'exécution des intentions bienveillantes de leurs Excellences, provenaient de difficultés qu'il serait dans les facultés du Soussigné d'applanir, il a l'honneur de les prévenir que, de son côté, il apportera toutes les facilités qui dépendront de lui, pour aider à lever ces difficultés, et qu'à cet effet il est muni, comme l'Ambassadeur Nouri Effendi, son prédécesseur, des pouvoirs les plus amples pour concerter avec leurs Excellences les moyens de parvenir à conclure un arrangement, lequel serait basé sur des principes équitables, et renfermerait les garanties d'une paix durable pour l'Empire Ottoman. Cependant, le Soussigné est persuadé que l'accord qui, dès le principe, a existé entre

les Cinq Grandes Puissances relativement aux intérêts du Sultan, et la continuation de leur union à cet égard, suffiront pour écarter toutes les difficultés, si effectivement il en existe.

En attendant, le Soussigné croit de son devoir de faire observer à leurs Excellences, que l'Empire Ottoman se trouve dans une position fort critique; que l'incertitude à l'égard des résultats des délibérations de Londres, y propage une inquiétude qui prend un caractère tellement grave et alarmant, que rien ne saurait justifier un plus long délai de l'ajustement d'une question soumise depuis dix mois aux jugemens et à la sagesse des Cinq Grandes Puissances; enfin, que la nécessité de sa solution devient de jour en jour plus urgente.

En conséquence, le Soussigné prie instamment Monsieur le Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté Britannique, de vouloir bien, de concert avec les Représentans des Cours d'Autriche, de France, de Prusse, et de Russie, redoubler ses généreux efforts pour mettre fin à un mal toujours croissant, et menaçant la paix de l'Orient.

Le Soussigné réitère avec une vive instance la demande faite par son prédécesseur, de vouloir bien donner suite au plus tôt possible à l'intérêt manifesté d'une manière si amicale et bienveillante au Sultan par la Note Collective des Représentans des Cinq Grandes Puissances, en date de Constantinople, le 27 Juillet, 1839, et les Représentans à Londres des dites Puissances, par leur Note responsive à celle du 7 Avril de son Excellence Nouri Effendi, avaient annoncé vouloir prendre immédiatement en considération.

Le Soussigné, l'Ambassadeur de la Sublime Porte près Sa Majesté Britannique, prie M. le Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté Britannique de vouer de concert avec les Représentans des autres Grandes Cours, une attention sérieuse à l'objet de la présente Note, et profite de cette occasion, &c.

(Signé) CHEKIB.

(Translation.)

Chekib Effendi to Viscount Palmerston.

London, May 31, 1840.

THE Undersigned, Ambassador from the Sublime Porte to Her Britannic Majesty, had hoped, on his arrival in London, from the Note presented by his predecessor, Nouri Effendi, on the 7th of April of this year, to the Representatives of the Courts of England, Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, and from their answers to the said Note, to find the Turco-Egyptian Question settled, or on the eve of being so.

It is, therefore, with the deepest regret that he has learnt, that the care which the Representatives had promised to devote to an object so important to the tranquillity of the East, had, up to this moment, proved fruitless.

The Undersigned, since his departure from Constantinople, has received fresh instructions which enjoin him to accelerate the solution of this affair. Consequently, if the delays which have taken place in the execution of the benevolent intentions of their Excellencies, proceeded from difficulties which it may be in the power of the Undersigned to smooth away, he has the honour to inform them, that he will offer every facility which depends upon him to assist in removing those difficulties, and that, for this purpose, he is furnished, like his predecessor the Ambassador Nouri Effendi, with the most ample powers to concert with their Excellencies as to the means of arriving at the conclusion of an arrangement, which may be based upon equitable principles, and may contain guarantees for a lasting peace to the Ottoman Empire. However the Undersigned is convinced, that the agreement which has subsisted from the commencement between the Five Great Powers, relative to the interests of the Sultan, and the continuance of their union in this respect, will suffice to remove all difficulties, if indeed any exist.

In the meantime, the Undersigned feels it his duty to submit to their

Excellencies, that the Ottoman Empire is in a very critical position; that the uncertainty, with respect to the result of the deliberations in London, occasions therein an uneasiness which assumes so serious and alarming a character, that nothing would justify a further delay in the settlement of a Question which during ten months has been submitted to the judgment and wisdom of the Five Great Powers; finally, that the necessity of its solution becomes daily more urgent.

The Undersigned, consequently, earnestly entreats the Plenipotentiary of Her Britannic Majesty, in concert with the Representatives of the Courts of Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, to redouble their generous endeavours to put an end to an evil which is continually increasing, and which threatens the peace of the East.

The Undersigned most earnestly repeats the demand made by his Predecessor, that no time may be lost in giving effect to the interest manifested in so friendly and benevolent a manner to the Sultan by the Collective Note of the Representatives of the Five Great Powers, dated Constantinople, July 27, 1839, and which the Representatives of the said Powers in London by their Note, in answer to that of his Excellency Nouri Effendi of the 7th of April, announced their intention of taking immediately into consideration.

The Undersigned, Ambassador from the Sublime Porte to Her Britannic Majesty, entreats the Plenipotentiary of Her Britannic Majesty to give his serious attention, in concert with the Representatives of the other Great Courts, to the subject of this Note, and he avails himself of this opportunity, &c., &c.

(Signed) CHEKIB.

No. 581.

The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received June* 1.)

(Extract.) *St. Petersburgh, May* 23, 1840.

IN conversing upon the limit for Syria, lately proposed, by Beyrout and Damascus, and upon the present state of the negotiations in London, I remarked to Count Nesselrode, that there appeared no reason, at this moment, to hurry them to a close, and asked if his Excellency did not think so. His Excellency replied, that it was always better to bring such a question as the one in hand, to a close as speedily as possible. But that, if we could be sure that Mehemet Ali would not move forward, delay in the negotiations was not of consequence.

No. 582.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received June* 5.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, May* 7, 1840.

THE Report from Aleppo, dated April 13th, transmitted in my preceding despatch, shows that preparations are making to enable Ibrahim to move; it is, however, certain, that if he moves his army to threaten the capital, Syria will be raised against him, and that he will put everything upon the issue of his enterprise.

No. 583.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received June* 5.)

My Lord, *Therapia, May* 13, 1840.

I HOPE 18,000 troops will march for a position selected between Isnick and Scutari, upon the only road by which Ibrahim could pass, were he to attempt an attack; the position is in itself very strong, and it will be strengthened by some field works, and the road may be also commanded by guns from the vessels in the Sea of Marmora.

About 6,000 of the troops have been inspected near Pera; and they are admitted by some French military men, to be as fine troops as need be. One of the regiments is said to be as good as any French regiment. I do not know how Ibrahim well can bring a larger number to attack, and I am sure his troops are not better than those he will have to assail, who, being in position, will have an advantage.

The spirit amongst the soldiery is good. I think Ibrahim will not venture an attack; it would be the extreme of rashness to do so, when such preparations are made to resist him, for a defeat or a repulse would be his ruin. The expence of these preparations will not be great to the Porte; nothing can be lost by the measures, though everything may be gained; for should the troops be beaten, the result could not be worse than that which would attend the unresisted march of Ibrahim to the sea-side, where he must be resisted by the Allies, or allowed to be master of Constantinople. The resistance there, however, even at the worst, would be easy enough, if the Allies choose to exert their maritime force, or if England alone exerts her own which is at hand.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 584.

Mr. Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 10.)

(Extract.) *Damascus, April* 24, 1840.

NOTHING has further transpired respecting the insurgent Mutualis in the Balbec district; it would appear that they are dispersed and quiet for the present, overawed by the Irregular Cavalry force brought against them from the Adana district.

The Damascus district remains in a tranquil state, and nothing whatever of interest has taken place worthy of your Lordship's notice. Preparations, however, continue making for the fortress of Acre: some hundred camels have been purchased here for the service of transporting provisions, tents, &c., to the garrison. The Government is very hard-pushed for funds; the Treasury is completely drained—so much so, that the only resource it has is to levy the Kharatch: and measures are taken to obtain the Ferdeh Tax in advance.

My advices from Aleppo, under the 8th instant, state Ibrahim Pasha to be always at Marash; and no movement of the regular forces had taken place, either from that position northwards, or from Orfa southwards, or of the irregulars, further than I had the honour of stating to your Lordship in my last despatch.

I learn from Aleppo, under the 15th instant, that warlike preparations are making there for the north of Syria; the artillery is being placed in an efficient state for immediate service. Works are being erected for overawing Aleppo, in case the chief military force is otherwise employed; a large quantity of ammunition has been sent to the coast, and a depôt is said to be forming at Byass. Two more regiments have been marched to the south—one destined for Hamah, and one for Damascus. These measures do not indicate the immediate advance of the Egyptian regular forces under Ibrahim Pasha, either from Marash northwards, or from Orfa southwards, but demonstrate the intention of a determined resistance for the retention of Syria, and at the same time holding all the disposable forces ready on the northern frontier for any emergency, either to advance, or to act on the defensive, which a change in the political position Mehemet Ali may be placed in, shall create.

No. 585.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received June* 10.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, May* 15, 1840.

YOUR Lordship was pleased, in your despatch of the 25th of March, to express certain opinions on the late actions and language of his Highness the Pasha, granting me, at the same time, liberty to show that communication to his Excellency Boghos Bey.

It appeared to me, that when the above despatch was written, your Lordship could hardly have been fully apprized of the resolved and uncompromising course on which the Pasha seems fully decided.

I felt that the relations of Great Britain with this Government are already sufficiently delicate, and that until the means of coercion are really at hand, it may be more injurious than useful to assume a hostile tone, and thus to widen our estrangement, and create premature difficulties.

I have therefore availed myself of the discretionary power confided to me by your Lordship, and have refrained from acting on the above-cited despatch, without ulterior instructions.

In conclusion, I may add, that with the Pasha himself, and every member of his Court, my personal intercourse, although somewhat reserved, continues to be perfectly satisfactory, and is marked by every proper form and courtesy.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 586.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received June* 10.)

(Extract.) *Alexandria, May* 21, 1840.

THE past month has not been very productive of events in Egypt. The warlike preparations in this country are continued.

The large frigate "Cafarshir," having on board seven cannon, and considerable military stores, sailed from this port on the 26th of April, accompanied by two schooners, and speedily followed by two transports. On the 10th of May, news reached Alexandria, that the frigate, which it is said was bound to St. Jean d'Acre, had been wrecked on her outward voyage.

On the 15th of May arrived here the former Sovereign of Dongola Ouroo, or King Thumball. He comes to complain of the tyranny of the Pasha's Governor in his late States.

In Syria there are appearances of increased activity. The fortifications of Acre are nearly completed; the coast is being placed in a state of defence: regiments, arms, ammunition, and stores, are being distributed through its ports. On the last days of April, 800 camels left Aleppo with gunpowder, each bearing about two cwt. The Local Government, at the same time, made a requisition for 150 additional camels, for the same purpose. From Aleppo 12,000 muskets were simultaneously despatched; biscuit and cartridges are being prepared in different places. Whether Ibrahim Pasha contemplates offensive, as well as defensive, warfare, is not so certain. He has caused the whole of his Artillery to be inspected, and carefully put into a condition for service. The garrison of Aleppo, with twelve batteries of Artillery now in that city, have orders to be ready to march at the shortest notice.

Maggiun Bey had returned in the beginning of April to Orfa, from his expedition towards the Sindjar; he had subjected all the tribes along the river Khaboor, and had joined the conquered territory to the Pashalic of Orfa, although it previously depended on that of Moussoul.

No. 587.

Viscount Palmerston to Colonel Hodges.

Sir, *Foreign Office, June* 11, 1840.

I HAVE received and laid before the Queen your despatches to the 26th of May.

In reply to your despatch of May 15, I have to acquaint you that I approve the course which you have adopted with reference to my instruction of the 25th of March.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 588.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received June* 14.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, May* 15, 1840.

THE deposition of the Seraskier (Halil) and the Festival of Mahomed's birth, have occasioned delay in the departure of the troops for the position between Isnick and Scutari, but I hope it will take place immediately.

I attach great importance to the execution of this plan; I think it will have the effect of—

1st. Making it almost an act of madness in Ibrahim to attempt an attack against the capital, because 18,000 men, posted as the Turks will be, would require a large force of good troops for their expulsion; and, on the most favourable calculation for Ibrahim, he cannot bring above 20,000, and that of an indifferent quality; and if he should not succeed, his whole power, which is founded upon the belief in his force, would be destroyed, and he would be attacked in the rear.

2nd. Because the assemblage of a large compact Ottoman force in such a position would dissipate the errors of those who imagine the Porte has no army; and it would put it out of the power of malcontents, animated by Mehemet Ali's agents, to excite in Constantinople acts of insubordination, they being evidently exposed to being attacked and put down, and punished by those troops. The same effect will be produced on the inhabitants of a large extent of country in every direction from the capital.

3rd. It will tend to improve the army itself, and it cannot cost any great additional outlay beyond that which must at any rate be expended upon the army.

4th. These effects above stated will obviate the necessity for the employment of foreign means for the defence of Constantinople, and thereby prevent inconveniences that might attend the arrangements for affording protection by foreigners. Russian forces need not be called in;—the French fleet need not be called up. The pretences upon which France rests the defence of her inimical policy will be taken away; and if M. Thiers should really wish to concur with Her Majesty's Government, they will give him a good ground to state to his country for so doing, as it will enable him to show that the power of Mehemet Ali is not what it has been stated to be, and that conclusions drawn from false premises are not true.

I have talked over these topics with Count Pisani, who is well acquainted with them, and your Lordship will have the goodness to examine him upon them. I have given this despatch into his charge, and he will be at your commands in London.

No. 589.

Mr. Consul Moore to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 15.)

(Extract.) *Beyrout, April* 25, 1840.

THE only information I have the honour to communicate on the present occasion, relates to the measures which continue to be taken for the defence of Acre.

On the 21st instant a regiment of Guards passed through Beyrout for that place.

The greater part of the inhabitants of Acre have retired outside the walls. The approaches to it are said to have been undermined; and besides the works to the east, others have been completed on the western side.

Military stores continue to arrive from Egypt for the same destination. Solyman Pasha is for the present at Sidon.

No. 590.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 15.)

My Lord, *Paris, June* 12, 1840.

I HAVE received your Lordship's despatches to the 9th of June.

I had some conversation yesterday with M. Thiers, on the Oriental Question. It began by his saying to me, that the dismissal of Hosrew Pasha from the councils of the Sultan had caused a very favourable change in the disposition of Mehemet Ali towards his Sovereign; that the Pasha had talked of sending back the Turkish fleet to Constantinople, and on board of it his son, to pay his homage to the Sultan. I asked M. Thiers what were the conditions of peace, which, under this favourable change in the disposition of Mehemet Ali, he indulged the hope of obtaining from him. He replied, that the language of the Pasha was less positive in regard to the retention of Adana; that he talked of that district being held as a Pashalic by one of his sons; and M. Thiers believed that he might be induced to consent to the restoration of it to the Sultan. When I spoke of the cession of a part of Syria as one of the conditions of peace which had been thought essential for the security of the Porte, M. Thiers gave me no encouragement to hope that the declared resolution of Mehemet Ali to keep possession of the whole of it was at all changed; but he held out the expectation that the Pasha might be induced to pay a tribute for it, far greater in amount than had ever hitherto been paid, and which would well compensate the Turkish Government for the loss of territory.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE

No. 591.

Mr. Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 15.)

(Extract.) *St. Petersburgh, June* 6, 1840.

I SAW Count Nesselrode this morning. His Excellency said that he had no late news from Constantinople, but according to the last accounts, matters were going on much as usual. He did not seem apprehensive of any advance by Mehemet Ali towards Constantinople; nor did he appear to have received any intelligence of expected revolutionary movements at Smyrna.

Count Nesselrode was evidently disappointed not to have a more favourable report of the reception by M. Thiers, of your Lordship's late proposals to the French Government on the Eastern Question. His Excellency observed to me, that M. Thiers had not, it is true, positively refused to accede to the proposed measures, but had given an answer which would allow him time for communicating with Alexandria.

No. 592.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 16.)

(Extract.) *Vienna, June* 9, 1840.

PRINCE METTERNICH will forward to Baron Neumann, for communication to your Lordship, despatches from the Internuncio, representing the sense entertained by the Divan of the urgency of an early settlement of their differences with Mehemet Ali. So pressingly is this felt at Constantinople, that full powers have been sent to the Turkish Plenipotentiary in London, to sign any agreement which the Four Powers shall concur in recommending.

Prince Metternich will readily place two frigates at the disposition of the Four Powers, for any service they may concur in recommending.

No. 593.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 16.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, May* 29, 1840.

THE removal of Hosrew from his post of Grand Vizier is to take place directly. Fethi Ahmed Pasha declined the post, and it is to be given to Raouff Pasha, the late Grand Vizier, a man of no party, and much esteemed for integrity and his knowledge of business.

No. 594.

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, June* 26, 1840.

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch, of the 12th instant, reporting the substance of a conversation which you held with M. Thiers on the preceding day, relative to the question pending between the Porte and Mehemet Ali, I have to observe to your Excellency, that the French Government has, for some time past, talked of the evacuation of the district of Adana, as one of the concessions which France knew that Mehemet Ali was willing to make; but now M. Thiers says, that if the report of the dismissal of Hosrew Pasha should prove true, Mehemet Ali may be prevailed upon, not indeed to evacuate Adana, but to erect it into a nominally separate Pashalic, to be held by one of Mehemet Ali's sons. M. Thiers, however, seems not to be aware that the district of Adana is at this moment a separate Pashalic, and is held, not by Mehemet

Ali, but by Ibrahim; and, therefore, the arrangement which M. Thiers holds out, as a possible consequence of the favourable change which the dismissal of Hosrew Pasha may produce in the mind of Mehemet Ali, is the very arrangement which has actually been in existence for the last six years.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 595.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 28.)

My Lord, *Therapia, June* 7, 1840.

I HAVE been furnished with the inclosed return of the forces of Mehemet Ali.

I have only to observe, that the population which supports this force is supposed to be about three millions of souls; and the country inhabited by that population is known to be wasted by the unceasing exactions of the Pasha's government.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 595.

Return of the Forces of Mehemet Ali Pasha.

	Men.
In Cairo (1,940 of which are Turks), four regiments	12,800
In Syria, twenty-five regiments - -	87,000
In the Hedjaz, the Nedjid, and Soudan -	57,000
In Rosetta - - - - -	3,200
In Damietta - - - - -	3,200
In and about Alexandria, land and sea forces, gunners, and men employed in the arsenal -	32,800
	196,000

Or, 155,000 Regulars,
And 41,000 Irregulars.

196,000

Return of Militia in the course of Organization.

	Men.
Seyd Ahmed Garbee has engaged to raise in Alexandria two regiments - -	6,200
The Commandant of Rosetta, one regiment	3,200
,, Damietta and neighbourhood, two regiments - - -	6,200
The Mamours in the four districts of Lower Egypt, four regiments - - -	12,800

In Cairo and Environs.

	Men.
Osman Bey, of Senaar, Aaleem of the College of Azhar, has engaged to raise four regiments with the rank of Mirmiran - -	12,800
The Mirleeva Ibrahim Aarif Bey, two regiments	6,400
The Mirleeva, the Aaleem Mehmed Bey, two regiments - - - - -	6,400
El Djezzar Abee Bey, from Boulac, the port of Cairo, one regiment - - -	3,200
Hassan Bey, from Old Cairo, one regiment -	3,200
,, from the Environs, one regiment	3,200
Twenty Regiments,	63,600

Return of the Efficient Troops in Alexandria.

	Men.
In the Arsenal - - - - -	4,000
On board Mehemet Ali's fleet - -	15,000
,, the Sultan's fleet - - -	14,000
Troops of the line within Alexandria -	4,800
Invalid pioneers - - - -	800
Turkish gunners - - - -	800
One regiment of Egyptian Artillery - -	4,000
One regiment of the line (at Marabout) -	3,200
	46,600

The armies of the Hedjaz and the Nedjid are daily expected under Kourschid and Ibrahim Pashas.

No. 596.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 28.)

My Lord, *Therapia, June* 9, 1840.

I RECEIVED yesterday a letter from Colonel Hodges, dated Alexandria, May 29, in which he speaks of the facility with which, in his opinion, Mehemet Ali could be brought to agree to such terms as your Lordship proposed should be offered, by the employment of Her Majesty's squadron in the Levant alone.

Colonel Hodges had received reports similar to those I also have received from Syria, and other parts, stating the great and increasing discontents.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 597.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 2.)

(Extract.) *Paris, June* 29, 1840.

THE French Government thinks, that during the suspense of an arrangement between the Sultan and the Pasha of Egypt, the power and authority of the Turkish Government in Asia Minor, as well as in the provinces of European Turkey, are daily becoming weaker, and that the Powers of Europe have not available means for the coercion of Mehemet Ali.

No. 598.

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 5.)

My Lord, *Paris, July* 3, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to transmit the "Constitutionnel" of yesterday's date, in which it is stated, according to the substance of a telegraphic despatch which M. Thiers has received, that Mehemet Ali, upon learning the dismissal of Hosrew Pasha, had determined to restore the Turkish fleet to the Sultan.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 599.

Mr. Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 5.)

(Extract.) *Damascus, May* 22, 1840.

THE Government here continues to be very straightened in its finances. Severe measures have been resorted to, to oblige the Christian community to pay up the arrears and balance owing on the Kharatch tax. The Ferdeh is also begun to be collected, though not due for three months hence. In this city great uneasiness exists. It is reported from good source, that the population of Haouran and the Ledgea Arabs are determined to resist the payment of the Ferdeh tax; that the Druses of the Emir Bechir's mountains, conjointly with his Christian subjects, are firmly agreed on all points to stand by each other; that it is thought they will resist at least the anticipated payment of this tax; the enforcement of which may lead to very considerable embarrassment to the Government in all its measures, situated, as those territories are, contiguous to Acre, and the absence of a sufficient military force in the Damascus district, to carry into execution its plans.

I am informed that orders were received by the Government here from Mehemet Ali and Ibrahim Pasha, to raise a militia in this city and environs, of, it is stated, two regiments of Infantry, about 7,000 men; but Sheriff Pasha and Bachri Bey have made representations to the above Chiefs that, under the actual circumstances of the absence of both regular and irregular forces in this city and its environs, the ill-feeling of the population generally towards the Egyptian Government, and the difficulty there is in restraining them and keeping them in subjection, even disarmed as they are, it would be impolitic to put arms in their hands, which might be the cause, in conjunction with the distaste which generally exists to military discipline, of insurrections breaking out at different points of this district; to these representations the Government here is awaiting fresh instructions; but I may remark that this tallies with the feeling of the population in the Emir Bechir's territories against the projected creation of a militia in the mountains, on which I have already informed your Lordship.

The advices from Aleppo to the 6th and 13th instant, state Ibrahim Pasha to be always at Marash. The arms, ammunition, &c., transporting to the coast, being chiefly those taken at the battle of Nezib, seem destined for Acre, whether to be in depôt there for arming the projected militia in the south, or for Egypt, does not appear yet clear. Troops continue to be directed along the coast from the north to the south. Solyman Pasha was, by last accounts, at Sidon.

I do not hear that anything indicates the advance of Ibrahim Pasha's regular forces, at least for the present. There is a report in town very generally credited, of which no mention is made in the advices from Aleppo, that Ibrahim Pasha has experienced some losses in rencontres with the Koords of the lower ranges of the Taurus; his irregular Druse Cavalry has suffered the most; and it is said an order has been received here to send a Chief, with 500 horsemen, from the Acre district to his Highness; also, that a regiment of Horse Artillery stationed here, the animals of which are now at grass, has received marching orders to join Ibrahim Pasha at Marash.

No. 600.

Mr. Consul Moore to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 5.)

My Lord, *Beyrout, May* 29, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship, that measures continue to be taken for the defence of the whole coast of Syria, and that Solyman Pasha is about to visit this and the neighbouring places on a tour of inspection.

But the most important information I have to communicate to your Lordship by this opportunity is, the refusal of the Christians of Lebanon to give up their arms at the demand of this Government. They reply to the requisition, that the Viceroy, by a firman, had granted these arms in perpetuity, in lieu of those formerly taken from them; that they had faithfully used them against his Highness's enemies, the Mutualis and Druses; had suffered much in the service, bearing the expences of their campaigns at their own cost; and finally declare their intention of retaining their arms.

The Christians have allied themselves with the Druses, and they are mutually pledged to resistance.

The determination has already been proved, by their wresting from some people of the Emir Bechir who had attempted to begin the disarmament, thirty muskets, which were delivered to Druses, heretofore their enemies, but henceforward to be their allies.

In consequence of an apprehended attack by the mountaineers upon Sidon, where there exists a depôt of arms, a brig of war has to-day been despatched to apprize Ibrahim Pasha. The Government Post betwixt this place and Sidon has been intercepted, and all we hear, indicates the commencement of a revolt.

The sentinels at the cordon established in this neighbourhood by the Health Department, hastily returned into the town last night, in consequence of an apprehended attack by the insurgents. They have been ordered back to their posts this morning, but I shall not be surprised to hear again of their retreat.

Such is the general feeling at present in Lebanon, that it will require equal caution on the part of this Government, either to proceed in their intention of disarmament, or to abandon it; and everything indicates a rekindling of the latent spirit of hostility in Syria to the Egyptian yoke.

Each hour now brings information of the spirit of disaffection among the population of Lebanon. The position of the Emir Bechir seems a very critical one, situated as he is with the Viceroy, with a population under his jurisdiction now all but in a state of declared revolt.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) N. MOORE.

P.S.—The French Consul here to-day privately chartered a small Greek brig for Smyrna, and hurried her off with the greatest secrecy. I have ascertained that she bore despatches.

It is rumoured that two of the Emir Bechir's sons are favourable to the insurrection.

We are every hour receiving accounts of the capture of arms from straggling parties of soldiers. The Cordon at Sidon has been forced, and the arms carried off. A strong guard is placed at each of the gates of this place, and the gunners are at their posts on the forts.

N. M.

No. 601.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received July* 10.)

(Extract.) *Alexandria, June* 6, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship, that yesterday his Highness the Viceroy quitted Alexandria for Cairo. The recent incendiary attempts in the capital seem to have been the motive of this visit; but it is not supposed that the Pasha will be long absent from hence. The fires appear to have been numerous, but it is not proved that they arose out of political causes. Some of them were certainly accidental, and others are supposed to have been the work of those lawless characters who abound in all large cities, and who convert a public calamity into an opportunity for depredation. Recent accounts deny that any fire had taken place in the citadel.

Public opinion in Egypt is unsettled and feverish, without being precisely hostile to Mehemet Ali. This is caused by the dubious and uncertain appearances of the Egyptian Question, as well as by the power of the Pasha wanting that aspect of rooted stability which inspires confidence in the masses.

It is certain that the spirit of the National Guard throughout Egypt, is eminently unsatisfactory; and the Viceroy seems to fear that a secret understanding amongst the Chiefs of the new force, extends its ramifications over the whole country.

I have been informed by very high authority, that immediately after the arrival of the French steam-vessel of the 24th ultimo, the French Consul-General visited the Viceroy, and in the conversation, M. Cochelet asked Mehemet Ali whether he found himself in a financial concondition to hold out another year in his present policy. The answer of the Pasha was, that he could do so very easily; that he could now sell produce which would clear off his debts to the merchants, and defray six months of the arrears of those in his service, after which he said that he would be very well able to proceed on credit for another year. The

Pasha added, that his crops of the present season, promised to be unusually productive.

In connexion with what I have stated of this conversation, I may notice that the Viceroy has recently been effecting very extensive sales of produce. About the middle of May he sold 150,000 cantars of cotton, at thirteen dollars per cantar, which is three dollars per cantar cheaper than last year. About the same time, the Government disposed of 40,000 ardebs of corn, at forty-five piasters per ardeb, making 90,000 dollars. Thus the Viceroy would have recently realized 1,950,000 dollars, but that the Government usually sells more produce than it possesses, and probably will not be able to produce the complete quantities above enumerated.

This morning, the British packet "Emetje," arrived with the mails from Syria, and the information I have received is very important.

Already, in my despatches of the 18th and 20th of April, I had apprized your Lordship that the utmost discontent and ferment existed in Syria, and that there had been even some partial symptoms of resistance. In the middle of last month my sources of information instructed me, that the population of Naplouse, one of the most warlike in Syria, had evinced a disposition to refuse payment of the new Miri tax, and that several armed bodies from various points, had retired to the mountains. About the same time I received news that the insurgents under Halil, had beaten two battalions of the 25th Regiment of Egyptian Infantry quartered in Jerusalem.

The correspondence of this day proves that these indications of an unsettled spirit have not been without corresponding results, and that the condition of Syria has become most critical.

It appears that the Egyptian authorities had given orders to disarm the Christians of Mount Lebanon, but that they have refused to comply, under the pretext that the arms put in their hands had been given to them by the Pasha only to replace those of which they had formerly been deprived.

It is to be remarked, that this people had formerly aided the Pasha in his wars; but that they have now joined cause with their former enemies, the Druses, and that both, in conjunction with the inhabitants of the Haouran district and other Syrian populations, appear to be fully decided on an open and formidable insurrection.

The post between Beyrout and Saida was stopped and delayed two hours by the insurgents. The horses and harness were taken; but the conductor of the mails and the correspondence were not detained or at all injured.

It seems that the Sanatory Cordon of Saida had been forced, and the arms there in depôt carried off to the mountains. News was constantly reaching Beyrout, on the 29th ultimo, of straggling parties of Egyptian troops having been surprised and disarmed by the Syrians. The above town was in a state of great agitation; all egress was prevented; strong guards were stationed at the gates, and the gunners were at their posts on the forts.

The above events do not come to my knowledge only by the reports of Consular officers attached to this Mission, but are confirmed to me by other sources of intelligence.

The utmost diligence prevails in perfecting the fortifications of St. Jean d'Acre, and in rendering it an immense depôt of all warlike stores. My advices of the middle of May inform me, that a very able European engineer, Lieutenant-Colonel Schultz, had recently arrived there, and had taken the direction of the works, some of which he disapproved and had demolished, in order to have them reconstructed on more scientific principles.

Enormous quantities of munitions were continually arriving in Acre. The powder magazine being completely filled; about 800 additional barrels of that material had been deposited in the extensive stores of the hospital.

The garrison of Acre, at the date already mentioned, was as follows

	Men.
18th Regiment Infantry (incomplete)	2,000
30th do. do. (invalids)	2,500
2nd do. do.	2,500
1 Battalion of 25th Regiment Infantry	600
1 do. of Sappers	600
1 do. of Invalids	600
1 Company of Engineers	100
10th Regiment of Cavalry	1,000
Regular Artillery	200
Irregular do.	600
Total	10,700
Masons and stone-cutters ..	1,500

The nearest military force to Acre was then at Saida, where the 6th Regiment of Infantry was quartered, and where a barrack was being constructed for the accommodation of a garrison of two regiments.

In the middle of May, Ibrahim Pasha was still at Marash, with a division of about 10,000 men. It was said that he had ordered five absent regiments to join him.

Solyman Pasha was about to leave Saida on a tour of inspection throughout the troops stationed in Syria, and was to establish a competent force at every point of the coast where a disembarkation might be possible.

By information of the 20th May, I learn that his Excellency Maggiun Bey continued then at Orfa. His force consisted of—

3 Regiments of Infantry.
3 do. of Cavalry.
2 Batteries of Heavy Artillery.
2 do. of Light do.
and about forty cannon.

He had, besides, about 1,500 Bedouin or Annadi Cavalry, and a corps of 700 irregular troops. The Gherba Arabs, dwelling on the river Khaboor, and recently subjugated by the Bey, were perfectly quiet. The district of Orfa was also tranquil; and it appears that the inhabitants are highly satisfied with the wise and temperate government of Maggiun Bey.

My despatches from Candia allude to some appearances of an intention to put that island in a posture of defence. The carriages of the guns in the various forts were being changed.

I do not know that I have more to add to the foregoing information, except it be the fact that the Pasha has lately declared, that should he be coerced by one or more European Powers, he is in a condition and fully determined to revolutionize the Turkish Empire.

I had neglected in the proper place to inform your Lordship, that the French steam-packet which arrived in this port on the 4th instant, is reported to have brought from Marseilles 300,000 dollars. This money was addressed to two gentlemen who are frequently employed in the affairs of the Pasha, and as they have never been known to receive remittance of anything like so large an amount, it is confidently asserted that the above sum was really destined for the treasury of the Viceroy.

No. 602.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 7.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, June* 16, 1840.

BY the British monthly steam-packet, I shall have the honour to furnish to your Lordship an ample narrative of late events in Syria.

I shall now briefly notice the latest information from that quarter. The Emir Bechir has declared openly for the Pasha's Government, and a large proportion of the mountaineers have returned to their homes and usual occupations. Still the insurgents are in force about Tripoli and Latakia; but his Highness the Pasha has taken prompt and energetic steps to crush the revolt. He even declares that the Druses have offered to march against the refractory, an assistance which he has declined.

Within the last three days I have had two long interviews with the Viceroy. He conversed on the affairs of Syria frankly, openly, and without any show whatever of doubt, fear, or hesitation. I am convinced that he has no dread of quelling the disturbances; but he seems to suspect that the Sublime Porte or her Allies may be tempted, by his present difficulties, to make some attempt on his Syrian possessions.

The Pasha has consequently despatched, or has nearly completed, for the protection of the coast of Syria, two naval divisions, consisting together, of—

3 Ships of the Line.	3 Corvettes.
12 Frigates.	1 Brig.

Of these, fully nine are Turkish vessels. Their Captains and superior officers are Egyptian, and the crews composed in equal numbers of Arabs and Turks. Eleven of these ships, expected to sail this day, will also bear,

2 Regiments of Turkish Marines .	6,400
2 Regiments of Egyptian Infantry .	6,400
	12,800

who are to be embarked in equal proportions. This force, I presume, is destined to strengthen those points of the Syrian coast where a descent of an invading army might be practicable.

Yesterday I received information which made it desirable, that I should hear the facts from the Viceroy's own lips. Accompanied, therefore, by M. de Laurin, Consul-General for Austria, I waited on his Highness at 5 o'clock P. M. I was welcomed in his name, and treated by his household and himself with marked distinction and cordiality. He informed me that he had resolved to despatch to Constantinople, his former secretary and confidential servant, Sami Bey, who would leave next morning (16th June). That his Envoy would be charged with the congratulations of his Highness to the Sultan on the birth of his daughter, and a complimentary present, on that happy event, of 2,000 purses (10,000*l.*). Sami Bey would also declare to the Sultan that, all along, Hosrew Pasha had been the only barrier to a friendly arrangement; and that since that personage had been removed, the Pasha was prepared to fulfil his former promises, and would restore the Turkish fleet so soon as His Imperial Majesty should please to indicate whether he desired it to return under the orders of the Viceroy's son, Said Bey, or of his Admiral, Mutish Pasha.

I have also heard that the Sultana Mother has written to the deserter Ahmed Fevzi, late Turkish Capudan Pasha, informing him, that in consequence of recent events, he may expect his speedy restoration to favour and power.

Yesterday morning, M. Cochelet, Consul-General of France, was in conference with his Highness the Pasha as early as 7 o'clock.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 603.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 5.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, June 17, 1840.*

YESTERDAY I had the honour to inform your Lordship, in a brief despatch forwarded by the French steam-packet, of the recent important circumstances connected with the Egyptian Question.

To avoid the confusion arising from a lengthened statement of numerous facts and considerations appertaining to late occurrences, I propose to divide into several despatches the matter on which it is my duty to address your Lordship.

His Highness Mehemet Ali, having returned from Cairo to Alexandria early on the morning of the 14th instant, I hastened to pay my respects to his Highness at 5 o'clock in the same afternoon.

I was received very cordially. The Pasha appeared to be in high spirits, probably caused by the news he had recently received, of the dismissal of Hosrew Pasha, late Grand Vizier. In speaking of that event, his Highness said that the downfall of Rechid Pasha must soon follow, and that the disgrace of that Minister would not give him much sorrow. He remarked, that the Commercial Treaties concluded by Rechid Pasha, as well as his hasty and premature reforms, would never be forgiven by the Turks, meaning, perhaps, by the nation, no more than those Pashas and High Functionaries whose rapacity his administrative acts had been the means of restraining.

The Pasha declared the condition of Turkey to be very precarious, and said that public feeling there is much excited. He told me, that he was about to despatch to Constantinople one of his most confidential servants, who possesses considerable influence in the Turkish capital. This is Sami Bey, late Secretary to his Highness, and high in his Councils. Sami Bey is a Turk of the Morea, educated in Constantinople, versed in many Oriental as well as European languages, and represented as a man of very considerable talents.

Mehemet Ali spoke calmly, freely, and with confidence, of the affairs of Syria. He assured me that the present revolt was occasioned by a mistake of his orders. He said, that wanting to equip his National Guards at Cairo, and knowing that there were disposable depôts of arms in the citadel of St. Jean d'Acre, he had written to his son Ibrahim Pasha to supply him; but that, either the order was not understood, or the Generalissimo felt unwilling to deprive his fortress of part of its stores; consequently, he had sought to make good the requisition by demanding of the Syrian mountaineers the restitution of those arms with which they had been formerly entrusted; a measure which the Pasha said he had never contemplated.

The Viceroy informed me, that he received news of the insurrection when about halfway on his voyage to Cairo, and that, at first, he had ordered off the "Nile" steam-vessel with despatches to the Emir Bechir, directing him to obey no one in the mean time, as he had resolved to proceed to Syria, and would take the supreme command in person. His Highness added, that subsequent intelligence had been of so tranquillizing a nature as to induce him to change his original purpose, and that he should now send, in his stead, his grandson Abbas Pasha, with proper instructions for reducing the disturbed provinces to subjection.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 604.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 5.)

(Extract.) *Alexandria, June* 17, 1840.

ON the 5th of June, the Pasha quitted this city for Cairo, where he arrived about 10 o'clock, A. M., of the 7th. During his voyage an express reached him with the news of the late insurrection in Syria. A body of 2,800 Arnaouts and Turks, quartered near the city, was ordered to march to the revolted country; but they were countermanded shortly after, the Pasha having received satisfactory advices from Syria.

In the mean time, the "Nile" steam-vessel was despatched, on the 7th instant, to Beyrout, with letters and orders from the Viceroy.

At 10 o'clock, A. M., of the same day, the Viceroy reached Cairo.

It was also on the 7th of June the French corvette of war, the "Vigilante," which had been in this port since last March, was sent to visit the Syrian coast from St. Jean d'Acre to Latakia, after which she will probably return to this place.

About the same time, a naval division was ordered to be ready for sea by the 9th instant, and to sail to the coast of Syria. It was to be commanded by Mustapha Bey, and to be thus composed:—

Frigates ..	Menufich,	*Corvettes* ..	Tantah,
	Rechid,		Genna-Bahari.
	Behere,	*Brig* ..	Temsah.
	Sergehad,		
	Damietta.		

I believe that the whole or greater portion of these ships have since sailed.

The Viceroy left Cairo on the morning of the 12th instant, and reached Alexandria at 8 o'clock, A. M., of the 14th.

The "Nile" steam-vessel had returned from Beyrout, the night previous to the Pasha's arrival. At the same time, news reached Alexandria of the birth of the Sultan's daughter, and of the dismissal of the Grand Vizier Hosrew Pasha, which had been previously expected, and its date pretty correctly predicted by Mehemet Ali.

The intelligence from Syria, which reached the various Representatives in Alexandria of Foreign Powers, was by no means distinct or conclusive: still it tended to the inference, that the revolt was less compact and formidable than at first imagined.

From the commencement, it was fully believed that the fate of Syria depended on the part which might be taken by the Emir Bechir, Prince of Mount Lebanon. He now appears to have declared wholly for the Pasha; and to insure his fidelity, I am assured that on some plausible pretext, the Emir has been surrounded by a guard of 800 Egyptians devoted to Ibrahim Pasha. These are with him in his palace of Bet-el-Dyn, near Deir-el-Ghamar. It appears, however, that the old Emir, with his son Emir Emin, who is a General of Division in the Viceroy's service, have been active in assembling those who still remain faithful to Mehemet Ali, and that they will exert their efforts in quelling the rising insurrection.

News has reached me that, on the outbreak of the present disturbances, the French Consul at Damascus wrote to the Emir Bechir, proposing to him that M. Cochelet, the French Consul-General at Alexandria, should be named to mediate between the Viceroy and the insurgents. The Emir commenced his reply by some compliments, and then went on nearly as follows:—"You greatly mistake the character of the disturbances which have taken place. They are originated by some abandoned characters of Deir-el-Ghamar, who have been joined by all sorts of vagabonds, who act without justice, without object, and without orders. My desire for peace accords entirely with the interest of the Egyptian Government. In conjunction with that Government, and by the aid of God, I hope soon to force the disorderly into subjection and to restore good order. I have advised all the honest population of the mountains not to meddle with these wicked people. I am grateful for your offer and thank you for it, as I find in it a proof of your friendship."

It is true that two of the sons of the Emir Bechir, the Emirs Casim and Halil, are understood to be hostile to the Egyptian authority; and it is said that the Emir Mahmoud, one of his grandsons, had even sent a message to the old Emir, to the effect, that should he dare to interfere with the present insurrection, he would slay him with his own hand.

If Mehemet Ali may be credited, who has asserted the facts to myself and to others of my Colleagues, the mountaineers have returned to their homes and occupations, and only a portion of rebels are in arms between Tripoli and Latakia.

But, probably, the safest documents from which conjectures may be derived of the more recent phases of the revolt are, first, the very politic letter already cited from the Emir Bechir to the French Consul in Damascus; and, secondly, a despatch of the 10th instant, from M. Gherkman, Austrian Consul at Beyrout, and obligingly communicated to me by M. de Laurin.

It would appear from this despatch, that his Excellency Solyman Pasha had marched from Saida against the inhabitants of Lebanon; but that the Emir Bechir had earnestly entreated him to forbear from pushing his troops into the mountains, and that the General had consented, with the proviso, that the insurgents should return to their villages and give up their arms.

The Emir Bechir is reported to have also addressed his Highness Ibrahim Pasha on the same subject, and the answer of the Generalissimo is quoted as follows:—"If your Excellency can become guarantee of tranquillity, I agree to your request, and a plenary pardon shall be granted. The peasants must disband. If they cannot, at present, pay their taxes, let them say when they will be in a condition to do so. They may keep their arms, if your Excellency thinks that they will not abuse the concession.

"If what I have proposed is sufficient to quell the revolt, you may tell Solyman Pasha to send back the troops to Acre; but if otherwise, let them march on Deir-el-Ghamar."

M. Gherkman adds, that it was hoped that these concessions would calm the Maronites for the moment; but that the Druses and Mutualis were still full of dissatisfaction.

It is at least certain, that the most prompt and energetic measures have been taken by the Egyptian Authorities to crush the present rising. What troops have been sent against the rebels I do not yet know precisely, further than that two regiments had left Acre for that purpose. Solyman Pasha seems to command the repressing division. It is certain that the Egyptians have such a military force in Syria, that they can, with the utmost facility, sweep any number of insurgents from the champaign countries. Whether they can advantageously push into the mountains is another question; but they can blockade those mountains, and starve their crowded population into submission. Lebanon produces little or no corn, and imports nearly all it consumes. The above measure of coercion was instantly adopted by Solyman Pasha, as your Lordship will perceive by his inclosed orders to the Governor of Beyrout, who, on the 1st instant, communicated them to the Foreign Consuls now in that town.

I remark that many persons who have travelled in Syria, and some consular officers residing there, express their suspicion that the actual revolt will have no other results or termination than those which attended previous attempts of the same nature. This, I presume, is also the opinion of the Viceroy, for he manifests neither irresolution, uncertainty, or anxiety.

My letters from our Consul at Damascus, assure me that the Catholic Greek patriarch, with his Bishops and Clergy, have been active in fomenting the revolt and promoting its objects.

I have given information of recent events to Admiral Sir John Louis, and I have suggested the possible expediency of sending one of Her Majesty's ships of war to the coast of Syria, for the protection of British subjects and property. On the latter subject, Mr. Consul Moore has also addressed the Admiral, from Beyrout.

Inclosure in No. 604.

Solyman Pasha to the Governor of Beyrout.

(Traduzione.)

GIACCHE gli abitanti della montagna dei Druzi generalmente, si sono sollevati in ribellione, vale adunque che alla ricezione diquesta mia notificazione, che pubblicherete avvertito a chi spetta, afin d'impedire l'esportazione per mare, alle scale di Giunié, Gibul e Battrun, ed egualmente per qualunque via per terra, al monte Libano generalmente, specialmente l'imbarco di granaglie ed altre provviste alle dette scale.

Se per trasgressione al presente Ordine si trovasse dei bastimenti, &c., diretti per quelli porti, è necessario immediatamente romperli e farli andar a fondo, senza il minimo esito. Che l'avviso vi serva.

Circular from the Governor of Beyrout to the Representatives of the European Powers, communicating the preceding Order.

1 *Rebi-akhir*, 1256. (1 *Giugno*, 1840.)

HO ricevuto il presente Ordine di sua Eccellencia il Maggior Generale Solyman Pascià, di cui avete copia acciochè prendiate la dovuta conoscenza, ed in conseguenza vi compiacerà d'avvertire, da parte vostra, i negozianti e capitani sotto la vostra giurisdizione per l'effetto.

(Firmato) MAHMUD BEY,
Governatore.

(Translation.)

Solyman Pasha to the Governor of Beyrout.

NOW that the inhabitants of the Mountain of the Druses generally are in rebellion, it is meet that on the receipt of this my letter, you should make a notification to those whom it may concern, to prohibit them from exporting by sea to the ports of Djounie, Gebel, and Batruon, as well as by land to Mount Lebanon; more particularly grain and other provisions to the same ports.

If, in violation of this order, any vessels shall be discovered bound to those ports, you should immediately sink them without hesitation. Let this be your warrant.

Circular from the Governor of Beyrout to the Representatives of the European Powers, communicating the preceding Order.

1st *Rebi-akhir*, 1256. (*June* 1, 1840.)

I HAVE received the present order of his Excellency Major-General Solyman Pasha, of which a copy is inclosed for your information, and in order that you may make the necessary communication to merchants and captains under your jurisdiction.

(Signed) MAHMOUD BEY,
Governor.

No. 605.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 5.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, June 17, 1840.*

I OBTAINED information on the 15th instant that a second naval division had received orders to victual for three months, and to make ready, with the utmost expedition, to proceed to the coast of Syria. It will be composed as follows:—

		Guns.	Men.
Ship of the Line, No. 8,	Beillan	80	1,000
Frigates	Nasratie	74	750
	Nusmatie	60	666
	Kaid Zafar	50	450
	Surie	50	547
	Mirat Zafar	44	562
	Naoun Bahari	50	500
	Hafiz Bahman	64	629
	Nezim Zafar	52	425
	Shehab Bahary	44	491
Corvette	Misiri Ferah	26	275

It is remarkable that all the above ships, except the first, belong to the Turkish squadron. The captains and superior officers will, however, be Egyptians, and the crews will be composed in equal numbers of Arabs and Turks.

The Turkish ships will be under the orders of Osman Bey, formerly fifth admiral (Riala Bey), and now promoted to the rank of fourth admiral (Patrona Bey). He is son of the second in command of the Turkish squadron, and, with his father and one other officer, is known to have induced the Capudan Pasha, Ahmed Fevzi, to betray his trust into the power of Mehemet Ali.

It is reported that the whole maritime force on the coast of Syria will consist of—

1	Ship of the Line,
15	Frigates,
3	Schooners,
1	Brig.

It has also been determined to place on board the ships now preparing, and probably for the defence of various points on the Syrian coast,—

2 Regiments of Turkish Marines	6,400	men.
2 Regiments of Egyptian Regular Infantry	6,400	„
	12,800	„

These troops will be thus distributed for transport. The Turks will sail in the "Beillan," as well as in three Egyptian frigates of the first division, which had not yet taken their departure; and the Egyptians will proceed on board the Turkish ships. The Turkish Marines will be under the orders of Hassan Bey, formerly a Colonel in the Sultan's fleet, and now raised to the rank of Brigadier-General.

His Highness Abbas Pasha, grandson of the Viceroy, is expected to arrive from Cairo to-morrow, and will embark in the "Beillan" on his way to Syria, where he is to occupy a high command. The character ascribed to Abbas Pasha is that of cruelty and unrelenting severity.

These accounts of the armament differ in some minute particulars from those indicated in my despatch of yesterday; but I presume that this discrepancy results from some alterations in the original dispositions.

The large naval force which the Pasha is despatching to Syria naturally excites attention, and awakens conjectures as to its objects.

It is obvious that ships can avail little in a war with mountaineers fighting from their fastnesses; and it is known that three Egyptian corvettes and three schooners of the fleet were already stationed at Beyrout. I do not either perceive that the Viceroy entertains any serious fears or doubts of being able to cope with the insurgents; but I am inclined to think that two motives may have induced the measures under my consideration, and presented them to the Pasha as necessary precautions.

1st. Possibly the information which the Viceroy has received, may have inspired in his mind a suspicion, that either the Sublime Porte or some of her Allies may seek to take advantage of his existing difficulties for attempting a descent on the Syrian coast.

2nd. Mehemet Ali is perhaps of opinion that his present warlike attitude and his display of force, as well as the show of being at all points prepared for defence, may be useful supports to the negotiations for an arrangement of the Egyptian Question which now occupy the thoughts of his Highness, and which constitute the main object of the recent mission of Sami Bey to Constantinople.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 606.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received July* 5.)

(Extract.) *Alexandria, June* 17, 1840.

HAVING yesterday morning received some information which led me to believe that Sami Bey, to whom and to whose intended voyage to Constantinople I alluded in my despatch, of the 17th instant, was about to be charged by his Highness the Viceroy with a most important mission to the Sublime Porte, I thought it expedient to verify what I had heard from the lips of Mehemet Ali himself.

Accompanied by M. de Laurin, Consul-General for Austria, I waited on the Pasha in the evening. I was welcomed in the name of his Highness, and received with marked distinction and cordiality.

The Viceroy informed me, that Sami Bey would next morning proceed to Constantinople by an express steam-packet; that he had charged his envoy with his congratulations to the Sultan on the birth of a daughter, and, in consequence of the same happy event, Sami Bey would be bearer of a complimentary present to His Imperial Majesty of 2,000 purses (£10,000).

Mehemet Ali added, that Sami Bey was besides charged to inform the Sultan, that the former Grand Vizier, Hosrew Pasha, having been dismissed from office, his Highness the Pasha was now prepared to abide by his former promises, and to restore the Turkish squadron, so soon as His Imperial Majesty should please to express his pleasure whether his fleet should be sent to him under command of the Viceroy's own son, Said Bey, or of the Pasha's Admiral, Mutish Pasha.

The French Consul-General had an audience of the Viceroy as early as 7 o'clock, A.M., of the 16th instant; but I have every reason to conclude that he had no participation whatever in the recent resolutions.

It is not for me to speculate on the above important declarations of his Highness Mehemet Ali; but I ought, perhaps, to state, that neither the opinion of those longest acquainted with him, nor my own observations of his character, induce in me a belief that the restitution of the Turkish fleet is likely to be entirely unconditional, or will be effected without something like a certainty of corresponding advantages. His Highness has probably already prepared the way for an arrangement with the Sublime Porte. No doubt Sami Bey, and the partisans of Mehemet Ali, will employ with skill the powerful engines of influence with which both the Pasha and his agents are thoroughly acquainted.

In the mean time, the Turkish fleet is not given up; and your Lordship will not fail to remark, by my other despatch of this day, the use to which his Highness is converting the ships and crews of that squadron.

No. 607.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received July* 5.)

(Extract.) *Alexandria, June* 19, 1840.

THE Egyptian steam-vessel, "Nile," returned to this port from Beyrout yesterday morning, and in the evening I again had the honour of waiting on the Viceroy.

His Highness informed me that his steamer had brought him news that the insurrection in Syria continued precisely in the same condition as when the former advices had left that country. He said that none remained in arms except the Maronites, and that he would very soon find means for bringing them to reason. He repeated again an assertion, that the Druses had offered to march against the rebels; but that, not feeling much confidence in such auxiliaries, he had declined their proposal.

I observed to Mehemet Ali, that the large naval armament he was sending to the coast of Syria must necessarily create astonishment in Europe, and possibly alarm; that ships could not avail much in a war of the mountains; and that I trusted he would see the expediency of informing me of his objects, since this measure was likely to be misinterpreted. The Pasha answered, that troops, whose presence was required in Syria, were about to be sent there, and that the naval force was merely destined for their transport. His Highness pledged his word, most solemnly, that so soon as the Syrian revolt should be quelled, the vessels sent to that coast should return to Alexandria.

The Viceroy continued, "Intriguers have been active in Syria. You and I shall have to speak of that hereafter. As to my business with the Porte, it will end quietly. All is on the eve of being settled."

I assured his Highness, that nothing would give me higher satisfaction than to see such a just and amicable arrangement made with the Porte, as might be consonant with the wishes and policy of the Great European Powers. At the same time, I remarked, that on this question I had not received any new instructions from Her Majesty's Government.

Mehemet Ali said, "It is neither from your Government nor from European Powers that I derive any assurance that my differences with the Porte are near their termination; it is from Constantinople.

"Abdul Medjid has expressed his desire to put an end to our dissensions; and as I seek nothing but justice, these dissensions will be settled with equity to me, and with benefit to the Sultan."

No. 608.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received July* 5.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, June* 19, 1840.

THE Russian Consul-General, Count Medem, has just related to me the circumstances of an interview he had this morning with his Highness Mehemet Ali, and they appear to me of sufficient interest to merit the attention of your Lordship.

In conversing on the mission of Sami Bey to Constantinople, Count Medem inquired whether that Envoy had full powers to conclude an arrangement with the Sublime Porte, without ulterior reference to his Highness. The Viceroy answered, that he had not; but that Sami Bey would report to him the fate of his propositions, and would await new instructions at Constantinople, unless the Sublime Porte should judge it expedient to send, itself, a Plenipotentiary to Alexandria.

Count Medem next put to the Viceroy the closest and most pressing queries, with the object of ascertaining whether his Highness purposed to restore the fleet unconditionally; and the Count even asked him, hypothetically, whether he would still maintain that intention in the event of Sami Bey failing in his negotiations?

The Pasha seemed piqued at these doubts, and said that, "on the word of Mehemet Ali," the Turkish fleet should be rendered to the Porte, whether Sami Bey succeeded in his mission or the reverse. He told Count Medem, that myself and others had put to him the same questions, though not so roughly, and that he had given all the same reply; that Hosrew Pasha having been removed from power, he (Mehemet Ali) was now prepared to abide by his former promises of giving up the Turkish squadron, provided the event alluded to should take place.

In talking of a settlement of the Egyptian Question, which the Pasha seemed to consider certain, he spoke of Egypt and Syria as one State indissolubly linked together under his dominion and that of his family. Adana, he thought, would probably be yielded to him for life, and so too Candia. But as regarded the latter, the Viceroy observed that it would not be the wish of either England or Turkey to take it from his hands. He declared that the Sublime Porte, in particular, well knows that such an event would soon be followed by the island acquiring an independence like that of Samos, or by its placing itself under the sceptre of Greece. As for Arabia, continued Mehemet Ali, they may do with it whatever they please. The Porte cannot govern it. It will be as before; Turkey will be perpetually soliciting my assistance and interference in that country, which of necessity must fall as much as ever under my authority.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 609.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 5.)

Alexandria, June 20, 1840.
12 o'clock, P.M.

My Lord,

BEFORE the closing of the mails, I have only a few moments in which to report briefly to your Lordship the latest information.

The ships of the naval force mentioned in my late despatches left this port during yesterday morning.

A letter of the 17th instant from Cairo, mentions the departure for the coast of 2,000 irregular Albanian troops, called down by a telegraphic order.

My latest Syrian news is from Jaffa, and is dated the 12th instant. It was then reported in that place, that the force under Solyman Pasha had returned to Saida, unable to approach the mountains. An export of grain from Jaffa was prohibited. The insurgents had seized the corn-mills near Saida and Beyrout, and had attacked the quarantine of the latter port.

The latest accounts from Arabia assert that the evacuation of that country by the troops of Mehemet Ali, had been countermanded by the Egyptian Government; that Kourschid Pasha was at Djidda, and Ahmed Pasha still between Mecca and Medina.

Inclosed is a species of manifesto widely circulated in St. Jean d'Acre, and other towns in that vicinity. It is understood that it proceeds from the Viceroy, although it is not invested with any official form. It seems well enough calculated for the limited intelligence of an uneducated population.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

Inclosure in No. 609.

Translation of a Manifesto or Proclamation circulated largely in St. Jean d'Acre and other cities of Syria. It has no signature, but is believed to be published by order of his Highness the Viceroy of Egypt.

The following are the preparations of Mehemet Ali for war.

THE fleets of the Sublime Porte and that of his Highness the Pasha, being united, amount to twenty-one line-of-battle ships, and nine large frigates. This being the Viceroy's force by sea may be compared with that of England, which consists of twelve or fourteen ships, unless indeed they shall hereafter add to that number. We shall also see what steps the French, in the meantime, will take.

Mehemet Ali states that he has no fear of being attacked at St. Jean d'Acre, while his fleet exists; for that no troops could force a landing on the coast so long as they shall not have a superior force in ships to protect their disembarkation. Necessity alone will decide between him and the above-mentioned Power.

This current report the Pasha circulates to the population. He adds, that he has no fear of the British forces, further stating that he respects the character of the English for their justice, but that they have no respect for him. Still he hopes that the world will make them respect him.

Ibrahim Pasha has troops enough to meet the Russians on the banks of the Euphrates. He possesses 50,000 men, besides having the addition of 25,000 men from the neighbourhood of the above river. Thus, if the Russians do meet him with an equal force, they cannot beat him. Even should they exceed that amount, he hopes to send them the same journey as he did formerly the Turkish troops.

In addition to all this, Mehemet Ali fully assures himself of the assistance of France, and he believes, that when Ibrahim Pasha and Solyman Pasha fight in company, they must always conquer.

In the mean time, he makes known to the population, that all the Mahommedan people will fight *en masse* for their religion. This has already been clearly known to the English, Russian, and Austrian Powers. Even supposing that the French will not assist the Pasha, he will also let them know that he is to be respected.

The Viceroy and his sons are determined to die as soldiers. They separate political from religious principles. The Pasha has already offered restitution to the Sublime Porte, proposing to return the Holy Cities and some parts of Syria. These terms were refused on the ground that all Syria would not be yielded.

No. 610.

Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

My Lords, *Foreign Office, July* 7, 1840.

WITH reference to the letter from your Lordships' Secretary of the 5th of July, inclosing a copy of a despatch from Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, dated the 26th of June, and stating the measures which he had adopted in consequence of the accounts which he had received of an insurrection having broken out in parts of Syria against the Egyptian authorities; I am to suggest to your Lordships, that Admiral Sir Robert Stopford should be cautioned so to shape the measures he may take for protecting British interests, as not thereby to give support to Mehemet Ali.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 611.

Chekib Effendi to Viscount Palmerston.

Le 7 *Juillet*, 1840.

LE Soussigné, Ambassadeur Extraordinaire et Plénipotentiaire de la Sublime Porte, vient d'apprendre que Méhémet Ali, Pacha d'Egypte, a annoncé l'intention de renvoyer à Constantinople la flotte de Sa Hautesse, dans le but d'ouvrir par cette offre la voie à des négociations directes avec le Divan.

Le Soussigné se fait en conséquence un devoir de communiquer à son Excellence Lord Palmerston le jugement qu'il porte sur cet incident.

Il a la ferme persuasion que Sa Hautesse le Sultan ayant reclamé et obtenu la promesse d'un appui efficace de la part des Grandes Puissances, persistera dans sa résolution d'attendre l'effet de l'assistance amicale des Cabinets amis, et n'entrera point en négociation directe avec le Pacha d'Egypte, tant que l'amitié des Grandes Puissances lui fait espérer une solution satisfaisante de la crise actuelle. Il est convaincu de plus, que les offres de Méhémet Ali, sans promettre aucun résultat positif, n'ont d'autre but que de compliquer la négociation, de traîner l'affaire en longueur, et de provoquer des retards qu'il se flatte de pouvoir tourner à son profit et au détriment de la Sublime Porte.

Dans cette persuasion, le Soussigné se fait un devoir d'adresser à Son Excellence Lord Palmerston la prière de ne différer d'aucune manière les délibérations actuellement ouvertes à Londres, et de n'attendre aucun résultat des propositions directement faites par Méhémet Ali. Loin de là, le Soussigné invite, avec une nouvelle instance, le Cabinet de Sa Majesté Britannique de hâter autant que possible les déterminations qui devront être prises afin d'en venir à un arrangement conforme à la sécurité de la Porte, comme à la dignité des Grandes Puissances qui ont promis leur appui à Sa Hautesse le Sultan.

Le moment actuel semble être décisif pour en venir à un arrangement satisfaisant. Méhémet Ali, sentant les embarras de sa position, cherche à en sortir de manière à transiger directement avec la Porte et à écarter par là l'intervention des Grandes Puissances. Celles-ci, étant sincèrement amies du Sultan, ne sauraient se laisser induire en erreur par cette politique perfide de Méhémet Ali. Au lieu de perdre un tems précieux en délibérations trop prolongées, elles doivent au contraire en venir promptement à une décision; convenir entre elles de concert avec le Représentant de Sa Hautesse, des conditions à imposer à Méhémet Ali; et concerter d'avance les moyens nécessaires pour obliger celui-ci à se soumettre à cet arrangement que les Puissances Amies auront reconnu comme juste et comme irrévocable.

Telle est la marche que le Soussigné se fait un devoir de signaler à la bienveillante attention du Cabinet de Sa Majesté Britannique comme la seule qui puisse conduire à un résultat prompt et utile. Chaque heure de retard menace la Sublime Porte d'un danger irréparable.

C'est dans cet état de choses que le Soussigné croit devoir faire un nouvel appel à l'amitié et à la sagesse du Cabinet de Sa Majesté Britannique, pour le conjurer de mettre immédiatement un terme à l'incertitude qui pèse sur l'Empire Ottoman, et dont il ne saurait plus longtems supporter le poids.

Le Cabinet de Sa Majesté Britannique, de concert avec les autres Puissances, a promis son appui et son assistance à Sa Hautesse le Sultan. C'est l'accomplissement de cette promesse que le Soussigné vient reclamer aujourd'hui avec une pleine confiance dans la loyauté et dans la prévoyance du Gouvernement Anglais, qui ne permettra point que Méhémet Ali, par des faux-fuyants et par de perfides efforts, parvienne à différer aujourd'hui la conclusion d'une affaire à laquelle tient le sort de l'Empire Ottoman.

Méhémet Ali, lorsqu'il saura que les Puissances, de concert avec la Porte, ont arrêté un plan de pacification, dans la ferme résolution de le mettre à exécution, ne tardera point à s'y soumettre, et l'affaire se terminera sans provoquer la moindre secousse. Mais tant que Méhémet Ali verra les Puissances irrésolues, il prolongera sa résistance, négociera dans l'intention de ne point conclure, et cherchera ainsi par ses sourdes menées, à ébranler l'Empire Ottoman d'une manière plus dangereuse encore que par la force des armes.

C'est sur ce perfide système de Méhémet Ali que le Soussigné se fait un devoir d'appeler l'attention la plus sérieuse du Cabinet de Sa Majesté Britannique, en reclamant instamment une décision immédiate et définitive.

Le Soussigné a l'honneur, &c.,
(Signé) CHEKIB.

(Translation.)

Chekib Effendi to Viscount Palmerston.

July 7, 1840.

THE Undersigned, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Sublime Porte, has just learnt that Mehemet Ali, Pasha of Egypt, has announced his intention to send back His Highness's fleet to Constantinople, with the view of opening the way by this step to direct negotiations with the Divan.

The Undersigned, consequently, considers it his duty to communicate to his Excellency Lord Palmerston, his opinion upon this event.

He is firmly persuaded that His Highness the Sultan having claimed and obtained the promise of efficient support from the Great Powers, will persist in his determination to await the result of the friendly aid of the Allied Cabinets, and will not enter into direct negotiation with the Pasha of Egypt, as long as the friendship of the Great Powers gives him the hope of a satisfactory solution of the present crisis. He is moreover convinced, that the overtures of Mehemet Ali, without giving hopes of any positive result, will only tend to complicate the negotiation, to protract the question, and to occasion delays which he flatters himself he can turn to his advantage and to the detriment of the Sublime Porte.

With this conviction, the Undersigned considers it his duty to request his Excellency Lord Palmerston, not to delay in any way the deliberations now entered upon in London, and not to expect any result from the proposals made direct by Mehemet Ali. Far from that, the Undersigned, with renewed earnestness, requests Her Britannic Majesty's Government to hasten as much as possible the resolutions which must be taken in order to come to an arrangement in accordance with the safety of the Porte, as well as with the dignity of the Great Powers who have promised their support to His Highness the Sultan.

The present moment appears to be the decisive one for coming to a satisfactory arrangement. Mehemet Ali, feeling the embarrassment of his position, seeks to relieve himself from it by treating directly with the Porte, and thereby averting the intervention of the Great Powers. These last, being sincere friends of the Sultan, cannot allow themselves to be led into error by this perfidious policy of Mehemet Ali. Instead of wasting precious time in too lengthened deliberations, they ought, on the contrary, to come quickly to a decision; to agree amongst themselves, in concert with the Representative of His Highness, upon the conditions to be imposed upon Mehemet Ali; and to settle beforehand the measures necessary for obliging the latter to submit to that arrangement which the Friendly Powers shall consider just and irrevocable.

Such is the course which the Undersigned thinks it his duty to point out to the kind attention of Her Britannic Majesty's Cabinet as the only one which can lead to a prompt and useful result. Every hour's delay threatens the Porte with irreparable danger.

In this state of things the Undersigned thinks it right to make a fresh appeal to the friendship and wisdom of Her Britannic Majesty's Cabinet, in order to entreat it immediately to put an end to the uncertainty which weighs upon the Ottoman Empire, and of which that Empire can no longer support the burthen.

Her Britannic Majesty's Cabinet, in concert with the other Powers, has promised its support and assistance to His Highness the Sultan. It is the fulfilment of this promise which the Undersigned now claims with full confidence in the good faith and foresight of the English Government, which will not permit Mehemet Ali, by subterfuge and treachery, to succeed in now delaying the conclusion of a question upon which the fate of the Ottoman Empire depends.

Mehemet Ali, when he shall know that the Powers, in concert with the Porte, have arranged a plan of pacification, with a firm determination to carry it into execution, will not delay to submit to it, and the question will be brought to a termination without causing the slightest shock.

But as long as Mehemet Ali shall perceive that the Powers are irresolute, he will prolong his resistance, will negotiate with the intention of coming to no conclusion, and will thus seek, by his underhand dealing, to shake the Ottoman Empire in a manner still more dangerous than by force of arms.

It is to this perfidious system of Mehemet Ali that the Undersigned considers it his duty to call the most serious attention of Her Britannic Majesty's Cabinet, while he earnestly entreats an immediate and definitive decision.

The Undersigned has the honour, &c.,
(Signed) CHEKIB.

No. 612.

Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Bulwer.

Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 10, 1840.

I TRANSMIT herewith for your information, a copy of a Note which I have received from Chekib Effendi, the Turkish Ambassador at this Court, relative to the differences between the Porte and Mehemet Ali.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 613.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 12.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, June* 23, 1840.

ALTHOUGH I presume you will have received Mr. Consul Moore's reports, I think it right to inclose one from him to me.

Inclosure in No. 613.

Mr. Consul Moore to Viscount Ponsonby.

(Extract.) *Beyrout, June* 10, 1840.

YESTERDAY a numerous meeting of Christians and Druses, at which several Sheiks attended, met near this town, and solemnly pledged themselves by oath to continue in arms until they had driven the Egyptians out of Syria. I had this information from a gentleman who was present.

This morning we have information of the arrival of the "Nile" Egyptian steamer at Sidon, bearing despatches for the Emir Bechir. The orders from Egypt are by all means to put a stop to the insurrection by concession and conciliation. It remains to be seen whether the insurgents will rest satisfied with any promises from the Viceroy, unless they are guaranteed by an European Power; and I think they will not. They have too often been deceived.

The ink of the Firman guaranteeing to the Christians of Lebanon their arms, was hardly dry, before they were called upon to deliver them up, and to furnish conscripts.

We have not above 1,000 troops in this town, and they dare not venture out. The insurgents have again attacked the Lazaretto, with a view of getting the arms which are there; and they meditate an assault on Beyrout also. They are full of ardour, and desire of all things the troops to come out. They are now about 5,000 strong in this neighbourhood.

The Franks who ride out in the environs are constantly importuned by them for powder and arms, which is their greatest want. Their hope is, that succour will be afforded them from Europe, or at least by the Porte.

June 11.—Last night the Emir Emin, the son of the Emir Bechir, attended a great council held at a church about an hour from Beyrout, at which many leading Emirs and Sheiks were present. His object was to submit to them the proposals of the Viceroy, brought by the "Nile"—a general pardon, retention of their arms, and exemption from the conscription—threatening them with extermination if they refused compliance.

The Emir Emin was hardly allowed to proceed in his address, which was received with the utmost disapprobation by the assembly; and the insurgents insisted on a guarantee on the part of England and France for their own conditions, as set forth in a memorial to the Emir Bechir. I have been able to obtain a copy of this document, which I have had hastily translated, and beg leave to inclose, together with another of a proclamation.

A French corvette is this moment arrived whilst I am writing.

I consider Egyptian influence at an end in Syria; and if arms and ammunition are supplied, the Pasha's troops will be driven out to a man or massacred.

There are, 11,000 stand of arms at Pleddin, the residence of the Emir Bechir, who is now in the most critical position. He has attempted to arm a party in favour of the Viceroy, but without success; and the insurgents menace an attack to get possession of these arms.

The Aleppo post, arrived to-day, was stopped by the insurgents; and we hear that the same spirit of revolt exists to the north generally. I do not see how Ibrahim Pasha can move his troops in this direction. The whole district of Damascus too, where much uneasiness prevails, is inadequately supplied with regulars and irregulars.

The insurgents are close to the town, and I hear their musketry.

No. 614.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received July* 12.)

My Lord, *Therapia, June* 23, 1840.

I INCLOSE for your Lordship a communication from a person at Alexandria, who is well acquainted with Mehemet Ali, and who writes what the Pasha wishes to have written.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 614.

Communication from Alexandria.

Alexandrie, le 16 *Juin,* 1840.

AUSSITOT que Son Altesse a su la destitution de Hosrew Pacha, seul personnage de qui elle avait à se méfier, elle a nolisé le bateau à vapeur Toscan, pour l'expédier *ad hoc* à Constantinople avec un Envoyé qui est Sami Bey, son Secrétaire intime, pour complimenter Sa Hautesse sur la naissance de sa fille et l'entrée du nouveau Ministre, et lui offrir ses hommages de soumission et de fidélité, ce que le Pacha n'a jamais cessé de faire, si des malveillans n'avaient mal interprété ses intentions loyales. Nos diplomates d'ici augurent bien de cette mission qui a aussi pour but de tenir tout ce qui appartient à la puissance Egyptienne au service du Sultan, Souverain légitime du Pacha,—de mettre à sa disposition les escadres, l'armée, les finances, ses enfans, et jusqu'à la personne même du Vice-Roi. Il est à espérer maintenant que la diplomatie de Constantinople agira de manière à conduire les affaires vers une prompte solution, en profitant de la volonté spontanée du Vice-Roi, et des bonnes dispositions des nouveaux Ministres Ottomans qui veulent en finir.

(Translation.)

Communication from Alexandria.

Alexandria, June 16, 1840.

AS soon as His Highness learnt the dismissal of Hosrew Pasha, the only person whom he had reason to distrust, he freighted the "Tuscan" steam-vessel to send her expressly to Constantinople with an Envoy, who is Sami Bey, his private Secretary, in order to compliment His Highness on the birth of his daughter, and the appointment of the new Minister, and to offer him his homage of submission and fidelity, which the Pasha has never ceased doing, if evil-disposed persons had not wrongly interpreted his sincere intentions. Our diplomatists here augur well of this mission, which has also for its object to place at the service of the Sultan, the lawful Sovereign of the Pasha, everything that appertains to the Egyptian Power,—to place at his disposal the squadron, the Army, the treasure, the children, and even the very person of the Viceroy. It is now to be hoped that the diplomacy of Constantinople will act so as to bring matters to a speedy solution, taking advantage of the spontaneous desire of the Viceroy, and of the good dispositions of the new Turkish Ministers who wish to have done with them.

No. 615.

CONVENTION

Conclue entre les Cours de la Grande Bretagne, d'Autriche, de Prusse, et de Russie, d'une part, et la Sublime Porte Ottomane, de l'autre, pour la Pacification du Levant; signée à Londres, le 15 *Juillet*, 1840.

Au nom de Dieu Très Miséricordieux.

SA Hautesse le Sultan ayant eu recours à Leurs Majestés La Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, l'Empereur d'Autriche, Roi de Hongrie et de Bohême, le Roi de Prusse, et l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, pour réclamer leur appui et leur assistance au milieu des difficultés dans lesquelles il se trouve placé par suite de la conduite hostile de Méhémet Ali, Pacha d'Egypte,—difficultés qui menacent de porter atteinte à l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman et à l'indépendance du Trône du Sultan; Leurs dites Majestés mûes par le sentiment d'amitié sincère qui subsiste entr'Elles et le Sultan; animées du désir de veiller au maintien de l'intégrité et de l'indépendance de l'Empire Ottoman, dans l'intérêt de l'affermissement de la Paix de l'Europe; fidèles à l'engagement qu'Elles ont contracté par la Note Collective remise à la Porte par Leurs Représentans à Constantinople, le 27 Juillet, 1839; et désirant de plus prévenir l'effusion de sang qu'occasionnerait la continuation des hostilités qui ont récemment éclaté en Syrie entre les Autorités du Pacha d'Egypte et les sujets de Sa Hautesse;

Leurs dites Majestés et Sa Hautesse le Sultan ont résolu, dans le but susdit, de conclure entr'Elles une Convention; et ont nommé à cet effet pour Leurs Plénipotentiaires, savoir:

Sa Majesté la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, le Très Honorable Henri Jean, Vicomte Palmerston, Baron Temple, Pair d'Irlande, Conseiller de Sa Majesté Britannique en Son Conseil Privé, Chevalier Grand Croix du Très Honorable Ordre du Bain, Membre du Parlement, et Son Principal Secrétaire d'Etat ayant le Département des Affaires Etrangères;

Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche, Roi de Hongrie et de Bohême, le Sieur Philippe, Baron de Neumann, Commandeur de l'Ordre de Léopold d'Autriche, décoré de la Croix pour le Mérite Civil, Commandeur des Ordres de la Tour et de l'Epée du Portugal, de la Croix du Sud du Brésil, Chevalier Grand Croix de l'Ordre de St. Stanislas de seconde classe de Russie, Son Conseiller Aulique, et Plénipotentiaire près Sa Majesté Britannique;

Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse, le Sieur Henri Guillaume, Baron de Bülow, Chevalier de l'Ordre de l'Aigle Rouge de première classe de Prusse, Grand Croix des Ordres de Léopold d'Autriche et des Guelphes de Hanovre, Chevalier Grand Croix de l'Ordre de St. Stanislas de seconde classe, et de St. Wladimir, de quatrième classe, de Russie, Commandeur de l'Ordre du Faucon de Saxe-Weimar, son Chambellan, Conseiller intime actuel, Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire près Sa Majesté Britannique;

Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Toutes les Russies, le Sieur Philippe, Baron de Brunnow, Chevalier de l'Ordre de Ste. Anne de première classe, de St. Stanislas de première classe, de St. Wladimir de troisième, Commandeur de l'Ordre de St. Etienne de Hongrie, Chevalier de l'Ordre de l'Aigle Rouge, et de St. Jean de Jérusalem, son Conseiller Privé, Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire près Sa Majesté Britannique;

Et Sa Majesté le Très Majestueux, Très Puissant et Très Magnifique Sultan, Abdul Medjid, Empereur des Ottomans, Chékib Effendi, décoré du Nichan Iftihar de première classe, Beylikdgi du Divan Impérial, Conseiller honoraire du Département des Affaires Etrangères, son Ambassadeur Extraordinaire près Sa Majesté Britannique:

Lesquels, s'étant réciproquement communiqué leurs Pleins-pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due forme, ont arrêté et signé les Articles suivans:—

ARTICLE I.

Sa Hautesse le Sultan s'étant entendu avec Leurs Majestés la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, l'Empereur d'Autriche, Roi de Hongrie et de Bohême, le Roi de Prusse, et l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, sur les conditions de l'arrangement qu'il est de l'intention de Sa Hautesse d'accorder à Méhémet Ali,—conditions lesquelles se trouvent spécifiées dans l'Acte Séparé ci-annexé,—Leur Majestés s'engagent à agir dans un parfait accord, et d'unir leurs efforts pour déterminer Méhémet Ali à se conformer à cet arrangement; chacune des Hautes Parties Contractantes se réservant de co-opérer à ce but selon les moyens d'action dont chacune d'elles peut disposer.

ARTICLE II.

Si le Pacha d'Egypte refusait d'adhérer au susdit arrangement qui lui sera communiqué par le Sultan avec le concours de leurs dites Majestés, celles-ci s'engagent à prendre, à la réquisition du Sultan, des mesures concertées et arrêtées entr'Elles, afin de mettre cet arrangement à exécution. Dans l'intervalle, le Sultan ayant invité Ses Alliés à se joindre à lui pour l'aider à interrompre la communication par mer entre l'Egypte et la Syrie, et à empêcher l'expédition de troupes, chevaux, armes, munitions, et approvisionnemens de guerre de tout genre d'une de ces provinces à l'autre; Leurs Majestés la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, et l'Empereur d'Autriche, Roi de Hongrie et de Bohême, s'engagent à donner immédiatement à cet effet les ordres nécessaires aux commandans de leurs forces navales dans la Méditerranée; Leurs dites Majestés promettent en outre, que les commandans de leurs Escadres, selon les moyens dont ils disposent, donneront au nom de l'Alliance tout l'appui et toute l'assistance en leur pouvoir à ceux des sujets du Sultan qui manifesteront leur fidélité et obéissance à leur Souverain.

ARTICLE III.

Si Méhémet Ali, après s'être refusé de se soumettre aux conditions de l'arrangement mentionné ci-dessus, dirigeait ses forces de terre ou de mer vers Constantinople, les Hautes Parties Contractantes, sur la réquisition expresse qui en serait faite par le Sultan à Leurs Représentans à Constantinople, sont convenues, le cas échéant, de se rendre à l'invitation de ce Souverain, et de pourvoir à la défense de son trône, au moyen d'une co-opération concertée en commun, dans le but de mettre les deux détroits du Bosphore et des Dardanelles, ainsi que la capitale de l'Empire Ottoman, à l'abri de toute agression.

Il est en outre convenu, que les forces qui, en vertu d'une pareille entente, recevront la destination indiquée ci-dessus, y resteront employées aussi longtems que leur présence sera requise par le Sultan, et lorsque Sa Hautesse jugera que leur présence aura cessé d'être nécessaire, les dites forces se retireront simultanément, et rentreront respectivement dans la Mer Noire et la Méditerranée.

ARTICLE IV.

Il est toutefois expressément entendu, que la co-opération mentionnée dans l'Article précédent, et destinée à placer temporairement les détroits des Dardanelles et du Bosphore et la Capitale Ottomane sous la sauvegarde des Hautes Parties Contractantes, contre toute agression de Méhémet Ali, ne sera considérée que comme une mesure exceptionnelle, adoptée à la demande expresse du Sultan, et uniquement pour sa défense dans le cas seul indiqué ci-dessus. Mais il est convenu que cette mesure ne dérogera en rien à l'ancienne règle de l'Empire Ottoman, en vertu de laquelle il a été de tout tems défendu aux bâtimens de guerre des Puissances Etrangères d'entrer dans les détroits des Dardanelles et du Bosphore. Et le Sultan, d'une part, déclare par le présent Acte, qu'à l'exception de l'éventualité ci-dessus mentionnée, il a la ferme résolution de maintenir à l'avenir ce principe invariablement établi comme ancienne règle de Son Empire, et tant que la Porte se trouve en paix, de n'admettre aucun bâtiment de guerre étranger dans les détroits du Bosphore et des Dardanelles; d'autre part, Leurs Majestés la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, l'Empereur d'Autriche, Roi de Hongrie et de Bohême, le Roi de Prusse, et l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, s'engagent à respecter cette détermination du Sultan, et à se conformer au principe ci-dessus énoncé.

ARTICLE V.

La présente Convention sera ratifiée, et les ratifications en seront échangées à Londres dans l'espace de deux mois, ou plus tôt si faire se peut.

En foi de quoi, les Plénipotentiaires respectifs l'ont signée, et y ont apposé les sceaux de leurs armes.

Fait à Londres, le quinze Juillet, l'an de grace mil huit cent quarante.

(L.S.) PALMERSTON. (L.S.) CHEKIB.
(L.S.) NEUMANN.
(L.S.) BULOW.
(L.S.) BRUNNOW.

(Translation.)

CONVENTION

Concluded between the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia on the one part, and the Sublime Ottoman Porte on the other, for the Pacification of the Levant, signed at London, July 15, 1840.

In the Name of the Most Merciful God.

HIS Highness the Sultan having addressed himself to their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of all the Russias, to ask their support and assistance in the difficulties in which he finds himself placed by reason of the hostile proceedings of Mehemet Ali, Pasha of Egypt,—difficulties which threaten with danger the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and the independence of the Sultan's throne,—Their said Majesties, moved by the sincere friendship which subsists between them and the Sultan; animated by the desire of maintaining the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire as a security for the peace of Europe; faithful to the engagement which they contracted by the Collective Note presented to the Porte by their Representatives at Constantinople, on the 27th of July, 1839; and desirous, moreover, to prevent the effusion of blood which would be occasioned by a continuance of the hostilities which have recently broken out in Syria between the authorities of the Pasha of Egypt and the subjects of the Sultan; Their said Majesties and His Highness the Sultan have resolved, for the aforesaid purposes, to conclude together a Convention, and they have therefore named as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and

Ireland, the Right Honourable Henry John Viscount Palmerston, Baron Temple, a Peer of Ireland, a Member of Her Britannick Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, a Member of Parliament, and Her Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs;

His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, the Sieur Philip, Baron de Neumann, Commander of the Order of Leopold of Austria, decorated with the Cross for Civil Merit, Commander of the Orders of the Tower and Sword of Portugal, of the Southern Cross of Brazil, Knight Grand Cross of the Order of St. Stanislaus of the Second Class of Russia, His Aulick Councillor, and His Plenipotentiary to Her Britannick Majesty;

His Majesty the King of Prussia, the Sieur Henry William, Baron de Bülow, Knight of the Order of the Red Eagle of the First Class of Prussia, Grand Cross of the Orders of Leopold of Austria, and of the Guelphs of Hanover, Knight Grand Cross of the Orders of St. Stanislaus of the Second Class, and of St, Wladimir of the Fourth Class of Russia, Commander of the Order of the Falcon of Saxe-Weimar, His Chamberlain, actual Privy Councillor, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Her Britannick Majesty;

His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, the Sieur Philip, Baron de Brunnow, Knight of the Order of St. Anne of the First Class, of St. Stanislaus of the First Class, of St. Wladimir of the Third, Commander of the Order of St. Stephen of Hungary, Knight of the Order of the Red Eagle, and of St. John of Jerusalem, His Privy Councillor, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Her Britannick Majesty

And His Majesty the Most Noble, Most Powerful, and Most Magnificent Sultan Abdul Medjid, Emperor of the Ottomans, Chekib Effendi, decorated with the Nichan Iftihar of the First Class, Beylikdgi of the Imperial Divan, Honorary Councillor of the Department for Foreign Affairs, His Ambassador Extraordinary to Her Britannick Majesty;

Who, having reciprocally communicated to each other their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon and signed the following Articles:—

ARTICLE I.

His Highness the Sultan having come to an agreement with their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of all the Russias, as to the conditions of the arrangement which it is the intention of His Highness to grant to Mehemet Ali, conditions which are specified in the Separate Act hereunto annexed; Their Majesties engage to act in perfect accord, and to unite their efforts in order to determine Mehemet Ali to conform to that arrangement; each of the High Contracting Parties reserving to itself to co-operate for that purpose, according to the means of action which each may have at its disposal.

ARTICLE II.

If the Pasha of Egypt should refuse to accept the above-mentioned arrangement, which will be communicated to him by the Sultan, with the concurrence of Their aforesaid Majesties; Their Majesties engage to take, at the request of the Sultan, measures concerted and settled between Them, in order to carry that arrangement into effect. In the meanwhile, the Sultan having requested his said Allies to unite with him in order to assist him to cut off the communication by sea between Egypt and Syria, and to prevent the transport of troops, horses, arms, and warlike stores of all kinds, from the one province to the other; Their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, engage to give immediately to that effect, the necessary orders to their naval Commanders in the Mediterranean. Their said Majesties further engage, that the naval Commanders of their squdrons shall, according to the means at their command, afford, in the name of the Alliance, all the support and assistance in their power to those subjects of the Sultan who may manifest their fidelity and allegiance to their Sovereign.

ARTICLE III.

If Mehemet Ali, after having refused to submit to the conditions of the arrangement above-mentioned, should direct his land or sea forces against Constantinople, the High Contracting Parties, upon the express demand of the Sultan, addressed to their Representatives at Constantinople, agree, in such case, to comply with the request of that Sovereign, and to provide for the defence of his throne by means of a co-operation agreed upon by mutual consent, for the purpose of placing the two Straits of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, as well as the Capital of the Ottoman Empire, in security against all aggression.

It is further agreed, that the forces which, in virtue of such concert may be sent as aforesaid, shall there remain so employed as long as their presence shall be required by the Sultan; and when His Highness shall deem their presence no longer necessary, the said forces shall simultaneously withdraw, and shall return to the Black Sea and to the Mediterranean, respectively.

ARTICLE IV.

It is, however, expressly understood, that the co-operation mentioned in the preceding Article, and destined to place the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus, and the Ottoman Capital, under the temporary safeguard of the High Contracting Parties against all aggression of Mehemet Ali, shall be considered only as a measure of exception adopted at the express demand of the Sultan, and solely for his defence in the single case above-mentioned; but it is agreed, that such measure shall not derogate in any degree from the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire, in virtue of which it has at all times been prohibited for ships of war of Foreign Powers to enter the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus. And the Sultan, on the one hand, hereby declares that, excepting the contingency above-mentioned, it is his firm resolution to maintain in future this principle invariably established as the ancient rule of his empire; and as long as the Porte is at peace, to admit no foreign ship of war into the Straits of the Bosphorus and of the Dardanelles; on the other hand, their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of all the Russias, engage to respect this determination of the Sultan, and to conform to the above-mentioned principle.

ARTICLE V.

The present Convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged at London at the expiration of two months, or sooner if possible.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the same, and have affixed thereto the seals of their arms.

Done at London, the fifteenth day of July, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and forty.

(L. S.) PALMERSTON. (L. S.) CHEKIB.
(L. S.) NEUMANN.
(L. S.) BULOW.
(L. S.) BRUNNOW.

No. 616.

ACTE SÉPARÉ

Annexé à la Convention conclue à Londres, le 15 *Juillet,* 1840, *entre les Cours de la Grande Bretagne, d'Autriche, de Prusse, et de Russie, d'une part, et la Sublime Porte Ottomane, de l'autre.*

SA Hautesse le Sultan a l'intention d'accorder et de faire notifier à Méhémet Ali les conditions de l'arrangement ci-dessous :—

§ 1.

Sa Hautesse promet d'accorder à Méhémet Ali, pour lui et pour ses descendans en ligne directe, l'administration du Pachalic de l'Egypte; et Sa Hautesse promet en outre d'accorder à Méhémet Ali, sa vie durant, avec le titre de Pacha d'Acre, et avec le commandement de la Forteresse de St. Jean d'Acre, l'administration de la partie méridionale de la Syrie, dont les limites seront déterminées par la ligne de démarcation suivante:

Cette ligne, partant du Cap Ras-el-Nakhora sur les côtes de la Méditerranée, s'étendra de là directement jusqu'à l'embouchure de la rivière Seisaban, extrémité septentrionale du Lac Tibérias; longera la côte occidentale du dit Lac; suivra la rive droite du fleuve Jourdain, et la côte occidentale de la Mer Morte; se prolongera de là en droiture jusqu'à la Mer Rouge, en aboutissant à la pointe septentrionale du Golfe d'Akaba ; et suivra de là la côte occidentale du Golfe d'Akaba et la côte orientale du Golfe de Suez jusqu'à Suez.

Toutefois, le Sultan, en fesant ces offres, y attache la condition que Méhémet Ali les accepte dans l'espace de dix jours après que la communication lui en aura été faite à Alexandrie par un Agent de Sa Hautesse; et qu'en même tems Méhémet Ali dépose entre les mains de cet Agent les instructions nécessaires aux Commandans de ses forces de terre et de mer, de se retirer immédiatement de l'Arabie et de toutes les Villes Saintes qui s'y trouvent situées; de l'Ile de Candie; du district d'Adana; et de toutes les autres parties de l'Empire Ottoman qui ne sont pas comprises dans les limites de l'Egypte et dans celles du Pachalic d'Acre, tel qu'il a été désigné ci-dessus.

§ 2.

Si dans le délai de dix jours fixé ci-dessus, Méhémet Ali n'acceptait point le susdit arrangement, le Sultan retirera alors l'offre de l'administration viagère du Pachalic d'Acre; mais Sa Hautesse consentira encore à accorder à Méhémet Ali, pour lui et pour ses descendans en ligne directe, l'administration du Pachalic d'Egypte, pourvu que cette offre soit acceptée dans l'espace de dix jours suivans, c'est-à-dire, dans un délai de vingt jours, à compter du jour où la communication lui aura été faite, et pourvu qu'il dépose également entre les mains de l'Agent du Sultan les instructions nécessaires pour ses Commandans de terre et de mer de se retirer immédiatement en dedans des limites, et dans les ports, du Pachalic de l'Egypte.

3.

Le tribut annuel à payer au Sultan par Méhémet Ali, sera proportionné au plus ou moins de territoire dont ce dernier obtiendra l'administration, selon qu'il accepte la première ou la seconde alternative.

§ 4.

Il est expressément entendu de plus, que dans la première comme dans la seconde alternative, Méhémet Ali (avant l'expiration du terme fixé de dix ou de vingt jours) sera tenu de remettre la flotte Turque, avec tous ses équipages et armemens, entre les mains du Préposé Turc qui sera chargé de la recevoir. Les Commandans des Escadres Alliées assisteront à cette remise.

Il est entendu que dans aucun cas Méhémet Ali ne pourra porter en compte, ni déduire du Tribut à payer au Sultan, les dépenses qu'il a faites pour l'entretien de la flotte Ottomane pendant tout le tems qu'elle sera restée dans les ports d'Egypte.

§ 5.

Tous les Traités, et toutes les lois de l'Empire Ottoman s'appliqueront à l'Egypte et au Pachalic d'Acre, tel qu'il a été désigné ci-dessus, comme à toute autre partie de l'Empire Ottoman. Mais le Sultan consent, qu'à condition du payement régulier du tribut susmentionné, Méhémet Ali et ses descendans perçoivent au nom du Sultan, et comme délégué de Sa Hautesse, dans les provinces dont l'administration leur sera confiée, les taxes et impôts légalement établis. Il est entendu en outre, que moyennant la perception des taxes et impôts susdits, Méhémet Ali et ses descendans pourvoieront à toutes les dépenses de l'administration civile et militaire des dites Provinces.

§ 6.

Les forces de terre et de mer que pourra entretenir le Pacha d'Egypte et d'Acre, fesant partie des forces de l'Empire Ottoman, seront toujours considérées comme entretenues pour le service de l'Etat.

§ 7.

Si à l'expiration du terme de vingt jours après la communication qui lui aura été faite, (ainsi qu'il a été dit plus haut, § 2,) Méhémet Ali n'adhère point à l'arrangement proposé, et n'accepte pas l'hérédité du Pachalic de l'Egypte, le Sultan se considérera comme libre de retirer cette offre, et de suivre, en conséquence, telle marche ultérieure que ses propres intérêts et les conseils de ses Alliés pourront lui suggérer.

§ 8.

Le présent Acte Séparé aura la même force et valeur que s'il était inséré mot à mot dans la Convention de ce jour. Il sera ratifié et les ratifications en seront échangées à Londres en même tems que celles de la dite Convention.

En foi de quoi, les Plénipotentiaires respectifs l'ont signé, et y ont apposé les sceaux de leurs armes.

Fait à Londres, le quinze Juillet, l'an de grace mil huit cent quarante.

(L.S.) NEUMANN. (L.S.) CKEKIB.
(L.S.) PALMERSTON.
(L.S.) BULOW.
(L.S.) BRUNNOW.

(Translation.)

SEPARATE ACT

Annexed to the Convention concluded at London on the 15*th of July*, 1840, *between the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, on the one part, and the Sublime Ottoman Porte, on the other.*

HIS Highness the Sultan intends to grant, and to cause to be notified to Mehemet Ali, the conditions of the arrangement hereinafter detailed :—

§ 1.

His Highness promises to grant to Mehemet Ali, for himself and for his descendants in the direct line, the administration of the Pashalic of Egypt; and His Highness promises, moreover, to grant to Mehemet Ali, for his life, with the title of Pasha of Acre, and with the command of the Fortress of St. John of Acre, the administration of the southern part of Syria, the limits of which shall be determined by the following line of demarkation :—

This line, beginning at Cape Ras-el-Nakhora, on the coast of the Mediterranean, shall extend direct from thence as far as the mouth of the river Seisaban, at the northern extremity of the Lake of Tiberias; it shall pass along the Western shore of that Lake, it shall follow the right bank of the river Jordan, and the western shore of the Dead Sea; from thence it shall extend straight to the Red Sea, which it shall strike at the northern point of the Gulf of Akaba, and from thence it shall follow the western shore of the Gulf of Akaba, and the eastern shore of the Gulf of Suez, as far as Suez.

The Sultan, however, in making these offers, attaches thereto the condition, that Mehemet Ali shall accept them within the space of ten days after communication thereof shall have been made to him at Alexandria, by an agent of His Highness; and that Mehemet Ali shall, at the same time, place in the hands of that agent the necessary instructions to the Commanders of his sea and land forces, to withdraw immediately from Arabia, and from all the Holy Cities which are therein situated; from the Island of Candia; from the district of Adana; and from all other parts of the Ottoman Empire which are not comprised within the limits of Egypt, and within those of the Pashalic of Acre, as above defined.

§ 2.

If within the space of ten days, fixed as above, Mehemet Ali should not accept the above-mentioned arrangement, the Sultan will then withdraw the offer of the life administration of the Pashalic of Acre; but His Highness will still consent to grant to Mehemet Ali, for himself and for his descendants in the direct line, the administration of the Pashalic of Egypt, provided such offer be accepted within the space of the ten days next following; that is to say, within a period of twenty days, to be reckoned from the day on which the communication shall have been made to him; and provided that in this case also, he places in the hands of the agent of the Sultan, the necessary instructions to his military and naval Commanders, to withdraw immediately within the limits, and into the ports of the Pashalic of Egypt.

§ 3.

The annual tribute to be paid to the Sultan by Mehemet Ali, shall be proportioned to the greater or less amount of territory of which the latter may obtain the administration, according as he accepts the first or the second alternative.

§ 4.

It is, moreover, expressly understood, that, in the first as in the second alternative, Mehemet Ali (before the expiration of the specified period of ten or of twenty days), shall be bound to deliver up the Turkish Fleet, with the whole of its crews and equipments, into the hands of the Turkish Agent who shall be charged to receive the same. The Commanders of the Allied Squadrons shall be present at such delivery.

It is understood, that in no case can Mehemet Ali carry to account, or deduct from the tribute to be paid to the Sultan, the expences which he has incurred in the maintenance of the Ottoman Fleet, during any part of the time it shall have remained in the ports of Egypt.

§ 5.

All the Treaties, and all the laws of the Ottoman Empire, shall be applicable to Egypt, and to the Pashalic of Acre, such as it has been above defined, in the same manner as to every other part of the Ottoman Empire. But the Sultan consents, that on condition of the regular payment of the tribute above-mentioned, Mehemet Ali and his descendants shall collect, in the name of the Sultan, and as the delegate of His Highness, within the provinces the administration of which shall be confided to them, the taxes and imposts legally established. It is moreover understood, that in consideration of the receipt of the aforesaid taxes and imposts, Mehemet Ali and his descendants shall defray all the expences of the civil and military administration of the said provinces.

§ 6.

The military and naval forces which may be maintained by the Pasha of Egypt and Acre, forming part of the forces of the Ottoman Empire, shall always be considered as maintained for the service of the State.

§ 7.

If, at the expiration of the period of twenty days after the communication shall have been made to him (according to the stipulation of § 2), Mehemet Ali shall not accede to the proposed arrangement, and shall not accept the hereditary Pashalic of Egypt, the Sultan will consider himself at liberty to withdraw that offer, and to follow, in consequence, such ulterior course as his own interests, and the counsels of his Allies may suggest to him.

§ 8.

The present Separate Act shall have the same force and validity, as if it were inserted, word for word, in the Convention of this date. It shall be ratified, and the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged at London at the same time as those of the said Convention.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the same, and have affixed thereto the seals of their arms.

Done at London, the fifteenth day of July, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and forty.

(L.S.) NEUMANN.
(L.S.) BULOW.
(L.S.) BRUNNOW.
(L.S.) PALMERSTON. (L.S.) CHEKIB.

No. 617.

PROTOCOLE signé à Londres, le 15 *Juillet*, 1840, *par les Plénipotentiaires*

d'Autriche;
de la Grande Bretagne;
de Prusse;
de Russie; et
de la Porte Ottomane.

EN apposant sa signature à la Convention de ce jour, le Plénipotentiaire de la Sublime Porte Ottomane a déclaré:

Qu'en constatant par l'Article IV. de la dite Convention, l'ancienne règle de l'Empire Ottoman, en vertu de laquelle il a été défendu de tout tems aux bâtimens de guerre étrangers d'entrer dans les détroits des Dardanelles et du Bosphore, la Sublime Porte se réserve comme par le passé de délivrer des Firmans de passage aux bâtimens légers sous pavillon de guerre, lesquels sont employés, selon l'usage, au service de la correspondance des Légations des Puissances amies.

Les Plénipotentiaires des Cours d'Autriche, de la Grande Bretagne, de Prusse, et de Russie, ont pris acte de la présente Déclaration pour la porter à la connaissance de leurs Cours.

(Signé) NEUMANN.
PALMERSTON.
BULOW.
BRUNNOW.
CKEKIB.

(Translation.)

PROTOCOL signed at London, on the 15*th of July*, 1840, *by the Plenipotentiaries of*

Great Britain;
Austria;
Prussia;
Russia; and
Turkey.

IN affixing his signature to the Convention of this date, the Plenipotentiary of the Sublime Ottoman Porte declared:

That in recording by Article IV. of the said Convention the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire, by virtue of which, it has been at all times forbidden to Foreign Vessels of War to enter within the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus, the Sublime Porte reserves to itself, as heretofore, to deliver passes to light vessels under Flag of War, which may be employed according to custom, for the service of the correspondence of the Legations of Friendly Powers.

The Plenipotentiaries of the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, took note of the above Declaration, for the purpose of communicating it to their respective Courts.

(Signed) PALMERSTON.
NEUMANN.
BULOW.
BRUNNOW.
CHEKIB.

No. 618.

PROTOCOLE réservé, signé à Londres, le 15 *Juillet*, 1840, *par les Plénipotentiaires*

d'Autriche;
de la Grande Bretagne;
de Prusse;
de Russie; et
de la Porte Ottomane.

LES Plénipotentiaires des Cours d'Autriche, de la Grande Bretagne, de Prusse, de Russie, et de la Sublime Porte Ottomane, ayant, en vertu de leurs Pleins-pouvoirs, conclu et signé en ce jour une Convention entre leurs Souverains respectifs pour la pacification du Levant;

Considérant que, vû la distance qui sépare les Capitales de leurs Cours respectifs, un certain espace de tems devra s'écouler nécessairement avant que l'échange des Ratifications de la dite Convention puisse s'effectuer, et que les ordres fondés sur cet Acte puissent être mis à exécution;

Et les dits Plénipotentiaires étant profondement pénétrés de la conviction, que vû l'état actuel des choses en Syrie, des intérêts d'humanité aussi bien que les graves considérations de politique Européenne qui constituent l'objet de la sollicitude commune des Puissances signataires de la Convention de ce jour, réclament impérieusement d'éviter, autant que possible, tout retard dans l'accomplissement de la pacification que la dite transaction est destinée à atteindre;

Les dits Plénipotentiaires, en vertu de leurs Pleins-pouvoirs, sont convenus entr'eux que les mesures préliminaires mentionnées à l'Article II. de la dite Convention, seront mises à exécution tout de suite, sans attendre l'échange des ratifications; les Plénipotentiaires respectifs constatent formellement par le présent Acte l'assentiment de leurs Cours à l'exécution immédiate de ces mesures.

Il est convenu, en outre, entre les dits Plénipotentiaires, que Sa Hautesse le Sultan procédera de suite à adresser à Méhémet Ali la communication et les offres spécifiées dans l'Acte Séparé, annexé à la Convention de ce jour.

Il est convenu de plus, que les Agens Consulaires de l'Autriche, de la Grande Bretagne, de Prusse, et de Russie, à Alexandrie, se mettront en rapport avec l'Agent que Sa Hautesse le Sultan y enverra, pour adresser à Méhémet Ali la communication et les offres susmentionnées; que les dits Consuls prêteront à cet Agent toute l'assistance et tout l'appui en leur pouvoir; et qu'ils employeront tous leurs moyens d'influence auprès de Méhémet Ali, à l'effet de le déterminer à accepter l'arrangement qui lui sera proposé d'ordre de Sa Hautesse le Sultan.

Les Amiraux des Escadres respectives dans la Méditerranée, recevront les instructions nécessaires pour se mettre en communication à ce sujet avec les dits Consuls.

(Signé) NEUMANN.
PALMERSTON.
BULOW.
BRUNNOW.
CHEKIB.

(Translation.)

RESERVED PROTOCOL signed at London on the 15th of July, 1840,

by the Plenipotentiaries of

Great Britain;
Austria;
Prussia;
Russia; and
Turkey.

THE Plenipotentiaries of the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Turkey, having, in virtue, of their full powers, concluded and signed this day a Convention between their respective Sovereigns, for the pacification of the Levant;

Considering that, in consequence of the distances which separate the Capitals of their respective Courts, a certain space of time must necessarily elapse before the ratifications of the said Convention can be exchanged, and before orders founded thereupon can be carried into execution;

And the said Plenipotentiaries being deeply impressed with the conviction, that by reason of the present state of things in Syria, the interests of humanity, as well as the grave considerations of European policy which constitute the object of the common solicitude of the Contracting Parties to the Convention of this day, imperiously require that, as far as possible, all delay should be avoided in the accomplishment of the pacification which the said Convention is intended to effect;

The said Plenipotentiaries, in virtue of their full powers, have agreed, that the preliminary measures mentioned in Article II. of the said Convention, shall be carried into execution at once, without waiting for the exchange of the ratifications; the respective Plenipotentiaries recording formally, by the present Instrument, the consent of their Courts to the immediate execution of these measures.

It is moreover agreed between the said Plenipotentiaries, that His Highness the Sultan will proceed immediately to address to Mehemet Ali, the communication and offers specified in the Separate Act annexed to the Convention of this day.

It is further agreed, that the Consular Agents of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, at Alexandria, shall place themselves in communication with the Agent whom His Highness may send thither to communicate to Mehemet Ali the above-mentioned offers; that the said Consuls shall afford to that Agent all the assistance and support in their power; and shall use all their means of influence wilh Mehemet Ali, in order to persuade him to accept the arrangement which will be proposed to him by order of His Highness the Sultan.

The Admirals of the respective squadrons in the Mediterrnean shall be instructed to place themselves in communication with the said Consuls on this subject.

(Signed) PALMERSTON.
NEUMANN.
BULOW.
BRUNNOW.
CHEKIB.

No. 619.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, July* 15, 1840.

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency copies of a Convention for the Pacification of the Levant, and of a Separate Act thereunto annexed, and of two Protocols, which have been this day signed by the Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and the Porte; and I have to instruct your Excellency, immediately to communicate these documents to the Ministers of the Porte.

Your Excellency will further urge the Turkish Ministers to cause to be prepared and sent to London, with the least possible delay, the Sultan's ratification of the Convention and of the Separate Act.

I have likewise to instruct your Excellency, when the Sultan sends to Alexandria the Envoy mentioned in the first paragraph of the Separate Act, to send with that Envoy some person belonging to your Embassy, to convey to Colonel Hodges any communication or information which your Excellency may think useful to send to him, with reference to the proposals to be made to Mehemet Ali.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 620.

Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, July* 15, 1840.

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency copies of a Convention for the Pacification of the Levant, and of a Separate Act thereunto annexed, and of two Protocols, which have been this day signed by the Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and the Porte; and I have to instruct your Excellency immediately to communicate these documents to the Austrian Government.

Your Excellency will further urge the Austrian Government to cause to be prepared and sent to London, with the least possible delay, the Emperor's ratification of the Convention and Separate Act.

I have likewise to inform your Excellency, that instructions have been sent to Viscount Ponsonby, to despatch, with the person who may be sent by the Sultan to Alexandria, some gentleman belonging to his Lordship's Embassy, in order to convey to Colonel Hodges any communication or information which Lord Ponsonby may think useful to send to him with reference to the proposals to be made to Mehemet Ali.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 621.

Baron Brunnow to Viscount Palmerston.

My Lord, *Londres, le* $\frac{3}{15}$ *Juillet*, 1840.

L'ARTICLE III. de la Convention que nous venons de signer prévoit une éventualité, et annonce, le cas échéant, une co-opération concertée en commun entre nos Cours.

Pour réaliser cette intention de manière à éviter les retards que la distance des lieux pourrait faire naître, j'ai l'honneur de vous inviter, my Lord, à vouloir bien me mettre à même d'informer le Cabinet Impérial de l'étendue des secours que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique serait dans le cas de placer à la disposition de Sa Hautesse le Sultan pour accomplir l'objet que les Cours Signataires de la Convention de ce jour ont en vue d'atteindre, dans l'intérêt commun de la conservation de l'Empire Ottoman.

Veuillez agréer, &c.,
(Signé) **BRUNNOW.**

(Translation.)

Baron Brunnow to Viscount Palmerston.

My Lord, *London, July* $\frac{3}{15}$, 1840.

THE Third Article of the Convention which we have just signed, anticipates a contingency, and announces, in that case, a co-operation concerted in common between our Courts.

To carry this intention into effect, in such a manner as to avoid the delays which distance from the spot might occasion, I have the honour to request you, my Lord, to have the goodness to enable me to apprize the Imperial Cabinet of the extent of the succour which Her Britannic Majesty's Government would have it in its power to place at the disposal of His Highness the Sultan, for the accomplishment of the object which the Courts, who have signed the Convention of this day, aim at obtaining, in the common interest of the preservation of the Ottoman Empire.

Receive, &c.,
(Signed) **BRUNNOW.**

No. 622.

Viscount Palmerston to Baron Brunnow.

M. le Baron, *Foreign Office, July* 15, 1840.

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of this day's date, and entirely agree with you that, in the present state of things, and considering the distances which separate our respective Courts from the places where the measures mentioned in Article III. of the Convention of this day would be carried into effect, it is desirable that we should at once come to an understanding as to the co-operation stipulated for in that Article.

Recent events in Syria have indeed rendered it less likely than ever that Ibrahim should venture to march upon Constantinople, but, nevertheless, we ought to be prepared for such a contingency.

There can be no doubt that if such a case were to arise, the Russian Government would be able, from its disposable means in the Black Sea, to send to the Straits of the Bosphorus a sufficient succour either of land or of naval forces, according to the nature of the case, for the defence of the Sultan; and it is not therefore for the purpose of completing a force which would otherwise be deficient, that the British contingent would be sent.

But it has been wisely judged by all the parties to the Convention which we have this day signed, that we should best promote the great objects of European policy which we all have in view, by so arranging the execution of every part of our measures, that we should in every step of our progress give manifest and indisputable proofs of our union and mutual confidence; and in this view of the matter it becomes of great importance, that a British force should co-operate with the Russian force in the contingency provided for by the Third Article of the Convention.

But the amount of naval force which we could spare for such a purpose, must necessarily be limited by a consideration of the aggregate amount of our squadron in the Mediterranean, and of the other services which that squadron will have to perform; and I had occasion to make known to your Court, by a despatch which I addressed to Lord Clanricarde in October last, that, in such a case, we should be able to send but a small number of ships to the Dardanelles and Sea of Marmora.

I have now communicated upon this matter with Lord Minto, and I have to state, that our Mediterranean squadron consists of the ships mentioned in the accompanying list; and considering the various duties which that squadron will have to perform, according to the arrangements agreed upon between the Four Powers and the Sultan, we could not conveniently undertake to detach more than three or four ships of the line, with a proportion of frigates and steamers, to co-operate with the Russian ships, in the event of the Sultan requiring the aid of the naval forces of the Two Powers for the defence of his Capital.

But the Admiral commanding our squadron in the Mediterranean will be ordered to hold the above-mentioned force ready to sail to the Dardanelles, under some steady and competent officer, the moment the Admiral shall receive from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, an intimation that the Sultan has applied for such assistance.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

Inclosure in No. 622.

List of Ships composing the Mediterranean Squadron.

Princess Charlotte	104	guns,	Captain Fanshawe.
Asia	84	,,	Captain Fisher.
Ganges	84	,,	Captain Reynolds.
Powerful	84	,,	Captain Napier.
Thunderer	84	,,	Captain Berkeley.
Bellerophon	80	,,	Captain Austin.
Implacable	74	,,	Captain Harvey.
Hastings	72	,,	Captain Laurence.
Benbow	72	,,	Captain Stewart.
Edinburgh	72	,,	Captain Henderson.
Belleisle	72	,,	Captain Nicolas.
Revenge	72	,,	Capt. Hon. W. Waldegrave.
Castor	36	,,	Captain Collier.
Dido	18	,,	Captain Davies.
Carysfort	26	,,	Captain Martin.
Talbot	26	,,	Captain Codrington.
Tyne	26	,,	Captain Townshend.
Daphne	26	,,	Captain Dalling.
Magicienne	24	,,	Captain Michell.
Hazard	18	,,	Commander Wilkinson.
Wasp	16	,,	Commander Mansel.
Jaseur	16	,,	Commander Boultbee.
Zebra	16	,,	Commander Stopford.
Scorpion	10	,,	Lieutenant Gayton.
Weazle	10	,,	Lieutenant Simpson.

Steam-Vessels.

Gorgon	6	guns,	Captain Henderson.
Cyclops	6	,,	Captain H. T. Austin.
Rhadamanthus	4	,,	Commander Wakefield.
Hydra	4	,,	Commander Robinson.
Phœnix	4	,,	Commander F. Stopford.
Confiance	2	,,	Lieutenant E. Stopford.